A.M. No. 3360 January 30, 1990 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant vs.ATTY. FE T. TUANDA, respondent.

Facts; Respondent was suspended for practicing his profession until further notice from the Supreme Court finding her guilty of violating BP 22. Atty. Tuanda is now appealing to the Supreme Court for her suspension to be lifted arguing that her suspension was a penalty so harsh on top of the fines imposed to her in violation of the aforementioned law. Arguing further that she intends no damage to the plaintiff-appellee (Herminia A. Marquez)and she is not guilty of the offense charged. Issue; WON the suspension of Atty. Fe Tuanda be lifted. Ruling; The Supreme Court ruled to DENY the respondent of his Motion to Lift Order of Suspension and affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals regarding the suspension. The court found Atty. Fe Tuanda guilty of an offense involving moral turpitude citing Secs 27 and 28 of the Rules of Court and the Code of Professional Responsibility. See Navarro v Geeslin in full case

ROYONG VS. OBLENA AC No. 376 April 30, 1963 En Banc, Barrera FACTS: Complainant Josefina Royong charge the respondent Ariston Oblena, a member of the bar and bench, with rape. The Solicitor General immediately conducted an investigation and found out that there was no rape, the carnal knowledge between complainant and respondent seems to be consensual sex. In view of his own findings as a result of his investigation, that even if respondent did not commit the alleged rape, nevertheless, he was guilty of other misconduct. The Solicitor General made another complaint charging the respondent of falsely and deliberately alleging in his application for admission to the bar that he is a person of good moral character, of living adulterously with Briccia Angeles at the same time maintaining illicit relations with the 18 year old Josefina Royong. Thus rendering him unfit to

practice law, praying that this Court render judgment ordering the permanent removal of the respondent as lawyer and judge. ISSUE: Whether or not the illicit relation of the respondent with Josefina Royong and the adulterous cohabitation of respondent with Briccia Angeles warrants disbarment. HELD: Ariston Oblena was disbarred. RATIO: The continued possession of a fair private and professional character or a good moral character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of law for one who has been admitted, and its loss requires suspension or disbarment even though the statutes do not specify that as ground for disbarment. Respondent's conduct though unrelated to his office and in no way directly bearing on his profession, has nevertheless rendered him unfit and unworthy of the privileges of a lawyer. Fornication, if committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as have proven in this case, as to shock common sense of decency, certainly may justify positive action by the Court in protecting the prestige of the noble profession of the law. As former Chief Justice Moran observed: An applicant for license to practice law is required to show good moral character, or what he really is, as distinguished from good reputation, or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is known. Respondent, therefore, did not possess a good moral character at the time he applied for admission to the bar. He lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles, and the fact that people who knew him sqemed to have acuuiesced to his utatus, did noq render him a person of good moral character. It is of no moment that his immoral state was discovered then or now as he is clearly not fit to remain a member of the bar

Cosmos Foundry Shop Workers Union (CFSWU) and Filemon Alvarez v. Lo Bu and Court of Appeals No. L-40136, March 25, 1975, 63 SCRA 321 Facts: After Cosmos Foundry Shop was burned , Ong Ting established Century Foundry Shop where he and his family resided in the premises. After several attempts to settle a pending unfair labor practice case proved unsuccessful, Ong Ting sold all his business, including equipment and rights in the New Century Foundry Shop to his compadre Lo Bu, for Php20,000.

On Jan 16, 1973, petitioner CFSWU obtained from the Court of Industrial Relations the third alias writ of execution for the satisfaction and enforcement of the judgment in its favor. Thereafter, writ was served January 17 and 18, 1973, levying on the personal properties of the Cosmos Foundry Shop or the New Century Foundry Shop for the purpose of conducting the public auction sale. Respondent Lo Bu filed an urgent motion to recall writ of execution, asserting lack of jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR). The CIR, in its order dated Feb 23, 1973, denied his motion. So likewise was the motion for reconsideration. Lo Bu appealed by certiorari but the Court denied this petition in its resolution dated July 17, 1993. In the meanwhile, there was a replevin suit by Lo Bu in the Court of First Instance (CFI) Manila covering the same properties. Upon receipt of order from the Court denying certiorari, petitioner Labor Union filed a second motion to dismiss complaint. After the complaint was dismissed by the lower court, decision was elevated to the Court of Appeals. Issues: (1) Whether or not petitioner Labor union has made out a case for certiorari and prohibition. (2) Whether or not counsel Atty Busmente performed his obligation as an officer of the court while sustaining the dignity of the profession while acting as counsel for Lo Bu. Held: Writ of certiorari is granted and the order of Respondent CA reinstating appeal is nullified and set aside. The writ of prohibition is likewise granted, respondent CA being perpetually restrained from taking any further action in such appeal, except that of dismissing it. Courts should dismiss a suit which has all the earmarks of a subterfuge that was resorted to for the purpose of frustrating the execution of a judgment in an unfair labor controversy. There was a replevin suit by the same vendee in bad faith, Lo Bu, which was dismissed by the CFI Manila. What is worse, private respondent Lo Bu certainly cannot plead ignorance , as he himself was the petitioner in the certiorari proceedings before this Court. He was a prinicipal in the nefarious scheme to frustrate the award in favor of the petitioner labor union. Rule that certiorari will not be granted where petitioners have plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law will not be enforced where it would result in further delay in satisfaction of judgment that ought to have been enforced years ago. It is about time that a halt be called to the schemes utilized by respondent Lo Bu in his far-from-commendable efforts to defeat labors just claim. A legal counsel is expected to defend a clients cause but not at the expense of truth and in defiance of the clear purpose of labor laws. For even such case, Atty Busmente had not exculpated himself. He ought to remember that his obligation as an officer of the court, no less than the dignity of the

profession, requires that should not act like an errand-boy at the beck and call of his client, ready and eager to do his every bidding. If he fails to keep that admonition in mind, then he puts into serious question his good standing in the bar. In re 1989 Ibp elections Facts:during the 1989 Ibp elections,Atty. Violeta Drilon and other candidates, used government resources to win favors from the voters.Article I, Section 4 of the IBP By-Laws emphasizes the "strictly non-political" character of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, thus: "SEC. 4. Non-political Bar. The Integrated Bar is strictly non-political, and every activity tending to impair this basic feature is strictly prohibited and shall be penalized accordingly. No lawyer holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof shall be eligible for election or appointment to any position in the Integrated Bar or any Chapter thereof. A Delegate, Governor, officer or employee of the Integrated Bar, or an officer or employee of any Chapter thereof shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his position as of the moment he files his certificate of candidacy for any elective public office or accepts appointment to any judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof. "' Section 14 of the same By-Laws enumerates the prohibited acts relative to IBP elections: SEC. 14. Prohibited acts and practices relative to elections. The following acts and practices relative to election are prohibited, whether committed by a candidate for any elective office in the Integrated Bar or by any other member, directly or indirectly, in any form or manner, by himself or through another person:(a) Distribution, except on election day, of election campaign material; (b) Distribution, on election day, of election campaign material other than a statement of the biodata of a candidate on not more than one page of a legal-size sheet of paper; or causing distribution of such statement to be done by persons other than those authorized by the officer presiding at the elections;(c) Campaigning for or against any candidate, while holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial or prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof; (d) Formation of tickets, single slates, or combinations of candidates, as well as the advertisement thereof;(e) For the purpose of inducing or influencing a member to withhold his vote, or to vote for or against a candidate, (1) payment of the dues or other indebtedness of any member;(2) giving of food, drink, entertainment, transportation or any article of value, or any similar consideration to any person; or (3) making a promise or causing an expenditure tobe made, offered or promised to any person." Issue: whether or not Atty violeta drilon and other candidates violated the by laws of Ibp . Held: The candidates and many of the participants in that election not only violated the By-Lawsof the IBP but also the ethics of the legal profession which imposes on all lawyers, as a corollary

ALFONSO v JUANSON FACTS:Complainant a doctor of medicine by profession filed with this court a sworn complaint charging the respondent with immorality and violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics. He accuses the respondent

of maintaining illicit sexual relations with his wife Sol Alfonso. Complainant received a phone call from the wife of the respondent, Mrs. Juanson who informed him that Sol and respondent judge have been carrying on an affair and that she has in her possession the love letters of Sol which she wants to show to the complainant. When he told this to Sol, she denied it.Sol and complainant left for the USA. Sol returned ahead of complainant. Mrs. Juansosn called up father of complainant and divulged to the latter the illicit affair between respondent judge and Sol. The father of complainant engaged the services of a private investigator who discovered that Sol, after arrival from USA met with respondent judge at an apartment and stayed there for 3 hours. Complainant upon knowing this, complainant confronted Sol. At first she denied it but later, however, admitted having an illicit sexual affair with the judge. Respondent judge denied the allegations and claimed that they have been communicating with each other casually and innocently and not as lovers. He alleges that he came to know of Sol when Sol engaged his professional services prior to appointment to the office of RTC judge. ISSUE:Is the judge guilty of the charge of immorality? HELD: NO. It must be stressed that the respondent is not charged with immorality or misconduct committed before he wasappointed to the judiciary. As to the post-appointment period, we find the evidence for the complainant insufficient toprove that the respondent and Sol continued their extramarital affair. In fact, no love notes were presented during trialthat are dated after the appointment. Proof of prior immoral conduct cannot be a basis for his administrative discipline inthis case. The respondent judge may have undergone moral reformation after his appointment. The imputation of the sexual acts upon the incumbent must be proven by substantial evidence, which is required in admin cases. The complainant failed to do. However, judge should be held liable for becoming indiscreet. Such indiscretions indubitably cast upon his conduct an appearance of impropriety. Respondent and Sols meetings could incite suspicion of either the relationships continuance or revival. He violated Canons 3 and 2requiring judges official conduct to be free from appearance of impropriety.

Castaneda v Ago see full text Roxas v CA see full text In re Tagorda 53 Phil 37 In re LUIS B. TAGORDA March 23, 1929

Nature of the case: The case is a suspension from the practice of law.

Facts:

The respondent, Luis B. Tagorda, a practising attorney and a member of the provincial board of Isabela, that he made use of a card written in Spanish and Ilocano, which, in translation, reads as follows:

LUIS B. TAGORDA Attorney Notary Public CANDIDATE FOR THIRD MEMBER Province of Isabela. Respondent also admitted having written a letter in Ilocano addressed to a lieutenant in his home municipality (Echague, Isabela) in which he stated his continued exercise of his profession as a lawer and a notary public, besides being a Member of the Board of the municipality of Ilagan, Isabela. He also stated that he would be willing to render his legal services to the people who have not contracted any other lawyers services. Issue: Whether or not the suspension of Luis B. Tagorda is meritorious. Held: Respondent Luis B. Tagorda was suspended from the practice as an attorney-at-law for the period of one month. The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for disbarment or suspension. (Canon 27 & 28, Code of Ethics) By Junelli Moreno

IN RE SYCIP FACTS: This is a consolidated petition. The first one filed by the surviving partners of atty. Alexander Sycip and the otherfiled by the surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ovaepa. They pray that they be allowed to continue using thenames of partners who had passed away. Petitioners based their petitions on the following arguments: Art. 1840 of the Civil Code, in regulating other professions, the legislature has authorized the adoption of firm names without anyrestriction as to the use of the name of a deceased partner, on the Canons of Professional Ethics allows the continued use of a deceased partner when permissible by local custom. ISSUE: W/N law firms may continue to use the names o deceased partners in their firm names

HELD: NO! Art. 1840 primarily deals with the exception of liability on cases of a dissolved partnership, of the individual property of the deceased partner for debts contracted by the person who continues the business using the partnership name. what the law contemplates is a hold over situation preparatory to formal reorganization. Art.1840 treats more of a commercial partnership with a good will to protect rather than a professional partnership whose reputation depends on the personal qualifications of its individual members. A partnership for the practice of law cannot be likened to partnerships formed by other professionals or for business. a partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is not a partnership formed for the purpose of carrying on trade or business or of holding property. Thus, assumed or trade name in law practice is improper. The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is in the nature of a privilege or franchise. It must be considered that in the Philippines, no local custom permits or allows the continued use of a deceased partners name. Therefore, the cited provision on Canons of Professional Ethics is not applicable. DISSENTING OPINION: Petition may be granted with the condition that it be indicated in the letterheads of the 2 firms that Sycip and Ovaepa are dead or the period when they served as partners should be stated therein.

Mauricio C. Ulep vs. The Legal Clinic, Inc. B.M. No. 553. June 17, 1993 Facts: Mauricio C. Ulep, petitioner, prays this Court "to order the respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., to cease and desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of Annexes `A' and `B' (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law. The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows: Annex A SECRET MARRIAGE? P560.00 for a valid marriage. Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE. ANNULMENT. VISA. THEPlease call: 521-0767, LEGAL5217232, 5222041

CLINIC, INC.8:30 am-6:00 pm 7-Flr. Victoria Bldg. UN Ave., Mla. Annex B GUAM DIVORCE DON PARKINSON an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours. Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic. THE 7 F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave. LEGALErmita, Manila nr. US Embassy CLINIC, INC. Tel. 521-7232521-7251 522-2041; 521-0767 It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champertous, unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as herein before quoted.

In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisements at its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines. Respondent further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these services should be allowed supposedly in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona, reportedly decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977. Issue: Whether or not the services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either case, whether the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements herein complained of. Held:

Yes. The Supreme Court held that the services offered by the respondent constitute practice of law. The definition of practice of law is laid down in the case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, as defined: Black defines "practice of law" as: "The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law." The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own description of the services it has been offering. While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and technical know-how, such as the installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient management of law offices, or the computerization of research aids and materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general rule. What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its contention that such function is nonadvisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all that respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for which services it will consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely to court appearances but extends to legal research, giving legal advice, contract drafting, and so forth. That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling. What is important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the services it renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against the advertisements which it has caused to be published and are now assailed in this proceeding. The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. The proscription against advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that the practice of law is a profession. The canons of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is right and proper. A good

and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda.

In Re INTEGRATION OF THE BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES [49 SCRA 22, January 9, 1973] FACTS: [T]he Commission on Bar Integration submitted its Report with the earnest recommendation on the basis of the said Report and the proceedings had in Administrative Case No. 526 of the Court, and consistently with the views and counsel received from its [the Commission's] Board of Consultants, as well as the overwhelming nationwide sentiment of the Philippine Bench and Bar that (the) Honorable (Supreme) Court ordain the integration of the Philippine Bar as soon as possible through the adoption and promulgation of an appropriate Court Rule. The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the Court to order the integration of the Philippine Bar, after due hearing, giving recognition as far as possible and practicable to existing provincial and other local Bar associations. ISSUES: (1) Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine Bar? (2) Would the integration of the Bar be constitutional? (3) Should the Court ordain the integration of the Bar at this time? HELD: YES. On all issues. RATIO: [T]he Court is of the view that it may integrate the Philippine Bar in the exercise of its power, under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, to promulgate rules concerning x x x the admission to the practice of law. The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable, within the context of contemporary conditions in the Philippines, has become an imperative means to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility fully and effectively. [T]he Court, by virtue of the power vested in it by Section 13 of Article VIII of the Constitution, ordained the integration of the Bar of the Philippines effective January 16, 1973.

PROPOSED RULE ON MANDATORY LEGAL AID SERVICE FOR PRACTICING LAWYERS RESOLUTION Acting on the Memorandum dated January 27, 2009 of Justice Renato C. Corona re: Comment of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines on our Suggested Revisions to the Proposed Rule of Mandatory Legal Aid Service for Practicing Lawyers, the Court Resolved to APPROVE the same. This Resolution shall take effect on July 1, 2009 following publication of the said Rule and its implementing regulations in at least two (2) newpapers of general circulation. February 10, 2009