Power is a contentious term within the realm of social science.

The study of the which has led to wildly differing accounts, capable of causing great confusion to the uninitiated reader. As Rush (1992:43) asserts, "[M]uch has been written about power as a concept, but there is no generally agreed definition and it remains a subject of much dispute". In a certain sense, one might be tempted to approach power in a manner akin to how political philosophy approaches concepts such as justice (Wrong, ) , however, such an approach would appear problematic for the strictures of this particular work. The brief of this paper tacitly encourages an attempt at universalising the term so that its myriad uses can be accommodated within one overarching definition. Such appeals will be resisted. Instead, it will be shown that such an attempt would likely prove futile, or result in ambiguity devoid of any utility to the study of political sociology. As an alternative, power will be addressed as is proper to its use; as a term which defies concise definition due to the epistemological limitations of language. Rather than falling into the trap of conclusively attributing an ontological status to the term 'power', a proposal to consider power as referring to a series of distinct language games, inspired by the 'later' thought of Ludwig Wittgenstein will be employed. Whilst this might lead one to suspect such a nebulous term as 'power' to be of little value to social research, it is hoped this paper will demonstrate that power can in fact be of conceptual utility to the social sciences. This however, will be executed with the caveat that to understand power is to understand the context to which it is applied. The paper will first explore early theoretical excursions into power in the form of community power studies - itself belonging to the Enlightenment tradition of substance ontology - and the positivistic hubris that arises from a misplaced dogmatic adherence to applying empiricist doctrines in an area ill-suited to their use. Then, other, more nuanced and compelling accounts will be considered, using the faces of power debate as its point of departure, in order to provide a viewpoint of how power might better be considered. Finally, a tentative account of what is argued to be a most appealing account of power will be offered, with the qualifier that this is best considered a preference based upon a set of requirements which it is argued, ought be of importance to readers and practitioners of social theory.

The term power has been described in numerous ways, for varying purposes. Whilst there is disagreement, one common shared feature in power studies, is a recognition of its importance; Hudson and Lowe inform us that "power is the core concept and epistemological identity of political science" (Hudson and Lowe: 113 ), whilst Ball suggests that power is arguably the single most important organising concept in social and political theory' (quoted in Hay, 2002 pp 168). Another example emphasising the primacy of power in social science can be seen in Russell's declaration that [T]he fundamental concept in social science is Power, in the same sense in which Energy is the fundamental concept in physics (quoted in Hudson and Lowe 113). Despite an ostensible consensus on the importance of power to social science, Ball (1991::14) describes the 'scandal' of social science - "that it has so far failed to arrive at a satisfactory understanding of power." Before an excursion into different conceptions of power, it is worth reiterating the elasticity and lack of consensus that the term has acquired: Power has always been one of those words that everybody uses without necessarily being able to define satisfactorily. It is treated as both a quality or attribute possessed by individuals, groups, or larger social structures and as an indicator of an active or interactive process or relation between individual or collective actors Wrong, viii The above passage can be expanded by highlighting some key terms which appear time and again within the literature on power, denoting "generalised perceptions of power which seem to dominate" (Haugaard, 2002:4), such as 'power over' and 'power to', conflictual and consensual

power and lastly, power as constitutive of social reality (Ibid). Our initial concern, will be with the first pair of terms. The most general concept of power - power to, or, "the ability to achieve a desired outcome" (Heywood :123) appears to have found its way into social science from a wider conception of power; seen in the natural sciences, as a monadic capacity, or subject object relationship - observed in such banalities as kicking a football, or buying a newspaper. From this standpoint, power would be seen as a the ready-to-handedness of an object relative to an agent akin to Heidegger's description of technological enframing for Being-in-the-world (see below) (Heidegger, question concerning technology). However, this view appears overly limiting; whilst one might initially imagine the example of a master possessing such power over slaves, we must bear in mind Hegel's slave/master dialectic - the power relationship existing between these agents is better considered dyadic - a two way relationship whereby "the master depends on the slave and the slave on the master" (Jessop, 2009:8). This rejection of the 'power to' conception leads us to a more commonly held analytic of power, seen as a dyadic relation - the exercise of control by agent A over B (Ibid.; Heywood, 123; Haugaard, 2002:4). Hindess ( _:2) explains that both of these conceptions fall under the rubric of power seen as 'simple capacity'; that power is an empirical, quantitative phenomenon which argued later owes a debt to Enlightenment scholars such as Hobbes (Hindess, 1996:23) and the sentiments of a substance ontology seen in writers such as Descartes (McNay). It is a resource which agents utilise "in their dealings with things and in their dealings with each other" (Hindess???, 1996:2). In this view, the implication is, when in agential conflict, those with more power will hold power over those with less - one could imagine it as a simple matter of aggregating 'units' of power, with those in possession of more, to overcome resistance from those in possession of less. Hindess argues this logic underpins Weber's associating power with "the chance of a man or a number of men to realise their own will against the resistance of others who are participating in the action". It follows from this conception of power that this scarce resource (who said that?? It was from MST in the section on structuralists) distributed unequally, leads to an unbalanced relationship "between those who employ power for their own purposes and those who are subject to it effects" (2). It is in this view, that power "may be used as a instrument of domination" (2)

For many commentators, this is the essential meaning of power, arguing that apparent competing understandings "should properly be seen as more or less acceptable variations of this one" (HIndesss???, 1996:2). The most prominent exponent of this view can be seen in Lukes' Power a Radical View. Lukes' holds that while views of power "are essentially contested" (quoted in Hindess, 1996:2) by various investigators maintaining contending social values, "the alternative 'views' of power which those values entail may nevertheless be reduced to the one underlying concept: that of power in the sense of simple quantitative capacity." (2) Such a call to generalization carries an appeal for this brief, as it provides a ready-made solution to the remit of this investigation. But the question of power cannot be taken uncritically as Lukes contends, so we will now outline the debate that this view emerges from. Lukes' book in an 'extended commentary' of the American debates of power in the 1960s and 1970s. These debates were between the elite theorists and pluralist theorists, to which Lukes' own contribution should be viewed as an intervention, not to dismiss these contending views, or 'faces', but rather , augment them within a three-dimensional theoretical framework.

First face The 'first face' of this debate, represented here by Robert Dahl, centres upon the Weberian view of power (Haugaard, 2002:10) -'power over' - conception as outlined above, attributable to individuals and is behavioural (Hay, 173); predicated upon the relational dyad, making it a 'zero sum' phenomenon - it does not exist independently of parties A and B, but is a product shared by the relation (Ibid.; Hindess, 1996:33). Dahl sought to discern "who in reality wields actual power" (Dahl, quoted in Hay __ :173) and sought to achieve this by deciphering levels of influence. Identifying Influence - considered semantically equivalent to power - was therefore, methodologically achieved through analysing the decision-making process in local government (Haugaard, HAy, Hindess). His method was to select key "issue areas" (Lukes, 2005: 18) judged (by himself) to be important enough to reveal any potential concentration of influence indicative of a power cabal elite scholars such as Mills asserted exist (cite). The pluralist methodology of Dahl, Polsby et al "studied actual behaviour, stressed operational definitions, and turned up evidence. Most important, it seemed to produce reliable conclusions which met the canons of science" (Merelman, quoted in Lukes, 2004:17). As an aside, while there are undoubtedly merits in the application of scientific methodology, as we shall see later, it is not necessarily as objective and neutral in the manner it is frequently taken to be. The findings of Pluralists such as Dahl - perhaps unsurprisingly when considering his 'liberal' inclinations and hailing from such a bastion of the status quo as Yale University (Lukes 2004:12) - Dahl's New Haven political study revealed to him that while falling short of political equality, America was essentially a society of popular sovereignty - 'where the people rule' - leading him to conclude it "is a republic of unequal citizens - but for all that a republic" (Dahl, quoted in Hindess, 1996:3-4). Second Face While pluralist studies of power conclude there to be a plurality of competing power blocs, of which none were found to attain the status of hegemon within the decision-making arena, leading Lukes (2004:15) to characterise the approach "one-dimensional". In limiting themselves to the narrow confines of the forum where decisions were taken to be made, following the liberal principle of the public domain being the arena where decisions were made (Lukes, The first two faces emphasise the observable conflicts between social actors, underlying a behaviourist and individualist ontology, and an empiricist epistemology (Benton 163) Third face Foucault Conclusion As stated above, this aporia has led to the conclusion for this brief - and in contrast to Lukes' belief that contestations over the definition of power can be rehabilitated under one meta-definition - that power is 'essentially contested' because it has no essential characteristics; it might be best described as a floating signifier. In attempting to make greater sense of this conceptual miasma, we will briefly

observe the seminal work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, whose theory of language games provides a useful escape from the appeals to generalization of the term power, and therefore, is an effective means to resist the coercive power that can be witnessed in the phrasing of the title's brief. Asking 'who holds power?' is leading, in that it presupposes an ontological certainty to a substance signified by the term power. Similarly, asking 'what is power?'; towards a declaration that power is something and not something else.

Wittgenstein - Language games George Eliot once wrote "For we all of us, grave or light. . . get our thoughts tangled up in metaphors, and act fatally on the strength of them" (quoted in Ball, 1991:15). Eliot here, appears to have identified in a general sense, the issue stipulated here as the fundamental cause of disagreement between acolytes of varying conceptions of power. In this sense, it provides a useful 'way in' to an explication of Wittgenstein's (1986) view of language, as expounded in Philosophical Investigations. For Wittgenstein - at least, 'later' Wittgenstein the problems of language associated with precise use are an intrinsic feature of the nature of thought itself; the lack of logical rules being tied up in the manner which thought is shaped and shapes our use of language. For instance, when one speaks of 'utopia' it conjures up mental ciphers related to notions of some idyllic social configuration devoid of the inhumanities common to all societies. However, this is not because of some ontological character of the term itself, and can be proved by a cursory etymological glance at its history. Originating in Greek, denoting "no place" (Skeat, 2007 pp. 560), Thomas Moore's classic of the same name, detailed an imaginary island enjoying a perfect arrangement of legal, social and political systems. Its literary success, however, has contributed to the term acquiring a wholly new and antonymic understanding. For instance, consulting any dictionary will carry a definition such as: "an imagined perfect place or state of things" (Trumble et al, 2004 pp. 1082). What this example demonstrates is the lack of an essence to the term utopia; the concept of language games advocates this position - therefore we cannot assign a reality to the term, because it is ascribed through protean social interactions, subject to change with the continual elaboration of the culture of language. Language games denote localised sets of meanings which operate as a contingent index, allowing a functionality of particularized utility within a specific activity. As we have already noted, discourses of power have differing - and often contradictory conceptions of the term; these varying discourses can be described as varying local language games, each specific to their own criterion and not reducible to each other. In this sense, we can understand the term power within Wittgensteinian parlance as a 'family resemblance' concept (Wittgenstein, :32; Haugaard 2002:3). For instance, Lukes (CITE) - who we shall discuss later - sought to demonstrate that all conceptions of power in fact, are accommodated by his generlalized notion of power, however, such attempts are exactly what Wittgenstein sought to distance himself from - "[but] if someone wished to say: 'There is something common to all these constructions - namely the disjunction of all their common properties' - I should reply: Now you are only playing with words." (Wittgenstein :32) The term power is consequently

nebulous, with myriad meanings, often ostensibly unrelated to one another, frequently irreconcilably; [T]here will never be a single concept of either political or social power because each usage takes place within local, tacit or explicit, theoretical systems. Any such theory which we construct (or take for granted) is almost like a sub-language within the greater language. Haugaard, 2002:2