LEGAL SEPARATION

JOSE DE OCAMPO vs. SERAFINA FLORENCIANO

THE FACTS: Jose and Serafina were married in April 5, 1938 by a religious ceremony in Guimba, Nueva Ecija, and had lived thereafter as husband and wife. They begot several children . In March, 1951, plaintiff discovered on several occasions that his wife was betraying his trust by maintaining illicit relations with one Jose Arcalas. Having found the defendant carrying marital relations with another man plaintiff sent her to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty culture, where she stayed for one year. Again, plaintiff discovered that while in the said city defendant was going out with several other men, aside from Jose Arcalas. Towards the end of June, 1952, when defendant had finished studying her course, she left plaintiff and since then they had lived separately. On June 18, 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relations with another man by the name of Nelson Orzame. Plaintiff signified his intention of filing a petition for legal separation, to which defendant manifested her conformity provided she is not charged with adultery in a criminal action. Accordingly, plaintiff filed on July 5, 1955, a petition for legal separation. On July 5, 1955, the complaint for legal separation was filed. As amended, it described their marriage performed in 1938, and the commission of adultery by Serafina, in March 1951 with Jose Arcalas, and in June 1955 with Nelson Orzame. Because the defendant made no answer, the court defaulted her, and pursuant to Art. 101 of the Civil Code, directed the provincial fiscal to investigate whether or not collusion existed between the parties. The fiscal examined the defendant under oath, and then reported to the Court that there was no collusion. The plaintiff presented his evidence consisting of the testimony of Vicente Medina, Ernesto de Ocampo, Cesar Enriquez, Mateo Damo, Jose de Ocampo and Capt. Serafin Gubat. The court of first instance of Nueva Ecija dismissed it. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding there was confession of judgment, plus condonation or consent to the adultery and prescription. THE ISSUE: Whether or not there was condonation or consent to the adultery? THE RULING: None. The mere circumstance that defendants told the Fiscal that she "like also" to be legally separated from her husband, is no obstacle to the successful prosecution of the action. When she refused to answer the complaint, she indicated her willingness to be separated. Yet, the law does not order the dismissal. Allowing the proceeding to continue, it takes precautions against collusion, which implies more than consent or lack of opposition to the agreement. Collusion in divorce or legal separation means the agreement. . . . between husband and wife for one of them to commit, or to appear to commit, or to be represented in court as having committed, a matrimonial offense, or to suppress evidence of a valid defense, for the purpose of enabling the other to obtain a divorce. This agreement, if not express, may be implied from the acts of the parties. It is a ground for denying the divorce. (Griffiths vs. Griffiths, 69 N. J. Eq. 689 60 Atl. 1099; Sandoz vs. Sandoz, 107 Ore. 282, 214 Pas. 590.).

In this case, there would be collusion if the parties had arranged to make it appear that a matrimonial offense had been committedalthough it was not, or if the parties had connived to bring about a legal separation even in the absence of grounds therefor. Here, the offense of adultery had really taking place, according to the evidence. The defendant could not have falsely told the adulterous acts to the Fiscal, because her story might send her to jail the moment her husband requests the Fiscal to prosecute. She could not have practiced deception at such a personal risk. Collusion may not be inferred from the mere fact that the guilty party confesses to the offense and thus enables the other party to procure evidence necessary to prove it and proof that the defendant desires the divorce and makes no defense, is not by itself. Plaintiff's failure actively to search for defendant and take her home (after the latter had left him in 1952) constituted condonation or consent to her adulterous relations with Orzame. It will be remembered that she "left" him after having sinned with Arcalas and after he had discovered her dates with other men. Consequently, it was not his duty to search for her to bring her home. Hers was the obligation to return. We hereby reverse the appealed decision and decree a legal separation between these spouse.

BROWN VS. YAMBAO

Facts: Brown alleges that while he was interned by the Japanese from 1942 to 1945, his wife had engaged in adulterous relationships from which she begot a child. He learned of it after his release. From then on they decided to live separately from each other and executed, to this effect, an agreement liquidating conjugal partnership, even giving the erring wife a share. On July, he led a suit for legal separation praying for conrmation of said agreement, custodial rights and disqualication of wife from succession of plaintiff. Her wife was declared in default for not having answered on time. When cross-examined by the assistant city scal, it was revealed however that Brown, after the liberation from the internment, had also lived with another woman with whom he has begotten children. The court refused to grant the petition on the basis of prescription, commission of similar offense by petitioner, and involvement of consent and connivance. Issue: WON proceedings for legal separation can still be instituted when both spouses are

offenders. Held/Ratio: No. His petition cannot prosper for two reasons: (1) prescriptive period is over since he learned of his wifes relations in 1945 and only led a complaint after ten years; and (2) His cohabitation with another woman bars him from claiming legal separation. Failure of the wife to set up a defense may be considered circumstantial evidence ofcollusion between them. Consent and connivance no longer need to be proven there being two established statutory grounds to grant the decree of legal separation.

Lerma v. CA 61 SCRA 440

FACTS: - May 1951Lerma (P) and Diaz (R )get married - Aug 1969P les a complaint for adultery vs. R and her lover Teodoro Ramirez - Nov 1969R les for legal separation and / or separation of properties, custody of children and support pendente lite (during pendency of action) for youngest son, Gregory on the grounds of concubinage and attempt against her life CFI(1970) R is entitled to support pendente lite from the date of Rs ling the complaint, the amount would be a monthly support of Php 1, 820 - P raised the petition to the CA CA (1971) - initially issuing a preliminary injunction on the decision of the lower court to give the respondent the opportunity to present evidence to the lower court, the CA dismissed the petition after the respondent asked for a reconsideration saying that he were not asking for a chance to present evidence to the lower court CFI (1972)R and Ramirez are convicted of adultery, this decision was appealed to the CA

- P les a new case of adultery against R and new lover, Manila policeman Jose Gochangco - P raises the petition against the giving support pendent elite to the SC, claiming, among others, that R did not ask for the enforcement of the CFI orders until he led a second adultery charge against R ISSUE: WON respondent can still claim for support even though she has already been convicted of adultery HELD: NO - Adultery is recognized as a defense for support o CC Article 303 - obligation to give support shall cease "when the recipient, be he a forced heir or not, has committed some act which gives rise to disinheritance o CC 921 - one of the causes for disinheriting a spouse is "when the spouse has given cause for legal separation - If allowed one would only need to le a case of legal separation no matter how groundless in order to get support Mere ling would not set Art 292 of FC to action. Still preclude loss of such right in certain cases.

Bugayong vs. Ginez (art.55-56)

Facts: Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the United States Navy, was married to defendant Leonila Ginez on August 27, 1949, at Asingan, Pangasinan. Immediately after their marriage, the couple lived with the sisters of the husband in said municipality, but before the latter left to report back to duty, he and his wife came to an agreement that Leonila would stay with his sisters who later moved to Sampaloc, Manila. As early as July, 1951, Benjamin Bugayong began receiving letters from

Valeriana Polangco (plaintiff's sisterinlaw) and some from anonymous writers (which were not produced at the hearing) informing him of alleged acts of indelity of his wife which he did not even care to mention. In August, 1952, plaintiff went to Asingan, Pangasinan, and sought for his wife whom he met in the house of one Mrs. Malalang, defendant's godmother. She came along with him and both proceeded to the house of Pedro Bugayong, a cousin of the plaintiff-husband, where they stayed and lived for 2 nights and 1 day as husband and wife. Then they repaired to the plaintiff's house and again passed the night therein as husband and wife. On the second day, Benjamin Bugayong tried to verify from his wife the truth of the information he received that she had committed adultery but Leonila, instead of answering his query, merely packed up and left, which he took as a conrmation of the acts of indelity imputed on her. After that and despite such belief, plaintiff exerted efforts to locate her and failing to nd her. On November 18, 1952, Benjamin Bugayong led in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan a complaint for legal separation against his wife, Leonila Ginez,. After the issues were joined and convinced that reconciliation was not possible, the court set the case for hearing on June 9, 1953. After plaintiff-husband nished testifying in his favor; counsel for the defendant orally moved for the dismissal of the complaint, but the Court ordered him to le a written motion to that effect and gave plaintiff 10 days to answer the same. The motion to dismiss was predicated on the following grounds: (1) Assuming arguendo the truth of the allegations of the commission of "acts of rank indelity amounting to adultery", the cause of action, if any, is barred by the statute of limitations; (2) That under the same assumption, the acts charged have been condoned by the plaintiff-husband; and (3) That the complaint failed to state a cause of action sufcient for this court to render a valid judgment. The motion to dismiss was answered by plaintiff and the Court, considering only the second ground of the motion to dismiss, i.e., condonation, ordered the dismissal of the action. After the motion for reconsideration led by plaintiff was denied, the case was taken up for review to the Court of Appeals, appellant's counsel maintaining that the lower court erred In nding that there was condonation on the part of plaintiff-appellant; As the questions raised in the brief were merely questions of law, the Court of Appeals certied the case to the SC. Issue: Was condonation on the part of the husband properly established in this case? Ruling: Art.56 of the Family Code provides condonation on the part of the offended spouse as one of the grounds for dismissal of legal separation. In this case, the Family Code is not yet in effect but the Civil Code which provides: ART. 97. A petition for legal separation may be led: (1) For adultery on the part of the wife and for concubinage on the part of the husband as dened in the Penal Code; or (2) An attempt by one spouse against the life of the other. ART. 100. The legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation

of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. Where both spouses are offenders, a legal separation cannot be claimed by either of them. Collusion between the parties to obtain legal separation shall cause the dismissal of the petition. Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for legal separation or, as stated in I Bouvier's Law Dictionary, p. 585, condonation is the "conditional forgiveness or remission, by a husband or wife of a matrimonial offense which the latter has committed". In this appeal, we have to consider plaintiff's line of conduct under the assumption that he really believed his wife guilty of adultery. What did he do in such state of mind? In August, 1952, he went to Pangasinan and looked for his wife and after nding her they lived together as husband and wife for 2 nights and 1 day, Now, do the husband's attitude of sleeping with his wife for 2 nights despite his alleged belief that she was unfaithful to him, amount to a condonation of her previous and supposed adulterous acts? A detailed examination of the testimony of the plaintiffhusband clearly shows that there was a condonation on the part of the husband, a reconciliation was effected between her and the plaintiff. Jurisprudence clearly supports this line of thinking taken by this Court; "In Shackleton vs. Shackleton, 48 N. J. Eq. 364; 21 Atl. 935, it has been held that 'condonation is implied from sexual intercourse after knowledge of the other indelity. Such acts necessarily implied forgiveness. Single voluntary act of marital intercourse between the parties ordinarily is sufcient to constitute condonation, and where the parties live in the same house, it is presumed that they live on terms of matrimonial cohabitation (27 C. J. S., section 6d). A divorce suit will not be granted for adultery. where the parties continue to live together after it was known (Land vs. Martin, 15 South 657; Day vs. Day, 80 Pac. 974) or there is sexual intercourse after knowledge of adultery (Rogers vs. Rogers, 67 N. J. Eq. 534) or sleeping together for a single night (Toulson vs. Toulson, 50 Atl. 401, citing Phinizy vs. Phinizy, 114 S. E. 185, 154 Ga. 199; Collins vs. Collins, 193 So. 702). Judgment of the trial court is afrmed.

Laperal vs Republic
Laperal vs. Republic GR No. 18008, October 30, 1962 FACTS: The petitioner, a bona de resident of Baguio City, was married with Mr. Enrique R.

Santamaria on March 1939. However, a decree of legal separation was later on issued to the spouses. Aside from that, she ceased to live with Enrique. During their marriage, she naturally uses Elisea L. Santamaria. She led this petition to be permitted to resume in using her maiden name Elisea Laperal. This was opposed by the City Attorney of Baguio on the ground that it violates Art. 372 of the Civil Code. She was claiming that continuing to use her married name would give rise to confusion in her nances and the eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets. ISSUE:Whether Rule 103 which refers to change of name in general will prevail over the specic provision of Art. 372 of the Civil Code with regard to married woman legally separated from his husband. HELD: In legal separation, the married status is unaffected by the separation, there being no severance of the vinculum. The nding that petitioners continued use of her husband surname may cause undue confusion in her nances was without basis. It must be considered that the issuance of the decree of legal separation in 1958, necessitate that the conjugal partnership between her and Enrique had automatically been dissolved and liquidated. Hence, there could be no more occasion for an eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets. Furthermore, applying Rule 103 is not a sufcient ground to justify a change of the name of Elisea for to hold otherwise would be to provide for an easy circumvention of the mandatory provision of Art. 372. Petition was dismissed.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 153206 October 23, 2006

ONG ENG KIAM a.k.a. WILLIAM ONG, petitioner, vs.

LUCITA G. ONG, respondent. DECISION AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: Before this Court is a Petition for Review seeking the reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. CV No. 59400 which affirmed in toto the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 41, Dagupan City granting the petition for legal separation filed by herein respondent, as well as the Resolution2 of the CA dated April 26, 2002 which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Ong Eng Kiam, also known as William Ong (William) and Lucita G. Ong (Lucita) were married on July 13, 1975 at the San Agustin Church in Manila. They have three children: Kingston, Charleston, and Princeton who are now all of the age of majority.3 On March 21, 1996, Lucita filed a Complaint for Legal Separation under Article 55 par. (1) of the Family Code4 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 41 alleging that her life with William was marked by physical violence, threats, intimidation and grossly abusive conduct.5 Lucita claimed that: soon after three years of marriage, she and William quarreled almost every day, with physical violence being inflicted upon her; William would shout invectives at her like "putang ina mo", "gago", "tanga", and he would slap her, kick her, pull her hair, bang her head against concrete wall and throw at her whatever he could reach with his hand; the causes of these fights were petty things regarding their children or their business; William would also scold and beat the children at different parts of their bodies using the buckle of his belt; whenever she tried to stop William from hitting the children, he would turn his ire on her and box her; on December 9, 1995, after she protested with Williams decision to allow their eldest son Kingston to go to Bacolod, William slapped her and said, "it is none of your business"; on December 14, 1995, she asked William to bring Kingston back from Bacolod; a violent quarrel ensued and William hit her on her head, left cheek, eye, stomach, and arms; when William hit her on the stomach and she bent down because of the pain, he hit her on the head then pointed a gun at her and asked her to leave the house; she then went to her sisters house in Binondo where she was fetched by her other siblings and brought to their parents house in Dagupan; the following day, she went to her parents doctor, Dr. Vicente Elinzano for treatment of her injuries.6 William for his part denied that he ever inflicted physical harm on his wife, used insulting language against her, or whipped the children with the buckle of his belt. While he admits that he and Lucita quarreled on December 9, 1995, at their house in Jose Abad Santos Avenue, Tondo, Manila, he claimed that he left the same, stayed in their Greenhills condominium and only went back to their Tondo house to work in

their office below. In the afternoon of December 14, 1995, their laundrywoman told him that Lucita left the house.7 On January 5, 1998, the RTC rendered its Decision decreeing legal separation, thus: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the legal separation of plaintiff and defendant, with all the legal effects attendant thereto, particularly the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership properties, for which purpose the parties are hereby ordered to submit a complete inventory of said properties so that the Court can make a just and proper division, such division to be embodied in a supplemental decision. SO ORDERED.8 The RTC found that: It is indubitable that plaintiff (Lucita) and defendant (William) had their frequent quarrels and misunderstanding which made both of their lives miserable and hellish. This is even admitted by the defendant when he said that there was no day that he did not quarrel with his wife. Defendant had regarded the plaintiff negligent in the performance of her wifely duties and had blamed her for not reporting to him about the wrongdoings of their children. (citations omitted) These quarrels were always punctuated by acts of physical violence, threats and intimidation by the defendant against the plaintiff and on the children. In the process, insulting words and language were heaped upon her. The plaintiff suffered and endured the mental and physical anguish of these marital fights until December 14, 1995 when she had reached the limits of her endurance. The more than twenty years of her marriage could not have been put to waste by the plaintiff if the same had been lived in an atmosphere of love, harmony and peace. Worst, their children are also suffering. As very well stated in plaintiffs memorandum, "it would be unthinkable for her to throw away this twenty years of relationship, abandon the comforts of her home and be separated from her children, whom she loves, if there exists no cause, which is already beyond her endurance.9 William appealed to the CA which affirmed in toto the RTC decision. In its Decision dated October 8, 2001, the CA found that the testimonies for Lucita were straightforward and credible and the ground for legal separation under Art. 55, par. 1 of the Family Code, i.e., physical violence and grossly abusive conduct directed against Lucita, were adequately proven.10 As the CA explained: The straightforward and candid testimonies of the witnesses were uncontroverted and credible. Dr. Elinzanos testimony was able to show that the [Lucita] suffered several injuries inflicted by [William]. It is clear that on December 14, 1995, she sustained redness in her cheek, black eye on her left eye, fist blow on the stomach,

blood clot and a blackish discoloration on both shoulders and a "bump" or "bukol" on her head. The presence of these injuries was established by the testimonies of [Lucita] herself and her sister, Linda Lim. The Memorandum/Medical Certificate also confirmed the evidence presented and does not deviate from the doctors main testimony --- that [Lucita] suffered physical violence on [sic] the hands of her husband, caused by physical trauma, slapping of the cheek, boxing and fist blows. The effect of the so-called alterations in the Memorandum/Medical Certificate questioned by [William] does not depart from the main thrust of the testimony of the said doctor. Also, the testimony of [Lucita] herself consistently and constantly established that [William] inflicted repeated physical violence upon her during their marriage and that she had been subjected to grossly abusive conduct when he constantly hurled invectives at her even in front of their customers and employees, shouting words like, "gaga", "putang ina mo," tanga," and "you dont know anything." These were further corroborated by several incidents narrated by Linda Lim who lived in their conjugal home from 1989 to 1991. She saw her sister after the December 14, 1995 incident when she (Lucita) was fetched by the latter on the same date. She was a witness to the kind of relationship her sister and [William] had during the three years she lived with them. She observed that [William] has an "explosive temper, easily gets angry and becomes very violent." She cited several instances which proved that William Ong indeed treated her wife shabbily and despicably, in words and deeds. xxx That the physical violence and grossly abusive conduct were brought to bear upon [Lucita] by [William] have been duly established by [Lucita] and her witnesses. These incidents were not explained nor controverted by [William], except by making a general denial thereof. Consequently, as between an affirmative assertion and a general denial, weight must be accorded to the affirmative assertion. The grossly abusive conduct is also apparent in the instances testified to by [Lucita] and her sister. The injurious invectives hurled at [Lucita] and his treatment of her, in its entirety, in front of their employees and friends, are enough to constitute grossly abusive conduct. The aggregate behavior of [William] warrants legal separation under grossly abusive conduct. x x x11 William filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the CA on April 26, 2002.12 Hence the present petition where William claims that: I THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW IN DISREGARDING CLEAR EVIDENCE THAT THE PETITION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION WAS

INSTITUTED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT FOR THE SOLE PURPOSE OF REMOVING FROM PETITIONER THE CONTROL AND OWNERSHIP OF THEIR CONJUGAL PROPERTIES AND TO TRANSFER THE SAME TO PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FAMILY. II THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW IN DISREGARDING CLEAR EVIDENCE REPUDIATING PRIVATE RESPONDENTS CLAIM OF REPEATED PHYSICAL VIOLENCE AND GROSSLY ABUSIVE CONDUCT ON THE PART OF PETITIONER.13 William argues that: the real motive of Lucita and her family in filing the case is to wrest control and ownership of properties belonging to the conjugal partnership; these properties, which include real properties in Hong Kong, Metro Manila, Baguio and Dagupan, were acquired during the marriage through his (Williams) sole efforts; the only parties who will benefit from a decree of legal separation are Lucitas parents and siblings while such decree would condemn him as a violent and cruel person, a wife-beater and child abuser, and will taint his reputation, especially among the Filipino-Chinese community; substantial facts and circumstances have been overlooked which warrant an exception to the general rule that factual findings of the trial court will not be disturbed on appeal; the findings of the trial court that he committed acts of repeated physical violence against Lucita and their children were not sufficiently established; what took place were disagreements regarding the manner of raising and disciplining the children particularly Charleston, Lucitas favorite son; marriage being a social contract cannot be impaired by mere verbal disagreements and the complaining party must adduce clear and convincing evidence to justify legal separation; the CA erred in relying on the testimonies of Lucita and her witnesses, her sister Linda Lim, and their parents doctor, Dr. Vicente Elinzanzo, whose testimonies are tainted with relationship and fraud; in the 20 years of their marriage, Lucita has not complained of any cruel behavior on the part of William in relation to their marital and family life; William expressed his willingness to receive respondent unconditionally however, it is Lucita who abandoned the conjugal dwelling on December 14, 1995 and instituted the complaint below in order to appropriate for herself and her relatives the conjugal properties; the Constitution provides that marriage is an inviolable social institution and shall be protected by the State, thus the rule is the preservation of the marital union and not its infringement; only for grounds enumerated in Art. 55 of the Family Code, which grounds should be clearly and convincingly proven, can the courts decree a legal separation among the spouses.14 Respondent Lucita in her Comment, meanwhile, asserts that: the issues raised in the present petition are factual; the findings of both lower courts rest on strong and clear evidence borne by the records; this Court is not a trier of facts and factual findings of the RTC when confirmed by the CA are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal; the contention of William that Lucita filed the case for legal separation in order to remove from William the control and ownership of their

conjugal properties and to transfer the same to Lucitas family is absurd; Lucita will not just throw her marriage of 20 years and forego the companionship of William and her children just to serve the interest of her family; Lucita left the conjugal home because of the repeated physical violence and grossly abusive conduct of petitioner.
15

Petitioner filed a Reply, reasserting his claims in his petition,16 as well as a Memorandum where he averred for the first time that since respondent is guilty of abandonment, the petition for legal separation should be denied following Art. 56, par. (4) of the Family Code.17 Petitioner argues that since respondent herself has given ground for legal separation by abandoning the family simply because of a quarrel and refusing to return thereto unless the conjugal properties were placed in the administration of petitioners in-laws, no decree of legal separation should be issued in her favor.18 Respondent likewise filed a Memorandum reiterating her earlier assertions.19 We resolve to deny the petition. It is settled that questions of fact cannot be the subject of a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The rule finds more stringent application where the CA upholds the findings of fact of the trial court. In such instance, this Court is generally bound to adopt the facts as determined by the lower courts.20 The only instances when this Court reviews findings of fact are: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to that of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.21 As petitioner failed to show that the instant case falls under any of the exceptional circumstances, the general rule applies. Indeed, this Court cannot review factual findings on appeal, especially when they are borne out by the records or are based on substantial evidence.22 In this case, the findings of the RTC were affirmed by the CA and are adequately supported by the

records. As correctly observed by the trial court, William himself admitted that there was no day that he did not quarrel with his wife, which made his life miserable, and he blames her for being negligent of her wifely duties and for not reporting to him the wrongdoings of their children.23 Lucita and her sister, Linda Lim, also gave numerous accounts of the instances when William displayed violent temper against Lucita and their children; such as: when William threw a steel chair at Lucita;24 threw chairs at their children;25 slapped Lucita and utter insulting words at her;26 use the buckle of the belt in whipping the children; 27 pinned Lucita against the wall with his strong arms almost strangling her, and smashed the flower vase and brick rocks and moldings leaving the bedroom in disarray;28 shouted at Lucita and threw a directory at her, in front of Linda and the employees of their business, because he could not find a draft letter on his table;29 got mad at Charleston for cooking steak with vetchin prompting William to smash the plate with steak and hit Charleston, then slapped Lucita and shouted at her "putang ina mo, gago, wala kang pakialam, tarantado" when she sided with Charleston;30 and the December 9 and December 14, 1995 incidents which forced Lucita to leave the conjugal dwelling.31 Lucita also explained that the injuries she received on December 14, 1995, were not the first. As she related before the trial court: q. You stated on cross examination that the injuries you sustained on December 14, 1995 were the most serious? a. Unlike before I considered December 14, 1995 the very serious because before it is only on the arm and black eye, but on this December 14, I suffered bruises in all parts of my body, sir.32 To these, all William and his witnesses, could offer are denials and attempts to downplay the said incidents.33 As between the detailed accounts given for Lucita and the general denial for William, the Court gives more weight to those of the former. The Court also gives a great amount of consideration to the assessment of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses as trial court judges enjoy the unique opportunity of observing the deportment of witnesses on the stand, a vantage point denied appellate tribunals.34 Indeed, it is settled that the assessment of the trial court of the credibility of witnesses is entitled to great respect and weight having had the opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses while testifying.35 In this case, the RTC noted that:

Williams denial and that of his witnesses of the imputation of physical violence committed by him could not be given much credence by the Court. Since the office secretary Ofelia Rosal and the family laundrywoman Rosalino Morco are dependent upon defendant for their livelihood, their testimonies may be tainted with bias and they could not be considered as impartial and credible witnesses. So with Kingston Ong who lives with defendant and depends upon him for support.36 Parenthetically, William claims that that the witnesses of Lucita are not credible because of their relationship with her. We do not agree. Relationship alone is not reason enough to discredit and label a witnesss testimony as biased and unworthy of credence37 and a witness relationship to one of the parties does not automatically affect the veracity of his or her testimony.38 Considering the detailed and straightforward testimonies given by Linda Lim and Dr. Vicente Elinzano, bolstered by the credence accorded them by the trial court, the Court finds that their testimonies are not tainted with bias. William also posits that the real motive of Lucita in filing the case for legal separation is in order for her side of the family to gain control of the conjugal properties; that Lucita was willing to destroy his reputation by filing the legal separation case just so her parents and her siblings could control the properties he worked hard for. The Court finds such reasoning hard to believe. What benefit would Lucita personally gain by pushing for her parents and siblings financial interests at the expense of her marriage? What is more probable is that there truly exists a ground for legal separation, a cause so strong, that Lucita had to seek redress from the courts. As aptly stated by the RTC, ...it would be unthinkable for her to throw away this twenty years of relationship, abandon the comforts of her home and be separated from her children whom she loves, if there exists no cause, which is already beyond her endurance.39 The claim of William that a decree of legal separation would taint his reputation and label him as a wife-beater and child-abuser also does not elicit sympathy from this Court. If there would be such a smear on his reputation then it would not be because of Lucitas decision to seek relief from the courts, but because he gave Lucita reason to go to court in the first place. Also without merit is the argument of William that since Lucita has abandoned the family, a decree of legal separation should not be granted, following Art. 56, par. (4) of the Family Code which provides that legal separation shall be denied when both parties have given ground for legal separation. The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is abandonment without justifiable cause for more than one year.40 As it was established that Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct, such does not constitute abandonment contemplated by the said provision. As a final note, we reiterate that our Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social institution.41 The Constitution itself

however does not establish the parameters of state protection to marriage and the family, as it remains the province of the legislature to define all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it and put into operation the constitutional provisions that protect the same.42 With the enactment of the Family Code, this has been accomplished as it defines marriage and the family, spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that affect married and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity and those for legal separation.43 As Lucita has adequately proven the presence of a ground for legal separation, the Court has no reason but to affirm the findings of the RTC and the CA, and grant her the relief she is entitled to under the law. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson), Ynares-Santiago, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur. Footnotes
1

Rollo, pp. 30-44; penned by Associate Justice Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis and concurred in by Associate Justices Teodoro P. Regino and Josefina GuevaraSalonga.
2 Rollo, p. 46. 3 See records, p. 1. 4 Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds:

(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common child, or a child of petitioner; xxx
5 6 7 8

Records, p. 2. Rollo, pp. 49-51 (RTC Decision). Id. at 53 (RTC Decision). Rollo, p. 56.

Id. at 55. Id. at 40-44. Rollo, pp. 40-42. Id. at 46. Id. at 8-9. Rollo, pp. 9-24. Id. at 149-152. Id. at 157-169.

10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

Art. 56. The petition for legal separation shall be denied on any of the following grounds: xxx (4) Where both parties have given ground for legal separation; xxx Rollo, pp. 210-236.
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

Id. at 221. Id. at 188-203. Mangonon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125041, June 30, 2006. Id. Potenciano v. Reynoso, 449 Phil. 396, 405-406 (2003). TSN, Ong Eng Kiam, September 25, 1997, pp. 29-32. TSN, Lucita Ong, June 11, 1997, p. 14. Id. at 20. Id. at 21.

27 Id. at 23. 28 TSN, Linda Lim, June 25, 1997, p. 5. 29 Id. at 5-6. 30 Id. at 7-8. 31 TSN, Lucita Ong, May 9, 1997, pp. 9-11, 16. 32 Id. at 21. 33 See TSN, Ong Eng Kiam, September 25, 1997, pp. 11, 53; TSN, Kingston Ong,

September 24, 1997, pp. 16-18.

34 35

Roca v. Court of Appeals, 403 Phil. 326, 333 (2001).

Cirelos v. Hernandez, G.R. No. 146523, June 15, 2006; Antonio v. Reyes, G.R. No. 155800, March 10, 2006, 484 SCRA 353, 364.
36 Rollo, p. 56. 37 Roca v. Court of Appeals, supra note 34 at 334. 38 Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127473, December 8, 2003,

417 SCRA 196, 207.

39 Rollo, p. 55. 40 Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds

(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year.
41 Tuason v. Court of Appeals, 326 Phil. 169, 180 (1996). 42 Antonio v. Reyes, supra note 35 at 372. 43 Id. at 372.