Studying Religion: Possibilities and Limitations of Different Definitions

FREDERICK J. STRENG A special problem facing the study of religion today is that because of the use of different definitions and measuring techniques, the conclusions of one study often are unrelated to other conclusions. This situation prevents the present impirical study of religion from being an intelligible field of inquiry that can integrate known information and provide insights for developing new areas of exploration. In this paper we want first to discuss some general questions about the nature of empirical study. In the second section we will review four operational definitions of religion to see their usefulness and their limitations. These sections will form the basis for some consideration in the final section about a definition of religion that may be useful in a systematic study of religious life.
OBJECTIVITY AND THE DEFINITION OF RELIGION

Today anyone studying religion "objectively" has access to a century-long

series of scholarly attempts to define and analyze religion. This effort has included a continuing reassessment of the nature of "objectivity" and of "religion." Also at present there is a concern to provide more exact symbols and scales of measurement which can be used in a systematic interpretation without distortion of the data. Nevertheless, in the study of religion, as in any study of human expression, we are confronted with the fact that the very questions asked, the implicit or explicit definitions used, and the measuring techniques contribute to the results of an investigation. One of the central problems in developing devices for the empirical study of religion is that any device (e.g., definitions of units and variables) attempts to serve two functions: (1) it exposes factors or properties of human life that contribute to a conclusion of a particular study; and (2) it claims to express truth, i.e., "the way things are." It is often assumed that "the way things are" is reality that stands ex-

FREDERICK J. STRENG (M.A. Southern Methodist University; B.D., Ph.D. University of Chicago) is Associate Professor of the History of Religions at Southern Methodist University. Two recent articles by him related to the topic of this essay are "The Buddhist Doctrine of Two Truths as Religious Philosophy," Journal of Indian Philosophy, I (1971), 262-71, and "The Objective Study of Religion and the Unique Quality of Religiousness," Religious Studies, 6 (1970), 209-19. He is author of EmptinessA Study in Religious Meaning and Understanding Religious Man; and senior editor of a forthcoming book of introductory readings in religion entitled Ways of Being Religious: Readings for a New Approach to Religion.

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220 ternal to any single person. "Facts" are purported to be units of knowledge not conditioned by subjective interests; and "objective truth," then, is thought to be exposed when a number of people (and in principle any number) arrive at the same conclusions derived from repeating a given procedure that uses accepted descriptive concepts. Nevertheless, a considerable amount of frustration is experienced when different methods (using different definitions of religion, and having different goals of investigation) are used to arrive at conclusions that appear to be unrelated. Some attempts at the alleviation of this frustration include reducing the scope of study to only certain descriptive and statistical categories that appear to be universal without regard to the uniqueness of particular data. A very hazardous methodological implication of this kind of empirical approach is that "the way things are" is reality external to the investigator which is only partially seen by various subjective perspectives. One of the central concerns of this paper is to call into question the notion of objectivity as observation of something totally external to the investigator. To do so will suggest to some readers that the study of religion then cannot be an intellectual field of study. I will argue, however, that the data of religion can be related to each other without assuming that a single set of descriptive terms must pertain to all data. The intention of this argument is not to reject empirical, inductive procedures in studying religion, but to set forth some consequences of redefining objectivity. In place of the single-

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external-object notion of "objectivity," we will use the term objectivity to indicate (1) a self-consciousness in the researcher of the limitations and possibilities inherent in particular definitions, and (2) an emphasis on the particularity of a given religious datum which can be realized most clearly in comparison with other data having common characteristics. In this context of study the worst sin is reductionism, the naive superimposition of an investigator's concepts and assumptions. As important as the goal is to relate a wide variety of data in a comprehensive system, we suggest that any system which reduces religion to something else in order to explain it is inadequate. To emphasize the difference in the data themselves is, of course, one of the major difficulties in arguing that the study of religion constitutes a coherent field of study. We must always be open to the possibility that the differences between identifiable characteristics of the data might indicate that the scope of study which one proposes is either too big or too small as a workable field of inquiry. Nevertheless, this paper contains the assumption that religion as a field of inquiry is not only a useful field of study, but also that unless one considers the religious life of man as a unified study, certain important questions about man's selfconsciousness cannot be asked. In the comments below there is also the assumption that religious thought and action are a vital aspect of human experience today which should not be relegated to either a mode of "primitive," or to merely fanciful, experience. The problem of defining just what

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data are important as "religion" is com- other kind of religious effort, such as plicated by working inductively and the Hindu spiritual discipline of the then allowing the variety and differ- yogi. The differences within a single ences of data to remain. There are at religious tradition are indicated by the least two indications in presently example of Sufi (mystical) movement known religious data that suggest that within the Muslim tradition. This the study of religion requires a broadly movement is based on Qur'anic interconceived working definition of re- pretations, meditative practices, and an ligion. (1) Data from the history and appeal to an inner awareness of truth phenomenology of religion indicate different from those found in the that there are variant definitions of Sunni expression that was so often conthe most profound expressions of re- nected with Muslim political control. ligious life in different historical tra- All of the above differences go beyond ditions, and also within any religious the recognition that there are divertradition. (2) Social science studies gent notions of God, or different social of religion and reflections of philoso- structures. phers of culture indicate that while Likewise, the second element that the traditional institutional forms of re- contemporary investigator must take ligion are important, these forms are into account increases the quantity not the only cultural expressions that and kind of data that he must allow in function religiously. his definition of religion. In recognizRegarding the data from the history ing that there are non-traditional forms and phenomenology of religion it is that function religiously, the empirical clear that a definition of religious life student of religion is attempting to which is simply that most familiar to deal significantly with the "secularizathe investigator personally is inade- tion" process that has developed in quate as an interpretive device for ana- Europe and America, especially in the lyzing many of the religious forms fields of education and social relations. found in cultures other than his own. The process of secularization represents For instance, to try to interpret all re- an important shift in the authority for ligious life with the imagery most some people's norms and valuesa prominent in Protestant Christianity shift from primary dependence on a (e.g., personal faith, or the revelation divine revelation guarded and exof God in one person or one people) pressed by a clearly defined social inmisses some of the most important stitution to a dependence on multiple aspects of the religious dynamics in sources of truth. Today people all such instances as the Hindu's effort to over the world can either go to one of fulfill his dharma or the Zen effort to the institutionalized religious tradistill the mind (even among Japanese tions, or they can acquire a religious warriors). Likewise, the identifying perspective a la carte. A person can characteristic of one religious phenome- interpret his own nature, his norms non, such as partaking the sacraments and values through a development of for salvation in Christianity, may be his capacity to use reason, his aesthetic the least important characteristic in an- sense, empirical observation, and po-

222 litical responsibility. To analyze such capacities, and institutions that cultivate such capacities, in terms of their religious function requires defining religion in such a way that it is not limited to some of the prominent characteristics of traditional forms of religion, e.g., the acceptance of a single transcendent and eternal being or norm. One of the major problems in composing a definition to fit this situation is to select concepts (interpretive categories) that keep the focus on the religious function of the phenomena rather than on the social, psychological, political, or economic functions. It is such a scope of data that we must keep in mind when we attempt to define the object of religious studies. This is especially true in light of the effort to integrate many kinds of study into a single field of inquiry. We must continually ask: What is the relation of one study, e.g., implications of racial biases for religious authority, to another, e.g., the point of the Buddhist philosopher Nagarjuna's statement that "all things are empty"? A science relates particular studies to larger theoretical schemes of interpretation. Thus, ideally, particular studies build a more detailed and comprehensive framework, which in turn helps to interpret strange data. At the same time, new data should be able to influence the concepts and procedures of the general scheme. New data are discovered both by using accepted techniques of discovery in unexamined areas and by raising new questions regarding well-known material. This suggests the close relation between the concepts and purposes of an investigation, on the one

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hand, and the data "discovered," on the other. We might best describe the process of discovery by saying that the data are allowed to appear through the medium of particular concepts and concerns (foci) in the questions asked. To take differences seriously, of course, makes an integration into a single framework more difficult, and suggests the value of having an open-ended definition of religion in order to have an intelligible field of inquiry. At present the differences in purposes of inquiry seem to have split the field into two groups (as is also the case in several of the other social sciences): (1) studies that describe and analyze data, in which the most universal categories are "structures" or "patterns" of human experience. Often in these studies there is a focus on noncontemporary and pre-historical materials, which cannot be tested in repeated examinations. (2) A second type of study is an examination of elements that lead to predictions and measurable hypotheses. These studies depend on contemporary data amenable to statistical examination. If we assume, as suggested above, that we need not restrict ourselves to an absolutistic view of objectivity, we can recognize that both these kinds of inquiries may be useful; and our concern then is not to judge between them, but to devise interpretive categories and procedures that allow integration of different kinds of studies. There are at least two reasons why students of religion should be selfconscious of how their definitions of religion in micro-studies relate to a more general interpretation of religion. One is that the conclusions of their

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223 votee conventionally would not regard as religious, e.g., "the American Way of Life." The third definition gives the investigator the final authority, and considers religion in terms of a universal function of religion that interprets religious life as part of a more basic condition or situation, e.g., to meet human psychological needs in moment of crisis, or to provide limitations on social relations through a system of morals. Such functional definitions are never (to my knowledge) regarded by the devotee as the most important element in his religious consciousness. The fourth definition also allows the investigator to define universal religiousness on a comparative basis, but the universal categories must comply with the devotee's intention of the forms, which from the devotee's perspective expresses a (transcendent, ultimate) dimension that cannot be reduced to other models of interpretation. This leads to a concern with the religious function of data.
COMMON DEFINITIONS USED IN EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF RELIGION

study will be most useful to other scholars if it can be correlated with other studies from different cultural contexts and different historical periods. The second is the strong possibility that a wider context of meaning will make for greater breadth of comprehension and for a wider scope of relevance in interpreting any set of findings. We should ask how the operational definitions now used in particular studies can be understood and modified to form a model for cross-cultural studies without superimposing the assumptions found in the content of one cultural expression on another cultural or historical expression. In order to focus on the problem of devising operational definitions of religion which can be used in relation to a general, cross-cultural study of religion we will look at some methodological consequences of four operational definitions of religion. These four are selected in part because they focus on the issues of (1) who finally determines the definition of religiousness, the religious devotee or the investigator, and (2) the importance of focusing on either the form (e.g., a specific historical institution, belief, or practice) or on the function of religion. The first definition allows the devotee in a given culture to designate the nature of religiousness and identifies religion with a specific form, e.g., conformity with specific doctrine, an act of prayer, the institutional Christian church. The second definition implicitly asumes religion to be equated with a particular form, e.g., rituals and processions, but allows the investigator to extend the object of his religious investigation to cultural data that a de-

1. The first kind of definition, stressing a particular cultural form and the devotee's account of it, is provided by those institutions commonly recognized in a culture. This does not mean necessarily that an investigator takes a theological position about the nature of religious institutions, but that he accepts the common usage of the term religion. Thus, American and European sociologists often identify a particular creedal formulation of membership in a particular social organization as a measurable expression

224 of a person's religiousness. It has also been useful as a way of distinguishing different kinds of social responses to personal religious commitment. This is seen in such representative works as Max Weber's The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, or his The Religion of India, in Gerhard Lenski's The Religious Factor, or Charles dock's Christian Beliefs and AntiSemitism. Prof. Glock clearly expressed his view in a summary statement of a conference on "Measuring the Religious Variable" in Dallas when he said: "I don't really think that it is possible to defineto develop a measure ofreligion and call it religion independently of what the institutions of society have defined."1 This concern to begin with the historically conditioned form of religion is likewise agreeable to historians of religion. Nevertheless, they also stress that to understand any given historical form of religion an investigator must deal with the prior forms and influences which may be hidden underneath the immediately apprehendable outward cultural forms. Likewise, a number of cultural anthropologists have shown the advantage of diachronic studies of a given institution in that where there is a specific form having a number of constants there can be a careful specification of conditions under which different variables are operative. The value of beginning an empirical study with a description of a concrete religious form stands without question. We must ask ourselves, however, about the methodological consequences of

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using this descriptive definition as a normative definition of religion or as a universal model for cross-cultural studies. The first problemallowing a descriptive definition to funaion as a normative definition of religion is exemplified, I believe, in G. Lenski's study The Religious Factor. In his conclusions he defines religion as "a system of beliefs about the nature of the force(s) ultimately shaping man's destiny, and the practices associated therewith, shared by the members of a group."2 This is consistent with his study throughout the book, which shows different shapes of politics, economics, and family life among different social groups of Americans whose prime difference is seen in terms of personal commitment to a system of beliefs. In this study, Lenski assumed that the belief system, a subjective commitment to traditional official formulations, is the clearest expression of religiousness. From a historical perspective there may be some justification in that religion for many Europeans and Americans has focused strongly on the voluntary form of religion whose expression centers in belief systems and community-identity patterns. However, one is forced to ask himself if there are not more important value systems developing now that have a structure of religiousness other than a commitment to an official belief-system, e.g., those suggested by T. Luckmann in his The Invisible Religion (which will be discussed below), or such forms as development of sen-

1 April 6, 1968, Southern Methodist University. 'The Religious Factor (Garden Gty: Doubleday and Co., 1961), pp. 298-99.

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225 for interpreting one of the most important religious processes, the way of wisdom (jndna-marga), it is not surprising to read that "the aim of [the 'intellectual soteriologies'] was to achieve a state of ecstatic Godly possession through orgiastic means, in contrast to everyday life, in which God was not felt as a living power."3 This is explained by the fact that "Asiatic religion could not supply the presuppositions of inner-worldly asceticism."4 Without getting into the issues involved in his inadequate consideration of the Puranic and Tantric materials, we must ask whether on methodological grounds Weber is justified in finding the basis of his interpretation of spiritual (mystical) insight in a notion about the nature of the world. While we would not deny that philosophical notions serve as points of intellectual orientation for meditationas seen in the philosophical assertions made in the sutras of the orthodox darsanas the conceptual formula itself is more on the periphery than at the center of the spiritual release that is the goal of meditation, according to the practitioners. 2. The second operational definition in the empirical study of religion results from broadening a notion of an institutionally defined religious form to include other sociological and psychological patterns identified with this historical form. This approach is found in the well-known studies of W. Lloyd Warner, American Life: Dream

sitivity to body-feeling and sensuous enjoyment, or technological capacities of changing man and his environment through scientific discoveries is electronic communication and genetics. Here we are not calling into question the correlations that Lenski found between belief-systems and political, economic, and social expressions; rather we suggest that these correlations may not be as significant for exposing the forms of religious influence on "secular institutions" in America as he holds. Another problem arises when one historical-cultural expression is taken as a norm of religiosity, and data from another cultural expression is analyzed in terms of the definitive form. This problem has appeared in many cross-cultural studies during the past century. With an emphasis on voluntary membership and the necessity for conceptual formulation of beliefs in the West for several centuries, western scholars often had difficulty in investigating the religious life of nonNorth Atlantic cultures in terms other than belief-systems and organizational structures. This difficulty is seen, for instance, in Max Weber's The Religion of India, where he sought to describe objectively the religious life of India. Weber's categories of understanding reveal his framework in which the India data had relevance: Part I, The Hindu Social System, Part II, Orthodox and Heterodox Holy Teaching of the Indian Intellectuals, and Part III, The Asiatic Seas and the Redemption Religions. With such a point of reference

'The Religion of India, H. Gerth and D. Martindale, trans., (Glencoe: Free Press, 1958), p. 337. 'Ibid.

226 and Reality, and of Will Herberg, Protestant - Catholic - Jew. In these studies a traditional notion of religion is expanded to include social forms which are usually not regarded as religious, but which function as religious expressions in forming social relationships, e.g., American Memorial Day ceremonies function as an ancestral rite, serve to express the ideals of selfsacrifice and accountability to God, and provide the occasion to show reverence collectively and publicly for the country. Here, as in the first definition, the culturally accepted notion of religion (e.g., rituals, beliefs, processions) is the prime definition of which data is to be included within the category of religious. However, unlike the focus in the former group, here there is the effort to show how social expressions which are not regarded as (fully) religious by religious institutions in a culture do, as a matter of fact, function as religious expressions in a culture. When Warner described Memorial Day as "an American sacred ceremony," he took the forms of "myth" and "sacred rites" as basic definitions of what is religious in the life of man, and found these religious forms in the American scene also outside the commonly recognized religious institutions. A typical expression of this orientation is his claim that "Christmas and Thanksgiving, Memorial Day and the Fourth of July, are days in our ceremonial calendar which allow Americans to express common sentiments

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about themselves and share their feelings with others on set days pre-established by the society for this very purpose."5 The American sacred symbol system, he continues, "functions periodically to unify the whole community, with its conflicting symbols and its opposing, autonomous churches and associations."6 Also, such a political figure as Abraham Lincoln could in these termsbe regarded as a religious symbol in which Americans could realize themselves vicariously. Lincoln's symbolic characteristics include norms from realms that are traditionally considered both sacred and secular: (1) he was a common man a positive mark within a norm of equalitarianism; (2) he was a superior man in having risen from a low estate by his own efforta mark of selfsufficiency; and (3) he sacrificed himself for mankind, and thereby followed in the footsteps of Jesus Christ. American cultural norms and holidays, then, are considered religious because they are seen to function in the same way as the traditional religious forms of American society. Similarly Will Herberg argues that "the American Way of Life" is a fundamental religious power in America because it is a faith, or set of convictions, that functions like the faiths of Protestantism, Catholicism, and Judaism. Herberg begins by pointing to surveys which show members of organized religions claiming that orthodox doctrines are irrelevant in business and political life. He says:

W. Lloyd Warner, American Life: Dream and Reality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 7. Another essay of interest here is Robert Bellah, "Civil Religion in America," Daedalus, 96, No. 1 (Winter, 1967), pp. 1-22. 'Ibid., p. 8.

STUDYING RELIGION The fact more than half the people openly admit that their religious beliefs have no effect on their ideas of politics and business would seem to indicate very strongly that, over and above conventional religion, there is to be found among Americans some sort of faith or belief or set of convictions, not generally designated as religion but definitely operative as such in their lives in the sense of providing them with some fundamental context of normativity and meaning.7

227 forces outside the traditional religious organizations found there. I suggest that it would be fruitful, however, to try other models of traditional religious forms to see if their structures may illumine some of the dynamics not compatible with the traditional Christian concern with creedal statements and voluntary membership in a community of believers. For instance, if we looked at the model of the Hindu dharma, with its emphasis on deepgoing social patterns and processes while allowing for a variety of beliefsystems, we might see some aspects of the American Way of Life that are hidden when we make use of the model of "faith" and association with others through agreement with creedal formulations. One example is the cultural parochialism found among m a n y American universities which appeals to a juxtaposition of Greek and Germanic ideals without recognizing the fact of an untested assumption of the ancient tribal seers as the final authority; likewise, it is difficult to understand the persistent racism in the United States without recognizing an implicit appeal to a natural hierarchy of social levels. To use non-western models of religiousness may also allow us to get some insight into the dynamics of religion which do not require an affirmation of monotheisma religious form rarely found in America except in official doctrines. Thus, a study of American unofficial polytheism could be made by focusing on various cultsfor example, of Venus as expressed in the

What is this faith? Herberg answers:

It is the American Way of Life that supplies American society with an "overarching sense of unity" amid conflict . . . The American Way of Life is, at bottom, a spiritual structure, a structure of ideas and ideals, of aspirations and values, of beliefs and standards; it synthesizes all that commends itself to the American as the right, the good, and the true in actual life.*

Here is an analysis of religion that assumes American religion to be of the same basic structure as the traditional organized religions found in American society; and these are defined predominantly in terms of "a set of convictions" and "faith." The latter term, faith, is used primarily in the sense of an emotional response, an attitude, that is characterized by optimism and determination. The object of the optimism and determination is not as important in the American Way of Life as the feeling or emotional attitude, so that the American can have "faith in faith." Herberg's and Warner's incisive analyses have made important contributions to the understanding of the American religious scene by investigating the religious structures and

'Will Herberg, Protestant-Catholic]ew (Garden Gty: Doubleday and Co., I960), rev. ed., p. 74. Ibid., p. 75.

228 cinema, TV, and popular magazine advertisements,9 or of Moloch to whom the first-born males are sacrificed in the fire of war to preserve American "peace" and "prosperity." Similarly, some of the perplexity by many officials of religious institutions over "secularism" and "the death of God movement" could be eliminated by studies on the religious value of rejecting absolutist claims of an ultimate reality that is an object of man's devotion. There are models for this kind of religious awareness in Hindu yoga, Chinese Taoism, and meditation in Buddhism. Without simply superimposing the historical forms of these eastern religious expressions, the values and patterns of meaning found in them could be illuminating for understanding some expressions of the religious quest in contemporary American life. 3. The third operational definition of religion is in terms of a universal condition of human life. This view of religion emphasizes the functional contribution of religion to social integration or personal conditioning for self-fulfillment. It rejects a particular religious form as defined by devotees as satisfactory for explaining the arising of religion or how religion relates to other human expression. Unlike the extension of historical models that Warner or Herberg used to express social relationships, this definition abstracts social and psychological forces

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in human existence and labels these "religious." Such a definition is basic to the study of such scholars as Thomas Luckmann and E. & Goodenough. Luckmann, in his The Invisible Religion, claims that religion is "the social processes that lead to the formation of Self."10 He continues:
The transcendence of biological nature by human organisms is a fundamentally religious process. We may now continue by saying that socialization, as the concrete process in which such transcendence is achieved, is fundamentally religious. It rests on the universal anthropological condition of religion, individuation of consciousness and conscience in social processes, and is actualized in the internalization of the configuration of meaning underlying a historical social order. We shall call this configuration of meaning a world view.u

For the purposes of sociological definition and analysis Luckmann must differentiate between processes of socialization that are regarded as religious and non-religious in a particular culture. He sees that a world view has a "hierarchy of significance" whereby there is a hierarchical arrangement of meaning in any world view. The highest stratum in this hierarchical arrangement is what is ultimate; it is symbolically formulated as that which transcends everyday life; it is experienced as that which is "different" and "mysterious."12 This domain of symbols is identified by Luckmann as "religious" in any culture. He claims:

'Harvey Cox gives some introductory insights into this phenomenon in his essay "Miss America and the Cult of The Girl," Christianity and Crisis, XXI, No. 14 (August 7, 1961), pp. 143-146. "Thomas Luckmann, The Invisible Religion (New York: Macmillan Co., 1967), p. 49. 11 Ibid., p. 51. "Ibid, p. 58.

STUDYING RELIGION This domain may be appropriately designated as a sacred cosmos. The symbols which represent the reality of the sacred cosmos may be termed religious representations because they perform, in a specific and concentrated way, the broad religious function of the world view as a whole . . . The configuration of religious representations that form a sacred universe is to be defined as a specific historical social form of religion?3

229 man cannot endure ignorance of his nature (which includes a sense of a terrifying part of existence), or his helplessness in face of "the tremendum." When man faces the utterly uncontrollable tremendum directly he loses his power to survive, and therefore weaves a symbolic curtain, called "religion." Goodenough explains:
Man's rituals make the individual participate in the tremendum to a slight extent, at least, and give him a feeling that by these acts he appeases the tremendum or makes it more apt to befriend him. By the rituals he also keeps himself from consciously facing the tremendum's unfathomable depth and power, the actual abyss of the uncontrollable."

With this orientation to the nature of religion, Luckmann suggests that sociologists look for religious forces in modern industrial society under such themes as "self-realization," "mobility," "sexuality," and "familism." E. R. Goodenough, in a similar fashion, defines religion (in Psychology of Religious Experience) as a universal human response to human existence. The common element in all religious manifestations, he writes, is "that of a devotion to something on which the people committed seem to themselves to depend, or in which they hope for security, or in which they actually find it."14 His concern to define religion in terms of human attitudes and emotions, rather than in terms of an historical expression, is made clear when he says that the basic human situation is insecurity, and human beings are conscious both of limited threats which come and go plus the sense of collective threats called "the tremendum."15 This latter feeling is the source of religious expression, for
a

The eastern religious expression of reabsorption into Brahman and the Buddhist attainment of Nirvana, says Goodenough, are based on the same human condition but the reaction is just the opposite. Where religious rituals screen the self from the tremendum, the meditative disciplines solve man's condition of anxiety about his nature by releasing all attachment to individuality, and submitting to the tremendum. Religion, then, is a set of social forms that express the effort to achieve self-adequacy in response to the terror of experiencing the non-self. In both the cases of Luckmann and Goodenough the methodological consequence of defining religion as a condition of man is the possibility of

Ibid, p. 61. " E R. Goodenough, Psychology of Religious Experience (New York: Basic Books, 1965), p. 3. See also his essay, "A Historian of Religion Tries to Define Religion," published posthumously in Zygon, 2, pp. 7-22, where man's insecurity and craving for an explanation and control of the source of terror are regarded as the only universals in the study of religion. a Ibid., p. 5. "Ibid., p. 7.

230 studying a broad scope of data which have a sociological or psychological function within the development of a person as a social-psychological being. Both traditional religious forms and other forms of human experience can be considered as a force in the socialization and personal development of a person. There are, nevertheless, two problems that I see in taking this approach to identifying the nature of religiousness with the kind of socializing process described. The first is the methodological assumption of a separate self and an external absolute reality as the prime conditions of religiousness. Such definitional assumptions do not do justice to the orientations of parts of the Hindu, Buddhist, and Chinese religious traditions. For example, in the meditation activities of Hinduism and Buddhism the intention is not to individualize consciousness nor to become proficient in participating in a socialization process. Rather, the key to religious activity is to get beyond the formation of symbols whether they are understood basically as protection from man's own fears or as techniques for socialization. Also, in the Advaita Vedanta expression of Hinduism, in Buddhism, and the Taoist teachings as expressed in the Tao Te Ching or Chuang Tzu there is the recognition that man has the capacity to fulfill himself without help from divine beingshe is already an expression of ultimate reality. It is actually his "psychological needs" and conventional socialization processes that prevent his realizing the highest (religious) truth. Thus, a method that assumes that the function of religion is exposed through the forms which some

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particular religious devotees regard as barriers to religious achievement has serious limitations. In this regard, empirical students of religion must become self-conscious that the views of man and of society which they use are themselves historically conditioned views. The second problem in describing the nature of religion basically as a process of socialization and personality development is that it reduces that dimension experienced by the devotee as ultimate to something less than ultimate. Even though Luckmann and Goodenough recognize the experience of ultimacy in their definition of religiousness, this ultimacy is understood simply as a projection derived from the devotee's feelings. These social scientists do not take their notion of ultimacy seriously. For a person whose self-identity is being formed by ultimate power (whether this is conceived in traditional theistic or in psychological and sociological symbols) "the ultimate" is indeed symbolized in terms which are personally and culturally available; but the basic characteristic of this ultimate power (according to the affirmations of religious people) is that it always transcends the symbols which express it. From this perspective the social scientist has reduced the ultimate character of religious expression to something else, e.g., psychological or sociological functions. These criticisms are meant only to show the limitations of relying solely on the sociological and psychological function of religious life for dealing with the characteristic of ultimacy (transcendence) in religious expression. It does not mean that studies in

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231 sions rather than in its function within a social science framework. This kind of definition is found in the work of Mircea Eliade, who denies that a definition of religion is adequate if religion is reduced to something other than its own category of value. In such works as Patterns in Comparative Religion and The Sacred and the Profane, Eliade argues that the cultural forms of religions cannot be properly identified and analyzed without a recognition of their unique religious quality. To affirm this quality, he claims, does not require asserting a distinctively different metaphysical reality in comparison to non-religious reality; rather, he assumes that religion exposes a wholly different order of selfconsciousness, which is also a "mode of being" not accessible in conventional awareness. This "mode of being" is a consciousness of reality known in symbolic meaning, which is prior to rational, analytic reflection, and called "the Sacred." The sacredness which Eliade finds manifest in symbols is exemplified, for instance, in his discussion of the sacredness of the sky.19 The sky, while regarded as a "natural" phenomenon by many contemporary westerners, is for a man in a non-literary tribal society not "natural." Worship of the sky is not "nature-worship"; for the sky manifests a transcendence, holy power (as well as other things). The transcendental quality of infinity is revealed to man all at once when he is aware of the

the social sciences are not useful for exposing the sociological and psychological functions where they are important. Nor does it suggest that all social science studies use universal terminology without a concern for particular historical differences in social forms. We should mention two studies of eastern religion as examples of sociological studies by scholars who took great care to deal with the religious institutions in terms of the respective Eastern culture. One is R. N. Bellah, Tokugawa Religion}1 where religion is seen to function as a metaphysical grounding for the central cultural value system, and as the activity which allows people to maintain the integration of personality in the face of death, guilt, and meaninglessness. The second is C. K. Yang, Religion in Chinese Society}6 where religion is regarded as those beliefs, practices, and organizational relationships dependent on the supernatural which function to handle personal crises and provide a means to deal with the economic and social conditions. Thus, while the cultural particularity is carefully exposed, the function of religion is seen predominantly in terms of its importance in social (organizational) relationships. 4. The fourth operational definition of religion, like the third, focuses on the universal character of religion; however, the norm of this character lies in the concrete, historical expres-

"Glencoe: Free Press, 1957; see especially Ch. 3, passim, pp. 82-84, and 179. "Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961; the subtitle reads: A Study of Contemporary Social Functions of Religion and Some of Their Historical Faaors. " E Eliade, Patterns in Comparative Religion, R. Sheed, trans. (London: Sheed and Ward, 1958), Ch. II "The Sky and Sky Gods."

232 sacred in and through the sky. Eliade continues his interpretation by saying:
The symbolism is an immediate notion of the whole consciousness, of the man, that is, who realizes himself as a man, who recognizes his place in the universe; these primeval realizations are bound up so organically with his life that the same symbolism determines both the activity of his subconscious and the noblest expressions of his spiritual life . . . Let me repeat: even before any religious values have been set upon the sky it reveals its transcendence. The sky 'symbolizes' transcendence, power and changelessness simply by being there. It exists because it is high, infinite, immovable, powerful.20

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agricultural and agricultural societies, he claims, "live in a sacralized cosmos" while the existential situation of man in modern society is that he lives "in a desacralized cosmos."22 Most modern men have failed to experience the integrative power of religious symbols through which all the normal human functions are integrated in a complementary fashion. From this point of view the history of religions is "constituted by a great number of hierophanies, by manifestation of sacred realities.
23

The concept of the "sacred," as distinct from the "profane," is basic to Eliade's interpretation of the way in which human thoughts, activities, and social relationships are religious. Religion is the manifestation of "the sacred," which is one of two possible existential situationsthe other being the profane. When man lives at the level of his being known through profound and integrative symbols, he is expressing "a reality that does not belong to our world, in objects that are [however] an integral part of our natural 'profane' world."21 The "profane" is that experienced reality typical of conventional dis-integrative, superficial awareness. When we ask how do we identify this sacred mode of being, Eliade points to the symbolism of non-literate societies for its normative expression. Pre-

In this approach, as in that of Luckmann and Goodenough, there is a universal definition of religion. For Eliade, however, the nature of religiousness is not simply a socialization process, but a process of becoming human at the most profound level of awarenessan entering into a different mode of being: the sacred. This claim is made without a concern for establishing a metaphysical reality "outside" the empirical world, since, as a phenomenologist, Eliade is concerned only with the phenomenanot what might or might not be behind them. The religious phenomena themselves, however, expose an existential reality which Eliade labels "the Sacred mode of being." This expression of becoming human is quite different from the experience of self-identification through social integration and psychological forces, which without the sacred mode of

"IMA, p. 39. " M . Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane, W. R. Trask, trans. (New York: Harcourt Brace and Co., 1959), pp. 11, 14. a Ibid., p. 17. See also M. Eliade, Cosmos and History, W. R. Trask, trans. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959), chapter 4. "Ibid., p. 11.

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SUGGESTIONS FOR AN INTEGRATED METHOD OF INTERPRETATION

being are profane. It is this sort of sacredness, he claims, that must emerge before one can speak of religion. The importance of this interpretation for our discussion here is that it insists on the non-reducible character of religious experience. According to Eliade this character, Sacredness, cannot be reduced in form to that found in one historical religious tradition, nor reduced in function to the meaning dependent solely on sociological, psychological, economic, linguistic or historical significance. On the other hand, a common criticism of this position is that it is simply the superimposition of one investigator's views of the nature of religiousness on all expressions of religion. Forms of religion that do not begin with the world view of non-literate societies are ruled out or, at best, misinterpreted. Indeed, this sacred-versus-profane model of religiousness has considerable difficulty to locate much religious expression in the modern "secular" world outside the remnants found in traditional religious communities, in dreams, and creative art. Likewise it is difficult, if not impossible, to use a sacred-profane model of interpretation for eastern religious forms that stress living in harmony with the cosmic order through relating appropriately to other members of society (as seen in the Hindu varna srama dharma or the Confucian rules of proper social conduct [li\), or that stress an immediate release from bondage to the self through individual insight into the nature of things (as found in Zen).

This brief examination of various definitions of religion indicates that different definitions are useful for certain purposes while they also have inherent limitations. One might argue that as long as one is self-conscious of the limitations in his definition, and in so far as it provides a hermeneutical tool to expose aspects of concrete religious life, it can be used legitimately. This argument is a solid one until one attempts to delineate the scope and goals of an integrated study of religion which seeks to use various studies on different kinds of data, all of which are labeled religious. As we indicated in the first part of this paper, among the central methodological issues in the empirical study of religion is the question of whether or not there can be a single system for analyzing and interpreting religion that will deal adequately with religious life in its variety of expressions. Scientific investigation struggles to provide an all-inclusive interpretive system which has categories for relating one study to another and several studies to a larger whole. As important as particular detailed studies are, there has to be a concern about the general terms (concepts, categories) that are used in any analysis, as well as for common structures or principles that underlie particular manifestations of human expressions. There are especially two problems that are continually raised: (1) Can a working definition of religion (and appropriate

234 categories for analyzing data in terms of that definition) be found that is useful for stating hypotheses that can be empirically examined and which applies equally to different historical and cultural expressions? (2) Is the nature of religious data such that it requires categories of interpretation emphasizing the assumptions and personal experiences of the religious devotees, or is religion better understood simply as a form of "a more basic force in human experience," e.g., social structures and psychological needs? Another kind of problem (and perhaps more complicated) is raised when a social scientist or historian asks the question "How religious are the Sunday Blue Laws" (with the implication that perhaps the basic force at work is economic advantage) ? Or, was the India-Pakistan split basically a religious one? Or, how "religious" was the decision for large numbers of American troops to enter Vietnam in 1966 as a crusade to extend the "American Way of Life?" This kind of question suggests that there is a difference between the quality of religion (e.g., the final norm for ultimate decisions) and the standard cultural form of religion (e.g., Friday night or Sunday morning worship services). One aspect in the solution to these problems stems from a methodological suggestion made earlier. This is that the claim to objectivity in a field of inquiry does not depend as much on having a single interpretive scheme as on using interpretive categories that expose the characteristics of a distinctive aspect of human life, e.g., religion, that are found in concrete data. This means that one could use religious cate-

FREDERICK J. STRENG

gories found in the content of traditional religious life from agricultural fertility rituals to Zen enlightenment as well as the claims of rational philosophers or teachers of sensuous awareness (as found at Esalen Institute) in particular studies of religion. To relate this variety of expressions, however, would require the use of constants found in each of the materials compared. These constants would be categories at a more abstract level than the descriptive historical-cultural level. They need not be identical in all comparisons or religious phenomena because they could operate among themselves on different levels of abstraction. For significant utility, a constant would need to apply only to two empirically distinct religious phenomena. Other phenomena could be dealt with by different (or higher order) constants. For example, it would be possible to compare "authority" in the Christian and Jewish communities on the basis of God's revelation recorded in a particular canon as the constant; then the power of the priest in the Christian mass could be compared to the Hindu priest's power in the samskaras (sacraments that lead to the "twice-born" status); then the orthodox Hindu whose ultimate concern is to live according to his dharma could be compared with the American Ethical Culturalist with his concern to implement a universal ethic rather than participate in rituals and devotion. The constants, then, are multiple. Such a focus on the particular religious forms interpreted in terms of the cultural patterns of thinking and life with a careful delimitation of the areas for comparison

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self-conscious about the boundaries or thresholds that one has when he uses the term religion. This is important since any use of religion has a certain content for the user, and to the degree that a person self-consciously seeks to participate in a study of religion that extends to the limits of human existence his use of this term will have implications for his colleagues. In this context I suggest that one possible universal abstraction, i.e., formal definition, of all religious forms is that they are "structural processes of ultimate transformation."24 This abstraction focuses on the character of religious thought, activity and social relationships as a transforming power which brings about insight, a new life, and structure from chaos. It claims to be power in action. Thus the use of the term process. Religion is not simply an idea, a belief, a symbol, ethical activity, or mystical insight. These are all forms which this power-in-action takes. The adjective structural before process is an attempt to give a level of abstraction other than immediate, historical processes which bring about momentary changes in the religious forms. The notion of structure expressesin line with the structural approach in several social sciencesthat any phenomenon (datum) when it appears is already part of a configuration of factors, and that a change in one of the factors affects the other factors because of the pattern (or structure, gestalt) that provides the meaning of that configuration. Any religious form is by the

would prevent oversimplified extensions of one cultural form into another culture while allowing some points of comparison. To suggest that there are abstractions that are useful for some crosscultural studies suggests that there may be a whole series of levels of abstractions, each level forming the constant for the level above it. Thus, beneath and connecting the first-level constants of authority in scripture and priestly power we might suggest a second-level constant of a social need for a hierarchy of authority topped by an official with special power. If this principle of abstraction is continued to include wider and wider data at greater and greater levels of abstraction we must ask whether there is not finally one abstraction that will pertain universally to all phenomena. I do not claim to know whether, as a matter of fact, one universal abstraction can do justice to all religious phenomena; however, there are two attempts at such a universal abstraction that I would reject in line with the criticisms given to the operational definitions of religion above. These are the extension of religious categories derived from one historical form of religion to all cultural forms, and the reduction of the religious character of ultimacy claimed by religious adherents to another dimension of human experience. Whether or not the students of an empirical study of religion can ever agree on one single universal abstraction, I think it is important to become

"The author has used this definition with a slight change from his definition of religion as "a means of ultimate transformation" in a small volume, Understanding Religious Man (Encino, California: Dickenson, 1969), that is meant to introduce beginning students of religion to the scope of data relevant to religious studies.

236
nature of its appearance already participating in a pattern of meaning which informs that particular expression with significance. Thus, a religious expression is here seen as a slice of a continuing process, which process has a configuration of meaning constituted by its factors and the particular relationship between its factors. By defining the structural processes inherent in religious data, we have located constants at third- or fourth-level of abstractions in light of which particular variables can be examined. Another crucial element in this definition of religion is the notion of ultimacy. This notion, like the notion of "process," is a formal term without specific content. It designates a boundary, a threshold, for considering what people might consider important and what they consider religiously important. The notion ultimate shows the scope of concern, a scope that is unconditioned. This notion has a fairly clear recognized meaning when used in reference to traditional religious expressions. It conventionally means a reality that transcends human existence and which is effective in special circumstances when man is ineffective. If, however, we are to take seriously the suggestion in the early part of the paper that empirical students of religion must look at human expressions which function religiously (but which have not been defined as religious during the past ten or fifteen millennia) then we must see what ultimate might mean. When, for instance, we view science, political institutions which are dependent more on social contract than divine sanctions, rational analysis of perplexing cosmological and ethical

FREDERICK J. STRENG

questions, or experiencing the beauty of life through the capacities of our senses as ultimate determinants of man's purpose, the ultimate reality is not seen to be essentially outside existence but inherent in existence. The ultimate is not appealed to, but cultivated. Thus, those forms in which any man or group of men place their ultimate creative expectation, are legitimate data for analysis. The notion transformation, as mentioned above, focuses on the devotee's claim that religion is effective; it is not only an ideal or wish, but a practical power to transform human experience from chaos to order, from meaninglessness to significance, from spiritual death to divine life. Transformation refers to an individual person, a segment of society (e.g., the believers), a culture, mankind, and the world; it refers to a momentary experience of bliss, social relationships, lifelong attitudes, and ritual activity. In every major religious tradition are found many forms of transformation in sacred symbols, rites, doctrines, social organization, poetry, carvings, historical records, myths, architecture, or educational patterns. The emphasis on "transformation" also highlights the character of religion as the means for solving basic human problems, e.g., anxiety, meaninglessness, and death. (Here, however, we must be cautious, recognizing that perhaps the consciousness of life's problematical character so manifest at present may not be a universal constant. At the same time we recognize that a good deal of the data available from the past three millennia lends itself to such a perspective.) The definition of religion as a

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237 This definition of religion also provides a focus for an integrated inquiry into an immense scope of data. The focus is on the structures and conditions in which the processes of ultimate transformation take place. Whatever study contributes to understanding this human process can become part of a unified, but not necessarily single kind of, interpretation. It would not require a single set of concepts to be applied in every investigation. To the contrary, the ideal (as stated before) is to interpret the data in terms of their own cultural symbols and historical patterns before abstracting the constants from the structures that are exposed through various empirical analyses. Also studies whose prime concern is to interpret religious life in terms of social and psychological functions might be relevant, especially to the degree that they revealed the conditions in which ultimate transformation took place. In the same vein, neurologists and chemists might make significant contributions. The empirical study of religion would significantly benefit from a clarification of the scope of its study and a specification of how the definitions of religion used in particular studies relate to those in other studies. It is a continuing task necessary to the growth of an intelligible field of study; for such a study can develop only when there is a concern for mutual clarification of basic principles of understanding.

(structural) process for ultimate transformation is useful for an empirical study of religion to the degree that it provides an interpretive device (1) to handle religious expressions defined functionally or in terms of their forms, (2) forms a distinctive field of inquiry though not limited to conventionally accepted forms of religion, and (3) is open to anyone having the conceptual tools and investigative sensitivities needed in various kinds of empirical study without appeal to special religious insights or a particular metaphysical position. In providing this definition of religion I am not suggesting that the full meaning of any particular religious form is found solely in universal elements, nor even in the different processes of ultimate transformation; the meaning of a given phenomenon is partly determined by the concrete historical and cultural determinants. Thus micro-studies are just as important as macro-studies or cross-cultural comparative studies. As we pointed out above, however, the micro-studies done without a self-consciousness of how their operational definition of religion relates to a wider interpretive context will not be contributing fully to a scientific study of religion. Any study of religion bound to a naive use of its key term will suffer not only a limitation in its wider relevance, but also a loss of that depth which it might have obtained from a more adequate vision of that interrelatedness of religious and secular phenomena.