LEON & GHEZZI v.

MANUFACTUERS LIFE INSURANCE (1951) FACTS: Butler who died in New York, left a will which was duly probated in New York County. The will contained a residuary clause bequeathing the remaining estate after the payment of the obligations of the estate to De Leon who is to receive an amount sufficient for her current needs. Ross, the trustee, bought an annuity from the ManuLife in Canada. The contract stipulates for a monthly payment to De Leon during her lifetime. De Leon wanted to claim the entire amount. She presented the will for probate in CFI, Manila with Ghezzi as administrator. ISSUE: WON De Leon can claim the entire amount in the contract HELD: NO. Sec. 4, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court provides in part: o Estate, how administered. When a will is thus allowed, the court shall grant letters testamentary, or letters of administration with the will annexed, and such letters testamentary or of administration, shall extend to all the estate of the testator in the Philippines In this case, the funds in question are outside the jurisdiction of the probate court of Manila. Having been invested in an annuity in Canada under a contract executed in the country, Canada is the suits of the money. There is no showing or allegation that the funds have been transferred or removed to the Manila Branch. Also, even if the money were in the hands of the Manila Branch, it no longer forms part of the estate and is beyond the control of the court. o It has passed completely into the hands of the company by virtue of the contract. Neither the domiciliary or ancillary executor of Butler's will, nor the trustee, nor the annuitant has disposition of any of these funds beyond the amounts and except upon the conditions agreed upon in the contract for annuity.

OZAETA v. PECSON (1953) FACTS: Palanca died and he left a will naming Ozaeta, former SC Justice, as executor if Roxas fails to qualify. Roxas predeceased Palanca so Ozaeta filed petition for probate of Palancas will with the prayer that he be appointed special administrator. Heirs of Palanca opposed. Court appointed Phil Trust Co. as administrator. Ozaeta argues that the reason why the judge did not appoint him is because of the judge's personal dislike for him. ISSUE: WON a probate court committed an abuse of discretion if, pending an appeal against its order of probate and appointing as judicial administrator the person named therein as executor, it appoints as special administrator any person other than the executor named in the will HELD: YES The choice of his executor is a precious prerogative of a testator, a necessary concomitant of his right to dispose of his property in the manner he wishes. When a will has been admitted to probate, it is the duty of the court to issue letters testamentary to the person named as executor upon his application (23 C.J. 1023). It is the testator that appoints his executor, as the question as to his peculiar fitness for such a position or his want of ability to manage the estate cannot be addressed to the discretion of the county judge. (Holbrook vs. Head). In the case at bar, the will has already been admitted to probate, and the judge himself has expressly appointed petitioner as administrator. The only reason or ground, therefore, for suspending his appointment, is a very technical one. It also appears that the PhilTrust Company, which had acted as special administrator for a period of only a few months, has submitted a bill for P90,000. This would cut deep into the income of the estate, and if the new special administrator appointed by the judge takes office, it is not improbable that the estate may again be subjected to the same expensive cost of administration. Under these circumstances, it would seem unreasonable to refuse to appoint the petitioner as special administrator.

NGO THE HUA v. CHUNG KIAT HUA (1963) FACTS: Ngo The Hua, claiming to be surviving spouse of the deceased, filed a petition to be appointed administratrix. Her petition was opposed by those claiming to be the children of the deceased. They claim that Ngo The Hua is morally and physically unfit to execute the duties as administratrix, and that they have secured an absolute divorce in Taiwan. They prayed the Chung Kiat Hua, allegedly the eldest child, be appointed administrator instead. Chung Kiat Kang, claiming be a nephew of the deceased, filed his opposition to the appointment of either Ngo The Hua or Chung Kiat Hu. The lower court found that Ngo The Hua and the deceased were validly divorced, and that Chung Kiat Hua, Lily Chung Cho, Bonifacio Chung Siong Pek and Chung Kiat Bio are children of the deceased. So it issued the order appointing Chung Kiat Hua as administrator of the estate of Chung Liu. ISSUE: WON it was proper for the court to pass upon the validity of the divorce and filiation in order to determine the rightful administrator HELD: YES A cursory reading of Sec. 1, Rule 91 discloses that what the court is enjoined from doing is the assignment or distribution of the residue of the deceased's estate before the obligations chargeable to the estate are first paid. Nowhere from said section may it be inferred that the court cannot make a declaration of heirs prior to the satisfaction of these obligations. In this case, it was deemed necessary by the lower court to determine the relationship of the parties to be able to appoint an administrator in accordance with the order preference established in Section 5, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court. Said section provides that letters of administration shall be granted to the surviving spouse the next of kin, or to any principal creditor, in this order. Since these applicants were asking for the letter of administration on the theory that they are preferred, the court necessarily had to pass first on the truth of their respective claims of relationship. Also, what the court actual decided is the relationships between the deceased and the parties to determine who among them is entitled to the administration, not who are his heirs who are entitled to share in his estate. This issue of heirship is one to be determined in the decree of distribution.

TORRES v. JAVIER (1916) FACTS: Torres and a Chinese woman, Yu Teng New claim to be the legal wives of the deceased. Torres objected to the appointment of any one except herself, while Tan Poo, on behalf of the Chinese woman, opposed the appointment of Torres. The probate court being unable to determine who, if either, was the lawful wife of the deceased, appointed a disinterested third person to act as administrator. ISSUE: WON it was proper for the court to appoint a third person as administrator HELD: YES Section 642 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires that letters of administration should be granted, first, to the surviving husband or wife; second, to other relatives in the order named; third, in case the surviving wife or next of kin or person selected by them be unsuitable, the administration may be granted to some other person, such as one of the principal creditors; and fourth, if there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, the administration may go to such person as the court may appoint. In this case, the probate court did not find as a fact that there was a wife in China; nor does his appointment of a third person determine the fact of the existence of another wife in China. The court considered the facts and circumstances as they were presented in the proceedings and upon the whole believed it for the best interest of all concerned to appoint as administrator a disinterested third person, particularly in view of the fact that there was likely to be litigation between Torres and the Chinese wife as to which is in fact his legal wife and entitled to an interest in the estate of the deceased Tan Po Pic.

TORRES v. SICAT (1953) FACTS: Morales, married to Sicat, died. Torres alleging to be a creditor of the conjugal partnership commenced a petition for the issuance of letter of administration in favor of Atty. De Jesus, for the purpose of settling the estate of the deceased. The widow opposed and claimed preference to be appointed as administratrix. Judge issued an order appointing Atty. De Jesus. ISSUE: WON the appointment of Atty. De Jesus should be upheld HELD: NO The order of preference provided in Sec. 6, Rule 79 is founded on the assumption that the persons preferred are suitable. If they are not, the court may entirely disregard the preference thus provided. But, of course, the order of preference may be disregarded only when the reasons therefor are positive and clear." (Moran, Comments) In this case, the judge stated that the reason for disregarding the preference is hostility of the wife to the creditors by openly disputing their credits. However, at the hearing, this widow practically did nothing more than to inform the alleged creditors, "prove your credit before I honor it." That is not necessarily dishonest nor contrary to real creditors. And then, not having opposed all creditors, because she did not deny the estate's liability to the People's Bank, she could not strictly be considered hostile to the creditors. On the other hand, the appealed order conceding that the evidence "showed clearly that the surviving widow is fully competent in a high degree to administer the intestate of her deceased husband," plainly indicates that except for her supposed hostility to creditors she was suitable for the trust.

DE GUZMAN v. LIMCOLIOC (1939) FACTS: This case is an appeal by Limcolioc questioning the appointment of Nicolasa, a child of the deceased Proceso of the first marriage, as administrator. She argues that being the legal wife, she is preferred in for the said appointment. ISSUE: WON preference of the wife to be appointed as administrator is absolute HELD: NO. Nicolasa de Guzman v. Angela Limcolioc o The principal consideration reckoned with in the appointment of the administrator of the estate of a deceased person is the interest in said estate of the one be appointed as such administrator. The preference established by law is not absolute, if there are other reasons justifying the appointment of an administrator other than the surviving spouse. In this case, The appointed co-administrator, Apolinario as brother of Nicolasais as interested as his sister in that said properties be duly administered and conserved for the benefit of the heirs. It is true that Proceso, in his life, filed a complaint against his son on the ground that the latter, as administrator of his father's estate, misappropriated the proceeds of the estate, but said complaint was dismissed at the instance of the father himself. Aside from the fact that Apolinario will administer properties in which he has a greater share than that of the oppositor and will act merely as a helper of his sister, there is no ground to believe that he would squander said properties and the products thereof. The lower court having been of the opinion that Apolinario deserves the appointment of co-administrator, and it being discretionary on its part to determine who should be appointed administrator of the properties of a deceased person, the Court believes it unjustified to meddle in the exercise of such discretion, it not appearing that said court has committed a grave abuse thereof. (Esler and Tad-Y vs. Tad-Y)

DURAN v. DURAN (1967) FACTS: Pio Duran died without testament. Cipriano, one of the brothers, executed a public instrument assigning and renouncing his hereditary rights to the decedent's estate in favor of Pios wife, Josefina. Cipriano filed a petition for intestate proceedings to settle Pio Duran's estate, further asking that he be named the administrator. Josefina filed an opposition, praying for its dismissal upon the ground that the petitioner is not an "interested person" in the estate, in view of the deed of transfer and renunciation the estate. CFI issued an order dismissing the petition of Cipriano for his lack of interest in the estate. ISSUE: WON Cipriano remains to be an interested person in the estate of the deceased HELD: NO. The Rules of Court provides that a petition for administration and settlement of an estate must be filed by an "interested person" (Sec. 2, Rule 79). Appellants contend that the deed of assignment executed by Cipriano did not operate to render him a person without interest in the estate. In this case, the assignment took place when no settlement proceedings was pending. The properties subject matter of the assignment were not under the jurisdiction of a settlement court. Allowing that the assignment must be deemed a partition as between the assignor and assignee, the same does not need court approval to be effective as between the parties. An extrajudicial partition is valid as between the participants even if the requisites of Sec. 1, Rule 74 for extrajudicial partition are not followed, since said requisites are for purposes of binding creditors and non-participating heirs only (Hernandez v. Andal). Should it be contended that said partition was attended with fraud, lesion or inadequacy of price, the remedy is to rescind or to annul the same in an action for that purpose. And in the meanwhile, assigning heir cannot initiate a settlement proceedings, for until the deed of assignment is annulled or rescinded, it is deemed valid and effective against him, so that he is left without that "interest" in the estate required to petite for settlement proceedings.

DE GUZMAN v. GUADIZ (1980) FACTS: Petitioner filed a petition for the probate of a will alleged to have been executed by Bajacan instituting him as sole and universal heir and naming him as executor. Private respondents filed a motion to dismiss contending, among others, that all the real properties of Bajacan are now owned by them by virtue of a Deed of Donation Inter vivos. A motion for the appointment of a special administrator was filed by the petitioner. The judge issued an order denying the motion for appointment of a special administrator. ISSUE: WON the motion for the appointment of a special administrator should be granted HELD: YES Under Sec. 1, Rule 80, the probate court may appoint a special administrator should there be a delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration occasioned by any cause including an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will. Subject to this qualification, the appointment of a special administrator lies in the discretion of the Court. The basis for appointing a special administrator under the Rules is broad enough to include any cause or reason for the delay as where a contest as to the will is being carried on in the same or in another court, or where there is an appeal pending as to the proceeding on the removal of an executor or administrator, or in cases where the parties cannot agree among themselves. In this case, the phrase "by any cause" includes those incidents which transpired clearly showing that there is a delay in the probate of the will and that the granting of letters testamentary will consequently be prolonged necessitating the immediate appointment of a special administrator. The facts justifying the appointment of a special administrator are: o Delay in the hearing of the petition for the probate of the will. o The basis of the private respondents' claim to the estate of Catalina Bajacan and opposition to the probate of the will is a deed of donation allegedly executed by the deceased Catalina Bajacan and her late sister Arcadia Bajacan in their favor.

RELUCIO v. SAN JOSE (1952) FACTS: Petitioner, Julita, was appointed administratrix of the estate of Felipe Relucio. Upon petition by Lorenzo, Rolando and Leticia Relucio, the CFI issued an order appointing Rolando as administrator in substitution of the petitioner. The latter filed a notice of appeal. Before the appeal could be perfected, Rolando moved for the immediate execution of the order. Rolando filed a motion praying that the petitioner be declared in contempt of court for failing to deliver to him all papers, documents, titles and properties of the estate. CFI denied this motion for contempt and appointed the Equitable Banking Corporation as special administrator pending the appeal of the petitioner. ISSUE: WON the appointment of a special administrator is proper HELD: NO The cases in which a special administrator may be appointed are specified in Sec. 1 of Rule 81: "When there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration occasioned by an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will, or from any other cause, the court may appoint a special administrator to collect and take charge of the estate of the deceased and executors or administrators thereupon appointed." A special administrator may also be appointed in a case covered by Sec. 8 of Rule 87: "If the executor or administrator has a claim against the estate he represents, he shall give notice thereof, in writing, to the court, and the court shall appoint a special administrator who shall, in the adjustment of such claim, have the same power and be subject to the same liability as the general administrator or executor in the settlement of other claims. The court may order the executor or administrator to pay to the special administrator necessary funds to defend such claim." The case at bar not one falling under either Sec. 1 of Rule 81 or Sec. 8 of Rule 87. In any view of the case, there is a regular administrator. Pending her appeal, the petitioner had the right to act as administratrix. If the Judge had decreed the immediate execution of the order, Rolando would then be the administrator pending petitioner's appeal. Consequently, the Judge exceeded his jurisdiction in appointing the Equitable Banking Corporation as special administrator.

ALCASID v. SAMSON (1957) FACTS: Respondents filed an application in the CFI for the issuance of letters of administration in favor in one of them, Jesus Samson, for the estate of the late Jose Samson. Jesus was appointed special administrator. The application was opposed by petitioners Josefina Samson, the widow together with the minor children, and that Josefina be appointed instead. Judge Alcasid issued an order appointing Antonio Conda, Municipal Treasurer, as regular administrator. Respondents filed an appeal but was denied, hence, respondents resorted to CA which set aside the appointment of Conda. ISSUE: WON the order setting aside the appointment of Conda is valid HELD: NO. The appointment and removal of a special administrator are interlocutory proceedings incidental to the main case, and lie in the sound discretion of the court. As the law does not say who shall be appointed as special administrator and the qualifications the appointee must have, the judge or court has discretion in the selection of the person to be appointed, discretion which must be sound, that is, not whimsical or contrary to reason, justice or equity. (Roxas vs. Pecson) In this case, the conditions of the estate justified the appointment and qualification of a regular administrator, because the special administration had lasted nearly two years, and the prompt settlement of the estate had been unduly delayed. The appointment of a disinterested person as regular administrator would be conducive to a smooth and peaceful administration of the properties of the estate. o It is certainly against the interests of justice and a frustration of the policy of those rules to extend unduly the time within which estates should be administered and to keep the property from the possession and use of those who are entitled thereto.

DE GUZMAN v. ANGELES (1988) FACTS: Respondent filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of her husband, Manolito de Guzman before the Makati RTC. Respondent filed a motion for writ of possession over five vehicles alleged to be conjugal properties of the de Guzman's but which are at present in the possession of the private respondent's father-in- law, the petitioner. The RTC issued an order setting for hearing directing the deputy sheriff to notify petitioner. However, no notice of the order was given to the petitioner. The RTC granted the private respondent's motion to be appointed as special administratrix. Acting on the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Assistance" the Judge appointed Deputy Sheriffs Santos and Flora. ISSUE: WON a probate court may appoint a special administratrix and issue a writ of possession of alleged properties of a decedent even before the probate court causes notice to be served upon all interested parties HELD: NO It is very clear from Sec. 3, Rule 79 that the probate court must cause notice through publication of the petition after it receives the same. The purpose of this notice is to bring all the interested persons within the court's jurisdiction. (Manalo v. Paredes) Where no notice as required has been given to persons believed to have an interest in the estate of the deceased person; the proceeding for the settlement of the estate is void and should be annulled. In this case, no notice was caused to be given by the probate court before it acted on the motions of the private respondent. The explanation that any delay in issuing the said Orders might have prejudiced the estate for the properties may be lost, wasted or dissipated does not sufficiently explain the disregard of the Rule. If indeed, the respondent court had the welfare of both the estate and the persons who have interest in the estate, then it could have caused notice to be given immediately. The petitioner as creditor of the estate has a similar interest in the preservation of the estate as the private respondent. It is not clear from the records exactly what emergency would have ensued if the appointment of an administrator was deferred at least until the most interested parties were given notice of the proposed action. No unavoidable delay in the appointment of a regular administrator is apparent from the records.

GARCIA FULE v. CA (1976) FACTS: Virginia Fule filed with the CFI of Laguna a petition for letters of administration over the Estate of Amado Garcia. She moved ex parte for her appointment as special administratrix, which the Judge granted. The appointment was questioned by Preciosa Garcia in a motion for reconsideration stating that as the spouse she should be preferred. The Judge denied the MR. The case was elevated to the CA, but even before Fule could receive the decision, Garcia had already filed a petition for letters of administration before the CFI of Rizal. In this case, she was appointed as special administratrix. However, the judge suspended the proceedings until the court has been informed of the final outcome of the first case. ISSUE: WON Garcia should be appointed as special administrator HELD: YES The discretion to appoint a special administrator lies in the probate court. That, however, is no authority for the judge to become partial. Exercise of that discretion must be based on reason, equity, justice and legal principle. There is no reason why the same fundamental and legal principles for choosing a regular administrator should not be taken into account in the appointment of a special administrator. In this case, Fule disputes the status of Garcia as the widow of Amado. Garcia is prima facie entitled to the appointment of special administratrix. In the issuance of such appointment, the appointing court does not determine who are entitled to share in the estate of the decedent but who is entitled to the administration. The issue of heirship is one to be determined in the decree of distribution, and the findings of the court on the relationship of the parties in the administration as to be the basis of distribution. The preference of Garcia is with sufficient reason. In a Donation Inter Vivos executed by the deceased in favor of Garcia, he indicated therein that he is married to her. In his certificate of candidacy for the office of Delegate to the Constitutional Convention, he wrote therein the name of Preciosa as his spouse. Faced with these documents and the presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage, Garcia can be reasonably believed to be the surviving spouse of the late Amado G. Garcia. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.

PIJUAN v. VDA. DE GUERRA (1966) FACTS: Carlos Guerra died leaving a will, in which he named Pijuan as executor. Pijuan instituted petition for the probate of said will. Thereafter Pijuan was, upon his ex parte motion, appointed special administrator of the estate. Oppositions to the probate of the will were filed by Mrs. Guerra and her son, Teodoro. Subsequently, she filed in the said proceedings a motion for her appointment as administratrix but was denied in view of the provision of the will of the deceased designating another person as executor thereof. ISSUE: WON Mrs. Guerra should be appointed as administratrix in view of her preference under Sec. 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court HELD: NO In the language of Sec. 6, Rule 78, said preference exists if no executor is named in the will or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate. In this case, however, none of these conditions obtains. The deceased has left a document purporting to be his will, seemingly, is still pending probate. So, it cannot be said, as yet, that he has died intestate. Again, said document names Marcelo Pijuan as executor thereof, and it is not claimed that he is incompetent therefor. What is more, he has not only not refused the trust, but, has, also, expressly accepted it, by applying for his appointment as executor, and, upon his appointment as special administrator, has assumed the duties thereof. The preference accorded by the aforementioned provision of the Rules of Court to the surviving spouse refers to the appoint of a regular administrator or administratrix, not to that of a special administrator, and that the order appointing the latter lies within the discretion of the probate court, and is not appealable.

CORONA v. CA (1982) FACTS: Dolores Vitug died leaving two Wills both of which expressly disinherited her husband Romarico. She appointed her niece Rowena Corona, the petitioner, as her Executrix. Rowena filed a petition for the probate of the Wills and for the appointment of Alonte as Administrator because she is presently employed in New York City. The Probate Court appointed Alonte as Special Administratrix. Romarico filed an "Opposition and Motion" and prayed that the Petition for Probate be denied and that the two Wills be disallowed and instead prayed for his appointment as Special Administrator. The Probate Court set aside its Order appointing Alonte and appointed instead Romarico as Special Administrator. CA affirmed the appointment. ISSUE: WON Alonte should be appointed as co-special administrator HELD: YES. Petitioner's nominee, Nenita F. Alonte, should be appointed as coSpecial Administrator. The executrix's choice of Special Administrator, considering her own inability to serve and the wide latitude of discretion given her by the testatrix in her Will, is entitled to the highest consideration. Objections to Nenita's appointment on grounds of impracticality and lack of kinship are over-shadowed by the fact that justice and equity demand that the side of the deceased wife and the faction of the surviving husband be represented in the management of the decedent's estate. En passant, it is apropos to remind the Special Administrators that while they may have respective interests to protect, they are officers of the Court subject to the supervision and control of the Probate Court and are expected to work for the best interests of the entire estate, its smooth administration, and its earliest settlement.

OZAETA v. PECSON (1953) FACTS: Palanca died and he left a will naming Ozaeta, former SC Justice, as executor if Roxas fails to qualify. Roxas predeceased Palanca so Ozaeta filed petition for probate of Palancas will with the prayer that he be appointed special administrator. Heirs of Palanca opposed. Court appointed Phil Trust Co. as special administrator. Ozaeta argues that the reason why the judge did not appoint him is because of the judge's personal dislike for him. ISSUE: WON Ozaeta should be appointed as special administrator HELD: YES Rule 81 grants discretion to the probate court to appoint or not to appoint a special administrator. It is silent as to the person that may be appointed as special administrator, unlike in the appointment of a regular administrator. o Roxas vs. PecsonThe appointment of special administrators is not governed by the rules regarding the appointment of regular administrators. While the choice of the person lies within the courts discretion, such discretion should not be a whimsical one, but one that is reasonable and logical and in accord with fundamental legal principles and justice. And there is no reason why the same fundamental and legal principles governing the choice of a regular administrator should not be taken into account for special administrators. In this case, the only reason for suspending the petitioners appointment, and for the appointment of another special administrator, is a very technical one. The PhilTrust Company, which had acted as special administrator for a period of only a few months, has submitted a bill for P90,000. This would cut deep into the income of the estate, and if the new special administrator appointed by the respondent judge takes office, it is not improbable that the estate may again be subjected to the same expensive cost of administration. It would seem unreasonable to refuse to appoint the petitioner as special administrator. To do so would be delaying the fulfillment of the wishes of the testator and subjecting the estate to unnecessary expense.

MATIAS v. GONZALES (1957) FACTS: Basilia Salud moved for the dismissal of Rodriguez, as special administrator of the estate of Gabina Raquel, and the appointment, in his stead of Ramon Plata. The Judge by an order relieved Rodriguez as special administrator and appointed Basilia as special administratrix. Plata also is appointed as coadministrator. Aurea Matias, the executrix appointed in the will, asked that said order, be set aside and that she be appointed special co-administratrix, jointly with Rodriguez. Basilia tendered her resignation as special administratrix and recommended the appointment, in her place, of Victorina Salud. Matias expressed her conformity to said resignation, but objected to the appointment of Victorina. ISSUE: WON the petitioner should have preference in the choice of special administratrix being the universal heiress to said estate and, the executrix appointed in the alleged will HELD: Orders annulled. Lower court ordered to re-hear such appointment. SC is unable to sanction fully the acts of Judge: 1. Although Rodriguez had notice of the hearing of the motion for his removal, the record shows that petitioner received copy of said motion on the date after that set for the hearing. Basilia prayed for the dismissal of Rodriguez, and the appointment of Ramon Plata, as special administrator of said estate. Petitioner had, therefore, no notice that her main opponent, Basilia would be considered. Also, soon after the institution of the probate proceedings, an issue arose between Matias and Basilia regarding the person to be appointed special administrator. There are also at least two factions among the heirs. Justice and equity demands that both factions be represented in the management of the estate of the deceased. Roxas vs. Pecson, which held that "only one special administrator may be appointed," must be considered in the light of the facts. The court appointed one special administrator for some properties forming part of said estate, and a special administratrix for other properties thereof. Thus, there were two independent special administrators. In the case at bar there is one special administration, the powers of which shall be exercised jointly. In short, the Roxas case is not squarely in point. There are authorities in support of the power of courts to appoint several special co-administrators (Lewis vs. Logdan)

ROXAS v. PECSON (1948) FACTS: Petitioner Natividad Roxas, widow of the deceased, filed for the probate of the alleged will of her husband. The Judge rendered a decision denying the probate of the will. Respondents, brother and sister, filed their petition for the appointment of Maria as special administratrix or special coadministratrix. The judge rendered his resolution appointing the petitioner as special administratrix only of all the conjugal properties of the deceased, and respondent Maria as special administratrix of all capital or properties belonging exclusively to the deceased. ISSUE: WON it was proper for the court to appoint two separate administrators HELD: NO As under the law only one general administrator may be appointed to administer, liquidate and distribute the estate of a deceased spouse, it clearly follows that only one special administrator may be appointed to administer temporarily said estate, because a special administrator is but a temporary administrator who is appointed to act in lieu of the general administrator. (Sec. 1, Rule 81) o As the law does not state who shall be appointed as special administrator including his qualifications, the judge or the court has discretion in the selection of the person to be appointed, discretion which must be sound, that is, not whimsical or contrary to reason, justice or equity In this case, there is no reason for appointing two separate administrators. If two separate administrators are appointed, in every action which one of them may institute to recover properties or credit of the deceased, the defendant may raise the question or set up the defense that the plaintiff has no cause of action, because the property or credit in issue belongs to the class which is being administered by the other administrator, which can not be done if the administrator of the entire estate is only one.

ANDERSON v. PERKINS (1961) FACTS: Anderson commenced special proceedings for the probate of the supposed last will and testament of the late Eugene Perkins. The court, upon the motion of Anderson, issued an order appointing Alfonso Ponce Enrile as special administrator. Enrile submitted to the court a petition seeking authority to sell, or give away to some charitable or educational institution or institutions, certain personal effects left by the deceased. Idonah Perkins filed an opposition to the proposed sale, however, the court approved the same. ISSUE: WON the special administrator has the authority to sell the properties of the deceased. If yes, WON such power can be exercised in this case HELD: YES, NO. Sec. 2, Rule 81 provides that the special administrator "may sell such perishable and other property as the court orders. o It is true that the function of a special administrator is only to collect and preserve the property of the deceased until a regular administrator is appointed (Sec. 2, Rule 81). But it is not alone the specific property which is to be preserved, but its value as well. It is in line with this general power of the special administrator to preserve not only the property of the estate but also its value, that Sec. 2, Rule 81, also empowers such administrator to sell "other property as the court ordered sold." However, it should not be allowed in this case. Up to the time the propose sale was asked for, no proceeding had been taken, or even started, to segregate the alleged exclusive property of the oppositorappellant from the mass of the estate supposedly left by the deceased or to liquidate the conjugal partnership property. Until, therefore the issue of the ownership of the properties sought to be sold is heard and decided, and the conjugal partnership liquidated; or, at least, an agreement be reached with a appellant as to which properties of the conjugal partnership she would not mind being sold to preserve their value the proposed sale is clearly premature. Moreover, it does not appear that appellant was given a reasonable opportunity to point out which items in the inventory she did not want sold.

LIWANAG V. REYES (1964) FACTS: Liwanag executed in favor of the Rotegaan Financing, a real estate mortgage on a parcel of residential land with the building and improvements thereon. Before the one year period expired for the payment of the debt, Liwanag died intestate. Rotegaan Financing instituted in the CFI, a complaint for foreclosure against the Estate of Liwanag and Gliceria Liwanag as administratrix of the estate. Glirceria filed a motion to dismiss, but the court deferred to act on it until after the trial of this case on the merits because there is a possibility that the estate of the deceased may be in a position to pay the amounts claimed by the plaintiff, in which case the latter may choose to file its claim against the decedent in the office of the Clerk of Court, and waive the mortgage. ISSUE: WON a special administrator may be a defendant in a suit against the estate HELD: YES Sec. 7 (2) of Rule 86 provides that a creditor holding a claim against the deceased, secured by a mortgage or other collateral security, may pursue any of these remedies: (2) foreclose his mortgage or realize upon his security by an action in court, making the executor or administrator a party defendant, and if there is a deficiency after the sale of the mortgaged property, he may prove the same in the testate or intestate proceedings The Rules do not expressly prohibit making the special administratrix a defendant in a suit against the estate. Otherwise, creditors would find the adverse effects of the statute of limitations running against them where the appointment of a regular administrator is delayed. As to the propriety of placing the estate under receivership The mortgage contract itself provides that in case of foreclosure, the property be put into the hands of a receiver, and this provision should be respected by the administratrix of the estate. The cases cited by petitioner in favor of the theory that property in custodia legis cannot be given to a receiver is not applicable, considering that this is an action to enforce a superior lien on certain property of the estate and the appointment of a receiver, which is a very convenient and feasible means of preserving and administering the property, has been agreed upon by the contracting parties.

ALCASID v. SAMSON (1957) FACTS: Respondents filed an application in the CFI for the issuance of letters of administration in favor in one of them, Jesus Samson, for the estate of the late Jose Samson. Jesus was appointed special administrator. The application was opposed by petitioners Josefina Samson, the widow together with the minor children, and that Josefina be appointed instead. Judge Alcasid issued an order appointing Antonio Conda, Municipal Treasurer, as regular administrator. Respondents filed an appeal but was denied, hence, respondents resorted to CA which set aside the appointment of Conda. ISSUE: WON there were valid grounds to remove the special administrator HELD: YES. The appointment and removal of a special administrator are interlocutory proceedings incidental to the main case, and lie in the sound discretion of the court. As the law does not say who shall be appointed as special administrator and the qualifications the appointee must have, the judge or court has discretion in the selection of the person to be appointed, discretion which must be sound, that is, not whimsical or contrary to reason, justice or equity. (Roxas vs. Pecson) The removal of the special administrator is at the court's sound discretion, and the orders show that there were good reasons to terminate the special administration. This being so, the heirs cannot seek to prolong the tenure of the removed special administrator by appealing Conda's appointment as regular administrator. It may be argued that during the appeal, the estate should be under special administration; but it does not appear that Amadeo Samson and his partisans have so asked the court nor have they proposed another administrator and therefore, their complaint against the court's action is unmeritorious. In this case, the conditions of the estate justified the appointment and qualification of a regular administrator, because the special administration had lasted nearly two years, and the prompt settlement of the estate had been unduly delayed. The appointment of a disinterested person as regular administrator would be conducive to a smooth and peaceful administration of the properties of the estate.

JUNQUERA v. BORROMEO (1967) FACTS: Borromeo executed a will naming Junquera as executor. After his death, Junquera filed in the CFI a petition for the probate of the said will and asking for his appointment as special administrator. After the filing of the bond, the court appointed Junquera. Crispin and Teofilo Borromeo opposed the petition for probate and subsequently filed a motion for removal of Junquera as special administrator on the ground that he failed to submit an inventory of the estate as well as to deposit all the income of the estate. The Court granted the motion to remove Junquera. ISSUE: WON there are sufficient grounds to remove the special administrator HELD: YES. The appointment and removal of a special administrator lies entirely in the sound discretion of the court. The court should determine the sufficiency of any ground. Sec. 4, Rule 82 provides that a special administrator shall give a bond conditioned that he will make and return a true inventory of the goods, chattels, rights, credits and estate of the deceased and that he will truly account for such as are received by him when required by law. In this case, for approximately seven months, he appears not to have taken any step to determine the property belonging to the estate and much less has filed an inventory thereof. Such duty must be performed within a reasonable period. His claim, that he has not been able to submit earlier an inventory of because the papers and documents relative thereto were in the possession of one of the heirs, is too flimsy to justify the delay. Moreover, there is an intimation that the special administrator has never been allowed by the legatees, who apparently are in actual possession of the estate, to take possession thereof, nor to collect its rentals, for which reason the account submitted by him at the last hour appears to be unsatisfactory. o Even the inventory he submitted suffers from a substantial deficiency for many properties belonging to the deceased have not been included therein.

COSME DE MENDOZA v. PACHECO (1937) FACTS: Soriano was former administrator of the estate of Baldomero Cosme. He filed a bond for P5,000, with the appellants, Pacheco and Cordero, as sureties. Unable to turn an amount over to the estate upon demand of Rosario Cosme, the new administratrix, the lower court ordered the execution of his bond. Later, the court approved a settlement had between the administratrix and the ex-administrator, whereby the latter ceded certain real properties to the estate reducing on that account his indebtedness. Separate motions to he discharged from the bond were filed by sureties but were denied. SC upheld the order of the trial court. When the case was remanded to the lower court, the sureties filed a motion challenging, for the first time, the jurisdiction of the trial court to issue the order executing the bond. ISSUE: WON the order for the execution of the bond of the exadministrator and the sureties should be vacated HELD: NO It lies within discretion of the court to select an administrator of the estate (Capistrano vs. Nadurata). An administrator is required to give a bond in such reasonable sum as the court directs, with one or more sufficient sureties, conditioned upon the faithful performance of his trust (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 643, 662). It is clear that the probate court is empowered to require the filing of the administrator's bond, to fix the amount thereof, and to hold it accountable for any breach of the administrator's duty. It cannot be devoid of legal authority to execute and make that bond answerable for the very purpose for which it was filed. It is true that the law does not say expressly or in so many words that such court has power to execute the bond of an administrator, but by necessary and logical implication, the power is there as eloquently as if it were phrased in unequivocal term.

WARNES, BARNES & CO. v. LUZON SURETY (1954) FACTS: Warner, Barnes and Co. filed a complaint in the CFI against Luzon Surety for recovery of a sum of money based on a bond filed by Gonzaga as administratrix of the Estate of Agueda Gonzaga the condition being that said bond would be void if the administratrix faithfully prepares a correct inventory of all the property and if the payments for the obligations of the estate were made. Plaintiff had a duly approved claim against the estate and alleged that the administratrix violated the conditions of her bond. Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment which was granted by the court. ISSUE: WON the surety is liable to the plaintiff HELD: YES As to jurisdiction of the court to pass upon its liability under the bond, because it is only the probate court that can hold a surety accountable for any breach by the administratrix of her duty. o While the Mendoza case ruled that the probate court has jurisdiction over the forfeiture/enforcement of the bond, it was not held therein that the same matter may not be litigated in an ordinary civil action in the CFI. As to the argument that as the bond in question was executed in favor of the RP and that the proper procedure would seem to be that it might be enforced in the administration proceedings were it was filed. o This is not tenable. Though nominally payable to the RP, it is expressly for the benefit of the heirs, legatees and creditors. There is no valid reason why a creditor may not directly in his name enforce said bond in so far as he is concerned. As to argument that the plaintiffs should have first filed a claim against the Estate, in conformity with Sec. 6 of Rule 87. o Apart from the fact that his defense was not pleaded and was therefore waived (Sec. 10, Rule 9), it appears that even when the present complaint was filed, (more than 2 years after the death), there were no proceedings for administration, with the result that Sec. 6 loses its applicability. It is to be noted that the appellant had also chosen to file a third-party complaint against Araneta, joint and several counter-guarantor of the deceased administratrix, instead of presenting a claim against the latter's estate.

LUZON SURETY v. QUEBRAR (1984) FACTS: Plaintiff issued two bonds in behalf of Quebrar, as administrator. Quebrar executed two indemnity agreements in favor of the plaintiff. Premiums for the first year were paid. CFI approved the Project of Partition, hence the defendant ordered a motion for the cancellation of the bonds. The CFI ordered the bonds cancelled. Plaintiff demanded from the defendant the rest of the premiums, but the defendant refused, hence the plaintiff filed the action to recover the sum from the defendant. The lower court ruled for the defendant. ISSUE: WON the defendant is liable to the surety for the remaining amount HELD: YES Sec. 1 of Rule 81 requires the administrator/executor to put up a bond for the purpose of indemnifying the creditors, heirs, legatees and the estate. It is conditioned upon the faithful performance of the trust (Mendoza vs. Pacheco). The surety is then liable under the bond, for as long as the administrator has duties to do as such. Since the liability of the sureties is co-extensive with that of the administrator, it follows that the administrator is still duty bound to respect the indemnity agreements entered into by him in consideration of the suretyship. o In this case, the defendant still had something to do as an administrator/executor even after the approval of the amended project of partition and accounts. It appears that there were still debts and expenses to be paid. The contention that both the Bonds and the Indemnity Agreements ceased to have any force and effect is without merit. Such construction of the said contracts entered into would render futile the purpose for which they were made. There is no provision or condition in the bond to the effect that it will terminate at the end of the first year if the premium for continuation thereafter is not paid. And there is no clause by which its obligation is avoided or even suspended by the failure of the obligee to pay an annual premium (U.S. vs. Maryland) With the payment of the premium for the first year, the surety already assumed the risk. Hence, for as long as defendant was administrator, the bond was held liable and inevitably, the plaintiff's liability subsists.