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G. Regime of separation of property 1.

When applicable (a) In the marriage settlements, FC 143-146

spouse already effected shall subsist, unless the spouses agree to revive their former property regime. The court's order containing the foregoing shall be recorded in the proper civil registries. (108a) (d) Judicial separation of property

Art. 143. Should the future spouses agree in the marriage settlements that their property relations during marriage shall be governed by the regime of separation of property, the provisions of this Chapter shall be suppletory.(212a) Art. 144. Separation of property may refer to present or future property or both. It may be total or partial. In the latter case, the property not agreed upon as separate shall pertain to the absolute community. (213a) Art. 145. Each spouse shall own, dispose of, possess, administer and enjoy his or her own separate estate, without need of the consent of the other. To each spouse shall belong all earnings from his or her profession, business or industry and all fruits, natural, industrial or civil, due or received during the marriage from his or her separate property. (214a) Art. 146. Both spouses shall bear the family expenses in proportion to their income, or, in case of insufficiency or default thereof, to the current market value of their separate properties.chan robles virtual law library The liabilities of the spouses to creditors for family expenses shall, however, be solidary. (215a) (b) When mandatory, FC 103 & FC 130

Ugalde v Ysasi, GR 130623, February 29, 2008 Facts: Lorea Ugalde and Jon de Ysasi got married before Municipal Judge Remigio Peña of Hinigaran, Negros Occidental and on March 1, 1951, Rev. Msgr. Flaviano Arriola solemnized their church wedding at the San Sebastian Cathedral in Bacolod City. Petitioner and respondent did not execute any antenuptial agreement. They had a son named Jon de Ysasi III. Later on, they separated and the respondent contracted another marriage with Victoria Eleanor Smith. Petitioner alleged that respondent and Smith had been acquiring and disposing of real and personal properties to her prejudice as the lawful wife and that she had been defrauded of rental income, profits, and fruits of their conjugal properties. Petitioner filed a petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains against respondent before the RTC of Negros Occidental. Thereafter, respondent contended that he and the petitioner entered into an agreement which provides that their conjugal partnership shall be deemed dissolved. Pursuant to this, an Amicable Settlement was submitted to the CFI of Negros Occidental. CFI approved the Amicable Settlement. Respondent likewise alleged that petitioner already obtained a divorce from him before the Supreme Court of Mexico. Petitioner then contracted a second marriage with Richard Galoway and upon the latter’s death, she contracted a third marriage with Frank Scholey. Respondent moved for the dismissal of the petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains on the grounds of estoppel, laches, and res judicata. Further, respondent alleged that their marriage was void because it was executed without the benefit of a marriage license.TC- ruled that there was no conjugal partnership of gains and that since they entered into an amicable settlement which was later on approved, the petitioner may no longer repudiate it.CAaffirmed the decision of the trial court Issue:1. Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the Trial Court's Decision which dismissed the action for dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains? 2.Whether or not the TC exceeded its jurisdiction in ruling on the validity of the petitioner and respondent’s marriage? Held: 1. No. Petitioner and respondent were married on 15 February 1951. Thus, the applicable law is the Civil Code(RA 386).Under Article 175 of the Civil Code, the judicial separation of property results in the termination of the conjugal partnership of gains: Art. 175. The conjugal partnership of gains terminates:(1) Upon the death of either spouse;(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;(3) When the marriage is annulled;(4) In case of judicial separation of property under Article 191. (Emphasis supplied)The finality of the Amicable Settlement approving the parties' separation of property resulted in the termination of the conjugal partnership of gains in accordance with Article 175 of the Family Code. Hence, when the trial court decided on the petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains(S.P. No 3330), the conjugal partnership between petitioner and respondent was already dissolved. The Amicable Settlement had become final as between petitioner and respondent when it was approved by the CFI on June 6, 1961. The CFI's approval of the Compromise Agreement

Art. 103. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the community property shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall liquidate the community property either judicially or extra-judicially within six months from the death of the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the six months period, no liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance involving the community property of the terminated marriage shall be void. Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without compliance with the foregoing requirements, a mandatory regime of complete separation of property shall govern the property relations of the subsequent marriage. (n) Art. 130. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the conjugal partnership property shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall liquidate the conjugal partnership property either judicially or extra-judicially within six months from the death of the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the six-month period no liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance involving the conjugal partnership property of the terminated marriage shall be void. Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without compliance with the foregoing requirements, a mandatory regime of complete separation of property shall govern the property relations of the subsequent marriage. (n) (c) Reconciliation in legal separation, FC 66(2) Art. 66. The reconciliation referred to in the preceding Articles shall have the following consequences: (2) The final decree of legal separation shall be set aside, but the separation of property and any forfeiture of the share of the guilty

(214a) (b) By the other spouse. (178a) 4. and no community of property was formed between them. FC 145 (c) FC 100 (3). The husband and the wife cannot sell property to each other. Civil Case No. 101 Art. Administration (a) By the owner-spouse. without need of the consent of the other. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her obligations to the family. Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage. (190a) Art. 144. The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph refer to marital. The spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three months or has failed within the same period to give any information as to his or her whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal dwelling. Negros Occidental. the marriage between petitioner and respondent was null and void. between the spouses during the marriage shall be void. conflict of interest. the separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by judicial order. The prohibition shall also apply to persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage. NCC 1490 Art. Hence. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her obligations to the family. (2) When one spouse is judicially declared an absentee. 142. 2. In the latter case. parental or property relations. (178a) Art. except: (1) When a separation of property was agreed upon in the marriage settlements. in case of insufficiency or default thereof. the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership. The validity of petitioner and respondent's marriage was the subject of another action. (3) When one spouse is sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction. The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not affect the regime of absolute community except that: (3) In the absence of sufficient community property. except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. The trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in ruling on the validity of petitioner and respondent's marriage. FC 142. the court shall appoint a suitable person to be the administrator. Family expenses. FC 87. administer and enjoy his or her own separate estate. possess. Conveyances between the spouses. (215a) 5. The administration of all classes of exclusive property of either spouse may be transferred by the court to the other spouse: (1) When one spouse becomes the guardian of the other. 1490. Separation of property may refer to present or future property or both. upon proper petition in a summary proceeding. the separate property of both spouses shall be solidarily liable for the support of the family. parental or property relations. A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when her or she has left the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. industrial or civil. or (4) When one spouse becomes a fugitive from justice or is in hiding as an accused in a criminal case. 101. be solidary. The spouse present shall. due or received during the marriage from his or her separate property. Both spouses shall bear the family expenses in proportion to their income. 2. Judicial separation of property 1. or (2) When there has been a judicial separation or property under Article 191. which was only raised by respondent as a defense to the action for dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains. The trial court ruled that it was shown by competent evidence that petitioner and respondent failed to obtain a marriage license. 87. It may be total or partial. business or industry and all fruits. for judicial separation of property or for authority to be the sole administrator of the absolute community. The spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three months or has failed within the same period to give any information as to his or her whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal dwelling. 134. FC 134 Art. or. or any other just cause. Property covered. Such judicial separation of property may either be voluntary or for sufficient cause. A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when her or she has left the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. (213a) 3. (178a) . for judicial separation of property or for authority to be the sole administrator of the absolute community. to the current market value of their separate properties. If the other spouse is not qualified by reason of incompetence.resulted in the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains between petitioner and respondent on even date. Each spouse shall own. In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements.chan robles virtual law library The liabilities of the spouses to creditors for family expenses shall.When possible. FC 144 Art. The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph refer to marital. the said court ruled that the marriage was null and void for failure to comply with the formal and essential requirements of the law. Yes. In 1995. 430 for Judicial Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage before RTC of Himamaylan. subject to such precautionary conditions as the court may impose. dispose of. (133a) Civil Code Art. the property not agreed upon as separate shall pertain to the absolute community. The trial court then proceeded to rule on the validity of petitioner and respondent's marriage. FC 146 Art. however. 101. 101 Art. be given judicial authority to administer or encumber any specific separate property of the other spouse and use the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter's share. direct or indirect. 145. the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership. subject to such precautionary conditions as the court may impose. (1458a) H. 146. (n) Art. To each spouse shall belong all earnings from his or her profession. 100. natural.

135. both accused were convicted of the crime charged. 155409 June 8. (3) That loss of parental authority of the spouse of petitioner has been decreed by the court. unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon. It is clear. such person shall be permanently deprived by the court of such authority. Under Article 333 of the same Code. — Civil interdiction shall deprive the offender during the time of his sentence of the rights of parental authority. If the degree of seriousness so warrants. FC 55 (10). Petitioner then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the Court of Appeals on the ground that the conviction of the respondent of the crime of adultery disqualify her from sharing in the conjugal property. prompted the petitioner to file a case of adultery against private respondent and the latter's paramour. The suspension or deprivation may be revoked and the parental authority revived in a case filed for the purpose or in the same proceeding if the court finds that the cause therefor has ceased and will not be repeated. 229. 55. or Art. 231. 229(4). The grounds enumerated above are deemed to include cases which have resulted from culpable negligence of the parent or the person exercising parental authority. (2) That the spouse of the petitioner has been judicially declared an absentee. ISSUE: Is the conviction of the respondent of the crime of adultery a disqualification for her to share in the conjugal property? HELD: No. No. and fruits of their conjugal properties. either as to the person or property of any ward. This motion was denied. (33a) Art. Thereafter. For sufficient cause. parental authority also terminates: (4) Upon final judgment of a competent court divesting the party concerned of parental authority. — The penalty of prision correccional shall carry with it that of suspension from public office. the penalty for adultery is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods. For purposes of this Article. Consequently. profits. Petitioner filed a petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains against respondent before the RTC of . The Petition was dismissed. that the crime of adultery does not carry the accessory penalty of civil interdiction which deprives the person of the rights to manage her property and to dispose of such property inter vivos. They had a son named Jon de Ysasi III. 2. 2007 FACTS: Herein petitioner and herein private respondent are spouses who once had a blissful married life and out of which were blessed to have a son. counsel or example. 1951. of the right to manage his property and of the right to dispose of such property by any act or any conveyance inter vivos. 34.R. (5) That the spouse granted the power of administration in the marriage settlements has abused that power. or guardianship. if the duration of said imprisonment shall exceed eighteen months. Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Damages imputing psychological incapacity on the part of the petitioner. FC 135 cf. and (6) That at the time of the petition. Subsequently. 232.VIRGILIO MAQUILAN vs. Prision correccional — Its accessory penalties. (2) and (3). or the welfare of the child so demands. the presentation of the final judgment against the guilty or absent spouse shall be enough basis for the grant of the decree of judicial separation of property. Civil Interdiction. (3) Compels the child to beg. of marital authority. (191a) Art. However. Flaviano Arriola solemnized their church wedding at the San Sebastian Cathedral in Bacolod City. Negros Occidental and on March 1. (4) That the spouse of the petitioner has abandoned the latter or failed to comply with his or her obligations to the family as provided for in Article 101. Petitioner and respondent did not execute any antenuptial agreement. petitioner filed a motion for the repudiation of the AGREEMENT. which thus. 2008 Facts: Lorea Ugalde and Jon de Ysasi got married before Municipal Judge Remigio Peña of Hinigaran. the spouses have been separated in fact for at least one year and reconciliation is highly improbable. 43. GR 130623. The latter provides: Art. The conviction of adultery does not carry the accessory of civil interdiction. (9a) Art. therefore. In the cases provided for in Numbers (1). If the person exercising parental authority has subjected the child or allowed him to be subjected to sexual abuse. DITA MAQUILAN G. the term "child" shall include a child by nature or by adoption. they separated and the respondent contracted another marriage with Victoria Eleanor Smith. Msgr. The offender shall suffer the disqualification provided in this article although pardoned as to the principal penalty. Article 34 of the Revised Penal Code provides for the consequences of civil interdiction: Art. Unless subsequently revived by a final judgment. Article 333 should be read with Article 43 of the same Code. 231. petitioner and private respondent entered into a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT. 232 Art. and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage. Later on. private respondent. or (4) Subjects the child or allows him to be subjected to acts of lasciviousness. (2) Gives the child corrupting orders. Rev. their once sugar coated romance turned bitter when petitioner discovered that private respondent was having illicit sexual affair with her paramour. The court in an action filed for the purpose in a related case may also suspend parental authority if the parent or the person exercising the same: (1) Treats the child with excessive harshness or cruelty. Petitioner alleged that respondent and Smith had been acquiring and disposing of real and personal properties to her prejudice as the lawful wife and that she had been defrauded of rental income. (n) Ugalde v Ysasi. During the pre-trial of the said case. the court shall deprive the guilty party of parental authority or adopt such other measures as may be proper under the circumstances. February 29. and as correctly held by the CA. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for judicial separation of property: (1) That the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds: (10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year. filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. from the right to follow a profession or calling. through counsel.

Negros Occidental. prompted the petitioner to file a case of adultery against private respondent and the latter's paramour. Prision correccional — Its accessory penalties.Under Article 175 of the Civil Code. Yes. Petitioner then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the Court of Appeals on the ground that the conviction of the respondent of the crime of adultery disqualify her from sharing in the conjugal property. The offender shall suffer the disqualification provided in this article although pardoned as to the principal penalty. their once sugar coated romance turned bitter when petitioner discovered that private respondent was having illicit sexual affair with her paramour. Thereafter. the conjugal partnership between petitioner and respondent was already dissolved. The Amicable Settlement had become final as between petitioner and respondent when it was approved by the CFI on June 6. of the right to manage his property and of the right to dispose of such property by any act or any conveyance inter vivos.ruled that there was no conjugal partnership of gains and that since they entered into an amicable settlement which was later on approved. the said court ruled that the marriage was null and void for failure to comply with the formal and essential requirements of the law. No. Sales v Sales. filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. The trial court then proceeded to rule on the validity of petitioner and respondent's marriage.R. During the pre-trial of the said case. 1961. Respondent moved for the dismissal of the petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains on the grounds of estoppel. and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage. the penalty for adultery is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods. the marriage between petitioner and respondent was null and void. Civil Case No. The conviction of adultery does not carry the accessory of civil interdiction. an Amicable Settlement was submitted to the CFI of Negros Occidental. when the trial court decided on the petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains(S.(3) When the marriage is annulled. unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon. and no community of property was formed between them. The trial court ruled that it was shown by competent evidence that petitioner and respondent failed to obtain a marriage license.CAaffirmed the decision of the trial court Issue:1. and res judicata.Negros Occidental. the applicable law is the Civil Code(RA 386). Voluntary separation of property. from the right to follow a profession or calling. 2007 FACTS: Herein petitioner and herein private respondent are spouses who once had a blissful married life and out of which were blessed to have a son. FC 136. Hence. It is clear. Article 333 should be read with Article 43 of the same Code. or guardianship. both accused were convicted of the crime charged. No 3330). Thus. Pursuant to this.Whether or not the TC exceeded its jurisdiction in ruling on the validity of the petitioner and respondent’s marriage? Held: 1. 155409 June 8. FC 74-75. respondent contended that he and the petitioner entered into an agreement which provides that their conjugal partnership shall be deemed dissolved. Petitioner then contracted a second marriage with Richard Galoway and upon the latter’s death. 430 for Judicial Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage before RTC of Himamaylan. However. and as correctly held by the CA. the judicial separation of property results in the termination of the conjugal partnership of gains: Art. FC 134 Art. The CFI's approval of the Compromise Agreement resulted in the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains between petitioner and respondent on even date. ISSUE: Is the conviction of the respondent of the crime of adultery a disqualification for her to share in the conjugal property? HELD: No. private respondent. through counsel. respondent alleged that their marriage was void because it was executed without the benefit of a marriage license. if the duration of said imprisonment shall exceed eighteen months. Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Damages imputing psychological incapacity on the part of the petitioner. . Article 34 of the Revised Penal Code provides for the consequences of civil interdiction: Art. CFI approved the Amicable Settlement. The conjugal partnership of gains terminates:(1) Upon the death of either spouse.(4) In case of judicial separation of property under Article 191.(2) When there is a decree of legal separation. Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the Trial Court's Decision which dismissed the action for dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains? 2. The Petition was dismissed. Subsequently. Further. of marital authority. therefore. and for the separation of their common properties. petitioner and private respondent entered into a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT. The latter provides: Art. Petitioner and respondent were married on 15 February 1951. 3. — Civil interdiction shall deprive the offender during the time of his sentence of the rights of parental authority. 43. DITA MAQUILAN G. In 1995. Hence. All creditors of the absolute community or of the conjugal partnership of gains. petitioner filed a motion for the repudiation of the AGREEMENT. either as to the person or property of any ward. (Emphasis supplied)The finality of the Amicable Settlement approving the parties' separation of property resulted in the termination of the conjugal partnership of gains in accordance with Article 175 of the Family Code. Consequently. that the crime of adultery does not carry the accessory penalty of civil interdiction which deprives the person of the rights to manage her property and to dispose of such property inter vivos. Respondent likewise alleged that petitioner already obtained a divorce from him before the Supreme Court of Mexico. The validity of petitioner and respondent's marriage was the subject of another action.P.TC. The spouses may jointly file a verified petition with the court for the voluntary dissolution of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains. 2. This motion was denied. 136. the petitioner may no longer repudiate it. 34. she contracted a third marriage with Frank Scholey. The trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in ruling on the validity of petitioner and respondent's marriage. No. — The penalty of prision correccional shall carry with it that of suspension from public office. VIRGILIO MAQUILAN vs. which thus. as well as the personal creditors of the spouse. Civil Interdiction. 175. which was only raised by respondent as a defense to the action for dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains. Under Article 333 of the same Code. laches. Thereafter.

in the marriage settlements. to enforce judgment secured by the Laperals on the fruits of Kalaw’s paraphernal property and to secure a ruling declaring the real property as conjugal property of Katigbak and Kalaw. all properties acquired during the marriage are. (193a) Art. c. 116 Phil 672 Facts: 1.al vs. 5. 3. 1 Art. 138. the system of absolute community of property as established in this Code shall govern. The Laperals instituted a complaint against Katigbak and Kalaw seeking the recovery of P14000 evidenced by various promissory notes and for the return of jewelry delivered to Katigbak for sale on commission.1 Once the separation of property has been decreed. the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall pay for the support of the spouses and their children. 2. Ramon and Evelina got married in 1938. et. 66. (190a) 4. The court's order containing the foregoing shall be recorded in the proper civil registries. the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains shall be liquidated in conformity with this Code. Such judicial separation of property may either be voluntary or for sufficient cause. 139. Laperals filed another complaint against Kalaw and Katigbak seeking the annulment of the proceedings for the above complaint. 66. (2) By the provisions of this Code. 75. (192a) (c) regime after JSP. the provisions on complete separation of property shall apply. but the separation of property and any forfeiture of the share of the guilty spouse already effected shall subsist. Evelina declares that her mother Pua was the one that had bought the property for her Issue: Whether or not the property is conjugal Held: NO Indeed. Other than invoking the presumption. FC 139-140. The court's order containing the foregoing shall be recorded in the proper civil registries. 3. unless the spouses agree to revive their former property regime. the separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by judicial order. unless the spouses agree to revive their former property regime. but the separation of property and any forfeiture of the share of the guilty spouse already effected shall subsist. About a month after the decision was rendered. In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements. 6. In the absence of a marriage settlement.(191a) Art. by law. 140. or any other regime. 1939 only two years after the marriage. or when the regime agreed upon is void. conjugal partnership of gains. of FC 66(2) Art.00 a month salary from a Manila Bank. The separation of property shall not prejudice the rights previously acquired by creditors. (b) support pendente lite. The land in question was purchased for the wife with her own separate funds. Ramon Katigbak. (108a) Roberto Laperal Jr. considering that singular source of income then was his P200. The petition for separation of property and the final judgment granting the same shall be recorded in the proper local civil registries and registries of property. complete separation of property. Kalaw filed a complaint against her husband Katigbak for “judicial separation of property and separate administration” 4. b. The reconciliation referred to in the preceding Articles shall have the following consequences: (2) The final decree of legal separation shall be set aside. 2 During the pendency of the proceedings for separation of property. the husband. the burden of denying the evidence so presented was shifted to the appellant. (108a) (d) binding effect on third parties. the property was already of such substantial value as admittedly. and (3) By the local custom. After dissolution of the absolute community or of the conjugal partnership. Effects of judicial separation of property (a) liquidation of CPG or ACP. The reconciliation referred to in the preceding Articles shall have the following consequences: (2) The final decree of legal separation shall be set aside. The presumption however is not conclusive but merely rebuttable. Par. 137. The property relationship between husband and wife shall be governed in the following order: (1) By marriage settlements executed before the marriage.al. by himself could not have afforded to buy. 2. The subject property was registered in the name of “Evelina Katigbak married to Ramon Katigbak” on December6. (119a) Art. (118) Art.shall be listed in the petition and notified of the filing thereof. The court shall take measures to protect the creditors and other persons with pecuniary interest. Court granted the said complaint. This is a case where the presumption has been sufficiently and convincingly proven. 134. et. 1. 137. (194a) Art. FC 138 of FC 66 (2) Art. presumed conjugal. 74. Court dismissed the complaint and rendered the property as paraphernal. Par. FC 137 par. At the time of its purchase. the court rendered judgment against him to pay the Laperals the said sum and return of jewelry. Upon confession of judgment by Katigbak. (191a) Art. The future spouses may. agree upon the regime of absolute community. FC 137 par. . 2 Art. Deed to the disputed land is in the name of the wife. a.

they agree to the revival of the former property regime. In the absence of such authority or consent. (2) Those to be retained as separated properties of each spouse. The administration and enjoyment of the community property shall belong to both spouses jointly. After due hearing. (n) 6. the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person. the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. or (7) When after voluntary dissolution of the absolute community of property or conjugal partnership has been judicially decreed upon the joint petition of the spouses. (2) That the spouse of the petitioner has been judicially declared an absentee. (2) When the absentee spouse reappears. file a motion in court for a decree reviving the property regime that existed between them before the separation of property in any of the following instances: (1) When the civil interdiction terminates. the presentation of the final judgment against the guilty or absent spouse shall be enough basis for the grant of the decree of judicial separation of property. 96. (5) That the spouse granted the power of administration in the marriage settlements has abused that power. in the same proceedings where separation of property was decreed.5. and may be perfected as a binding . the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person. the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. (4) When the spouse who has left the conjugal home without a decree of legal separation resumes common life with the other. However. which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision. (2) When one spouse is judicially declared an absentee. in its order. conflict of interest. if the husband should become a fugitive from justice or be in hiding as a defendant in a criminal case. In case of disagreement. (2) and (3). If the other spouse is not qualified by reason of incompetence. 108a) Art. 135. subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy. authorizes the resumption of said administration. (191a) Art. reconcile and resume common life. The revival of the former property regime shall be governed by Article 67. the husband's decision shall prevail. their addresses and the amounts owing to each. the spouses have been separated in fact for at least one year and reconciliation is highly improbable. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In case of disagreement. 124. Transfer of administration of exclusive property. (1441a) Art. 142 Art. or (4) When one spouse becomes a fugitive from justice or is in hiding as an accused in a criminal case. (3) That loss of parental authority of the spouse of petitioner has been decreed by the court. subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy. (4) That the spouse of the petitioner has abandoned the latter or failed to comply with his or her obligations to the family as provided for in Article 101. FC 142 cf NCC 196. the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the common properties. the court shall. In the absence of such authority or consent. With the conjugal partnership subsisting. 142. The agreement to revive the former property regime referred to in the preceding Article shall be executed under oath and shall specify: (1) The properties to be contributed anew to the restored regime. The administration of all classes of exclusive property of either spouse may be transferred by the court to the other spouse: (1) When one spouse becomes the guardian of the other. The recording of the ordering in the registries of property shall not prejudice any creditor not listed or not notified. FC 67. the court shall appoint a suitable person to be the administrator. The agreement of revival and the motion for its approval shall be filed with the court in the same proceeding for legal separation. FC 124 Art. the administration of all classes of property in the marriage may be transferred by the courts to the wife: (1) When she becomes the guardian of her husband. (n) Civil Code Art. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties. (3) When one spouse is sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for judicial separation of property: (1) That the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction. and (3) The names of all their known creditors. (2) When she asks for the declaration of his absence. No voluntary separation of property may thereafter be granted. he should have failed to provide for administration. (2) When one spouse is judicially declared an absentee. (206a) Art. 142. which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision. 135. being absolutely unable to administer. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. the husband's decision shall prevail. In the cases provided for in Numbers (1). being satisfied that the spouse granted the power of administration in the marriage settlements will not again abuse that power. 196. conflict of interest. If the other spouse is not qualified by reason of incompetence. Revival of property regime after JSP. and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (3) In case of civil interdiction of the husband. FC 96. with copies of both furnished to the creditors named therein. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership shall belong to both spouses jointly. 67. or any other just cause. FC 141 cf. the court shall appoint a suitable person to be the administrator. The courts may also confer the administration to the wife. with such limitation as they may deem advisable. and (6) That at the time of the petition. 141. or if. or any other just cause. (6) When the spouses who have separated in fact for at least one year. The spouses may. (3) When one spouse is sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction. The administration of all classes of exclusive property of either spouse may be transferred by the court to the other spouse: (1) When one spouse becomes the guardian of the other. (195a. However. (5) When parental authority is judicially restored to the spouse previously deprived thereof. or (4) When one spouse becomes a fugitive from justice or is in hiding as an accused in a criminal case.(195a) Art. (3) When the court. take measure to protect the interest of creditors and such order shall be recorded in the proper registries of properties. the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. unless the debtorspouse has sufficient separate properties to satisfy the creditor's claim.

35 (3). killed that other person's spouse. (82) Art. (85a) 1. for the contracting parties to appear personally before the solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife. 35 (2). however. (5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other. (55a) Art. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of public policy: (1) Between collateral blood relatives whether legitimate or illegitimate. 36. or (6) That either party was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible disease found to be serious and appears to be incurable. Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common. it shall be sufficient for one of the witnesses to the marriage to write the name of said party. unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage. 6. For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee. 44. unless such party after coming to reason. an absence of only two years shall be sufficient. (165a) I. FC 41. In the absence of descendants. (3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud. It shall be necessary. freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife. (7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes. properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts. 53. When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith. 41. For purposes of this Article. (3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law. unless the same having disappeared or ceased. 53. 35. (5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the other. No prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required. and (9) Between parties where one. the subsequent marriage shall be null and void. until after the termination of their cohabitation. the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. cf. (2) Between step-parents and step-children. A marriage contracted by any party who. 6. (3) Those solemnized without license. unless such party afterwards.contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. without the consent of the other. (As amended by Executive Order 227) Art. (144a) Art. a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household. shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. 36. in that order. up to the fourth civil degree. when the party at the point of death is unable to sign the marriage certificate. such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband and wife. without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (2) That either party was of unsound mind. the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation. live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage. (8) Between adopted children of the same adopter. except those covered the preceding Chapter. Property regime of unions without marriage Review: FC 6. and Art. or his or her own spouse. guardian or person having substitute parental authority over the party. (n) Art. This declaration shall be contained in the marriage certificate which shall be signed by the contracting parties and their witnesses and attested by the solemnizing officer. said marriage shall be void ab initio and all donations by reason of marriage and testamentary dispositions made by one in favor of the other are revoked by operation of law. for the contracting parties to appear personally before the solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife. with the intention to marry the other. 45. (5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child. It shall be necessary. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith. work or industry. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code.chan Art. with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud. 6. (4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force. which fact shall be attested by the solemnizing officer. 38. each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. NCC 144 Art. Either of the former spouses may marry again after compliance with the requirements of the immediately preceding Article. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants. and such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void. 44. the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. This declaration shall be contained in the marriage certificate which . 36. FC 45 (Void and voidable marriages) Art. existing at the time of the marriage: (1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen years of age or over but below twenty-one. (83a) Art. was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning: (2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages unless such marriages were contracted with either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal authority to do so. unless after attaining the age of twenty-one. In case of a marriage in articulo mortis. In the absence of proof to the contrary. and shall be owned by them in equal shares. and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parents. 38. 147. 35 (5). such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife. No prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required. (4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child. at the time of the celebration. 53. otherwise. however. Unions under FC 147. intimidation or undue influence. their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife. 35. In all cases. (6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter. such share shall belong to the innocent party.

A marriage contracted by any party who. with whom he had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation starting way back in 1982 Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the subsistence of. Begotten during the marriage were five children. or a criminal case for that matter. or their marriage is void from the beginning. Valdez sought the declaration of nullity of marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. (4) It is necessary to determine the parent with whom majority of the children wish to stay. was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage. To reiterate. 36. Sahlee and Sandee Cariño. and the second was on November 10. Ratio Decidendi: for purposes other than remarriage.R. 51 and 52 of the Family Code. with respondent Susan Yee Cariño (hereafter referred to as Susan Yee). The petitioner and respondent are also directed to start proceedings in the liquidation of their property as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code and to comply to Articles 50. Civil Code Art. July 31. except those covered the preceding Chapter. G. the subsequent marriage shall be null and void." Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage. 53. (2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages unless such marriages were contracted with either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal authority to do so. Respondent: Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of the decision directing compliance with Articles 50. before a party . under Article 40 of the Family Code. Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for the liquidation of common property in “unions without marriage”. 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife. In case of a marriage in articulo mortis. 1996 Facts: Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married January 5. 1971. Cariño v. (4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not failing under Article 41. 1992. (3) Those solemnized without license. the same may be read consistently with Article 129. Either of the former spouses may marry again after compliance with the requirements of the immediately preceding Article. otherwise. there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage. During the hearing on the motion. Cariño. claimed that she had no knowledge of the previous marriage and that she became aware of it only at the funeral of the deceased Issue(s): Whether or not properties purchased at the time the parties are living together are considered common property Held: Property regime applicable for bigamous marriage. with whom he had two offsprings. No. namely. 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code govern the disposition of the family dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared void ab initio. She asserted that the Family Code contained no provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of common property in "unions without marriage. and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of. legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child. therefore. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family. the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. including a marriage declared void by reason of the psychological incapacity of the spouses (3) Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages declared void ab initio on the ground of the psychological incapacity of a spouse. dissolution of property regime. with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cariño (hereafter referred to as Susan Nicdao). for purposes of remarriage. settlement of estate. For other purposes. the property relations of the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership (Art 147 Family Code). Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. though void. the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto 1st marriage void: first marriage lacked marriage license. at the time of the celebration. however. but they are not married. and (6) Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53. (2) Articles 50. the “death benefits” under scrutiny would now be awarded to respondent Susan Yee. such as but not limited to the determination of heirship. (n) VALDEZ VS. when the party at the point of death is unable to sign the marriage certificate. 1992. The trial court granted the petition. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning: (1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the consent of parents or guardians. it shall be sufficient for one of the witnesses to the marriage to write the name of said party. 122749. regardless of the cause thereof. which fact shall be attested by the solemnizing officer. Art. shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. 51 and 52 of the same code. however. (5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the other. (55a) Art. 35. no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. She.shall be signed by the contracting parties and their witnesses and attested by the solemnizing officer. (As amended by Executive Order 227) Art. In a petition. Issue: Whether or not the property regime should be based on coownership. Facts: Death benefits During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. void ab initio It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition. he contracted two marriages. Cariño (2001) GR 132539. that since the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is declared void ab initio. Arguments: Petitioner: Petitioner argues that: (1) Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties are psychological incapacitated. thereby declaring their marriage null and void on the ground of mutual psychological incapacity. the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. 1969. the first was on June 20. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT. the children filed a joint affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father. dated June 22. Stella and Joaquin were placed in the custody of their mother and the older children chose which parent they want to stay with.

namely. It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. 2011 FACTS: January 1998 petitioner and respondent got married. even if only one party earned the wages and the other did not contribute thereto. choosing instead to go on shopping sprees and gallivanting with her friends that depleted the family assets. Diño v Diño. 19 Conformably. personnel management. 4. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him or her exclusively. She accepted the offer and took care of the business‘ daily operations. The Court has ruled in Valdes v. which should be declared . Francisco. 2. or their marriage is void All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the property relations between petitioner and respondent. petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Niullity of Marriagw against respondent citing psychological incapacity under article 36. Petitioner further alleged that respondent was not faithful. Hence. 2nd marriage void: The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. however. For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply. and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code HELD: The court erred. Thus. Article 147 of the Family Code governs. are excluded in this regime For 1st marriage: Article 147 of the Family Code governs. Francisco admitted in a handwritten letter dated Sept. Party who didn‘t participate in acquisition by other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in acquisition if former‘s efforts consisted of care and maintenance of family and household.7 Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage. and had abandoned her responsibility to the family.Despite their marriage on Feb. RTC. his pizza business.Art 147 applies when )1) when man and woman capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other without benefit of marriage (2) when man and woman live together under void marriage o Presumption is anything acquired during both instances are obtained through joint efforts and shall be divided equally. the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is. 16 Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio. the property regime that applies is co-ownership under FC 147. Their union is without the benefit of marriage. In short. Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto. the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. Quezon City that in a void marriage. but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons. It later altered it to” A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued after liquidation. Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code. but rather. 12. The trial court declared their marriage void ab initio. Branch 102. 1997. 478 SCRA 327 Facts: Before they started living together on March 1977. This article applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage. 1989 that Erminda had helped in the management of the business and was not a mere housewife. 1979. GR 178004. to his legal heirs. both parties of the first marriage are presumed to be in good faith. children and household. contributions in the form of care of the home. one-half of the subject “death benefits” under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her share in the property regime. but whose marriage is nonetheless void. properties acquired by both parties during their union (under a void marriage) are presumed to have been obtained through joint efforts and will be owned by them in equal shares absent proof of the contrary.can enter into a second marriage. likewise. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife. Francisco Gonzales offered Erminda Gonzales to be his partner in Fiesta Pizza. otherwise. This article applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage. . void ab initio One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property of the spouses according to the applicable property regime. wages and salaries earned by either party during the cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided equally between them. Then too. the same was declared void under FC 36 on Feb. be governed by the provisions of Articles 147 and 148 Article 148 of the Family Code. intestate succession. January 19. the second marriage would also be void. 6. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the present case. the applicable property regime would not be absolute community or conjugal partnership of property. like the absence of a marriage license. his children with Susan Nicdao Gonzales vs Gonzales. Erminda then sought the dissolution of the conjugal partnership and claimed the pizza business to be conjugal property where she contributed to 80% of the total management. even if the disputed “death benefits” were earned by the deceased alone as a government employee. and to take over its operations. entitling the petitioner to share one-half thereof. which refers to the property regime of bigamous marriages. Petitioner alleged that respondent failed in her marital obligation to give love and support to him. . regardless of its cause. partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code” ISSUE: WON the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation. like the absence of a marriage license. but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons. or spiritual or moral inspiration. and the other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass by. the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. outlets supervision. and would at times become violent and hurt him. Hence. partition. Under the rules of co-ownership. The court ruled that A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only be issued upon compliance with Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Code. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other. Issue: WON properties should be divided equally between husband and wife Held: YES because the marriage was declared void. the business is co-owned and both Francisco and Erminda are presumed to have contributed jointly. For 2nd marriage: Article 148 applies. and met people during inspections. such as petitioner and respondent in the case before the Court. On May 2001. claimed that it was exclusive. and 3. the following elements must be present: 1.

x x x. shall be adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129. his or her shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article. 1973 Miguel married with nineteen-year-old Erlinda Agapay  May 17. (n) Bienvenido v. the Court ruled that the property relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. “[p]artition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. In the complaint. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another. Thus. In Valdes. Art. Herminia Palang  1979. 101736 issued in their names  September 23. property.600 a month while the other defendants promised to pay 1. (4) and (5) of Article 43 and by Article 44 shall also apply in the proper cases to marriages which are declared ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45. During the pendency of the action and in the absence of adequate provisions in a written agreement between the spouses. only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money.  Erlinda failed to persuade the court that she actually contributed money to buy the subject Riceland hence the riceland reverts to the first marriage  With respect to the house and lot. In the absence of proof to the contrary. Carlina Palang and her daughter Herminia Palang de la Cruz. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2000 FACTS: Mario and Lourdes Fernandez were plaintiffs in an action for ejectment filed against Guillerma. on February 15.void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties. there is a need to liquidate. Unions under FC 148 of FC 50 in rel.00 on September 23. The Court shall give paramount consideration to the moral and material welfare of said children and their choice of the parent with whom they wish to remain as provided to in Title IX. It shall also provide for appropriate visitation rights of the other parent. Tumlos vs Fernandez GR No. unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. he left to work in Hawaii  as early as 1957. jointly purchased a parcel of rice land. 1973. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit. their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. (3).000 a month which was not . Since the property relations of the parties in art 40 and 45 are governed by absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of gains. In the partition. the first wife  Under FC Article 148. 148. It must be stressed that actual contribution is required by this provision since it for relationships that have legal impediments o Art 147 is the law that recognizes relationships without legal impediment and proof of care and maintenance of family and household equates to joint effort. All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be notified of the proceedings for liquidation. or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. spouses Fernandez alleged that they are the absolute owners of an apartment building that through their tolerance they allowed the Tumlos’ to occupy the apartment for the last 7 years without payment of any rent. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article. Gina and Toto Tumlos. Two years later. That is not the case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code because the marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership. herein private respondents. 137650. Miguel had attempted to divorce Carlina in Hawaii  July 15. the Court shall provide for the support of the spouses and the custody and support of their common children. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code. 1981. instituted the case at bar. It was agreed that Guillerma will pay 1.000. In this case. 1975 Erlinda allegedly purchased a house and lot and title was issued in her name  October 30. 1949  October 1949. to FC 49(2) and FC 50 Art. The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith. April 12. If one of the parties is validly married to another. partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses. his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. what governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. Miguel and Cornelia Palang executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise agreement to settle and end a case filed by the latter. 1981. Miguel and Erlinda. petitioner’s marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 3615 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of Concubinage upon Carlina‘s complaint. an action for recovery of ownership and possession with damages of the house and lot together with the riceland Issue Who is the owner of the two pieces of property Held: Carlina. and the delivery of third presumptive legitimes. 49. (144a) Art.however the notary testified that the property was purchased by Miguel but put in the name of Erlinda.” It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage. The effects provided for by paragraphs (2). NO LIQUIDATION WAS MADE. The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation. The parties therein agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of six parcels of land to their only child. Miguel died  July 11. the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated. only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money. the custody and support of the common children. partition and distribute the properties before a decree of annulment could be issued. 1975. 50. 1975 when she was only 22 years old. CA 237 SCRA 676 Agapay vs Agapay 276 SCRA 340 Facts:  Miguel Palang married Carlina (or Cornelia) Vallesterol on July 16. Erlinda allegedly bought the same for P20.the transaction was essentially a void donation  Article 87 of the Family Code expressly provides that the prohibition against donations between spouses now applies to donations between persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage Compromise agreement entered into by Carliana and late Miguel is not a separation of property and should not be inferred as such. The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership.

427 SCRA 439 Facts: 1. Nicolas no longer lived with his family and cohabited with Pacita wherein Procopio is their illegitimate son. his right to prove ownership over the claimed properties was denied. 1926. Mario is validly married with Lourdes hence Guillerma and Mario are not capacitated to marry each other. They likewise acquired real and personal properties which were registered solely in respondent’s name. income. the illegitimate son was the one who receives the income from the said properties. 152. 4. in the absence of proof to the contrary. Nicolas then was the only person who received the income of the properties. 9. respondent denied that she and petitioner lived as husband and wife because they were still legally married at the time of cohabitation. 5. Hence. 6. She sought the reconveyance from Nicolas and Pacita several properties claiming that said properties are conjugal properties with Nicolas. Due to irreconcilable conflict. Under Article 148. And the latter replied that it is not yet time to talk about the said matter.[17] . 10. It was likewise alleged that they lived together in the said apartment building with their 2 children for about 10 years and that Gullerma administered the property by collecting rentals from the lessees until she discovered that Mario deceived her as to the annulment of their marriage. Out of the said marriage they begot 5 children. They established Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation during their union of which petitioner was the President and Chairman and respondent as Vice President and Treasurer. Eusebia filed a complaint against her husband Nicolas. not parties in the case. 2. which they claim is Pacita’s exclusive property. The property relation governing their supposed cohabitation is under Article 148 of the Family Code. if the parties are incapacitated to marry each other. Procopio. Adriano v CA. Defendants appealed to RTC that Mario and Guillerma had an amorous relationship and that they acquired the property in question as their love nest. and Ma. Nicolas is also a co-owner of a parcel of land which he inherited from his parents as well as the purchasers of hereditary shares. Furthermore.Eusebia died in 1996. property or industry. ISSUE: WON petitioner can validly claim his share in the acquired properties registered under the name of the respondent considering they both have subsisting relationship when they started living together. 328 SCRA 738 Malilin vs Castillo. Such dismissal is unjustified since both ends may be served by simply excluding from the action for partition the properties registered in the name of Steelhouse Realty and Eloisa Castillo. Elvira Castillo were alleged to be both married and with children but separated from their respective spouses and cohabited in 1979 while respective marriages still subsist. the claim of co-ownership still cannot be accepted. HELD: The Court ruled that trial court erred that parties who are not capacitated to marry each other and were living together could not have owned properties in common. the couple separated in 1992. From the time Nicolas suffered stroke until the present. Villanueva vs CA. Trial court dismissed the former and granted the latter. Such is not included in Art 148. Issue: WoN the subject properties are conjugal Held: YES Petitioners claim that the subject properties[16] are exclusive properties of Nicolas except for Lot No. Furthermore. Eusebia is the legal wife of Nicolas having been married to the latter on October 7. has no occupation and had no properties of her own. properties acquired by them through their joint contribution. The Family Code provisions on conjugal partnerships govern the property relations between Nicolas and Eusebia even if they were married before the effectivity of Family Code. Pacita from the time she lived in concubinage with Nicolas. Natividad went to Procopio to discuss about the properties. If actual contribution is not proven then there can be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares. 8. During their marriage they acquired real properties and all improvements. there is coownership even though the couples in union are not capacitated to marry each other. Petitioner then demanded his share from respondent in the subject properties but the latter refused alleging that said properties had been registered solely in her name. shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their contributions which. 3. work or industry. ISSUE: WON Guillerma is a co-owner of the said apartment under Article 148.complied with. In 1945. Actual contribution is required by the said provision in contrast to Art 147 which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household are regarded as contributions to the acquisitions of common property by one who has no salary. The claim was not satisfactorily proven by Guillerma since there were no other evidence presented to validate it except for the said affidavit. Even if the allegations of having cohabited with Mario and that she bore him two children were true. Nicolas suffered stroke and cannot talk and walk anymore. is presumed to be equal. Demand was made several times for the defendants to vacate the premises as they are in need of the property for the construction of a new building. The case was remanded to lower court for further proceedings. Natividad knew of Nicolas’ physical condition visited him at the hospital. when CA dismissed petitioner’s complaint for partition on grounds of due process and equity. Pacita and Procopio. 333 SCRA 628 FACTS: Eustaquio Mallilin Jr. 7. Petitioner filed complaint for partition of co-ownership shares while respondent filed a motion for summary judgment. HELD: SC rejected the claim that Guillerma and Mario were coowners of the subject property.

R.de Castro G. Eusebia died on 23 November 1996. Hence. The burden is on petitioners to prove that the subject properties are not conjugal. The burden of proving that a property is exclusive property of a spouse rests on the party asserting it and the evidence required must be clear and convincing. Since the subject properties. What petitioners fail to grasp is that Nicolas and Pacita’s cohabitation cannot work to the detriment of Eusebia. [26] Petitioners failed to meet this standard. the presumption is that they are conjugal. after the second child they parted ways. The cohabitation of a spouse with another person. The marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia continued to exist regardless of the fact that Nicolas was already living with Pacita.[25] The date of acquisition of Lot No. were acquired during the marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia. Under this regime only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution shall be owned by them in proportion to their contributions. The presumption in Article 116. which subsists “unless the contrary is proved. -CA reversed the TC! Saying that itwas the exclusive property of Yolanda.[26] Petitioners failed to meet this standard. subject properties were in fact acquired during the marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia. Nicolas and Eusebia were married on 7 October 1926. on whether Lot No. Pacita and Nicolas were married on 16 December 1996. are still presumed conjugal. Absent of proof of contribution. -Yolanda on the other hand said she bought it with her own funds. the presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code is that all these are conjugal properties of Nicolas and Eusebia. Moreover. and jewelry retail. the date of Nicolas and Eusebia’s marriage. The burden of proving that a property is exclusive property of a spouse rests on the party asserting it and the evidence required must be clear and convincing. Since the subject properties. They had 2 children.” stands as an obstacle to any claim the petitioners may have. until 23 November 1996. 152 is clearly during the marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia. The presumption in Article 116. the presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code is that all these are conjugal properties of Nicolas and Eusebia. the answer came from petitioners themselves. No. 2. Issues: WON the disputed property is the exclusive property of Yolanda Held: Yes Ratio: Since they are not capacitated to marr yeach other in their cohabitation. -Then Lupo filed a complaint against Yolanda for a judicial partition of a land between them in the Bel-Air subdivision -Lupo said Yolanda bought the said property with his own funds. -evidence of De Castro: job as accountant and business woman engaged in foreign currency trading. promisorry notes of dealings with clients. the legal spouse. 2006 Facts: -Lupo Atienza hired De Castro as accountant for his two corporations(Enrico Shipping Corporation andEurasian Maritime Corporation) in1983 -Then their relationship became intimate despite Lupo being a married man! They lived together in the later part of 1983. does not sever the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. including Lot No. a. FC 148 applies.[20] This is counter-balanced by the requirement that the properties must first be proven to have been acquired during the marriage before they are presumed conjugal. the law would be giving a stamp of approval to an act that is both illegal and immoral. The burden is on petitioners to prove that the subject properties are not conjugal. it shall be presumed to be equal. bank account statements. The tax declarations[23] covering the subject properties. all property acquired from 7 October 1926. which subsists “unless the contrary is proved. Petitioners themselves admit that Lot No. even for a long period. Atienza vs. and business transactions = had financial capacity on the other hand Atienza merely provided evidence . were acquired during the marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia. 152 was purchased on 4 October 1957. along with the unrebutted testimony of Eusebia’s witnesses. 3. 1695698. Thus. under the Family Code. 1.” stands as an obstacle to any claim the petitioners may have. money lending. the date of Eusebia’s death. including Lot No. establish this fact. Petitioners have neither claimed nor proved that any of the subject properties was acquired outside or beyond this period. 152 is conjugal or not. if the properties are acquired during the marriage. 29. 152. 152. -Trial Court said that the contested property is owned common by him and Yolanda and ordered the partition into two equal parts. Nov. He did not show any evidence that he contributed in the parcel of land while the accountant showed bank accounts which apparently shows that she was capacitated to buy the said land.Article 105[18] of the Family Code explicitly mandates that the Family Code shall apply to conjugal partnerships established before the Family Code without prejudice to vested rights already acquired under the Civil Code or other laws. b. The burden of proof is on the party claiming that they are not conjugal. Nicolas and Pacita started cohabiting in 1936.[33]Otherwise.

Mandaue City. . W/n petitioner has the right to the benefits against the illegitimate children? Held: No. 3) However. W/n petitioner has the right to the benefits against the illegitimate children? Held: No. 19862 and A Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 16. arrived in the Philippines in 1983. 1987 covering the properties in Agro-Macro Subdivision. respondent found a new boyfriend while Jambrich began to live with another woman in Danao City. saying Gina‘s 2 children are the primary beneficiariesunder the SSS Law -Says also that the marriage between Yolanda and Rodolfo is null and void because Rodolfo was still married with Editha -Yolanda files a petition with SocialSecurity Commission (SSC) along with awaiver of rights by Editha wherein Edithawaived all claims of benefits from SSS because she (Editha) was married to a diff person -SSC affirms the SSS Decision oDespite the new waiver by Editha. There is no merit to the petition1. adopted. and they have to be minors. 5) April 1991. saying Gina‘s 2 children are the primary beneficiaries under the SSS LawSays also that the marriage between Yolanda and Rodolfo is null and void because Rodolfo was still married with Editha -Yolanda files with SSC -SSC affirms the SSS Decision Issue:3. W/n petitioner‘s marriage with the deceased is valid?4. while Editha is the legal wife. 173582. There is no merit to the petition3. Cabancalan. he met respondent Antonietta OpallaDescallar. Jan. 2009 Facts: 1) Wilhelm Jambrich. Editha Espinosa (respondent) o Claimed death benefits (Oct 2001) o Claims that she is the legal wife -SSS denies Yolanda. O Gina‘s 2 minor children are entitled to 100% of the benefits o Has 2 minor children with Rodolfo o Claims that she and Yolanda were common law-wives. 638): O It defines who are dependents: Legal Spouse Legitimate. died onMay 21 2001. a separated mother of two boys who was working as a waitress at St. The existence of a prior marriage between Editha and Rodolfa is supported byevidence4. 24.W/n petitioner‘s marriage with the deceased is valid? 2. in the records he had designated Yolanda as primary beneficiaryand his 4 children with her as secondary beneficiaries. SSS member. Signey v SSS GR No. 19851 and March 10.that Yolanda had no such sufficient funds and didn‘t provide for evidence regarding his own capacity to pay for such property. and illegitimate child who is unmarried. Editha Espinosa (respondent) o Claimed death benefits (Oct 2001) o Claims that she is the legal wife -SSS denies Yolanda. 638): o It defines who are dependents: Spouse Legitimate. Jambrich and respondent were referred to as the buyers. 3. 4. when the Deed of Absolute Sale was presented for registration before the Register of Deeds. and illegitimate child who is unmarried. Thus they erased Jambrich‘s name from the document only retaining his signature in certain areas. Section 8(e) and (k) of RA 8282 is very clear (court applies statcon) (found in thecase pg. O Rodolfo had one legitimate child who diedearlier than he did O His children with Yolanda are all over 21years old O His children with Gina are qualified (them being minors) Issue: 1. SSC gave more weight to the confirmed marriage of Rodolfo and Editha o SSC: Mere designation by Rodolfo in the records of who his beneficiaries were is not a controlling factor -SSC then applies SSS Law (RA 8282)where it says that dependent legit / illegit children may be primary beneficiaries. 159310. In 1984. 2) In the Contracts to Sell dated November 18. not employed and is under 21 years old o Whoever claims entitlement benefits should establish his/her right by substantial evidence o Since petitioner is disqualified to be a beneficiary and bec the deceased has no legitimate child. Gina‘s 2 minor children are entitled to100% of the benefits Borromeo vs Descallar GR No. not employed and is under 21 years old O Whoever claims entitlement benefits should establish his/her right by substantial evidence O Since petitioner is disqualified to be a beneficiary and bec the deceased has no legitimate child. adopted. Section 8(e) and (k) of RA 8282 is very clear (found in the case pg. Feb. 2008 Facts: -Rodolfo Signey. an Austrian. -3 women started claiming his death benefits from SSS (in order) 1. it follows that the dependent illegitimate minor children of the deceased shall be entitled to the death benefits as primary beneficiaries. Jambrich and respondent fell in love and decided to live together. The existence of a prior marriage between Editha and Rodolfa is supported byevidence2. while Editha is the legal wife. registration was refused on the ground that Jambrich was an alien and could not acquire alienable lands of the public domain. Gina Servano (respondent) o Claimed death benefits (July 13 2001) o Has 2minor children with Rodolfo o Claims that she and Yolanda were common law-wives. Moritz Hotel. Yolanda Signey (petitioner) O Claimed death benefits first (July 6 2001) 2. 4) Jambrich also formally adopted respondent‘s two sons. 28. it follows that the dependent illegitimate minor children of the deceased shall be entitled to the death benefits as primary beneficiaries.

Furthermore the vice of alienage plaguing the sale of the property to Jambrich was in fact cured by the transfer of the property to the petitioner who is a Filipino citizen citing the case United Church Board for World Ministries v. To pay the debt he sold his rights to the Agro-Macro properties to the petitioner. 1991. and their seducer. (d) That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue. 9) Respondent denies the allegation citing that she had paid for the property solely and exclusively using the money from her copra business. 11) April 10. shall kill any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter. the same case must be dismissed. June 5. or otherwise extinguished. (5) The jurisdiction of courts. (3) Among brothers and sisters. the latter having paid nothing for the said properties. or relatives by affinity within the same degrees. Heirs of Maramag vs De Guzman. (b) That the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim. shall suffer the penalty of destierro. Brion’s Separate Opinion) IX. March 21. 20. 149. he discovered that titles to the three lots have been transferred in the name of respondent. 2035. Consequently. is a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects. alleging that the deed of sale issued for the property in favor of the respondent do not reflect the true agreement of the parties. he shall be exempt from punishment. (1814a) ROC Rule 16 Sec. it was proven in the RTC trial that the properties in question were in fact purchased from the exclusive funds of Wilhelm Jambrich who at the time of acquisition had sufficient income compared to the waitress‘ wages of the respondent. 7) On July 26. 1991. and adopted brothers and sisters. 2009 Lacbayan v Samoy.000. Jambrich could not have transferred a property he has no title thereto. or shall otherwise have consented to the . (e) That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause. 10) RTC rules for the petitioner (Borromeo) citing the proofs presented on the earning capacity of Jambrich at the time the property was purchased over the supposed earnings of the respondent from her Copra business (which were markedly fictional since the respondent was still working as a waitress for P1000 a month at the time of the purchase of the properties. (h) That the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff's pleading has been paid. (i) That the claim on which the action is founded is enforceable under the provisions of the statute of frauds. GR 181132. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances. petitioner filed a complaint against respondent for recovery of real property before the Regional Trial Court. As such the purchase of the property could clearly be attributed Janbrich and subsequently to the petitioner. descendants. under the same circumstances. 218a) B. or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury. 151. In 1989.chanrobles virtual law library Any person who shall promote or facilitate the prostitution of his wife or daughter. Held: NO. while the daughters are living with their parents. (4) Future support. — Any legally married person who having surprised his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made. Family relations include those: (1) Between husband and wife. FAMILY RELATIONS A. (1a) RPC 20. This rules shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code. — Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim.R.chanrobles virtual law library These rules shall be applicable. Thus. family relations are governed by law and no custom. Issues: WON Respondent has a right over the said property. being the foundation of the nation. (g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action. 247. (222a) NCC 2035 Art. (2) Between parents and children. 2002 Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. the title of the subject property is not in the name of Jambrich but in the name of defendant-appellant. The family. when petitioner sought to register the deed of assignment. (f) That the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment or by the statute of limitations. No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid: (1) The civil status of persons. CA sides w/ respondent citing: In the case at bar. Grounds. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made. whether of the full or halfblood. Jambrich purchased an engine and some accessories for his boat from petitioner. and that the subject property has already been mortgaged. Accessories who are exempt from criminal liability. — The penalties prescribed for accessories shall not be imposed upon those who are such with respect to their spouses.00.6) Jambrich met petitioner Camilo F. Art. 247 and 332 Art. (6) Future legitime. natural. G. Borromeo sometime in 1986. No. Effects of family relationship on legal disputes FC 150 – 151 Art. (3) Any ground for legal separation. 165427. waived. (2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation. for which he became indebted to the latter for about P150. 1(j) RULE 16 Motion to Dismiss Section 1. abandoned. (c) That venue is improperly laid. ascendants. (216a. (217a) . with the single exception of accessories falling within the provisions of paragraph 1 of the next preceding article. practice or agreement destructive of the family shall be recognized or given effect. 8) On August 2. 2011 (see J. to parents with respect to their daughters under eighteen years of age. 150.chanrobles virtual law library If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind. legitimate. and (j) That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with. FC 149 Art. Sebastian Art. What governs family relations. a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds: (a) That the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defending party. but that the same have failed.

and 3. died on January 6. but only civil liability. constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of a family. beconstrued in the light of Art. in lieu of the decedent. that Annex "A" to the complaint is fictitious." This phrase. of the heirs of the deceased SilvestreGayon. Sept. Brothers and sisters and brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law. "members of the same family. and. The family home 1. (227a.including the improvements thereon. G. 156.She prayed. by virtue of a deed of sale — copy of which was attached to thecomplaint. moreover. municipality of Guimbal. itfollows that the same does not come within the purview of Art. It is so ordered. The family home must be part of the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership. 222.Tribiana. (223a) Art. that he had.WHEREFORE. or any of their heirs or successors. 228a) Art. sold the aforementioned land to plaintiff Pedro Gayon for the sum of P614. For purposes of availing of the benefits of a family home as provided for in this Chapter. 332. and that being abrother of the deceased Silvestre Gayon. 1967.00".(4) Among brothers and sisters. Gayon alleged that herhusband. therefore. h owever. long before theinstitution of this case. G. subject to the limitations in article 2035. that said right o f redemption had not been exercised by Silvestre Gayon. Spouses. as defendan t ordefendants therein. Wainwright v. in the absence of such administrator or executor. introduced thereon improvements worthP1. 26 SCRA 78 Magbaleta vs Gonong. Acuña.It is noteworthy that the impediment arising from this provision appliesto suits "filed or maintained between members of the same family. that said Pedro Gelera and his wife Estelita Damasohad.(3) Among other ascendants and their descendants. Genoveva deGayon. 156. The family home. a parcel of unregistered land therein described. 161. It may also be constituted by an unmarried head of a family on his or her own property. 36 SCRA 104 FACTS: The records show that on July 31. Gayon. No. What constitutes the family home.(2) Between parent and child. a person may constitute. for the su m of P500. that the heirs of Silvestre Gayon had to "employ the services of counsel for a fee of P500.In her answer to the complaint. and for further proceedings. not inconsistent with this decision.R. fully paid the taxes on said property upto 1967.chanrobles virtual law library 2. since 1961. 222 of our Civil Code provides:No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should appear that earnestefforts toward a compromise have been made. 154132. 13. that the complaint ismalicious and had embarrassed her and her children.00.chanrobles virtual law library The exemption established by this article shall not be applicable to strangers participating in the commission of the crime. asAnnex "A" — whereby they sold to Pedro Gelera.R. subject to redemption within five(5) years or not later than October 1. August 31. 152. and locatedin the barrio of Cabubugan. NO. ascendants and descendants. whereas her children are hisnephews and/or nieces. only one family home. Gayon v. FC 152. said spousesexecuted a deed — copy of which was attached to the complaint. 161 Art. accordingly. Who may constitute the family home.000.and plaintiff's failure to seek a compromise before filing the complaintdoes not bar the same. (223a) . it being an exception to the general rule — a nd SilvestreGayon must necessarily be excluded as party in the case at bar. 76 SCRA 511 Tribiana vs. FC 161 Art. 1954. of the administrator or executor of the estate of Silvestre Gayon. HELD: As regards plaintiff's failure to seek a compromise. praying that anorder be issued in plaintiff's favor for the consolidation of ownership inand to the aforementioned property.00 and incurred expenses of at least P200. 1961. Versoza. forthe signature thereon purporting to be her signature is not hers. 152.Gayon that anearnest effort toward a compromise before the filing of the suit istenable. 1957. swindling or malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by the following persons: 1. shall result from the commission of the crime of theft. or. that the same be dismissed and that plaintiff besentenced to pay damages." should. FC 152.chanrobles virtual law Art. province of Iloilo. is the dwelling house where they and their family reside. alleging substantially that. The widowed spouse with respect to the property which belonged to the deceased spouse before the same shall have passed into the possession of another. or be the beneficiary of. as Annex "B" — dated March 21. Mrs. if living together.00. Inasmuch as none of them is included in theenumeration contained in said Art. is the dwelling house where they and their family reside. on October 1. if any. constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of a family.Mrs. despite the expiration of theperiod therefor. 1952. Genovevade Gayon. (n) 2. but that thesame have failed. The family home. and the land on which it is situated.with the costs of this instance against defendant-appellee. the order appealed from is hereby set aside and the caseremanded to the lower court for the inclusion. ISSUE : Whether or not the contention of the Mr. Art. Nevertheless. thatneither she nor her deceased husband had ever executed " anydocument of whatever nature in plaintiff's favor". 2006 C.that plaintiff had. or relatives by affinity in the same line. plaintiff "did not exert effortsfor the amicable settlement of the case" before filing his complaint.infidelity of the other spouse shall not be entitled to the benefits of this article. 137359. — No criminal. property that is the subject of a conditional sale on installments where ownership is reserved by the vendor only to guarantee payment of the purchase price may be constituted as a family home. 217 — which should be construedstrictly. as an allege dobstacle to the present case. Silvestre Gayon. or of the exclusive properties of either spouse with the latter's consent. 2004 Hiyas Savings vs. 217 of the same Code. and the land on which it is situated. and that Articles 1606 and 1616 of our Civil Code require a judicial decree for the consolidation of the title in and to a lan dacquired through a conditional sale. pursuant to which:Family relations shall include those:(1) Between husband and wife. Pedro Gayon filed saidcomplaint against the spouses Silvestre Gayon and Genove va deGayon. Gayon is plaintiff's sister-inlaw. Persons exempt from criminal liability.

and (2) Their parents. For purposes of availing of the benefits of a family home as provided for in this Chapter. (2) It is intransmissible.As to the first requisite. FC 155. (4) It cannot becompromised. the court shall decide. Dario IV. extrajudicially settled his estateThereafter. Dario died intestate. Marcelino Marc Dario and private respondent Marcelino G. When terminated. He was survived by his wife. Beneficiaries. The beneficiaries of a family home are: (1) The husband and wife. a person may constitute. 170829. 199 Art. (2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home. Marcelino Marc and. the property may be occupied by the “beneficiaries” enumerated in Article 154 of the Family Code. also known as Ino. the son of private respondent and grandson of the decedent Marcelino V. the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution. G. (238a) 5. 159. forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law. FC 153 compare with FC 159 Art. (223a) 4. alienated. 153. Dario.Petitioner Perla. The term “descendants” contemplates all descendants of the person or persons who constituted the family home withoutdistinction. (3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution. Among theproperties he left was a parcel of land with a residential house and a pre-school building built thereon. as to the third requisite.However. Dario IV is dependent on legal supportnot from his grandmother. (2) they live in the family home. brothers and sisters. (n) 3. The family home shall be exempt from execution. Marcelino III. has been living in the family homesince 1994. No. Held: The law explicitly provides that occupancy of the family home either by the owner thereof or by “any of its beneficiaries” must be actual . Dario.who are living in the family home and who depend upon the head of the family for legal support. Marcelino Lorenzo R.R. he satisfies the second requisite. 2006 Facts: Marcelino V. ascendants. Perla and Marcelino Marc formally advised Marcelino III of their intention topartition the subject property and terminate the co-ownership. descendants. 158. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property orconstituted the family home.Art. need not be by the owner of thehouse specifically. the grandson of the decedent. 194-196. oran unmarried person who is the head of a family. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family home. He argued that as long as the minor is living in thefamily home. Hence petitioner andMarcelino Marc instituted an action for partition. but from his father.Legal support has the following characteristics: (1) It is personal. The law first imposes the obligation of legalsupport upon the shoulders of the parents. FC 160 Art. hence.Article 154 of the Family Code enumerates who are the beneficiaries of a family home: (1) Thehusband and wife. who are living in the family home and who depend upon the head of the family for legal support. 159. The family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of ten years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary. (5) It is free from attachment or execution. Marcelino Lorenzo R. (3) It cannot be renounced.ascendants. Issue: Whether or not the partition of the family home is proper where one of the co-owners refuse toaccede to such partition on the ground that a minor beneficiary still resides in the said home. 155. however. FC 154. and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. only one family home. whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate. Private respondent refused to partitionthe property claiming that the subject property which is the family home duly constituted by spousesMarcelino and Perla Dario cannot be partitioned while a minor beneficiary is still living therein namely. petitioner Perla G. or an unmarried person who is the head of a family. and only in their default is theobligation imposed on the grandparents. Dario IV’s parents. In case of conflict. 154. minor beneficiaries must be actually living in the family home to availof the benefits derived from Art. the same continues as such until the beneficiary becomes of age. (226a) Art. Exemptions. and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. assigned or encumbered by the owner or owners thereof with the written consent of the person constituting the same. (235a) Patricio vs. and (2) Their parents. especially the father. brothers and sisters. 161. Dario III. Patricio andtheir two sons. Article 159 of the Family Code provides that the family home shall continue despitethe death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of 10 years or foras long as there is a minor beneficiary. Actual occupancy. (7) It is variable in amount. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. But the law definitely excludes maids and overseers. which may include the in-laws where the family home is constituted jointly bythe husband and wife. brothers and sisters.Moreover.his 12-yearold son. November 20. donated. hence. whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate. When deemed constituted. and (2) Their parents. the beneficiaries of the family home are: (1) The husband and wife. Dario IV cannot demand support fromhis paternal grandmother if he has parents who are capable of supporting him. the latter's spouse. Marcelino Lorenzo R. whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate. forced sale or attachment except: (1) For nonpayment of taxes. or be the beneficiary of. and a majority of the beneficiaries of legal age. ascendants. The liability for legalsupport falls primarily on Marce lino Lorenzo R. 154 of the Family Code. descendants. three requisites must concur: (1) they must be amongthe relationships enumerated in Art. herein private respondent who is the head of his immediate family.To be a beneficiary of the family home. The family home may be sold. descendants. Rather. (6) It is reciprocal. and (3)they are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family. 158. and . or within 10 years from the death of the decedent. FC 157. FC 153 Art.As to the second requisite. or an unmarried person who is the head of a family. especially his father. They are not thebeneficiaries contemplated by the Code. it must necessarily include the grandchildren and great grandchildren of the spouseswho constitute a family home. based on family ties which bindthe obligor and the obligee.

Then. 160. The decision became final and executory so a writ of . if the value of the currency changes after the adoption of this Code. spouses Fortaleza executed on January 28. The excess. shall be delivered to the judgment debtor. All others are deemed to be rural areas. only one family home. For purposes of availing of the benefits of a family home as provided for in this Chapter. 180587. no bid below the value allowed for a family home shall be considered. Thus. the same rule and procedure shall apply.M. the creditors applied for extrajudicial foreclosure of the Real Estate Mortgage before the Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of Calamba City. 248a) Art. alienated. they were issued a Certificate of Sale that was registered with the Registry of Deeds of Calamba City. The proceeds shall be applied first to the amount mentioned in Article 157. GR No. 13th month pay &service incentive leave pay. The actual value of the family home shall not exceed. which was even notarized by their original counsel of record. urban areas are deemed to include chartered cities and municipalities whose annual income at least equals that legally required for chartered cities. And assuming that the property is exempt from forced sale. When a creditor whose claims is not among those mentioned in Article 155 obtains a judgment in his favor." In this case. or be the beneficiary of.(4) For debts due to laborers. 2001. 248a) 7. the patriarch of herein petitioners. 2003 and the registration of the subject property in their names on February 4. 8. a company owned by Ernesto M. The provisions in this Chapter shall also govern existing family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable. donated. the value most favorable for the constitution of a family home shall be the basis of evaluation. and he has reasonable grounds to believe that the family home is actually worth more than the maximum amount fixed in Article 157. materialmen and others who have rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building. or by any of the beneficiaries. and then to the liabilities under the judgment and the costs. For purposes of this Article. 162. 1998 a deed of Real Estate Mortgage over the subject property. 2004. and a majority of the beneficiaries of legal age. the latter's spouse. (n) Art. The one-year redemption period expired without the spouses Fortaleza redeeming the mortgage. March 20. Laguna (subject property). or such amounts as may hereafter be fixed by law. 1998 a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over their residential house and lot situated in Barrio Anos. and two hundred thousand pesos in rural areas. if any. builders. by the owner or owners of the property. assigned or encumbered by the owner or owners thereof with the written consent of the person constituting the same. there is no doubt that spouses Fortaleza voluntarily executed on January 28..R. 157. by the owner or owners of the property. spouses Lapitan executed an affidavit of consolidation of ownership on November20. The family home may be sold. (247a. In case of conflict. a person may constitute. Raul Lapitan and his wife R ona emerged as the highest bidders. When a creditor whose claims is not among those mentioned in Article 155 obtains a judgment in his favor. The proceeds shall be applied first to the amount mentioned in Article 157. or by any of the beneficiaries. (247a. Ramos. 158. 2005 Cabang vs Basay. Issue: Whether or not the Honorable court of appeals gravely erred i n not holding that thepetitioners were prevented by the respondent from exercising their right of redemption over the foreclosed property by demanding a redemption over the foreclosed property by demanding a redemption price of a highly equitable and more than double the amount of the foreclosed property. The labor arbiter ordered Ramos and the company to pay the respondents’ back -wages. the court shall decide. Rights of creditors. If the increased actual value exceeds the maximum allowed in Article 157 and results from subsequent voluntary improvements introduced by the person or persons constituting the family home. Municipality of Los Baños. At the execution sale. shall be delivered to the judgment debtor. When spouses Fortaleza failed to pay the indebtedness including the interests and penalties. The court shall so order if it finds that the actual value of the family home exceeds the maximum amount allowed by law as of the time of its constitution. FC 160-162 Art. 185920 July 20. Inc. and he has reasonable grounds to believe that the family home is actually worth more than the maximum amount fixed in Article 157. the spouses Fortaleza refused spouses Lapitan’s formal demand to vacate and surrender possession of the subject property. 25. At the execution sale. When may be sold. In any event. The public auction sale was set on May 9. (243a) Art. The court shall so order if it finds that the actual value of the family home exceeds the maximum amount allowed by law as of the time of its constitution. the same rule and procedure shall apply.R. G. The excess. 160. architects. at the time of its constitution. FC 158 Art. 2009 Fortaleza v Lapitan. no bid below the value allowed for a family home shall be considered. 161. If the increased actual value exceeds the maximum allowed in Article 157 and results from subsequent voluntary improvements introduced by the person or persons constituting the family home. separation pay. Despite the foregoing. mechanics. GR 166333. the amount of the three hundred thousand pesos in urban areas. the creditors’ son Dr. At the sale. 178288 August 15. (n) Ramos v Pangilinan. he may apply to the court which rendered the judgment for an order directing the sale of the property under execution. G. 2010 Facts: Respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against E. As security. (231a) Art. and then to the liabilities under the judgment and the costs. 2012 Facts: Spouses Charlie and Ofelia Fortaleza obtained a loan from spouses Rolando and Amparo Lapitan (creditors). he may apply to the court which rendered the judgment for an order directing the sale of the property under execution. No. (235a) Honrado v CA. spouses Fortaleza did not set up and prove to the Sheriff such exemption from forced sale before it was sold at the public auction. No. Ramos Electric. Ruling: The Supreme Court held that Article 155(3) of the Family Code explicitly allows the forced sale of a family home "for debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution. Nov. especially that the foreclosed mortgaged property is the family home of petitioners and their children. if any.

In the present case. Injunction and Annulment of Extrajudicial Foreclosure Sale” seeking to enjoin the impending foreclosure sale. Alleging that the Pandacan property was the family home. the debts incurred for which the exemption does not apply as provided under Art. De Mesa (Spouses De Mesa). . Clearly. In both instances. 185064. August 11. Thereafter. and its value must not exceed certain amounts depending upon the area where it is located. It must be emphasized that an application for injunctive relief is construed strictly against the pleader. T221755 (M) on the basis that the subject property is a family home which is exempt from execution under the Family Code. seeking to nullify TCT No. 2010 Facts: Respondent-spouses Oscar and Evangeline Martinez obtained a loan from petitioner Equitable PCI Bank secured by a real estate mortgage over a condominium unit in San Miguel Court. the same will not exempt it from foreclosure as Article 155 (3) of the same Code allows the execution or forced sale of a family home “for debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution. Respondent spouses filed a civil case or “Temporary Restraining Order (‘TRO’). 165950. 1988. the law protecting the family home cannot apply thereby making the levy upon the Pandacan property valid. hence.750 sq. Moreover. Issue: Whether or not respondent-spouses have shown a clear legal right to enjoin the foreclosure and public auction of the third-party mortgagor’s property while the case for annulment of REM on said property is being tried? Ruling: No.. the appellate court seriously erred in sustaining the trial court’s orders granting respondents’ application for preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC’s Decision. since petitioners claim that the family home was constituted prior to August 3. whether as majority stockholder or creditor. G. where the spouses are residing. G. acquired the ownership of a parcel of land formerly owned by petitioners Araceli Oliva-De Mesa and Ernesto S. However. Metro Manila. its constitution must have been with consent of the other. There being absolutely no proof that the Pandacan property was judicially or extra judicially constituted as the Ramos’ family home. Ramos and the company moved to quash the writ of execution. or if exclusively by one spouse. Acero Jr. at least insofar as the unencumbered area in excess of 180. However. Spouses De Mesa filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC).. 2012 FACTS: Claudio D. Meanwhile. respondents Acero and his wife Rufina (Spouses Acero) leased the subject property to its former owners who then defaulted in the payment of the rent. In their defense. is exempt from forced sale or execution under Article 155 of the Family Code. If the family home was constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before August 3. Articles 240 to 242 governs extrajudicial constitution.155 for which the family home is made answerable must have been incurred after August 3. the application should clearly allege facts and circumstances showing the existence of the requisites. is a family corporation. Petitioner. on the other hand. is entirely inconsistent with the clear contractual agreement of the real estate mortgage.then it must have been constituted either judicially or extra-judicially as provided under Articles 225. No. distinction must be made as to what law applies based on when it was constituted and what requirements must be complied with by the judgment debtor or his successors claiming such privilege. For the family home to be exempt from execution. m. Pursuant to respondent-spouses failure to settle the obligation. Inc. De Mesa v Acero. Hence. will not suffer any loss if the foreclosure will not proceed. there is no need to constitute extra judiciall y or judicially. the claim for exemption must be proved. On the other hand. Pasig City.R. Ruling: Yes. and the exemption iseffective from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries under Art. thereby raising issue on the mortgaged condominium unit being a family home and not corporate property. No. exempt from execution tosatisfy the judgment award. Issue: Whether or not the levy upon the Pandacan property was valid. respondent OJ-Mark Trading. The trial court granted the issuance of preliminary injunction.execution was issued which the Deputy Sheriff of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) implemented by levying a property in Ramos’ name situated in Pandacan. two sets of rules are applicable. 153 of the Family Code. Martinez. the RTC dismissed their complaint. this appeal. Hence. Assuming arguendo that the mortgaged condominium unit constitutes respondents’ family home. Unable to collect the rentals due. for family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3. or as early as 1944. The rule requires that in order for a preliminary injunctionto issue. Respondent-spouses’ alleged “proprietary right” in the mortgaged condominium unit appears to be based merely on respondents’ averment that respondent OJ-Mark Trading. January 16. Equitable PCI Bank v. The MTC ruled in Spouses Acero’s favor. The motion was denied and the appeal was likewise denied by the NLRC. in which they were residing since 1997. and thus. 1988. Valle Verde 5. 1988. the family home should belong to the absolute community or conjugal partnership. being the highest bidder.229-231 and 233 of the Civil Code. petitioner initiated the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage by filing an ex parte petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). there is neither allegation nor evidence to show prima facie that such purported right. 154actually reside therein. Inc. Further. 1988. Spouses Acero filed a complaint for ejectment with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) against Spouses De Mesa. The mortgage was signed by respondent Oscar Martinez both as a principal debtor and as a president of the registered owner and third-party mortgagor. Rationale: The court ruled that the claim of exemption under Art. The property was sold at a public auction after Spouses De Mesa failed to pay the loan they secured from Acero. One of the contentions raised by respondent-spouses was that that theextrajudicial foreclosure will cause grave injustice and irreparableinjury to respondentspouses and their four (4) young children because their family home. Respondents argued that it is not the family home there being another one in Antipolo and that thePandacan address is actually the business address.R. they must comply with t he procedure mandated by the CivilCode. was superior to that of petitioner as creditor-mortgagee. could have not been validly levied upon for purposes of satisfying their unpaid loan.” Respondents thus failed to show an ostensible right that needs protection of the injunctive writ.

is generally exempt from execution. March 20. from the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein. For all intents and purposes. Acuña. it is incumbent upon the De Mesa to invoke and prove the same within the prescribed period and it is not the sheriff’s duty to presume or raise the status of the subject property as a family home. It cannot be seized by creditors except in certain special cases. the family home is a sacred symbol of family love and is the repository of cherished memories that last during one’s lifetime. 26 SCRA 78 Magbaleta vs Gonong. 2006 Heirs of Maramag vs De Guzman. waived or declined to assert it. this right can be waived or be barred by laches by the failure to set up and prove the status of the property as a family home at the time of the levy or a reasonable time thereafter. Nov. Honrado v CA. 165427. It is likewise without dispute that the family home. NO. GR 181132.R. 13. 2009 Wainwright v. 2005 Cabang vs Basay. No. The family home is a real right. 25. Sept. 328 SCRA 738 Bienvenido v. the negligence of Petitioners De Mesa or their omission to assert their right within a reasonable time gives rise to the presumption that they have abandoned. CA 237 SCRA 676 Sales v Sales. G.R. 2004 Hiyas Savings vs. GR 166333. GR No. which is gratuitous.ISSUE: Whether or not the family home is exempted from execution HELD: Petition DENIED. 2009 Lacbayan v Samoy. forced sale or attachment. 137359. August 31. Versoza.Tribiana. Indeed. . However. G. No. G. 154132. Since the exemption under Article 153 of the Family Code is a personal right. 76 SCRA 511 Tribiana vs. 180587. 2011 Adriano v CA. June 5. inalienable and free from attachment. March 21.R.