Vous êtes sur la page 1sur 14

Taking Sides and Opening DoorSo Authority and Integrity in the Academy's Hinduism

Douglas R. Brooks

Take sides! Always take sides! You will sometimes be wrongbut the man who refuses to take sides must always be wrong. Heaven save us from poltroons who fear to make a choice. Robert A. Heinlein

WHO IS SPEAKING TO WHOM?


Scholars are challenged emotionally as much as they are intellectually by the terms Hinduism and Hindu. Our subject, as Thomas Coburn has recently reminded us, is human beings who must never be treated like objects.1 Our goal then is never "objectivity"; in these endeavors, we are ourselves subjects that study others and must take seriously our agendas and goals, no matter who we might represent or who may be offended by what is said. Geertz put it plainly enough when he noted that "excessive concern, which in practice usually means any concern at all, with how ethnographic texts are constructed seems like an unhealthy self-absorption time-wasting at best, hypochondriacal at worst" (1). The same, I think, is true of any type of scholarship, be it textual, historical, or anthropological. While we may run the risk of talking too much about ourselves and not enough about our subjects, we need to remind ourselves that there is always more at stake than what we say. At risk is our own humanity should
Douglas R. Brooks is Professor of Religion at the University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627.
1 Coburn's comments came in the context of a paper delivered to the Hinduism section of the American Academy of Religion during its annual meeting in 1999. He was referring in turn to W. C. Smith's comments in Towards a World Theology (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1981).

Journal of the American Academy of Religion December 2000, Vol. 68, No. 4, pp. 817-829 2000 The American Academy of Religion

818

Journal of the American Academy of Religion

we fail to speak with consideration of this more subtle and, dare I say, profound issue of who we are when we speak. Herein lies the crux of our credibility in speaking at all. My concern is not that we may offend othersfor surely good scholarship will always offend someone. And at the risk of sounding as if nothing has been learned from postcolonial scholarship, scholars can no longer hold themselves hostage to a conscience that refuses to speak openly for fear of representing another legacy of colonialism. We cannot shrink from opinions that offend some Hindus because we may stand outside their community. As scholars we have multiple voices, even multiple agendas. Is it too self-absorbed to say that fundamentally we do scholarship for ourselves? It is not merely the demands of our self-regulating academic community to which we must answer. This is not to say that we ignore the accounts others take of us. At least at the outset of our careers we write knowing that the future depends on how our work is received by senior scholars who rely on the institution of tenure to protect honesty and candor. When we reach the more-safe harbor of this professional accomplishment, we gain new opportunities, along with the responsibility to speak more fearlessly in the company of our peers. We may also write for others on whose lives we seek to leave our imprint, not only the students or colleagues we serve in our college or university communities. How are we to regard the work that emerges from the havens of tenured scholarship? Do we rely on anything other than the usual mechanisms of academic accountability? Geertz again offers an insight that applies to our humanistic studies, however directed his comments are toward the work of the anthropologist. He writes, "The ability of anthropologists to get us to take what they say seriously has less to do with either a factual look or an air of conceptual elegance than it has with their capacity to convince us that what they say is a result of their having actually penetrated (or, if you prefer, been penetrated by) another form of life, of having, one way or another, truly 'been there.' And that, persuading us that this offstage miracle has occurred, is where the writing comes in" (4-5). To speak credibly about Hinduism or Hindus we must convey the sense of having "been there," not merely penetrating but penetrated by what we have learned. This is precisely what we do in the classroom when our students experience our authenticity as human beings who do more than command the scholarly facts. At issue is not merely speaking about Hinduism but also why we choose to speak at all and what we wish to accomplish. We come to our subject not with objectivity at stake but with honesty and integrity. This is what we owe ourselves, each other as scholars, our students, and the Hindu folk we study. I do not mean to suggest

Brooks: Taking Sides and Opening Doors

819

that honesty has been lacking but, rather, that we need to speak honestly about ourselves to the same degree that we express openness toward our subject. We need to make clear what we seek from our conversation and situate ourselves in relationship to our subject. There are always consequences to speaking honestly and openly when this involves revealing our personal motivations. The veil of scholarly objectivity can legitimately protect one's privacy just as it does the truth. By claiming no personal or political stake in the matter, we liberate ourselves to speak accepting the consequences. Yet this begs the question, so what? Why would we bother with ideas or matters in which we have no stake? We all know how important it is not to overpersonalize what we say or how we act, especially in the classroom. This is not the same as assuming the guise of "outsider" looking in. Such a guise is itself an agenda. The non-personal-stakeholder position is a use of power over ourselves, another kind of effort to establish a relationship with our subject. Power can be used to create possibilities for revelation and truth telling just as well as it can staunch the flow of free exchange. As scholars we always argue views in public ways and presumably according to the same rules. We admit concepts such as factual, authentic, right and wrong understandings, and legitimate irresolution. If we choose to stand "outside" our topic and claim to be looking in, we have to accept that we may sacrifice a level of credibility even as we gain one. On the contrary, the scholar who admits "penetration" of the subject risks being "penetrated," as Geertz puts it. Legitimacy and authenticity are not resolved by being either "outside" or "inside." Instead what is established is a relationship with our subject that everyone in the conversation understands. Standing "outside" the subject or claiming knowledge by entering into it more directly, more personallythese are not exclusive categories of understanding. Individuals always wear more than one guise. Why should our scholarly identities be different from the rest of our lives? My point is simply that who we choose to be matters. This is never "off the table" in our "scientific" methods of humanistic study. We need not bare our souls to be credible or authentic, but we do need to make explicit who we are, refocusing our relationship to the subject in each context. Scholar is no more a neutral or value-free term than Hinduism or Hindu. We may be just as unlikely to reach agreements regarding any of these usages or meanings. As a scholar of Hindu Tantrism I have struggled from the outset of my formal learning with the challenges involving "insider knowledge" and the ethics of access and revelation. Tantric texts and traditions presume secret and initiated knowledge. One discovers that materials are nearly unintelligible without the input of oral traditionalists, traditionalists who

820

Journal of the American Academy of Religion

will only speak to "fellow initiates." If we are to study the Hindu Tantra at all, we must admit that thisfirstlevel of access denies admission to those who do not, cannot, or will not seek out the secrets of oral tradition. Goudriaan, in a most matter of fact tone, makes the point that we must take seriously what Tantrikas say and think about themselves in relation to our scholarly interpretations: "If one takes the emphasis on oral instruction into account,. . . modern scientifically oriented studies of Tantrism exclusively based upon the written literature are liable to appear incomplete and full of misunderstandings to an initiated Tantric adept" (Goudriaan and Gupta: 13). We can go further than this now because our understanding of Hindu Tantra has evolved. It is more precise to say that textual understandings are incomplete without oral input, no matter how they appear to "insider" initiates. The scholar of Tantrism must admit this fact without privileging every insider voice as equally important or even as equally valid. The scholar must constantly judge the value of the input itself, both in terms of his or her own privileged access and by what is divulged by informants. Once secrets are revealed in the context of initiate conversation, under what circumstances is it ethical to reveal these in public scholarship? Is it immoral to reveal traditional secrets? How is such gathered evidence and input appropriate to a conversation that occurs in public, one that depends on principles of public discourse and mutual verifiability? How should "scholarship" treat the understanding of materials that are by definition inaccessible and restricted? Scholars of Hinduism are never exempt from ethical challenges involving credibility, reliability, and authenticity. While the circumstances of Tantric secrecy may exaggerate the insider/outsider "problem," scholars in Hindu studies seem to be more discomforted by this situation than others in related fields, particularly Buddhist studies. We find it difficult to say we are "Hindus" (or even simply "insider initiates") if we are not Hindu by birth and culture. The complexities of this issue are exacerbated by our historical connections to colonialism, the relationship of Hinduism to caste and culture, and our need to disavow religious and cultural imperialism. Hindus, like other religious persons, do not need experts, be they religious or scholarly authorities, to formulate their own boundaries and meanings. Only when definitions and understandings demand some or another common ground do we need to ask ourselves in a more critical fashion, "Who speaks for Hinduism?" Whose common ground is of foremost concern: in whose setting and context is a given claim, argument, or body of evidence being considered? In other words, how is studying Hinduism as a religion connected with being Hindu? Jonathan Z. Smith helps to clarify this point:

Brooks: Taking Sides and Opening Doors

821

While there is a staggering amount of data, of phenomena, of human experiences and expressions that might be characterized, by one criterion or another, as religiousthere is no data for religion. Religion is a creation of the scholar's study. It is created by the scholar's imaginative acts of comparison and generalization. Religion has no independent existence apartfrom the academy. For this reason, the student of religion must be exquisitely self-conscious. Indeed, this self-consciousness constitutes his primary expertise, his foremost object of study. (217) To study "Hindus" or "Hinduism" then as a scholar is to sustain this "exquisite self-consciousness," no more or less if one personally maintains Hindu or other religious beliefs. This is the distinctive position of scholarship, whether it be purely analytical or theological. What matters most is that the scholar declare his or her stance by means of this "primary expertise." We should not labor here over the definitional issues of Hindu or Hinduism. As scholars we have enough to identify "Hinduism" as a one of the world's macrohistorical religions in terms of both substance and method.2 In light of J. Z. Smith's comments, we can conclude that being Hindu confers no qualification or privilege for studying Hinduism within the academy. But neither would being Hindu, or being religious in any other way, disqualify one's academic participation. Imprecise or even disagreed-on definitions need not prevent us from considering the issue of who speaks for Hinduism. Hinduism may not be so much a "what" as it is a "who," regardless of whether the term is used (self-)descriptively or to name a theoretical or analytical category. Hinduism describes the religion of people who call themselves "Hindus" just as it refers to those whom, for any number of reasons, scholars choose to call "Hindu." At issue for the scholar is not the religious practitioners' agreement or personal preferences; the scholar and the practitioners' like or dislike of the term and its various applications are themselves a subject of study, not delimiting or definitional boundaries. To think of scholarship as an unemotional enterprise or one in which emotions are left at the doorstep as we enter the temple of reason is to ignore the realities of our own involvement. While we may choose to be sensitive to others' feelings because we are talking about religion and aware of how we might affect their understandings, this should not be confused with compromising our intellectual integrity. Do theologians or religious people hesitate to make their own claims or affirmations of what they believe is true for all?
See, for example, Brian K. Smith's "Exorcising the Transcendent: Strategies for Defining Hinduism and Religion," History of Religions 27/1 (August 1987): 32-55; and John Stratton Hawley, "Naming Hinduism," Wilson Quarterly (Summer 1991): 20-34.
2

822

Journal of the American Academy of Religion

The question "Who speaks for Hinduism?" belongs as much to scholars as it does to Hindus. It is the selected audience who creates the authority of whomever is doing the speaking, and that audience undoubtedly has its own dynamics, history, agenda, and bias. Authority so "delegated" is a moving target as much as we might like to believe that truths endure and untruths eventually fail or vanish. Further, a person may speak with more than one agenda, or for more than one audience, or for multiple reasons. In our zeal to speak the truth or present the evidence, we need to remember that scholarship is not a religion antagonistic to religion. The same person may speak with authority or with multiple agendas in any number of different settings. The point is simply that people are held accountable within each context, sometimes by very different criteria and standards. The consequences of a scholarly viewpoint may be as offensive to some religious people as any other dissonant or disagreeable view. The extent to which one is willing to go to make one's views public is ultimately an individual decision with personal and professional consequences. What will our peers think? How will our reputations be affected? Before we consider such matters any further, there remain a few points to make regarding the study of Hinduism and its evolution as a world religion. HINDUISM AS A WORLD RELIGION Hinduism has always been a multicultural religion. Anyone who has witnessed its many expressions in South Asia knows that its diversity, even within this limited geographical setting, has created the practical equivalent of a "world religion." There is no culture of Hinduism or normative Hindu culture, unless, of course, one asks a Hindu for whom this is a religious or nationalist issue. Rather, there are multiple religious, cultural, ethnic, and political expressions of Hinduism, and these different modes of being Hindu are not necessarily the same. One can be a "cultural" or "ethnic Hindu" without being particularly "religious"just as it seems to be the case with certain North American people of, say, Jewish, Catholic, or Protestant upbringing. Some Hindus limit their interests in religion to their need for four wheelsa baby carriage, limousine, ambulance, or hearsebut this certainly does not make religion less important to them when the time comes. Religious people need not be pious or particularly observant to have opinions about who speaks for their religion or what constitutes an authentic religious identity. One can nowadays be "religiously Hindu" from any number of cultural or ethnic backgrounds, much to the chagrin of those who might prefer it otherwise. To put it another way, Hinduism names a religion,

Brooks: Taking Sides and Opening Doors

823

whereas the term Hindu may be used religiously, ethnically, culturally, politically, or in other ways. World religions have multiple cultural, ethnic, and historical contexts as religionsthis is precisely what makes them world religions. It is not simply a matter of numbers, the place of origin, or historical majorities. Certainly, the task of defining a religion qua religion is a formidable one and perhaps more of an interest to scholars than practitioners. But in India today and among the Hindu diaspora, religious identity is not an issue left only to scholarship. Some Hindus seem as offended by the prospect of "western Hindus" as they are by a multicultural interpretation of the Mahabharata. At stake are feelings of religious identity and "ownership" that seem to affect Hindus differently at this point in history than it does others, like Buddhists or Muslims, whose religions have long been world religions. Hinduism today is undergoing a profound transformation, not merely as a religion of South Asian origins and in its diaspora but as a world religion. There are now European and New World Hindus whose ancestors were Christian by religion and whose Hinduism was taught to them in ways decidedly unfamiliar to South Asian Hindus. As scholars we cannot ignore either what people say about themselves, their religion, or the things we see them doing. That such Hindus of non-Asian origins may be disavowed or poorly regarded by other Hindus is simply another fact to consider. It is a religious claim of some Hindus both in South Asia and beyond that to be Hindu is to be (South) Asian by birth; but it is no longer, nor perhaps has it ever been, the case that ethnicity is a defining feature of this religion. While there may be disputes over what it means to "become" Hindu, "convert," or simply assume a Hindu identitya controversy that is played out among Hindus and Hinduism scholarsthis is part of the reality of Hinduism as a world religion. Hinduism is a world religion, a religion practiced by peoples of many different cultures and ethnicities and now also by peoples of "previous" religious origins and identities. There has emerged outside of South Asia a variety of Hinduisms that are culturally diverse and divergent from South Asian Hinduisms, just like the versions one sees in other world religions, such as Judaism or Roman Catholicism. In the American Academy of Religion we have adjusted to this fact by singling out Hinduism as a religion that is both part of the phenomenon of South Asian religions and a religion (qua religion) not dependent on geography, ethnic origins, or a particular cultural setting. As immigrant Hindus in North America watch their children grow up as Americans and Hindus, they may not have noticed something else: there are now others who claim "membership" in their religion who have had other religious and ethnic backgrounds. Being a WASH myself, a White Anglo-Saxon

824

Journal of the American Academy of Religion

Hindu, and a scholar of Hinduism by profession has given rise to questions of religious and intellectual integrity that deserve to be addressed. How can one be both religiously authoritative and intellectually honest to the tasks of critical scholarship? INTEGRITY AND AUTHORITY: BHEDABHEDA, OR DIFFERENCE AND IDENTITY Who speaks for Hinduism is less a matter of authority than one of integrity. Any Hindu is authoritative at least for her- or himself. The manner in which their claims apply to others is something that may be measurable. Taking people at their word as an assumption of scholarly work is not the same as believing that everything they say is "true." Rather, it is assessing their statements to deduce what we wish to know. It is not the "truth" of such a claim that is the proper matter of scholarly inquiry but, rather, its basis and comparison. Jacob Neusner, who along with William Scott Green and others has worked to distinguish Judaism from Jewish identity, makes clear how description and comparison define the scholarly endeavor: Descriptive analysis of "a religion" is a labor of comparison and differentiation. To begin with, subject to the work of comparing and contrasting are the diverse systems of life and thought, the various societies or cultures, finding a place within said "religion." Because these systems or societies or cultures are alike, they discern commonalities and important traits of sameness. What one thing shows me can be applied to two things only when both things show the same one thing (among other things). (229) Comparison as such requires that we establish grounds located in a diachronic setting. When we consider Hinduism as a world religion (and not merely South Asian, ethnic, or political, etc.), we endeavor to see "a given religious tradition extending over a long period of time and many countries," and so "we must seek moments at which we may fairly and reliably speak of a particular place and time of proximate uniformity. Then, and only then, will the exercise of differentiation become possible, so that we may apply what the one thing shows me to be the case of two things" (Neusner: 229). Scholars assess if persons are acting in good faith, that is, with authenticity and honesty. When we think people are acting in bad faith, that they are deliberately misleading or lying, then that too becomes part of the story of religion. Sustaining a religious view even as one engages in the presentation of scholarship does not by definition subvert the scholarly endeavor.

Brooks: Taking Sides and Opening Doors

825

Scholarship in Hinduism must learn to take conviction as a subject of scholarship as well as part of its critical endeavors. Integrity can be judged only in a context in which each person is granted the courage of convictions. This presumption is part of an ongoing process of making choices and judgments. Scholars should indeed judge the integrity and validity of religious claims in their contexts. Just because our subject is religion or Hinduism and we may be neither religious nor Hindu by birth, this creates no exemption. Likewise, being of any religious persuasion, including Hindu by birth or by choice, neither qualifies nor disqualifies a work as scholarship. There is no privileged authority conferred by birth, culture, or religious persuasion in the contexts of academic study. Our colonial history notwithstanding, Hinduism is not merely the same religion in different places and contexts. Hinduism is, if you will, a plural religion or even a "religions" to be studied comparatively. Not long ago it was tacitly assumed that those who study a religion of Asian origins and who were not born into that religion (or ethnicity) should not be "adherents." To "go native" was a violation of scholarly tradition. This situation has been seriously challenged by the propagation of Buddhism in the West and especially its popularity within the academy. Buddhist scholars can nowadays be seemingly both Buddhists and scholars in ways that have hitherto been reserved for Jews, Christians, and Muslims. Why is this not true of Hinduism scholars who are religious Hindus but not of South Asian origin or ethnicity? Of course, Buddhist tradition not only accepts "converts" but has its own centuries-old traditions of evangelism. In the case of Hinduism, however, this shift to nonnative adherents who have adopted the religion (and perhaps not "gone native" culturally) has been far more problematic. Surely it is not caste or birthright that defines the religious boundaries of inside and outside Hindu bhakti (devotion) and Tantra have long defied any such limitations. But even within these traditional categories by which thresholds of extent and limit are measured we see a much deeper uneasiness among both scholars and traditionalist Hindus. Is it merely scholarship's relationship to the colonialist past? Then why have Buddhists made this transition from "honest scholar" to "true believer" so much more easily than those who claim to be scholars and Hindus? The issue of authority to speak about or for a religion takes us directly into the realm of the normative. The question "Who speaks for Hinduism?" quickly becomes "Who should speak for Hinduism?" Religious authority involves more than who is speaking for themselves or about their religion with integrity. Just as with the terms Hinduism and Hindu, we might consider the matter of authority from two perspectives: as a matter of religious persons and as a matter of scholars. These are distinctive

826

Journal of the American Academy of Religion

but not exclusive categories. An authoritative religious person need not be scholarly at all, if by that we mean either educated or engaged with a community of academics inside or beyond one's own religious group. There are any number of ways to be religiously authoritative and, thus, a voice within and for a given religion. To be authoritative or scholarly from within Hinduism strikes me as no different from the issue in any other religion: it is a matter of audience, not of normative or even agreed-on standards of right and wrong or correct and incorrect. Scholarship in the tradition of the western academy considers the integrity of a given voice, its bias and agenda, its claims, sources, and contexts. With all this information we measure the value and importance of a religious voice (i.e., to whom it is authoritative and in what ways it stands for a group or community); we evaluate its purport against other measures and standards such as historical sources and the traditions of learning that distinguish the enterprise. In this sense scholars have religious authority as their subject, regardless of whether or not they are participating in it. To stand within the community of scholars is to be held accountable from within that community, and in this sense the traditions of western scholarship bear resemblance to religion. Scholarly tradition speaks for Hinduism insofar as it takes the measure of everything said and done by those we as scholars identify as Hindus. Of course everyone has her or his own religious and nonreligious views; what makes "religion" any different from other subjects in this way? Scholarship about religion is responsible for creating its own standards of authoritative work and for assessing its integrity; we are no different from political scientists, historians, or anyone else. Scholarship about religion is not about advocacy anymore than it should be about the subversion of religious views. We walk a high-wire when we describe and critique the religion of Hindus not because we assess their truth claims but because we consider their modes of creating authority and the integrity of their voices. We use the evidence and make judgments on the basis of our own integrity and the degree to which we create a deeper selfawareness regarding our claims, agendas, or preferences. Our task is neither to privilege religious claims nor to dismiss them. A religious belief, conviction, or practice is what we see and understand it to be in light of the other evidence before us. Like all humanistic endeavors, scholarship is only as good as the integrity of those involved in creating and sustaining it; scholarship simply demands that people declare their methods, biases, agendas, and sources in a way that opens them to the criticism of their peers and anyone else who cares to consider their work. Scholarship requires a willingness not only to play one's hand in the public game but to reveal one's cards. This

Brooks: Taking Sides and Opening Doors

827

is not, it seems to me, the same for those religious persons who do not identify their work within the academic guild.

MEDITATION REVOLUTION:
HONESTY IS NOT OBJECTIVITY Scholars have never been immune to their personal choices and the effect these have on their work, be it in religion or any other subject. But in the study of religion we distinguish theology among the forms of "critical"scholarship. We might say that one important difference is "doing religion" (or religious scholarship) and the "study of religion." While the former is marked by the "we" who acknowledge advocacy and make clear endorsements, the latter seeks the subtle advancement of an empathetic distancethis is what "they" think or do as we see it. The key point of self-conscious distinction is whether or not "we" and "they" are the same group. When "we" admit to being "them," the terms of scholarship have changed. But this is exactly what happens in the academic study of the western monotheisms and now Buddhism. These are subjects populated by "true believers." Is Hinduism to be singled out for some special reason? Somefiveor six years ago I was asked, along with a group of colleagues, to write a history and theology of Siddha Yoga Meditation, the movement established in the west by Swami Muktananda and now under the leadership of Gurumayi Chidvilasananda. We undertook the project with devotion to Swami Chidvilasananda and with the clear intent to place Siddha Yoga in a "favorable" theological light. We sought to take seriously Siddha Yoga's religious claims and assert a certain degree of theological authority with respect to its interpretation. In my own view, we received this theological "authority" to speak for Siddha Yoga from Swami Chidvilasananda herself. Further, this authority was granted to us on the basis of her view of the authors as scholarly authorities. I believe she asked us to write a Siddha Yoga theology because we already had the authority to do so from within the guild of scholarship. The outcome, Meditation Revolution: A History and Theology of Siddha Yoga, has drawn considerable attention from colleagues, critics, and devotees. Some wonder if we have "sold out" our scholarly objectivity or have been censored; others have questioned our integrity openly and have suggested that we can no longer write "academically" with authority. Did we see all the evidence, and were we willing to consider it? Were we willing to discuss Siddha Yoga in light of the criticisms of those who have critical or unfavorable views? First, it should be clear that Meditation Revolution was deliberately written as theology, primarily by western scholars who have long been part

828

Journal of the American Academy of Religion

of the academic guild. That we should "come out" as theologians seems unfortunate to some colleagues who find such an endeavor anathema to academic honesty. Can we ever be trusted to write with candor or openness again when we freely admit to being part of a religious organization? Among the authors only Swami Durgananda is not a member of the academic guild. Her history of Siddha Yoga, which forms part 1 of Meditation Revolution, makes no claim to being "objective" and was certainly never meant to be "definitive." Hers is but one history, and surely other histories and stories will be told. Perhaps in future editions more of the controversial history of Siddha Yoga needs to be presented publicly from Siddha Yoga's own perspective. Our task was to present Gurumayi Chidvilasananda's Siddha Yoga as it is understood from within its living tradition. As a kind of modern Tantrism, Siddha Yoga is a guruvada and so is defined by the teachings and practices of the current guru. The history of the movement seen from this perspectivea theological oneis part of the contemporary movement's self-understanding. In this sense, the "history" of Siddha Yoga presented in Meditation Revolution offers the sorts of insights that only an "insider" can provide. The remainder of Meditation Revolution is perhaps less controversial in content but no less unusual for being a theology focusing on a modern Hinduism written by western academics. The authors, new to the category of scholarly theology, hope other theologians and scholars will engage the book in ways that revise, correct, and supplement its content. Using received knowledge from within academic tradition, we sought as well to expand that body of data. However, the value and worth of this scholarship need to be assessed in light of it being theological. At no time during its composition or internal review was there any form of censorship, nor were any subjects or ideas considered "out of bounds." Our discussions "inside" the Siddha Yoga context and community were frank, open, and occasionally contentious. Ultimately we, as scholars and theologians, were left to our own devices and decisions. My own experience with academic presses and publications has, in fact, proven much more interventionist. The choices we made regarding content were decided on by the authors collectively; we did not always each "get our way." This is simply the nature of true collaboration. For the theological section of Meditation Revolution we concluded that there was little reason to discuss any controversial issues raised by the history of Siddha Yoga. However, in our discussions of these topics we applied a standard of academic/journalistic verifiability. When faced with "facts" or "assertions," we employed "the Watergate principle": there must be at least one additional corroborating source for any claims, a standard of truth beyond a reasonable doubt, and relevance to the topic under

Brooks: Taking Sides and Opening Doors

829

consideration. Just because something may have been said publicly in a "credible" source, such as a respected journalistic publication, or reiterated with frequency was not itself enough for us to consider it "news" or "newsworthy." Too often we discovered nothing more than accusations and hearsay. But it is also the case that claims regarding the behavior or teachings of Swami Muktananda were considered relevant primarily in the context of Swami Chidvilasananda's Siddha Yoga. In other words, our mission was to describe the theology of Siddha Yoga as it exists today, under the leadership of Gurumayi Chidvilasananda. While we expected that Meditation Revolution would prompt some discussion and even controversy, we did not anticipate how its publication would raise anew questions of academic integrity, the insider/outsider issues in studying religion, or its part in the "new" Hinduism as a world religion. Scholars of Hinduism need not limit themselves to any one genre of scholarship, be it strictly descriptive and "critical" or theological. We are responsible to ourselves, to one another, and to anyone who chooses to engage our conversation. At stake is not our authority, which is a matter in some sense beyond our personal claims or control, but our integrity. And integrity is measured as much by our own religious views as it is by whatever standards and traditions make up our community. REFERENCES
Geertz, Clifford 1988 Goudriaan, T., and 1981 Neusner, Jacob 1983 Works and Lives: The Anthropologist as Author. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Hindu Tantric and Sakta Literature. Wiesbaden: Otto Gupta Harrossowitz. "Alike and Not Alike: A Grid for Comparison and Differentiation." In Take Judaism, for Example: Studies toward the Comparison ofReligions, 227-235. Ed. by Jacob Neusner. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Imagining Religion: From Babylon to Jonestown. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Smith, Jonathan Z. 1982

NEW FROM CONTINUUM


Jesus and die Politics of Interpretation
ELISABETH SCHUSSLER F1ORENZA

Jesus

and the Politics

Jesus mid Oie Politics of Intcrj>reUUon seeks to interrupt the rhetorics and |x>litics of meaning which, in the past decade, have compelled the proliferation of |x>pular and scholarly lxx>ks and articles alxmt tlie historical Jesus and which have turned Jesus into a commodity iif IMIT|iri'iation of necxapitalist Western culture. 0-82G4-1273-4 ' $22.9.5 Now Available

Early Christian Historiography


Narratives of Retribution
G. W. TROMPF

This lxx>k identifies and explores the "logic of retribution" that |>ervades Christian records of the past. 0-304-70406-7 * $90.9.5 hlxl Now Available

Feminism in die Study of Religion


A Reader
DARLENEJUSCHKA, EDITOR

Written by feminist scholars over a ixeriod of thirty years, the selected readings in this volume are wide-ranging in content, offer a multi-ethnic and multicultural pers|jertive, and reflect the work of scholars working within religious studies as well as other disciplines. ()-82(i44727-9 * $%).<).'> pbk 0-82(i4-472(>-0' $107.9.5 hlxl Now Available

CONTINUUM CONTINUUM

Continuum Publishing 1-800-561-7704 www.continuumbooks.com

Vous aimerez peut-être aussi