1.

MELIZZA VS CA FACTS:Melliza sold under a deed several tracts of land to the then Municipality of Iloilo, including lots 1214-C and 1214-D. The instrument of sale did not mention lot 1214-B, although it was contiguous to the other two lots, but stipulated that the area being sold shall include the area needed for the construction of the city hall site, avenues and parks according to the Arellano plan. The Arellano plan had long been in existence before the execution of the deed. DOCTRINE:The requirement that a sale must have for its object a determinate thing is fulfilled as long as, at the time the contract is entered into, the object of the sale is capable of being made determinate without the necessity of a new or further agreement between the parties. The requirement was deemed fulfilled under the contract of sale because it specifically referred to such other portions of the lots required by the Arellano plan, which had long been in existence and it specifically provided for the land areas needed for the city hall site. Therefore, at the time of the perfection of the contract, the exact area of the land needed, which was the subject matter of the sale, could be determined by simply referring to the Arellano plan, without the parties needing to draw-up a new contract, nor even to clarify matters or explain their intentions. 2. ALCANTARA-DAUS v. SPOUSES DE LEON FACTS: Spouses De Leon are the owners of a parcel of land situated in the Municipality of San Manuel, Pangasinan with an area of Four Thousand Two Hundred Twelve square meters more or less. Respondent Hermoso De Leon inherited the said lot from his father Marcelino De Leon by virtue of a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition. Said lot is covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 22134 of the Land Records of Pangasinan. Sometime 1960s, Spouses De Leon engaged the services of the late Atty. Florencio Juan to take care of the documents of their properties. They were asked to sign voluminous documents by the latter. After the death of Atty. Juan, some documents surfaced and most revealed that their properties had been conveyed by sale or quitclaim to Hermosos brothers and sisters, to Atty. Juan and his sisters, when in truth and in fact, no such conveyances were ever intended by them. Furthermore, respondent found out that his signature in the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition with Quitclaim made in favor of Rodolfo de Leon was forged. They discovered that the land in question was sold by Rodolfo de Leon to Aurora Alcantara Spouses De Leon demanded the annulment of the document and re-conveyance but defendants refused. Petitioner, Aurora Alcantara-Daus averred that she

bought the land in question in good faith and for value on December 1975 and that she has been in continuous, public, peaceful, open possession over the same and has been appropriating the produce thereof without objection from anyone. The RTC of Urdaneta, Pangasinan rendered its Decision in favor of herein petitioner. It ruled that respondents claim was barred by laches, because more than 18 years had passed since the land was sold. It further ruled that since it was a notarial document, the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition in favor of Rodolfo de Leon was presumptively authentic. ISSUES: Whether or not the Deed of Absolute executed by Rodolfo De Leon over the land in question in favor of petitioner was perfected and binding upon the parties therein? Whether or not the evidentiary weight of the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Quitclaim, executed by respondent Hermoso de Leon, Perlita de Leon and Carlota de Leon in favor of Rodolfo de Leon was overcome by more than a preponderance of evidence of respondents? HELD: First Issue: NO. It is during the delivery that the law requires the seller to have the right to transfer ownership of the thing sold. In general, a perfected contract of sale cannot be challenged on the ground of the sellers non-ownership of the thing sold at the time of the perfection of the contract. Further, even after the contract of sale has been perfected between the parties, its consummation by delivery is yet another matter. It is through tradition or delivery that the buyer acquires the real right of ownership over the thing sold. Undisputed is the fact that at the time of the sale, Rodolfo De Leon was not the owner of the land he delivered to petitioner. Thus, the consummation of the contract and the consequent transfer of ownership would depend on whether he subsequently acquired ownership of the land in accordance with Article 1434 of the Civil Code. Therefore, we need to resolve the issue of the authenticity and the due execution of the Extrajudicial Partition and Quitclaim in his favor. Second Issue: NO. As a general rule, the due execution and authenticity of a document must be reasonably established before it may be admitted in evidence. Notarial documents, however, may be presented in evidence without further proof of their authenticity, since the certificate of acknowledgment is prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument or document involved. To contradict facts in a

notarial document and the presumption of regularity in its favor, the evidence must be clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant. The CA ruled that the signature of Hermoso De Leon on the Extrajudicial Partition and Quitclaim was forged. However, this factual finding is in conflict with that of the RTC. While normally this Court does not review factual issues, this rule does not apply when there is a conflict between the holdings of the CA and those of the trial court, as in the present case. After poring over the records, the SC finds no reason to reverse the factual finding of the appellate court. A comparison of the genuine signatures of Hermoso De Leon with his purported signature on the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Quitclaim will readily reveal that the latter is a forgery. As aptly held by the CA, such variance cannot be attributed to the age or the mechanical acts of the person signing.

3. SIY CONG BIEN V HSBC Facts Otto Ranft called at the office of the herein plaintiff to purchase hemp (abaca), and he was offered the bales of hemp as described in the quedans above mentioned. The parties agreed to the aforesaid price, and on the same date the quedans, together with the covering invoice, were sent to Ranft by the plaintiff, without having been paid for the hemp, but the plaintiff's understanding was that the payment would be made against the same quedans, and it appear that in previous transaction of the same kind between the bank and the plaintiff, quedans were paid one or two days after their delivery to them. However, on the day the Quedan was supposed to be delivered, Ranft died. Thereupon, Siy discovered that Ranft delivered such quedans to the Hongkong Shanghai Bank to whom Ranft was indebted to. Siy then filed before the estate proceedings to collect the debt of Ranft and filed an action against HSBC to demand for the recovery of possession of the quedans. Siy further argued that there was negligence in the part of HSBC, because Ranft had not yet acquired ownership over the quedans at the time of its indorsment to HSBC. Issue Whether or not HSBC acquired the quedans in good faith Held The Supreme Court held that the quedans is now owned by HSBC, and not by Ranft nor by Siy so as he claims. Ranft delivered to HSBC the quedans for a

valuable consideration, which is valid, and that as it appears as well, those quedans were negotiable in form and endorsed in blank. So, upon delivery, it no longer becomes property of the indorser but the indorsee as it appears in this case, unless he pays for his indebtedness. For a warehouse receipt to be negotiated, it should be properly indorsed and delivered which is evident in this case. Since it was a blank warehouse receipt, it may be delivered to any person, and the bearer thereon becomes the owner of the receipt. As to the question of ownership, Siy voluntarily clothed Ranft with all the attributes of ownership, thus he is estopped to question the valid title of the quedans. There is now no remedy for the plaintiff, and the bank is not responsible if the quedans be negotiated to the bank as there is no proof of fraud on the part of the defendant.

DOCTRINE: The quedans were issued in the name of Siy Cong Bien duly endorsed in blank, and thus negotiable in form. It follows that on the delivery of the quedans to HSBC they were no longer the property of the endorser unless he liquidated his debt with the bank. It is a representation that the one to whom the possession of the receipt has been so intrusted has the title to the goods. If the owner of the goods permits another to have the possession or custody of negotiable warehouse receipts running to the order of the latter, or to /bearer, it is a representation of title upon which bona fide purchasers for value are entitled to rely, despite breaches of trust or violations of agreement on the part of the apparent owner. 4. MAPALO VS MAPALO FACTS:Illiterate spouses were tricked into signing a deed of donation of the eastern portion of the land to Maximo, the brother of the owner of the land. The document signed by the spouses was actually a deed of sale conveying the WHOLE property to Maximo. Maximo sold the whole lot to the Narcisos. DOCTRINE:A contract of purchase and sale is null and void and produces no effect whatsoever where the same is without cause or consideration in that the purchase price which appears thereon as paid has in fact never been paid by the purchaser to the vendor. The deed of sale is governed by the Old Civil Code. If it is w/o consideration, it is inexistent. If it is only w/ a false consideration, it is voidable. In this case, the consideration of P500 was totally absent. The inexistence of a contract is permanent and incurable and cannot be the subject of prescription

5. Republic v. Phil. Resources, FACTS: The Republic of the Philippines, in representation of the Bureau of Prisons, instituted against Macario Apostol a civil complaint. PDRC moved to intervene. The complaint says that sometime prior to Apostols transactions the corporation had some goods deposited in a warehouse. Apostol, then the president of PDRC, but without the knowledge or consent of the stockholders thereof, disposed of said goods by delivering the same to the Bureau of Prisons in an attempt to settle his personal debts. DOCTRINE: PRDC has legal interest in the case because A1458 provides that the purchaser may pay a price certain in money or its equivalent, which means payment of the price need not be in money. Whether the goods claimed by PRDC belong to it and delivered to the Bureau of Prisons by Apostol in payment of his account is sufficient payment therefore, is for the court to pass upon and decide after hearing all the parties in the case. ***VILLANUEVA NOTES This case is not at all authority to say that under A1458, as it defines a contract of sale, the term equivalent of price can cover other than money or other media of exchange, since this case covers not the perfection stage of a contract of sale, but rather the consummation stage where the price agreed upon can be paid under the mutual arrangements agreed upon by the parties to the contract of sale, even by dation in payment, as is the case herein 6. Toyota Shaw v. CA, 244 SCRA 320 (1995)

FACTS: Luna wanted to buy Toyota Lite Ace, met w/ a sales rep ad emphasized that he needed the Lite Ace not later than June 17, 1989 because he, his family and a balikbayan guest would use it on June 18 to go to his home province where he would celebrate his birthday. He also intimated that if he does not arrive in his hometown with a new car, he would become a laughing stock. Sales rep informed them that the vehicle was being readied for delivery but after about 1 hour, Bernardo told them that the car could not be delivered since nasulot ang unit ng ibang malakas. DOCTRINE: No obligation on Toyotas part to transfer ownership of a determinate thing to Sosa and no correlative obligation on Sosas part to pay a price certain appears therein. Nothing was mentioned about the full purchase price and the manner the instalments were to be paid. A definite agreement on the manner of payment of the price is an essential element in the formation of a binding and enforceable contract of sale. A disagreement on the manner of payment is tantamount to a failure to agree on the price 7.Navarra v. Planters Dev. Bank,

. Kaisahan at Kapatiran ng mga Manggagawa at Kawani sa MetropolitanWaterworks and Sewerage System (KKMK-MWSS) is a union in the said public sector (MWSS) created and registered pursuant to Executive Order No. 180. On May 7, 1993, a petition for election of officers was filed by Bonifacio deGuzman, former auditor of KKMK-MWSS before the Bureau of Labor Relations(BLR); The BLR granted the petition and the Labor Organization Division of the Bureaushall supervise the conduct of said elections; A motion for reconsideration was filed by the incumbent officers of KKMK-MWSS, led by its president, Genaro Bautista, but was denied by BLR; An appeal was filed with the Office of the Secretary of Labor and Employmentwhere the order of the BLR was assailed as having been issued with graveabuse of discretion and without jurisdiction, and so dismissed the petition for lackof jurisdiction; The then incumbent officers filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC, QuezonCity, with the issuance of temporary restraining order, but the petition wasdismissed for being insufficient in form and substance, and for want of genuine justiciable issue. The resolution became final; However, on November 25, 1993, a Petition for Prohibition with Prayer of Temporary Restraining/Injunction was filed by Bautista, et al., before RTCQuezon City (Branch 87) to enjoin the respondents (present officers, BLR, etc.)from proceeding with the election of officers scheduled on December 2, 1993.The petition was granted; On December 2, 1993, the election proceeded in defiance to the order of thecourt. Hence, an order was issued by the court to refrain from giving effect of theelection and recognizing the persons supposedly elected, and hereby orderingthe latter to refrain from assuming office and acting as officers of the KKMK-MWSS. The court subsequently issued a writ of preliminary injunction; The case was re-raffled to Branch 220 of RTC Quezon. The respondents filed aReiteration of Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Lift Writ Preliminary Injunction onthe ground of lack of jurisdiction and that the injunction does not anymore servedits purpose. The instant case was dismissed; A motion for reconsideration was filed by Bautista, et al alleging that the RTC has jurisdiction considering that the case before it is an action for prohibition, as aresult of which, the said writ was reinstated; A motion for reconsideration was filed by private respondents but was denied.Hence, they filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for preliminary

injunction and/or restraining order, before the Court of Appeals