#1 PIMENTEL vs CONGRESS (Joint Committee of Congress to Canvass the Votes Cast for President and Vice-

President in the May 10, 2004 Elections

[G.R. No. 163783. June 22, 2004] EN BANC R E S O L U T I O N

Petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari on May 7, 2010. However, under the Rules of Court, the filing of such petition would not stay the execution of the judgment, final order or resolution of the COMELEC that is sought to be reviewed. Besides, petitioner did not even pray for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction. Hence, private respondent was able to participate as a candidate for the position of President in the May 10, 2010 elections where he garnered the second highest number of votes. ISSUE: What is the proper interpretation of the following provision of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution: [t]he President shall not be eligible for any re-election? RULING:

Facts:Petition for Prohibition. Pimentel, Jr. seeks a judgment declaring null and void the continued existence of the Joint Committee. The petition corollarily prays for the issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Joint Committee to cease and desist from conducting any further proceedings pursuant to the Rules of the Joint Public Session of Congress on Canvassing. Petitioner posits that with "the adjournment sine die(w/o date fixed) on June 11, 2004 by the Twelfth Congress of its last regular session, [its] term ... terminated and expired on the said day and the said Twelfth Congress serving the term 2001 to 2004 passed out of legal existence." Henceforth, petitioner goes on, "all pending matters and proceedings terminate upon the expiration of ... Congress. ISSUE: WON the Joint Committee performing election canvass even after the termination of congress session is constitutional. RULING: Sec. 15. Art VI - The Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth Monday of July for its regular session, unless a different date is fixed by law, and shall continue to be in session for such number of days as it may determine until thirty days before the opening of its next regular session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. The President may call a special session at any time. Contrary to petitioner's argument, however, the term of the present Twelfth Congress did not terminate and expire upon the adjournment sine die of the regular session of both Houses on June 11, 2004. Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution cited by petitioner does not pertain to the term of Congress, but to its regular annual legislative sessions and the mandatory 30-day recess before the opening of its next regular session (subject to the power of the President to call a special session at any time). Section 4 of Article VIII provides that "[t]he term of office of the Senators shall be six years and shall commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election." Similarly, Section 7 provides that "[t]he Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years. Consequently, there being no law to the contrary, until June 30, 2004, the present Twelfth Congress to which the present legislators belong cannot be said to have "passed out of legal existence." The legislative functions of the Twelfth Congress may have come to a close upon the final adjournment of its regular sessions on June 11, 2004, but this does not affect its non-legislative functions. In fact, the joint public session of both Houses of Congress convened by express directive of Section 4, Article VII to canvass the votes for and to proclaim the newly elected President and VP has not, and cannot, adjourn sine die until it has accomplished its constitutionally mandated tasks. For only when a board of canvassers has completed its functions is it rendered functus officio. Its membership may change, but it retains its authority as a board until it has accomplished its purposes. Since the Twelfth Congress has not yet completed its non-legislative duty to canvass the votes and proclaim the duly elected President and VP, its existence as the National Board of Canvassers, as well as that of the Joint Committee to which it referred the preliminary tasks of authenticating and canvassing the certificates of canvass, has not become functus officio. #2: Atty. Evillo C. Pormento v. Joseph Ejercito "Erap" Estrada and Comelec, G.R. No. 191988, August 31, 2010 RESOLUTION CORONA, C.J.: FACTS: Private respondent Joseph Erap Ejercito Estrada was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines in the general elections held on May 11, 1998. He was however ousted] from office and was not able to finish his term. He sought the presidency again in the general elections held on May 10, 2010. Petitioner Atty. Evillo C. Pormento opposed Eraps candidacy and filed a petition for the latters disqualification, which was however denied by the COMELEC 2nd Division. His motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the COMELEC en banc.

[The petition was DENIED DUE COURSE and thereby DISMISSED by the Supreme Court.]
Private respondent was not elected President the second time he ran [in the May 2010 elections]. Since the issue on the proper interpretation of the phrase any reelection will be premised on a persons second (whether immediate or not) election as President, there is no case or controversy to be resolved in this case. No live conflict of legal rights exists. There is in this case no definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy that touches on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. No specific relief may conclusively be decreed upon by this Court in this case that will benefit any of the parties herein. As such, one of the essential requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review , the existence of an actual controversy is sorely lacking in this case. As a rule, this Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies. The Court is not empowered to decide moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the case before it. In other words, when a case is moot, it becomes non-justiciable. An action is considered moot when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues involved have become academic or dead or when the matter in dispute has already been resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial intervention unless the issue #3 ATTY. ROMULO TRIBUNAL, Respondent. G.R. No. 191618 November 23, 2010 B. MACALINTAL, Petitioner, vs. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL

FACTS: A petition was filed by Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal (Atty. Macalintal), that questions the constitution of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) as an illegal and unauthorized progeny of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution: The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose. While petitioner concedes that the Supreme Court is "authorized to promulgate its rules for the purpose," he chafes at the creation of a purportedly "separate tribunal" complemented by a budget allocation, a seal, a set of personnel and confidential employees, to effect the constitutional mandate. Petitioners averment is supposedly supported by the provisions of the 2005 Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (2005 PET Rules), specifically: (1) Rule 3 which provides for membership of the PET wherein the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices are designated as "Chairman and Members," respectively; (2) Rule 8(e) which authorizes the Chairman of the PET to appoint employees and confidential employees of every member thereof; (3) Rule 9 which provides for a separate "Administrative Staff of the Tribunal" with the appointment of a Clerk and a Deputy Clerk of the Tribunal who, at the discretion of the PET, may designate the Clerk of Court (en banc) as the Clerk of the Tribunal; and (4) Rule 11 which provides for a "seal" separate and distinct from the Supreme Court seal. Grudgingly, petitioner throws us a bone by acknowledging that the invoked constitutional provision does allow the "appointment of additional personnel."

Further, petitioner highlights our decision in Buac v. COMELEC which peripherally declared that "contests involving the President and the Vice-President fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the PET, x x x in the exercise of quasi-judicial power." On this point, petitioner reiterates that the constitution of the PET, with the designation of the Members of the Court as Chairman and Members thereof, contravenes Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution, which prohibits the designation of Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions. ISSUES: 1. Whether the petitioner has locus standi to file the petition 2. Whether the constitution of the PET, composed of the Members of this Court, is unconstitutional, and violates Section 4, Article VII and Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution. 3. Whether the PET exercises quasi-judicial functions in contravention of Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution. HELD: 1. NO. The petitioner does not possess the locus standi in filing the instant petition as he was unmistakably estopped in assailing the jurisdiction of the PET before which tribunal he had ubiquitously appeared and had acknowledge its jurisdiction in 2004 therefore making the petitioners standing still imperiled by thee white elephant in the petition (i.e., his appearance as counsel for former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (Macapagal-Arroyo) in the election protest filed by 2004 presidential candidate Fernando Poe, Jr. before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal). Judicial inquiry requires that the constitutional question be raised at the earliest possible opportunity to challenge the constitutionality of the Tribunals constitution. The 1987 Constitution introduces an innovation about the Supreme Courts independence as cited in Section 4, Article VII. The judicial power expanded, but it remained absolute. 2. NO. A plain reading of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, readily reveals a grant of authority to the Supreme Court sitting en banc. In the same vein, although the method by which the Supreme Court exercises this authority is not specified in the provision, the grant of power does not contain any limitation on the Supreme Courts exercise thereof. The Supreme Courts method of deciding presidential and vice -presidential election contests, through the PET, is actually a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Thus, the subsequent directive in the provision for the Supreme Court to "promulgate its rules for the purpose." By the same token, the PET is not a separate and distinct entity from the Supreme Court, albeit it has functions peculiar only to the Tribunal. It is obvious that the PET was constituted in implementation of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, and it faithfully complies not unlawfully defies the constitutional directive. The adoption of a separate seal, as well as the change in the nomenclature of the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices into Chairman and Members of the Tribunal, respectively, was designed simply to highlight the singularity and exclusivity of the Tribunals functions as a special electoral court. 3. NO. The issue in Buac v. COMELEC involved the characterization of the enforcement and administration of a law relative to the conduct of a plebiscite which falls under the jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections. However, petitioner latches on to the enumeration in Buac which declared, in an obiter, that "contests involving the President and the Vice-President fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the PET, also in the exercise of quasi-judicial power." Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution reads: SEC. 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions. The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution which provides that the power "shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law." Consistent with our presidential system of government, the function of "dealing with the settlement of disputes, controversies or conflicts involving rights, duties or prerogatives that are legally demandable and enforceable" is apportioned to courts of justice. With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, judicial power was expanded to include "the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." The power was expanded, but it remained absolute. The set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterizes the resolution of electoral contests as essentially an exercise of judicial power.

At the barangay and municipal levels, original and exclusive jurisdiction over election contests is vested in the municipal or metropolitan trial courts and the regional trial courts, respectively. At the higher levels city, provincial, and regional, as well as congressional and senatorial exclusive and original jurisdiction is lodged in the COMELEC and in the House of Representatives and Senate Electoral Tribunals, which are not, strictly and literally speaking, courts of law. Although not courts of law, they are, nonetheless, empowered to resolve election contests which involve, in essence, an exercise of judicial power, because of the explicit constitutional empowerment found in Section 2(2), Article IX-C (for the COMELEC) and Section 17, Article VI (for the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals) of the Constitution. Besides, when the COMELEC, the HRET, and the SET decide election contests, their decisions are still subject to judicial review via a petition for certiorari filed by the proper party if there is a showing that the decision was rendered with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The PET is not simply an agency to which Members of the Court were designated. The PET, as intended by the framers of the Constitution, is to be an institution independent, but not separate, from the judicial department, i.e., the Supreme Court. McCulloch v. State of Maryland proclaimed that "[a] power without the means to use it, is a nullity." The vehicle for the exercise of this power, as intended by the Constitution and specifically mentioned by the Constitutional Commissioners during the discussions on the grant of power to this Court, is the PET. Thus, a microscopic view, like the petitioners, should not constrict an absolute and constitutional grant of judicia l power. #3A Macalintal vs PET GR 191618 June 7, 2011 Facts: Par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution provides: The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose. Sec 12, Art. VIII of the Constitution provides: The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions. The case at bar is a motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner of the SCs decision dismissing the formers petition and declaring the establishment of the respondent PET as constitutional. Petitioner argues that PET is unconstitutional on the ground that Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution does not provide for the creation of the PET, and it violates Sec 12, Art VIII of the Constitution. The Solicitor General maintains that the constitution of the PET is on firm footing on the basis of the grant of authority to the Supreme Court to be the sole judge of all election contests for the President or Vice-President under par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution. Issue: 1. 2. Whether or not PET is constitutional. Whether or not PET exercises quasi-judicial power.

Held: 1. Yes. The explicit reference of the Members of the Constitutional Commission to a Presidential Electoral Tribunal, with Fr. Joaquin Bernas categorically declaring that in crafting the last paragraph of Sec. 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution, they constitutionalized what was statutory. Judicial power granted to the Supreme Court by the same Constitution is plenary. And under the doctrine of necessary implication, the additional jurisdiction bestowed by the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to decide presidential and vice-presidential elections contests includes the means necessary to carry it into effect. 1. No. The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution which provides that the power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. The set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterize the resolution of electoral contests as essentially an exercise of judicial power. When the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or vicepresidential election contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power. The COMELEC, HRET and SET are not, strictly and literally speaking, courts of law. Although not courts of law, they are, nonetheless, empowered to resolve election contests which involve, in essence, an exercise of judicial power,

because of the explicit constitutional empowerment found in Section 2(2), Article IX-C (for the COMELEC) and Section 17, Article VI (for the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals) of the Constitution.

powers of the Executive Branch. Moreover, the Supreme Court observed that this decision would not result in a deluge of private litigation against sitting presidents. Discussion. Although the Defendant claims that in all but the most exceptional cases, the United States Constitution (Constitution) affords the President temporary immunity from civil damages litigation arising out of events that took place before he took office, it is not the case. The Defendants argument rests on neither history nor prece. #6 G.R. NO. 183871 Rubrico vs. Arroyo February 18, 2010 FACTS: Rubrico, in her petition, said she was abducted on April 3, 2007 by armed men belonging to the 301st Air Intelligence and Security Squadron, based at the Philippine Air Force Field Station at Fernando Air Base in Lipa City, Batangas. During her detention, the petitioner added, her daughters Mary Joy Rubrico Carbonel and Jean Rubrico Apruebo were harassed by Senior Insp. Arsenio Gomez and that there were also armed men following them. The petitioners prayed that a writ of amparo be issued, ordering the individual respondents to desist from performing any threatening act against the security of the petitioners and for the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) to immediately file an information for kidnapping qualified with the aggravating circumstance of gender of the offended party. It also prayed for damages and for respondents to produce documents submitted to any of them on the case of Lourdes. The respondents then filed a joint return on the writ specifically denying the material inculpatory averments against them. Respondents interposed the defense that the President may not be sued during her incumbency. Petitioners pleaded back to be allowed to present evidence ex parte against the President, et al. By a separate resolution, the CA dropped the President as respondent in the case . ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT the [CA] committed reversible error in dismissing [their] Petition and dropping President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as party respondent. HELD: The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved under our system of government, albeit not expressly reserved in the present constitution. Addressing a concern of his co-members in the 1986 Constitutional Commission on the absence of an express provision on the matter, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J. observed that it was already understood in jurisprudence that the President may not be sued during his or her tenure. Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such. The Court also affirmed the dismissal of the amparo case against other respondents for failure of the petition to allege ultimate facts as to make out a case against that body for the enforced disappearance of Lourdes and the threats and harassment that followed. #6: Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo (ISSUE IN COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY) G.R. No. 183871 18 February 2010 PONENTE: Velasco, Jr., J. FACTS: On 03 April 2007, Lourdes Rubrico, chair of Ugnayan ng Maralita para sa Gawa Adhikan, was abducted by armed men belonging to the 301st Air Intelligence and Security Squadron (AISS) based in Lipa City. She was brought to and detained at the air base without charges. She was released a week after relentless interrogation, but only after she signed a statement that she would be a military asset. Despite her release, she was tailed on at least 2 occasions. Hence, Lourdes filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman a criminal complaint for kidnapping and arbitrary detention and grave misconduct against Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana, and Jonathan, but nothing has happened. She likewise reported the threats and harassment incidents to the Dasmarinas municipal and Cavite provincial police stations, but nothing eventful resulted from their investigation.

#4 Nixon vs. Fitzgerald Brief Fact Summary. A cost-management expert for the Air Force was fired after he testified in front of Congress about cost overruns in certain military projects. The Defendant, the President of the United States Richard Nixon (Defendant), claimed that he made the firing decision. Synopsis of Rule of Law. The President of the United States (President) is shielded by absolute immunity from civil damages for acts done in his official capacity as President. Facts: The Plaintiff, Ernest Fitzgerald was fired from his job with the Air Force as cost-management analyst because he embarrassed his superiors by testifying about certain cost-overruns. The Air Force said he was fired because of reorganization and a reduction in force. An internal memorandum was passed through White House staff saying that the plaintiff was a top notch cost expert but with very low marks of loyalty and recommended that they let him bleed. At a press conference, the Defendant said he personally made the decision to fire the Plaintiff. The White House later retracted the statement saying that the defendant had confused the Plaintiff with another employee. The plaintiff brought suit and the defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground of absolute immunity from suit. Issue: Does the President have absolute immunity from suit for actions taken in his official capacity? Held: Yes. The President is immune from suit from his official acts as a matter of public policy rooted in the structure of government mandated by the separation of power principle. This immunity stems from the Presidents unique position in the constitution scheme and the immense importance of his duties. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) is worried about diverting the Presidents energies to the concerns related to private lawsuits. The President of the United States (President) is shielded by absolute immunity from civil damages for acts done in his official capacity as President.

#5 William Jefferson Clinton v. Paula Corbin Jones Brief Fact Summary. The Defendant, the President of the United States William Clinton (Defendant) was accused of sexually harassing the Plaintiff, Paula Jones (Plaintiff), while he was Governor of Arkansas. The Defendant sought to postpone the proceeding of a civil lawsuit until after he left office. Synopsis of Rule of Law. A sitting President does not enjoy temporary immunity from all civil suits until he has left office. Facts. In 1994, the Plaintiff filed suit against the Defendant regarding sexual advances (in a hotel), which occurred while the Defendant was Governor of Arkansas in 1991. The Defendant was a speaker at the conference and the Plaintiff was a state employee working at the reception desk. The Plaintiff claims she was summoned by a state trooper to the Defendants suite where he made sexual advances towards her that she rejected. As a result, her supervisors were hostile and rude to her and her duties were changed to punish her for rejecting those advances. The Plaintiff filed suit seeking actual and punitive damages. Issue. Does the President have immunity from all suits against him while he occupies the office? Held. No, a sitting President is not immune from suit for unofficial acts. The separation of powers doctrine does not require federal courts to stay all private actions against the president until he leaves office. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) distinguishes this matter from a situation where a public official is sued based on some sort of official action taken. In the latter situation the public official is generally granted immunity. The Defendan ts Separation of Powers argument fails because there is no indication that the judiciary is being asked to perform any function that might in some way be described as executive, or that this decision will curtail the scope of official

Meanwhile, the human rights group Karapatan conducted an investigation which indicated that men belonging to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) led the abduction of Lourdes. Based on such information, Rubrico filed a petition for the writ of amparo with the Supreme Court on 25 October 2007, praying that respondents be ordered to desist from performing any threatening act against the security of petitioners and for the Ombudsman to immediately file an information for kidnapping qualified with the aggravating circumstance of gender of the offended party. Rubrico also prayed for damages and for respondents to produce documents submitted to any of them on the case of Lourdes. The Supreme Court issued the desired writ and then referred the petition to the Court of Appeals (CA) for summary hearing and appropriate action. At the hearing conducted on 20 November 2007, the CA granted petitioners motion that the petition and writ be served on Darwin Sy/Reyes, Santana, Alfaro, Cuaresma, and Jonathan. By a separate resolution, the CA dropped the President as respondent in the case. On 31 July 2008, after due proceedings, the CA rendered its partial judgment, dismissing the petition with respect to Esperon, Razon, Roquero, Gomez, and Ombudsman. Hence, the petitioners filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court. PERTINENT ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of command responsibility is applicable in an amparo petition. ANSWER: No. SUPREME COURT RULINGS: DOCTRINE OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY and THE WRIT OF AMPARO

undermined by the indiscriminate filing of amparo petitions for purposes less than the desire to secure amparo reliefs and protection and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations. #7 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND WRIT OF HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ GR NO. 191805 NOVEMBER 15, 2011 Facts: Petitioner Noriel Rodriguez is a member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti Cagayan (Kagimungan), a peasant organization affiliated with Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP). He claims that the military tagged KMP as an enemy of the State under the Oplan Bantay Laya, making its members targets of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. Rodriguez was abducted by military men and was tortured repeatedly when he refused to confess to his membership in the NPA. When released, he filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and and Petition for the Writ of Habeas Data with Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of Place, and Production of Documents and Personal Properties. The petition was filed against former Pres. Arroyo, et al. The writs were granted but the CA dropped Pres Arroyo as party-respondent, as she may not be sued in any case during her tenure of office or actual incumbency. Issue: 1. Whether former Pres GMA should be dropped as respondent on the basis of presidential immunity from suit 2. Whether the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in amparo and habeas data cases. 3. Whether the president, as commander-in-chief of the military, can be held responsible or accountable for extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. 4. Whether Rodriguez has proven through substantial evidence that former President Arroyo is responsible or accountable for his abduction. Held: 1. No. It bears stressing that since there is no determination of administrative, civil or criminal liability in amparo and habeas data proceedings, courts can only go as far as ascertaining responsibility or accountability for the enforced disappearance or extrajudicial killing. As was held in the case of Estrada v Desierto, a non-sitting President does not enjoy immunity from suit, even for acts committed during the latters tenure; that courts should look with disfavor upo n the presidential privilege of immunity, especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission also reveal that the intent of the framers is clear that presidential immunity from suit is concurrent only with his tenure and not his term. (The term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds office. The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent.) Therefore, former Pres. GMA cannot use such immunity to shield herself from judicial scrutiny that would assess whether, within the context of amparo proceedings, she was responsible or accountable for the abduction of Rodriguez. 2. Yes. As we explained in Rubrico v. Arroyo, command responsibility pertains to the "responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic conflict." Although originally used for ascertaining criminal complicity, the command responsibility doctrine has also found application in civil cases for human rights abuses. This development in the use of command responsibility in civil proceedings shows that the application of this doctrine has been liberally extended even to cases not criminal in nature. Thus, it is our view that command responsibility may likewise find application in proceedings seeking the privilege of the writ of amparo. Precisely in the case at bar, the doctrine of command responsibility may be used to determine whether respondents are accountable for and have the duty to address the abduction of Rodriguez in order to enable the courts to devise remedial measures to protect his rights. Clearly, nothing precludes this Court from applying the doctrine of command responsibility in amparo proceedings to ascertain responsibility and accountability in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. In other words, command responsibility may be loosely applied in amparo cases in order to identify those accountable individuals that have the power to effectively implement whatever processes an amparo court would issue. In such application, the amparo court does not impute criminal responsibility but merely pinpoint the superiors it considers to be in the best position to protect the rights of the aggrieved party. Such identification of

Doctrine of Command Responsibility has little, if at all, bearing in amparo proceedings [C]ommand
responsibility, as a concept defined, developed, and applied under international law, has little, if at all, bearing in amparo proceedings. The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the development of laws of war and armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas, command responsibility, in its simplest terms, means the responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic conflict. In this sense, command responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity. The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of command responsibility, foreshadowing the present-day precept of holding a superior accountable for the atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be remiss in his duty of control over them. As then formulated, command responsibility is an omission mode of individual criminal liability, whereby the superior is made responsible for crimes committed by his subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the perpetrators.

There is no Philippine law that provides for criminal liability under the Doctrine of Command Responsibility While there are several pending bills on command responsibility, there is still no Philippine law

that provides for criminal liability under that doctrine. It may plausibly be contended that command responsibility, as legal basis to hold military/police commanders liable for extra-legal killings, enforced disappearances, or threats, may be made applicable to this jurisdiction on the theory that the command responsibility doctrine now constitutes a principle of international law or customary international law in accordance with the incorporation clause of the Constitution. Still, it would be inappropriate to apply to these proceedings the doctrine of command responsibility, as the CA seemed to have done, as a form of criminal complicity through omission, for individual respondents criminal liability, if there be any, is beyond the reach of amparo. In other words, the Court does not rule in such proceedings on any issue of criminal culpability, even if incidentally a crime or an infraction of an administrative rule may have been committed. to security of persons is a guarantee of the protection of ones right by the government. And this protection includes conducting effective investigations of extra-legal killings, enforced disappearances, or threats of the same kind. The nature and importance of an investigation are captured in the Velasquez Rodriguez case, in which the Inter-American Court of Human Rights pronounced: [The duty to investigate] must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality preordained to be ineffective. An investigation must have an objective and be assumed by the State as its own legal duty, not a step taken by private interests that depends upon the initiative of the victim or his family or upon offer of proof, without an effective search for the truth by the government. The remedy of amparo ought to be resorted to and granted judiciously The privilege of the writ of amparo is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the rights to life, liberty, and security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of this life. It is an extraordinary writ conceptualized and adopted in light of and in response to the prevalence of extra-legal killings and enforced disappearances. Accordingly, the remedy ought to be resorted to and granted judiciously, lest the ideal sought by the Amparo Rule be diluted and

Reluctance of the amparo petitioners or their witnesses to cooperate ought not to pose a hindrance to the police in pursuing, on its own initiative, the investigation in question to its natural end [T]he right

the responsible and accountable superiors may well be a preliminary determination of criminal liability which, of course, is still subject to further investigation by the appropriate government agency. Thus, although there is no determination of criminal, civil or administrative liabilities, the doctrine of command responsibility may nevertheless be applied to ascertain responsibility and accountability within these foregoing definitions. 3. Yes. To hold someone liable under the doctrine of command responsibility, the following elements must obtain: a. the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the accused as superior and the perpetrator of the crime as his subordinate; b. the superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about to be or had been committed; and c. the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal acts or punish the perpetrators thereof.84 The president, being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces, necessarily possesses control over the military that qualifies him as a superior within the purview of the command responsibility doctrine. 4. No. Rodriguez anchors his argument on a general allegation that on the basis of the "Melo Commission" and the "Alston Report," respondents in G.R. No. 191805 already had knowledge of and information on, and should have known that a climate of enforced disappearances had been perpetrated on members of the NPA. Without even attaching, or at the very least, quoting these reports, Rodriguez contends that the Melo Report points to rogue military men as the perpetrators. While the Alston Report states that there is a policy allowing enforced disappearances and pins the blame on the President, we do not automatically impute responsibility to former President Arroyo for each and every count of forcible disappearance. Aside from Rodriguezs general averments, there is no piece of evidence that could establish her responsibility or accountability for his abduction. Neither was there even a clear attempt to show that she should have known about the violation of his right to life, liberty or security, or that she had failed to investigate, punish or prevent it. #8 DENNIS A.B. FUNA vs. ALBERTO C. AGRA G.R. No. 191644, February 19, 2013 Facts: Petitioner alleges that President Gloria M. Macapagal-Arroyo appointed Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice following the resignation of Sec. Agnes Devanadera in order to vie for congressional seat in Quezon Province. Also, the president appointed Agra as the Acting Solicitor General in a concurrent capacity. Petitioner, as taxpayer, concerned citizen and a lawyer commenced this suit to challenge the constitutionality of Agras concurrent appointments or designations claiming it to be prohibited under Sec. 13, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution. Issue: Whether the designation of Agra as Acting Secretary of Justice, concurrently with his position as Acting Solicitor General violate the constitutional prohibition against dual or multiple offices for the members of the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants. Ruling: Yes. The designation is unconstitutional and void for being a violation of the constitutional prohibition under Sec. 13, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution. Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office. Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants. Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to impose a stricter prohibition on the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants with respect to holding multiple

offices or employment in the government during their tenure, the exception to this prohibition must be read with equal severity. On its face, the language of Section 13, Article VII is prohibitory so that it must be understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation of the privilege of holding multiple government offices or employment. Verily, wherever the language used in the constitution is prohibitory, it is to be understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation. The phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" must be given a literal interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the Constitution itself, to wit: the Vice-President being appointed as a member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII; or acting as President in those instances provided under Section 7, pars. (2) and (3), Article VII; and, the Secretary of Justice being ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII. (Bold emphasis supplied.) Being designated as the Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his position of Acting Solicitor General, therefore, Agra was undoubtedly covered by Section 13, Article VII, supra, whose text and spirit were too clear to be differently read. Hence, Agra could not validly hold any other office or employment during his tenure as the Acting Solicitor General, because the Constitution has not otherwise so provided. The only two exceptions against the holding of multiple offices are: (1) those provided for under the Constitution, such as Section 3, Article VII, authorizing the Vice President to become a member of the Cabinet; and (2) posts occupied by Executive officials specified in Section 13, Article VII without additional compensation in ex officio capacities as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of the officials offices. It is equally remarkable, therefore, that Agras designation as the Acti ng Secretary of Justice was not in an ex officio capacity, by which he would have been validly authorized to concurrently hold the two positions due to the holding of one office being the consequence of holding the other. Being included in the stricter prohibition embodied in Section 13, supra, Agra cannot liberally apply in his favor the broad exceptions provided in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B of the Constitution ("Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position") to justify his designation as Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his designation as Acting Solicitor General, or vice versa. Thus, the Court has said [T]he qualifying phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" in Section 13, Article VII cannot possibly refer to the broad exceptions provided under Section 7, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution. To construe said qualifying phrase as respondents would have us do, would render nugatory and meaningless the manifest intent and purpose of the framers of the Constitution to impose a stricter prohibition on the President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants with respect to holding other offices or employment in the government during their tenure. Respondents inte rpretation that Section 13 of Article VII admits of the exceptions found in Section 7, par. (2) of Article IX-B would obliterate the distinction so carefully set by the framers of the Constitution as to when the highranking officials of the Executive Branch from the President to Assistant Secretary, on the one hand, and the generality of civil servants from the rank immediately below Assistant Secretary downwards, on the other, may hold any other office or position in the government during their tenure .35 To underscore the obvious, it is not sufficient for Agra to show that his holding of the other office was "allowed by law or the primary functions of his position." To claim the exemption of his concurrent designations from the coverage of the stricter prohibition under Section 13, supra, he needed to establish herein that his concurrent designation was expressly allowed by the Constitution. But, alas, he did not do so. To be sure, Agras concurrent designations as Acting Secretary of Justice and Acting Solicitor General did not come within the definition of an ex officio capacity. Had either of his concurrent designations been in an ex officiocapacity in relation to the other, the Court might now be ruling in his favor. #9 AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., EDGARDO J. ANGARA, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, LUISA P. EJERCITOESTRADA, JINGGOY E. ESTRADA, PANFILO M. LACSON, ALFREDO S. LIM, JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, and SERGIO R. OSMEA III, Petitioners vs. EXEC. SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, FLORENCIO B. ABAD, AVELINO J. CRUZ, JR., MICHAEL T. DEFENSOR, JOSEPH H. DURANO, RAUL M. GONZALEZ, ALBERTO G. ROMULO, RENE C. VILLA, and ARTHUR C. YAP, Respondents. G.R. No. 164978 October 13, 2005 Facts: While Congress is in their regular session, President Arroyo, through Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, issued appointments to respondents as acting secretaries of their respective departments without the consent of the Commission on Appointments. After the Congress had adjourned, President Arroyo issued ad interim appointments to respondents as secretaries of the departments to which they were previously appointed in an acting capacity. Petitioners senators filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to declare unconstitutional the appointments issued.

They assert that while Congress is in session, there can be no appointments, whether regular or acting, to a vacant position of an office needing confirmation by the CoA, without first having obtained its consent. Respondent secretaries, on the other hand, maintain that the President can issue appointments in an acting capacity to department secretaries without the consent of the CoA even while Congress is in session. Issue: Whether or not President Arroyos appointment of respondents as acting secretaries without the consent of the Commission on Appointments while Congress is in session is constitutional. Held:

office occupied by an alter ego of the President, such as the office of a department secretary, the President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could assume office.
Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation to appoint automatically the undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether temporary or permanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence. Congress, in the guise of prescribing qualifications to an office, cannot impose on the President who her alter ego should be. The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session. Since a department secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office must necessarily have the Presidents confidence. Thus, by the very nature of the office of a department secretary, the President must appoint in an acting capacity a person of her choice even while Congress is in session. That person may or may not be the permanent appointee, but practical reasons may make it expedient that the acting appointee will also be the permanent appointee.

Preliminary matters: On the Mootness of the Petition

The Solicitor General argues that the petition is moot because President Arroyo had extended to respondents ad interim appointments on 23 September 2004 immediately after the recess of Congress. Mootness of the petition does not bar its resolution. The question of the constitutionality of the Presidents appointment of department secretaries in an acting capacity while Congress is in session will arise in every such appointment.

Express provision of law allows President to make acting appointment

Sec. 17, Chap. 5, Title I, Book III, EO 292 states that [t]he President may temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or any other competent person to perform the functions of an office in the executive branch. Thus, the President may even appoint in an acting capacity a person not yet in the government service, as long as the President deems that person competent. But does Sec. 17 apply to appointments vested in the President by the Constitution? Petitioners assert that it only applies to appointments vested in the President by law. Petitioners forget that Congress is not the only source of law. Law refers to the Constitution, statutes or acts of Congress, municipal ordinances, implementing rules issued pursuant to law, and judicial decisions.

Preliminary matters: On the Nature of the Power to Appoint The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the legislature may not interfere with the exercise of this executive power except in those instances when the Constitution expressly allows it to interfere . Limitations on

the executive power to appoint are construed strictly against the legislature. The scope of the legislatures interference in the executives power to appoint is limited to the power to prescribe the qualifications to an appointive office. Congress cannot appoint a person to an office in the guise of prescribing qualifications to that

Petitioners claim that the issuance of appointments in an acting capacity is susceptible to abuse. Petitioners fail to consider that acting appointments cannot exceed one year as expressly provided in Section 17(3), Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292. The law has incorporated this safeguard to prevent abuses, like the use of acting appointments as a way to circumvent confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Ad-interim appointments vs. appointments in an acting capacity

office. Neither may Congress impose on the President the duty to appoint any particular person to an office.

xxx The Commission on Appointments is a creature of the Constitution. Although its membership is confined to members of Congress, said Commission is independent of Congress. The powers of the Commission do not come

from Congress, but emanate directly from the Constitution. Hence, it is not an agent of Congress. In fact, the functions of the Commissioner are purely executive in nature. Preliminary matters: On Petitioners Standing

Ad-interim appointments must be distinguished from appointments in an acting capacity. Both of them are effective upon acceptance. But ad-interim appointments are extended only during a recess of Congress, whereas acting appointments may be extended any time there is a vacancy. Moreover ad-interim appointments are submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting appointments are not submitted to the Commission on Appointments. Acting appointments are a way of temporarily filling important offices but, if abused, they can also be a way of circumventing the need for confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. However, we find no abuse in the present case. The absence of abuse is readily apparent from President Arroyos issuance of ad interim appointments to respondents immediately upon the recess of Congress, way before the lapse of one year. #10 : Rufino vs. Endriga Case: Section 16 Article 7: Facts: Two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari. First case, GR No. 139554, represented by the Solicitor General, collectively known as the RUFINO group seeks to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals and the Resolution denying the motion for the reconsideration: 1. Declaring petitioners, ENDRIGA group to have a clear right to their respective offices elected by the CCP board up to expiration of 4-year term 2. Ousting respondents, Rufino group, except respondent Tantoco, from their respective offices and excluding them therefrom 3. Dismissing case against Tantoco Second case, GR No. 139565, the Endriga group, seeks to assail the Resolution issued by the Court of Appeals in same case insofar as it denied their Motion for Immediate Execution of the Decision.

Considering the independence of the Commission on Appointments from Congress, it is error for petitioners to claim standing in the present case as members of Congress. President Arroyos issuance of acting appointments while Congress is in session impairs no power of Congress. Among the petitioners, only the following are members of the Commission on Appointments of the 13th Congress: Senator Enrile as Minority Floor Leader, Senator Lacson as Assistant Minority Floor Leader, and Senator Angara, Senator Ejercito-Estrada, and Senator Osmea as members. Thus, on the impairment of the prerogatives of members of the Commission on Appointments, only Senatorscommissioners have standing in the present petition. The other senator-petioners possess no standing in the present petition.

Main ISSUE: Constitutionality of President Arroyos issuance of appointments to respondents as acting secretaries

Petitioners contend that President Arroyo should not have appointed respondents as acting secretaries because "in case of a vacancy in the Office of a Secretary, it is only an Undersecretary who can be designated as Acting Secretary." Petitioners further assert that "while Congress is in session, there can be no appointments, whether regular or acting, to a vacant position of an office needing confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, without first having obtained its consent."

The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of a permanent occupant to the office. In case of vacancy in an

History of PD 15: Marcos In 1966, Marcos created EO 30 Creation of the Cultural Center of the Philippines as a trust governed by a Board of Trustees of 7 members to preserve and promote Philippine culture. The original founding trustees were all pointed by Pres. Marcos 1972, after declaration of Martial Law Pres. Marcos issued PD 15 which converted CCP into a non-municipal public corporation free from the pressure or influence of politics and increased 7 members to 9. EO 1058 issued in 1985 increased 9 to 11. Aquino - 1986, after People Power Resolution, Aquino asked incumbent CCP trustees for courtesy resignation and appointed new trustees to the Board. Ramos started Endriga group Estrada appointed 7 new trustees to CCP board with term of 4 years to replace the Endriga group, except for Tantoco. Thus Rufino group took respective oaths of office and assumed performance of their duties in 1999. Endriga vs. Estrada Endriga group files Petition for Quo Warranto questioning Pres. Estradas appointment of 7 new member of CCP board.

Intent to insulate the CCP from political influence and pressure, specifically from the Pres. Makes CCP a selfperpetuating entity, virtually outside the control of the Pres. SUCH CANNOT EXISTS UNDER CONSTI. Sec. 3s provision of Board initiating and formulating plocies and activities are still subject to Pres. power of control. Section 16 of Article 7 of Consti: source of presidents power to appoint gives President legislature authority to delegate power to appoint However, Congress may, by law, vest upon the appointment of other officers lower in rank (as contended in Rufinos MOC) President appoints 5 groups of officers: 1. Heads of Executive department (with consent from Commission of Appointments) 2. Those whom President may be authorized by law to appoint (and 3. without consent of Comm of App) 3. Officers of the Government (if the law is silent or head appointing declared unconsti) 4. Lower-ranked officers whose appointments Congress may, by the law, vest in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions or boards. 5. Appointments vested by Consti in Supreme Court and Constitutional Commission Appointment of Heads of Departments, Agencies, Commissions, and Boards: Appointing powers belong to President, with: Congress - share such authority as to appointing inferior or lower in rank than those vested by law

Alleged that under Sec. 6 (b) of PD 15 vacancies of the CCP Board shall be filled by election by majority vote of trustees held at next regular meeting only when the board is entirely vacant may the President of the Phil. fill such vacancies, acting in consultation with ranking officers of CCP. In the case at bar, only one seat was vacant due to Ma Osas expiration term. 4-year term: Endriga group maintained that under CCP Charter, the trustees fixed 4 -year term can only be terminated by reason of resignation, incapacity, death, or other cause thus Pres. action was unnecessary because 10 incumbent trustees had the statutory power to fill up by election any vacancy of the board. Sec. 3 of PD 15 Endriga refuses to accept CCP is under the supervision and control of the President as Sec. 3 states shall enjoy autonomy of policy and operation CAs decision: declared Endriga group lawfully entitled to hold office as CCP trustees and ousting Rufino group from board. Sec. 6 (b) of PD 15 is free from ambiquity. Nor may the Presidents constitutional statutory power of supervision and control over government corporations restrict or modify application of CCP Charter.

Batasang Pambansa can also appoint inferior officers Power to appoint to heads is a matter of legislative grace. Presidents power is self-executing vested by Consti thus not subject to legislative limitations or conditions. Others such power are the Supreme Court en banc and Consti Com Sec. 8 PD 15 Chairperson of CCP Board is Head of CCP: Chairperson, with confirmation from the Board, has the power to appoint all officers, staff and personnel of the Center The CCP may elect membership in Govt Service Insurance System (GSIS) those elected will have same rights and privileges and obligations as govt service Exempted from coverage of Civil Service Law and Rules Sec. 3 Duties of Chairperson: Appoint, remove, discipline all officers and personnel Perform duties until Board, by majority vote, shall elect another Chairperson

Rufinos Motion for Recon: asserted, by Section 16 of Article 7 of the 1987 Consti, that the law could only delegate to the CCP board the power to appoint officers lower in rank than trustees of Board which is in conflict with Sec. 6 of PD 15 CCP trustees has the authority to appoint or elect fellow officers of equal rank not of lower CA: denied Rufinos Motion and also denied Endrigas motion for immediate execution of decision. Hence the consolidated petitions. MAIN ISSUE OF 1st case: Whether or not Section 6 paragraph B of PD 15 in which gives authority to CCP trustees to elect or appoint fellow officers of equal rank, is unconstitutional (as it is against Sec.16 of Article 7, that only the President has the appointing powers of appointing heads of executive departments) Important Issues related to lesson: 1. Invalid delegation of the Presidents appointing power under the Constitution 2. Deprives Presidents constitutional power of control and supervision over CCP MAIN ISSUE OF 2nd case: whether or not a writ of quo warranto involving public office such as CCP should be declared a self-executing judgment and deemed immediately executor under Rule 39, Section 4 of the rules of court. Section 6 (b) and (c) of PD 15: Board of trustees has the power and authority of the corporation. Vacancies shall be filled by election of majority vote by the trustees. Only can the President exercise his/her power to appoint if the board becomes entirely vacant.

Thus, under COnsti, CCP head is Chairperson and has power to appoint lower ranked officers Under PD 15, CCP is a public corporation governed by the Board thus not an agency

Sec. 6 (b) (c) vs. Sec. 16 of Article 7: HOLDING: Sec. 6 (b) and (c) of PD 15 are unconstitutional. While Sec. 6 empowers remaining trustees to fill vacancies of Board, allowing them to elect fellow trustees... Sec. 16 allows only theheads of departments, agencies, commissions or boards to appoint only officers lower in rank Sec. 6 talks about independent appointing powers which conflicts with the Presidents power to appoint the two system of appointing powers are recurring anomalies and controversies in appointment every time new President assumed office. What is the CCP? CCP is under the Executive branch, as stated in Revised Admin Code of 1987 any agency, not placed or order creating them under specific department falls under Office of Pres. President controls CCP Sec. 17 of Art. 7 CCP perform executive and not legislative, judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Presidents Power to Control: Applies to acts or decision of all officers in the Executive Branch Power to control the power to revise or reverse acts or decisions of a subordinate officer involving exercise of discretion Supervision and Control includes authority to act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation of subordinate

Executive branch is unitary thus only the Presindet had executive power exercising control over entire Executive Branch. Legislature cant validly enact law outside control of Presindent. Limitations: Doesnt extend to qyaus -judicial bodies, since proceedings and decisions are judicial in nature and subject to judicial review, only admin power of Pres. Local government units only general supervision HOLDING: Wherefore, we grant the petition of the 1st case wherein we find Sec. 6 (b) and (c) of PD 15 UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it authorizes remaining trustees to fill by election vacancies of the Board.And we find it unnecessary to rule 2nd case.

requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised. 2. There is a justiciable issue. We hold that the petitions set forth an actual case or controversy that is ripe for judicial determination. The reality is that the JBC already commenced the proceedings for the selection of the nominees to be included in a short list to be submitted to the President for consideration of which of them will succeed Chief Justice Puno as the next Chief Justice. Although the position is not yet vacant, the fact that the JBC began the process of nomination pursuant to its rules and practices, although it has yet to decide whether to submit the list of nominees to the incumbent outgoing President or to the next President, makes the situation ripe for judicial determination, because the next steps are the public interview of the candidates, the preparation of the short list of candidates, and the interview of constitutional experts, as may be needed. The resolution of the controversy will surely settle with finality the nagging questions that are preventing the JBC from moving on with the process that it already began, or that are reasons persuading the JBC to desist from the rest of the process. 3. PROHIBITION UNDER SECTION 15, ARTICLE VII DOES NOT APPLY TO APPOINTMENTS TO FILL A VACANCY IN THE SUPREME COURT OR TO OTHER APPOINTMENST TO THE JUDICIARY. Two constitutional provisions seemingly in conflict: The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof. Justification of the Supreme Court: First. The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the framers devoted time to meticulously drafting, styling, and arranging the Constitution. Such meticulousness indicates that the organization and arrangement of the provisions of the Constitution were not arbitrarily or whimsically done by the framers, but purposely made to reflect their intention and manifest their vision of what the Constitution should contain. The Constitution consists of 18 Articles, three of which embody the allocation of the awesome powers of government among the three great departments, the Legislative (Article VI), the Executive (Article VII), and the Judicial Departments (Article VIII). The arrangement was a true recognition of the principle of separation of powers that underlies the political structure As can be seen, Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department, and, among others, it lists the powers vested by the Constitution in the President. The presidential power of appointment is dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Article. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. Although Valenzuela came to hold that the prohibition covered even judicial appointments, it cannot be disputed that the Valenzuela dictum did not firmly rest on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. Moreover, the usage in Section 4(1), Article VIII of the word shall an imperative, operating to impose a duty that may be enforced should not be disregarded. Thereby, Sections 4(1) imposes on the President the imperative duty

#11 ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) G. R. No. 191002 March 17, 2010. Facts: This case is based on multiple cases field with dealt with the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory requirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010 or seven days after the presidential election. On December 22, 2009, Congressman Matias V. Defensor, an ex officio member of the JBC, addressed a letter to the JBC, requesting that the process for nominations to the office of the Chief Justice be commenced immediately. In its January 18, 2010 meeting en banc, the JBC passed a resolution which stated that they have unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice to be vacated on May 17, 2010 upon the retirement of the incumbent Chief Justice. As a result, the JBC opened the position of Chief Justice for application or recommendation, and published for that purpose its announcement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Philippine Star. In its meeting of February 8, 2010, the JBC resolved to proceed to the next step of announcing the names of the following candidates to invite to the public to file their sworn complaint, written report, or opposition, if any, not later than February 22, 2010. Although it has already begun the process for the filling of the position of Chief Justice Puno in accordance with its rules, the JBC is not yet decided on when to submit to the President its list of nominees for the position due to the controversy in this case being unresolved. The compiled cases which led to this case and the petitions of intervenors called for either the prohibition of the JBC to pass the shortlist, mandamus for the JBC to pass the shortlist, or that the act of appointing the next Chief Justice by GMA is a midnight appointment. A precedent frequently cited by the parties is the In Re Appointments Dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the RTC of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively, shortly referred to here as the Valenzuela case, by which the Court held that Section 15, Article VII prohibited the exercise by the President of the power to appoint to judicial positions during the period therein fixed. ISSUES: 1. W/N the petitioners have legal standing? 2. W/N there is justiciable controversy that is ripe for judicial determination? 3. W/N the incumbent President appoint the next Chief Justice? 4. W/N mandamus and prohibition will lie to compel the submission of the shortlist of nominees by the JBC? HELD: 1. Petitioners have legal standing because such requirement for this case was waived by the Court. Legal standing is a peculiar concept in constitutional law because in some cases, suits are not brought by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other government act but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest. But even if, strictly speaking, the petitioners are not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the

to make an appointment of a Member of the Supreme Court within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy. The failure by the President to do so will be a clear disobedience to the Constitution. The 90-day limitation fixed in Section 4(1), Article VIII for the President to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court was undoubtedly a special provision to establish a definite mandate for the President as the appointing power, and cannot be defeated by mere judicial interpretation in Valenzuela to the effect that Section 15, Article VII prevailed because it was couched in stronger negative language. Second. Section 15, Article VII does not apply as well to all other appointments in the Judiciary. There is no question that one of the reasons underlying the adoption of Section 15 as part of Article VII was to eliminate midnight appointments from being made by an outgoing Chief Executive. Given the background and rationale for the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII, we have no doubt that the Constitutional Commission confined the prohibition to appointments made in the Executive Department. The framers did not need to extend the prohibition to appointments in the Judiciary, because their establishment of the JBC and their subjecting the nomination and screening of candidates for judicial positions to the unhurried and deliberate prior process of the JBC ensured that there would no longer be midnight appointments to the Judiciary. Indeed, the creation of the JBC was precisely intended to de-politicize the Judiciary by doing away with the intervention of the Commission on Appointments. Third. As earlier stated, the non-applicability of Section 15, Article VII to appointments in the Judiciary was confirmed by then Senior Associate Justice Regalado to the JBC itself when it met on March 9, 1998 to discuss the question raised by some sectors about the constitutionality of xxx appointments to the Court of Appeals in light of the forthcoming presidential elections. He assured that on the basis of the (Constitutional) Commissions records, the election ban had no application to appointments to the Court of Appeals. This confirmation was accepted by the JBC, which then submitted to the President for consideration the nominations for the eight vacancies in the Court of Appeals. Fourth. Of the 23 sections in Article VII, three (i.e., Section 14, Section15, and Section 16) concern the appointing powers of the President. Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. Fifth. To hold like the Court did in Valenzuela that Section 15 extends to appointments to the Judiciary further undermines the intent of the Constitution of ensuring the independence of the Judicial Department from the Executive and Legislative Departments. Such a holding will tie the Judiciary and the Supreme Court to the fortunes or misfortunes of political leaders vying for the Presidency in a presidential election. Consequently, the wisdom of having the new President, instead of the current incumbent President, appoint the next Chief Justice is itself suspect, and cannot ensure judicial independence, because the appointee can also become beholden to the appointing authority. In contrast, the appointment by the incumbent President does not run the same risk of compromising judicial independence, precisely because her term will end by June 30, 2010. Sixth. The argument has been raised to the effect that there will be no need for the incumbent President to appoint during the prohibition period the successor of Chief Justice Puno within the context of Section 4 (1), Article VIII, because anyway there will still be about 45 days of the 90 days mandated in Section 4(1), Article VIII remaining. The argument is flawed, because it is focused only on the coming vacancy occurring from Chief Justice Punos retirement by May 17, 2010. It ignores the need to apply Section 4(1) to every situation of a vacancy in the Supreme Court. Section 4 (3), Article VII requires the regular elections to be held on the second Monday of May, letting the elections fall on May 8, at the earliest, or May 14, at the latest. If the regular presidential elections are held on May 8, the period of the prohibition is 115 days. If such elections are held on May 14, the period of the prohibition is 109 days. Either period of the prohibition is longer than the full mandatory 90-day period to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court. The result is that there are at least 19 occasions (i.e., the difference between the shortest possible period of the ban of 109 days and the 90-day mandatory period for appointments) in which the outgoing President

would be in no position to comply with the constitutional duty to fill up a vacancy in the Supreme Court. It is safe to assume that the framers of the Constitution could not have intended such an absurdity. Seventh. As a matter of fact, in an extreme case, we can even raise a doubt on whether a JBC list is necessary at all for the President any President to appoint a Chief Justice if the appointee is to come from the ranks of the sitting justices of the Supreme Court. Sec. 9, Article VIII says: xxx. The Members of the Supreme Court xxx shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for any vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation. xxx The provision clearly refers to an appointee coming into the Supreme Court from the outside, that is, a non-member of the Court aspiring to become one. It speaks of candidates for the Supreme Court, not of those who are already members or sitting justices of the Court, all of whom have previously been vetted by the JBC. 4. WRIT OF MANDAMUS DOES NOT LIE AGAINST THE JBC Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act that the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It is proper when the act against which it is directed is one addressed to the discretion of the tribunal or officer. Mandamus is not available to direct the exercise of a judgment or discretion in a particular way. For mandamus to lie, the following requisites must be complied with: (a) the plaintiff has a clear legal right to the act demanded; (b) it must be the duty of the defendant to perform the act, because it is mandated by law; (c) the defendant unlawfully neglects the performance of the duty enjoined by law; (d) the act to be performed is ministerial, not discretionary; and (e) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. #11A De Castro vs. JBC G.R. No. 191002 April 20, 2010 FACTS: This is a Motion for Reconsideration on the March 17, 2010 decision of the Court. The said decision directs the Judicial and Bar Council to resume its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill the vacancy created by the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010, and to prepare the short list of nominees and submit it to the incumbent President. Movants argue that the disputed constitutional provision, Art. VII, Sec. 15 and Art. VIII, Sec. 4(1), clearly intended the ban on midnight appointments to cover the members of the Judiciary, and they contended that the principle of stare decisis is controlling, and insisted that the Court erred in disobeying or abandoning the Valenzuela ruling. ISSUE: (Section 4): Did the Constitutional Commission extend to the Judiciary the ban on presidential appointments during the period stated in Sec. 15, Article VII? HELD: The Constitutional Commission did not extend to the Judiciary the ban on presidential appointments during the period stated in Sec. 15, Art. VII. The deliberations that the dissent of Justice Carpio Morales quoted from the records of the Constitutional Commission did not concern either Sec. 15, Art. VII or Sec. 4(1), Art. VIII, but only Sec. 13, Art. VII, a provision on nepotism. Election ban on appointments does not extend to the Supreme Court. The Court upheld its March 17, 2010 decision ruling that the prohibition under Art. VII, Sec. 15 of the Constitution against presidential appointments immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the term of the outgoing president does not apply to vacancies in the Supreme Court.

Separate Opinion of Justice Brion A first reality is that the JBC cannot, on its own due to lack of the proper authority, determine the appropriate course of action to take under the Constitution. Its principal function is to recommend appointees to the Judiciary and it has no authority to interpret constitutional provisions, even those affecting its principal function; the authority to undertake constitutional interpretation belongs to the courts alone. A second reality is that the disputed constitutional provisions do not stand alone and cannot be read independently of one another; the Constitution and its various provisions have to be read and interpreted as one seamless whole, giving sufficient emphasis to every aspect in accordance with the hierarchy of our constitutional values. The disputed provisions should be read together and, as reflections of the will of the people, should be given effect to the extent that they should be reconciled. The third reality, closely related to the second, is that in resolving the coverage of the election ban vis--vis the appointment of the Chief Justice and the Members of the Court, provisions of the Constitution other than the disputed provisions must be taken into account. In considering when and how to act, the JBC has to consider that: 1. The President has a term of six years which begins at noon of June 30 following the election, which implies that the outgoing President remains President up to that time. (Section 4, Article VII). The President assumes office at the beginning of his or her term, with provision for the situations where the President fails to qualify or is unavailable at the beginning of his term (Section 7, Article VII). 2. The Senators and the Congressmen begin their respective terms also at midday of June 30 (Sections 4 and 7, Article VI). The Congress convenes on the 4th Monday of July for its regular session, but the President may call a special session at any time. (Section 15, Article VI) 3. The Valenzuela case cited as authority for the position that the election ban provision applies to the whole Judiciary, only decided the issue with respect to lower court judges, specifically, those covered by Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution. Any reference to the filling up of vacancies in the Supreme Court pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII constitutes obiter dictum as this issue was not directly in issue and was not ruled upon. These provisions and interpretation of the Valenzuela ruling when read together with disputed provisions, related with one another, and considered with the May 17, 2010 retirement of the current Chief Justice bring into focus certain unavoidable realities, as follows: 1. If the election ban would apply fully to the Supreme Court, the incumbent President cannot appoint a Member of the Court beginning March 10, 2010, all the way up to June 30, 2010. 2. The retirement of the incumbent Chief Justice May 17, 2010 falls within the period of the election ban. (In an extreme example where the retirement of a Member of the Court falls on or very close to the day the election ban starts, the Office of the Solicitor General calculates in its Comment that the whole 90 days given to the President to make appointment would be covered by the election ban.) 3. Beginning May 17, 2010, the Chief Justice position would be vacant, giving rise to the question of whether an Acting Chief Justice can act in his place. While this is essentially a Supreme Court concern, the Chief Justice is the ex officio Chair of the JBC; hence it must be concerned and be properly guided. 4. The appointment of the new Chief Justice has to be made within 90 days from the time the vacancy occurs, which translates to a deadline of August 15, 2010. 5. The deadline for the appointment is fixed (as it is not reckoned from the date of submission of the JBC list, as in the lower courts) which means that the JBC ideally will have to make its list available at the start of the 90-day period so that its process will not eat up the 90-day period granted the President. 6. After noon of June 30, 2010, the JBC representation from Congress would be vacant; the current representatives mandates to act for their principals extend only to the end of their present terms; thus, the JBC shall be operating at that point at less than its full membership. 7. Congress will not convene until the 4th Monday of July, 2010, but would still need to organize before the two Houses of Congress can send their representatives to the JBC a process may extend well into August, 2010. 8. By July 5, 2010, one regular member of the JBC would vacate his post. Filling up this vacancy requires a presidential appointment and the concurrence of the Commission on Appointments. 9. Last but not the least, the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII is that "a President or Acting President shall not make appointments." This prohibition is expressly addressed to the President and covers the act of appointment; the prohibition is not against the JBC in the performance of its function of "recommending appointees to the Judiciary" an act that is one step away from the act of making appointments. #12 Abakada Guro Party List, et al. vs. Exec. Sec. Ermita G.R. No. 168056, September 1, 2005 Facts: On May 24, 2005, the President signed into law Republic Act 9337 or the VAT Reform Act. Before the law took effect on July 1, 2005, the Court issued a TRO enjoining government from implementing the law in response to a slew of petitions for certiorari and prohibition questioning the constitutionality of the new law.

The challenged section of R.A. No. 9337 is the common proviso in Sections 4, 5 and 6: That the President, upon the recommendationof the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to 12%, after any of the following conditions has been satisfied: (i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%); or (ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-half percent (1%) Petitioners allege that the grant of stand-by authority to the President to increase the VAT rate is an abdication by Congress of its exclusive power to tax because such delegation is not covered by Section 28 (2), Article VI Consti. They argue that VAT is a tax levied on the sale or exchange of goods and services which cant be included within the purview of tariffs under the exemption delegation since this refers to customs duties, tolls or tribute payable upon merchandise to the government and usually imposed on imported/exported goods. They also said that the President has powers to cause, influence or create the conditions provided by law to bring about the conditions precedent. Moreover, they allege that no guiding standards are made by law as to how the Secretary of Finance will make the recommendation. Issues: Whether or not the RA 9337's stand-by authority to the Executive to increase the VAT rate, especially on account of the recommendatory power granted to the Secretary of Finance, constitutes undue delegation of legislative power? NO Held: The powers which Congress is prohibited from delegating are those which are strictly, or inherently and exclusively, legislative. Purely legislative power which can never be delegated is the authority to make a complete law- complete as to the time when it shall take effect and as to whom it shall be applicable, and to determine the expediency of its enactment. It is the nature of the power and not the liability of its use or the manner of its exercisewhich determines the validity of its delegation. The exceptions are: (a) delegation of tariff powers to President under Constitution (b) delegation of emergency powers to President under Constitution (c) delegation to the people at large (d) delegation to local governments (e) delegation to administrative bodies For the delegation to be valid, it must be complete and it must fix a standard. A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. In this case, it is not a delegation of legislative power BUT a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and administration of the increased rate under the law is contingent. The legislature has made the operation of the 12% rate effective January 1, 2006, contingent upon a specified fact or condition. It leaves the entire operation or non-operation of the 12% rate upon factual matters outside of the control of the executive. No discretion would be exercised by the President. Highlighting the absence of discretion is the fact that the word SHALL is used in the common proviso. The use of the word SHALL connotes a mandatory order. Its use in a statute denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion. Thus, it is the ministerial duty of the President to immediately impose the 12% rate upon the existence of any of the conditions specified by Congress. This is a duty, which cannot be evaded by the President. It is a clear directive to impose the 12% VAT rate when the specified conditions are present. Congress just granted the Secretary of Finance the authority to ascertain the existence of a fact--- whether by December 31, 2005, the VAT collection as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds 2 4/5 % or the national government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and 1%. If either of these two instances has occurred, the Secretary of Finance, by legislative mandate, must submit such information to the President.

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In making his recommendation to the President on the existence of either of the two conditions, the Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the President or even her subordinate. He is acting as the agent of the legislative department, to determine and declare the event upon which its expressed will is to take effect. The Secretary of Finance becomes the means or tool by which legislative policy is determined and implemented, considering that he possesses all the facilities to gather data and information and has a much broader perspective to properly evaluate them. His function is to gather and collate statistical data and other pertinent information and verify if any of the two conditions laid out by Congress is present. Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the only way in which the legislative process can go forward. There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress did not delegate the power to tax but the mere implementation of the law. VELASCO - FORMER CHAIRMAN, TARIFF COMMISSION Et al, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT AND THE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL GOVERNMENT AUDIT OFFICE , respondents. [G.R. No. 189774. September 18, 2012.] Directives and orders issued by the President in the valid exercise of his power of control over the executive department must be obeyed and implemented in good faith by all executive officials. Acts performed in contravention of such directives merit invalidation. Facts: After the effectivity of the Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. 292) and in accordance thereof, the Tariff Commission (TC) established its own Employee Suggestions and Incentives Awards System (ESIAS), which was approved by CSC. With ESIAS, TC issued Special Order granting Merit Incentive Award to its officials and employees for a total disbursement of P929,000. And then Birthday Cash Gifts for which it disbursed P794,000. Upon post-audit conducted by the COA, the grant of the Merit Incentive Award was suspended for "lack of approval of the Office of the President.TC requested for reconsideration. State Auditor Ochosa denied the request for reconsideration of TC, stating that the grant of the subject incentives was contrary to AO 161 and DBM Circular No. 73 which prohibited heads of departments and agencies from establishing and authorizing a separate productivity and performance incentive award. The matter was elevated to COA Director IV Juanito Espino, Jr. who affirmed the pronouncements of State Auditor Ochosa, holding that since the revised ESIAS was never approved by the CSC, then the same could not be a valid basis for the grant of the subject incentives. Hence, the filing of a petition for review with the COA En Banc assailing the disallowance of the subject incentives. 19 Ruling of COA COA En Banc uphold the disallowances. It ruled that Section 7 of AO 161 revoked Section 35, Chapter 5, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of EO 292 and therefore, presidential approval was required for the grant of the Merit Incentive Award. Issue: WON the President, through AO 161, encroached upon the authority of CSC to grant benefits to government employee. Ruling: no The petition is partly meritorious.

The President is the head of the government. Governmental power and authority are exercised and implemented through him. His power includes the control over executive departments

"The president shall have control over all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed." (Section 17; Article VII, 1987 Constitution)
Control means "the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter." It has been held that "[t]he President can, by virtue of his power of control, review, modify, alter or nullify any action, or decision of his subordinate in the executive departments, bureaus, or offices under him. He can exercise this power motu proprio without need of any appeal from any party." xxx xxx xxx It cannot be said that the President encroached upon the authority of the CSC to grant benefits to government personnel. [The subject AOs] did not revoke the privilege of employees to receive incentive benefits. The same merely regulated the grant and amount thereof. Sound management and effective utilization of financial resources of government are basically executive functions, not the Commission's. Implicit is this recognition in EO 292, which states: Conformably, it is the President or the head of each department or agency who is authorized to incur the necessary expenses involved in the honorary recognition of subordinate officers and employees of the government." It is not the duty of the Commission to fix the amount of the incentives. Such function belongs to the President or his duly empowered alter ego. #14:BIRAOGO VS PTC G.R. No. 192935 December 7, 2010 LOUIS BAROK C. BIRAOGO vs. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010 x - - - - - - - - - - - -x G.R. No. 193036 REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP. SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, and REP. ORLANDO B. FUA, SR. vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. and DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD FACTS: Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July 30, 2010. PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between contending parties. Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions. They argued that: (a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation. (b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office which was hitherto inexistent like the Truth Commission. (c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the Truth Commission with quasi judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and the DOJ created under the Administrative Code of 1987. (d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes those of the other administrations, past and present, who may be indictable. Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued that: 1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the Presidents executive power and power of control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or form such bodies. 2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.

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3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the latters jurisdiction. 4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was validly created for laudable purposes. ISSUES: 1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E. O. No. 1? 2. 2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions? 3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ? 4. 4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause? RULING: The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. 1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which they belong as members. To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution. Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators. With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable to the implementation of E. O. No. 1. Locus standi is a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. In private suits, standing is governed by the real-parties-in interest rule. It provides that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. Real-party-in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a public right in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He has to show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. He has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a citizen or taxpayer. The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result. The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogos assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. The powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land. 2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission because, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be the very source of the funds for the commission. The amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no impropriety in the funding. 3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the investigative function of the commission will complement those of the two offices. The function of determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. PTCs power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land. 4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution. Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals

in a similar manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a st ates jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the states duly constituted authorities. There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution. Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification. The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to investigate all past administrations. The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights determined and all public authority administered. Laws that do not conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for being unconstitutional. WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution #15 RANDOLF DAVID, ET AL. VS. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ET AL. G.R. No. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489 & 171424 May 3, 2006 Facts: On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency and call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence in the country. The Office of the President announced the cancellation of all programs and activities related to the 20th anniversary celebration of Edsa People Power I; and revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local governments and dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA. The police arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a professor at the University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also arrested was his companion, Ronald Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan. In the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) of the PNP, on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila and attempt to arrest was made against representatives of ANAKPAWIS, GABRIELA and BAYAN MUNA whom suspected of inciting to sedition and rebellion. On March 3, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP 1021 declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist. Petitioners filed seven (7) certiorari with the Supreme Court and three (3) of those petitions impleaded President Arroyo as respondent questioning the legality of the proclamation, alleging that it encroaches the emergency powers of Congress and it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and assembly. Issue: 1.) Whether 2.) Whether NAFLU-KMU 3.) Whether 4.) Whether 5.) Whether are used? or not Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 is unconstitutional? or not the warantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas and the dispersal of KMU and members during rallies were valid? or not proper to implead President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as respondent in the petitions? or not the petitioners have a legal standing in questioning the constitutionality of the proclamation? or not the concurrence of Congress is necessary whenever the alarming powers incident to Martial Law

Held: 1.) The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the President for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence whenever becomes necessary as prescribe under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. However, there were extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied power:

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(A) To issue decrees; (" Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states that "[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.") (B) To direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to lawless violence as well as decrees promulgated by the President[The absence of a law defining "acts of terrorism" may result in abuse and oppression on the part of the police or military]; and (C) To impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, are ultra vires and unconstitutional. The Court also rules that under Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, the President, in the absence of legislative legislation, cannot take over privately-owned public utility and private business affected with public interest. Therefore, the PP No. 1017 is only partly unconstitutional. Take-Care Power This refers to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed, based on Sec. 17, Art. VII: The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. As the Executive in whom the executive power is vested, the primary function of the President is to enforce the laws as well as to formulate policies to be embodied in existing laws. He sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. Before assuming office, he is required to take an oath or affirmation to the effect that as President of the Philippines, he will, among others, execute its laws. In the exercise of such function, the President, if needed, may employ the powers attached to his office as the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the country, including the Philippine National Police under the Department of Interior and Local Government. The specific portion of PP 1017 questioned is the enabling clause: to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction. Is it within the domain of President Arroyo to promulgate decrees?The President is granted an Ordinance Power under Chap. 2, Book III of E.O. 292. President Arroyos ordinance power is limited to those issuances mentioned in the foregoing provision. She cannot issue decrees similar to those issued by Former President Marcos under PP 1081. Presidential Decrees are laws which are of the same category and binding force as statutes because they were issued by the President in the exercise of his legislative power during the period of Martial Law under the 1973 Constitution. This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Sec. 1, Art. VI categorically states that the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and aHouse of Representatives. To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justifyPresident Arroyos exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. But can President Arroyo enforce obedience to all decrees and laws through the military? As this Court stated earlier, President Arroyo has no authority to enact decrees. It follows that these decrees are void and, therefore, cannot be enforced. With respect to laws, she cannot call the military to enforce or implement certain laws, such as customs laws, laws governing family and property relations, laws on obligations and contracts and the like. She can only order the military, under PP 1017, to enforce laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless violence. 2.) The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies are illegal, in the absence of proof that these petitioners were committing acts constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and violating BP 880; the imposition of standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, as well as the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for publication and other materials, are declared unconstitutional because there was no clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent. 3.) It is not proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. 4.) This Court adopted the direct injury test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial i nterest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result. Therefore, the court ruled that the petitioners have a locus standi, for they suffered direct injury resulting from illegal arrest and unlawful search committ ed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017.

5.) Under Article XII Section 17 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, in times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the President may temporarily take over a privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest only if there is congressional authority or approval. There must enactment of appropriate legislation prescribing the terms and conditions under which the President may exercise the powers that will serves as the best assurance that due process of law would be observed. #16 TENET et al. v. DOE et al. Facts: Respondent husband and wife filed suit against the United States and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), asserting estoppel and due process claims for the CIAs alleged failure to provide them with financial assistance it had promised in return for their espionage services during the Cold War. The District Court denied the Governments motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, finding that respondents claims were not barred by the rule of Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, prohibiting suits against the Government based on covert espionage agreements. Affirming in relevant part, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that Totten posed no bar to reviewing some of respondents claims and thus the case could proceed to trial, subject to the Governments asserting the evidentiary state secrets privilege and the Distric t Courts resolving that issue. Issue: Held: Respondents suit is barred by the Totten rule. In Totten, this Court concluded with no difficulty that the President had the authority to bind the United States to contracts with secret agents, observed that the very essence of such a contract was that it was secret and had to remain so, and found that allowing a former spy to bring suit to enforce such a contract would be entirely incompatible with the contracts nature. The Ninth Circuit was quite wrong in holding that Totten does not require dismissal of respondents claims. It reasoned that Totten developed merely a contract rule, prohibiting breach-of-contract claims seeking to enforce an espionage agreements terms but not barring due process or estoppel claims. However, Totten was not so limited. It precludes judicial review in cases such as respondents where success depends on the existence of their secret espionage relationship with the Government. Id., at 107. The Ninth Circuit also claimed that Totten had been recast simply as an early expression of the evidentiary state secrets privilege, rather than a categorical bar to respondents claims, relying mainly on United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, in which widows of civilians killed in a military plane crash sought privileged military information in their wrongful death action against the Government. While the Reynolds Court looked to Totten in invoking the well established state secrets privilege, it in no way signaled a retreat from Tottens broader holding that lawsuits premised on alleged espionage agreements are altogether forbidden. The Court later credited Tottens more sweeping holding in Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Haw./Peace Ed. Project, 454 U.S. 139, 146147, thus confirming its continued validity. Reynolds therefore cannot plausibly be read to have replaced Tottens categorical bar in the distinct class of cases that depend upon clandestine spy relationships. Nor does Websterv. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, which addressed constitutional claims made by acknowledged (though covert) CIA employees, support respondents claim. Only in the case of an alleged former spy is Tottens core concern implicated: preventing the existence of the plaintiffs relationship with the Government from being revealed. The state secrets privilege and the use of in camera judicial proceedings simply cannot provide the absolute protection the Court found necessary in enunciating the Totten rule. The possibility that a suit may proceed and an espionage relationship may be revealed is unacceptable. Forcing the Government to litigate these claims would also make it vulnerable to graymail,i.e., individual lawsuits brought to induce the CIA to settle a case out of fear that litigation would reveal classified information that might undermine covert operations. And requiring the Government to invoke the privilege on a case-by-case basis risks the perception that it is either confirming or denying relationships with individual plaintiffs.

#17 B/GEN. (RET.) FRANCISCO V. GUDANI AND LT. COL. ALEXANDER F. BALUTAN Petitioners, vs. LT./GEN. GENEROSO S. SENGA CORONA, AS CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE CARPIO-MORALES, ARMED FORCES OF THE CALLEJO, SR., PHILIPPINES, COL. GILBERTO AZCUNA, JOSE C. ROA AS THE PRETRIAL TINGA, INVESTIGATING OFFICER, THE CHICO-NAZARIO, PROVOST MARSHALL GENERAL GARCIA, and OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE GENERAL COURTMARTIAL, Respondents. G.R. No. 170165 August 15, 2006 THE PRESIDENT AS THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES. FACTS

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Gudani and Balutan are high ranking officials of the Philippine Marines who, at the time of the incidents in this case, were assigned at the Philippine Military Academy in Baguio. Senator Biazon invited several junior officers of the AFP including Chief of Staff Senga to appear before the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security on Sept. 28, 2005, in light of the electoral fraud in the 2004 elections. (Gudani and Balutan were assigned to maintain peace and order in Lanao del Norte and Sur during the 04 elections). Gen. Senga informed Senator Biazon that he could not attend due to prior commitments but he would ask the other officers to attend so the PMA superintendent was informed that Gudani and Senga were invited to appear before the Senate hearing. On the evening of Sept. 27, a message was transmitted to the PMA superintendent that as per instruction of Pres. Arroyo, no AFP personnel shall appear before any congressional hearing without the approval of the Pres. HOWEVER, by that time Gudani and Senga already left Baguio for Manila. The following day, Gen. Senga informed Sen. Biazon that no approval has been granted by the President to any AFP officer to appear before the hearing scheduled on that day. Nonetheless, both Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were present as the hearing started, and they both testified as to the conduct of the 2004 elections

the President. After all, the Constitution prescribes that it is the President, and not the Senate, who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. #18: Province of North Cotabato vs GRP Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain G.R. No. 1833591,

October 14, 2008

Decision:

CARPIO MORALES, J.: Subject of these consolidated cases is the extent of the powers of the President in pursuing the peace process. While the facts surrounding this controversy center on the armed conflict in Mindanao between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the legal issue involved has a bearing on all areas in the country where there has been a long-standing armed conflict. Yet again, the Court is tasked to perform a delicate balancing act. It must uncompromisingly delineate the bounds within which the President may lawfully exercise her discretion, but it must do so in strict adherence to the Constitution, lest its ruling unduly restricts the freedom of action vested by that same Constitution in the Chief Executive precisely to enable her to pursue the peace process effectively. Facts:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF, through the Chairpersons of their respective peace negotiating panels, were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF was not to materialize, however, for upon motion of petitioners, specifically those who filed their cases before the scheduled signing of the MOA-AD, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the GRP from signing the same. The MOA-AD was preceded by a long process of negotiation and the concluding of several prior agreements between the two parties beginning in 1996, when the GRP-MILF peace negotiations began. On July 18, 1997, the GRP and MILF Peace Panels signed the Agreement on General Cessation of Hostilities. The following year, they signed the General Framework of Agreement of Intent on August 27, 1998. On July 23, 2008, the Province of North Cotabato and Vice-Governor Emmanuel Piol filed a petition, docketed as G.R. No. 183591, for Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MOA-AD including its attachments, and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD, pending the disclosure of the contents of the MOAAD and the holding of a public consultation thereon. Supplementarily, petitioners pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. Issues: 1. Whether the petitions have become moot and academic (i) insofar as the mandamus aspect is concerned, in view of the disclosure of official copies of the final draft of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA); and (ii) insofar as the prohibition aspect involving the Local Government Units is concerned, if it is considered that consultation has become fait accompli with the finalization of the draft; 2. Whether the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication; 3. Whether respondent Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it negotiated and initiated the MOA vis--vis ISSUES Nos. 4 and 5;

Note: EO 464 was also issued on Sept 28.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) manifests that shortly before the start of the hearing, a copy of Gen. Sengas letter to Sen. Biazon sent earlier that day was handed at the Senate by Commodore Tolentino to Gen. Gudani, who replied that he already had a copy. Further, Gen. Senga called Commodore Tolentino on the latters cell phone and asked to talk to Gen. Gudani, but Gen. Gudani refused. In response, Gen. Senga instructed Commodore Tolentino to inform Gen. Gudani that it was an order, yet Gen. Gudani still refused to take Gen. Sengas call. A few hours after Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan had concluded their testimony, the office of Gen. Senga issued a statement which noted that the two officers disobeyed a legal order, in violation of Artcles of War 65 (Willfully Disobeying Superior Officer), hence they will be subjected to General Court Martial proceedings. Both Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were likewise relieved of their assignments then. Petitioners were separately served with Orders directing them to appear in person at the Pre-Trial Investigation of the Charges for violation of Articles 66 and 97 of Commonwealth Act No. 408 and to submit their counter-affidavits and affidavits of witnesses at the Office of the Judge Advocate General. The Orders were accompanied by respective charge sheets against petitioners, accusing them of violating Articles of War 65 and 97. It was from these premises that the present petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed, particularly seeking that (1) the order of President Arroyo coursed through Gen. Senga preventing petitioners from testifying before Congress without her prior approval be declared unconstitutional ISSUE: WON the President may prevent a member of the armed forces from testifying before legislative inquiry? RULING: The President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under military justice. At the same time, any chamber of Congress which seeks the appearance before it of a military officer against the consent of the President has adequate remedies under law to compel such attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons to testify before it may be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land which the President has the duty to faithfully execute. The ability of the President to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief Executives power as commander -in-chief to control the actions and speech of members of the armed forces. The Presidents prerogatives as commander -inchief are not hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege. The President could, as a general rule, require military officers to seek presidential approval before appearing before Congress is based foremost on the notion that a contrary rule unduly diminishes the prerogatives of the President as commander-in-chief. Congress holds significant control over the armed forces in matters such as budget appropriations and the approval of higher-rank promotions, yet it is on the President that the Constitution vests the title as commander-in-chief and all the prerogatives and functions appertaining to the position. Again, the exigencies of military discipline and the chain of command mandate that the Presidents ability to control the individual members of the armed forces be accorded the utmost respect. Where a military officer is torn between obeying the President and obeying the Senate, the Court will without hesitation affirm that the officer has to choose

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4. Whether there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public concern (1987 Constitution, Article III, Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (1987 Constitution, Article II, Sec. 28) including public consultation under Republic Act No. 7160 (LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991)[;] If it is in the affirmative, whether prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is an appropriate remedy; 5. Whether by signing the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be BINDING itself a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law; b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA; c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997), particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION, RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)[;] If in the affirmative, whether the Executive Branch has the authority to so bind the Government of the Republic of the Philippines; 6. Whether the inclusion/exclusion of the Province of North Cotabato, Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan and Isabela, and the Municipality of Linamon, Lanao del Norte in/from the areas covered by the projected Bangsamoro Homeland is a justiciable question; and 7. Whether desistance from signing the MOA derogates any prior valid commitments of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. Held: The main body of the MOA-AD is divided into four strands, namely, Concepts and Principles, Territory, Resources, and Governance. The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies. Courts decline to issue advisory opinions or to resolve hypothetical or feigned problems, or mere academic questions. The limitation of the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies defines the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power, to assure that the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government. As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or of transcendental importance, the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and intervening respondents the requisite locus standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo. Contrary to the assertion of respondents that the non-signing of the MOA-AD and the eventual dissolution of the GRP Peace Panel mooted the present petitions, the Court finds that the present petitions provide an exception to the "moot and academic" principle in view of (a) the grave violation of the Constitution involved; (b) the exceptional character of the situation and paramount public interest; (c) the need to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the fact that the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. The MOA-AD is a significant part of a series of agreements necessary to carry out the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace signed by the government and the MILF back in June 2001. Hence, the present MOA-AD can be renegotiated or another one drawn up that could contain similar or significantly dissimilar provisions compared to the original. That the subject of the information sought in the present cases is a matter of public concern faces no serious challenge. In fact, respondents admit that the MOA-AD is indeed of public concern. In previous cases, the Court found that the regularity of real estate transactions entered in the Register of Deeds, the need for adequate notice to the public of the various laws, the civil service eligibility of a public employee, the proper management of GSIS funds allegedly used to grant loans to public officials, the recovery of the Marcoses' alleged ill-gotten wealth, and the identity of party-list nominees, among others, are matters of public concern. Undoubtedly, the MOA-AD subject of the present cases is of public concern, involving as it does the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, which directly affects the lives of the public at large.

In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.

The SC ruled that the MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence, it said. Moreover, as the clause is worded, it virtually guarantees that the necessary amendments to the Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in place. Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is authorized to make such a guarantee. Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the process of initiative , for the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is through an undue influence or interference with that process.While the MOA-AD would not amount to an international agreement or unilateral declaration binding on the Philippines under international law, respondents act of guaranteeing amendments is, by itself, already a constitutional violation that renders the MOA-AD fatally defective.
Justice Santiago said, among others, that the MOA-AD contains provisions which are repugnant to the Constitution and which will result in the virtual surrender of part of the Philippines territorial sovereignty. She further said that had the MOA-AD been signed by parties, would have bound the government to the creation of a separate Bangsamoro state having its own territory, government, civil institutions, and armed forcesThe sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Philippines would have been compromised. #19 JAMAR KULAYAN, et al. vs GOV. ABDUSAKUR TAN, in his capacity as Governor of Sulu, et al. G.R. No. 187298 July 3, 2012 The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President. An exercise by another official, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not be justified by the invocation of Section 465 of the Local Government Code. FACTS: Three members from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were kidnapped in the vicinity of the Provincial Capitol in Patikul, Sulu. Andres Notter, Eugenio Vagni and Marie Jean Lacaba, were purportedly inspecting a water sanitation project for the Sulu Provincial Jail when they were seized by three armed men who were later confirmed to be members of Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). A Local Crisis Committee, later renamed Sulu Crisis Management Committee (Committee) was then formed to investigate the kidnapping incident. The Committee convened under the leadership of respondent Abdusakur Mahail Tan, the Provincial of Sulu. Governor Tan issued Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009, declaring a state of emergency in the province of Sulu. The Proclamation cited the kidnapping incident as a ground for the said declaration, describing it as a terrorist act pursuant to the Human Security Act (R.A. 9372). It also invoked Section 465 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160), which bestows on the Provincial Governor to carry out emergency measures during manmade and natural disasters and calamities, and to call upon the appropriate national law enforcement agencies to suppress disorder and lawless violence. In the Proclamation, Tan called upon the PNP and the Civilian Emergency Force (CEF) to set up checkpoints and chokepoints, conduct general search and seizures including arrests, and other actions necessary to ensure public safety. Petitioners, Jamar Kulayan, et al. claimed that Proclamation No. 1-09 was issued ultra vires, and thus null and void, for violating Sections 1 and 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which grants the President sole authority to exercise emergency powers and calling-out powers as the chief executive of the Republic and commander-in chief of the armed forces. ISSUE: HELD: Whether or not a governor can exercise the calling-out powers of a President

It has already been established that there is one repository of executive powers, and that is the President of the Republic. This means that when Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution speaks of executive power, it is granted to the President and no one else. Corollarily, it is only the President, as Executive, who is

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authorized to exercise emergency powers as provided under Section 23, Article VI of the Constitution, as well as what became known as the calling-out powers under Section 7, Article VII thereof. While the President is still a civilian, Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution mandates that civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military, making the civilian president the nations supreme military leader. The net effect of Article II, Section 3, when read with Article VII, Section 18, is that a civilian President is the ceremonial, legal and administrative head of the armed forces. The Constitution does not require that the President must be possessed of military training and talents, but as Commander-in-Chief, he has the power to direct military operations and to determine military strategy. Normally, he would be expected to delegate the actual command of the armed forces to military experts; but the ultimate power is his. Given the foregoing, Governor Tan is not endowed with the power to call upon the armed forces at his own bidding. In issuing the assailed proclamation, Governor Tan exceeded his authority when he declared a state of emergency and called upon the Armed Forces, the police, and his own Civilian Emergency Force. The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President. An exercise by another official, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not be justified by the invocation of Section 465 of the Local Government Code. #20 Datu Zaldy Uy Ampatuan, et al. vs. Hon. Ronaldo Puno, et al. G.R. No. 190259, June 7, 2011 FACTS: On November 24, 2009, the day after the gruesome massacre of 57 men and women, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation 1946, placing the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under a state of emergency. She directed the AFP and the PNP to undertake such measures as may be allowed by the Constitution and by law to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in the named places. Under AO 273, she also delegated to the DILG the supervision of the ARMM. The petitioners claimed that the Presidents issuances encroached the ARMMs autonomy, that it constitutes an invalid exercise of emergency powers, and that the President had no factual basis for declaring a state of emergency, especially in the Province of Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato, where no critical violent incidents occurred. They want Proc. 1946 and AO 273 be declared unconstitutional. The respondents, however, said that its purpose was not to deprive the ARMM of its autonomy, but to restore peace and order in subject places. It is pursuant to her calling out power as Commander-in-Chief. The determination of the need to exercise this power rests solely on her wisdom. The President merely delegated her supervisory powers over the ARMM to the DILG Secretary who was her alter ego any way. The delegation was necessary to facilitate the investigation of the mass killings ISSUES: 1. Whether President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when she called out the AFP and the PNP to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City 2. Whether there is factual basis on the calling out of the Armed Forces. HELD: 1. NO. The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the three places mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not need a congressional authority to exercise the same. 2. YES. The Presidents call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence springs from the power vested in her under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. While it is true that the Court may inquire into the factual bases for the Presidents exercise of the above power, unless it is shown that such determination was attended by grave abuse of discretion, the Court will accord respect to the Presidents judgment. #21 Philip Sigfrid Fortun v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al., G.R. No. 190293, March 20, 2012 (and other consolidated cases) DECISION (En Banc) FACTS: On November 23, 2009, heavily armed men believed led by the ruling Ampatuan family of Maguindanao gunned down and buried under shoveled dirt 57 innocent civilians. In response to this carnage, President Arroyo

issued on November 24, 2009 PP 1946 declaring a state of emergency in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City. On December 4, 2009, President Arroyo issued PP 1959 declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao except for identified areas of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. On December 6, 2009, President Arroyo submitted her report to Congress. On December 9, 2009, Congress convened in joint session to review the validity of the Presidents action. But two days later, or on December 12, 2009, before Congress could act, the President issued PP 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. ISSUE: Did the issuance of PP 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the [privilege of the] writ in Maguindanao, render the issues moot and academic? RULING: [The Court DISMISSED the consolidated petitions on the ground that they have become MOOT and

ACADEMIC.]

YES, the issuance of PP 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the [privilege of the] writ in Maguindanao, rendered the issues moot and academic
Prudence and respect for the co-equal departments of the government dictate that the Court should be cautious in entertaining actions that assail the constitutionality of the acts of the Executive or the Legislative department. The issue of constitutionality, said the Court in Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 , must be the very issue of the case, that the resolution of such issue is unavoidable. The issue of the constitutionality of Proclamation 1959 is not unavoidable for two reasons: One. President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus before the joint houses of Congress could fulfill their automatic duty to review and validate or invalidate the same. xxx. xxx xxx xxx

[U]nder the 1987 Constitution the President and the Congress act in tandem in exercising the power to proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. They exercise the power, not only sequentially, but in a sense jointly since, after the President has initiated the proclamation or the suspension, only the Congress can maintain the same based on its own evaluation of the situation on the ground, a power that the President does not have. Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the Court must allow Congress to exercise its own review powers, which is automatic rather than initiated. Only when Congress defaults in its express duty to defend the Constitution through such review should the Supreme Court step in as its final rampart. The constitutional validity of the Presidents proclamation of martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first a political question in the hands of Congress before it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the Court. xxx xxx xxx

Here, President Arroyo withdrew Proclamation 1959 before the joint houses of Congress, which had in fact convened, could act on the same. Consequently, the petitions in these cases have become moot and the Court has nothing to review. The lifting of martial law and restoration of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao was a supervening event that obliterated any justiciable controversy. Two. Since President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in just eight days, they have not been meaningfully implemented. The military did not take over the operation and control of local government units in Maguindanao. The President did not issue any law or decree affecting Maguindanao that should ordinarily be enacted by Congress. No indiscriminate mass arrest had been reported. Those who were arrested during the period were either released or promptly charged in court. Indeed, no petition for habeas corpus had been filed with the Court respecting arrests made in those eight days. The point is that the President intended by her action to address an uprising in a relatively small and sparsely populated province. In her judgment, the rebellion was localized and swiftly disintegrated in the face of a determined and amply armed government presence.

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xxx

xxx

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xxx. In a real sense, the proclamation and the suspension never took off. The Congress itself adjourned without touching the matter, it having become moot and academic. #22: AKBAYAN vs. AQUINO Date: July 16. 2008 Ponente: CARPIO-MORALES, J. Facts: Petitioners, as non-government orgs, congresspersons, citizens and taxpayers, filed a petition for mandamus and prohibition seeking to compel respondents, Department of Trade Industry (DTI) Undersecretary Thomas Aquino, et al., to furnish petitioners the full text of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) including the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation process and all pertinent attachments and annexes thereto. The JPEPA, which will be the first bilateral free trade agreement to be entered into by the Philippines with another country in the event the Senate grants its consent to it, covers a broad range of topics which includes trade in goods, rules of origin, customs procedures, paperless trading, trade in services, investment, intellectual property rights, government procurement, movement of natural persons, cooperation, competition policy, mutual recognition, dispute avoidance and settlement, improvement of the business environment, and general and final provisions. Petitioners emphasize that the refusal of the government to disclose the said agreement violates their right to information on matters of public concern and of public interest. That the non-disclosure of the same documents undermines their right to effective and reasonable participation in all levels of social, political and economic decision making. Respondent herein invoke executive privilege. They relied on the ground that the matter sought involves a diplomatic negotiation then in progress, thus constituting an exception to the right to information and the policy of full disclosure of matters that are of public concern like the JPEPA - that diplomatic negotiations are covered by the doctrine of executive privilege. Issues: Procedural Issues: 1. Do the therein petitioners have standing to bring this action for mandamus in their capacity as citizens of the Republic, as taxpayers, and as members of the Congress? 2. Whether the petition has been entirely rendered moot and academic because of the subsequent event that occurred. Substantive Issues: 1. Whether the claim of the petitioners is covered by the right to information. 2. Are the documents and information being requested in relation to the JPEPA exempted from the general rules on transparency and full public disclosure such that the Philippine government is justified in denying access thereto (whether they are covered by the doctrine of executive privilege). 3. Whether the executive privilege claimed by the respondents applies only at certain stages of the negotiation process. 4. Whether there is sufficient public interest to overcome the claim of privilege. 5. Whether the Respondents failed to claim executive privilege on time. Dispositive: Petition dismissed. Held/Ratio: (Procedural) 1. YES. The right of people to information on matters of public concern is a public right by its very nature so petitioners need not show that they have any legal or special interest in the result. It is enough that they are part of the general public who possess the right. Since in the present position is anchored on the right of information and the petitioners are suing in their capacity as citizens, citizen-groups, petitioner-members of the House of Rep, their standing to file the present suit is grounded on jurisprudence. 2. NOT ENTIRELY. The Supreme Court ruled that the principal relief petitioners are praying for is the disclosure of the contents of the JPEPA prior to its finalization between the two States parties, public disclosure of the text of the JPEPA after its signing by the President, during the pendency of the present petition, has been largely rendered moot and academic. The text of the JPEPA having then been made accessible to the public, the petition has become moot and academic to the extent that it seeks the disclosure of the full text thereof. The petition is not entirely moot, however, because petitioners seek to

obtain, not merely the text of the JPEPA, but also the Philippine and Japanese offers in the course of the negotiations. (Substantive) 1. YES. To be covered by the right to information, the information sought must meet the threshold requirement that it be a matter of public concern. In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which can be applied. Public concern and public interest both embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public. From the nature of the JPEPA as an international trade agreement, it is evident that the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiations towards its execution are matters of public concern. This, respondents do not dispute. They only claim that diplomatic negotiations are covered by the doctrine of executive privilege, thus constituting an exception to the right to information and the policy of full public disclosure. Thus, the Court holds that, in determining whether an information is covered by the right to information, a specific showing of need for such information is not a relevant consideration, but only whether the same is a matter of public concern. When, however, the government has claimed executive privilege, and it has established that the information is indeed covered by the same, then the party demanding it, if it is to overcome the privilege, must show that that the information is vital, not simply for the satisfaction of its curiosity, but for its ability to effectively and reasonably participate in social, political, and economic decision-making. 2. YES. The Supreme Court Ruled that Diplomatic negotiations, therefore, are recognized as privileged in this jurisdiction, the JPEPA negotiations constituting no exception. It bears emphasis, however, that such privilege is only presumptive. For as Senate v. Ermita holds, recognizing a type of information as privileged does not mean that it will be considered privileged in all instances. Only after a consideration of the context in which the claim is made may it be determined if there is a public interest that calls for the disclosure of the desired information, strong enough to overcome its traditionally privileged status. The court adopted also the doctrine in PMPF v. Manglapus, wherein petitioners were seeking information from the Presidents representatives on the state of the then on -going negotiations of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement. The Court held that applying the principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it is clear that while the final text of the JPEPA may not be kept perpetually confidential since there should be ample opportunity for discussion before [a treaty] is approved the offers exchanged by the parties during the negotiations continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published. It is reasonable to conclude that the Japenese representatives submitted their offers with the understanding that historic confidentiality would govern the same. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with other foreign governments in future negotiations. The Court also stressed that secrecy of negotiations with foreign countries is not violative of the constitutional provisions of freedom of speech or of the press nor of the freedom of access to information. It also reasoned out that opening for public scrutiny the Philippine offers in treaty negotiations would discourage future Philippine representatives from frankly expressing their views during negotiations. The Highest Tribunal recognized that treaty negotiations normally involve a process of quid pro quo, where negotiators would willingly grant concessions in an area of lesser importance in order to obtain more favorable terms in an area of greater national interest. The Court also addressed the dissent of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by saying: We are aware that behind the dissent of the Chief Justice lies a genuine zeal to protect our peoples right to information against any abuse of executive privilege. It is a zeal that We fully share. The Court, however, in its endeavour to guard against the abuse of executive privilege, should be careful not to veer towards the opposite extreme, to the point that it would strike down as invalid even a legitimate exercise thereof. 3. NO. Supreme Court stated that the constitutional right to information includes official information on ongoing negotiations before a final contract. However, the information must constitute definite propositions by the government and should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public order. 4. NO. The deliberative process privilege is a qualified privilege and can be overcome by a sufficient showing of need. This need determination is to be made flexibly on a case-by-case, ad hoc basis. "[E]ach time [the deliberative process privilege] is asserted the district court must undertake a fresh balancing of

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the competing interests," taking into account factors such as the relevance of the evidence," the availability of other evidence," the seriousness of the litigation," the role of the government," and the possibility of future timidity by government employees. In the case at hand, Petitioners have failed to present the stron g and sufficient showing of need. The arguments they proffer to establish their entitlement to the subject documents fall short of this standard stated in the decided cases. There is no dispute that the information subject of this case is a matter of public concern. The Court has earlier concluded that it is a matter of public concern, not on the basis of any specific need shown by petitioners, but from the very nature of the JPEPA as an international trade agreement. Further, the text of the JPEPA having been published, petitioners have failed to convince this Court that they will not be able to meaningfully exercise their right to participate in decision-making unless the initial offers are also published. 5. NO. When the respondents invoked the privilege for the first time only in their Comment to the present petition does not mean that the claim of privilege should not be credited. Respondents failure to claim the privilege during the House Committee hearings may not, however, be construed as a waiver thereof by the Executive branch. What respondents received from the House Committee and petitioner-Congressman Aguja were mere requests for information. The House Committee refrained from pursuing its earlier resolution to issue a subpoena duces tecum on account of then Speaker Jose de Venecias alleged request to Committee Chairperson Congressman Teves to hold the same in abeyance. While it is a salutary and noble practice for Congress to refrain from issuing subpoenas to executive officials out of respect for their office until resort to it becomes necessary, the fact remains that such requests are not a compulsory process. Being mere requests, they do not strictly call for an assertion of executive privilege. SEPARATE OPINION AZCUNA, J. (fully agrees with J. Punos dissent) The equally important and fundamental power and duty of the Congress- its informing function of investigating for the purpose of enlightening the electorate has been forgotten. This informing function should actually be preferred to its legislative function. This should be more compelling in our polity because of our Constitutions focus on transparency, accountability and the right of people to know the facts of governance. Transparency is in fact the prevalent trend and non-disclosure is the diminishing exception. The underlying reason being the recognition of the fundamental human right of a citizen to take part in governance. The President, therefore, to show that a particular exception obtains in every case where the privilege is claimed. Moreover, Executive Secretary Ermita did not really invoke the privilege but merely said that at the time of the request with the negotiations ongoing, it was difficult to provide all the papers relative to the proposed Treaty. Now that the negotiations are over, with the proposed treaty signed and submitted to Senate, there would be no more difficulty in complying with the reduced request of giving copies of the starting offers of Philippines and Japan. SEPARATE DISSENTING OPINION TINGA, J. If the petitioner in the case had been the Senate of the Philippines, I will vote for the disclosure of the documents, however the reason for the position would not be based on the right to information, but rather, on the right of the Senate to fully exercise its constituent function of ratifying treaties. PUNO, J. The Executive as the custodian of records of negotiations of treaties and other international agreements has the discretion to classify information as confidential in accordance with applicable laws and not let it become part of the public record. But when the executive is haled by the court to enforce a constitutional right to this information, it is the courts task in each particular case to balance the executives need for secrecy in treaty negotiations with the constitutional right to information. Transparency and opacity are not either-or propositions in the conduct of international trade agreement negotiations, rather the degree of confidentiality needed in a negotiation is a point in a continuum where complete disclosure and absolute secrecy are on opposite ends. The Court should balance the need for secrecy of the Executive and the demand for information by the legislature or the public in order to safeguard against disclosure of information prejudicial to the public interest and to uphold the fundamental principle enunciated in Senate vs. Ermita that a claim of executive privilege may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made. (warning! verbatim but I liked his closing statement eh )

We elevated the right to information to constitutional stature not without reason. In a democracy, debateby the people directly or through their representatives in Congress is a discussion of and by the informed and not an exchange of surpluses of ignorance. In the arena of economic governance, the right to debate and participate in exercised not as an end in itself. Especially for the powerless whose sword and shield against abuse is their voice, the exercise of the right is not merely rhetoric. It is a fight from the gut satisfy basic human needs and lead a humane life.

#23 VINUYA VS. SEC. ROMULO G.R. No. 162230 April 28, 2010 FACTS: This is an original Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the Office of the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of the DFA, the Secretary of the DOJ, and the OSG. Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit organization registered with the SEC, established for the purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the Philippines during the Second World War. Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the establishment of the comfort women stations in the Philippines. But officials of the Executive Department declined to assist the petitioners, and took the position that the individual claims of the comfort women for compensation had already been fully satisfied by Japans compliance with the Peace Treaty between the Phili ppines and Japan. Hence, this petition where petitioners pray for this court to (a) declare that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of discretion in refusing to espouse their claims for the crimes against humanity and war crimes committed against them; and (b) compel the respondents to espouse their claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other international tribunals. Respondents maintain that all claims of the Philippines and its nationals relative to the war were dealt with in the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the bilateral Reparations Agreement of 1956. On January 15, 1997, the Asian Womens Fund and the Philippine gov ernment signed a Memorandum of Understanding for medical and welfare support programs for former comfort women. Over the next five years, these were implemented by the Department of Social Welfare and Development. ISSUE: WON the Executive Department commi tted grave abuse of discretion in not espousing petitioners claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan. HELD: Petition lacks merit. From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has the exclusive prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners claims against Japan. Political questions refer to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure. One type of case of political questions involves questions of foreign relations. It is well-established that the conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative the politicaldepartments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision. are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy. They are and should be undertaken only by those directly responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or imperil.

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But not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and courts certainly possess the authority to construe or invalidate treaties and executive agreements. However, the question whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches. In this case, the Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to question. The President, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign countries, and especially is this true in time of war. He has his confidential sources of information. He has his agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and other officials. The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners cause would be inimical to our countrys foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby creating serious implications for stability in this region. For the to overturn the Executive Departments determination would mean an assessment of the foreign policy judgments by a coordinate political branch to which authority to make that judgment has been constitutionally committed. From a municipal law perspective, certiorari will not lie. As a general principle, where such an extraordinary length of time has lapsed between the treatys conclusion and our consideration the Executive must be given ample discretion to assess the foreign policy considerations of espousing a claim against Japan, from the standpoint of both the interests of the petitioners and those of the Republic, and decide on that basis if apologies are sufficient, and whether further steps are appropriate or necessary. In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means available for individuals to bring a claim within the international legal system has been when the individual is able to persuade a government to bring a claim on the individuals behalf. By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of international law. Within the limits prescribed by international law, a State may exercise diplomatic protection by whatever means and to whatever extent it thinks fit, for it is its own right that the State is asserting. Should the natural or legal person on whose behalf it is acting consider that their rights are not adequately protected, they have no remedy in international law. All they can do is resort to national law, if means are available, with a view to furthering their cause or obtaining redress. All these questions remain within the province of municipal law and do not affect the position internationally. Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations will not alter this analysis. Petitioners have not shown that the crimes committed by the Japanese army violated jus cogens prohibitions at the time the Treaty of Peace was signed, or that the duty to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes is an erga omnes obligation or has attained the status of jus cogens. The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in international law has been used as a legal term describing obligations owed by States towards the community of states as a whole. Essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards the international community as a whole, and those arising vis--vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature, the former are the concern of all States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes. The term jus cogens (literally, compelling law) refers to norms that command peremptory authority, superseding conflicting treaties and custom. Jus cogens norms are considered peremptory in the sense that they are mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can be modified only by general international norms of equivalent authority WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED. #24 Paguia vs. Office of the President G.R. No. 176278, June 25, 2010 Facts: Petitioner Alan F. Paguia, as citizen and taxpayer assailed the then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyos act of nominating respondent former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. as permanent representative to the United Nations. Paguia alleged that Davides age at the time of nomination is 70. This disqualifies him from holding his post

since the mandatory retirement age of all officers and employees of the DFA is 65 as provided by Section 23 of R.A. 7157. Respondents counter that Section 23s mandated retirement age applies only to c areer diplomats, excluding from its ambit non-career appointees such as respondent Davide. Issue: Whether Congress could limit the Presidents prerogative to nominate ambassadors by legislating age qualifications despite the constitutional rule limiting Congress role in the appointment of ambassadors to the Commission on Appointments confirmation of nominees. Ruling: No. Section 16 (1), Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides: "The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint x x x ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls x x x." The following comment on the interaction of the constitutional spheres of power of the President, Senate (the Commission on Appointments in this jurisdiction), and Congress in the nomination and confirmation process under the US Constitutions Appointments Clause, the normative model of the first sentence of Section 16 (1), Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, is instructive: The Constitution assigns the power of nomination for a confirmation appointment to the President alone, and it allocates the power of confirmation appointments to the President together with the Senate. Congress can pass laws x x x to help the President and Senate carry out those functions, such as establishing an agency to help identify and evaluate potential nominees. But x x x Congress cannot require that the President limit his nominees to a specific group of individuals named by someone else, or constrain appointments to people who meet a particular set of qualifications, for confirmation appointments. (Hanah Metchis Volokh, The Two Appointments Clauses: Statutory Qualifications For Federal Officers, 10 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 745, 763 [2007]) (internal citations omitted; emphasis supplied). The Presidents exclusive power to nominate ambassadors is complimented by a subsidiary doctrine treating ambassadorial selections as "based on the special trust and confidence" of the President (Santos v. Macaraig, G.R. No. 94070, 10 April 1992, 208 SCRA 74, 84). #25 Spouses Renato Constantino, Jr. and Lourdes Constantino and their minor children Renato Redentor, Anna Marika Lissa, Nina Elissa, and Anna Karmina, Freedom From Debt Coalition, and Filomeno Sta. Ana III, Petitioners, vs. Hon. Jose B. Cuisia, in his capacity as Governor of the Central Bank, Hon. Ramon del Rosario, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, Hon. Emmanuel V. Pelaez, in his capacity as Philippine Debt Negotiating Chairman, and the NATIONAL TREASURER, Respondents. G.R. No. 106064 October 13, 2005 FACTS: During the Aquino regime, her administration came up w/ a scheme to reduce the countrys external debt. The solution resorted to was to incur foreign debts. Three restructuring programs were sought to initiate the program for foreign debts they are basically buyback programs & bond-conversion programs). Constantino as a taxpayer and in behalf of his minor children who are Filipino citizens, together w/ FFDC averred that the buyback and bond-conversion schemes are onerous and they do not constitute the loan contract or guarantee contemplated in Sec. 20, Art. 7 of the Constitution. And assuming that the President has such power unlike other powers which may be validly delegated by the President, the power to incur foreign debts is expressly reserved by the Constitution in the person of the President. They argue that the gravity by which the exercise of the power will affect the Filipino nation requires that the President alone must exercise this power. They argue that the requirement of prior concurrence of an entity specifically named by the Constitution the Monetary Boardreinforces the submission that not respondents but the President alone and personally can validly bind the country. Hence, they would like Cuisia et al to stop acting pursuant to the scheme. ISSUE: Whether or not the president can validly delegate her debt power to the respondents. RULING: There is no question that the president has borrowing powers and that the president may contract or guarantee foreign loans in behalf of this country w/ prior concurrence of the Monetary Board. It makes no distinction whatsoever and the fact that a debt or a loan may be onerous is irrelevant. On the other hand, the president can delegate this power to her direct subordinates. The evident exigency of having the Secretary of Finance implement the decision of the President to execute the debt-relief contracts is made manifest by the fact that the process of establishing and executing a strategy for managing the governments debt is deep within the realm of the expertise of the Department of Finance, primed as it is to raise the required amount of funding, achieve its risk and cost objectives, and meet any other sovereign debt management goals. If the President were to personally exercise every aspect of the foreign borrowing power, he/she would have to pause from running the country long enough to focus on a welter of time-consuming detailed activitiesthe propriety of incurring/guaranteeing loans, studying and choosing among the many methods that may be taken toward this end,

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meeting countless times with creditor representatives to negotiate, obtaining the concurrence of the Monetary Board, explaining and defending the negotiated deal to the public, and more often than not, flying to the agreed place of execution to sign the documents. This sort of constitutional interpretation would negate the very existence of cabinet positions and the respective expertise which the holders thereof are accorded and would unduly hamper the Presidents effectivity in running the government. The act of the respondents are not unconstitutional. Exception There are certain acts which, by their very nature, cannot be validated by subsequent approval or ratification by the President. There are certain constitutional powers and prerogatives of the Chief Executive of the Nation which must be exercised by him in person and no amount of approval or ratification will validate the exercise of any of those powers by any other person. Such, for instance, in his power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law and the exercise by him of the benign prerogative of pardon (mercy). There are certain presidential powers which arise out of exceptional circumstances, and if exercised, would involve the suspension of fundamental freedoms, or at least call for the supersedence of executive prerogatives over those exercised by coequal branches of government. The declaration of martial law, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the exercise of the pardoning power notwithstanding the judicial determination of guilt of the accused, all fall within this special class that demands the exclusive exercise by the President of the constitutionally vested power. The list is by no means exclusive, but there must be a showing that the executive power in question is of similar gravitas and exceptional import. #26: Fortich vs Corona Facts: This pertains to the two (2) separate motions for reconsideration filed by herein respondent and the applicants for intervention, seeking a reversal of our April 24, 1998 Decision nullfying the so-called "win-win" Resolution dated November 7, 1997, issued by the Office of the President in O.P. Case No. 96-C-6424, and denying the applicants Motion For Leave To Intervene. The issue in this case stems from a proposed agro-economic development of the disputed land which the province of Bukidnon and the municipality of Sumilao, Bukidnon intend to undertake. Expressing full support for the proposed project, the Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao, Bukidnon on March 4, 1193 enacted Ordinance No. 24 converting or reclassifying the subject 144-hectare land from agricultural to industrial/institutional use. It was intended to provide an opportunity to attract investors, who can inject new economic vitality, provide more jobs and raise the income of its people. Bukidnon Provincial Board also supported the said project. Issue: Whether the power of the local government units to reclassify lands is subject to the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)? Held: Local Government Units need not obtain the approval of the DAR to convert or reclassify lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use. It should be stressed that when the March 29, 1996 OP Decision was declared final and executory, vested rights were acquired by the herein petitioners, namely, the province of Bukidnon, the municipality of Sumilao, Bukidnon, and the NQSR Management and Development Corporations, and all others who should be benefited by the said decision. The issue here is not a question of technicality but that of substance and merit. Whether the Sangguniang Bayan of umilao has the legal authority to reclassify the land into industrial/institutional use, the March 29, 1996 OP Decision has thoroughly and properly disposed the issue. Converting the land in question from agricultural to agro-industrial would open great opportunities for employment and bring about real development in the area towards a sustained economic growth of the municipality. Procedural lapses in the manner of identifying/reclassifying the subject property for agro-industrial purposes cannot be allowed to defeat the very purpose of the law granting autonomy to local government units in the management of their local affairs. Stated more simply, the language of Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160 is clear and affords no room for any other interpretation. By unequivocal legal mandate, it grants local governments units autonomy in their local affairs including the power to convert portions of their agricultural lands and provide for the manner of their utilization and disposition to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities.

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