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theory, establishing among others the notions of logical bi-simplexes (or structures), of (n-1)-dimensional modal n(m)-graphs, the logical

series of ndimensional hyper-owers and hyper-tetraicosahedra (or -structures) and the powerful setting method of modal decoration. In order to be able to formalise geometrically (i.e. n-oppositionally) the existing systems of modal logic (i.e. in order to show and explore the concrete use and utility of abstract nopposition theory as applied to any particular system of modal logic, normal or non-normal) we need to go beyond this commitment to graph linearity (for clarity, if the modal graph of S5 is linear, the one of S4 has two nested forkings). We do it in the present study, where we show how to interpret, inside n-opposition theory, forkings and isolated points (or isolated basic modalities) of classical and non-classical modal graphs by means of the set-theoretic decoration method newly adapted.

S. Salaet (Barcelona): An abstract algebraic logic view on Nelsons paraconsistent logic N4


The N4 logic is the paraconsistent version of the N3 logic. N3 logic was developed by Nelson in the forties to solve a problem of the negation in Intuitionistic logic. The so-called problem of the strong negation: in the later logic we cant derive the negation of or from the negation of . In the last years, Odintsov makes a sistematically study of the variety VN4 which gives completness for N4. He also characterizes it with help of the socalled twist-structures over implicative lattices. We make in relation these results with the theory of algebraic abstrac logic. In particular we show VN4 gives an algebraic equivalent semantics to N4 and we also show it is exactly Mod*S, the class of reduced models of S. This proves N4 is strongly axiomatizable. We also develop an example which proves N4 is paraconsistent and not regularly axiomatizable. Finally we show special lters, as dened by Odintsov, are all the lters for every A in VN4.

K. Br unnler (Bern): Is there a proof theory of temporal logic?


Currently known sequent systems for temporal logics such as propositional linear time temporal logic (PLTL) either include a cut rule in some form or an innitary rule, which is a rule with innitely many premises. Both kinds of systems are unsatisfactory for automated deduction and for studying cut elimination. I will discuss the question of whether there is a satisfactory nitary cut-free sequent system and what satisfactory means in the rst place.

A. Costa-Leite (Neuch atel): Paraconsistentization of logics - the general theory of paraconsistent logics
Given a logic, how to obtain its paraconsistent counterpart? Given a paraconsistent logic, how to obtain the non-paraconsistent counterpart of this logic? 5

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