POLI DIGEST - Principles & State Policies

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW Case Digests
Part VI (Principles & State Policies) Page 1 of 50
Part VI Principles & State Policies ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL. vs. JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL. G.R. No. L-14639, March 25, 1919 Malcolm, J.: DOCTRINE: No official, no matter how high, is above the law. The courts are the forum which function to safeguard individual liberty and to punish official transgressors. FACTS: In order to exterminate vice, Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, ordered the closing of the segregated district for women of ill repute, which had been permitted for a number of years in the city of Manila. The women were kept confined to their houses in the district by the police. The city authorities quietly perfected arrangements with the Bureau of Labor for sending the women to Davao, Mindanao, as laborers. The police, acting pursuant to orders from the chief of police and Justo Lukban, descended upon the houses, hustled some 170 inmates (women) into patrol wagons, and placed them aboard the steamers that awaited their arrival. The women were given no opportunity to collect their belongings, and apparently were under the impression that they were being taken to a police station for an investigation. They had no knowledge that they were destined for a life in Mindanao. They had not been asked if they wished to depart from that region and had neither directly nor indirectly given their consent to the deportation. The women were landed and receipted for as laborers. The governor Sales and the haciendero Yigo, who appear as parties in the case, had no previous notification that the women were prostitutes who had been expelled from the city of Manila. The attorney for the relatives and friends of a considerable number of the deportees [Type text]
presented an application for habeas corpus to a member of the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Are petitioners entitled to a writ of habeas corpus? HELD: Yes. The judiciary should not permit a government of men instead of a government of laws to be set up in the Philippine Islands. Law defines power. Centuries ago, Magna Charta decreed that "No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseized of his freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise destroyed; nor will we pass upon him nor condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either justice or right." No official, no matter how high, is above the law. The courts are the forum which function to safeguard individual liberty and to punish official transgressors. "The law," said Justice Miller, delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, "is the only supreme power in our system of government, and every man who by accepting office participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority which it gives." "The very idea," said Justice Matthews of the same high tribunal in another case, "that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or any material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself." All this explains the motive in issuing the writ of habeas corpus, and makes clear why we said in the very beginning that the primary question was whether the courts should permit a government of men or a government of laws to be established in the Philippine Islands.
By authority of what law did the Mayor and the Chief of Police presume to act in deporting by duress these persons from Manila to another distant locality within the Philippine Islands? The SC found that Alien prostitutes can be expelled from the Philippine Islands in conformity with an Act of congress. The Governor-General can order the eviction of undesirable aliens after a hearing from the Islands. Act No. 519 of the Philippine Commission and section 733 of the Revised Ordinances of the city of Manila provide for the conviction and punishment by a court of justice of any person who is a common prostitute. Act No. 899 authorizes the return of any citizen of the United States, who may have been convicted of vagrancy, to the homeland. New York and other States have statutes providing for the commitment to the House of Refuge of women convicted of being common prostitutes. Always a law! Even when the health authorities compel vaccination, or establish a quarantine, or place a leprous person in the Culion leper colony, it is done pursuant to some law or order. But one can only search in vain for any law, order, or regulation, which even hints at the right of the Mayor of the city of Manila or the chief of police of that city to force citizens of the Philippine Islands and these women despite their being in a sense lepers of society are nevertheless not chattels but Philippine citizens protected by the same constitutional guaranties as are other citizens to change their domicile from Manila to another locality. On the contrary, Philippine penal law specifically punishes any public officer who, not being expressly authorized by law or regulation, compels any person to change his residence. We find, therefore, both on reason and authority, that no one of the defense offered by the respondents constituted a legitimate bar to the granting of the writ of habeas corpus. TUASON V. REGISTER OF DEEDS 157 SCRA 613 [Type text]
FACTS: Petitioner spouses, the Tuasons, were retired public school teachers. On April 6, 1965, they bought from Carmel Farms, Inc.) a piece of land in the latter's subdivision in Caloocan City. Carmel's Torrens title over the lot was cancelled and a new one issued in the name of the Tuasons. In 1973, they discovered that by presidential flat, they were no longer the owners of the land they had purchased with their hard-earned money, and that their land and the other lots in the subdivision had been "declared open for disposition and sale to the members of the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc., the present bona fide occupants thereof" thru PD 923. The decree invalidated inter alia the title of the Tuasons' vendor, Carmel, which had earlier purchased from the Government the land it had subsequently subdivided into several lots for sale to the public (the Tuasons being among the buyers). The land bought by Carmel was part of the Tala Estate (one of the so-called "Friar Lands"). Carmel bought the land under Act No. 1120 and C.A. No. 32, as amended. The statute states among others, that until the price was fully paid however, title was reserved in the Government, and any sale or encumbrance made by the purchaser prior to such full payment was explicitly declared to 'be invalid as against the Government and in all respects subordinate to its prior claim. Said PD No. 293 made the finding that Carmel had failed to complete payment of price. It adjudged that according to the records of the Bureau of Lands, neither the original purchasers nor their subsequent transferees have made full payment of all installments of the purchase money and interest on the lots claimed by the Carmel Farms, Inc., including those on which the dwellings of the members of said Association stand. Hence, title to said land has remained with the Government, and the land now occupied by the members of said association has never ceased to form part of the property of the Republic of the Philippines, any and all acts affecting said land and purporting to segregate it from the said
property of the Republic of the Philippines being therefore null and void ab initio as against the law and public policy. Upon this adjudgment, Mr. Marcos invalidated the titles of Carmel Farms, Inc. and all those derived therefrom, and declared as aforestated "the members of the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc. the present bona fide occupants" of the lots which, in consequence, thereby became open to them for disposition and sale. The Tuason Spouses thereupon filed with this Court a petition for certiorari assailing the Marcos decree as an arbitrary measure which deprived them of their property in favor of a selected group, in violation not only of the constitutional provisions on due process and eminent domain but also of the provisions of the Land Registration Act on the indefeasibility of Torrens titles; and they prayed that the Register of Deeds be directed to cancel the derogatory inscription on their title and restore its efficacy, or in the alternative, that they be compensated for the loss from the Assurance Fund. ISSUE: Is the decree justifiable under the social justice clause of the Constitution and exercise of the States police power? HELD: NO. The decree reveals that Mr. Marcos exercised a judicial function. He made a determination of facts, and applied the law on those facts, declaring what the legal rights of the parties were in the premises. These acts essentially constitute a judicial function, or an exercise of jurisdiction which is the power and authority to hear or try and decide or determine a cause. These acts may thus be properly struck down by the writ of certiorari, because done by an officer in the performance of what in essence is a judicial function, if it be shown that the acts were done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. Since Mr. Marcos was never vested with judicial power that being vested in the Supreme Court and inferior courts as may be established by law, actions of judicial nature were all unconstitutional. The acts [Type text]
were completely alien to his office as chief executive, and utterly beyond the permissible scope of the legislative power that he assumed as head of the martial law regime. Moreover, he had assumed to exercise power i.e. determined the relevant facts and applied the law thereto without a trial at which all interested parties were accorded the opportunity to adduce evidence to furnish the basis for a determination of the facts material to the controversy. He made the finding on the basis of "the records of the Bureau of Lands." From that fact, there is no indication of whatever the nature and reliability of these records were, and that they were in no sense conclusive. It is undeniable that petitioner Tuasons (and petitioners in intervention) were never confronted with those records and afforded a chance to dispute their trustworthiness and present countervailing evidence. Hence, the adjudication was patently and grossly violative of the right to due process to which the petitioners were entitled to under our Constitution. Mr. Marcos, in other words, not only arrogated unto himself a power never granted to him by the Constitution or the laws but had in addition exercised them unconstitutionally. ANGARA V. ELECTORAL COMMISSION G.R. NO. L-45081, JULY 15, 1936 Laurel, J.: DOCTRINE: Electoral Commission has the sole jurisdiction to be the judge of all contests relating to election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly and not the National Assembly itself. When judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any SUPERIORITY over the other departments. It does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature but only asserts the SUPREMACY of the constitution.
the trust accounts in behalf of the landowner is unjustified. FACTS: Petitioner was elected as a member of Congress. However, an electoral protest was lodged against him by Pedro Ynsua. He seeks a writ of prohibition against the Electoral Commission from taking cognizance of this protest. He argues that the National Assembly by virtue of a resolution passed confirming the election of its members has now barred the protest filed, such confirmation taking effect 12/3/1935. The Electoral Commission on the other hand had passed a resolution that set 12/9/1935 as the deadline for filing protests. Pedro Ynsua filed his protest 12/8/1935. The Commission thus took cognizance of the electoral protest filed and denied the MTD filed by herein petitioner. PETITIONERS CONTENTION: (a) That the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the electoral Commission solely as regards the merits of contested elections to the National Assembly; (b) That the Constitution excludes from said jurisdiction the power to regulate the proceedings of said election contests, which power has been reserved to the Legislative Department of the Government or the National Assembly; (c) That like the Supreme Court and other courts created in pursuance of the Constitution, whose exclusive jurisdiction relates solely to deciding the merits of controversies submitted to them for decision and to matters involving their internal organization, the Electoral Commission can regulate its proceedings only if the National Assembly has not availed of its primary power to so regulate such proceedings; [Type text]
(d) That Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly is, therefore, valid and should be respected and obeyed; (e) That under paragraph 13 of section 1 of the ordinance appended to the Constitution and paragraph 6 of article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law (No. 127 of the 73rd Congress of the United States) as well as under section 1 and 3 (should be sections 1 and 2) of article VIII of the Constitution, this Supreme Court has jurisdiction to pass upon the fundamental question herein raised because it involves an interpretation of the Constitution of the Philippines. RESPONDENTS CONTENTION: (a) That at the time of the approval of the rules of the Electoral Commission on December 9, 1935, there was no existing law fixing the period within which protests against the election of members of the National Assembly should be filed; that in fixing December 9, 1935, as the last day for the filing of protests against the election of members of the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission was exercising a power impliedly conferred upon it by the Constitution, by reason of its quasi-judicial attributes; (b) That said respondent presented his motion of protest before the Electoral Commission on December 9, 1935, the last day fixed by paragraph 6 of the rules of the said Electoral Commission; (c) That therefore the Electoral Commission acquired jurisdiction over the protest filed by said respondent and over the parties thereto, and the resolution of the Electoral Commission of January 23, 1936, denying petitioner's motion to dismiss said protest was an act within the jurisdiction of the said commission, and is not reviewable by means of a writ of prohibition;
(d) That neither the law nor the Constitution requires confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of its members, and that such confirmation does not operate to limit the period within which protests should be filed as to deprive the Electoral Commission of jurisdiction over protest filed subsequent thereto; (e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent entity created by the Constitution, endowed with quasijudicial functions, whose decision are final and unappealable; ( f ) That the electoral Commission, as a constitutional creation, is not an inferior tribunal, corporation, board or person, within the terms of sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and that neither under the provisions of sections 1 and 2 of article II (should be article VIII) of the Constitution and paragraph 13 of section 1 of the Ordinance appended thereto could it be subject in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions to a writ of prohibition from the Supreme Court; (g) That paragraph 6 of article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law (No. 127 of the 73rd Congress of the united States) has no application to the case at bar. ISSUES: 1.) WON the court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the controversy (YES) 2.) WON the Electoral Commission acted in excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the protest. (NO) HELD: 1) YES. The Electoral Commission, is a constitutional organ, created for a specific purpose, namely to determine all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. Although the Electoral Commission [Type text]
may not be interfered with, when and while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not subject to constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between department powers and agencies of the government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in justifiable and appropriate cases. The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government. The overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties between the several departments, however, sometimes makes it hard to say just where the one leaves off and the other begins. In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the governments of the government. 3.) NO. The EC has the implied power to set promulgate its own rules and regulations. It is an independent Constitutional organ. The confirmation [Type text]
made by the National Assembly does not in any way deprive it of its prerogative of setting the deadline of filing protests. The EC has sole exclusive jurisdiction in deciding the qualifications, returns and election of the members of the National Assembly. These powers were transferred to it under the Consti in full. The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And this is as effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the Constitution MARCOS V. MANGLAPUZ GR NO. 88211, SEPT. 15, 1989 Cortes, J. FACTS: Ferdinand Marcos who was deposed from his seat through the EDSA people power revolution was forced into exile in 1986. Corazon C. Aquino was declared President of the Republic under a revolutionary government. When Marcos was dying, he wished to return to the country along with his family but Pres. Aquino stood in his way and contended that Marcos cannot return to the country considering that his return would be a threat to the stability of the government and the countrys economy. The Marcoses assert that their right to return to the country is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights of the 1987 Constitution and that under international law, the right of Marcos and his family to return to the Philippines is guaranteed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. ISSUE: Whether or not the banning of the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines was justified.
RULING: YES. The Supreme Court held that the president, as part of her residual power, can ban the return of Marcos and his family to the country considering the consequences which could pose a serious threat to national interest and welfare of the country. The Constitution provides that "the executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines." [Art. VII, Sec. 1]. However, it does not define what is meant by executive power" although in the same article it touches on the exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute the laws, the appointing power, the powers under the commander-in-chief clause, the power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of Congress, the power to contract or guarantee foreign loans, the power to enter into treaties or international agreements, the power to submit the budget to Congress, and the power to address Congress. The inevitable question then arises: by enumerating certain powers of the President did the framers of the Constitution intend that the President shall exercise those specific powers and no other? Are these se enumerated powers the breadth and scope of "executive power"? Petitioners advance the view that the President's powers are limited to those specifically enumerated in the 1987 Constitution. Thus, they assert: "The President has enumerated powers, and what is not enumerated is impliedly denied to her. Inclusion unius est exclusio alterius We do not say that the presidency is what Mrs. Aquino says it is or what she does but, rather, that the consideration of tradition and the development of presidential power under the different constitutions are essential for a complete understanding of the extent of and limitations to the President's powers under the 1987 Constitution. The 1935 Constitution created [Type text]
a strong President with explicitly broader powers than the U.S. President. The 1973 Constitution attempted to modify the system of government into the parliamentary type, with the President as a mere figurehead, but through numerous amendments, the President became even more powerful, to the point that he was also the de facto Legislature. The 1987 Constitution, however, brought back the presidential system of government and restored the separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers by their actual distribution among three distinct branches of government with provision for checks and balances. It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is the power to enforce the laws, for the President is head of state as well as head of government and whatever powers in here in such positions pertain to the office unless the Constitution itself withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that the execution of the laws is only one of the powers of the President. It also grants the President other powers that do not involve the execution of any provision of law, e.g., his power over the country's foreign relations. On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated, DANTE O. CASIBANG vs. HONORABLE NARCISO A. AQUINO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch XIV, and REMEGIO P. YU G.R. No. L-38025 August 20, 1979 Makasiar, J.: FACTS: Remigio P. Yu was proclaimed on November 9, 1971 as the elected Mayor of
Rosales, Pangasinan in the 1971 local elections, by a plurality of 501 votes over his only rival, Dante Casibang, who seasonably filed on November 24, 1971 a protest against the election of the former with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, on the grounds of (1) anomalies and irregularities in the appreciation, counting and consideration of votes in specified electoral precincts; (2) terrorism; (3) rampant vote buying; (4) open voting or balloting; and (5) excessive campaign expenditures and other violations of the 1971 Election Code. Proceedings therein continued with respect to the election protest of Casibang before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, presided by Judge Narciso Aquino, who initially took cognizance of the same as it is unquestionably a justiciable controversy. Thereafter or on October 10, 1973, at which time Casibang had already completed presenting his evidence and in fact had rested his case, Yu moved to dismiss the election protest of petitioner on the ground that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the same in view of the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution by reason of which principally) Section 9 of Article XVII [Transitory Provisions] and Section 2 of Article XI a political question has intervened in the case. Yu contended that "... the provisions in the 1935 Constitution relative to all local governments have been superseded by the 1973 Constitution. Therefore, all local government should adhere to our parliamentary form of government. This is clear in the New Constitution under its Article XI." He further submitted that local elective officials (including mayors) have no more four-year term of office. They are only in office at the pleasure of the appointing power embodied in the New Constitution, and under Section 9 of Article XVII. On December 18, 1973, the trial court, presided by Judge Aquino, sustained the political question theory of Yu and ordered the dismissal of the electoral protest.
ISSUE: Whether or not the election protest of Casibang has become a political question at the advent of 1973 Constitution. HELD: NO. That Section 9 of Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution did not render moot and academic pending election protest cases . "There is a difference between the 'term' of office and the 'right' to hold an office. A 'term' of office is the period during winch an elected officer or appointee is entitled to hold office, perform its functions and enjoy its privileges and emoluments. A 'right' to hold a public office is the just and legal claim to hold and enjoy the powers and responsibilities of the office. In other words, the 'term' refers to the period, duration of length of time during which the occupant of an office is entitled to stay therein whether such period be definite or indefinite. Hence, although Section 9, Article XVII of the New Constitution made the term of the incumbent officers indefinite, it did not foreclose any challenge by Aquino, in an election protest, of the 'right' of the Yus to continue holding their respective office. What has been directly affected by said constitutional provision is the 'term' to the office, although the 'right' of the incumbent to an office which he is legally holding is co-extensive with the 'term' thereof," and that "it is erroneous to conclude that under Section 9, Article XVII of the New Constitution, the term of office of the Yu expired, and that they are now holding their respective offices under a new term. We are of the opinion that they hold their respective offices still under the term to which they have been elected, although the same is now indefinite" (Parades, Sunga and Valley cases, supra). That the New Constitution recognized the continuing jurisdiction of courts of first instance to hear, try and decide election protests: "Section 7 of Article XVII of the New Constitution provides that 'all existing laws not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, modified or
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repealed by the National Assembly. 'And there has been no amendment, modification or repeal of Section 220 of the Election Code of 1971 which gave the Aquino the right to file an election contest against those proclaimed elected," and "according to Section 8, Article XVII of the New Constitution 'all courts existing at the time of the ratification of this Constitution shall continue and exercise their jurisdiction until otherwise provided by law in accordance with this Constitution, and all cases pending in said courts shall be heard, tried and determined under the laws then in force.' General Order No. 3, as amended by General Order No. 3-A, does not expressly include electoral contests of municipal elective positions as among those removed from the jurisdiction of the courts; That General Order No. 3 may not be invoked by the courts to avoid exercise of their jurisdiction because to do so "is nothing short of unwarranted abdication of judicial', authority, which no judge duly imbued with the implications of the paramount principle of independence of the judiciary should ever think of doing. In the light of the foregoing pronouncements, We hold that the electoral protest case herein involved has remained a justiciable controversy. The term "political question" connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions which under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure" (Taada vs. Cuenco, L-1052, Feb. 28, 1957). A broader definition was advanced by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Brennan in Baker vs. Carr (369 U.S. 186 [1962]): "Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political [Type text]
department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of respect due coordinate branches of the government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question" (p. 217). And Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, then an Associate Justice, of this Court fixed the limits of the term, thus: "The term has been made applicable to controversies clearly nonjudicial and therefore beyond its jurisdiction or to an issue involved in a case appropriately subject to its cognizance, as to which there has been a prior legislative or executive determination to which deference must be paid (Cf. Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192 [1946]; Lopez vs. Roxas, L-25716, July 28, 1966, 17 SCRA 756; Gonzales vs. Commission on Elections, L-28196, Nov. 9, 1967, 21 SCRA 774). It 'has likewise been employed loosely to characterize a suit where the party proceeded against is the President or Congress, or any branch thereof (Cf. Planas vs. Gil, 67 Phil. 62 [1937]; Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192 [1946]). If to be delimited with accuracy; 'political questions' should refer to such as would under the Constitution be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity or in regard to which full discretionary authority is vested either in the President or Congress. It is thus beyond the competence of the judiciary to pass upon. ..." (Lansang vs. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448, 504-505 [1971]). GARCIA VS.THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY G.R. No. 101273 July 3, 1992 Feliciano, J.: DOCTRINE: The Tariff and Customs Code grants stand-by powers to the President and is a valid
exercise of delegated legislative authority. BRIEF FACTS: The 1990 President issued Executive Order No. 438 which imposed, in addition to any other duties, taxes and charges imposed by law on all articles imported into the Philippines, an additional duty of five percent (5%) ad valorem. This additional duty was imposed across the board on all imported articles,. This additional duty was subsequently increased from five percent (5%) ad valorem including crude oil and other oil products imported into the Philippines to nine percent (9%) a d valorem by the promulgation of Executive Order No. 443, dated 3 January 1991. The Department of Finance requested the Tariff Commission to initiate the process required by the Tariff and Customs Code for the imposition of a specific levy on crude oil and other petroleum products, covered by HS Heading Nos. 27.09, 27.10 and 27.11 of Section 104 of the Tariff and Customs Code as amended. Accordingly, the Tariff Commission, following the procedure set forth in Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code, scheduled a public hearing to give interested parties an opportunity to be heard and to present evidence in support of their respective positions. Meantime, Executive Order No. 475 was issued by the President, on 15 August 1991 reducing the rate of additional duty on all imported articles from nine percent (9%) to five percent (5%) ad valorem, except in the cases of crude oil and other oil products which continued to be subject to the additional duty of nine percent (9%) ad valorem. Upon completion of the public hearings, the Tariff Commission submitted to the President a "Report on Special Duty on Crude Oil and Oil Products for consideration and appropriate action. Seven (7) days later, the President issued Executive Order No. 478, dated 23 August 1991, which levied (in addition to the aforementioned additional duty of nine percent (9%) ad valorem and all [Type text]
other existing ad valorem duties) a special duty of P0.95 per liter or P151.05 per barrel of imported crude oil and P1.00 per liter of imported oil products. PETITIONERS CONTENTION: In the present Petition for Certiorari, and Mandamus, The petitioner, Congressman Garcia from Bataan, assails the validity of Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478. He argues that 1. Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 are violative of Section 24, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides as follows: Sec. 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments. 2. Since the Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills in Congress, the President may not assume such power by issuing Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which are in the nature of revenuegenerating measures and the Executive Orders have nothing to do whatsoever with the protection of local industries and products for the sake of national economy, general welfare and/or national security . 3. Since the Executive Orders are unconstitutional, declared there should be a roll back of prices of petroleum products equivalent to the "resulting excess money not be needed to adequately maintain the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF). 4. The protection of local industries" is the only permissible objective that can be secured by the exercise of that delegated authority in the Tariff and Customs COde, and that therefore "protection of local industries" is the sum total or the alpha and the omega of "the national economy, general welfare and/or national security." RESPONDENTS CONTENTIONS:
The executive orders are valid and constitutional, the powers being derived from the Constitution itself. The power to impose the additional ad valorem tax is by virtue of the power granted to the President as expressly declared in the Tariff and Customs Code. ISSUE: 1. Are Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 unconstitutional and invalid for the Court to restrain the implementation of such orders?- NO. 2. Does the Tariff and Customs Code put a limit to the exercise of such powers as to specifically protect local industries and products and not for the purpose of raising additional revenue (and as petitioner puts it crude oil, an essential product which we do not have to protect, since we produce only minimal quantities and have to import the rest of what we need and thus, the Executive Orders were issued for the purpose of raising reveues) ? - NO. 3. Is there a need for the Court to declare that there should be roll back of prices of petroleum products ?- NO. RULING: Note: the recent promulgation of Executive Order No. 507 did not render the instant Petition moot and academic. Executive Order No. 517 which is dated 30 April 1992 provides fting of E,O 443 but crude oil and other oil products continue to be subject to the additional duty of nine percent (9%) ad valorem under Executive Order No. 475 and to the special duty of P0.95 per liter of imported crude oil and P1.00 per liter of imported oil products under Executive Order No. 478. I. THE TARIFF AND CUSTOMS CODE GRANTS STAND-BY POWERS TO THE PRESIDENT. It is Constitutional. Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows: [Type text]
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government. There is thus explicit 1 constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the President "subject to such limitations and restrictions is [Congress] may impose" to fix "within specific limits" "tariff rates . . . and other duties or imposts . . ."The relevant congressional statute is the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines., and Sections 104 and 401, the pertinent provisions thereof. These are the provisions which the President explicitly invoked in promulgating Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478. (SEE ***) II. The Court makes four major points on deciding on the second issue: First: There is nothing in the language of either Section 104 or of 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code that suggest such a sharp and absolute limitation of authority. The entire contention of petitioner is anchored on just two (2) words, one found in Section 401 (a)(1): "existing protective rates of import duty," and the second in the proviso found at the end of Section 401 (a): "protection levels granted in Section 104 of this Code . . . . " The words "protective" and
''protection" are simply not enough to support the very broad and encompassing limitation which petitioner seeks to rest on those two (2) words. Second, Petitioner's singular theory collides with a very practical fact of which this Court may take judicial notice that the Bureau of Customs which administers the Tariff and Customs Code, is one of the two (2) principal traditional generators or producers of governmental revenue, the other being the Bureau of Internal Revenue. (There is a third agency, non-traditional in character, that generates lower but still comparable levels of revenue for the government The Philippine Amusement and Games Corporation [PAGCOR].) Third, Customs duties which are assessed at the prescribed tariff rates are very much like taxes which are frequently imposed for both revenue-raising and for regulatory purposes. Thus, it has been held that "customs duties" is "the name given to taxes on the importation and exportation of commodities, the tariff or tax assessed upon merchandise imported from, or exported to, a foreign country." The levying of customs duties on imported goods may have in some measure the effect of protecting local industries where such local industries actually exist and are producing comparable goods. Simultaneously, however, the very same customs duties inevitably have the effect of producing governmental revenues. Customs duties like internal revenue taxes are rarely, if ever, designed to achieve one policy [Type text]
objective only. Most commonly, customs duties, which constitute taxes in the sense of exactions the proceeds of which become public funds have either or both the generation of revenue and the regulation of economic or social activity as their moving purposes and frequently, it is very difficult to say which, in a particular instance, is the dominant or principal objective. In the instant case, since the Philippines in fact produces ten (10) to fifteen percent (15%) of the crude oil consumed here, the imposition of increased tariff rates and a special duty on imported crude oil and imported oil products may be seen to have some "protective" impact upon indigenous oil production. For the effective, price of imported crude oil and oil products is increased. At the same time, it cannot be gainsaid that substantial revenues for the government are raised by the imposition of such increased tariff rates or special duty. Fourth, petitioner's concept which he urges us to build into our constitutional and customs law, is a stiflingly narrow one. Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code establishes general standards with which the exercise of the authority delegated by that provision to the President must be consistent: that authority must be exercised in "the interest of national economy, general welfare and/or national security." Note: The Court said, It seems also important to note that tariff rates are commonly established and the corresponding customs duties levied and collected upon articles and goods which are not found at all and not
produced in the Philippines. The Tariff and Customs Code is replete with such articles and commodities: among the more interesting examples are ivory castoreum or musk taken from the beaver Olives truffles or European fungi growing under the soil on tree roots,; dates figs caviar aircraft ; special diagnostic instruments and apparatus for human medicine and surgery ); X-ray generators; X-ray tubes;X-ray screens, etc. etc. In such cases, customs duties may be seen to be imposed either for revenue purposes purely or perhaps, in certain cases, to discourage any importation of the items involved. In either case, it is clear that customs duties are levied and imposed entirely apart from whether or not there are any competing local industries to protect. III. The conclusion that the Court has reached above renders it unnecessary to deal with petitioner's additional contention that, should Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 be declared unconstitutional and illegal, there should be a roll back of prices of petroleum products equivalent to the "resulting excess money not be needed to adequately maintain the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF)." **TARIFF AND CUSTOMS CODE where the President derived powers. Section 104 of the Tariff and Customs Code provides in relevant part: Sec. 104. All tariff sections, chapters, headings and subheadings and the rates of import duty under Section 104 of Presidential Decree No. 34 and all subsequent amendments issued under Executive Orders and Presidential Decrees are hereby adopted and form part of this Code.
There shall be levied, collected, and paid upon all imported articles the rates of duty indicated in the Section under this section except as otherwise specifically provided for in this Code: Provided, that, the maximum rate shall not exceed one hundred per cent ad valorem. The rates of duty herein provided or subsequently fixed pursuant to Section Four Hundred One of this Code shall be subject to periodic investigation by the Tariff Commission and may be revised by the President upon recommendation of the National Economic and Development Authority. xxx xxx xxx Section 401 of the same Code needs to be quoted in full: Sec. 401. Flexible Clause. a. In the interest of national economy, general welfare and/or national security, and subject to the limitations herein prescribed, the President, upon recommendation of the National Economic and Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as NEDA), is hereby empowered: (1) to increase, reduce or remove existing protective rates of import duty (including any necessary change in classification). The existing rates may be increased or decreased but in no case shall the reduced rate of import duty be lower than the basic rate of
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ten (10) per cent ad valorem, nor shall the increased rate of import duty be higher than a maximum of one hundred (100) per cent ad valorem; (2) to establish import quota or to ban imports of any commodity, as may be necessary; and (3) to impose an additional duty on all imports not exceeding ten (10) per cent ad valorem, whenever necessary; Provided, That upon periodic investigations by the Tariff Commission and recommendation of the NEDA, the President may cause a gradual reduction of protection levels granted in Section One hundred and four of this Code, including those subsequently granted pursuant to this section. b. Before any recommendation is submitted to the President by the NEDA pursuant to the provisions of this section, except in the imposition of an additional duty not exceeding ten (10) per cent ad valorem, the Commission shall conduct an investigation in the course of which they shall hold public hearings wherein interested parties shall be afforded reasonable opportunity to be present, produce evidence and to be heard. The Commission shall also hear the views and recommendations of any government office, agency or instrumentality concerned. The Commission shall submit their [Type text]
findings and recommendations to the NEDA within thirty (30) days after the termination of the public hearings. c. The power of the President to increase or decrease rates of import duty within the limits fixed in subsection "a" shall include the authority to modify the form of duty. In modifying the form of duty, the corresponding ad valorem or specific equivalents of the duty with respect to imports from the principal competing foreign country for the most recent representative period shall be used as bases. d. The Commissioner of Customs shall regularly furnish the Commission a copy of all customs import entries as filed in the Bureau of Customs. The Commission or its duly authorized representatives shall have access to, and the right to copy all liquidated customs import entries and other documents appended thereto as finally filed in the Commission on Audit. e. The NEDA shall promulgate rules and regulations necessary to carry out the provisions of this section. f. Any Order issued by the President pursuant to the provisions of this section shall take effect thirty (30) days after promulgation, except in the
imposition of additional duty not exceeding ten (10) per cent ad valorem which shall take effect at the discretion of the President. J. ANTONIO ARANETA v. RAFAEL DINGLASAN G.R. No. L-2044, August 26, 1949 FACTS: The petitions challenge the validity of executive orders of the President avowedly issued in virtue of Commonwealth Act No. 671 - AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY. Involved in cases Nos. L-2044 and L-2756 is Executive Order No. 62, which regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings. The petitioner, J. Antonio Araneta, is under prosecution in the Court of First Instance of Manila for violation of the provisions of this Executive Order, and prays for the issuance of the writ of prohibition to the judge and the city fiscal. Involved in case L-3055 is Executive Order No. 192, which aims to control exports from the Philippines. In this case, Leon Ma. Guerrero seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the Administrator of the Sugar Quota Office and the Commissioner of Customs to permit the exportation of shoes by the petitioner. Both officials refuse to issue the required export license on the ground that the exportation of shoes from the Philippines is forbidden by this Executive Order. Case No. L-3054 relates to Executive Order No. 225, which appropriates funds for the operation of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines during the period from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and for other purposes. The petitioner Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr., as a tax-payer, an elector, and president of [Type text]
the Nacionalista Party, applies for a writ of prohibition to restrain the Treasurer of the Philippines from disbursing this Executive Order. Affected in case No. L-3056 is Executive Order No. 226, which appropriates P6,000,000 to defray the expenses in connection with, and incidental to, the hold lug of the national elections to be held in November, 1949. The petitioner, Antonio Barredo, as a citizen, tax-payer and voter, asks this Court to prevent "the respondents from disbursing, spending or otherwise disposing of that amount or any part of it. PETITIONERS CONTENTION: The Emergency Powers Act (Commonwealth Act No. 671) has ceased to have any force and effect. ISSUE: When does the Emergency powers of the President cease? RULING: Commonwealth Act No. 671 became inoperative when Congress met in regular session on May 25, 1946, and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of law. In setting the session of Congress instead of the first special session preceded it as the point of expiration of the Act, we think giving effect to the purpose and intention of the National Assembly. In a special session, the Congress may "consider general legislation or only such as he (President) may designate." (Section 9, Article VI of the Constitution.) In a regular session, the power Congress to legislate is not circumscribed except by the limitations imposed by the organic law. Act No. 671 ended ex proprio vigore with the opening of the regular session of Congress on May 25, 1946. Acts Nos. 600 and 620 contain stronger if not conclusive indication that they were self-liquidating. By express provision the rules and regulations to be eventually made in pursuance of Acts Nos. 600 and 620, respectively approved on August 19, 1940 and June 6, 1941, were to be good only up to the corresponding dates
of adjournment of the following sessions of the Legislature, "unless sooner amended or repealed by the National Assembly." The logical deduction to be drawn from this provision is that in the mind of the lawmakers the idea was fixed that the Acts themselves would lapse not later than the rules and regulations. The design to provide for the automatic repeal of those rules and regulations necessarily was predicated on the consciousness of a prior or at best simultaneous repeal of their source. Were not this the case, there would arise the curious spectacle, already painted, and easily foreseen, of the Legislature amending or repealing rules and regulations of the President while the latter was empowered to keep or return them into force and to issue new ones independently of the National Assembly. For the rest, the reasoning heretofore adduced against the asserted indefinite continuance of the operation of Act No. 671 equally applies to Acts Nos. 600 and 620. CONGRESSMAN JAMES L. CHIONGBIAN et al. vs HON. OSCAR M. ORBOS, Executive Secretary et al. IMMANUEL JALDON vs. HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OSCAR M. ORBOS G.R. No. 96754 June 22, 1995 FACTS: This is a consolidated case. Pursuant to Art. X, 18 of the 1987 Constitution, Congress passed R.A. No. 6734, the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, calling for a plebiscite to be held in the provinces of Basilan, Cotobato, Davao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Palawan, South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Norte, and Zamboanga del Sur, and the cities of Cotabato, Dapitan, Dipolog, General Santos, Iligan, Marawi, Pagadian, Puerto Princesa and Zamboanga. In the ensuing plebiscite held on November 16, 1989, four provinces voted in favor of creating an autonomous region. These are the provinces of Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. In accordance with the constitutional provision, these provinces [Type text]
became the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. On the other hand, with respect to provinces and cities not voting in favor of the Autonomous Region, Art. XIX, 13 of R.A. No. 6734 authorizing the President of the Philippines to "merge" by administrative determination the regions remaining after the establishment of the Autonomous Region. President Aquino issued an executive order "Providing for the Reorganization of Administrative Regions in Mindanao. Petitioners in G.R. No. 96754 who are members of Congress challenge the validity of a provision of the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (R.A. No. 6734) and the executive order as there is no law which authorizes the President to pick certain provinces and cities within the existing regions and restructure them to new administrative regions. On the other hand, the petitioner in G.R. No. 96673, Immanuel Jaldon, is a resident of Zamboanga City, who is suing in the capacity of taxpayer and citizen of the Republic of the Philippines. Petitioners in both cases contend that Art. XIX, 13 of R.A. No. 6734 is unconstitutional because (1) it unduly delegates legislative power to the President by authorizing him to "merge [by administrative determination] the existing regions" or at any rate provides no standard for the exercise of the power delegated and (2) the power granted is not expressed in the title of the law. In addition, petitioner in G.R. No. 96673 challenges the validity of E.O. No. 429 on the ground that the power granted by Art. XIX, 13 to the President is only to "merge regions IX and XII" but not to reorganize the entire administrative regions in Mindanao and certainly not to transfer the regional center of Region IX from Zamboanga City to Pagadian City. The Solicitor General defends the reorganization of regions in Mindanao by E.O. No. 429 as merely the exercise of a
power "traditionally lodged in the President," as held in Abbas v. Comelec, and as a mere incident of his power of general supervision over local governments and control of executive departments, bureaus and offices under Art. X, 16 and Art. VII, 17, respectively, of the Constitution. He contends that there is no undue delegation of legislative power but only a grant of the power to "fill up" or provide the details of legislation because Congress did not have the facility to provide for them. The Solicitor General justifies the grant to the President of the power "to merge the existing regions" as something fairly embraced in the title of R.A. No. 6734, to wit, "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao," because it is germane to it. He argues that the power is not limited to the merger of those regions in which the provinces and cities which took part in the plebiscite are located but that it extends to all regions in Mindanao as necessitated by the establishment of the autonomous region. Finally, he invokes P.D. No. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772 which provides that the President of the Philippines shall have the continuing authority to reorganize the National Government. ISSUES: (1) whether the power to "merge" administrative regions is legislative in character, as petitioners contend, or whether it is executive in character, as respondents claim it is, and, in any event, whether Art. XIX, 13 is invalid because it contains no standard to guide the President's discretion; (2) whether the power given is fairly expressed in the title of the statute; and (3) whether the power granted authorizes the reorganization even of regions the provinces and cities in which either did not take part in the plebiscite on the creation of [Type text]
the Autonomous Region or did not vote in favor of it; and (4) whether the power granted to the President includes the power to transfer the regional center of Region IX from Zamboanga City to Pagadian City. HELD: It will be useful to recall first the nature of administrative regions and the basis and purpose for their creation. On September 9, 1968, R.A. No. 5435 was passed "authorizing the President of the Philippines, with the help of the Reorganization Commission, to reorganize the different executive departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and instrumentalities of the government. Accordingly, the Reorganization Commission prepared an Integrated Reorganization Plan which divided the country into eleven administrative regions. The Plan was approved and made part of the law of the land. Thus the creation and subsequent reorganization of administrative regions have been by the President pursuant to authority granted to him by law. In conferring on the President the power "to merge [by administrative determination] the existing regions" following the establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Congress merely followed the pattern set in previous legislation dating back to the initial organization of administrative regions in 1972. As this Court observed in Abbas, "while the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over local governments [see Art. X, 4 of the Constitution]." The regions themselves are not territorial and political divisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays but are "mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes." The power conferred on the President is similar to the power to adjust municipal boundaries which has been
described in Pelaez v. Auditor General or as "administrative in nature." There is, therefore, no abdication by Congress of its legislative power in conferring on the President the power to merge administrative regions. Finally, it is contended that the power granted to the President is limited to the reorganization of administrative regions in which some of the provinces and cities which voted in favor of regional autonomy are found, because Art. XIX, 13 provides that those which did not vote for autonomy "shall remain in the existing administrative regions." The contention has no merit. While Art. XIX, 13 provides that "The provinces and cities which do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing administrative regions," this provision is subject to the qualification that "the President may by administrative determination merge the existing regions." This means that while non-assenting provinces and cities are to remain in the regions as designated upon the creation of the Autonomous Region, they may nevertheless be regrouped with contiguous provinces forming other regions as the exigency of administration may require. The regrouping is done only on paper. It involves no more than are definition or redrawing of the lines separating administrative regions for the purpose of facilitating the administrative supervision of local government units by the President and insuring the efficient delivery of essential services. There will be no "transfer" of local governments from one region to another except as they may thus be regrouped so that a province like Lanao del Norte, which is at present part of Region XII, will become part of Region IX. Petitioners nonetheless insist that only those regions, in which the provinces and cities which voted for inclusion in the Autonomous [Type text]
Region are located, can be "merged" by the President. To be fundamental reason Art. XIX, 13 is not so limited. But the more fundamental reason is that the President's power cannot be so limited without neglecting the necessities of administration. Petitioners contend that the determination of provincial capitals has always been by act of Congress. But as, this Court said in Abbas, administrative regions are mere "groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes . [They] are not territorial and political subdivisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays." There is, therefore, no basis for contending that only Congress can change or determine regional centers. It may be that the transfer of the regional center in Region IX from Zamboanga City to Pagadian City may entail the expenditure of large sums of money for the construction of buildings and other infrastructure to house regional offices. That contention is addressed to the wisdom of the transfer rather than to its legality and it is settled that courts are not the arbiters of the wisdom or expediency of legislation. SHIGENORI KURODA vs. Major General RAFAEL JALANDONI, Brigadier General CALIXTO DUQUE, Colonel MARGARITO TORALBA, Colonel IRENEO BUENCONSEJO, Colonel PEDRO TABUENA, Major FEDERICO ARANAS, MELVILLE S. HUSSEY and ROBERT PORT G.R. No. L-2662, March 26, 1949 DOCTRINE: In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international law of the present day including the Hague Convention the Geneva Convention and significant precedents of international jurisprudence established by the United Nation all those person military or civilian who have been guilty of planning preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of crimes and offenses consequential and
incidental thereto in violation of the laws and customs of war, of humanity and civilization are held accountable therefor. Consequently in the promulgation and enforcement of Execution Order No. 68 the President of the Philippines has acted in conformity with the generally accepted and policies of international law which are part of the our Constitution. FACTS: Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a LieutenantGeneral of the Japanese Imperial Army and Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in The Philippines during a period covering 19433 and 19444 who is now charged before a military Commission convened by the Chief of Staff of the Armed forces of the Philippines with having unlawfully disregarded and failed "to discharge his duties as such command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes against noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the Imperial Japanese Forces in violation of the laws and customs of war" comes before this Court seeking to establish the illegality of Executive Order No. 68 of the President of the Philippines: to enjoin and prohibit respondents Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port from participating in the prosecution of petitioner's case before the Military Commission and to permanently prohibit respondents from proceeding with the case of petitioners. Executive Order No. 68, establishing a National War Crimes Office prescribing rule and regulation governing the trial of accused war criminals, was issued by the President of the Philippines on the 29th days of July, 1947 This Court holds that this order is valid and constitutional. Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3, that The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the of the nation. In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international law of the present day including the Hague Convention the [Type text]
Geneva Convention and significant precedents of international jurisprudence established by the United Nation all those person military or civilian who have been guilty of planning preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of crimes and offenses consequential and incidental thereto in violation of the laws and customs of war, of humanity and civilization are held accountable therefor. Consequently in the promulgation and enforcement of Execution Order No. 68 the President of the Philippines has acted in conformity with the generally accepted and policies of international law which are part of the our Constitution. ISSUES AND PETITIONERS CONTENTION: First. "That Executive Order No. 68 is illegal on the ground that it violates not only the provision of our constitutional law but also our local laws to say nothing of the fact (that) the Philippines is not a signatory nor an adherent to the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare and therefore petitioners is charged of 'crimes' not based on law, national and international." Hence petitioner argues "That in view off the fact that this commission has been empanelled by virtue of an unconstitutional law an illegal order this commission is without jurisdiction to try herein petitioner." Second. That the participation in the prosecution of the case against petitioner before the Commission in behalf of the United State of America of attorneys Melville Hussey and Robert Port who are not attorneys authorized by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines is a diminution of our personality as an independent state and their appointment as prosecutor are a violation of our Constitution for the reason that they are not qualified to practice law in the Philippines. Third. That Attorneys Hussey and Port have no personality as prosecution the United State not being a party in interest in the case. RULING:
1.) The promulgation of said executive order is an exercise by the President of his power as Commander in chief of all our armed forces as upheld by this Court in the case of Yamashita vs. Styer (L-129, 42 Off. Gaz., 664) 1 when we said War is not ended simply because hostilities have ceased. After cessation of armed hostilities incident of war may remain pending which should be disposed of as in time of war. An importance incident to a conduct of war is the adoption of measure by the military command not only to repel and defeat the enemies but to seize and subject to disciplinary measure those enemies who in their attempt to thwart or impede our military effort have violated the law of war.Indeed the power to create a military commission for the trial and punishment of war criminals is an aspect of waging war. And in the language of a writer a military commission has jurisdiction so long as a technical state of war continues. This includes the period of an armistice or military occupation up to the effective of a treaty of peace and may extend beyond by treaty agreement. Consequently, the President as Commander in Chief is fully empowered to consummate this unfinished aspect of war namely the trial and punishment of war criminal through the issuance and enforcement of Executive Order No. 68. It cannot be denied that the rules and regulation of the Hague and Geneva conventions form, part of and are wholly based on the generally accepted principals of international law. In facts these rules and principles were accepted by the two belligerent nation the United State and Japan who were signatories to the two Convention, Such rule and principles therefore form part of the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them for our [Type text]
Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rule and principle of international law as continued inn treaties to which our government may have been or shall be a signatory. Furthermore when the crimes charged against petitioner were allegedly committed the Philippines was under the sovereignty of United States and thus we were equally bound together with the United States and with Japan to the right and obligation contained in the treaties between the belligerent countries. These rights and obligation were not erased by our assumption of full sovereignty. If at all our emergency as a free state entitles us to enforce the right on our own of trying and punishing those who committed crimes against crimes against our people. In this connection it is well to remember what we have said in the case of Laurel vs. Misa -The change of our form government from Commonwealth to Republic does not affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason committed during then Commonwealth because it is an offense against the same sovereign people. . . . By the same token war crimes committed against our people and our government while we were a Commonwealth are triable and punishable by our present Republic. 2.) In the first place respondent Military Commission is a special military tribunal governed by a special law and not by the Rules of court which govern ordinary civil court. It has already been shown that Executive Order No. 68 which provides for the organization of such military commission is a valid and constitutional law. There is nothing in said executive order which requires that counsel appearing before
said commission must be attorneys qualified to practice law in the Philippines in accordance with the Rules of Court. In facts it is common in military tribunals that counsel for the parties are usually military personnel who are neither attorneys nor even possessed of legal training. Secondly the appointment of the two American attorneys is not violative of our nation sovereignty. It is only fair and proper that United States, which has submitted the vindication of crimes against her government and her people to a tribunal of our nation should be allowed representation in the trial of those very crimes. If there has been any relinquishment of sovereignty it has not been by our government but by the United State Government which has yielded to us the trial and punishment of her enemies. The least that we could do in the spirit of comity is to allow them representation in said trials. 3.) It is of common knowledge that the United State and its people have been equally if not more greatly aggrieved by the crimes with which petitioner stands charged before the Military Commission. It can be considered a privilege for our Republic that a leader nation should submit the vindication of the honor of its citizens and its government to a military tribunal of our country SECRETARY OF JUSTICE vs. HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B. JIMENEZ G.R. No. 139465, January 18, 2000 Melo, J. DOCTRINE: The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or local courts) are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state. Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both [Type text]
since it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted principles of international law in observance of the observance of the Incorporation Clause. FACTS: On January 13, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1069 "Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country". The Decree is founded on: the doctrine of incorporation under the Constitution; the mutual concern for the suppression of crime both in the state where it was committed and the state where the criminal may have escaped; the extradition treaty with the Republic of Indonesia and the intention of the Philippines to enter into similar treaties with other interested countries; and the need for rules to guide the executive department and the courts in the proper implementation of said treaties. Then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the "Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America" (hereinafter referred to as the RP-US Extradition Treaty). The Senate, by way of Resolution No. 11, expressed its concurrence in the ratification of said treaty. On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S. Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the United States. Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, private respondent Jimmenez, through counsel, wrote a letter addressed to petitioner requesting copies of the official extradition request from the U.S. Government, as well as all documents and papers submitted therewith; and that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers. Private respondent also requested that the proceedings on the matter be held in abeyance in the meantime.
PETITIONERS CONTENTION: In response to private respondent's letter, petitioner, in a reply-letter, denied the foregoing requests for the following reasons: 1. We find it premature to furnish you with copies of the extradition request and supporting documents from the United States Government, pending evaluation by this Department of the sufficiency of the extradition documents submitted in accordance with the provisions of the extradition treaty and our extradition law. 2. The formal request for extradition of the United States contains grand jury information and documents obtained through grand jury process covered by strict secrecy rules under United States law. The United States had to secure orders from the concerned District Courts authorizing the United States to disclose certain grand jury information to Philippine government and law enforcement personnel for the purpose of extradition of Mr. Jimenez. 3. This Department is not in a position to hold in abeyance proceedings in connection with an extradition request. Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, to which we are a party provides that "[E]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith". Extradition is a tool of criminal law enforcement and to be effective, requests for extradition or surrender of accused or convicted persons must be processed expeditiously. PRIVATE RESPONDENT: On August 6, 1999, private respondent filed with the RTC of the National Capital Judicial Region a petition against the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, for mandamus (to compel herein petitioner to furnish private respondent the extradition documents, to give him access thereto, and to afford him an opportunity to comment on, or oppose, the extradition request, and [Type text]
thereafter to evaluate the request impartially, fairly and objectively);certiorari (to set aside herein petitioner's letter dated July 13, 1999); and prohibition (to restrain petitioner from considering the extradition request and from filing an extradition petition in court; and to enjoin the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the NBI from performing any act directed to the extradition of private respondent to the United States), with an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction. The aforementioned petition was raffled to Branch 25 of said regional trial court stationed in Manila which is presided over by the Honorable Ralph C. Lantion. Respondent judge issued an order disposing: WHEREFORE, this Court hereby Orders the respondents, namely: the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, their agents and/or representatives to maintain the status quo by refraining from committing the acts complained of; from conducting further proceedings in connection with the request of the United States Government for the extradition of the petitioner; from filing the corresponding Petition with a Regional Trial court; and from performing any act directed to the extradition of the petitioner to the United States Forthwith, petitioner initiated the instant proceedings. ISSUE: Would private respondent's entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government under the RPExtradition Treaty? Assuming the answer is in the affirmative, is there a conflict between the treaty and the due process clause in the Constitution? HELD: NO, it will not constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Phil government. There is really no conflict between the treaty
and the due process clause in the Constitution because there is no occasion to choose which of the two should be upheld. Private respondent's due process rights, although not guaranteed by statute or by treaty, are protected by constitutional guarantees The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest and most fundamental maxims of international law, requires the parties to a treaty to keep their agreement therein in good faith. The observance of our country's legal duties under a treaty is also compelled by Section 2, Article II of the Constitution which provides that "[t]he Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with nations." Under the doctrine of incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the land and no further legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere. The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or local courts) are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state. Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted principles of international law in observance of the observance of the Incorporation Clause in the above-cited constitutional provision (Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1996 ed., p. 55). In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts (Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 [1957]; Gonzales vs. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230 [1963]; In re: Garcia, 2 SCRA 984 [Type text]
[1961]) for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances. The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogat priori takes effect a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution. In the case at bar, is there really a conflict between international law and municipal or national law? En contrario, these two components of the law of the land are not pined against each other. There is no occasion to choose which of the two should be upheld. Instead, we see a void in the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, as implemented by Presidential Decree No. 1069, as regards the basic due process rights of a prospective extraditee at the evaluation stage of extradition proceedings. From the procedures earlier abstracted, after the filing of the extradition petition and during the judicial determination of the propriety of extradition, the rights of notice and hearing are clearly granted to the prospective extraditee. However, prior thereto, the law is silent as to these rights. Reference to the U.S. extradition procedures also manifests this silence. Petitioner interprets this silence as unavailability of these rights. Consequently, he describes the evaluation procedure as an "ex parte technical assessment" of the sufficiency of the extradition request and the supporting documents. We disagree.
In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair play. An application of the basic twin due process rights of notice and hearing will not go against the treaty or the implementing law. Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes these rights from a prospective extraditee. In the case at bar, private respondent does not only face a clear and present danger of loss of property or employment, but of liberty itself, which may eventually lead to his forcible banishment to a foreign land. The convergence of petitioner's favorable action on the extradition request and the deprivation of private respondent's liberty is easily comprehensible. We have ruled time and again that this Court's equity jurisdiction, which is aptly described as "justice outside legality," may be availed of only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial pronouncements. The constitutional issue in the case at bar does not even call for "justice outside legality," since private respondent's due process rights, although not guaranteed by statute or by treaty, are protected by constitutional guarantees. We would not be true to the organic law of the land if we choose strict construction over guarantees against the deprivation of liberty. That would not be in keeping with the principles of democracy on which our Constitution is premised. Verily, as one traverses treacherous waters of conflicting and opposing currents of liberty and government authority, he must ever hold the oar of freedom in the stronger arm, lest an errant and wayward course be laid. Petitioner is ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers, and to grant him a reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence. RIZAL ALIH, ET AL. vs. MAJOR GENERAL DELFIN C. CASTRO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS COMMANDER SOUTHCOM AND [Type text]
REGIONAL UNIFIED COMMAND, REGION IX, ZAMBOANGA CITY, ET AL. G.R. No. L-69401 June 23, 1987 CRUZ, J.: FACTS: On November 25, 1984, a contingent of more than 200 Philippine marines and elements of the home defense forces raided the compound occupied by the petitioners at Gov. Alvarez street, Zamboanga City, in search of loose firearms, ammunition and other explosives. The military operation was commonly known and dreaded as a "zona," which was similar to the feared practice of the kempeitai during the Japanese Occupation of rounding up the people in a locality, arresting the persons fingered by a hooded informer, and executing them outright (although the last part is not included in the modern refinement). The initial reaction of the people inside the compound was to resist the invasion with a burst of gunfire. No one was hurt as presumably the purpose was merely to warn the intruders and deter them from entering. Unfortunately, the soldiers returned fire and a bloody shoot-out ensued, resulting in a number of casualties. The besieged compound surrendered the following morning, and sixteen male occupants were arrested, later to be fingerprinted, paraffin-tested and photographed over their objection. The military also inventoried and confiscated nine M16 rifles, one M14 rifle, nine rifle grenades, and several rounds of ammunition found in the premises. PETITIONERS CONTENTION: This is a petition for prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction and restraining order. Their purpose was to recover the articles seized from them, to prevent these from being used as evidence against them, and to challenge their fingerprinting, photographing and paraffin-testing as violative of their right against selfincrimination. RESPONDENTS CONTENTION:
While admitting the absence of the required such warrant, sought to justify their act on the ground that they were acting under superior orders. There was also the suggestion that the measure was necessary because of the aggravation of the peace and order problem generated by the assassination of Mayor Cesar Climaco. ISSUE: Whether or not the acts of the respondents were lawful. HELD: NO. (Non-observance of the constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizures- Bill of Rights) In acting as they did, respondents defied the precept that "civilian authority is at all times supreme over the military" so clearly proclaimed in the 1973 Constitution. In the instant case, the respondents simply by-passed the civil courts, which had the authority to determine whether or not there was probable cause to search the petitioner's premises. Instead, they proceeded to make the raid without a search warrant on their own unauthorized determination of the petitioner's guilt. The respondents cannot even plead the urgency of the raid because it was in fact not urgent. They knew where the petitioners were. They had every opportunity to get a search warrant before making the raid. If they were worried that the weapons inside the compound would be spirited away, they could have surrounded the premises in the meantime, as a preventive measure. There was absolutely no reason at all why they should disregard the orderly processes required by the Constitution and instead insist on arbitrarily forcing their way into the petitioner's premises with all the menace of a military invasion. When the respondents could have easily obtained a search warrant from any of the TEN civil courts then open and functioning in Zamboanga City, they instead simply barged into the beleaguered premises on the verbal order of their superior officers. One cannot just force his way into any man's house on the illegal orders of a superior, however lofty his rank. Indeed, even the humblest hovel is protected from official intrusion because of [Type text]
the ancient rule, revered in all free regimes, that a man's house is his castle. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may enter; the rain may enter. But the King of England may not enter. All the forces of the Crown dare not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement. It follows that as the search of the petitioners' premises was violative of the Constitution, all the firearms and ammunition taken from the raided compound are inadmissible in evidence in any of the proceedings against the petitioners. These articles are "fruits of the poisonous tree. As Judge Learned Hand observed, "Only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong, will the wrong be repressed. Pending determination of the legality of such articles, however, they shall remain in custodia legis, subject to such appropriate disposition as the corresponding courts may decide. The objection to the photographing, fingerprinting and paraffin-testing of the petitioners deserves slight comment. The prohibition against self-incrimination applies to testimonial compulsion only. Also, the record does not disclose that the petitioners were wanted criminals or fugitives from justice. At the time of the "zona," they were merely suspected of the mayor's slaying and had not in fact even been investigated for it. As mere suspects, they were presumed innocent and not guilty as summarily pronounced by the military. Indeed, even if were assumed for the sake of argument that they were guilty, they would not have been any less entitled to the protection of the Constitution, which covers both the innocent and the guilty. LIM V EXECUTIVE SECRETARY GR No. 151445, April 11, 2002 En Banc
FACTS: This case involves a petition for certiorari and prohibition as well as a petition-in-intervention, praying that respondents be restrained from proceeding with the so-called "Balikatan 02-1" and that after due notice and hearing, that judgment be rendered issuing a permanent writ of injunction and/or prohibition against the deployment of U.S. troops in Basilan and Mindanao for being illegal and in violation of the Constitution. Beginning January of this year 2002, personnel from the armed forces of the United States of America started arriving in Mindanao to take part, in conjunction with the Philippine military, in "Balikatan 02-1." These so-called "Balikatan" exercises are the largest combined training operations involving Filipino and American troops. In theory, they are a simulation of joint military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty, a bilateral defense agreement entered into by the Philippines and the United States in 1951. The entry of American troops into Philippine soil is proximately rooted in the international anti-terrorism campaign declared by President George W. Bush in reaction to the tragic events that occurred on September 11, 2001. PETITIONERS CONTENTION: On February 1, 2002, petitioners Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition, attacking the constitutionality of the joint exercise. They were joined subsequently by SANLAKAS and PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA, both party-Iist organizations, who filed a petition-inintervention on February 11, 2002. Lim and Ersando filed suit in their capacities as citizens, lawyers and [Type text]
taxpayers. SANLAKAS and PARTIDO, on the other hand certain members of their organization are residents of Zamboanga and Sulu, and hence will be directly affected by the operations being conducted in Mindanao. On February 71 2002 the Senate conducted a hearing on the "Balikatan" exercise wherein VicePresident Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr., who is concurrently Secretary of Foreign RESPONDENTS CONTENTION: The Terms of Reference are clear as to the extent and duration of "Balikatan 02-1," The issues raised by petitioners are premature, as they are based only on a fear of future violation of the Terms of Reference. Even petitioners' resort to a special civil action for certiorari is assailed on the ground that the writ may only issue on the basis of established facts. There is actually no question of constitutionality involved. The true object of the instant suit, it is said, is to obtain an interpretation of the V FA. The Solicitor General asks that we accord due deference to the executive determination that "Balikatan 02-1" is covered by the VFA, considering the President's monopoly in the field of foreign relations and her role as commander-in-chief of the Philippine armed forces. ISSUE: Whether "Balikatan 02-1" is covered by the Visiting Forces Agreement. RULING: Yes. it appeared farfetched that the ambiguity surrounding the meaning of the word .'activities" arose from accident. In our
view, it was deliberately made that way to give both parties a certain leeway in negotiation. In this manner, visiting US forces may sojourn in Philippine territory for purposes other than military. As conceived, the joint exercises may include training on new techniques of patrol and surveillance to protect the nation's marine resources, sea search-and-rescue operations to assist vessels in distress, disaster relief operations, civic action projects such as the building of school houses, medical and humanitarian missions, and the like. Under these auspices, the VFA gives legitimacy to the current Balikatan exercises. It is only logical to assume that .'Balikatan 02-1," a "mutual anti- terrorism advising, assisting and training exercise," falls under the umbrella of sanctioned or allowable activities in the context of the agreement. Both the history and intent of the Mutual Defense Treaty and the V FA support the conclusion that combat-related activities -as opposed to combat itself -such as the one subject of the instant petition, are indeed authorized. Petition dismissed. CALALANG v. WILLIAMS G.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940 Laurel, J. FACTS: Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila, brought before this court this petition for a writ of prohibition against the respondents, A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, et.al. It is alleged in the petition that the National Traffic Commission(NTC), in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarias Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., from a period of one year [Type text]
from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic; On August 10, 1940, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, in his second indorsement addressed to the Director of Public Works, approved the recommendation of the latter that Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila enforced and caused to be enforced this rules and regulations. As a consequence of such enforcement, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above-mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well. ISSUE: Whether or not Commonwealth Act No. 548, which authorizes the Director of Public Works to promulgate rules and regulations for the regulation and control of the use of and traffic on national roads and streets is unconstitutional because it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. HELD: NO. The true distinction therefore is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made. Discretion may be committed by the Legislature to an executive department or official. The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments or subordinate officials thereof, to whom it has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact. The growing tendency in the decisions is to give prominence to the necessity of the case. Commonwealth Act No. 548 do not confer legislative power upon the Director of Public Works and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. The authority therein conferred upon them and under which they
promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said Act. The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when and how long a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative function which cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly. Said Act, by virtue of which the rules and regulations complained of were promulgated, aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads, in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, therefore, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of traffic. which is, to say the least, a menace to public safety. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind through education and personal [Type text]
discipline, so that there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness for all. The moment greater authority is conferred upon the government, logically so much is withdrawn from the residuum of liberty which resides in the people. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its preservation. The scope of police power keeps expanding as civilization advances. In People vs. Pomar (46 Phil., 440), it was observed that advancing civilization is bringing within the police power of the state today things which were not thought of as being within such power yesterday. The development of civilization, the rapidly increasing population, the growth of public opinion, with an increasing desire on the part of the masses and of the government to look after and care for the interests of the individuals of the state, have brought within the police power many questions for regulation which formerly were not so considered. The petitioner finally avers that the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people. The promotion of social justice, however, is to be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy towards any given group. Social justice is neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy, but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or
extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex. Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about the greatest good to the greatest number. DR. PERLA A. POSTIGO et. al vs PHILIPPINE TUBERCULOSIS SOCIETY, INC. G.R. No. 155146, January 24, 2006 FACTS: Petitioners Dr. Perla A. Postigo, et al., were regular employees of the respondent PTSI. They retired on various dates from 1996 to 1998. Upon retirement from service, some of the petitioners who were compulsory members of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) obtained retirement benefits from the GSIS. At the time the petitioners retired, Article 287 of the Labor Code had been amended by RA. 7641. 4 Rep. Act No. 7641 granted retirement pay to qualified employees in the private sector, in the absence of any retirement plan or agreement with the company. As the respondent did not have a retirement plan for its employees, aside from its contribution to the GSIS, petitioners claimed from the respondent their retirement benefits under Rep. Act No. 7641. The respondent denied their claims on the ground that the accommodation extended by the GSIS to the petitioners removed them from the coverage of the law. Petitioners then sought the opinion of the DOLE which confirmed their entitlement. PTSI, despite this, still denied their claims.
Petitioners the filed a complaint before the Labor Ariter, which declared then to be entitled to retirement benefits under RA 7641, except for Dr Tan who was awrded her terminal leave pay. PTSi appealed to the NLRC but instead of posting the reuired bond, it filed a Motion to Reduce Bond on the ground that the LAs computation was erroneous. The NLRC dismissed the appeal for failure to file bond. The CA reversed the dismissal and directed the NLRC to act on PTSIs motion to reduce bond. Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in ordering the NLRC to act on the motion. PETITIONERS CONTENTION: Posting of the bond is indispensable to perfect employers appeal RESPONDENTS CONTENTION: In case the monetary awa is disputed, an appeal may still be filed without appeal bond provided that a motion to reduce bond is filed within the reglementary period. HELD: The CA was correct. Respondent deferred the posting of the surety bond in view of the alleged erroneous computation by the Labor Arbiter of the monetary award. While the Labor Arbiter awarded P5,480,484.25 as retirement benefits, only P5,072,277.73, 14 according to the respondents computation was due and owing to the petitioners. Since the motion raised a pure mathematical error, the same may be resolved without going into the merits of the case. The special circumstances in this case, upon which the motion to reduce the bond was predicated, justify the relaxation of the appeal bond requirement. However, considering that the claim for retirement benefits was made sometime in 1999 to support the petitioners during the twilight years of their lives, there is no doubt that a remand of the case to the NLRC will only unduly delay the determination of their entitlement to such benefits. Moreover, since the case calls for the resolution of a question of law, we consider it more appropriate to
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resolve the appeal at this juncture, rather than remand the case to the NLRC. ISSUE: Are the petitioners entitled to benefits under RA 7641? PETITIONERS CONTENTION: Despite their compulsory membership in the GSIS, they are still covered by RA 7641 because 1.) respondent is registered with the SEC as a nn stock non profit corp, hence a private entiry and its employees are in the private sector and 2.) petitioners are not included in the excemption from RA 7641 Respondentscontention: as an employer in the public sector, it is not covered by RA 7641 which applies only to eployees in the private sector. It relies on Sec 3, Rule I of the Amended Rules Implementing Titlte II, Book IV of the Labor Code to wit: SEC. 3. Employer(a) The term shall mean any person natural or juridical, domestic or foreign, who carries on in the Philippines any trade, business, industry, undertaking or activity of any kind and uses the services of another person who is under his orders as regards the employment. (b) An employer shall belong to either: (1) The public sector covered by the GSIS, comprising the National Government, including governmentowned or controlled corporations, the Philippine Tuberculosis Society, the Philippine National Red Cross, and the Philippine Veterans Bank; or (2) The private sector covered by the SSS, comprising all employers other than those defined in the immediately preceding paragraph. HELD: Yes, they are entitled.Respondents reliance on the afore-quoted rules is unfounded. The definition of a public sector employer as quoted above is relevant only for purposes of [Type text]
coverage under the Employees Compensation and State Insurance Fund. Instead, it is the implementing rules of Title II, Book VI of the Labor Code, which provides for the coverage and exemptions of retirement benefits. Thus: SECTION 1. General Statement on Coverage. This Rule shall apply to all employees in the private sector, regardless of their position, designation or status and irrespective of the method by which their wages are paid, except to those specifically exempted under Section 2 hereof. As used herein, the term Act shall refer to Republic Act No. 7641 which took effect on January 7, 1993. SEC. 2. Exemption. This Rule shall not apply to the following employees: 2.1 Employees of the National Government and its political subdivisions, including Government-owned and/or controlled corporations, if they are covered by the Civil Service Law and its regulations. Having determined the applicable implementing rules, we now proceed to resolve whether the respondent is a private corporation or a public corporation; and consequently, whether the petitioners are employees in the private sector or in the public sector. The respondent was incorporated on March 11, 1960 as a non-profit, benevolent and non-stock corporation under the Corporation Code. Having been created under the general corporation law instead of a special charter, we hold that the respondent is a private and not a governmental corporation. More so, Section 2(1), Article IX(B) of the 1987 Constitution provides: SECTION 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.
Extant on the records is the respondents admission that although its employees are compulsory members of the GSIS, said employees are not governed by the Civil Service Law. If the respondent is truly a government-owned or controlled corporation, and petitioners are employees in the public sector, then, they should have been covered by said law. Even assuming that by virtue of their compulsory inclusion in the GSIS, the petitioners became employees in the public sector, they are still entitled to the benefits of Rep. Act No. 7641 since they are not covered by the Civil Service Law and its regulations. In Juco v. NLRC, we clarified that employees of government-owned and controlled corporations with special charters are covered under the Civil Service. On the other hand, employees of government-owned and controlled corporations under the Corporation Code are governed by the provisions of the Labor Code. The Philippine Tuberculosis Society, Inc. (PTSI) belongs to the latter category and, therefore, covered by Rep. Act No. 7641 which is an amendment to the Labor Code. The accommodation under Rep. Act No. 1820 extending GSIS coverage to PTSI employees did not take away from petitioners the beneficial coverage afforded by Rep. Act No. 7641. Hence, the retirement pay payable under Article 287 of the Labor Code as amended by Rep. Act No. 7641 should be considered apart from the retirement benefit claimable by the petitioners under the social security law or, as in this case, the GSIS law. PT&T VS. NLRC AND GRACE DE GUZMAN G.R. NO. 118978, MAY 23, 1997 Regalado, J.: DOCTRINE: Petitioner's policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any woman worker who contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the right against, discrimination, afforded all women workers by our labor laws and by no less than the Constitution. [Type text]
FACTS: Grace de Guzman was initially hired by petitioner as a reliever, specifically as a "Supernumerary Project Worker." Under the Reliever Agreement, her employment was to be immediately terminated upon expiration of the agreed period. Grace was once more asked to join petitioner company as a probationary employee. In the job application form that was furnished her to be filled up for the purpose, she indicated in the portion for civil status therein that she was single although she had contracted marriage a few months earlier. It appeared that Grace had made the same representation in the two successive reliever agreements. When petitioner supposedly learned about the same later, its branch supervisor in Baguio City sent to her a memorandum requiring her to explain the discrepancy. In that memorandum, she was reminded about the company's policy of not accepting married women for employment. In her reply, Grace stated that she was not aware of PT&T's policy regarding married women at the time, and that all along she had not deliberately hidden her true civil status. Petitioner nonetheless remained unconvinced by her explanations. She was dismissed from the company which she readily contested by initiating a complaint for illegal dismissal, coupled with a claim for non-payment of cost of living allowances (COLA), before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission in Baguio City. At the preliminary conference conducted in connection therewith, Grace volunteered the information that she had failed to remit the amount of P2,380.75 of her collections. She then executed a promissory note for that amount in favor of petitioner . All of these took place in a formal proceeding and with the agreement of the parties and/or their counsel. The Labor Arbiter declared that Grace, who had already gained the status of a regular employee, was illegally dismissed by
petitioner. Her reinstatement, plus payment of the corresponding back wages and COLA, was correspondingly ordered, the labor arbiter being of the firmly expressed view that the ground relied upon by petitioner in dismissing private respondent was clearly insufficient, and that it was apparent that she had been discriminated against on account of her having contracted marriage in violation of company rules. The NLRC upheld the labor arbiter and ruled that Grace had indeed been the subject of an unjust and unlawful discrimination by her employer, PT&T. However, the decision of the labor arbiter was modified with the qualification that she deserved to be suspended for three months in view of the dishonest nature of her acts which should not be condoned. ISSUES: Was Grace De Guzman discriminated against when she was dismissed? Yes. Were there proper grounds for her dismissal? None. HELD: Petitioner's policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any woman worker who contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the right against, discrimination, afforded all women workers by our labor laws and by no less than the Constitution. Contrary to petitioner's assertion that it dismissed private respondent from employment on account of her dishonesty, the record discloses clearly that her ties with the company were dissolved principally because of the company's policy that married women are not qualified for employment in PT & T, and not merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty. Private respondent's act of concealing the true nature of her status from PT & T could not be properly characterized as willful or in bad faith as she was moved to act the way she did mainly because she wanted to retain a permanent job in a stable company. In other words, she was practically forced by that very same illegal company policy into [Type text]
misrepresenting her civil status for fear of being disqualified from work. The decision of the SC contained several principles which were numbered from 1-5. These are as follows: 1. Decreed in the Bible itself is the universal norm that women should be regarded with love and respect but, through the ages, men have responded to that injunction with indifference, on the hubristic conceit that women constitute the inferior sex. Nowhere has that prejudice against womankind been so pervasive as in the field of labor, especially on the matter of equal employment opportunities and standards. In the Philippine setting, women have traditionally been considered as falling within the vulnerable groups or types of workers who must be safeguarded with preventive and remedial social legislation against discriminatory and exploitative practices in hiring, training, benefits, promotion and retention. The Constitution, cognizant of the disparity in rights between men and women in almost all phases of social and political life, provides a gamut of protective provisions. a. Section 14, Article II on the Declaration of Principles and State Policies (recognizes the role of women in nation-building and commands the State to ensure, at all times, the fundamental equality before the law of women and men. b. Section 3 of Article XIII (requires the State to afford full protection to labor and to promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all, including an assurance of entitlement to tenurial security of all workers) c. Section 14 of Article XIII (mandates that the State shall protect working women through provisions for opportunities that would enable them to reach their full potential)
2. Corrective labor and social laws on gender inequality have emerged with more frequency in the years since the Labor Code was enacted on May 1, 1974 as PD No. 442, largely due to our country's commitment as a signatory to the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). Principal among these laws are: a. RA 6727 (prohibits discrimination against women with respect to terms and conditions of employment, promotion, and training opportunities) b. RA 6955 (bans the "mail-orderbride" practice for a fee and the export of female labor to countries that cannot guarantee protection to the rights of women workers) c. RA 7192 (also known as the "Women in Development and Nation Building Actaffords women equal opportunities with men to act and to enter into contracts, and for appointment, admission, training, graduation, and commissioning in all military or similar schools of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police) d. RA 7322 (increasing the maternity benefits granted to women in the private sector) e. RA 7877 (outlaws and punishes sexual harassment in the workplace and in the education and training environment) f. RA 8042 ("Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 prescribes as a matter of policy, inter alia, the deployment of migrant workers, with emphasis on women, only in countries where their rights are secure. g. Family Code (women's rights in the field of civil law have been greatly enhanced and expanded) h. In the Labor Code, provisions governing the rights of women workers are found in Articles 130 to 138 thereof. Article 130 involves the right against particular kinds of night work while Article 132 ensures the right of women to be provided with [Type text]
facilities and standards which the Secretary of Labor may establish to ensure their health and safety. For purposes of labor and social legislation, a woman working in a nightclub, cocktail lounge, massage clinic, bar or other similar establishments shall be considered as an employee under Article 138. Article 135, on the other hand, recognizes a woman's right against discrimination with respect to terms and conditions of employment on account simply of sex. Finally, and this brings us to the issue at hand, Article 136 explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by reason of the marriage of a female employee. 3. Acknowledged as paramount in the due process scheme is the constitutional guarantee of protection to labor and security of tenure. Thus, an employer is required, as a condition sine qua non prior to severance of the employment ties of an individual under his employ, to convincingly establish, through substantial evidence, the existence of a valid and just cause in dispensing with the services of such employee, one's labor being regarded as constitutionally protected property. On the other hand, it is recognized that regulation of manpower by the company falls within the so-called management prerogatives, which prescriptions encompass the matter of hiring, supervision of workers, work assignments, working methods and assignments, as well as regulations on the transfer of employees, lay-off of workers, and the discipline, dismissal, and recall of employees. 19 As put in a case, an employer is free to regulate, according to his discretion and best business judgment, all aspects of employment, "from hiring to firing," except in cases of unlawful discrimination or those which may be provided by law. 20 4. The government abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature of that adopted by petitioner PT&T. The Labor Code state as follows:
Art. 136. Stipulation against marriage. It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of marriage. 5. Petitioner's policy is not only in derogation of the provisions of Article 136 of the Labor Code on the right of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in connection with her employment, but it likewise assaults good morals and public policy, tending as it does to deprive a woman of the freedom to choose her status, a privilege that by all accounts inheres in the individual as an intangible and inalienable right. In the final reckoning, the danger of just such a policy against marriage followed by petitioner PT & T is that it strikes at the very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution and, ultimately, of the family as the foundation of the nation. That it must be effectively interdicted here in all its indirect, disguised or dissembled forms as discriminatory conduct derogatory of the laws of the land is not only in order but imperatively required. OPOSA VS. FACTORAN G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993 FACTS: The petitioners, all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents, filed a petition to cancel all existing timber license agreements (TLAs) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. This case is filed not only on the appellants right as taxpayers, but they are also suing in behalf [Type text]
of succeeding generations based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility in so far as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Together with the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), the petitioners presented scientific evidence that deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies. One of these is the reduction of the earths capacity to process carbon dioxide, otherwise known as the greenhouse effect. Continued issuance by the defendant of TLAs to cut and deforest the remaining forest stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to the plaintiffs. Appellants have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendants office regarding the plea to cancel the said TLAs. The defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel existing TLAs. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing on the said case 2. Admitting that all facts presented are true, whether or not the court can render a valid judgment in accordance to the prayer of the complaints 3. Whether or not the TLAs may be revoked despite the respondents standing that these cancellation of these TLAs are against the non-impairment clause of the Constitution HELD: 1. The petitioners have locus standi (legal standing) on the case as a taxpayers (class) suit. The subject matter of complaint is of common and general interest to all the citizens of the Philippines. The court found difficulty in ruling that the appellants can, for themselves, and for others file a class suit. 2. The right of the petitioners to a balanced and healthful ecology has been clearly stated. A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the
same gives rise to a cause of action. The granting of the TLAs, as the petitioners claim to be done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology hence, the full protection thereof requires that no TLAs should be renewed or granted. The appellants have also submitted a document with the sub-header CAUSE OF ACTION which is adequate enough to show, prima facie, the violation of their rights. On this basis, these actions must therefore be granted, wholly or partially. 3. Despite the Constitutions nonimpairment clause, TLAs are not contracts, rather licenses; thus, the said clause cannot be invoked. Even if these are protected by the said clause, these can be revoked if the public interest so required as stated in Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705). Furthermore, Section 16 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that: The State shall protect the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the government. The said right is also clear as the DENRs duty under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under Executive Order No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and advance the said right. Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded. It is not a contract, property or property right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution. VILLAR VS. TIP G.R. NO. L-69198 APRIL 17, 1985 Fernando, C.J.: (note: no petitioners nor respondents contention- short facts ang case) DOCTRINE: The academic freedom enjoyed by institutions of higher learning includes the right to set academic standards to determine under what circumstances failing grades would suffice for the expulsion of the [Type text]
students. Once it has done so, however, that standard should be followed meticulously. It cannot be utilized to discriminate against those students who exercise their constitutional rights to peaceable assembly and free speech. FACTS: Petitioners invoke their right to freedom of expression against the respondents, in their refusal to admit the said petitioners at the Technological Institute of the Philippines. However, reference was made to some of the petitioners' school records. Petitioners Rufino Salcon Jr., Romeo Guilatco, Venecio Villar, Inocencio Recitis had failed in one or two of their subjectsin 1983-1985. However, petitioner Noverto Baretto had five failing grades in the first semester in the first school year, six failing grades in the second semester of 1984-1985. Petitioner Edgardo de Leon Jr. had three failing grades, one passing grade and one subject dropped in the first semester of school year 1984-1985. Petitioner Regloben Laxamana had five failing grade with no passing grade in the first semester of 1984-1985 school year. Petitioners Barreto, de Leon Jr. and Laxamana could be denied enrollment in view of such failing grades. ISSUE: Whether or not the exercise of the freedom of assembly on the part of certain students of respondent Technological Institute of the Philippines could be a basis for their being barred from enrolment. HELD: In the aforementioned Malabanan v. Ramento decision, this Court held: "As is quite clear from the opinion in Reyes v. Bagatsing, the invocation of the right to freedom of peaceable assembly carries with it the implication that the right to free speech has likewise been disregarded. Both are embraced in the concept of freedom of expression, which is Identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully, any
matter of public interest without censorship or punishment and which 'is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing ... of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent." 11 An equally relevant excerpt from the opinion therein follows: "Petitioners invoke their rights to peaceable assembly and free speech, they are entitled to do so. They enjoy like the rest of the citizens the freedom to express their views and communicate their thoughts to those disposed to listen in gatherings such as was held in this case. They do not, to borrow from the opinion of Justice Fortas in Tinker v. Des Moines Community School District, 'shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.'" Petitioners, therefore, have a valid cause for complaint if the exercise of the constitutional rights to free speech and peaceable assembly was visited by their expulsion from respondent College. What cannot be stressed too sufficiently is that among the most important social, economic, and cultural rights is the right to education not only in the elementary and high school grades but also on the college level. The constitutional provision as to the State maintaining "a system of free public elementary education and, in areas where finances permit, establish and maintain a system of free public education" up to the high school level does not per se exclude the exercise of that right in colleges and universities. It is only at the most a reflection of the lack of sufficient funds for such a duty to be obligatory in the case of students in the colleges and universities. As far as the right itself is concerned, not the effectiveness of the exercise of such right because of the lack of funds, Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides: "Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit." It is quite clear that while the right to college education is [Type text]
included in the social economic, and cultural rights, it is equally manifest that the obligation imposed on the State is not categorical, the phrase used being "generally available" and higher education, while being "equally accessible to all should be on the basis of merit." To that extent, therefore, there is justification for excluding three of the aforementioned petitioners because of their marked academic deficiency.The academic freedom enjoyed by "institutions of higher learning" includes the right to set academic standards to determine under what circumstances failing grades suffice for the expulsion of students. Once it has done so, however, that standard should be followed meticulously. It cannot be utilized to discriminate against those students who exercise their constitutional rights to peaceable assembly and free speech. If it does so, then there is a legitimate grievance by the students thus prejudiced, their right to the equal protection clause being disregarded. SORIAO v. PINEDA CA-G.R. SP No. 31546 August 10, 1994
FACTS: Louie Soriao was a high school student in the sub province of Dinalungan, Aurora ( S.Y. 1993 to 1994). Due to his reputation of talking back to school authority during the past years, he was refused readmission to complete his fourth and final year of high school through a verbal notice not to readmit. Soriao questioned the notice, averring that he was deprived of a hearing on the matter and thus the verbal notice was a denial of his right to due process. The administration ignored the students plea to reconsider its decision to deny him readmission claiming, it was their prerogative. Seeking further remedies to no avail, Soriao filed a petition for certiorari to the CA.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was denied his right to education. RULING: YES. The Court of Appeals invoked the 1987 Constitution and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article 14 Sections 1 and 2 of the 1987 and Article II Secs. 13 and 17 Constitution provide: Section 1. The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education at all levels, and shall take appropriate steps to make such education accessible to all. Section 2. The State shall: (1) Establish, maintain, and support a complete, adequate, and integrated system of education relevant to the needs of the people and society; (2) Establish and maintain, a system of free public education in the elementary and high school levels. Without limiting the natural rights of parents to rear their children, elementary education is compulsory for all children of school age; (3) Establish and maintain a system of scholarship grants, student loan programs, subsidies, and other incentives which shall be available to deserving students in both public and private schools, especially to the under-privileged; (4) Encourage non-formal, informal, and indigenous learning systems, as well as selflearning, independent, and out-of-school study programs particularly those that respond to community needs; and (5) Provide adult citizens, the disabled, and out-of-school youth with training in civics, vocational efficiency, and other skills. Section 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral, [Type text]
spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being . It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs. Section 17. The State shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts, culture, and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote total human liberation and development. Also since it is the Constitution which granted petitioner the right of education, he may only be deprived of such right with due process of law as stated in Art. III, Sec. 1 of the 1987 Constitution. Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC. vs. HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON as Secretary of Labor and Employment, and TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration SARMIENTO, J.: FACTS: Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI,), challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS,". Specifically, the measure is assailed for "discrimination against males or females;" that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills;" and that it is violative of the right to travel. It is held likewise to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and not executive, in character. PASEI invokes Section 3, of Article XIII, of the Constitution, providing for worker
participation "in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law." Department Order No. 1, it is contended, was passed in the absence of prior consultations. It is claimed, finally, to be in violation of the Charter's non-impairment clause, in addition to the "great and irreparable injury" that PASEI members face should the Order be further enforced. In submitting the validity of the challenged "guidelines," the Solicitor General invokes the police power of the Philippine State. It is admitted that Department Order No. 1 is in the nature of a police power measure. ISSUE: whether or not Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS, is valid under the Constitution. HELD: The concept of police power is wellestablished in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its allcomprehensive embrace. It is inborn in the very fact of statehood and sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of government that has enabled it to perform the most vital functions of governance. Marshall, to whom the expression has been credited, refers to it succinctly as the plenary power of the State "to govern its citizens." "The police power of the State ... is a power coextensive with self- protection, and it is not inaptly termed the "law of overwhelming necessity." It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things [Type text]
hurtful to the comfort, welfare of society."
safety,
and
It constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights. Significantly, the Bill of Rights itself does not purport to be an absolute guaranty of individual rights and liberties "Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act according to one's will." t is subject to the far more overriding demands and requirements of the greater number. Notwithstanding its extensive sweep, police power is not without its own limitations . For all its awesome consequences , it may not be exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. As a general rule, official acts enjoy a presumed validity. In the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, the presumption logically stands. The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified. There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law" under the Constitution does not import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class. The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female workers rests on substantial distinctions.Discrimination in this case is justified. As we have furthermore indicated, executive determinations are generally final on the Court. Under a republican regime, it is the executive branch that enforces policy. For their part, the courts decide, in the proper cases, whether that policy, or the manner by
which it is implemented, agrees with the Constitution or the laws, but it is not for them to question its wisdom. As a co-equal body, the judiciary has great respect for determinations of the Chief Executive or his subalterns, especially when the legislature itself has specifically given them enough room on how the law should be effectively enforced. In the case at bar, there is no gainsaying the fact, and the Court will deal with this at greater length shortly, that Department Order No. 1 implements the rule-making powers granted by the Labor Code. But what should be noted is the fact that in spite of such a fiction of finality, the Court is on its own persuaded that prevailing conditions indeed call for a deployment ban. The Order does not narrowly apply to existing conditions. Rather, it is intended to apply indefinitely so long as those conditions exist. What the Constitution prohibits is the singling out of a select person or group of persons within an existing class, to the prejudice of such a person or group or resulting in an unfair advantage to another person or group of persons (Fernando says: "Where the classification is based on such distinctions that make a real difference as infancy, sex, and stage of civilization of minority groups, the better rule, it would seem, is to recognize its validity only if the young, the women, and the cultural minorities are singled out for favorable treatment. There would be an element of unreasonableness if on the contrary their status that calls for the law ministering to their needs is made the basis of discriminatory legislation against them. If such be the case, it would be difficult to refute the assertion of denial of equal protection." In the case at bar, the assailed Order clearly accords protection to certain women workers, and not the contrary.) The consequence the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right. The right to travel is subject, among other things, to the requirements of "public safety," "as may be provided by law." Department Order No. 1 is a valid implementation of the Labor Code, in [Type text]
particular, its basic policy to "afford protection to labor," pursuant to the Department of Labor's rule-making authority vested in it by the Labor Code. Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power. It is true that police power is the domain of the legislature, but it does not mean that such an authority may not be lawfully delegated. As we have mentioned, the Labor Code itself vests the Department of Labor and Employment with rulemaking powers in the enforcement whereof. The petitioners's reliance on the Constitutional guaranty of worker participation "in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits" is not well-taken. The right granted by this provision, again, must submit to the demands and necessities of the State's power of regulation. The Constitution declares that: Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all. 30 "Protection to labor" does not signify the promotion of employment alone. What concerns the Constitution more paramountly is that such an employment be above all, decent, just, and humane. The non-impairment clause of the Constitution, invoked by the petitioner, must yield to the loftier purposes targetted by the Government. Freedom of contract and enterprise, like all other freedoms, is not free from restrictions, more so in this jurisdiction, where laissez faire has never been fully accepted as a controlling economic way of life. ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE COCONUT DESICCATORS, v. PHILIPPINE COCONUT AUTHORITY G.R. No. 110526 February 10, 1998
Mendoza, J.: DOCTRINE: Self-reliant and independent economic order. Although the Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it nevertheless reserves to the Government the power to interfere whenever necessary for the promotion of the genral welfare , as reflected in Sec,6 and, Art XII. BRIEF FACTS: Petitioner Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators (hereafter referred to as APCD) brought this suit for certiorari and mandamus against respondent Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) to: invalidate the latter's Board Resolution No. 018-93 (POLICY DECLARATION DEREGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW COCONUT PROCESSING PLANTS) (SEE ***) and the certificates of registration issued under it. By virtue of the resolution it issued, the PCA declared that it will no longer require those wishing to engage in coconut processing to apply to it for a LICENSE or permit as a condition for engaging in such business: As a result, PCA was issuing certificates of registration indiscriminately to new coconut millers. PETITIONERS CONTENTION: The resolution in question is beyond the power of the PCA to adopt, and to compel said administrative agency to comply instead with the mandatory provisions of statutes regulating the desiccated coconut industry, in particular, and the coconut industry, in general by removing the power to grant license and instead simply monitor the volumes of production and administration quality standards. By virtue of that resolution, it in effect PCA had authorized the establishment and operation of new plants in areas which were already crowded and that the PCA has [Type text]
abdicated its power to protect industry by removing its power to determine qualified operators of plants and thus would resurrect the evils of cut-throat competition underselling and smuggling of poor quality products and ultimately in the decline of the export performance of coconut-based commodities. Petitioner also raises the issues and contends that the resolution is null and void for being an undue exercise of legislative power; it is without any nasis and is arbitrary and unreasonable; and in passing the resolution, it violated procedural due process as consultation is required. RESPONDENTS CONTENTION: PCA alleges that this petition should be denied on the ground that petitioner has a pending appeal before the Office of the President. Respondent accuses petitioner of forum-shopping in filing this petition and of failing to exhaust available administrative remedies before coming to this Court. Respondent anchors its argument on the general rule that one who brings an action under Rule 65 must show that one has no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The PCA contends that it did have the power to remove from its authority the granting of license as viewed from previous measures adopted in the 1982 and 1987 by virtue of the orders of the President and considering the measures on existing market demands. The PCA contends that In the first "whereas" clause of the questioned resolution as set out above, the PCA invokes a policy of free enterprise that is "unhampered by protective regulations and unnecessary bureaucratic red tape" as justification for abolishing the licensing system. Trimming down of PCA's function to registration is not an abdication of the power to regulate but is regulation itself. ISSUE:
1. Does requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies before a party may seek judicial review be applied in this case? NO. 2. Can the PCA can renounce the power to regulate implicit in the law creating the PCA.NO IT CANNOT. RULING: The court cannot renounce its power to regulate implicit in the law creating it. I. The rule of requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies before a party may seek judicial reviewhas obviously no application here. The resolution in question was issued by the PCA in the exercise of its rule-making or legislative power. However, only judicial review of decisions of administrative agencies made in the exercise of their quasi-judicial function is subject to the exhaustion doctrine. The exhaustion doctrine stands as a bar to an action which is not yet complete 4 and it is clear, in the case at bar, that after its promulgation the resolution of the PCA abandoning regulation of the desiccated coconut industry became effective. II. The Philippine Coconut Authority was originally created by P.D. 232 on June 30, 1973, to take over the powers and functions of the Coconut Coordinating Council, the Philippine Coconut Administration and the Philippine Coconut Research Institute. On June 11, 1978, by P.D. No. 1468, it was made "an independent public corporation . . . directly reporting to, and supervised by, the President of the Philippines," and charged with carrying out the State's policy "to promote the rapid integrated development and growth of the coconut and other palm oil industry in all its aspects and to ensure that the coconut farmers become direct participants in, and beneficiaries of, such [Type text]
development and growth." 10 through a regulatory scheme set up by law. By repudiating its role in the regulatory scheme, the PCA has put at risk other statutory provisions, particularly those of P.D. No. 1644, to wit: Sec. 1. The Philippine Coconut Authority shall have full power and authority to regulate the marketing and export of copra, coconut oil and their by-products, in furtherance of the steps being taken to rationalize the coconut oil milling industry. PCA claims that trimming down of PCA's function to registration is not an abdication of the power to regulate but is regulation itself. But how can this be done when, under Resolution No. 018-93, the PCA no longer requires a license as condition for the establishment or operation of a plant? If a number of processing firms go to areas which are already congested, the PCA cannot stop them from doing so. If there is overproduction, the PCA cannot order a cut back in their production. This is because the licensing system is the mechanism for regulation. Without it the PCA will not be able to regulate coconut plants or mills. In the first "whereas" clause of the questioned resolution as set out above, the PCA invokes a policy of free enterprise that is "unhampered by protective regulations and unnecessary bureaucratic red tape" as justification for abolishing the licensing system. There can be no quarrel with the elimination of "unnecessary red tape." That is within the power of the PCA to do and indeed it should eliminate red tape. Its success in doing so will be applauded. But free enterprise does not call for removal of "protective regulations."
Our Constitutions, beginning with the 1935 document, have repudiated laissez-faire as an economic principle. 18 Although the present Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it nonetheless reserves to the government the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare. This is clear from the following provisions of Art. XII of the Constitution which, so far as pertinent, state: Sec. 6. . . . Individuals and private groups, including corporations, cooperatives, and similar collective organizations, shall have the right to own, establish, and operate economic enterprises, subject to the duty of the State to promote distributive justice and to intervene when the common good so demands. Sec. 19. The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public interest so requires. No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed. (Emphasis added). At all events, any change in policy must be made by the legislative department of the government. The regulatory system has been set up by law. It is beyond the power of an administrative agency to dismantle it. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. PCA Resolution No. 018-93 and all certificates of registration issued under it are hereby declared NULL and VOID for having been issued in excess of the power of the Philippine Coconut Authority to adopt or issue. ***RESOLUTION IN QUESTION:
RESOLUTION NO. 018-93 POLICY DECLARATION DEREGULATINGTHE ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW COCONUT PROCESSING PLANTS WHEREAS, it is the policy of the State to promote free enterprise unhampered by protective regulations and unnecessary bureaucratic red tapes; WHEREAS, the deregulation of certain sectors of the coconut industry, such as marketing of coconut oils pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1960, the lifting of export and commodity clearances under Executive Order No. 1016, and relaxation of regulated capacity for the desiccated coconut sector pursuant to Presidential Memorandum of February 11, 1988, has become a centerpiece of the present dispensation; WHEREAS, the issuance of permits or licenses prior to business operation is a form of regulation which is not provided in the charter of nor included among the powers of the PCA; WHEREAS, the Governing Board of PCA has determined to follow and further support the deregulation policy and effort of the government to promote free enterprise; NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, that, henceforth, PCA shall no longer require any coconut oil mill, coconut oil refinery, coconut desiccator, coconut product processor/factory, coconut fiber plant or any similar coconut processing plant to apply with PCA and the latter shall no longer issue any form of license or permit as condition prior to establishment or operation of such mills or plants; RESOLVED, FURTHER, that the PCA shall limit itself only to simply registering the
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aforementioned for the purpose of production, standards with fees/charges.
coconut product processors of monitoring their volumes administration of quality the corresponding service
centralize all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law. Petitioners filed a petition to annul the PAGCOR Charter. The petition was DISMISSED for lack of merit. PETITIONERS CONTENTION: The creation of PAGCOR is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order, and because A. It constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. It waived the Manila City government's right to impose taxes and license fees, which is recognized by law; B. For the same reason stated in the immediately preceding paragraph, the law has intruded into the local government's right to impose local taxes and license fees. This, in contravention of the constitutionally enshrined principle of local autonomy; C. It violates the equal protection clause of the constitution in that it legalizes PAGCOR conducted gambling, while most other forms of gambling are outlawed, together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices; D. It violates the avowed trend of the Cory government away from monopolistic and crony economy, and toward free enterprise and privatization. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not P.D. 1869 is contrary to morals, public policy and order. 2. Whether or not P.D. 1869 is violative of the principle of local autonomy because it constitutes a waiver of the
ADOPTED this 24th day of March 1993, at Quezon City.
ATTORNEYS HUMBERTO BASCO, EDILBERTO BALCE, SOCRATES MARANAN AND LORENZO SANCHEZ v. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENTS AND GAMING CORPORATION G.R. No. 91649 May 14, 1991 DOCTRINE: Gambling in all its forms, unless allowed by law, is generally prohibited. But the prohibition of gambling does not mean that the Government cannot regulate it in the exercise of its police power. FACTS: The Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was created by virtue of P.D. 1067-A dated January 1, 1977 and was granted a franchise under P.D. 1067-B also dated January 1, 1977 "to establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos on land or water within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines." Its operation was originally conducted in the well known floating casino "Philippine Tourist." The operation was considered a success for it proved to be a potential source of revenue to fund infrastructure and socio-economic projects, thus, P.D. 1399 was passed on June 2, 1978 for PAGCOR to fully attain this objective. Subsequently, on July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was created under P.D. 1869 to enable the Government to regulate and [Type text]
right of the City of Manila to impose taxes and legal fees. RULING: 1. P.D. 1869 was enacted pursuant to the policy of the government to "regulate and centralize thru an appropriate institution all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law" (1st whereas clause, PD 1869). As was subsequently proved, regulating and centralizing gambling operations in one corporate entity the PAGCOR, was beneficial not just to the Government but to society in general. It is a reliable source of much needed revenue for the cash strapped Government. It provided funds for social impact projects and subjected gambling to "close scrutiny, regulation, supervision and control of the Government" (4th Whereas Clause, PD 1869). With the creation of PAGCOR and the direct intervention of the Government, the evil practices and corruptions that go with gambling will be minimized if not totally eradicated. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of PD 1896. 2. The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes. The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be stressed that "municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress" (Unson v. Lacson, G.R. No. 7909, January 18, 1957) which has the power to "create and abolish municipal corporations" due to its "general legislative powers" (Asuncion v. Yriantes, 28 Phil. 67; Merdanillo v. Orandia, 5 SCRA 541). Congress, therefore, has the power of control over Local governments (Hebron v. Reyes, G.R. No. 9124, July 2, 1950). And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the power. [Type text]
Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government. PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation with an original charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National Government. PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to regulate gambling casinos. The latter role is governmental, which places it in the category of an agency or instrumentality of the Government. Being an instrumentality of the Government, PAGCOR should be and actually is exempt from local taxes. Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere Local government. Pamatong vs. Commission on Elections GR 161872, 13 April 2004 Facts: Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy for President on 17 December 2003. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) refused to give due course to Pamatongs Certificate of Candidacy in its Resolution 6558 dated 17 January 2004. The decision, however, was not unanimous since Commissioners Luzviminda G. Tancangco and Mehol K. Sadain voted to include Pamatong as they believed he had parties or movements to back up his candidacy. On 15 January 2004, Pamatong moved for reconsideration of Resolution 6558. The COMELEC, acting on Pamatongs Motion for Reconsideration (SPP [MP] 04-001) and on similar motions filed by other aspirants for national elective positions, denied the same under the aegis of Omnibus Resolution 6604 dated 11 February 2004. The COMELEC declared Pamatong and 35 others nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a national constituency. Commissioner Sadain maintained his vote for Pamatong. By then, Commissioner Tancangco had retired.
Pamatong filed the Petition For Writ of Certiorari, seeking to reverse the resolutions which were allegedly rendered in violation of his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. In so doing, Pamatong argues that the COMELEC indirectly amended the constitutional provisions on the electoral process and limited the power of the sovereign people to choose their leaders. The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has numerous national organizations under his leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in other countries, and he has a platform of government. Pamatong likewise attacks the validity of the form for the Certificate of Candidacy prepared by the COMELEC. Pamatong claims that the form does not provide clear and reasonable guidelines for determining the qualifications of candidates since it does not ask for the candidates bio-data and his program of government. Issue: Whether there is a constitutional right to run for or hold public office and, particularly, to seek the presidency. Held: There is no constitutional right to run for or hold public office and, particularly, to seek the presidency. What is recognized is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. Section 26, Article II of the Constitution neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort. The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of [Type text]
Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts. An inquiry into the intent of the framers5 produces the same determination that the provision is not selfexecutory. The original wording of the present Section 26, Article II had read, "The State shall broaden opportunities to public office and prohibit public dynasties." Commissioner (now Chief Justice) Hilario Davide, Jr. successfully brought forth an amendment that changed the word "broaden" to the phrase "ensure equal access," and the substitution of the word "office" to "service." The provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would accommodate as many people as possible into public office. The approval of the "Davide amendment" indicates the design of the framers to cast the provision as simply enunciatory of a desired policy objective and not reflective of the imposition of a clear State burden. Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means and reach are not properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be entirely open-ended. Words and phrases such as "equal access," "opportunities," and "public service" are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of the framers to inflict on the people an operative but amorphous foundation from which innately unenforceable rights may be sourced. The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on the
privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates" and COMELEC Resolution 645210 dated 10 December 2002 outlining the instances wherein the COMELEC may motu proprio refuse to give due course to or cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. Herein, there is no showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create. VALENTIN L. LEGASPI vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION G.R. No. L-72119 May 29, 1987 DOCTRINE: Public office being a public trust, [Const. Art. XI, Sec. 1] it is the legitimate concern of citizens to ensure that government positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by persons who are eligibles. Public officers are at all times accountable to the people even as to their eligibilities for their respective positions. FACTS: The fundamental right of the people to information on matters of public concern is invoked in this special civil action for mandamus instituted by petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi against the Civil Service Commission. The respondent had earlier denied Legaspi's request for information on the civil service eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. These government employees, Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, had allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligibles who passed the civil service examinations for sanitarians. Claiming that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, is guaranteed by the Constitution, and that he has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to acquire the information, petitioner prays for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of mandamus to [Type text]
compel the respondent Commission to disclose said information. Respondents Contention: He challenges the petitioner's standing to sue upon the ground that the latter does not possess any clear legal right to be informed of the civil service eligibilities of the government employees concerned. He calls attention to the alleged failure of the petitioner to show his actual interest in securing this particular information. He further argues that there is no ministerial duty on the part of the Commission to furnish the petitioner with the information he seeks. ISSUE: 1.Whether petitioner has actual interest in the case. 2. What constitutes public interest. 3. Is the information being sought in the case at bar considered as public interest. RULING: 1.) Yes. But what is clear upon the face of the Petition is that the petitioner has firmly anchored his case upon the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, which, by its very nature, is a public right. It has been held that: * * * when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws * * * (Tanada et. al. vs. Tuvera, et. al., G.R. No. L-
63915, April 24, SCRA 27, 36).
1985,
136
From the foregoing, it becomes apparent that when a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general "public" which possesses the right. 2.) The incorporation in the Constitution of a guarantee of access to information of public concern is a recognition of the essentiality of the free flow of ideas and information in a democracy. In the same way that free discussion enables members of society to cope with the exigencies of their access to information of general interest aids the people in democratic decision-making (87 Harvard Law Review 1505 [1974]) by giving them a better perspective of the vital issues confronting the nation. But the constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is not absolute. It does not open every door to any and all information. Under the Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc., are "subject to limitations as may be provided by law" (Art. III, Sec. 7, second sentence). The law may therefore exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny, such as those affecting national security. It follows that, in every case, the availability of access to a particular public record must be circumscribed by the nature of the information sought, i.e., (a) being of public concern or one that involves public interest, and, (b) not being exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee. The threshold question is, therefore, whether or not the information sought is of public interest or public concern. a. This question is first addressed to the government agency having custody of the desired information. However, as already discussed, this does not give the agency concerned any discretion to grant or deny access. In case of denial of access, the government agency has the burden of [Type text]
showing that the information requested is not of public concern, or, if it is of public concern, that the same has been exempted by law from the operation of the guarantee. To hold otherwise will serve to dilute the constitutional right. As aptly observed, ". . . the government is in an advantageous position to marshall and interpret arguments against release . . ." (87 Harvard Law Review 1511 [1974]). To safeguard the constitutional right, every denial of access by the government agency concerned is subject to review by the courts, and in the proper case, access may be compelled by a writ of Mandamus. In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which can be applied. "Public concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine in a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public. The information sought by the petitioner in this case is the truth of the claim of certain government employees that they are civil service eligibles for the positions to which they were appointed. The Constitution expressly declares as a State policy that: Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit and fitness to be determined, as far as practicable, and except as to positions which are policy determining, primarily confidential or highly technical, by competitive examination. (Art. IX, B, Sec. 2.[2]). Public office being a public trust, [Const. Art. XI, Sec. 1] it is the legitimate concern of
citizens to ensure that government positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by persons who are eligibles. Public officers are at all times accountable to the people even as to their eligibilities for their respective positions. But then, it is not enough that the information sought is of public interest. For mandamus to lie in a given case, the information must not be among the species exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee. In the instant, case while refusing to confirm or deny the claims of eligibility, the respondent has failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service Law which would limit the petitioner's right to know who are, and who are not, civil service eligibles. We take judicial notice of the fact that the names of those who pass the civil service examinations, as in bar examinations and licensure examinations for various professions, are released to the public. Hence, there is nothing secret about one's civil service eligibility, if actually possessed. Petitioner's request is, therefore, neither unusual nor unreasonable. And when, as in this case, the government employees concerned claim to be civil service eligibles, the public, through any citizen, has a right to verify their professed eligibilities from the Civil Service Commission. The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern, and in the absence of express limitations under the law upon access to the register of civil service eligibles for said position, the duty of the respondent Commission to confirm or deny the civil service eligibility of any person occupying the position becomes imperative. Mandamus, therefore lies. MA. CARMEN G. AQUINO-SARMIENTO vs. MANUEL L. MORATO (in his capacity as Chairman of the MTRCB) and the MOVIE & TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD [Type text]
G.R. No. 92541 November 13, 1991 Bidin, J.: DOCTRINE: The decisions of the Board and the individual voting slips accomplished by the members concerned are acts made pursuant to their official functions, and as such, are neither personal nor private in nature but rather public in character. They are, therefore, public records access to which is guaranteed to the citizenry by no less than the fundamental law of the land. Being a public right, the exercise thereof cannot be made contingent on the discretion, nay, whim and caprice, of the agency charged with the custody of the official records sought to be examined. FACTS: In February 1989, petitioner, herself a member of respondent Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB), wrote its records officer requesting that she be allowed to examine the board's records pertaining to the voting slips accomplished by the individual board members after a review of the movies and television productions. It is on the basis of said slips that films are either banned, cut or classified accordingly. Acting on the said request, the records officer informed petitioner that she has to secure prior clearance from respondent Manuel Morato, as chairman of MTRCB, to gain access to the records sought to be examined. RESPONDENTS CONTENTION: Petitioner's request was eventually denied by respondent Morato on the ground that whenever the members of the board sit in judgment over a film, their decisions as reflected in the individual voting slips partake the nature of conscience votes and as such, are purely and completely private and personal. It is the submission of respondents that the individual voting slips is the exclusive property of the member concerned and anybody who wants access thereto must first secure his (the member's) consent, otherwise, a request therefor may be legally denied.
PETITIONERS CONTENTION: Petitioner argues, on the other hand, that the records she wishes to examine are public in character and other than providing for reasonable conditions regulating the manner and hours of examination, respondents Morato and the classification board have no authority to deny any citizen seeking examination of the board's records. Respondent Morato called an executive meeting of the MTRCB to discuss, among others, the issue raised by petitioner. In said meeting, seventeen (17) members of the board voted to declare their individual voting records as classified documents which rendered the same inaccessible to the public without clearance from the chairman. Thereafter, respondent Morato denied petitioner's request to examine the voting slips. ISSUE: Whether the respondents refusal to allow petitioner to examine the records of respondent MTRCB, pertaining to the decisions of the review committee as well as the individual voting slips of its members, is violative of petitioner's constitutional right of access to public records. HELD: YES, it is violative of petitioners right of access to public records. Sec. 7, Art. III of the Constitution provides that: The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions,as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. As We held in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, this constitutional provision is self-executory and supplies "the rules by means of which the right to information may be enjoyed by guaranteeing the right and mandating the duty to afford access to [Type text]
sources of information. Hence, the fundamental right therein recognized may be asserted by the people upon the ratification of the constitution without need for any ancillary act of the Legislature. What may be provided for by the Legislature are reasonable conditions and limitations upon the access to be afforded which must, of necessity, be consistent with the declared State Policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest (Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 28)." Respondents contend, however, that what is rendered by the members of the board in reviewing films and reflected in their individual voting slip is their individual vote of conscience on the motion picture or television program and as such, makes the individual voting slip purely private and personal; an exclusive property of the member concerned. The term private has been defined as "belonging to or concerning, an individual person, company, or interest"; whereas, public means "pertaining to, or belonging to, or affecting a nation, state, or community at large". May the decisions of respondent Board and the individual members concerned, arrived at in an official capacity, be considered private? Certainly not. As may be gleaned from the decree (PD 1986) creating the respondent classification board, there is no doubt that its very existence is public is character; it is an office created to serve public interest. It being the case , respondents can lay no valid claim to privacy. The right to privacy belongs to the individual acting in his private capacity and not to a governmental agency or officers tasked with, and acting in, the discharge of public duties. There can be no invasion of privacy in the case at bar since what is sought to be divulged is a product of action undertaken in the course of performing official functions. To declare otherwise would be to clothe every public official with an impregnable mantle of protection against public scrutiny for their official acts. Further, the decisions of the Board and the individual voting slips accomplished by the
members concerned are acts made pursuant to their official functions, and as such, are neither personal nor private in nature but rather public in character. They are, therefore, public records access to which is guaranteed to the citizenry by no less than the fundamental law of the land. Being a public right, the exercise thereof cannot be made contingent on the discretion, nay, whim and caprice, of the agency charged with the custody of the official records sought to be examined. The constitutional recognition of the citizen's right of access to official records cannot be made dependent upon the consent of the members of the board concerned, otherwise, the said right would be rendered nugatory. As stated by this Court in Subido v. Ozaeta (80 Phil. 383 [1948]): Except, perhaps when it is clear that the purpose of the examinations is unlawful, or sheer, idle curiosity, we do not believe it is the duty under the law of registration officers to concern themselves with the motives, reasons, and objects of the person seeking access to the records. It is not their prerogative to see that the information which the records contain is not flaunted before public gaze, or that scandal is not made of it. If it be wrong to publish the contents of the records, it is the legislature and not the officials having custody thereof which is called upon to devise a remedy. It is significant to point out that this Court in the 1948 case of Subido v. Ozaeta , supra, upheld the right to information based on the statutory right then provided in Sec. 56 of the Land Registration Act (Act 496, as amended). Consequently, We see no cogent reason why said right, now constitutionalized, should be given less efficacy and primacy than what the fundament law mandates. The Court is not unaware of RA 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees) which provides, among others, certain exceptions as regards [Type text]
the availability of official records or documents to the requesting public, e.g., closed door Cabinet sessions and deliberations of this Court. Suffice it to state, however, that the exceptions therein enumerated find no application in the case at bar. Petitioner request is not concerned with the deliberations of respondent Board but with its documents or records made after a decision or order has been rendered. Neither will the examination involve disclosure of trade secrets or matters pertaining to national security which would otherwise limit the right of access to official records.

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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW Case Digests

Part VI (Principles & State Policies) Page 26 of 50

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW Case Digests

Part VI (Principles & State Policies) Page 27 of 50

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW Case Digests

Part VI (Principles & State Policies) Page 28 of 50

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW Case Digests

Part VI (Principles & State Policies) Page 29 of 50

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW Case Digests

Part VI (Principles & State Policies) Page 30 of 50

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW Case Digests

Part VI (Principles & State Policies) Page 31 of 50

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW Case Digests

POLI DIGEST - Principles & State Policies

POLI DIGEST - Principles & State Policies