Balancing Development Priorities: Ghanas Experience with the I.M.F.

from Structural Adjustment to Poverty Reduction Strategies

By Gian-Paolo Mendoza 301 154 165 POL 346 International Organization Dr. Logan Masilamani Simon Fraser University March 29, 2012

Introduction Following the global financial crisis in the late nineteen-seventies and early eighties, the International Monetary Fund played a crucial role in the stabilizing the economies of subSaharan Africa that were hit hard by the shock. The role of the Fund in providing assistance to these countries shifted to a more long-term role in the wake of the impact during the eighties, playing a much stronger role in regards to the domestic fiscal policies undertaken in these countries. The scope of the influence of the IMF manifests itself in the neo-liberal policies that have been implemented through Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) in most of sub-Saharan Africa: policies including the privatization of formerly state-regulated enterprises, currency devaluation, and the removal of tariffs and subsidies for imported goods. In the mid nineteen eighties, Ghana became one of the first sub-Saharan African countries to undergo structural adjustment under the auspices of the IMF and the World Bank. The IMF has largely heralded Ghana as a success story, citing consistent economic growth over the years in both GDP and GNP;1 however, a number of criticisms exist against such an approach to measuring long-term economic success, as they largely ignore the short-term impact of structural adjustment on the social and economic lives of the citizens.2 The question guiding this research is whether the IMF has been successful in promoting economic development in sub-Saharan African countries. In the context of Ghanas experience with the IMF, this paper will argue that a more balanced approach to development is needed. The evolution of Ghanas development strategy in conjunction

Kwame Frimpong, Structural Adjustment and the myth of its success in Ghana, in Structural Adjustment, Reconstruction and Development in Africa ed. Kempe Ronald Hope, Sr (Vermont: Ashgate, 1992), 97. 2 Ibid, 97.

with the IMF and World Bank illustrates both the positive and negative impacts of narrowing the policy focus on either the private or public sectors of the economy. I will argue for a reforming of the adjustment process that will allow more opportunities for Ghanaian civil society organizations to engage in dialogue with development policymakers, a stronger state role in building and upholding the infrastructure required to facilitate growth in the domestic private sector, as well as greater flexibility in loan conditionality. This paper will examine the issues in the IMFs transition in development strategies from structural adjustment to poverty reduction; give a brief history of Ghanas experience with the PRSP approach and the influence of the IMF over the setting of national development priorities; and examine the impacts implications of IMF-led strategies on both the private and public sectors of the Ghanaian economy, as well as the implications this current approach has for national control over development policy. In examining alternative approaches to economic development, I will discuss three main factors that IFIs must take into account when formulating lending and development policies, namely in providing more consultation with civil society to have a bigger voice in setting development priorities, reforming loan conditionality to allow the state to develop the infrastructure necessary to facilitate growth in the private sector, and greater flexibility in loan conditions to facilitate national ownership of the development process.

Defining Structural Adjustment, Poverty Reduction, and the Role of the IMF Structural Adjustment was first undertaken in Ghana in response to a debt crisis and a massive drought in the 1980s. Adjustment was the first of many approaches to poverty reduction in the developing world, as devised by the IMF and the World Bank. Asante and Ayee (2004, in Domfeh and Bawole 2009) define poverty reduction as, designing, 3

implementing and targeting appropriate methods to ensure that scarce resources are allocated to activities that are likely to yield the greatest impact on the poor and decrease their levels of deprivation and vulnerability.3 While the scope of adjustment policies varied greatly between countries during this time, the most distinct reforms undertaken through this approach, led by the IMF, focused on the liberalization of domestic price controls over certain goods, currency devaluations, and reductions in government deficit spending; laws that reduced the capacity of the state to intervene in the economy. Adjustment was implemented through President Jerry Rawlings Economic Recovery Program (ERP) in 1983, following negotiations with the IMF and World Bank for financial assistance. The tenets of the ERP embodied a set of policies required by the IMF to be implemented domestically in order for the Ghanaian government to receive loans; policies that would reform many crucial sectors of Ghanas economy. They included both short-run measures designed to stabilize the economy, as well as more long-run structural reforms targeting domestic legislation, specifically the gradual removal of agricultural subsidies for famers and cuts to health care and public education. SAPs during this period were intended for countries experiencing high inflation, high deficits in their balance payments, and low or negative GNP growth rates.4 Funds were disbursed to applicant countries through the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility of the IMF, a lending facility that at the time was charged with providing concessionary lending to countries with a per capita income of $550 or less.5 In 1997, SAPs were subjected to review by the World Bank and a network of civil society
3

Asante and Ayee (2004), as quoted in Kwame A. Domfeh and Justice N. Bawole, Localising and Sustaining poverty reduction: experiences from Ghana, Management of Environmental Quality: An International Journal 20, no. 5 (2009): 494. 4 Gavin M. Hilson, Structural Adjustment in Ghana - Assessing the Impacts of Mining-Sector Reform, Africa Today 51, no. 2 (Winter 2004): 56. 5 Kwabena Donkor, Structural Adjustment and Mass Poverty in Ghana (Vermont: Ashgate, 1997), 106.

organizations (Ghana included) under the Structural Adjustment Participatory Review Initiative (SAPRI).6 SAPRI found that structural adjustment policies had largely failed to tackle the problems they sought out to correct through policies that encouraged financial liberalization, the ending of price controls, currency devaluation, and the reduction of trade barriers.

From Structural Adjustment to Poverty Reduction Strategies: Given the criticisms of SAPRI and the negative image that came to be associated with the structural adjustment approach, the IMF and the World Bank embarked on the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative in 1997, seeking to modify the nature of the policies associated with the previous approach with the goal of transferring ownership of the development process to the national level. Countries seeking HIPC status were required to prepare a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) that encompassed more specific and focused debt reduction and rescheduling packages that were added onto the previous reforms under SAP. PRSPs are prepared for the IMF and the Bank by the governments of the countries themselves; a more internally driven approach to tackling poverty and promoting economic development compared to the former SAPs that were seen as being administered from the top-down by the IMF. The approach emphasizes the importance of formulating economic reforms according to national priorities. The World Bank goals for PRSPs suggest that they should be country-driven and owned, results-oriented, comprehensive in scope, partnership-oriented (providing a base for participation of bilateral, multilateral, and non-governmental development partners),
6

Ibid, 78.

and based on a medium and long-term perspective for poverty reduction.7 One of the main distinguishing features of PRSPs from SAPs is the focus on allocating resources to social sectors, namely the provision of health care and building a public education system.8 The IMF claims that another distinguishing feature from SAPs is that PRSP programs are considerably more streamlined in terms of their conditionality, claiming they possess about one-third fewer structural reform conditions compared to ESAF programs in the same countries. Sanjeev et. al (2002) point out that policy conditions relating to privatization and civil service reform decreased by almost 60 percent (as an aggregate number) compared to conditions in countries that had implemented the same reforms under the ESAF.9 Critics however, point out that PRSPs still operate within the neoliberal framework proposed by the IMF, seeking, as Marcus et. al (2002) states, to promote growth through relaxing restrictions on foreign investment, reducing import tariffs, and widespread privatization.10 A significant portion of the finance for PRSP implementation also comes from international donors. Processes within the formulation of PRSPs give more attention to donor assistance strategies and operational procedures, as well as forums for policy discussion between donors and the national government.11 Another feature of the PRSP approach was the implementation of the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF), which replaced the ESAF as the Funds primary lending instrument to developing countries during this time. In theory, policy conditions
7

World Bank (2003) cited in Kwame A. Domefh and Justice N. Bawole, Localising and Sustaining poverty reduction, Management of Environmental Quality: An International Journal (2009): 494. 8 Graham Harrison, Neoliberal Africa (New York: Zed Books, 2010), 56. 9 Sanjeev Gupta, Mark Plant, Thomas Dorsey, and Benedict Clements, Is the PRGF Living up to Expectations? in Finance & Development 39, no. 2 (2002), Accessed via: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2002/06/gupta.htm 10 Rachel Marcus, John Wilkinson and Jenni Marshall, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) Fulfilling their potential for children in poverty? Journal of International Development 14, (2002): 1120. 11 Lindsay Whitfield, Trustees of development from conditionality to governance: poverty reduction strategy papers in Ghana, Journal of Modern African Studies 43, no. 4 (2005): 644.

within the PRGF are to be taken from the nationally formulated PRSP.12 In order to be eligible for HIPC status, a participating country must have achieved at least three years of recognizable performance under an ESAF program, as well as formulate a Poverty Reduction Strategy in conjunction with the IMF and the World Bank after dialogue with a variety of domestic actors (such as NGOs and civil society organizations) and a setting of development priorities by the national government.

Ghanas PRSP and its Experience with the IMF Ghanas experience with the poverty reduction approach of the IMF largely follows this pattern of policy implementation. Facing a massive debt and fragile economic stability upon election in 2001, the New Patriotic Party (NPP) government, led by president John Kufuor, applied for the HIPC initiative. According to Lindsay Whitfield (2010), in order to access debt relief, the government had to meet the conditions specified in the HIPC agreement, implement its World Bank and IMF agreements, and implement its PRSP for a year.13 Ghanas implementation of its PRSP (known as the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy, or GPRS) was characterized mainly by tensions with international donors, in terms of conditionality. International donors have been the biggest drivers of PRSPs in sub-Saharan Africa in terms of finance, with the World Bank being the largest in Ghana specifically. Bartholomew Armah (2008) argues that conditionality compromises one of the main goals of the PRSP approach: the national ownership of the development process. In regards to the IMF and the World
12

Bartholomew Armah, From SAPs to PRSPs: A tale of two paradigms or simply a tale? In Poverty Reduction Strategies in Action: Perspectives and Lessons from Ghana , ed. Joe Amoako-Tuffour & Bartholomew Armah. (UK: Lexington Books, 2008), 81 82. 13 Lindsay Whitfield, The State Elite, PRSPs and Policy Implementation in Aid -dependent Ghana, Third World Quarterly 31, No. 5 (2010): 728.

Bank, he states that, both institutions will only support PRSs that concur with their philosophy of what constitutes an appropriate strategy for poverty reduction and growth.14 The NPP government in Ghana faced pressure from the IMF and World Bank to continue with the first phase of the GPRS as its development plan, despite a convergence from their own national priorities in addition to those of smaller bilateral donors that were involved in the PRSP implementation process. The GPRS focused on long-term economic restructuring, such as the building of roads and energy sources, strengthening the private sector through long-term credit, and the modernization of agriculture processing.15 This differed from the pro-poor stance of other donor actors involved, who were pushing for increased allocation towards social services and more direct targeting of the poorer sectors of the Ghanaian population. The implications and outcomes of IMF influence over these policy conditions, imposed through PRSPs, will be examined in the next section.

The Impacts of IMF Structural Adjustment and Poverty Reduction Strategies The neoliberal nature of their development approaches has been one of the biggest criticisms of both SAPs and PRSPs. Ghanas SAP in particular has concentrated on economic growth generated by increasing the exploitation and export of primary products, subjecting the vulnerability of these products to world market forces.16 Followed by the focus of the GPRS on infrastructure and private sector development, direct allocation of resources towards social services has been challenged by the IMF through its economic leverage, consolidated as being one of the biggest financiers for the
14 15

Armah, From SAPs to PRSPs, In Poverty Reduction Strategies in Action, 83. Whitfield, The State Elite, PRSPs and Policy Implementation, Third World Quarterly, 728. 16 Donkor, Kwabena, Structural Adjustment and Poverty in Ghana (Vermont: Ashgate, 1997), 192-193.

GPRS project. The bulk of criticism in Ghana has come from the groups most adversely affected by the economic reforms, most notably being workers formerly employed by state industries, families living in rural areas, and farmers. However, there also exist a number of institutional barriers to facilitating private investment as well.

Effects of PRSP: Public Sector Services and Employment in Ghana In regards to development in the public sector, IMF lending conditions have generally called for cuts to state expenditures on health care and public education. This is driven by the IMFs firm belief in liberalized markets and the reduction in size of the state as the key to economic development. As Mazur (2004) states, this has resulted in increased poverty, unemployment, food insecurity and hunger, restricted access to health care and education, environmental destruction, and increased multilateral debt.17 Even the transition in approach from SAPs to PRSPs has been met with this same criticism. Brazier, in McGregor (2005), criticizes PRSPs, pointing out that their distinguishing features are the same as those found in SAPs: poverty is used as window dressing to peddle more or less the same SAPs to low income countries that led them into a state of chronic economic crisis to begin with.18 Specifically in regards to employment, Ghanas series of adjustment and poverty reduction programs since 1983 has seen a crippling of the industrial and agricultural workforce, mainly due to the exposure of domestic enterprise to foreign imported goods,

17

Robert E. Mazur, Realization or deprivation of the right to development under globalization? Debt, structural adjustment, and poverty reduction programs, GeoJournal 60 (2004), 65. 18 McGregor, Structural adjustment programs and human well-being, 170.

rising interest rates, and the gradual withdrawal of agricultural subsidies.19 The removal of protectionist measures, such as tariffs on imports and farming subsidies, has subjected the domestic capacity of Ghanaian agriculture and production industry to the global economy, where the developed states dominate international competition in these sectors. Increased privatization of formerly state-owned services has also hindered populations access to utilities such as water, electricity, communications, and even land. Even the introduction of policies such as user fees on state-provided services, such as hospitals and electricity, under adjustment also increases costs to users, inhibiting access to poorer families.20

Effects of PRSP: Private Sector Investment and Production in Ghana In addition to the effects on Ghanas social sector, SAPs and PRSPs have also not been able to make a significant impact when it comes to confronting the barriers hindering private sector development. According to Baah-Boateng (2008), the high cost of credit, poor telecommunications services, and high energy costs coupled with the erratic supply of power, continue to constrain the operations of private enterprises.21 The belief driving structural adjustment, that the free market will create efficiency and growth, has failed to stand the test of reality in Ghana; on the contrary, economic decline has been the outcome, as opposed to growth.22 Nicholas Amponsah (2000) further argues that there needs to be important prerequisites for investment, growth, and development to occur
19

William Baah-Boateng, Employment Generation for Poverty Alleviation, in Poverty Reduction Strategies in Action: Perspectives and Lessons from Ghana , ed. Joe Amoako-Tuffour and Bartholomew Armah, (UK: Lexington Books, 2008), 228. 20 Marcus, et. al, PRSPs Fulfilling their potential for children in poverty? Journal of International Development, 1121. 21 Ibid, 236. 22 Nicholas Amponsah, Ghanas Mixed Structural Adjustment Results: Explaining the Poor Private Sector Response, Africa Today 47, no. 2 (Spring 2000): 12.

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under SAPs.23 Amponsahs survey of private business owners in Ghana found that foundations for private sector development, such as a credible regulatory environment that protects private property rights and a streamlined bureaucratic regime for obtaining business licenses, are fundamental to ensuring the efficiency and productivity of a liberalized economy. He further argues that the World Bank and IMF, who generally prescribe the same neo-liberal economic approach to adjustment and poverty reduction policies, often overlook these regulatory factors.24

Effects of PRSP: Erosion of State Control over National Development As mentioned earlier, IMF influence over development policy in Ghana under the PRSP approach stems from their role as the primary financier for Ghanas GPRS projects and programs. Whitfield (2005) argues that this donor conditionality is a product of aid dependency. She states that, most of Ghanas debt is owed to multilateral creditors, and continuous debt servicing places restrictions on government spending on investment and on social sectors.25 Debt dependency constrains the ability of the government to set its own priorities in the development agenda, as conditions are imposed from the global level down to the national sphere. Ghana does not own this development strategy in a sovereign sense; it shares it with donors that fund significant parts of the reform programs and projects within the GPRS, namely the IMF and World Bank.26 McGregor further states that, when SAPs are introduced, expenditures on basic services (health,

23 24

Ibid, 12. Ibid, 10. 25 Whitfield, Trustees of development from conditionality to governance, Journal of Modern African Studies 43, no. 4 (2005): 643. 26 Harrison, Neoliberal Africa, 58.

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education, welfare and social programmes) are often severely curtailed.27 The money instead goes towards semi-annual repayments back to the IMF, the World Bank, and other multilateral donors involved in financing domestic development projects.

Balancing Development Priorities Given the problems associated with the IMFs neoliberal framework for development policy in both the private and public spheres, it is inferred that placing one single sphere at the forefront of the development agenda, paramount to the other, results in an overweighted emphasis on one particular sphere of the economy. The shortcomings of the IMF-led development strategy in Ghana can be framed in the context of the limited role that civil society plays in setting priorities for the allocation of funds for development, the limited role of the state in regulating and maintaining productive infrastructure, and reforming the nature of the policy conditions attached to development loans.

The Public Sector: Civil Society and Development Priorities The creation of more opportunities for civil society organizations (CSOs) to engage in the setting of development policy is necessary, as foreign development partners and the national government have dominated the current process in Ghana. The dominance of foreign policymakers input in the formulation of Ghanas PRSP has adverse implications for the development process, as foreign input is largely driven by the institutional bias of their economic ideologies, subordinating social concerns and national ownership of

27

Sue McGregor, Structural adjustment programs and human well-being, International Journal of Consumer Studies 29, vol. 3 (May 2005): 171.

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development funding.28 Amoako-Tuffour (2008) attributes this type of policy-making as output-oriented legitimacy. He argues that this particular form of economic policy making is conferred on a policy-making process that enhances the public good, regardless of who participated in it. This is in contrast to input-oriented legitimacy, which emphasizes the importance and scope of public participation and consultation in the formulation of development policy.29 The PRSP initiative called for a shift in the amount of public consultation that would be included in the policy-making process, but was still very exclusive in its practice. In the initial phases of the GPRS consultations, Ghanaian CSOs were excluded from discussions of particular importance, namely the question of alternatives to market-driven poverty reduction strategies. Policies such as income support and social safety nets were not considered for public discussion, as they were deemed to be outside the scope of the GPRS because of their fiscal implications.30 Increasing opportunities for public consultation in the formulation of development policy would provide a more comprehensive picture of the issues associated with economic underdevelopment in Ghana. This would benefit policymakers, in that a more substantive amount of knowledge relating to poverty in the country would assist their framing of policies and help them target issues with increased direction and clarity.

The Private Sector: The Role of the State in Developing Market Infrastructure Paramount to the hasty removal of state intervention in the economy, the IMF should target their efforts towards providing resources for states to develop the public
28

Joe Amoako-Tuffour, Public Consultations, Bureaucrats and Development Partners in Ghanas Poverty Reduction Strategy, in Poverty Reduction Strategies in Action: Perspectives and Lessons from Ghana ed. by Joe Amoako-Tuffour and Bartholomew Armah, (UK: Lexington Books, 2008), 98. 29 Ibid, 98 - 99. 30 Ibid, 105.

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infrastructure necessary to support a liberalized market, with the goal of the country eventually becoming able to take full control over its financial policies. Moshi (1997) argues that the assumption by the IMF and World Bank, that standardized structural reforms imposed on Africa would achieve the same results as in other regions of the world, was misguided, having failed to take into account the diversity of the continent in terms of its entrepreneurship and human and technical potential.31 He also states that, African countries can hardly formulate home-made privatization objectives because of the standard conditionalities imposed on them by the IFIs32 In light of this, a loosening of grip over policy conditionality imposed by the Fund is necessary to accommodate for the needs of Ghanaian private enterprise. This would require a stronger state role in developing the infrastructure necessary to facilitate the growth of Ghanas private sector. Starr (1990, in Aponsah 2000) argues that, market reform is an institution-building program it requires the design of basic private institutions and the development of public institutions that private firms and associations can depend upon for protection of their legitimate rights and interests.33 The tenets of structural adjustment have overlooked the role of the state in developing public infrastructure for industry, such as roads to connect access to rural areas, the extension of electricity and power, and improving the national telecommunications systems. Improving these institutions would also help to lift barriers to the provision of social services in the more disconnected regions of the country as well. Sustaining services such as health care and the provision of education will largely depend on improvements in Ghanas physical
31

H.P.B. Moshi, The limits of privatization as a development strategy in Africa, in Structural Adjustment, Reconstruction and Development in Africa, ed. by Kempe Ronald Hope, Sr. (Vermont: Ashgate Publishing, 1997), 167. 32 Ibid, 165. 33 Paul Starr (1990), as quoted by Nicholas Amponsah, Ghanas Mixed Structural Adjustment Results: Explaining the Poor Private Sector Response, Africa Today 47, no. 2 (Spring 2000): 10.

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infrastructure, as inadequate transportation and communication links between the urban and rural sectors of the country is a major disincentive for health care personnel and teachers to relocate to these where areas, where poverty is often most prevalent.34

State Ownership: Flexibility in IMF Conditionality and Approaches to Development A reform in loan conditions needs to reflect the reality that the neo-liberal model has limitations as a development strategy. For countries that have sustained relatively significant macro-economic growth over the years of structural adjustment, their growing over-dependency on the Fund has impeded long-term economic growth; reducing the amount of ownership they have over their development initiatives and targets. Radelet (2006) states that, continued strong involvement by the Fund actually may undermine the process of building strong independent monetary and financial institutions and policymaking capacity in the recipient countries.35 As one of the main goals of the PRSP initiative is to facilitate the transition to national ownership of development policy, the IMF must also recognize their primary role as an IFI in providing finance to establish market infrastructure and economic stability, reforming their lending conditions so as to empower the role of the country itself, and to not interfere with the long-term development process.

Conclusion

34

Amoako-Tuffour, Public Consultations, Bureaucrats and Development Partners in Ghanas Poverty Reduction Strategy, in Poverty Reduction Strategies in Action (2008), 113. 35 Steven Radelet, IMF Facilities for Post-stabilization Low-Income Countries, in Reforming the IMF for the 21st Century, ed. Edwin M. Truman (Washington: Institute for International Economics, 2006), 401.

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An analysis of the transition from the SAP to PRSP approach in the context of Ghanas experience with the IMF suggests that a balance of focus is needed, specifically in regards to the divide between public and private sector priorities, as well as the implications of IMF influence over national development. Negative impacts of both structural adjustment and poverty reduction policies in both the private and the public sector, in addition to an erosion of state control over national priorities, further suggest a shift in the formulation, implementation, and scope of development priorities. Firstly, this paper argued for giving increased attention to the needs of the public sector through more inclusive dialogue with civil society organizations to better frame social targets for poverty reduction strategies. A balanced approach to development would also stress the importance of increasing the role of the state in establishing the infrastructure necessary to facilitate growth in Ghanaian private enterprise throughout the country; this would also accommodate the provision of social services in the more rural regions of Ghana. Lastly, I argued that excessive IMF influence over domestic poverty reduction strategies impedes long-term economic growth, as it creates a longer-term dependency on the Fund in the provision of financial direction and monetary policy. National ownership of PRSP initiatives is necessary to not only maintain, but also advance the development of the institutions required to facilitate economic growth according to the needs of Ghanaian enterprise and society.

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