Vous êtes sur la page 1sur 109
MASARYKOVA UNIVERZITA FAKULTA SOCIÁLNÍCH STUDIÍ Katedra politologie THE RELIGIOUS CLEAVAGE AND ITS IMPACT ON PARTIES BEHAVIOUR IN INDIA MAGISTERSKÁ PRÁCE Ing. Bc. Ladislav Kudláček Vedoucí práce: Mgr. Tomáš Šmíd, PhD. UČO: 42062 Obor: Politologie Imatrikulační ročník: 2007 Brno, New Delhi, 2008 Prohlašuji, že jsem tuto magisterskou diplomovou práci na oboru politologie Fakulty sociálních studií Masarykovy univerzity vypracoval samostatně a pouze za použití uvedených pramenů a literatury. .................................................. Ladislav Kudláček student magisterského prezenčního studia politologie 2 Poděkování Srdečně děkuji vedoucímu práce Mgr. Tomáši Šmídovi PhD. za odborné vedení práce a profesoru M. P. Singhovi z University of Delhi za užitečné připomínky k práci. Děkuji rovněž Shaguftě Anzum Suheily za pomoc při konečné jazykové úpravě. Ladislav Kudláček 3 Contents: Abstract.......................................................................................................................................5 Introduction.................................................................................................................................6 1.Democratization in society with strong cleavages...................................................................8 1.1.Donald L. Horowitz: Model of integrative and exclusive Majoritarianism....................11 1.2.Arend Lijphart: Consociational democracy....................................................................13 1.3.Steven I. Wilkinson: Relationship between party competition and a state’s response to anti-minority polarization and violence................................................................................16 2.Electoral systems in India and its analysis in the context of Horowitz and Lijphart’s concepts.....................................................................................................................................18 2.1.Electoral systems – basic description.............................................................................18 2.2.Electoral systems – theoretical understanding................................................................20 3.Affiliation of the main political parties by the religion cleavage..........................................22 3.1.Parties with secularism affiliation...................................................................................23 3.1.1.Secularism in Indian Context...................................................................................23 3.1.2.Congress party and United Progressive Alliance.....................................................24 3.1.3.Leftist parties...........................................................................................................25 3.2.Parties with Hinduism affiliation....................................................................................26 3.3.Parties with Islamic (Muslim) affiliation........................................................................28 3.4.Parties with other mostly regional or specific community affiliation.............................30 3.5.The characteristics of the main relevant political parties in India..................................31 3.5.1.Indian National Congress.........................................................................................32 3.5.2.Bharatiya Janata Party..............................................................................................32 3.5.3.Communist Party of India (Marxist)........................................................................34 3.5.4.Bahujan Samaj Party................................................................................................36 3.5.5.Samajwadi Party......................................................................................................37 4.Analysis of the election on the federal level in relation to the main religious disorder and clashes in the context of Horowitz, Lijphart.............................................................................38 4.1.Indian federalism based and minority autonomy............................................................38 4.2.Horowitz’s majoritarism.................................................................................................41 4.3.Lijphart’s Indian Puzzle .................................................................................................50 5.Analysis of the election results in regions with large and frequent religious conflicts in Indian States in the context of Wilkinson.................................................................................55 5.1.Gujarat case study...........................................................................................................59 5.2.Orissa case study.............................................................................................................64 5.3.Uttar Pradesh case study.................................................................................................68 5.4.Kerela case study............................................................................................................73 5.5.Rajasthan case study.......................................................................................................80 5.6.Maharashtra case study...................................................................................................84 5.7.Bihar case study..............................................................................................................88 5.8.Wilkinson’s hypothesis and its modification and alternative explanation......................93 Conclusion................................................................................................................................96 Sources and Literatures.............................................................................................................98 List of Figures.........................................................................................................................104 List of Diagrams.....................................................................................................................105 Počet znaků: 174 000 znaků včetně mezer bez poznámek pod čarou 178 527 znaků včetně mezer a poznámek pod čarou 4 Abstract The work has evaluated the hypothesis that government without minority electorates’ requirement does not protect the minorities against violence, riots and aggression from majority. There is a critical view on Indian political system which has been evaluated and compared with Lijphart’s theory of consensual democracy and Horowitz theory of Majoritarism. Some significant points which support division and clashes in Indian societies have been found. These points are evaluated by the two mentioned theoretical approaches. The other evaluated theoretical assumption in this work is based on Wilkinson hypothesis which describe relationship between party competition and a state's response to anti-minority polarization and violence. Wilkinson supports Lijphart and Horowitz assumption of office holding and proportional representation. Without that the riots and violence against minorities have bigger intensity. The work has compared selected cases of governments’ and parties’ behaviour in particular Indian states using Wilkinson’s and Varshney’s data and enlarged them by new data collection based on Times of India records. There is a link between minority support (as well as proportional representation) for government increasing its fair behaviour and minority protection from government. However, there are also some deviations from this hypothesis which need explanation. The numbers of riots and deaths as a one measurement of their intensities compare the party and government behaviour in particular cases. The number of parties in government and their core electoral support indicates the intensity as well as quantity of communal violence in India. This work has enlarged the hypothesis and the cases of moderate Multipartism with bipolar spectrum have been included Wilkinson’s assumption. 5 Introduction India is a country of many religions which have coexisted for several centuries. This coexistence could be generally characterised as peaceful, but also has some historical and ideological clashes, which have generated problems in both the past and present time. The nationalism and its ideology have brought new troubles to the political and common life of many religious communities in many parts of India. The identity of Indians with the Indian state has been eroded by these clashes and the Indian political system as well as the main political parties have to cope with these challenges. The main challenge and also the topic of this work is to study the religious clashes and Hinduism’s and Muslim’s nationalism. These religious cleavages have brought problems such as terrorism and community riots. This work will analyse these problems of Indian religions in political life. The main goals of this thesis are: 1. Thesis will find the highlighted points of Lijphart and Horowitz theoretical approach of problem solving of electoral democracy in divided Indian society and find which of these points have any practical connection in India similar to those. 2. Willkinson’s hypothesis of the impact of number of the parties in the political system on India states government minorities’ policy. Practical cases show how strong is the influence of Majoritarism election system on ethnic policy. These goals will be following by verification of two main hypotheses which have been analysed in this text. The hypotheses are: 1. Hypothesis has based on comparison of Indian real political system with the theoretical approach of Lijphart and Horowitz. The ethnic disorder is produced by the system gaps which do not follow the Lijphart’s and Horowitz’s ideal model and recommendation. 2. The number of parties in Indian state governments has strong influence on the number of ethnic disorder. If the government depends on minorities’ votes or secular and minority parties, the number of ethnic violence is lower. If the government depends on majority population the number of death in violence increases. There is a statistical comparison of a number of death and number of ethnic violence in selected Indian states. The work uses selected case studies of Indian states - Gujarat, Uttar Pradesh, Kerala, Orissa, Maharashtra, Rajasthan and Bihar. They were selected because together they constitute most 6 of the examples which are possible to find in India relating to our study. Gujarat and Rajasthan are examples of two parties competition, Kerala is an example of a peaceful state with secular party system as oppose to the violent Gujarat. Uttar Pradesh and Bihar are examples of states with successful state parties having tremendous influence in federal level and with different level of responsibility. Gujarat, Maharashtra and Orissa gave the examples of increasing level of violence with growing electoral success of nationalistic parties in different environment. These examples together complete the scale of potential example of party competition in India. The deeper explanation of case studies selection is explained in chapter 5. Main goals will be enriched by description of Indian secularism as well as by concept of Indian (Hinduism) nationalism – Hindutva ideology. There will be also an analysis and description of main political parties in India (mainly on federal level) and their affiliation to religion. 7 1. Democratization in society with strong cleavages The third wave of democratization brought tremendous discussion about the role of electoral system in reproduction of democratic system. Many scholars such as Lijphart, Horowitz, Reynolds or Reilly discussed their ideal concept of electoral system in divided societies and compared the practical cases from real political world. Their works introduce also their normative view on ideal election system, however, their researches are based on practical cases. This work has focused mainly on popular normative attitude to this problem presented by Lijphart and Horowitz. The fundamental base of these case studies is built on consensus that first-past-the-post (FPTP) system is not the best electoral design for divided societies with strong multi-ethnical cleavages. Westminster’s model of democracy does not generate interethnical cooperation and increases the probability of mono-ethnical majority in legislative assembly and government. The minorities have then lower chance to enunciate its interest in normal political way. (compare with Chytílek 2007: 145-146) Horowitz and Lijphart described their views on the ideal electoral model for divided societies. The evaluation of the electoral system plays an important role for understanding the “practice” of politics. Its role is significant, because electoral system helps determine how many parties a country has, how cohesive they are, who forms the government, and how long the government cabinets tend to last. Electoral system is expressed in electoral laws and their impact depends on the way politicians and voters make use of these laws. At times, flawed electoral laws can undo democracy or lead to staleness. (Taagepera 2007: 1) However, as also Horowitz wrote “no electoral system simply reflects voter preferences or the existing pattern of cleavages in a society or the prevailing political party configuration. Every party shape and reshapes these features of the environment, and each does so in different ways…The best electoral system is the one that straightforwardly and most accurately reflects the preferences of voters.” (Horowitz 2003a: 3) There are also six significant goals which Horowitz defined as the potential best way to achieve the functioning electoral system in divided societies. The choice must also be geared to the pre-existing features of the political environment, since the functioning of electoral mechanisms varies with the context. Here are the six Horowitz’s possible goals: 1. proportionality of seats to votes; 2. accountability to constituents; 3. durable governments; 8 4. victory of the “Condorcet winner”; 5. interethnic and inter-religious conciliation; 6. minority office holding. (Horowitz 2003a: 4) Chapter 1.1. will discuss these six point in detailed perspective as well as Horowitz model of integrative and exclusive Majoritarianism which give normative recommendations for ideal system for divided societies. Then this theoretical perspective will be compared with Indian reality. Arend Lijphart, the other scholar, who tried to find ideal electoral system for society with strong ethnical, religious cleavages in his article The Puzzle of Indian Democracy: A Consociational Interpretation defined the Indian model of ethnical divided society and function saying that the Indian experience does not resemble ethnically accommodative consociation democracy. For one, the structures of majoritarianism excluded elements of proportionality and autonomy central to consociationalism; for another, the partition of India was a partition against consociationalism and for the construction of a majority and unitary state. Lijphart’s effort to understand the ‘puzzle of Indian democracy’ in the form of a ‘consociation interpretation’ misunderstands religious ‘encapsulation’ as autonomy, tactical political accommodation within the Congress as elite power-sharing, and linguistic pluralism within meta-Hindu areas as developed federalism. In an ideal consociational system minority rights are entrenched, guaranteed and backed by a minority veto. ( Singh 2000: 46) Consociationalism is meant to apply where cleavages are deep and unmediated by multiple memberships. To manage conflict in such societies, Lijphart argues, requires using four mechanisms of governance: segmental autonomy, a grand coalition of governing elites, proportional representation and mutual vetoes. Consociations are systems characterized by these four distinguishing features. (Eisenberg 2006) Look at the precondition of consensual democracy as Lijphart called in Indian concept “the Indian puzzle”: A) Grand coalition governments include representatives of all major linguistic and religious groups. B) A minority veto with regard to vital minority rights and autonomy. C) Proportionality in political representation and civil service appointments. D) Cultural autonomy for linguistic and religious groups.(Lijphart 1996: 258) The issue of ideal model of consociationalism, consocional or consensual democracy (in this work will be used as synonym) will be discussed in detailed perspective in chapter 1.2. 9 Lijphart also defined his normative evaluation of electoral system in divided societies based on mentioned consociationalism which will be discussed also in the same chapter. Lijphart’s theoretical perspective with his practical description of Indian political system will be critically evaluated from the present Indian perspective. He also presented his ideal model of “one size” power sharing or consensual democracy which should give the best fit for dividing societies (Lijphart 2004: 99) and have been described also in chapter 1.2. The Indian model of consensual democracy will be discussed in chapter 2 and 4. Table 1 offers the overview of theoretical approaches to designing of electoral systems and gives also the abstract of their functioning. This work has focused mostly on Lijphart and Horowitz model. Table 1 Models of democracy for divided societies Characterisations characterisation and goal of electoral system FPTP system support artificial majorities proportional electoral system, goal is the most realistic vote transformation to the seats mechanical effect of electoral system Strong Weak strategi implication for c effect dividing societies of electora l system Strong supporting exclusion of some minority group Weak function of electoral system in allocation process is neutral, moderation is duty of political elites in great coalition (seatpooling) Medium connection between consensual practices on the level of elites (seat pooling) and interethnic appeals through vote pooling in constituencies Strong strong support of interethnic appeals through vote pooling or constituency pooling Exclusive majoritarism Westminster model of democracy Consensus model great coalition, (Lijphart) proportional representation (proportional electoral system), proportionality in sources allocation, multilateral veto, segmental autonomy Integrative parliamentalism, great consensual model coalition, federalism, (Reynolds) proportional electoral system – STV STV electoral system support crosscutting cleavages Weak Inclusive presidentialism, majoritarism alternative voting (centripetalism, system, federalism integrative majoritarism) (Horowitz, Reilly) alternative voting, the goal is to enforce interethnic appeals in heterogenic constituencies Strong Source: Chytílek 2007: 146 10 Chapter 1.3. describes another view on communal violence which focuses more on existing examples of election results than on normative approaches of electoral design. Moreover, there is a strong link between normative approaches of Lijphart and Horowitz. Their ideal models predict the output of the electoral system and number of parties in government which is important for Wilkinson hypothesis. 1.1. Donald L. Horowitz: Model of integrative and exclusive Majoritarianism One of the leading theorists of democratic institutional design, Donald L. Horowitz, emphasizes how powerful the electoral system can be in shaping the character of a democracy and how vexing the choices can be. There are numerous ways that voter preferences can be aggregated in order to determine which parties get how many seats in parliament. Every electoral system has biases and no system merely passively translates “individual wishes into a collective choice.” Horowitz identifies six above mentioned possible aims of an electoral system, some of which directly conflict with one another. (Diamond and Plattner 2006: X). First goal of Horowitz is the normative goal of proportionality – the closest possible matches for the relative party shares of the vote. It could be call also as “fairness”. ( Diamond and Plattner 2006: X) Scholars and decision makers are inclined to judge electoral systems by their ability or inability to produce proportional results. ( Horowitz 2003a: 4) Horowitz emphasized that this is not one of the most important goal among the other six. Accountability to constituents should show that the elections to representative bodies assume some degree of accountability of legislators to those who elect them. Generally the electoral systems which limit the power of central party leaders to choose candidates produce more responsive representatives. This shows the sovereignty of the voter to choose the candidates. When central party leaders have power to select candidates, the voter’s sovereignty to choose the candidates, rather than just to choose among candidates, is thought to be impaired. Horowitz said that possibilities to choose among candidates (such as in open list in proportional representation) can have perverse consequences, especially in multiethnic societies. (Horowitz 2003a: 5) Durable government is a third goal. An electoral system is not able to represent the idiosyncratic opinions of every voter. Nevertheless, according to Horowitz, some systems make it possible for many shades of opinion to be represented, sometimes so many that the legislature ends up being fragmented, with no party having anywhere near 50 % of the seats. 11 In these particular cases are coalition governments necessary. Where the legislature is garmented, it may be difficult to put together durable coalitions. Other electoral design may force parties to aggregate the diverse opinions in a society for the sake of electoral success. Where this happens and diverse opinions are represented within parties rather than across parties. The reduction in the number of parties makes it more likely that durable governments can be formed. And durable governments are thought to be desirable as they promote policy consistency and responsibility and may avoid the instability that can result during interregna or from the creation of fragile, unpredictable coalitions. (Horowitz 2003a: 5-6) As a forth goal Horowitz mentioned a Victory of the Condorcet winner. The Condorcet winner is the candidate who would receive a majority of the vote in a paired or head-to-head contest with each and every other candidate. Winner is obviously the more popular candidate, whose victory ought to be preferred. However, there are obstacles to this outcome and some electoral systems can disfavour the Condorcet winner and it could be wanting. Horowitz has chosen the system of alternative vote as an electoral design that does a good job at picking the Condorcet winner. (Horowitz 2003a: 6) Interethnic and interreligious conciliation is fifth goal of Horowitz institutional design. Electoral systems that produce proportional result or accountability to constituents or durable governments may or may not foster interethnic conciliation. Important question is whether a given system provides politicians with electoral inducements for moderate behaviour, that is, for compromises with members of other ethnic groups for the sake of electoral success. Electoral systems that allow politicians to be elected without behaving moderately may make post-electoral conciliation more difficult. For interethnic conciliation, the question is how the electoral system affects the pre-electoral calculations of parties and politicians. ( Horowitz 2003a: 6-7) The necessity to engage in what Horowitz calls “vote-pooling’ in order to win elections and maintain coalitions is what forces politicians to moderate their demands and offer protection to minorities. (Wilkinson 2004: 7) As a last but not least goal for multiethnic successful societies is requirement of minority office holding. It gives rise to attempts to achieve proportionality between votes and seats, except that proportionality in that respect is party proportionality rather than group proportionality. Creation of homogeneous constituencies could mean not only more minoritydominated constituencies but also more constituencies in which majority-group voters dominate and in which majority-group candidates do not need to worry about minority 12 support or minority interests. (Horowitz 2003a: 7-8) Horowitz put stress on importance of majority interest in minority votes also in earlier mentioned goals. Horowitz and also Australian political scientist Ben Really examined to what extent electoral systems can “encourage cooperation and accommodation among rival groups, and therefore work to reduce the salience of ethnicity.” Both scholars preferred vote-pooling mechanisms, which “make politicians reciprocally dependent on votes from groups other than their own.“ Such systems give an advantage to moderate candidates who reach across the divides of party and ethnicity to appeal for the second and lower-order preferences of the voters, and who thereby exhibit a “capacity to represent groups other than their own.” Horowitz evaluated this system through his mentioned six goals. The potential electoral design see in alternative vote and see also the value of the single transferable vote (STV), in which voters rank a larger number of candidates in multimember districts. The advantage of STV is that it is a fairer, more proportional system than AV, better able to represent minorities. The disadvantage, Horowitz stressed, is that the low threshold for election in a district “provides few incentives to inter party agreements to transfer votes,” and thus generates “weaker incentives to compromise” than alternative vote (AV), under which a candidate must ultimately gather enough lower-order preferences to win a majority of votes in the district. (Diamond and Plattner 2006: XII-XIII) 1.2. Arend Lijphart: Consociational democracy Consociational, consensual or consensus democracy described by Arend Lijphart is in his words “kind of democracy can be seen as an institutional arrangement that is able to produce as much consensus as possible in countries, such as ethnically and religiously divided societies, where a spontaneous consensus is in short supply. ” (Lijphart 1998: 100) Lijphart used the term consociational democracy in his book Democracy in Plural Societies published in 1977. In this book, he emphasized “consociational” democracy as a solution for states where traditional majoritarian democracy might not work due to deep ethnic, linguistic, or religious cleavages. (Lijphart 1977) Later he advocates “consensus democracy” in his book Patterns of Democracy as the ideal governance type for any country. It is not ideal type just for deeply divided states. (Lijphart 1999a) The crucial decisions by political leaders are to establish power-sharing in some of the deeply divided societies. The power-sharing systems that were set up in some societies (such as 13 Switzerland in 1943, Austria in 1945, Malaysia in 1955, Belgium in 1970) have the same general pattern: an inclusive government consisting of representatives of all of the important rival groups; as much autonomy for these groups as possible; proportionality in representation and appointments; and a formal or informal minority veto power with regard to the most vital and fundamental matters. (Lijphart 1998: 101-102) Lijphart (1998: 102) argued that set power sharing systems were “invented and re-invented time and again because of its compelling logic: it was the most rational choice to be made in the circumstances of potential or actual civil strife. The moral is that pure rational-choice decisions can and do occur.” The important part of consensus in society Lijphart found in consisting of the types of executive power, executive and legislative relations, party system, electoral system, and interest group system. Democracies that have either broad governing coalitions or minority cabinets that are dependent on the shifting support of legislative majorities (instead of oneparty majority governments) also tend to have relatively strong legislatures (instead of dominant, and even domineering, executives), multiparty systems (instead of two-party systems), proportional election systems (instead of plurality or majority electoral systems), and corporatist or coordinated interest group systems (instead of free-for-all competitive pluralism among interest groups). These are the democracies that Lijphart call consensus democracies, and the democracies characterized by the contrasting cluster of traits are the majoritarian democracies. Elections by proportional representation allow or encourage multiple parties to form and to gain representation in parliaments, and multiparty systems make it more likely that either coalition or minority cabinets will be formed. (Lijphart 1998: 103-104) Lijphart disagree with Horowitz and his concept of “one size fits all” recommendation regarding power sharing rules and institutions while the optimal model should be adapted according to the particular features of the country at hand. Lijphart disagree that everything depends on these characteristics. (Lijphart 2004: 99) He offer his own way and outlined nine areas of constitutional choice and provide own recommendations in each area. He called “one size” power sharing model. Lijphart found as one of the most important choice is the legislative electoral system, for which three broad categories are proportional representation (PR), majoritarian systems, and intermediate systems. For divided societies, ensuring the election of a broadly representative legislature should be the crucial consideration, and PR is undoubtedly according to Lijphart the optimal way of doing so. (Lijphart 2004: 99-100) Lijphart argued that consensus 14 democracies clearly outperform the majoritarian democracies. The reason for this is partly structural, because consensus democracies generally use proportional representation (PR) as their electoral systems. PR makes it much easier for minorities and women to be elected, and PR also boosts voter turnout in two ways: by minimizing the wasted-vote problem, it makes it more attractive for voters to vote, and by making it more attractive for parties to campaign in areas where they are relatively weak, such stronger party efforts will also stimulate turnout. However, an alternative or additional explanation would be cultural: consensus democracy itself and what I have just called its "consequences" may both be argued to spring from a general cultural inclination toward a strong community orientation and social consciousness. And indeed, the consensus democracies are the kinder and gentler democracies: they are more likely than majoritarian democracies to be welfare states, to be protective of the environment, to have less punitive criminal justice systems (as measured by their rates of incarceration and use of the death penalty), and to be more generous with foreign aid. The moral of this story is another victory for cultural explanation. (Lijphart 1998: 105-106) The Lijphart’s trust in proportional representation will be significant for critical approach of Indian electoral system in other part of this work. However, Lijphart also put the stress on guidelines with PR. A particular type selection within PR system can be significant especially for new democracies and it is also about creating much or less distance between voters and their representatives. (Lijphart 2004: 100-101) The distance could enlarge or reduce the possibilities for minorities’ representation. Earlier mentioned Horowitz’s thought said that possibilities to choose among candidates (such as in open list in proportional representation) could have perverse consequences, especially in multiethnic societies. (Horowitz 2003a: 5) For dividing societies is important choice also the selection between parliamentary or presidential government. In countries with deep ethnic and other cleavages, the choice should be based on the different systems’ relative potential for power sharing in the executive. As the cabinet in a parliamentary system is a collegial decision-making body – as opposed to the presidential one-person executive with a purely advisory cabinet – it offers the optimal setting for forming a broad power-sharing executive. Presidential election is necessarily majoritarian in nature. (Lijphart 2004: 102-103) As well as selection of the head of the state is important part of Lijphart theoretical approach. Lijphart agrees with Horowitz that sharing of executive power and group autonomy are two key ingredients for successful democracy in divided societies and denominated them as two "primary characteristics" of consociational democracy. Power-sharing means the 15 participation of the representatives of all significant groups in political decision-making, especially at the executive level; group autonomy (or nonterritorial autonomy) ( Lijphart 2004: 105) means that these groups have authority to run their own internal affairs, especially in the areas of education and culture. (Lijphart 1999b) Elite bargaining in democratic system has its own arrangement of mutual checks and balances. To the extent that elected representatives participate in the bargaining process, they are a channel through which popular desires, goals, and values enter into governmental decisions. Political and bureaucratic elites in democratic countries are powerful, far more powerful than ordinary citizens can be; but they are not despots. (Dahl 1998: 113-114) Cabinet stability problem, according to Lijphart, should not be overestimated. The vast majority of stable democracies have parliamentary rather than presidential or semipresidential forms of government. This is argument against others which says that cabinets depending on majority support in parliament can be dismissed by parliamentary votes of noconfidence which can lead to cabinet instability and, as a result, regime instability. ( Lijphart 2004: 103) The choice between federalism and decentralization is important for divided societies with geographically concentrated communal groups. Lijphart believes that a federal system is a good way to provide autonomy for these groups. He also recommends an existence of second (federal) legislative chamber with strong power. The shape of federalization should be designed by country to country. (Lijphart 2004: 104-105) Power sharing beyond the cabinet and parliament is essential. Broad representations of all communal groups suppose to be also in the civil service, judiciary, police as well as military. This aim can be achieved (but not necessary) by instituting ethnic or religious quotas. (Lijphart 2004: 105-106) 1.3. Steven I. Wilkinson: Relationship between party competition and a state’s response to anti-minority polarization and violence The essential question is what determines ethnic violence breaks out and whether the state will protect minorities or not? One response can be found in Wilkinson hypothesis that democratic states protect minorities when it is in their governments’ electoral interest to do so. It was also described on some cases in Indian states in theses “The Religious Clashes in India and Their Impact on Election Results“. Specifically, politicians in government will increase 16 the supply of protection to minorities when either of two conditions applies: when minorities are an important part of their party’s current support base, or the support base of one of their coalition partners in a coalition government; or when the overall electoral system in a state is so competitive – in terms of the effective number of parties – that there is therefore, a high probability that the governing party will have to negotiate or form coalitions with minority supported parties in the future, despite its own preferences. The necessity to engage in what Horowitz calls “vote-pooling’ in order to win elections and maintain coalitions is what forces politicians to moderate their demands and offer protection to minorities. We can call it “the prospect of vote pooling with profit”. In India, vote pooling moderates even the behaviour of nationalist parties that have no minority support, as long as these parties are forced to form coalitions with parties that do rely on minority votes. (Wilkinson 2004: 7-8) On the other hand, politicians in government will restrict the supply of security to minorities if they have no minority support and the overall levels of party competition in a state would be low. Figure 1 shows the model of the parties’ competition and its impact on government policy making in the field of minorities and religious groups. As it is showed in model A – three or more parties prevent the riots or community violence and care more about minorities. 17 Figure 1 The theoretical relationship between party competition and a state's response to antiminority polarization and violence (ENVP = effective number of parties1) Source: Wilkinson 2004: 139 2. Electoral systems in India and its analysis in the context of Horowitz and Lijphart’s concepts 2.1. Electoral systems – basic description India is a constitutional democracy with a parliamentary- federal system of government, and at the heart of the system is a commitment to hold regular, free and fair elections. These elections determine the composition of the government, the membership of the two houses of ) The formula for the effective number of parties is ENPV = 1/Σv i2 , where vi is vote share of the ith party. This widely used measure weights parties with a higher vote share more heavily than those parties with a very low vote share, thus providing a better measure of the “real” level of party competition than if we were to simply count the total number of parties competing in a state. (Wilkinson 2004: 7) For this work will be used the formula for effective number of parties in assembly: N=1/Σsi2, si seat share of the ith parties in assembly. (Šedo 2006: 87) This formula stresses more on party sharing in assembly and do not count with lost votes. This is more useful if the system use FPTP electoral system. 1 18 parliament, the state and union territory legislative assemblies, and the Presidency and vicepresidency. The country has been divided into 543 Parliamentary Constituencies, each of which returns one Member of Parliament to the Lok Sabha, the lower house of the Parliament. The size and shape of the parliamentary constituencies are determined by an independent Delimitation Commission, which aims to create constituencies and has roughly the same population, subject to geographical considerations and the boundaries of the states and administrative areas. (Election Commission of India) Delimitation is the redrawing of the boundaries of parliamentary or assembly constituencies to make sure that there are, as near as practicable, the same number of people in each constituency. In India boundaries are meant to be examined after the ten-yearly census to reflect changes in population, for which Parliament by law establishes an independent Delimitation Commission, made up of the Chief Election Commissioner and two judges or ex-judges from the Supreme Court or High Court. However, under a constitutional amendment of 1976, delimitation was suspended until after the census of 2001, ostensibly so that states’ family-planning programs would not affect their political representation in the Lok Sabha and Vidhan Sabhas. This has led to wide discrepancies in the size of constituencies, with the largest having over 2,500,000 electors, and the smallest less than 50,000. ( Election Commission of India) Parliament has two chambers – The House of the People (Lok Sabha) and The House of the States (Rajya Sabha). Lok Sabha has 545 members (Constitution of India, Chapter II, Article 81a), 543 members elected for a five year term in single-seat constituencies and 2 members appointed to represent the Anglo-Indian community. The two unelected members are a relic from the past. The special dispensation of nominating two members of European or Eurasian blood was created as a transitory arrangement, at the time of Independence in 1947, to protect the interests of the departing ruling class. The 543 members are elected under the plurality ('first past the post') electoral system. The House of the States has 245 members, 233 members elected for a six year term, with one third retiring every two years. ( Constitution of India, Chapter II, Article 80 ) The members are elected by legislators of the state and union (federal) territories. The elected members are chosen under the system of proportional representation by means of the Single Transferable Vote. The twelve members are to be nominated by the President in accordance with the provisions of clause as given in the Constitution of India, Chapter II, Article 80. 19 The State Assemblies have been divided into federal Parliamentary Constituencies, each of which returns one Member of Parliament to the Lok Sabha. The size and shape of the parliamentary constituencies are determined by an independent Delimitation Commission, which aims to create constituencies and has roughly the same population, subject to geographical considerations and the boundaries of the states and administrative areas. (Election Commission of India) 2.2. Electoral systems – theoretical understanding Indian electoral system took the basic electoral law for Lok Sabha and State Assemblies from British tradition and its Westminster model of Parliamentarism. However, selected FPTP system has operated differently. Indian electoral system with a single member district voting does not determinate the same outcomes as FPTP system in the UK. According to Duverger law the FPTP system should support two party system. However, Indian reality shows something different. The party system on federal level produces from 1990s multi-parties when in the period before the characteristic was party system with predominant party, which was INC. The last two decades are characterised by multi coalition government and by multi-parties. Indian party system could be characterises as a puzzle (Lijphart used this word for his description of Indian political system) of many party subsystems, which exist on the level of states of Indian union. Electoral concentration corresponds to party systems in particular Indian states. Federal party system is more puzzles of these states’ party structures, which mutually linked to each other. However, state level does not have always two party system formats as could be awaited according to FPTP and Westminster model (like in Great Britain). As an example could be mentioned Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Kerela, West Bengal etc. On the other side, it is possible to find almost pure two party system on state level in Gujarat. Indian party system has its anomalies, which do not reflect Duvergen’s or Sartori’s principles. Electoral concentration in India does not always follow traditional Indian cleavages (languages, religious, etc.), but system could be also described as multi-level political and party system of particular Indian states, which has its own conservancies on federal level. It is difficult to say that on the federal level is possible to find electoral concentration, but it is mostly state party system, which has its own specific differences from federal level. According to Strmiska, Indian political and party system does not have any theoretical 20 background, which is able to substantiate the strength of electoral system to party system. (Chytílek 2004: 45) It is not really possible to implement Sartori’s principles on the federal level. If we look at the Horowitz and Lijphart concept, we can see that they see in Westminster model and in its FPTP electoral system disadvantage for minority. The reductive effect of FPTP eliminates the minority votes (also Muslims) and its representatives. It means that in society where Hindus have majority is not possible for minorities (Muslims) gain the parliamentary seats or to have successful own party. Without the strong concentration of voters it is not possible to elect own minority representative. However, secular parties (such Congress) usually gains the minority votes and give a profit from such divided constituencies where do not exist big concentration of minority votes. The example of Gujarat state shows how the minority representation in assembly could be suppressed. Similar situation is also on the federal level. The example of Gujarat was selected, because the state has faced strong communal violence in past two decades. The number of Muslims in Gujarat is around 9 %. Nevertheless, it was only 3.2 % of candidates of INC (2.7 % of all elected candidates) in 2007 but it is bigger number compare to BJP. Gujarat has also very strong religious and community cleavage between Muslims and Hindus. The Muslim minority is underrepresented and main reason is the effect of FPTP. This is also one significant explanation which supports bipartism in Gujarat. The BJP is a party with strong affiliation to nationalism and ideology of Hindutva and INC opposes to this concept with its idea of secularism. This cleavage cannot be marginalised because FPTP increases it. Lijphart and as well as Horowitz see the FPTP as the way which increase communal disharmony due to under representation of minorities and cleavage increasing. The other example is Kerala where is strong Muslim community and in northern part of this state is strong concentration of voters in some constituencies and the local Muslim party Muslim league is able to gain majority of votes. On the other hand state Jammu and Kashmir shows that parties count with strategic electoral behaviour of voters. There is a party which makes a profit from Hindu minority. Hindus know that BJP cannot be elected and prefer secular Kashmir Peoples Democratic Party (JKPDP) which has chance to be elected and will protect their interest. These examples also show that FPTP system in India produce strategic behaviour among electorates and minorities. They try to vote according the religious cleavages, the parties which have chance to win and protect their interest. However, this does not solve the problem of under representation of minorities and low level of vote pooling. 21 Reservation of seats policy for religious minorities for parliamentary election does not exist on federal level. However, there are seats which are reserved for scheduled caste and scheduled tribe. Moreover, these backward communities have also special quotas for government services and higher education. This does not exist on religious base. There are some cases, which follow also the religious way. For example, the state Andhra Pradesh uses the reservation seats also for religious communities. However, the reservation of seats for minorities in election (Muslims) cannot solve the main problem with the effort to marginalize the community (religious) cleavage. There is no support of inter-ethnic appeals through vote pooling or constituency pooling as Horowitz mentioned in his work. There is also no active effort for the moderation by political elites to achieve the consensus or great coalition (seatpooling) which is advantage of consensual system described by Lijphart. Table 2 Muslims in Gujarat Assembly elections (winners/candidates) Year 1980 1985 1990 1995 1998 2002 2007 Congress 9/9 ontestants 7/10 2/6 3/10 4/7 3/5 5/6 BJP 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/1 0/1 0/0 0/0 Independents won 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 Source: Najiullah 2008 3. Affiliation of the main political parties by the religion cleavage Indian political parties do not always follow the religious cleavages. Even in British India when the Hindu-Muslim communal divide was sharp and deep, only Muslim League and the Hindu Mahasabha and the Akali Dal followed the religious division in the society. The largest party INC was not a Hindu Party. After independence, Muslim League (party with this name still exist in Kerala) left for Pakistan, most Indian Muslims joined Congress or other secular parties. The other parties of the right and the left in India today are not communal parties with strong communalist politics as its main profile. They project themselves as secular parties. Secularism is the national creed. However, there are some differences of understanding of 22 secularism and pressure on its importance. BJP is a party of “Hindutva”, but even this party claims to be for “positive secularism” and its membership is open to all. Its minority basting is practical political behaviour. These dissimilarities are described in following chapters which make the division among Indian parties’ affiliation to secularism. 3.1. Parties with secularism affiliation Among the main political parties, which exist in India, the secular parties have power in states with a higher level of the education. As example the states of West Bengal, Kerela or Tamilnadu and Haryana. These states have different levels of industrialisation and urbanisation. The level of religious or ethnic minorities is also different, but generally, it is possible to say that there are large groups of Muslims. Especially states of Kerela and West Bengal have more than Indian average percentage of Muslims in their population. If we look at table 8 (p. 60), there are states with generally lower level of religious or ethnic violence compared to other states with similar level of Muslim population. How can this result be explained? 3.1.1. Secularism in Indian Context Indian scholar Mehta described secularism in two dimension: 1) as a term directly concerned with the value of individual liberty. Those who advocate the disentanglement of the state from religion as far as is possible are motivated by a concern for freedom. ( Mehta 2004: 73) 2) As a term of communal harmony, secularism as respect for all religions, and secularism as a project for giving different groups their own space to collectively define their identities. This secularism is even less motivated by a concern for individual liberty. It is motivated by the high ideals of peace, sometimes solicitude for pluralism, sometimes a genuine piety towards the diversity of society. This definition of secularism does not make freedom as a central value. This version of secularism is not averse to using state power to advance religious ends provided some kind of parity between different communities is maintained. So, as per this view, it is all right for the state to ban practices offensive to Hindus so long as it does the same for Muslims, and so forth. In deed, it could be argued that the parity model, has dominated Indian secularism. While, the state is not itself religious, its involvement in religious activity is vast. This state can subsidize religious pilgrimages for Muslims, and ban cow slaughter for Hindus. (Mehta 2004: 74) 23 Chatterji described concept of the secular state as following: 1. The state guarantees of conscience in matters of religion to all citizens. 2. There is no discrimination between individuals on grounds of religion. This would imply that there is equality before the law and positions of authority are open to all. 3. The state is not concerned with and, therefore, does not interfere in matters of religion. (Chatterji 1995: 91) This is a definition above and applies to the Christian religion. The question arises as to whether the same principle cannot be invoked in the case of the Indian religions – Hinduism, Islam (Indian Islam), Buddhism and Sikhism? ( Chatterji 1995: 92) The secularism in Indian context has been understood differently. Firstly, secularism in India (according Dr. Radhakrishran – formed vice-president of India) “does not mean irreligion or atheism or even stress on material comfort. It proclaims that it lays stress on universality of spiritual values which may be attained by a variety of ways. ” It tries to build up a fellowship of believers not by subordinately individual qualities to the group mind but by bringing them into harmony with each other. This fellowship is based on principle of diversity in unity which alone has the quality of creativeness. Secondly, secularism in Indian concept means an equal status for religious. (Chatterji 1995: 103) Concept of Indian secularism described by Chatterji as well as second definition given by Mehta brought many challenges for India. Secularism, which is based on equal status for religious and state religious subsidizing, is difficult for maintenance in situation when the political system is divided to two groups – religious nationalist and secularist. Also the challenge could be finding in electoral system which could not give chance for religious group proportionality. Nationalism (Hindutva ideology represented by party in government) and lack of proportional representation could bring privileges for majority religion. For nationalists it could be difficult to maintenance secularism and to be neutral to the religious groups; especially in situation when the main electoral support comes from majority. 3.1.2. Congress party and United Progressive Alliance A similar situation is in the states where the Congress party lead the government, but the problem is in strict secular politics, which is sometime not followed by INC. INC has marked as a Brahmanical party, which is dominated by Hindu elites and Brahmans. However, there is secular affiliation characterisation. 24 Secular affiliation could be also evaluated by the number of cross religious supporters in election. Diagram 1 and 2 shows the gain of main political groups or parties among different religious groups. INC (with coalition partners’ support) is only one party in election of 1996 and 1998 which were able to recruit their voters across different religious minorities. Muslims and Christians who are out of Hindutva understanding of Hindu nation preferred Congress. BJP with its partner do not have support among religious communities. Vice versa, BJP focus more on Indian religious group where their support is strong – mainly Hindus. The Congress had its strength among the Muslims and the dalits. (Heath and Yadav 2006: 135) Congress party has tried to follow the Indian way of secularism in governing and its political programme. Secularism is part of the ideology of the party. In the Congress programme it is possible to find some points about minorities and its positive discrimination approach. “The Congress believes in affirmative action for all religious and linguistic minorities. The Congress has provided for reservations for Muslims in Kerala and Karnataka in government employment and education on the grounds that they are a socially and educationally backward class. The Congress is committed to adopting this policy for socially and educationally backward sections among Muslims and other religious minorities on a national scale. The Congress also pledges to extend reservations for the economically deprived persons belonging to communities that are at present not entitled to such reservations. The Congress will adopt all possible measures to promote and maintain communal peace and harmony, especially in sensitive areas. It will enact a comprehensive law on social violence in all its forms and manifestations, providing for investigations by a central agency, prosecution by Special Courts and payment of uniform compensation for loss of life, honour and property. The Congress commits itself to amending the Constitution to establish a Commission for Minority Educational Institutions that will provide direct affiliation for minority professional institutions to central universities. Special steps will be taken to spread modern and technical education among women in minority communities particularly.” (INC 2004) 3.1.3. Leftist parties In introduction of this chapter are mentioned states which have been active secular parties such as CPI(M) or INC which have a great deal of political power. In West Bengal and Kerela the main power in government is the Communist party – CPI(M) and has been for almost 40 25 years (they have had strong power in both state parliaments and governments from 1977 in West Bengal and respectively in Kerela in 1970). This party insists on secularism and supporting the minorities in their cultural life and education. Strict secularisation and nondiscrimination of all religious and ethnic groups help avoid politically motivated intolerance among religious communities and unwanted political support of religious cleavage on the side of government policy making. The connection between the number of religions riots and secular policy making can probably be found in West Bengal or Kerela (CPI(M) and coalition government) where the lowest number of riots and violence exists (see table 8, p. 60). Diagrams 1 and 2 also support the secular affiliation of Communist parties in India. CPI(M) and CPI were part of LF in 1996 which had bigger gains among religious group than among Hindu. However, the support among Hindus was similar to other communities. Alliance LF where also Indian communist parties took part gain the profit from their secular politics and the support among Muslim population were higher than among other groups. One successful example of relatively peaceful state under communist party government is West Bengal. The relative absence of violence against minorities and the lowest castes and classes in West Bengal has not earned the CPI(M) the credit it deserves. An ‘absence’ by definition constitutes an invisible achievement, especially because West Bengal has had a tradition of harmonious caste and ‘communal’ relations since the partition in 1948, quite independently of the CPI(M) actions. However, there is little precedent of historical basis for some of the most virulent communal conflicts that have occurred elsewhere in India in the recent period. (Basu 2006: 345-346) 3.2. Parties with Hinduism affiliation Since the rise of the Indian national movement, three competing themes about India – territorial, cultural, and religious – have fought for political dominance. The territorial notion is that India has a “sacred geography,” enclosed between the Indus River, the Himalayas and the seas and emphasized for 2,500 years since the time of the Mahabharata. The cultural notion is that ideas of tolerance, pluralism, and syncretism define Indian society. India is not only the birthplace of several religions – Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, and Sikhism – but in its history, it has also regularly received, accommodated, and absorbed “outsiders” – Parsis, Jews, and “Syrian” Christians (whose reached India before Europeans). In the process, syncretistic forms of culture have emerged and become part of India. The third religious 26 notion is that India is originally the land of the Hindus, and it is the only land that the Hindus can call their own. India has nearly all of Hinduism’s holy places and its holy rivers. A great deal of diversity may exist within Hindu society: a faith in Hinduism brings the various practitioners together. India thus viewed is a Hindu nation. (Varshney 2002: 60-61) In political discourse, the territorial idea is called “national unity” or “territorial integrity,” the cultural idea is expressed as “political pluralism”, and the religious idea is known as Hindutva, or political Hinduism. (Varshney 2002: 61) The recognition of Hinduism as a metaethnicity has been an essential component of Indian nation and state-building and has called for radical revision of the experience of Indian democracy since 1947. It does not conform to secularized majoritarianism (where the state encourages acculturation and assimilation but allows ethnic groups to maintain ethnicity in the private sphere, for example the USA). Indian democracy subordinated secularism to the ‘nationalism of the Hindu majority’. ( Singh 2000: 45-46) BJP is the biggest and main party which supports the ideology of Hindutva and Hindu nationalism. In last Lok Sabha election this ideology went to the backcloth and the main election topics was economic growth. The present topic before new Lok Sabha election is the Jammu-Kashmir issue due to 2008 disorder in this state as well as the discussion around USIndia Nuclear deal which also divided political spectrum out of secular – anti-secular. However, the ideology of the BJP is based on Hindutva. In BJP political manifesto is the emphasis on the Indian nationalism and ideology of Hindutva. (BJP 2004) The victory of BJP ideology of Hindutva was the decision of the Indian Supreme Court. In a judgment the Supreme Court ruled that no precise meaning can be ascribed to the terms 'Hindu', 'Hindutva' and 'Hinduism'; and no meaning in the abstract can confine it to the narrow limits of religion alone, excluding the content of Indian culture and heritage. This gave the hallmark of legitimacy to the main stream of Indian nationalism ideology. ( Kudláček 2006: 24-25, compare with Indian Supreme Court decision from December 11 th, 1995 in case of the election of the Maharashtra Chief Minister, Mr. Manohar Josuu2) Shiv Sena (meaning Army of Shiva, referring to Shivaji) is a right-wing political party. The Sena's ideology is based on the concepts of 'Bhumiputra' (Marathi for "Sons of Soil") and Hindutva or Hindu nationalism. However, in recent times, the Sena has laid more emphasis on ) The unanimous view expressed by the three Judges regarding Hinduism and Hindutva are based upon the views expressed earlier by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in a few cases. For example, in Shastri Yagna Purushadji case (1966(3) SCR 242) and in Sridharan case (1976 SCR 478). (Bharatiya Janata Party) 2 27 Hindutva. (Kudláček 2006: 25) Shiv Sena was part of BJP leaded government (1999-2004) and has been coalition partner in National Democratic Alliance leaded by same party. Hindutva and Hinduism politics are the main ideological attributes of NDA and coalition partners of BJP. This is also the characteristic which give NDA the dimension of opposition to UPA and INC. 3.3. Parties with Islamic (Muslim) affiliation Indian Muslim nationalism refers to the political and cultural expression of nationalism, founded upon the religious tenets and identity of Islam, of the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent. Some prominent Muslims politically sought a base for themselves, separate from Hindus and other Indian nationalists, who espoused the Indian National Congress. Muslim scholars, religious leaders and politicians founded the All India Muslim League in 1906. Muslims comprised 25 % to 30 % of (pre-partition) India's collective population. Some Muslim leaders felt that their massive cultural and economic contributions to India's heritage and life merited a significant role for Muslims in a future independent India's governance and politics. (Kudláček 2006: 25) Parties which support Muslim communities and their rights mostly cooperate with INC, because its secular politics affiliation supports these communities and give to Muslims the advantages in the powerful opposition of Hindu nationalism and Hindutva. Now these parties are in coalition with INC in the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) in the present ruling coalition of political parties in India. (UPA was formed after the 2004 Lok Sabha elections). Other parties try to cooperate with other secular parties such as CPI(M). Indian Union Muslim League is an Islamic nationalist political party in India. The chief support base of the party is northern Kerala where there is strong concentration of Muslims. Muslims make majority of voters in some constituencies in Kerala which give them advantage in FPTP system to have strong electorate support. All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen (All India Council of the Union of Muslims) is a political party in India that was formed to represent the Muslim population of Andhra Pradesh. The stronghold of AIMIM is the old city of Hyderabad and Muslim dominated areas of Andhra Pradesh, though it has its units in some parts of Mahrashtra and Karnataka also. All India Muslim Forum is a Muslim political party in India. The president is Nihaluddin and the general secretary is Dr. M. K. Sherwani. The Forum is 28 staunchly opposed to the Hindutva nationalism of BJP. The Forum has collaboration with Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) Liberation. (Kudláček 2006: 25-26) Diagram 1 Support for main political parties in 1996 election according to religion 3 100% 90% 80% 3,7 70% religious group voting 60% 50% 28,9 40% 30% 20% 26,2 10% 0% Hindu Muslim INC+ BJP+ Christian NF LF Sikh BSP Others Others 35,3 39,9 48,3 26,5 3,1 7,4 8,4 25,3 0,0 5,6 2,0 3,0 25,4 25,0 42,7 1,2 10,1 5,6 2,4 16,7 4,8 2,4 12,0 6,0 49,5 48,3 14,3 Source: Prakash 2006: 145 ) 1996 Election: INC+ = INC + All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK) BJP+ = BJP + Samata + Shiv Sena + Haryana Vikas Party NF = Janata Dal + Samajwadi Party LF = CPI (M) + CPI + Revolutionary Socialist Party (RSP) + Forward Block (FBL) 3 29 Diagram 2 Support for main political parties in 1998 election according to religion 4 100% 16,6 3 80% 17,4 1,3 0,4 18,6 22,4 29,8 10,1 10,2 26,4 18 riligious group voting 60% 34,4 10,5 3,9 37,4 40% 6,8 9,1 39,8 10,5 42,1 20% 25,6 35,1 21,9 26,4 0% Hindu Muslim INC Christian BJP+ UF BSP Sikh Others Others Source: Prakash 2006: 146 3.4. Parties with other mostly regional or specific community affiliation Samajwadi Party and Bahujan Samaj Party are parties which are out of the main stream affiliation. They are regional parties based in Uttar Pradesh, but BSP have tried to enlarge their base to other Indian states. The electoral base is among underprivileged groups of Indian society as has been already mentioned lower. The main support has been found among Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes and they also try to find the electoral among other religious minorities (Muslims), which can give them the voting advantage. ( compare with Chandra 2004: 148-149) However, the main base of BSP is in state of Uttar Pradesh, but the party’s influence is in federal politics as well. The Uttar Pradesh generates high number of 4 ) In the election 1998: BJP+ = BJP + Samata + Shiv Sena + Haryana Vikas Party + AIADMK + Akali Dal + Trinamool Congress + Lok Shakti + Biju Janata Dal + TDP (NTR) UF = Janata Dal + SP (Mulayam) + Telugu Desan Party (TDP (N)) + AGP + Tamil Maanila Congress (TMC) + Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) + Maharashtrawadi Gomantak Party (MGP) + CPI + CPI(M) + RSP + FBL 30 seats for BSP in Lok Sabha. The Congress Party historically gains the support from Scheduled Castes, but BSP took its place in Uttar Pradesh. BSP loudly identified itself as a champion not of the nation as a whole, but of Bahumaj 5 Samaj and the Scheduled Castes in particular. (Chandra 2004: 151) Uttar Pradesh has around 21 percent of SCs in its population. India's primary opposition party prior to the BJP was fragmented into several regional parties. The Samajwadi Party believes in democratic socialism and opposes the unrestricted entry of multinational companies into India. (Samajwadi Party Mumbai web) Samajwadi Party is primarily based in Uttar Pradesh, where it bases its support largely on OBCs and Muslims. Other mostly regional parties such as Janata Dal (United), Shiromani Akali Dal or Biju Janata Dal are also part of NDA (the BJP led ruling alliance). Their affiliation could be also defined as a Hinduistic. There are many other more or less successful Janata parties. Anti-secularism is not significant part of their identity and some of Janata parties could be also pro-secular as well as pro-hindu. Some Janata parties such as Rashtriya Janata Dal are part of pro-secular UDA. However, these parties notify their self as adherents of Janata movement from 1970s and Janata Party. 3.5. The characteristics of the main relevant political parties in India This chapter characterises the political programme and political base of main political parties in India. For as much as the number of political parties in India is enormous and their success in different by the states, this work will focused mostly on two present biggest parties. These parties lead also two main alliances in the country. Moreover, there is also mentioned Left Front which is mixture of communist and socialist parties. For all that there will be only study of Communist Party of India (Marxist) which have been successful in West Bengal and Kerela and is the biggest and leading party in Left Front. Bahujan Samaj Party and Samajwadi Party have been selected because their electoral success is perceptually similar to CPI(M) in both last election. The electoral gains in last two federal elections were bigger than 4 % which is limitation for this selection. These five parties are the biggest parties in India. Relative to existing alliances there will be also characteristic of these alliances programme according to their leaders. ) Bahujan literally means majority. It means majority of the castes in Hindu society (including untouchable) who are not Brahmins, Kshatriya or Vaishya. ( Chandra 2004: 148) 5 31 3.5.1. Indian National Congress Indian National Congress (also known as the Congress Party, abbreviated INC) is a major political party in India. Created in 1885, the Indian National Congress became the nation's leader in the Independence Movement, with over 15 million Indians involved in its organisations and over 70 million participants in its struggle against the British Empire. After Independence in 1947, it became the nation's dominant political party. In the 14th Lok Sabha (2004-2009), 145 INC members, the largest contingent amongst all parties, serve in the house. The party is currently the chief member of the ruling United Progressive Alliance coalition government supported by the Left Front. (Indian National Congress web) Congress party has tried to follow the secular attitude in governing and its political programme. Secularism is part of the ideology of the party. In the Congress programme it is possible to find some points about minorities and its positive discrimination approach. This has been described in previous chapter 3.1.2. The minority support which Congress has is strong. Dalit and other minorities were more likely to vote for the Congress than the BJP and allies in almost all States in last election. Only West Bengal, Assam and Uttar Pradesh have different affiliation of their voters. (Sings and Saxena 2008: 221) The cleavage which makes the party different is in their attitude to minorities and more important to unprivileged groups in Indian society. Congress is traditionally more popular for those groups. However, Congress also follows its Gandhi’s heritage. The economic programme is in present on the right mainstream. The support of liberalisation of the economy is very strong. Both main relevant parties and alliance support liberal principles of free market. The market oriented economy is dominant in INC from the beginning of 1990s. In 1950s, 60s, 70s was INC more pro-socialist oriented economy with mixture central planning and of free market. The international politics of INC is pro-western and pro-American. There is strong cooperation with the USA in “War on Terror”. 3.5.2. Bharatiya Janata Party The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), literally meaning Indian People's Party, created in 1980, is one of the two major national political parties in India. It projects itself as a champion of socio-religious cultural values of the country's Hindu majority, conservative social policies and strong national defence. Its constituency is strengthened by the broad umbrella of Hindu nationalist organizations, informally known as the Sangh Parivar (League of Indian nationalist 32 organizations), where the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh6 play a leading role. Since its inception, the BJP has been a prime opponent of the Indian National Congress. It has allied with regional parties to roll back the left-of-centre tendencies formerly endorsed by the Congress Party, which dominated Indian politics for four decades. The ideological rallying cry of the BJP is Hindutva, literally "Hinduness," or cultural Hindu nationalism. ( Kudláček 2006: 21) As was mentioned in chapter 3.2. the main concept of the ideology on which BJP has been built is Cultural nationalism, which is called Hindutva. The BJP wants to take its inspiration from the history and civilisation of India. For this party means “Indian nationhood stems from a deep cultural bonding of the people that overrides differences of caste, region, religion and language. We believe that Cultural Nationalism for which Indianness, Bharatiyata and Hindutva are synonyms -- is the basis of our national identity” . (BJP 2004) The BJP really helps the Supreme Court decision about Hindutva that it is not a religious or exclusivist concept. It is inclusive, integrative, and abhors any kind of discrimination against any section of the people of India on the basis of their faith. (BJP 2004) It has also been written in the BJP Vision document 2004 that BJP “appeals to the religious and social leaders of the Hindu and Muslim communities to speed up the process of dialogue and bring it to an amicable and early fruition. We hope that these efforts will succeed in heralding a new chapter of amity in Hindu-Muslim relations and fortify national integration“ . (BJP 2004) Generally it is possible to say that BJP is a conservative political organisation. It sees itself as rising to the defence of indigenous culture, and Indian religious systems which include Hinduism, Jainism, Sikhism and Buddhism. To many Hindu nationalists, Bharat is a Hindu Rashtra, literally a Hindu nation. According to BJP, this definition does not exclude Muslims, Christians, or other minorities. Hindu Rashtra is portrayed as cultural nationalism and Hinduism as the entire complex system of culture, history, faith and worship that have evolved in India over the past 5,000 years. In the political language of Hindu nationalists, all the people of India, their culture and heritage are "Hindu," which literally means "inhabitant of the land of the river Sindhu," the modern-day Indus. The BJP has been accused of being a xenophobic, racist, and fascist organization by its opponents. Its supporters, on the other hand, argue that it is no more than a conservative, nationally-oriented party which does not wish to polarise the country on communal (religious) grounds. (Kudláček 2006: 28) BJP has ) The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (Sanskrit, "National Volunteers' Union"; also known as the Sangh or the RSS) is a Hindu nationalist organization in India. 6 33 promoted and supported an anti-terrorist law, which they feel in its present form could be misused to harass minority groups such as Muslims. (Satish 2002) The economic programme is in populist right mainstream. The support of liberalisation of the economy is in practical way similar to INC. Both main relevant parties and alliance support liberal principles of free market. However, there is also populist orientation of the policy making. The BJP is against foreign capital which is against traditional groups’ interest. The economic philosophy of the party stood on three pillars: economic development or growth, social stability or harmony, and self-reliance or swadeshi. Operation experience from BJP governance showed that BJP continued with on-going policy of economic reforms started by INC. This was a paradox in BJP’s economic policy. Traditionally a party of small traders and entrepreneurs, the BJP would not like to subject this community to on onslaught of the international big brand names. However, party showed its willingness to continue with the reform process to achieving higher economic growth. (Ghosh 2000: 286-305) The international politics of BJP is pro-western and pro-American and anti-Muslims. There is an agreement with strong cooperation with the USA in “War on Terror”. However, the BJP is not open to the cooperation with the West which could be against Indian national independence. Example is the new “Nuclear Deal” agreement with the USA from 2008 with which the BJP strongly disagree. Anti-Nuclear Deal position goes together with the economic approach which “based on a self-reliant approach.” Also BJP and NDA want to be „at the forefront of defending the interests of Indian kisans 7 by bringing about a coalition of developing countries against such unjust practices of developed countries.“ (BJP Vision Document 2004) The economic approach goes together with nationalism (cultural nationalism) which is promoted by BJP and NDA. 3.5.3. Communist Party of India (Marxist) The CPI(M) was formed at the Seventh Congress of the Communist Party of India held in Calcutta from October 31 to November 7, 1964. The CPI(M) was born (as they declared) in the struggle against revisionism and sectarianism in the communist movement at the international and national level, in order to defend the scientific and revolutionary tenets of Marxism-Leninism and its appropriate application in the concrete Indian conditions. The CPI(M) declare its self as the leading Left party and it is committed to build a Left and 7 ) Kisans - Farmers 34 democratic front which can present a real alternative to the existing bourgeoisie-landlord policies. (CPI(M) 2006) CPI(M) declares the party policy and party behaviour as the right communist party in India with the right Marxist ideology. However, the practical policy is mostly similar to socialist parties. The background of their programme is on social and economic bases. CPI(M) gives the special stress on social problems of the Indian society. They are on the side of untouchable people and also as a secular party they are again caste system. It means that it is not really popular party among higher class and higher castes. Especially, if it is compared to BJP or other parties supporting Hindu religion and ideology. The party is mostly supported by rural people and workers. This is also one of the reasons why the party is very successful in rural areas and states such as Kerela, Tripoli or West Bengal. (Kudláček 2006: 22) CPI(M) is a communist party traditionally on the side of secularisation of society and politics. In religious issues and ethnic and religious violence, this party sees the problem with social and economic background. They see the problem in lack of equal opportunities and in discrimination. A passage is written in the CPI(M) programme about the attitude to this problematic issue: “In conditions of capitalist exploitation the guaranteed rights to the minorities provided in the Constitution are also not implemented. There is the lack of equal opportunities and discrimination against the Muslim minorities both in the economic and social sphere. Communal riots and violent attacks against the Muslims have become a permanent feature. The RSS and its outfits constantly instigate hatred against the minorities and they target the Christian community also. This fosters alienation and insecurity among the minorities, which breeds fundamentalist trends and weakens the secular foundations. Minority communalism isolates the minorities and hampers the common movement of all oppressed sections. Defence of minority rights is a crucial aspect of the struggle to strengthen democracy and secularism.” (CPI(M) 2006) As stated in the programme mentioned, the CPI(M) wants to solve the question of Muslim and other minorities group by invoking strong secular policy. The economy programme background is in left side of political spectrum. In present time, it is not communist central planning economy which dominates to the CPI(M). It is more socialmarket economy which is more similar to socialist parties. The support of liberalisation of the economy is only in the way which cannot have bad impact of the lower social groups. The CPI(M) support the welfare programme against poverty. There is strong focus on rural and agriculture policy. Party wants to “defend the interests of the country against the 35 depredations of imperialism.” (CPI(M) 2006) The international politics of CPI(M) and Left Front is neutral to the West and more anti-American. There is bigger support of Russia and China. Example could be the new “Nuclear Deal” agreement with the USA with which the CPI(M) strongly disagree. CPI(M) also disagree with USA activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 3.5.4. Bahujan Samaj Party The BSP was formed in 1984 by Kanshi Ram who has remained party leader ever since till his death in 2007. The party emerged from Kanshi Ram's earlier activity promoting the interests of Scheduled Caste government employees. Although the BSP is recognised by the Election Commission as a national party it effectively functions on certain North Indian states only. On 11th May 2007 the Uttar Pradesh BSP was elected as the first single majority party since 1991 with Mayawati as leader in the party. BSP’s ideology is based on the argument that the majority are oppressed by the select upper class. It aims to change this using the government power. ( Indian elections web) The BSP is the political party with the stated goal of serving the traditionally lower castes of Indian society, including Sudras (the fourth Varna) and Dalits (Untouchables). BSP is the party formed to represent religious minorities, those at the bottom of India's caste system. The founder of this party was Kanshi Ram, who wanted to mobilize members of his “own” ethnic category for the forwarding of his political goals. The principal salient categories that he could identify as his own were Ramdassia, Chamar 8, Punjabi, Sikh and Scheduled Caste. Of these, the Scheduled Caste category was the only one that had a nationwide membership. His motivation for entering politics, furthermore, had to do specifically with the grievances of the Scheduled Castes. However, the population of Scheduled Castes is not sufficient to bring about a victory in the struggle for power either at the centre or in any of the Indian states. Kanshi Ran resuscitated the term “Bahujan” 9 which literally means “majority” and popularized it. As he said: “Bahujan Samaj is comprised of Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribes, Other Backward Classes and converted minorities.” (Chandra 2006: 144-148) ) Ramdassia – the Sikh’s Chamar occupational caste in Punjab; Chamar – (from the Sanskrit Charmakara) is a prominent occupational Dalit caste in India. Chamars were traditionally engaged in profession such as Leatherworking and Shoemaking. Chamars are among the biggest castes in India. 9 ) Kanshi Ram defined this term as an inscriptive category consisting of a collection of subordinate ethnic categories, hitherto considered separate, that constitute a majority of the Indian population. 8 36 Chandra says that the specification of the groups, on which BSP has targeted their political programme, has been based on ethnical principle. The term Scheduled Tribe refers to tribal populations that are eligible under the Indian Constitution for affirmative action in government employment, education, and representative institutions. Scheduled Tribes make up 8 percent of the population of India. The term Other Backward Classes (OBCs) refers, misleadingly, to a collection of subordinate caste categories identified by the government/appointed Mandal Commission as backward and therefore deserving of affirmative action in government employment. Although the census does not collect data on the population of OBCs, as they are now called, they are estimated to make up 52 percent of the Indian population. Finally, the term converted minorities refers to India’s religious minorities Muslims, who make up 12 percent of the Indian population; Christians, who make up 2.34 percent; Sikhs, who make up 1.94 percent; and Buddhists, who make up 0.76 percent. The BSP refers to the Bahujan Samaj as constituting 85 percent of the population of India. The 85 percent figure, while not precise underlines its claim to speak for the majority of the Indian population. (Chandra 2006: 148-149) The problem of BSP is that many voters from these groups have political preferences in other political parties and while ethnic and social groups focus on dividing any efforts of the party’s popularising among these communities. Uttar Pradesh is only one state where BSP gains wide-ranging support from its target group. 3.5.5. Samajwadi Party The Samajwadi Party is one of several parties that emerged when the Janata Dal (People's Party) broke up. The Samajwadi Party believes in democratic socialism and opposes the unrestricted entry of multinational companies into India ( Samajwadi Party Mumbai web). Samajwadi Party has the strongest support in Uttar Pradesh. The electorates consist mostly from OBCs and Muslims, particularly Mulayam Singh Yadav's 10 (party supreme) own Yadav11 caste. SP is known for its socialist philosophy and is also on the side of populism. It 10 ) Mulayam Singh Yadav (born November 22, 1939) is a politician in Uttar Pradesh, India. He has been repeatedly elected to the Uttar Pradesh legislative assembly since 1965 and is the current chief minister of the state. 11 ) Yadav is a Hindu caste which is referred to in ancient Hindu scriptures. They are among the few surviving ancient Indo-Aryan kshatriya (Kshatriya is the title of the princely military order in the Vedic society. They are the warrior and ruling caste, in the varna system) clans known as panchjanya (Panchjanya, meaning five people, is the common name given to five most ancient vedic kshatriya tribes). 37 is possible to see on Samajwadi Party’s slogans “Equality and Prosperity of all” and their opposition against communal forces. Another Samajwadi Party’s populist motto is “ SP is against favours of a confederation of India-Pakistan-Bangladesh. ”. The Party opposes wild entry of international companies to India. The party believes that agriculture, small and middle industry is the strength of Indian economy and assistance should be given to these sectors. All of these populist proclamations support the Indian nationalism and socialism background of politics. The main agendas for the last elections in 2004 was provision for reservation in jobs, medical and technical institutions; reconstitution of the Shanti Suraksha Bal; remove illiteracy amongst Muslims; creating more employment opportunities and removing poverty. (Samajwadi Party Mumbai web) The advantage of SP in last election in 2004 was that SP has strong support of the Yadav community. Its avowed objective of battling communal forces and Yadav's determination to defeat them has won it a large Muslim following as well, especially in Uttar Pradesh. The Samajwadi Party can bank upon the Yadavs, but has now to compete with the BSP and Congress for the support of Muslims and Thakurs. SP has the election base built on minorities (also Muslims) and Schedule caste. It means that they have similar potential among voters as BSP has, but SP compared to BSP tries to find support among higher classes (owner of small and middle businesses) as well as higher castes. Although it could divide their potential as the party which support minorities as a socialist party. 4. Analysis of the election on the federal level in relation to the main religious disorder and clashes in the context of Horowitz, Lijphart 4.1. Indian federalism based and minority autonomy Indian federalism as an important aspect of the state constitution will be described in this chapter. Federalism play important role in Indian politics and has also strong impact on minorities and cleavages in India. This is the reason why this chapter interested in this area a bit deeply. Federalism is an important factor for both theories of Lijphart and Horowitz. Horowitz talks about federalism and Lijphart a bit widely about segmental autonomy. 38 Segmental autonomy automatically does not mean federal constitution. However, Lijphart also put the stress on importance of federal political system. Lijphart believes that a federal system is a good way to provide autonomy for minorities. (Lijphart 2004: 104) Federalism supposes to give the minorities’ autonomy and freedom from central (majority) government. Indian federalism is characterised by union of states. The position of the states under the Indian constitution according to Prof. Majeed can be summed up as follows: The Constitution does not grant to any State the right of secession. The states do not have any priori rights, but only such rights as have been expressly granted to them by the constitution. Even the residuary rights vest in the union government. In the concurrent field of powers it is the union law which prevails over a state law in the event of a conflict between the two. There is a single unified Judiciary for the whole country and an integrated Civil Service under the supervision and control of the All Indian Services. The governors of states are appointees of the union government and besides being the constitutional head of the state they are also the eyes and ears of the union in the state. The constitution guarantees individual rights and rights of certain groups, such as scheduled castes, scheduled tribes, and minorities, but not of state as such. It does not concede even the right of equal representation to the states in the upper house of the union parliament. (Majeed 2005: 6) The executive power of the union extends to giving of such directions to a state as may appear to be necessary for that purpose. However, this does not empower the union to interfere in any matter pertaining to the exclusive concern of a state. The union can issue a direction only where some action of a state government is likely to prejudice the exercise of the executive power of the union. (Majeed 2005: 6-7) The federalism is based mostly on language principle. There is no real federalism or special autonomy based on religious and given to religious groups. Indian federalism follows language and cultural autonomy and there is less autonomy for religious minorities. The function of federalisation in India cannot follow minorities’ interest. This federalisation cannot give any particular segmental autonomy to minorities inside India as Lijphart or Horowitz described. However, there is also no concentration of religious group which can follow the state boundaries. Only Kashmir and Punjab could be characterised as states with religious demarcates. Religious groups are characterised as communities on local level inside of urban or rural area. Indian union has reorganized its units 39 on the basis of either one or two or the combination of four structural principles of state formulation: Preservation and strengthening of the unity and security of India; Linguistic and cultural homogeneity; Financial, economic and administrative considerations; Successful working of the national plan. (Singh 2005: 9) For Indian “constitution fathers” only a strong centre could effectively drive economic development and ensure equality across territorial jurisdictions, religions, languages, classes and castes. Later was it realised that federalism could help solve conflicts rooted in territorially base ethnic, religious, linguistic, and other characteristics. Since 1989, coalition governments at the centre, proliferating regional and state parties across the country, and liberalisation of the economy, have served to decentralise the federal political system in many respects. In a very limited sense, Indian federalism can be called asymmetrical because there are still special provisions for Kashmir and northeast states such as Nagaland and Maghalaya. (Majeed 2005: 8) Except few cases, there is no real religious division of power and religious group do not have reservation of seats in regional (state) assemblies. There is departure from the rule in example of mentioned state Andhra Pradesh with its reservation of seats for religious group. However, as was mentioned before, the reservation of seats is not the right way for Horowitz and Lijphart who do not support FPTP system for dividing societies. Federal politics in India has changed with developing of multipartism. India historically developed phases of one-party dominant systems at the national but subsequently turned into multi-party systems with increasing politicization and assertion of regional and ethnic identities. The effects of proportional representation are seen even under plurality electoral system due to the complicating third factor of social and regional diversities. It is widely accepted that proportional representation lead to a multi-party system. (Singh and Saxena 2008: 156) Multipartism in India context cannot work as a good system for consensual democracy in Lijphart’s theoretical context. Figure 2 and other electoral results show that many constituencies have been challenged by two-party competition. Some states as Rajasthan, Gujarat etc. have tendency to be pure bipartisan. Only few states and some constituencies gave chance more than two main party groups. Party system is perhaps the most important intervening variable that significantly influences the working of a federal political system. The centralized phase of Indian federation was 40 spanned the era of the dominant party system. This feature of the party system was clearly reflected in the working of all organs of the government. Autonomy of states was somewhat overshadowed by the rule of the same party in New Delhi as well as in almost all states. ( Sing and Saxena 2008: 156-157) This overly centralization was challenged by new multipartism in 1990s and beginning of new millennium. Coalition and minority governments have increased the autonomy of the federal parliament as well as that of state governments that was ever the case under one-party majority governments. This trend of greater federalization of the political system is likely to continue. (Singh and Saxena 2008: 158) However, this does not increase the communal harmony because federalism is not based on religious minorities. The division will not find the solution as Horowitz or Lijphart described. Religious communities cannot get autonomy in this federal shape of boundaries. According to Horowitz India as the federation, do not follow the power division and power sharing of government among religious cleavages. The main cleavage, on which the Indian federation was based, is linguistic principal. There are some states which have also the religious identity as Punjab. However, there is also strong linguistic root in Punjabi language. Autonomy of religious minorities is not supported by federalism as Lijphart recommended in his theoretical approach. He also recommends an existence of second (federal) legislative chamber with strong power, which can also give better representation for minorities. However, this does not exist in Indian case, because the second chamber is a chamber of the Indian states more than Indian minorities and religious communities. In spite of that, the Upper House is able to better representation of minorities or support proportionality as well as support crosscutting cleavages due to STV electoral system for this chamber (compare with Reynolds: 2002). Nevertheless, the Rajya Sabha does not give a trust to the federal government which is a priority right of Lok Sabha. State level assemblies consist only from one chamber with FPTP system arrangement. 4.2. Horowitz’s majoritarism How Horowitz’s six goals for successful political system in divided societies are fulfilled in Indian context has been described in this chapter. The first goal proportionality of seats to votes is not in India achieved. If we look at Indian party system we can see that this is multipartism. From the beginning of 1990s the party system has transformed from dominant party system to multipartism. (compare with Singh and Saxena 2008 or Saxena 1994: 31-43) 41 or Arora 2003: 83-99) From the 1989 breakpoint we can see in India coalition or minority governments. Nonetheless, the Indian party system is mostly product of federalism and territoriality. It could be called as multi-level party system, because there are many relatively independence party systems in different Indian states and they coexist together with federal level. The FPTP electoral system produce parties which have many times concentrated voters background in particular territories and states of India. The example is CPI (M) which has strong electoral in West Bengal and Kerela but in other state their voting gains are not as much strong. The similar successes have parties like BJP and BSP in Uttar Pradesh or Shivsena in Maharashtra or SP in Orissa. Deep observation shows that the electoral outcomes produce mostly two party competitions in constituencies. These electoral rivalries produce in many state bipartism. The examples could be Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab, Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka, Delhi, Assam and there could be also included Jammu and Kashmir and other states are more or less far to this characteristic. ( Indian Election Commission, compare with Singh and Saxena 2008: 177-179) On the other side, there are also some examples which do not support Duverger’s or Sartori’s axioms for FPTP electoral system also on the state level of election competition and the FPTP does not produce two candidates competition. The deviation is in Uttar Pradesh where in some electoral constituencies could be possible find three or four parties which allocated similar percentage of votes. Election in Uttar Pradesh is the example when FPTP generates multipartism on the state level of electoral competition (see figure 2, p 47). (compare with Chytílek 2007: 50-51) These UP’s electoral competition outcomes have negated Duverger’s and Sartori’s axioms for FPTP. The electoral competition in India could be also characterised as bipolar plus one minor left stream. Two main streams have been produced since 1999 respectively 2004. One stream is National Democratic Alliance (NDA) leaded by BJP and another one is United Progressive Alliance (UPA) leaded by Congress. The minor Left Front is mainly represented by CPI (M) plus other small leftist parties which are out of two main alliances. The results of election in 1999 and 2004 according to this division are shown in table 3 and 4. However, the electoral system gives small chance for minorities and communities which do not have electoral concentration in particular constituencies. Horowitz assumption of proportionality of seats to votes is not fulfilled for many minorities, because FTPT do not produce real proportionality. This is example of religious groups such as Muslims. Linguistic or ethnic cleavages could be more followed as shows the examples of Tamilnadu, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Orissa and Punjab. Punjab could be also example of religious concentration of Sikh 42 electoral community. These examples show regional parties’ success. They have relatively strong position in the federal Lok Sabha due to voters’ concentration in states where the main parties’ bases are. They are for example BSP and SP in Uttar Pradesh, Shiromani Akali Dal in Punjab as well as Shivsena in Maharashtra and BJD in Orissa. Examples of Jammu and Kashmir and North-eastern states have been excluded due to validity of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (Act 28 of 1958, from 11th September, 1958) which gave special power to the security forces against putative terrorist. The number of deaths and causalities has been misrepresented. The over representative of winners has certainly become a serious defect in the Indian system. It has been further aggravated by the FPTP voting system, with a single non-transferable vote and single member constituencies, which India copied from Britain. It was argued that a proportional or list or any such alternative voting system would throw up too many parties. Chopra (2003: 170-171) noted that the reasoning was understandable but it backfired. In practice it has meant a distortion: A party can obtain a far higher share of seats than of votes, because any party can win a constituency with a minority share of the vote if no other party has polled one vote more. If a party wins many seats in this way it can have a much higher share of seats than of votes. 43 Table 3 Election results for Lok Sabha in 1999 Alliance National Democratic Alliance Bharatiya Janata Party Janata Dal (United) Shiv Sena Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam Biju Janata Dal All India Trinamool Congress Pattali Makkal Katchi Indian National Lok Dal Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam Jammu & Kashmir National Conference Shiromani Akali Dal Rashtriya Lok Dal Lok Shakti Indian National Congress Communist Party of India (Marxist) Telugu Desam Party Samajwadi Party Bahujan Samaj Party All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam Rashtriya Janata Dal Nationalist Congress Party Communist Party of India Revolutionary Socialist Party All India Forward Bloc Muslim League Kerala State Committee Akhil Bharatiya Lok Tantrik Congress Janata Dal (Secular) Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) Liberation Bharipa Bahujan Mahasangha All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimen M.G.R. Anna Dravida Kazhagam Kerala Congress Kerala Congress (Mani) Samajwadi Janata Party (Rashtriya) Peasants and Workers Party of India Shiromani Akali Dal (Simranjit Singh Mann) Himachal Vikas Congress Manipur State Congress Party Sikkim Democratic Front Independent Party % of votes 36,7 23,8 3,1 1,6 1,7 1,2 2,6 0,7 0,6 0,4 0,1 0,7 0,4 0,0 28,3 5,4 3,7 3,8 4,2 1,9 2,8 2,3 1,5 0,4 0,4 0,2 0,2 0,9 0,3 0,2 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,0 2,7 Seats 270 182 21 15 12 10 8 5 5 4 4 2 2 0 114 33 29 26 14 10 7 8 4 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 Total - 543 Source: Election Commission of India 44 Table 4 Election results for Lok Sabha in 2004 Alliance National Democratic Alliance Bharatiya Janata Party All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam Janata Dal (United) Nationalist Trinamool Congress Shiv Sena Shiromani Akali Dal Biju Janata Dal Nagaland People's Front Mizo National Front United Progressive Alliance Indian National Congress Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam Nationalist Congress Party Rashtriya Janata Dal Lok Jan Shakti Party Telangana Rashtra Samotni Pattali Makkal Katchi Jharkhand Mukti Moucha Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam Indian Union Muslim League Republican Party of India (Athvale) Jammu and Kashmir People's Democratic Party Left Front Communist Party of India (Marxist) Communist Party of India Revolutionary Socialist Party All India Forward Bloc Others Bahujan Samaj Party Samajwadi Party Telugu Desam Party Janata Dal (Secular) Rashtriya Lok Dal Asom Gana Parishad Jammu and Kashmir National Conference All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen Kerala Congress Sikkim Democratic Front National Loktantrik Party Samajwadi Janata Party (Rashtriya) Indian Federal Democratic Party Bharatiya Navshakti Party Party % of votes 33,0 22,2 2,2 2,6 2,1 1,8 0,9 1,3 0,2 0,0 35,4 26,7 1,8 1,8 2,2 0,6 0,6 0,5 0,5 0,4 0,2 0,1 0,0 7,7 5,7 1,4 0,4 0,2 5,3 4,3 3,0 1,5 0,6 0,5 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,0 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 Seats 181 138 0 8 2 12 8 11 1 1 218 145 16 9 21 4 5 6 5 4 1 1 1 59 43 10 3 3 19 36 5 3 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Total - 543 Source: Election Commission of India 45 Figure 2 Territorial election results for the Lok Sabha election in 2004 BJD - Biju Janata Dal BJP - Bharatiya Janata Party BSP - Bahujan Samaj Party CPI – Communist Party of India CPI (M) – Communist Paty of India (M) DMK - Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam INC – Indian National Congress JD(U) – Janata Dal (U) LJNSP - Lok Jan Shakti Party SHS - Shivsena NCP – Nationalist Congress Party RJD - Rashtriya Janata Dal SAD - Shiromani Akali Dal SP - Samajwadi Party Source: Indian elections web Accountability to constituents is defined by FPTP electoral system where the voters are independent to select the candidate. The personality of the candidate play important role in this system as well as the party membership. The party is the authority who selects the candidate for particular constituencies. However, we can see that parties also find the seats runners who are more vote-able. The Gujarat example in table 2 (p. 23) shows that ethnicity or religious affiliation play important role. There should be stressed that Horowitz said that 46 possibilities to choose among candidates can have perverse consequences, especially in multiethnic societies. (Horowitz 2003a: 5) If we talk about victory of the “Condorcet winner”, in Indian concept we can talk about advantages and disadvantages of FPTP system for the Lok Sabha elections. The reason for selection of FPTP electoral system was in Indian context the extreme pluralist society with many cleavages which can generate very fragmented election results and representation in lower house of the parliament. However, the Condorcet winner asks for the victory among all electoral alternatives. On the other side, the selected electoral system for Upper House, which is STV, follow the rules of the Condorcet winner. In spite of it, this work focuses more on Lok Sabha as a house of parliament which generate the constitution of Indian federal government. There is observing that selected FPTP electoral system generally does not follow the axiom of Condorcet winner. (compare with Chytílek 2007: 49) Inter-ethnic and inter-religious conciliation and durable governments can be possibly found in Indian modern political history. The Congress party was based on inter-religious membership from its beginning. However, for inter-ethnic and inter-religious conciliation, the question is how the electoral system affects the pre-electoral calculations of parties and politicians. (Horowitz 2003a: 6-7) The necessity to engage in what Horowitz calls “votepooling’ in order to win elections and maintain coalitions is what forces politicians to moderate their demands and offer protection to minorities. (Wilkinson 2004: 7) This is not easy to find in real Indian politics due to Congress government and its one party dominance in Indian politics during 1950s, 1960s, 1970s as well as in 1980s. The Janata Party and its Janata Movement at 1970s and 1980s and its cross-national government would not be defined as a coalition or multi-religious movement in its basic. However, there are some significant changes from 1990s and at the beginning of millennium. From this period Indian government is based on coalition of parties across state, federal and regional parties represented in the Lok Sabha. The coalition government lead by BJP is hardly possible to be denominated as interethnic or inter-religious conciliation power. Also the BJP leaded governmental and electoral coalition National Democratic Alliance is set up from mostly on Hinduism based parties. The part of the coalition is also Nagaland Peoples’ Front as a pure regional party, but not out of inter-religious group of Hindutva ideology. On the other side, by Congress leaded coalition United Progressive Alliance consists from Muslim parties or regional parties supported by Muslim such as Indian Union Muslim League and Jammu and Kashmir People's Democratic 47 Party. Regardless, they do not have big value in this coalition and their representation in Lok Sabha is marginal (see tables 3 and 4). As Horowitz also wrote in his theory, the FPTP system does not create inter-ethnic and inter-religious conciliation due to its main majority principle when the winner wins everything. However, Indian elections also produce high number of MPs with criminal charges among every major political party. ( see Sing and Saxena 2008: 221) Durable government is in last two decades in India very difficult to construct. The multipartism across the whole country gives very difficult negotiation position for parties and they make labile compromises among Indian ethnic, regional as well as religious parties. A qualitatively new phase in Indian politics was ushered in with the advent of the multi-party system in 1989 elections which have continued ever since. With no clear majority for any one party during two decades, the coalition and minority governments have been the rule, with decisive role played by some major regional parties. (Singh and Saxena 2008: 158-159) Minority office holding is in India connected on federal level with All India Services – divided to Indian Administrative Service and Indian Police Service. This system and institution is heritage after British Empire. Tables 5 and 6 shows that the Muslim minority is discriminated in the selection process for the Indian Civil (Administration) Services. The proportion of new administration staff is lower that the percentage of Muslim in Indian population. Table 5 Indian Administrative Service from 1971 till 1980 Year 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 Total Total 87 142 124 141 129 138 158 134 117 124 1294 Intake Muslims Sikhs 1 (1.14%) 4 (4.59%) 1 (0.7%) 6 (4.85%) 3 (2.41%) 5 (4.03%) 1 (0.7%) 9 (6.38%) 2 (1.55%) 5 (3.87%) 5 (3.62%) 9 (6.52%) 10 (6.32%) 4 (2.53%) 10 (7.46%) 6 (4.47%) 3 (2.56%) 8 (6.83%) 1 (0.80%) 5 (4.03%) 37 (2.86%) 61 (4.71%) Christians 5 (5.74%) 4 (2.81%) 7 (5.64%) 4 (2.83%) 7 (5.42%) 10 (7.24%) 13 (8.22%) 13 (9.70%) 7 (5.98%) 3 (2.41%) 73 (5.64%) Source: Dr. Gopal Singh Report on Minorities, 1983, p.31 and Najiulah 2008 48 Table 6 Muslims in Indian Administrative Services since 1981 Year 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total Total intake 126 167 235 233 214 216 178 249 246 298 217 157 147 131 91 81 76 55 56 93 3266 Muslims 1 (0.79%) 5 (2.99%) 1 (0.43%) 6 (2.58% 4 (1.87%) 6 (2.78%) 5 (2.81%) 15 (6.02%) 13 (5.28%) 9 (3.02%) 8 (3.69%) 3 (1.91%) 2 (1.36%) 2 (1.53%) 8 (8.79%) 3 (3.70%) 3 (3.95%) 1 (1.82%) 2 (3.57%) 6 (6.45%) 103 (3.15%) Source: Najiullah 2008 Table 7 Representation of OBCs/SCs/STs in the Service of the Central Government in 1979 Class I (total N = 174021) SCs/STs OBCs 18.33 % 12.27 % Class II (total N = 912925) SCs/STs OBCs 50.56 % 25.63 % Source: Singh and Saxena 2008: 192 Table 7 shows that the OBCs / SCs / STs are more represented in governmental offices than Muslim community (see tables 5 and 6). However, there are also some disproportionalities advanced by higher castes of Indian Hindu society. These disadvantaged groups of Indian society do not have proportional representation in higher position of Indian government (Class I) in spite of reservation policy of Indian state. There is evidence that the higher position and also lower position are under representative by OBCs and on the other hand over representative by SCs/STs in lower level of governmental bureaucracy. Total average number 49 of SCs, STs and OBCs try to respect the reservation policy. Scheduled tribes make up 8 percent of the population of India. Although the census does not collect data on the population of OBCs, as they are now called, they are estimated to make up 52 percent of the Indian population. (Chandra 2006: 148) The conclusion, of comparison of Horowitz’s theoretical approach according to Indian context which have been done in this work, shows that Indian political system does not reflect ideally any goal from the six defined. In Indian context it is problematic, because if one goal reflects religious cleavage than on the other side could damage the other socio-political cleavage in Indian society. As an example could mentioned the minority office holding goal where India follow the socio-economic and cultural cleavage among Hindu society (reflect ST/SC), but do not respect the religious cleavage. The similarities could be find in electoral system and in reservation seats policy advantaged ST and SC, but any religious group. The right to be represented is damaged by FPTP electoral system especially in the context of religious communities’ representation. 4.3. Lijphart’s Indian Puzzle If we look at the points above in chapter 1 which basically characterised Lijphart’s concept of consensual democracy and compare it with the situation in India we can find some analogy, but also some dissimilarity. This system comes near to a system of two main parties. As stated in Lijphart’s definition of consensual democracy, we need to find the similarities from points of A) grand coalition governments, B) existing of minority veto, C) proportionality in representation, D) cultural autonomy. It is also possible to find (A) grand coalition in India, but it is not the coalition which can include parties supported by different communities. Especially on the federal level the parties make the alliances, which oppose each other. Now, we can find National Democratic Alliance (NPA) and United Progressive Alliance (UPA), which are from two main blocs – nationalism versus secularism. It should also be mentioned that we can find coalition on a state level, in which nationalist’s or communities’ parties cooperate with pure secular parties. The state level can also show the situation where the system of two main parties – bipartism with strong bipolarism – can be found in state Gujarat in 2002. 50 (B) Minority veto – the main parties have been supported by the smaller ones, which are usually based on the state level, but they also have their own ideology. Coalitions in India are now mainly based on cleavage nationalism versus secularism. In the states, where the parties cannot get majority of votes they have to depend on communities’ votes and their national rhetoric against the minorities are not as culminated as in the system of two main parties. It means that the smaller parties can successfully block the majority in ideal position, especially INC depending on the votes of Indian minorities. ( Kudláček 2006: 35) Party system with dominancy of INC has also significant advantage for minorities. Congress was the party represented in the structure of the population. There were also important positions of minorities such as Muslims or Sikhs etc. According to Lijphart this cross population membership structure of INC gave to minorities veto. However, the party system development made changes in style of government. New nationalistic governments neglect the right of minorities and minority veto is suppressed. (compare with Lijphart 1996) In an ideal consociational system minority rights are entrenched, guaranteed and backed by a minority veto. Unfortunately, in India the minority veto has been practically non-existent for most religious minorities and, in the case of Muslims, has been frequently undermined by ‘compensatory’ concessions to the Hindu community. (Singh 2000: 46) (C) Proportionality – The electoral system of the two chambers of Indian Parliament have a combination of two voting system. It is a combination of plurality ('first past the post') electoral system and proportionality system with Single Transferable Vote. The 'first past the post' system in Lok Sabha is a heritage of British rule and their Westminster’s parliamentarism. India with its federalism and wild spectrum of the population – communities, minorities and castes system, generate a big spectrum of the electoral results – especially in states with various structures of population and regional parties. The main division is between BJP and INC. Where BJP and INC operate as the biggest and two dominant parties the problem with religious violence seems to be worse (e.g. state Gujarat), but where it is necessary, governing cooperation in coalition, the tension is weaker and parties show more respect for the minorities. Parties as well as their candidates (especially the secular one) try to respect the structure of the population. However, if we look also at the tables 2, 4, 6 (pages 23, 46 and 50) we can realise that there are not always success. The example can be again state Gujarat (see table 2) where INC is not able to put number of Muslim candidates to state assembly according to the proportion in Gujarati population. Moreover, the successes of the minority candidates in election are not big, because the FPTP system does not help to 51 maintain the proportionality existing in the Indian political system. Godbole ( 2006: 203) indicated that number of Muslims in Lok Sabha is low and have decreasing tendency. The 7 th Lok Sabha had maximum Muslims among MPs – 41 (8.5 %), the 12 th Lok Sabha had only 4.99 %. The percentage of Muslims in Indian population is around 13 %. There is evidence of under representation of this religious minority. The minorities incline to the parties with secular politics. However, the secular parties follow the electoral strategy in Hindu majority population. They prefer Hindu candidates who have bigger chance to be elected. Proportionality of representation is problematic in FPTP system due to its relevant majority of votes but also for the shaping of constituencies. Brass ( 2003: 149-199, 219-220) shows how the demographic changes influence the electoral behaviour and shaping of constituencies. He argues that where the demographic changes inside of consequences’ boundaries, there is are more probability for communal riots. Therefore, the resultant communalization and polarization in turn reduce the electoral prospects of parties and candidates who stand for secular political practices, inter-communal cooperation, and class or caste mobilisation rather than communal mobilisation. (Brass 2003: 220) The not existing proportionality in Indian election and state as well as federal assembly produce potential conflict between religious or other communities. (D) Cultural autonomy – India has a secular democracy with many religions and other minorities. Federalism helps to support the system, where the cultural autonomy can function, which is based on languages. The problem is with Untouchables and religious minorities, but the government tries to help to improve their position by positive discrimination in the public governmental sector – Indian Civil Service. (Kudláček 2006: 35) Some success could be found among scheduled tribes and scheduled caste, where exist reservation seats policy. Regardless, the situation of these communities is not yet satisfying. Furthermore religious minorities do not have the proportional representation in Indian Civil Service (Administration Service) as is shown in table 5 and 6 (pages 49 and 50). Muslims do not have the proportioned representation in governmental offices according to their number in Indian population. On the other side, the Christians and Sikhs are “over representative” according to their average percentage of inhabitants in India. After fifty years of independence India maintains a constitutional commitment to secularism. However, the practice of secularism in India is now increasingly under attack. In the quest for electoral advantage, the once-dominant Congress Party, made a series of choices that compromised India's secular ethos. These choices enabled the explicitly anti-secular BJP to 52 dramatically expand its political base through the pursuit of a blatantly anti-secular and majoritarian political agenda. In recent years, as a direct consequence of the BJP's rhetoric and policies, a range of religious minorities have been subjected to discrimination and violence. The growing electoral strength of hitherto disenfranchised groups, the existence of institutions committed to secularism and the continuing secular constitutional dispensation offer some hope for sustaining the secular order in India. (Ganguly 2003) Lijphart’s preferences for constitution of the political system show his affiliation to proportional representation as shown mainly in chapter 2.2. and 4 and 5.2. India does not have the proportional electoral results in spite of existing multipartism. Multipartism reflects not only regional or linguistic cleavages but not the strong religious one. Electoral results in India expose FPTP disadvantages and unsuitability for dividing societies according to Lijphart’s (and as well as Horowitz’s) theories. This is valid for state as well as federal level elections. The FPTP system cannot follow the Lijphart’s assumption of guidelines with PR. The distance of FPTP to electorates reduces the possibilities for minorities’ representation in India. The Indian model of parliamentary government helps to set up the system of coalition and collegial decision-making. This is valid for India in last two decades. There were some deviations of this system when the India was governed by dominant congress party where the main position had prime minister and the cabined played second role. ( compare with Singh and Saxena 2008: 159, 217-218 or Singh 2005 or Majere 2005) Cabinet stability or disability in Indian last two decades context changed the relationship between federal and state governments. The state governments lead by regional parties often take advantage from cooperation on federal level and governmental support and try to negotiate bigger power for their local state government. State level is for regional (recognized state) parties the main source of voters and power. It is significant for federal as well as state level of election. (compare with Singh and Saxena 2008: 158, 171-172, 217-218 or Singh 2005 or Majere 2005) The position and role of the institution in political system has changed. As an example could be also mentioned the role of Rajya Sabha. With the transformation of the party system by the 1990s, the upper house has emerged as a federal second chamber as it reflects a different party configuration than that of the Lok Sabha. The differential oppositional majority in the Rajya Sabha is attributable to a different party system configuration in the States whose legislatures from the electoral college for the federal Second Chamber. Thus, the governmental majority in the Lok Sabha now must make inter-house 53 legislative understanding with the Rajya Sabha to facilitate passage of legislations and constitutional amendments. (Singh and Saxena 2008: 158) Regardless, the Rajya Sabha reflects mostly only regional and linguistic cleavage and the religious cleavage is in background. The problem with religious communities’ right of representation is not resolved. Due to this we cannot also talk about power sharing beyond the cabinet and parliaments based on religious group representation or quotas. If we look on diagram 1 (p. 30), we can see that there is significant trend in increasing of communal violence in India in last three or two decades. Thin inclination if also followed by increasing of the number of parties and setting up of multipartism. However, Lijphart has the explanation for this trend. He argues that India was the most consociational under Nehru’s governments when INC has its own internal multi-ethnicity and its governments followed crucial rules for power-sharing with minorities. Especially the minority veto and ethnicity proportionality have been violated. (compare with Wilkinson 2004: 100-101) Lijphart’s assumption for consensual democracy is not fluffily accomplished. All parties agree with secularism and secular orientation of India. However, there are some significant differences which neglected secularism and religious minorities. According to Lijphart’s theory the reason could be in electoral system with lack of proportionality which does not give full representation right to minorities. However, there is strong parliamentary and federal system of government which has good assumption for power sharing. On the other hand the FPTP system neglects minority representation. Moreover, the Muslim minority do not have proportional representation in government offices. Their office holding is lower than their percentage in population. Sharing of executive power and group autonomy of minorities is lower. Especially Muslim minority participation of the representatives in political decisionmaking almost does not exist. However, there are some differences according the parties. INC governments usually give bigger chance to minorities because their votes are significant for electoral success. BJP as the second biggest party does not depend on minorities votes. The minority participation in their state or federal assemblies or governments is lower. 54 5. Analysis of the election results in regions with large and frequent religious conflicts in Indian States in the context of Wilkinson This chapter will analyse the election result and the party system in the context of riots incidences in particular Indian states. For this analyse will be use Wilkinson’s hypothesis about influence of the number of the parties in political system on number of the riots and their intensity. For this analysis we will use the Wilkinson’s and Varshney’s data about religious and communal violence in India. Their data analyse Indian communal violence from 1977 until the year 1995. Respectively, these data reflect communal violence by states. There are also data gathered up by Varshney from 1950 till 1995 for all India. The next period is not mapping in any official resources or statistical analysis. There are only fractioned reports about communal violence collected by nongovernmental or international organisation such as Human Right Watch. Wilkinson and Varshney had to deal with similar problem and their data collection mostly based on the newspaper article survey ( compare with Wilkinson 2004: 248249). Similar study of communal violence and riots will bring also this work. The new data collection has been collected from biggest English newspapers in India “Times of India” from its online database. The period, for which was data collected through this survey, is from the year 2001 till August 200812. Data collection based on Olzak’s definition of communal riots (Olzak 1992: 233-234). This definition used also Wilkinson specification (Wilkinson 2004: 255). Olzak and Wilkinson defined the communal riots: 1. 2. 3. There is violence. Two or more communally identified groups confront each other / members of the other group, at some point during the violence. Additionally, there have to be also identified the groups and their members as a part of religious communities.13 There is a selection of Indian state which have been analysed. The choice of states was based on data resources availabilities. There is also selection based on causalities and examples of party system. Gujarat is the state which has changed from non-violence state to one of the ) Online Times of India database has been available from the year 2001. ) There is a strong Naxalite Movement in some Indian states. However, the communal violence among caste (Dalists, OBCs against landlords and upper castes), which is well reported by Indian police, is not able to marked as religious communal violence. Moreover, there is mostly socioeconomical background of this violence. ( compare with Deshpande 386-287, for further information also see Annual report of the Ministry of Home Affairs 2007, chapter II, Para no. 2.63 ) 12 13 55 most rioting states (according to the number of victims) in India. It is also the example of domination of one party. The case study of Uttar Pradesh has been selected for the significant party system with regional parties with federal level influence as well as for the structure of population. Uttar Pradesh is an example of the state which has multiparty system and there cases of communal violence are relatively frequent. Kerala has been selected as a case with opposition of Gujarat party system. In Gujarat is strong BJP with Hindutva ideology and Kerala is known for leftist coalition multiparty government. Kerala is only one state with successful Muslim party which is given by the structure of population. It is also very peaceful state according to number of religious riots. Orissa is another example, which analyse moderate multiparty system with nationalist party in government. It is present example of increasing communal violence in 2007 and 2008 against Christian’s minority. Orissa is a state with coalition government and with multiparty system. In the past, it was also relatively peaceful state also during the years of high number of riots in India. Analyse of present violence in connection with present government can explain the changes in the intensity of disorder it this state. Maharashtra was selected because it was in 1990s one of the first example of electoral success of nationalist party with anti-secular and anti-muslim affiliation and unprecedented brutal communal violence with participation of governmental security forces. Rajasthan is example of pure bipartism with competition between nationalist and secular parties, but on the other hand with lower number of religious disorders compare to other cases. The number of victims in communal riots is similar to Kerala example. Bihar is example of the state where the traditional federal parties have relatively low electoral success. Most of the votes gain parties which have small influence on federal politics or government. Multipartism is high as in Uttar Pradesh but there is Bihar’s main parties do not have as big role as a state parties (BSP, SP) in Uttar Pradesh. Therefore, Bihar is good comparison to Uttar Pradesh example. All these states- Gujarat, Uttar Pradesh, Kerala, Orissa, Maharashtra, Rajasthan and Bihar were selected because together they make large scale of example which is possible to find in India. These examples together complete the scale of potential example of party competition in India. Lijphart’s and Horowitz’s theoretical concepts will be also fractionally used in explanation of case studies. However, there will be only focus on particular problems which are typical for the selected case study. Most of the problems which generate communal violence in India were described above and it means that they could be similar to them. As an example can be 56 mentioned FPTP electoral system. This method generates low minority representation and lesser proportionality in whole India. Regardless there are some significant highlights and specifics which could be described deeply by Lijphart’s or Horowitz’s theoretical assumptions. Diagram 3 shows the development of intensity of communal violence in whole India. There is a number of riots comparisons as well as intensity of violence measured by number of deaths. There is a trend which shows increasing of communal disorder when Congress lost its dominancy in party system. Multipartism and competition between main rival – Congress and BJP brought an increasing trend of violence and their victims in 1990s as well as in early years of new millennium. The trend from this last two decades also opened the question of viability of Indian secularism philosophy in the shape as chapter 4.1.1. has described. The main electoral competition has been between secular Congress (UPA) and nationalist BJP (NDA) in some states as well as in federal election. The other parties also operate within the nationalist or secular party politics. Leftist parties as Indian communist parties operate inside secular bloc. There are just few (mostly regional) parties which operate only within other Indian cleavages. 57 Diagram 3 Communal Violence and Riots in 1950-1995 and 2001-200814 200 180 160 140 Number of Deaths 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 1950 1953 1956 1959 1962 1965 1968 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 Year riots deaths trend (deaths) trend (riots) y = 0,2535x + 18,342 R2 = 0,0262 y = 1,0194x - 6,5488 R2 = 0,1677 Source: Varshney 2002: 95, Times of India and author ) Gujarat (Ahmedabad) riots were the biggest riots in modern Indian history. However, there is not exact number of death people in this Ahmedabad riots. Maximum number of deaths is officially presented around 850. The international organization reported number of approximately 2000 victims (compare with Human Rights Watch 2004 or USCIFR 2008) 14 58 Table 8 Total Riots and Deaths by States and Effective Number of Parties Incidents in particular electoral term Effective no. of parties in federal electoral term Number of Communal Number of (year of election) Riots Number of Deaths Deaths 1999-2004 2004-2008 1999-2004 2004-2008 1999-2004 2004-2008 1950-1995 1.95 (1999) 2.31 (2004) Andhra Pradesh 2 2 1 300 4.64 (2000) 5.21 (2005) Bihar 1 1 890 1.61 (1998) 1.88 (2003) Delhi 1 100 1.92 (2002) 1.93 (2007) Gujarat 100* 9 966*** 36 1420 2.88 (2000) 1.73 (2004) Haryana 20 Himachal Pradesh 2.37 (1998) 2.16 (2003) 2 3.93 (2001) 4.07 (2006) Kerala 1 1 25 2.49 (1999) 3.54 (2004) Karnataka 4 2 1 240 2.31 (1998) 1.68 (2003) Madhya Pradesh 1 1 330 4.83 (1999) 4.84 (2004) Maharashtra 4 5 1350 3.13 (2000) 3.43 (2004) Orissa 1 10** 3 27 90 1.63 (1998) 2.25 (2003) Rajasthan 90 2.81 (2001) 3.72 (2006) Tamil Nadu 30 4.12 (2002) 2.94 (2007) Uttar Pradesh 5 8 30 2 1250 3.35 (2001) 2.59 (2006) West Bengal 290 * Gujarat court system has registered more than 1000 cases of communal violence during the riots in 2002 ** Orissa court system has registered more than 120 cases of communal violence in 2007 and 2008 *** Gujarat official sources talk about 850 victims in the riots in 2002, Human Right Watch reported about 2000 deathss Source: Varshney 2002: 98, Times of India, Election Commission of India and author 5.1. Gujarat case study Who can actually gain from the communal and religious violence? The hypothesis is that the main profit is on the side of nationalist parties such as BJP which can recruit new electoral in the next election. These parties have proposed an easy way how to solve the religious problem and proclaim support to majority (Hindu), which is the ‘moral and historical power’ in the conflict. Parties as BJP have mostly core electorates from this majority. Diagram 2 shows the growth in community riots which has started in 80s and this trend raised similarly with the popularity of Hindutva and BJP. The case study shows also communal violence in Gujarat in 2002. There was the situation clearer than in other states, because the election fight was focused on two big parties – BJP an INC. Gujarat has been also the most affected state by religious disorder in India (compare with number of deaths in last two decades). The Gujarat communal violence were the product of the long and sustained mobilization that took place in the state long before Ahmedabad riots in 2002 happened. In effect, the stage for the post Ahmedabad disorder had been set some time ago. BJP had systematically reached out 59 to Gujarati in order to disseminate the message of Hindutva. ( Chandhoke 2004: 51-52) For details see table 8 which shows intensity of violence by states. Diagram 4 Total deaths per year in communal violence, Gujarat 600 500 400 killed 300 200 100 y = 3,6808x + 41,526 2 R = 0,0182 0 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 year Source: Varshney 2002: 99, Times of India reports, author Gujarat witnessed several more riots since 1969, in 1981, in 1985, in 1990, in 1992-93 and also the biggest in 2002 and several other riots in between. According to the "Times of India" report, under Madhav Singh Solanki15 who was chief minister on three occasions, 276 people died in 117 incidents of mob violence. Under Amarsingh Chaudhuri16, 582 persons died in 413 incidents of violence. And under Chimanbhai Patel 17, who was chief minister twice, 563 persons died in 370 incidents of violence. (Engineer 2006) In comparison with these facts the report written by Human Rights Watch said that during communal riots in 2002 as many as 15 ) Madhav Singh Solanki is an Indian politician from Indian National Congress party and a former External affairs minister of India and former Chief Minister of Gujarat. 16 ) Amarsinh Chaudhary was an Indian politician from INC. He was the Chief Minister of Gujarat from 1985 to 1989. 17 ) Chimanbhai Patel is a former chief minister of Gujarat state in India from INC. He served in that office from 1973 to 1974 and from 1990 to 1994. 60 2,000 Muslims were left dead. The riots occurred after some Muslims allegedly attacked a train carrying Hindu pilgrims and activists. One carriage caught fire and fifty-nine Hindus were killed in the blaze. In retaliation, Hindu extremist mobs, often with police participation and complicity, killed hundreds of Muslims and displaced thousands. The report also said that the Gujarat state government, led by Chief Minister Narandra Modi of the Hindu nationalist BJP, not only failed to take appropriate action to prevent the violence, but has since failed to investigate properly the crimes committed as well. It has consistently sought to impede successful prosecutions of those allegedly involved in the massacres, leading the Supreme Court and National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) to intervene on several occasions. (Human Rights Watch 2004) Table 9 Effective number of parties in Gujarat Year Effective number of parties18 1980 1.62 1985 1.47 1990 3.24 1995 1.96 1998 1.99 2002 1.92 2007 1.93 Source: Election Commission of India and author The BJP, for many years in opposition against the erstwhile-ruling Congress Party, has defined the terms in which this split public can be reconstituted. They have aligned their national politics with the more communal campaigns at the local level, using power of the religious image to bypass the gulf in language and literacy. Simultaneously, the inability of their opponents to bridge this gap has been critical for their success. In the process, they have come to dominate the rhetorical field of politics. In a poor country where Hindus are 80 per cent of the population, arguments for state protection of minorities have been hard-pressed to withstand Hindu chauvinism’s assault. Deliberately engineered riots against Muslims have been an indispensable tool in this connection. Together with vicious rumour mongering, which a state government is well placed to carry out unopposed, fear and suspicion resulting from violence project a deeper divide than actually exists between the religious communities. (Rajagopal 2006) Comparison with table 8 and with diagram 2 shows that Wilkinson’s hypothesis is supported by the Gujarat case, but there is some perturbation. On the contrary, the last period from the ) Effective number of parties: N=1/Σsi2, si proportion of seats of the parties in assembly. (Šedo 2006: 87) 18 61 year 2004 has shown also the decrease of violence intensity, but again the brutality of communal riots (like Orissa) has taken intensity in 2008. Henceforth, there are still cases of communal violence but without fatal cases compared to beginning of 21st century. There are also cases of terrorist attacks from Muslim fundamentalist side which have been not counted as regular communal violence according to definition of communal violence. These cases would increase number of victims of religious cleavage noticeably. According to Times of India records from 2001-2008, Gujarat has higher number of communal violence than is average. In India in mentioned period (except the Orissa case in last two years where is higher number of communal disorder than in Gujarat). Wilkinson’s supposition has been supported in Gujarat case. Moreover, there should be enlargement of the hypothesis. Violence in Gujarat was higher when federal government was more nationalistic oriented and the electoral did not have core inside of religious minorities. The highest number of violence with victims in Gujarat happened during BJP government on the state as well as federal level. It was from the electoral term 1999-2004 and beginning of nineties when the new electoral behaviour and party system formed and when the nationalist party was the most important part of federal government. In connection with Lijphart and Horowitz, there are some significant highlights which also can explain why the communal violence is higher in Gujarat. Lijphart see the main success of communal harmony in divided societies in proportional representation and electoral system. The FPTP system cannot give this result in Gujarat. The constituencies are not also shaped according to ethnic or religious base. There is low chance for minorities to be represented in Gujarat Assembly. Majority representation of nationalistic party in government does not need to ask for minority support and also does not need to create any great coalition or share the seats with minorities. Seat-pooling with minorities does not exist. There is no chance for other Lijphart’s assumption such as minority veto or segmental autonomy. Segmental autonomy for religious minorities is given only by Indian understanding of secularism, but it is sometime neglected by nationalistic government. Example could be found in Gujarat again where the Christian community must to face violent conversion to Hinduism. (Times of India records) Horowitz’s assumption also counts with minority office-holding, which is very low in Gujarat. This state does not have any Muslim representation in State Assembly (see table 2, p. 23). The number of Muslim in governmental jobs is generally very low in whole India. Vote pooling which can create interethnic appeals is not exist in FPTP environment and in BJP domination in Gujarat. 62 Table 10 The Gujarat Assembly Election Results in 2007 (total seats: 182) Party Congress Bharatiya Janata Party Nationalist Congress Party Others Contestants 173 182 10 903 Won 59 117 3 3 % of votes 38.00 49.12 1.05 11.83 Source: Election Commission of India Table 11 The Gujarat Assembly Election Results in 2002 (total seats: 182) Party Congress Bharatiya Janata Party Others Contestants 180 181 628 Won 51 127 4 % of votes 39.28 49.85 10.87 Source: Election Commission of India Table 12 The Gujarat Assembly Election Results in 1998 (total seats: 182) Party Congress Bharatiya Janata Party Others Contestants 179 182 764 Won 53 117 12 % of votes 34.85 44.81 20.34 Source: Election Commission of India Table 13 The Gujarat Assembly Election Results in 1995 (total seats: 182) Party Congress Bharatiya Janata Party Others Contestants 181 182 2 182 Won 45 121 16 % of votes 32.86 42.51 24.63 Source: Election Commission of India Table 14 The Gujarat Assembly Election Results in 1990 (total seats: 182) Party Contestants Won % of votes 63 Congress Bharatiya Janata Party Janata Dal Others 181 147 147 1 414 33 63 70 16 30.74 26.69 29.36 13.21 Source: Election Commission of India Table 15 The Gujarat Assembly Election Results in 1985 (total seats: 182) Party Congress Bharatiya Janata Party Janata Dal Others Contestants 182 124 141 690 Won 149 11 14 8 % of votes 55.55 14.96 19.25 10.24 Source: Election Commission of India Table 16 The Gujarat Assembly Election Results in 1980 (total seats: 182) Party Congress (I) Bharatiya Janata Party Janata Dal (JP) Janata Dal (SC) Others Contestants 182 127 152 16 497 Won 141 9 21 1 10 % of votes 51.04 14.02 22.77 0.63 11.54 Source: Election Commission of India 5.2. Orissa case study Orissa is a state which could be diagnosed with low number of violence as well as with low intensity. However, in past decade, there is some significant shift in electoral behaviour as well as in minority approach from government. Orissa changed (see table 16) its party system from dominant party system, to two party system, to moderate multipartism. However, this multipartim is bipolar (there is marginal third leftist pole without big importance for government composition). BJP and its coalition partner BJD (Biju Janata Dal) won last two elections. BJD is a leading party in Orissa, which has regional focus as well as Hindu (Hindutva) affiliation. There is also INC which has the main opponent to the nationalist coalition. The electoral behaviour could be compared with the Gujarat example where there is secularism of INC supported by minorities confronted with BJP nationalism. The intensity of 64 2007 and 2008 riots is strong. However, the number of death is minimized compare to Gujarat case. In spite of it, there are increasing quantities of victims in Orissa from Christmas 2007. The number of displaced is up to 20,000. ( compared with USCIRF 2008) USCIRF Annual Report 2008 said that “police reportedly look the other way or even appear to be complicit in the attacks.” Diagram 5 Total deaths per year in communal violence, Orissa 100 80 60 killed 40 20 y = 0,0366x + 3,6917 2 R = 0,0003 0 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 year Source: Varshney 2002: 101, Times of India reports, author There is a similar situation in Gujarat where government security forces have been accused of inactivity. Some reports also mentioned that incited mobs against Christians in India are supported and frequently invoked by the Hindus nationalist and supported by nationalist political groups and leaders. In Orissa it is mainly Sangh Parivar (National Commission for Minorities (NCM) named this organisation in its reports) which has close link to BJD. Table 17 Effective number of parties in Orissa 65 Year Effective number of parties 1985 1,52 1990 1.41 1995 2.5 2000 3.13 2004 3.43 Source: Election Commission of India and author This situation only partly supported Wilkinson’s hypothesis. However, there are significant attributes which increase the validity of hypothesis that government, which is not dependent on minorities’ votes, does not protect minorities from majority aggressions. On the other side, there is disagreement that the lower number of parties corresponded with higher number of riots. The hypothesis could be modified. The bipolarism escalates intensity of community disorder. Coalition of nationalistic parties does not search for support from minorities. Bipolarism and coalition nationalistic government cannot be consider as great coalition as Lijphart understands it. There is also no chance for interethnic appeals through vote pooling or constituency pooling as Horowitz described. Orissa’s last communal violence was carefully observed by Christian community in India and also in abroad. ( compare with USCIRF 2008) The pressure of this Indian religious minority on federal government helps to decrease the intensity of violence. Stress which put Horowitz or Lijphart on federalism can be understandable also in this context. Secular and pro-minority federal government could reduce negative consequences of majority nationalistic government in the state. Table 18 Results of the 2004 Orissa Assembly Election (total seats: 147) Party Bharatiya Janata Party Biju Janata Dal Indian National Congress Communist Party of India Communist Party of India (M) Jharkhand Mukti Morcha Independents/Others Source: Election Commission of India Contestants 63 84 133 6 3 12 299 Won 32 61 38 1 1 4 10 % of votes 17.11 27.36 34.82 0.77 0.55 1.78 13.49 Table 19 Results of the 2000 Orissa Assembly Election (total seats: 147) 66 Party Bharatiya Janata Party Biju Janata Dal Indian National Congress Communist Party of India Communist Party of India (M) Janata Dal (S) Jharkhand Mukti Morcha Independents Source: Election Commission of India Contestants 63 84 145 29 15 24 21 236 Won 38 68 26 1 1 1 3 8 % of votes 18.20 29.40 33.78 1.22 0.77 0.84 2.14 10.66 Table 20 Results of the 1995 Orissa Assembly Election (total seats: 147) Party Bharatiya Janata Party Indian National Congress Communist Party of India Janata Dal Jharkhand Mukti Morcha Jharkhand People's Party Independents Source: Election Commission of India Contestants 144 146 21 146 16 4 682 Won 9 80 1 46 4 1 6 % of votes 7.88 39.08 1.71 35.41 1.94 0.17 10.51 Table 21 Results of the 1990 Orissa Assembly Election (total seats: 147) Party Bharatiya Janata Party Indian National Congress Communist Party of India Communist Party of India (M) Janata Dal Independents Source: Election Commission of India Contestants 63 145 9 3 139 389 Won 2 10 5 1 123 6 % of votes 3.56 29.78 2.98 0.84 53.69 7.36 Table 22 Results of the 1985 Orissa Assembly Election (total seats: 147) 67 Party Bharatiya Janata Party Indian National Congress Communist Party of India Janata Party Independents Source: Election Commission of India Contestants 67 147 27 140 374 Won 1 117 1 21 7 % of votes 2.60 51.08 3.31 30.61 10.50 5.3. Uttar Pradesh case study North-Indian states in general and Uttar Pradesh in particular, are generally believed to be worst-affected by communal violence. This is partly true because, in popular and scholarly perceptions, the “worst” states are usually seen as those with the greatest total number of incidents and deaths. Therefore the most populous states, even if they have a lower per capita rate of deaths in communal riots, appear to be the most violent. Uttar Pradesh is however not the worst state in number of communal riots and deaths and it is (with population of 175 million) the most populated state in India and fifth in the world. If we compare it with Gujarat which has the highest per capita rate of deaths in communal incidents, at around 117 per million of urban population – Uttar Pradesh has only 43 deaths per million (in the years 19501995). Clearly, communalism is not primarily a northern Indian problem; it is a serious issue for western India. Indeed, the western state of Gujarat not only has a greater per capita rate of deaths and incidents but also a larger number of total deaths in riots than do Uttar Pradesh. Although Gujarat has high levels of deaths in communal incidents, a look at the state level data for Gujarat over time (diagram 4) in comparison with that for Uttar Pradesh (diagram 6) suggests that there are significant qualitative differences in the levels of violence in Uttar Pradesh that may, at one level, justify that popular perceptions of them as the most communally violent state. (Varshney 2002: 96-98) Increasing number of effective parties in UP Assembly and the decreasing trend of deaths in riots in last decade shows that there is possible link between multipartism and minority protection if the coalition partner or government as whole depends on minorities. UP governments in 1990s and first decade of new millennium have depended on SCs/STs, OBCs and religious minorities such as Muslims. 68 Diagram 6 Total deaths per year in communal violence, Uttar Pradesh 300 250 200 killed 150 100 50 y = -3,097x + 81,754 2 R = 0,1073 0 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 year Source: Varshney 2002: 102, Times of India, author The growth of effective number of parties in UP had started in 1990s and continued till the election in 2007, where was significant setback of this number. However, the result of 2007 election confirmed the increasing support of BSP and SP. These parties have base among SCs/STs and OBCs. Moreover, the support also comes from Muslim part and other minorities. Table 23 Effective number of parties in Uttar Pradesh Year Effective number of parties 1980 1.81 1985 2.24 1989 3.15 1991 2.87 1993 3.61 1996 3.70 2002 4.12 2007 2.94 Source: Election Commission of India and author 69 The main political party in Uttar Pradesh is BSP, SP and then BJP (tables 23 and 25). In the past BSP made coalition with them or other smaller parties. Also SP were in coalition with BJP. Congress can be characterised as a party in the middle of the political spectrum with lower relevancy. Nationalists cannot be as radical as in Gujarat, because they depend on their coalition partners and also the nationalist are not the main stream of UP party system. Also, the secularism cannot be as strict as in Kerala, because of the same reason. It means that the government tries to prevent the riots and communal violence, because of its dependence on minorities – especially SP, BSP and also INC. In Uttar Pradesh effective multipartism with multipolarised political environment has been in existence. A strong party with strong secular programme does not exist, because the power and electoral potential of INC is divided between BSP and SP. The real riots do not have a real impact on election result as we can see in Gujarat, because any party cannot destroy their own coalition potential. ( Kudláček 2006: 50-52) Uttar Pradesh with its multipartism shows that FPTP electoral system does not produce only bipartism or bipolar party system. The electoral competition is in some constituencies among three or four big parties with different ideology which have good chance to win. However, there is no real proportionality of votes, but in some approximate to it. Very tight competition among all four main parties (BJP, BSP, INC, SP) shifts party behaviour and searches for the electoral support also among minorities which are not typical voters for this party. This is important in undecided constituencies. Parties follow the interethnic appeals in heterogenic constituencies. Government also moderates their behaviour. The seat pooling was necessary in last decades. However, the last election shows that one party (BSP) can also get majority of seats and make one colour government. Table 24 Results of the 2007 Uttar Pradesh Assembly Election (total seats: 403) Party Bharatiya Janata Party Bahujan Samaj Party Indian National Congress Samajwadi Party Janata Dal (U) Rashtriya Lok Dal Independents/Others Source: Election Commission of India Contestants 350 403 393 393 16 254 3937 Won 51 206 22 97 1 10 16 % of votes 16.97 30.43 8.61 25.43 0.42 3.70 13.34 70 Table 25 Results of the 2002 Uttar Pradesh Assembly Election (total seats: 403) Party Bharatiya Janata Party Bahujan Samaj Party Communist Party of India (M) Indian National Congress Samajwadi Party Janata Dal (U) Janata Party Rashtriya Lok Dal Natural Law Party Samajwadi Janata Party (Rashtriya) Independents/Others Source: Election Commission of India Contestants 320 401 6 402 390 16 23 38 130 21 3034 Won 88 91 2 25 143 2 1 14 1 1 28 % of votes 20.08 23.06 0.13 8.96 25.37 0.58 0.27 2.48 0.71 0.24 14.50 Table 26 Results of the 1996 Uttar Pradesh Assembly Election (total seats: 424) Party All India Indira Congress (T) Bharatiya Janata Party Bahujan Samaj Party Communist Party of India (M) Indian National Congress Samajwadi Party Janata Dal Samajwadi Janata Party (Rashtriya) Independents/Others Source: Election Commission of India Contestants 37 414 296 11 126 281 54 77 2093 Won 4 174 67 4 33 110 7 1 24 % of votes 1.33 32.52 19.64 0.77 8.35 21.80 2.56 0.59 9.43 71 Table 27 Results of the 1993 Uttar Pradesh Assembly Election (total seats: 422) Party Bharatiya Janata Party Bahujan Samaj Party Communist Party of India (M) Communist Party of India Indian National Congress Janata Dal Janata Party Samajwadi Party Independents/Others Source: Election Commission of India Contestants 422 164 17 37 421 377 298 256 7506 Won 177 67 1 3 28 27 1 109 9 % of votes 33.30 11.12 0.47 0.64 15.08 12.33 0.52 17.94 6.96 Table 28 Results of the 1991 Uttar Pradesh Assembly Election (total seats: 419) Party Bharatiya Janata Party Bahujan Samaj Party Communist Party of India (M) Communist Party of India Indian National Congress Janata Dal Janata Party Independents/Others Source: Election Commission of India Contestants 415 386 14 44 413 374 399 5652 Won 221 12 1 4 46 92 34 9 % of votes 31.45 9.44 0.32 1.04 17.32 18.84 12.52 8.53 Table 29 Results of the 1989 Uttar Pradesh Assembly Election (total seats: 425) Party Bharatiya Janata Party Bahujan Samaj Party Communist Party of India (M) Communist Party of India Indian National Congress Janata Dal Janata Party (JP) Lok Dal (B) Independents/Others Source: Election Commission of India Contestants 275 372 8 68 410 356 119 204 3748 Won 57 13 2 6 94 208 1 2 42 % of votes 11.61 9.41 0.37 1.56 27.9 29.71 0.74 1.19 15.82 72 Table 30 Results of the 1985 Uttar Pradesh Assembly Election (total seats: 425) Party Bharatiya Janata Party Communist Party of India (M) Communist Party of India Indian National Congress Janata Party Lok Dal Indian Congress Independents/Others Source: Election Commission of India Contestants 347 25 161 425 311 385 169 3768 Won 16 2 6 269 20 84 5 23 % of votes 9.83 0.68 3.04 39.25 5.60 21.43 2.27 16.80 Table 31 Results of the 1980 Uttar Pradesh Assembly Election (total seats: 425) Party Bharatiya Janata Party Communist Party of India Indian National Congress (I) Indian National Congress (U) Janata Party (JP) Janata Party (SC) Janata Party (SR) Independents/Others Source: Election Commission of India Contestants 400 155 424 339 339 399 302 2290 Won 11 7 309 13 4 59 4 18 % of votes 10.76 3.55 37.65 6.38 2.89 21.51 4.17 12.07 5.4. Kerela case study Kerala is a state which has a different political situation from Gujarat. Both states have similar religious community population structures. There are differences in structure of the population in rural or urban area as well as the in literacy rate. Kerala has the highest literacy rate in India around 91% and around 70% in Gujarat (Census of India 2001)). Kerala is a more rural state compared to a more industrialised and urbanised Gujarat. The election results show that Kerala is traditionally multipartism with coalition governments. The dominance of some parties is not as strong as in Gujarat. Bipolarism does not exist, but strong multipolarism exists. The strong alliances are divided into the three main stream – 73 socialist and communist blocks (leftist) led by CPI(M) and middle-left block led by Congress. The third blocks are BJP and their partners and they are not as strong in Kerala as in Gujarat. In Kerala the left orientation of the politics and strong secularism helps the preventing communal violence and hindering the growth of nationalism and Hindutva ideology. The comparison of the states Gujarat and Kerala helps support the hypothesis that the two- party system and the low number of the effective parties are blamed for the riots and clashes among majority and minority of the population. On the other hand, the multipartism help prevent communal violence. Here we should also take into account other variables, such as the literacy rate and the rural environment. The cities and higher concentration of the population can increase the chances of community disorder. Moreover, Kerala is state traditionally with secular parties’ dominancy. Muslims and Christians are also very strong minority which is almost as big as Hindus majority. There is also concentration of voters. Some constituencies are predominantly Muslim or Christian. Party system in Kerala has developed from strong multipartism to present moderate multipartism. The effective number of parties was the lowest after election in 2001 when was reported 3.93 and in 2006 with 4.07. Kerala party system is close to the outcomes which generate usually proportional (or list) electoral system. Muslims as strong minority are represented by own party. Also other affiliations are represented in society. The secular leftist parties have strong position in Kerala’s political system. CPI(M) is one tradition leader in Kerala poltics. Other is secular Congress. Both secular parties have their own offshoots or brother parties (leftist or congress parties). The nationalist parties do not have big support in Kerala societies and they usually do not gain any seats. The governments which are coalition of parties with secular affiliation (and often supported by minorities’ votes or parties as Muslim league) do not have interest to support riots and intensity of violence. Religious disorder will not bring gains for any main parties in Kerala Assembly. 74 Diagram 7 Total deaths per year in communal violence, Kerala 100 80 60 killed 40 20 0 year y = 0,0109x + 0,3478 2 R = 0,0012 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Source: Varshney 2002: 102, Times of India, author Table 32 Effective number of parties in Kerala Year Effective number of parties 1980 7.39 1982 7.07 1986 5.86 1991 4.36 1996 5.17 2001 3.93 2006 4.07 Source: Election Commission of India and author Lijphart and Horowitz’ critique of FPTP system is not fully warranted in Kerala. The structure of population and concentration of religious groups in the shaping of constituencies give to the minorities the chance to get their own representation. Moreover, this specific situation creates multipartism which generates moderate politics. Parties’ representation make great coalition (seat pooling) and it create other Lijphart’s assumption as strong minority veto and cultural autonomy for minorities. The parties which win the seats are mostly secular and depend on minority votes. The structure of the population forces the parties for cooperation. The secular electoral coalitions for their electoral success need to gain the votes in different 75 environment and religious groups. They need to cooperate and it creates strong support of inter-ethnic appeals through vote pooling or constituency pooling. Kerala’s example is near to Lijphart’s concept of consensual democracy. Table 33 Results of the 2006 Kerala Assembly Election (total seats: 140) Party United Democratic Front (UDF) Indian National Congress Muslim League Kerala Congress – Mani Janadhipatya Samrakshana Samithi Kerala Congress (B) Left Democratic Front Communist Party of India (M) Communist Party of India Janata Dal – Secular Kerala Congress Nationalist Congress Party Revolutionary Socialist Party Bharatiya Janata Party Independents / Others Source: Election Commission of India Contestants 116 77 21 11 5 2 129 85 24 8 6 2 4 136 398 Won 40 24 7 7 1 1 91 61 17 5 4 1 3 0 9 % of votes 36.78 24.09 7.30 3.26 1.51 0.62 44.81 30.45 8.09 2.44 1.75 0.64 1.44 4.75 11.98 Table 34 Results of the 2001 Kerala Assembly Election (total seats: 140) Party United Democratic Front (UDF) Indian National Congress – Indira Indian Union Muslim League Kerala Congress – Mani Janadhipatya Samrakshana Samithi Revolutionary Socialist PartyBolshevik Kerala Congress- Jacob Communist Marxist Party Kerala Congress – Balakrishna Pillai Left Democratic Front Contestants 140 88 23 11 5 4 4 3 2 140 Won 99 63 16 9 4 2 2 1 2 40 % of votes 49.05 31.40 8.00 3.54 1.78 1.37 1.32 0.92 0.72 43.70 76 Communist Party of India (M) Communist Party of India Janata Dal – Secular Kerala Congress – Joseph Nationalist Congress Party Revolutionary Socialist Party Bharatiya Janata Party BJP Allies Independents Source: Election Commission of India 74 24 12 10 9 6 123 7 266 24 7 3 2 2 2 0 0 1 23.85 7.70 3.48 2.90 2.60 1.71 5.02 0.06 2.16 Table 35 Results of the 1996 Kerala Assembly Election (total seats: 140) Party Indian National Congress Communist Party of India- Marxist Communist Party of India Muslim League Bharatiya Janata Party Janata Dal Kerala Congress- Mani Kerala Congress Indian Congress-Socialist Revolutionary Socialist Party Janadhipathya Samrakshna Samithi Kerala Congress-Jacob Kerala Congress -Balakrishna Pillai Independents Source: Election Commission of India Contestants 94 72 22 23 128 13 10 10 9 6 5 4 2 636 Won 37 40 18 13 0 4 5 6 3 5 1 2 1 1 % of votes 30.43 24.41 7.88 7.42 5.48 4.12 3.18 3.10 2.49 2.07 1.54 1.14 0.64 2.38 77 Table 36 Results of the 1991 Kerala Assembly Election (total seats: 140) Party Indian National Congress Communist Party of India- Marxist Communist Party of India Muslim League Bharatiya Janata Party Janata Dal Kerala Congress- Mani Kerala Congress Indian Congress-Socialist Revolutionary Socialist Party Independents / Others Source: Election Commission of India Contestants 91 64 24 22 137 13 13 11 12 6 340 Won 55 28 12 19 0 3 10 1 2 2 8 % of votes 32.07 21.74 8.26 7.37 4.76 4.04 4.32 3.37 3.47 1.73 8.27 Table 37 Results of the 1987 Kerala Assembly Election (total seats: 140) Party Indian National Congress Communist Party of India- Marxist Communist Party of India Muslim League Bharatiya Janata Party Janata Party Lok Dal Kerala Congress Indian Congress-Socialist Revolutionary Socialist Party Independents Source: Election Commission of India Contestants 76 70 25 23 116 12 2 14 14 6 896 Won 33 38 16 15 0 7 1 5 6 5 14 % of votes 24.83 22.86 8.08 7.73 5.56 3.79 0.62 3.54 4.02 2.07 16.92 78 Table 38 Results of the 1982 Kerala Assembly Election (total seats: 140) Party Indian National Congress Communist Party of India- Marxist Communist Party of India Muslim League Bharatiya Janata Party Janata Party All India Muslim League Kerala Congress Indian Congress-Socialist Revolutionary Socialist Party Kerala Congress (I) National Democratic Party Independents Source: Election Commission of India Contestants 36 51 25 18 69 13 12 17 15 8 12 5 418 Won 20 26 13 14 0 4 4 6 5 4 8 2 34 % of votes 11.90 18.80 8.42 6.17 2.75 4.04 3.25 5.86 4.81 2.76 4.55 1.67 25.02 Table 39 Results of the 1980 Kerala Assembly Election (total seats: 140) Party Indian National Congress (I) Indian National Congress (U) Communist Party of India- Marxist Communist Party of India Muslim League Janata Party All India Muslim League Kerala Congress Revolutionary Socialist Party Kerala Congress (I) Kerala Congress (Pillai Group) Independents Source: Election Commission of India Contestants 53 31 50 22 21 29 11 17 8 17 2 329 Won 17 21 35 17 14 5 5 8 6 6 1 5 % of votes 17.03 11.28 19.35 7.80 7.18 7.63 3.51 5.25 3.02 4.95 0.80 12.08 79 5.5. Rajasthan case study Rajasthan is another example of competition between main two parties (BJP an INC) in the system. The party system in this state could be called as bipartism (Sartori’s classification). However, there have been not as many cases of communal disorder and murdered violence as in selected period in Gujarat. How it could be explained? The BJP has not depended on religious minority votes as well as there is no need of any coalition government due to FPTP system and existing almost pure bipartism. Communal violence with victims was also registered in electoral term when the highest numbers of effective parties were in Rajasthan Assembly. The government also depended on minorities that time. All these differences from Gujarat example go against Wilkinson’s hypothesis. The explanation could be finding in historical conservancies in both Indian states. For some scholars, the violence in Gujarat was not entirely unprecedented. In Gujarat itself, incidents of mass violence have tended to be more intense in duration and scale than in other Indian states. (Basu and Roy 2004: 321) Rajasthan is historically communal riots free state and also the number of victims is comparatively very low in India. Rajasthan had to cope with communal violence at the end of 1980s and beginning of 1990s. That time the INC had power but the electoral behaviour was changing and the dominance of INC broke and also bipartism originated. However, the number of death was comparatively low as compared to causes in Bihar, Maharashatra and Gujarat in the same period. 80 Diagram 8 Total deaths per year in communal violence, Rajasthan 100 80 60 killed 40 20 y = -0,001x + 3,2292 2 R = 4E-07 0 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 year Source: Varshney 2002: 102, Times of India, author The possible explanation could be the growing nationalism of BJP and its potential in state as well as in federal election. However, the next election term after the strongest violence in Rajasthan in 1993, the electoral success was on the side of BJP and INC lost its position in this state. Table 40 Effective number of parties in Rajasthan Year Effective number of parties 1980 2.1 1985 2.63 1993 2.59 1998 1.63 2003 2.25 Source: Election Commission of India and author There is an also important electoral swing between BJP and INC. Both parties are not able to repeat their electoral success from previous election. Moreover, Rajasthan changes periods 81 with BJP or INC government on federal and state level. Both parties do not have coexistence of their government on both levels in the same time. Lijphart and Horowitz put the stress on federalism as the important factor for communal harmony and autonomy of minorities. There is another reason than this for Rajasthan’s communal harmony, but federalism and changing government could be one explanation for peaceful Rajasthan. However, the INC which depends more on minority votes have significant interest to protect minorities. Orissa’s example can support this assumption when federal government leading by INC threatened intervention to nationalistic government in Orissa during the riots in 2008. Minority’s pressure on federal level (or government) can help to prevent violence in Indian states which they have own responsibility for communal harmony and security. Table 41 Results of the 2003 Rajasthan Assembly Election (total seats: 200) Party Bharatiya Janata Party Indian National Congress Bahujan Samaj Party Communist Party of India (M) Indian National Lok Dal Janata Dal (U) Independents / Others Source: Election Commission of India Contestants 197 200 124 18 50 10 457 Won 120 56 2 1 4 2 15 % of votes 39.20 35.65 3.97 0.77 2.58 0.90 13.97 Table 42 Results of the 1998 Rajasthan Assembly Election (total seats: 200) Party Bharatiya Janata Party Indian National Congress Bahujan Samaj Party Communist Party of India (M) Janata Dal Independents / Others Source: Election Commission of India Contestants 196 200 108 14 69 622 Won 33 153 2 1 3 8 % of votes 33.23 44.95 2.17 0.81 1.97 14.69 82 Table 43 Results of the 1993 Rajasthan Assembly Election (total seats: 199) Party Bharatiya Janata Party Indian National Congress Communist Party of India (M) Janata Dal Independents Source: Election Commission of India Contestants 196 199 12 146 1506 Won 95 76 1 6 21 % of votes 38.60 38.27 0.98 6.93 12.90 Table 44 Results of the 1985 Rajasthan Assembly Election (total seats: 200) Party Bharatiya Janata Party Indian National Congress Communist Party of India Janata Party Lok Dal Independents Source: Election Commission of India Contestants 118 199 47 31 60 995 Won 39 113 1 10 27 10 % of votes 21.24 46.57 1.23 5.88 11.86 11.90 Table 45 Results of the 1980 Rajasthan Assembly Election (total seats: 200) Party Bharatiya Janata Party Indian National Congress (I) Indian National Congress (U) Communist Party of India Communist Party of India (M) Janata Party (JP) Janata Party (SC) Independents Source: Election Commission of India Contestants 123 199 69 25 16 76 103 750 Won 32 133 6 1 1 8 7 12 % of votes 18.60 42.96 5.59 0.97 1.20 7.34 9.55 13.08 83 5.6. Maharashtra case study Maharashtra is the state where the relatively peaceful period is changed by violent time. The communal violence has tradition in the state and especially Bombay has experience with clashes between Muslims and Hindus. The riots are usually very bloody as we can see in diagram 9. Riots in 1984 and in 1992/93 had many victims. Especially the disorder in the early 1990s took many lives. Wilkinson’s hypothesis is not as much valid in this case, because the Hindu-Muslim clashes in 1992/93 have been signed up to Shiv Sena politics. This party was not the main power in the state, but their nationalist politics and increasing electoral potency provoked riots in Bombay in 1992. Also there was participation of official security forces on violence. However, the government did not have situation under the control. But the Wilkinson’s hypothesis could be verified if we look deeply on the structure of government and their administration and security forces. The police as well as administration is under the control of majority Hindus. Muslims and other minorities do not have proper proportion there. Government was under the pressure of public and Muslims were that time marked as the instigators of violence. Lijphart and Horowitz put stress in their theory on office holding and power sharing in any level. In Maharashtra the police forces were under the control of radical Hindus or sometimes illegally directly under the control of Shiv Sena. There was no fast brake which was possible for official use by minorities to stop the violence or pull out the state forces from participation in. Absence of power sharing and office holding (which is common in whole India) or the consciousness of importance of Muslims’ votes help to create massacre with state participation in Bombay. Stress on a Hindu identity and the use of Hindi in political sloganeering are indicative of a major shift in the politics of in Western India. This turn to Hinduism is what seemed to lead to the outbreak of violence in Bombay on a scale never before witnessed in the city. In winter of 1992-93, Bombay experienced the worst Hindu-Muslim conflagration the city has ever known. It is shift in which once local, native party in Bombay, the Shiv Sena now finds itself as the dominant political force in the state of Maharashtra, with a ready capacity to incite widespread violence. (Katzenstein, Mehta and Thakkar 2006: 257-258) 84 Diagram 9 Total deaths per year in communal violence, Maharashtra 600 500 400 killed 300 200 100 y = -1,0683x + 61,895 R2 = 0,0035 0 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 year Source: Varshney 2002: 101, Times of India, author The Shiv Sena conjures up images of Muslim treachery and betrayal. In inflammatory language, the Shiv Sena depicts anti-national Muslims and destroyers of temples, as murderers of the police, and as threats to the Indian state. ( Katzenstein, Mehta and Thakkar 2006: 268) Table 46 Effective number of parties in Maharashtra Year Effective number of parties 1980 2.21 1985 2.76 1990 3.29 1995 4.52 1999 4.83 2004 4.84 Source: Election Commission of India and author The ancillary explanation can be found also in changing electoral as well as party behaviour when the federal and state party system has changed from dominant party system (respectively two party system) to multipartism and parties wanting to find the major support 85 of voters and find new electorates. The parties searched for their new political position and profile. The secular parties could not know how to react on new situation and during the riots they afraid of protecting minorities due to loosing votes from Hindu majority. Table 47 Results of the 2004 Maharashtra Assembly Election (total seats: 288) Party Bharatiya Janata Party Indian National Congress Communist Party of India (M) Nationalist Congress Party Shivsena Jan Surajya Shakti Peasants And Workers Party Independents / Others Source: Election Commission of India¨ Contestants 111 157 16 124 163 19 43 1213 Won 54 69 3 71 62 4 2 23 % of votes 13.67 21.06 0.62 18.75 19.97 0.88 1.31 16.36 Table 48 Results of the 1999 Maharashtra Assembly Election (total seats: 288) Party Bharatiya Janata Party Indian National Congress Communist Party of India (M) Nationalist Congress Party Shivsena Janata Dal (S) Samajwadi Party Republican Party of India Peasants And Workers Party Bharipa Bahujan Mahasangha Independents / Others Source: Election Commission of India Contestants 117 249 23 223 161 25 15 10 22 34 859 Won 56 75 2 58 69 2 2 1 5 3 15 % of votes 14.54 27.20 0.64 22.60 17.33 1.51 0.69 0.69 1.49 1.85 10.1 86 Table 49 Results of the 1995 Maharashtra Assembly Election (total seats: 288) Party Bharatiya Janata Party Indian National Congress Communist Party of India (M) Shivsena Janata Dal Samajwadi Party Peasants and Workers Party Independents / Others Source: Election Commission of India Contestants 116 286 18 169 182 22 42 3199 Won 65 80 3 73 11 3 6 47 % of votes 12.80 31.00 1.00 16.39 5.86 0.93 2.05 27.74 Table 50 Results of the 1990 Maharashtra Assembly Election (total seats: 288) Party Bharatiya Janata Party Indian National Congress Communist Party of India Communist Party of India (M) Indian Congress (Socialist-Sarat Chandra Sinha) Janata Dal Muslim League Shivsena Peasants and Workers Party Independents / Others Source: Election Commission of India Contestants 104 276 16 13 71 214 9 183 40 3004 Won 42 141 2 3 1 24 1 52 8 14 % of votes 10.71 38.17 0.74 0.87 0.98 12.72 0.51 15.94 2.42 14.90 87 Table 51 Results of the 1985 Maharashtra Assembly Election (total seats: 288) Party Bharatiya Janata Party Indian National Congress Communist Party of India Communist Party of India (M) Indian Congress (Socialist) Janata Party Peasants and Workers Party Independents Source: Election Commission of India Contestants 67 287 31 14 126 61 29 1506 Won 16 161 2 2 54 20 13 20 % of votes 7.25 43.41 0.92 0.79 17.28 7.38 3.77 17.49 Table 52 Results of the 1980 Maharashtra Assembly Election (total seats: 288) Party Bharatiya Janata Party Indian National Congress (I) Indian National Congress (U) Communist Party of India Communist Party of India (M) Janata Party (JP) Peasants and Workers Party Independents Source: Election Commission of India Contestants 145 286 192 17 10 111 41 654 Won 14 186 47 2 2 17 9 11 % of votes 9.38 44.50 20.49 1.31 0.93 8.61 4.14 9.39 5.7. Bihar case study Bihar is an example of a state where the riots has happened in selected period during the electoral term with higher number of effective parties in assembly. However, Bihar could be called as a relatively peaceful state. When riots happened, they were more violent than in other Indian states but less then in Gujarat, Maharashtra or Uttar Pradesh. Bihar’s governments are coalition and could be describe as unstable. 88 Diagram 10 Total deaths per year in communal violence, Bihar 450 400 350 300 250 killed 200 150 100 50 y = -1,5039x + 45,341 2 R = 0,0154 0 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 year Source: Varshney 2002: 100, Times of India, author The trend in Bihar is decreasing in last period when the effective number of parties in the Bihar Assembly has increased. In the year 1989, when deaths quantity were really high, the effective number of parties was 2.78. The number of parties has increased from that time and with that also the violence has fallen down in Bihar. Table 53 Effective number of parties in Bihar Year Effective number of parties 1980 3.24 1985 2.78 1990 4.49 1995 3.33 2000 4.64 2005 5.21 Source: Election Commission of India and author According to this description Wilkinson’s hypothesis is confirmed. The most violent riots happened in term with the lowest number of parties in Assembly. However, the assembly was 89 under dominancy of INC which has support from minorities. INC also is more secular than other parties in Bihar assemby. The explanation of riots and high number of killed could be described similarly as in the case of Maharashtra. The electoral behaviour and party system had been under changing process and parties did not have experience with this new situation and wanted to find their policy outlines and their electoral gains in majority. It was malfunction of Indian version of secularism. Bihar with its multipartism could generate consensus among minorities according to Lijphart theory. It is true because the number of death in Bihar is very low in last decade. The government in Bihar is not stable (it is very weak), therefore, the minority votes and voice is stronger than in other states. The table 53 also shows that with increasing number of parties and decreasing of stability, the number of death is decreasing. Also last communal violence in September 2008 (Orissa) shows that government made strict action against rioters. In connection to Horowitz durable governments are thought to be desirable as they promote policy consistency and responsibility and may avoid the instability that can result during interregna or from the creation of fragile, unpredictable coalitions. ( Horowitz 2003a: 5-6) Bihar is opposite example and the example of this state supports more Lijphart standpoint of cabinet stability problem (cabinet instability does not automatically lead to regime instability). Table 54 Results of the 2005 Bihar Assembly Election (total seats: 243) Party Bharatiya Janata Party Bahujan Samaj Party Indian National Congress Nationalist Congress Party Communist Party of India Communist Party of India (M) Janata Dal (U) Rashtriya Janata Dal Communist Party of India (ML)(L) Samajwadi Party Lok Jan Shakti Party Independents Source: Election Commission of India Contestants 103 238 84 31 17 12 138 215 109 142 178 1493 Won 37 2 10 3 3 1 55 75 7 4 29 17 % of votes 10.97 4.41 5.00 0.98 1.58 0.64 14.55 25.07 2.49 2.69 12.62 16.16 90 Table 55 Results of the 2000 Bihar Assembly Election (total seats: 324) Party Bharatiya Janata Party Bahujan Samaj Party Indian National Congress Communist Party of India Communist Party of India (M) Janata Dal (U) Rashtriya Janata Dal Communist Party of India (ML)(L) Samata Party United Goans Democratic Party Jharkhand Mukti Morcha Kosal Party Marxist Co-Ordination Independents Source: Election Commission of India Contestants 168 249 324 153 21 87 293 107 120 6 85 7 9 1482 Won 67 5 23 5 2 21 124 6 34 2 12 2 1 20 % of votes 14.64 1.89 11.06 3.60 0.91 6.47 28.34 2.50 8.65 0.26 3.53 0.36 0.28 11.37 Table 56 Results of the 1995 Bihar Assembly Election (total seats: 324) Party Bharatiya Janata Party Bahujan Samaj Party Indian National Congress Communist Party of India Communist Party of India (M) Janata Dal Jharkhand People’s Party Samajwadi Party Samata Party Communist Party of India (ML)(L) Jharkhand Mukti Morcha Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (M) Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (S) Marxist Co-Ordination Bhartiya Pragatisheel Party Independents / Others Source: Election Commission of India Contestants 315 161 320 61 31 264 33 176 310 89 63 58 22 5 259 5708 Won 41 2 29 26 6 167 2 2 7 6 10 3 6 2 1 14 % of votes 12.96 1.34 16.27 4.76 1.44 27.98 0.34 1.67 7.06 2.36 2.32 0.96 1.26 0.29 3.04 14.27 91 Table 57 Results of the 1990 Bihar Assembly Election (total seats: 324) Party Bharatiya Janata Party Indian National Congress Communist Party of India Communist Party of India (M) Janata Dal Janata Party (JP) Jharkhand Mukti Morcha Indian People’s Front Jharkhand Dal Marxist Co-Ordination Independents / Others Source: Election Commission of India Contestants 237 323 109 31 277 158 82 82 28 11 4377 Won 39 71 23 6 122 3 19 7 1 2 31 % of votes 11.61 24.78 6.59 1.33 25.61 1.54 3.14 2.77 2.77 0.22 18.76 Table 58 Results of the 1985 Bihar Assembly Election (total seats: 324) Party Bharatiya Janata Party Indian National Congress Communist Party of India Communist Party of India (M) Lok Dal Janata Party Jharkhand Mukti Morcha Indian Congress (Socialist) Independents / Others Source: Election Commission of India Contestants 234 323 167 44 261 229 57 59 2805 Won 39 196 12 1 46 13 9 1 30 % of votes 7.54 39.30 8.86 1.61 14.69 7.21 1.82 0.66 17.96 92 Table 59 Results of the 1980 Bihar Assembly Election (total seats: 324) Party Bharatiya Janata Party Indian National Congress (I) Indian National Congress (U) Communist Party of India Communist Party of India (M) Janata Party (JP) Janata Party (SC) Janata Party (SR) Jharkhand Mukti Morcha Independents / Others Source: Election Commission of India Contestants 246 311 185 135 27 240 254 153 31 1354 Won 21 169 14 23 6 13 42 1 11 24 % of votes 8.41 34.20 7.34 9.12 1.75 7.21 15.63 1.61 1.69 12.18 5.8. Wilkinson’s hypothesis and its modification and alternative explanation Wilkinson’s hypothesis explains with small modification (see figure 3) the intensity of riots and the high number of death in particular cases as in Gujarat 2002 and in Orissa 2007 respectively 2008. However, the hypothesis does not explain why the riots happen in a particular state and period. Regardless, Wilkinson’s hypothesis also explains why the riots do not happen very often and with low intensity in Kerala and in Orissa in the past and also in Uttar Pradesh. In spite of it, there are some cases of violence which had high intensity and many causes of killing people, but the hypothesis is not strongly supported. One example is Bihar and Maharashtra in late 1980s and early 1990s where bloody riots happened, although the government was supposed to be secular and had some support in minorities. According to Wilkinson’s hypothesis government should prevent the riots and their intensity as well as protect minorities. There could be more explanation why there was opposite situation: changing electoral behaviour in late 1980s and early 1990s and due to this party system changed, new shaping of major parties and their electoral (this supports Wilkinson’s assumption, because government did not feel the importance of minority votes); 93 - increasing potency of nationalist parties (like Shiv Sena in Maharastra) and its effort to gain votes from growing nationalism; - over votes and over seats gained by INC in Bihar and its elites felt that minorities are not as much important for electoral success (this supports Wilkinson’s assumption, because government did not feel the importance of minority votes); - alternative economical, demographical and other explanations and theories. Rajasthan’s example shows that for riots and their intensity must be also other prerequisite. One should be also a historical background and experience. Gujarat has stronger tradition of communal clashes than Rajasthan. Figure 3 shows some modification of Wilkinson’s hypothesis and try it fixed more on present Indian states. Especially this figure explains Orissa case of riots in 2007 and 2008. Figure 3 The modified Wilkinson’s hypothesis of relationship between party competition and a state's response to anti-minority polarization and violence 94 Wilkinson’s hypothesis could be verified in some cases, but there should be also many other expected or unexpected causalities which are out of it. There are some historical, economical, demographical as well as other sources of causations which are difficult to describe and attach. However, this hypothesis could be one main source of behaviour of parties and their electorates during any riots. Moreover, Lijphart’s and Horowitz’s ideal model for divided societies also gave some explanation as to why riots in India happened. Wilkinson’s hypothesis does not count with federalism. Nevertheless, this could be one significant factor which helps to explain relatively peaceful Rajasthan or some periods of violent Gujarat. Gujarat riots 2002 happened in electoral term when BJP were in power in Gujarat as well as in Indian Union. Rajasthan changes periods with BJP or INC government on federal and state level. Both parties do not have coexistence of their government on both levels in the same time for several electoral terms. 95 Conclusion This work focused on Lijphart and Horowitz’ theoretical concept of ideal model for divided societies. Indian differences were studied through these two models. According to these two scholars the main problem for Indian state is based on the Westminster electoral model – FPTP and also in weak federalism (strong centre and weak states). No minority veto and also lack of minorities’ representation as well as power sharing and office holding gave big power the majority not to care about minorities’ needs. Wilkinson’s hypothesis of the impact of number of the parties in the political system on India states government minorities’ policy supports and follows up Lijphart and Horowitz. The work supported hypothesis that without minority electorates’ requirement government do not protect these minorities against violence, riots and aggression form majority. Wilkinson’s support Lijphart and Horowitz assumption of office holding and proportional representation. Without that the riots and violence against minorities would have bigger intensity as Maharashtra, Orissa and Gujarat example showed. The need of minority support (as well as proportional representation) for government increases fair behaviour and minority protection from government as the case of Kerala and partly Uttar Pradesh and Bihar showed. The Wilkinson’s hypothesis does not include all situation of electoral and party behaviour dependence. Chapter 5.8 enlarged the hypothesis and the cases of moderate multipartism with bipolar spectrum which have been included in Wilkinson’s assumption. The answers to the questions from beginning were given by this work. First of all this thesis has found the highlighted points of Lijphart and Horowitz theoretical approach of electoral democracy in divided Indian society and finds which of these points have any practical conservancies in India. The comparison of Indian real political system with the theoretical approach of Lijphart and Horowitz shows how and where ethnic disorder is produced by the system gaps which do not follow the Lijpahrt’s and Horowitz’s ideal model and recommendation. There is a problem of electoral system which support majority and also a lack of real federalisation as well as segmental or cultural autonomy and multicultural and multiethnic veto. The power sharing and minority proportion of office holding is also weak. There has been evaluation of the Willkinson’s hypothesis of the impact of number of the parties in the political system on India states government minorities’ policy. Practical cases show how strong is the influence of majoritarism election system on ethnic policy. The link between number of parties in state level governments in India and number of ethnical disorder exist. However, there is some assumption which has been upgraded. There is no necessity of 96 two party system, but there is also importance of existing polarisation in party system. Bipolarism in multiparty system has also impact on intensity of communal violence. The Willkinson’s model has been enlarged by the important role of polarisation of party system. There is also significance of federal government which can back up the intensity of violence if the state governments have similar political affiliation as the main parties on federal level. 97 Sources and Literatures Annual report of the Ministry of Home Affairs 2007, on-line text (http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/document/papers/annualreport_2007-08.htm). Arora, B. (2006): Federalisation of Indian’s Party System in: Mehra, K. A., Khanna, D. D. and Kueck W. G. (eds.): Political Parties and Party Systems, New Delhi, Sage Publications. Bahujan Samaj Party (www.bahujansamajp.com). Basu, A. (2006): Parliamentary Communism as a Historical Phenomenon: The CPI(M) in West Bengal in: Hasan, Z. (ed.): Parties and Party Politics in India, New Delhi, Oxford University Press. Basu, A. and Roy, S. (2004): Prose after Gujarat – Violence, Secularism and Democracy in India in: Hasan, M. (ed.): Will Secular India Survive?, New Delhi, imprintOne. Bharatiya Janata Party (www.bjp.org). BJP (2004): Vision document 2004, on-line text (http://www.bjp.org/Press/mar_3104a.htm). Brass, P. R. (2003): The production of Hindu-Muslim Violence in Contemporary India, New Delhi, Oxford University Press. Census of India 2001(http://www.censusindia.net). Chandhoke, N. (2004): Re-presenting the Secular Agenda for India in: Hasan, M. (ed.): Will Secular India Survive?, New Delhi, imprintOne. Chandra, K. (2004): Why Ethnic Parties Succeed - Patronage and Ethnic Head Counts in India, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Chatterji, P. C. (1995): Secular Values for Secular India, New Delhi, Manohar Publishers. Chhibber, K, P. (1999): Democracy without Associations – Transformation of the Party System and Social Cleavages in India, Michigan, University Michigan Press. Chhibber, P. K. and Kollman, K. (2004): The Formation of National Party Systems. Federalism and Party Competition in Canada, Great Britain, India and the United States. Princeton- Oxford: Princeton University Press. Chopra, P. (2006): How Many Parties are too Many? in: Mehra, K. A., Khanna, D. D. and Kueck W. G. (eds.): Political Parties and Party Systems, New Delhi, Sage Publications. Constitution of India (http://indiacode.nic.in/coiweb/welcome.html). CPI(M) (2006): CPI (M) Programme, on-line text (http://cpim.org/documents/programme.htm#I). Dahl, R. A. (1998): On Democracy, New Havan, Yale University Press. Deshpande, R (2004): Social Movement in Crisis in Rajandra, V and Suhas, P. (eds.): Indian Democracy Meanings and Practices, New Delhi, Saga Publications. DeSouza P. R. and Sridharan E. (2006): India’s Political Parties, New Delhi, Sage Publications. Diamond L. and Plattner M. (2006): Electoral Systems and Democracy. Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press. Dr. Gopal Singh Report on Minorities (1983), New Delhi. Duverger, M. (1954): Political Parties. London, Methuen. 98 Eisenberg, A. (2006): Pluralism, Consociationalism, Group Differentiated Citizenship and the Problem of Social Cohesion, on-line text (http://www2.arts.ubc.ca/cresp/plurpap.pdf). Election Commission of India (http://www.eci.gov.in). Ganguly, S. (2003): The Crisis of Indian Secularism, on-line Journal of Democracy, Volume 14, No 4, October 2003, on-line text (http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_democracy/toc/ jod14.4.html). Ghosh, S. P. (2000): BJP and the Evolution of Hindu Nationalism – from Periphery to Centre, New Delhi, Manohar Publishers. Godbol, M. (2006): The Holocaust of Indian Partition, New Delhi, Rupa Publishing. Hansen, T. B. (2005) Violence in Urban India – Identity Politics, ‘Mumbai’, and the Postcolonial City, Delhi, Permanent Black. Heath, A. and Yadav, Y. (2006): The United Colours of Congress: Social Profile of Congress Voters, 1996 and 1998 in: Hasan, Z. (ed.): Parties and Party Politics in India, New Delhi, Oxford University Press. Horowitz, D.L. (1985): Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Los Angeles, University of California Press. Horowitz, D.L. (1990): Community Conflict: Policy and Possibilities, Centre for Conflict Studies, University of Ulster, Coleraine, Monograph Series, number one 1990. Horowitz, D.L. (2003a): Electoral Systems: A Primer for Decision Makers, Journal of Democracy, vol. 14 no. 4 (October, 2003), pp. 115-127. Horowitz, D.L. (2003b): Foreward: Compared to What? Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law, vol. 13 (October, 2003), pp. 1-6. Horowitz, D.L. (2004): Some Realism About Constitutional Engineering, in Facing Ethnic Conflicts: Towards a New Realism, edited by Andreas Wimmer, pp. 245-57, Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield . Human Rights Watch (2004): Discouraging Dissent: Intimidation and Harassment of Witnesses, Human Rights Activists, and Lawyers Pursuing Accountability for the 2002 Communal Violence in Gujarat, on-line text (http://hrw.org/backgrounder/asia/india/gujarat). INC (2004): Manifest 2004, on-line text (http://aicc.org.in/manifesto-detail.php?id=31). Indian elections web (http://www.indian-elections.com). Katzenstein, M. F., Mehta U. S. and Thakkar, U. (2006): The Rebirth of the Shiv Sena: The Symbiosis of Discursive and Organizational Power in: Hasan, Z. (ed.): Parties and Party Politics in India, New Delhi, Oxford University Press. Kerala Assembly (http://www.keralaassembly.org). Kudláček, L. (2006): The Religious Clashes in India and Their Impact on Election Results, bachelor’s thesis. Brno, Masaryk University. Kumar, R. (1994): Congress and Congressism in Indian Politics, New Delhi, Deep and Deep Publications. Lijphart, A. (1977): Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration. New Haven, Yale University Press. Lijphart, A. (1994): Democracies: Forms, Performance, and Constitutional Engineering, European Journal of Political Research, vol. 25, pp. 1-17. 99 Lijphart, A. (1996): The Puzzle of Indian Democracy: A Consociational Interpretation, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 90, No. 2 (Jun., 1996), pp. 258-268. Lijphart, A. (1998): Consensus and Consensus Democracy Cultural, Structural, Functional, and Rational-Choice, Explanations Lecture given by the Winner of the Johan Skytte Prize in Political Science, Uppsala, October 4, 1997, Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. 21 - No. 2, pp. 99-107. Lijphart, A. (1999a): Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms & Performance in Thirtysix Countries. New Haven, Yale University Press. Lijphart, A. (1999b): Power Sharing and Group Autonomy in the 1990s and the 21st Century, on-line text (http://www.tamilnation.org/conflictresolution/consociationalism/Lijphart.pdf). Lijphart, A. (2002): Negotiation democracy versus consensus democracy: Parallel conclusions and recommendations, European Journal of Political Research, vol. 41, pp. 107113. Lijphart, A. (2004): Constitutional Design for Divided Societies, Journal of Democracy, vol. 15 (April, 2004), pp. 96-109. Majere, A. (2005): Working of the Indian Federal System, New Delhi, Centre for Federal Studies, Hamdard University. Mehta, B. P. (2004): Secularism and the Identity Trap in: Hasan, M. (ed.): Will Secular India Survive?, New Delhi, imprintOne. Najiullah, S. (2008): The Status of Muslims in India, on-line text (http://www.indianmuslims.info/book/export/html/19). Olzak, S. (1992): The Dynamics of Ethnic Competition and Conflict, Stanford, Stanford University Press. Prakash, A. (2006): Social, Cultural and Economic Dimension of the Party System in: Mehra, K. A., Khanna, D. D. and Kueck W. G. (eds.): Political Parties and Party Systems, New Delhi, Sage Publications. Rajagopal, A. (2006): Gujarat’s ‘successful experiment’, on-line text (http://www.opendemocracy.net/content/articles/PDF/1056.pdf). Reynolds, A. (2002): The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Reynolds, A., Reilly, B., and Ellis, A. (1997): Electoral System Design: The New International IDEA Handbook, Stockholm, IDEA, on-line text (http://www.idea.int/ publications/esd/index.cfm). Samajwadi Party (www.samajwadipartyindia.com). Samajwadi Party Mumbai web (www.samajwadipartymumbai.org). Sartori, G. (2005): Strany a stranické systémy – Schéma pro analýzu, Brno, Centrum pro studium demokracie a kultury. Saxena, R. (1994): Indian Politics in Transition – From Dominance to Chaos, New Delhi, Deep and Deep Publications. Singh, G. (2000): Ethnic Conflict in India – A Case-Study of Punjab, London, MacMillan Press Ltd. 100 Singh, K. A. (2005): Union Model of Indian Federalism – Structural Features and Competence Dimensions, New Delhi, Centre for Federal Studies, Hamdard University. Singh, M.P. and Saxena R. (2008): Indian Politics: Contemporary Issues and Concerns, New Delhi, Prentice-Hall of India Private Limited. Strmiska, M. (1997): Soustavy politických stran v Indii: od "kongresového systému" k multipartismu. Brno, Masarykova univerzita. Taagepera, R. (2007): Predicting Party Sizes. The Logic of Simple Electoral Systems, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Times of India (http: //www.timesofindia.com). USCIRF (2008): USCIRF Annual Report 2008 – India, on-line text (http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/485569a0c.html). Varshney, A. (2002): Ethnic conflict and civic life, Hindus and Muslims in India, New Havan, Yale University Press. Wilkinson, I. S. (2004): Votes and Violence – Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 101 List of Tables Table 1 Models of democracy for divided societies.................................................................10 Table 2 Muslims in Gujarat Assembly elections (winners/candidates)....................................22 Table 3 Election results for Lok Sabha in 1999........................................................................44 Table 4 Election results for Lok Sabha in 2004........................................................................45 Table 5 Indian Administrative Service from 1971 till 1980.....................................................48 Table 6 Muslims in Indian Administrative Services since 1981..............................................49 Table 7 Representation of OBCs/SCs/STs in the Service of the Central Government in 1979 ...................................................................................................................................................49 Table 8 Total Riots and Deaths by States and Effective Number of Parties............................59 Table 9 Effective number of parties in Gujarat........................................................................61 Table 10 The Gujarat Assembly Election Results in 2007 (total seats: 182)........................................................................................................................63 Table 11 The Gujarat Assembly Election Results in 2002 (total seats: 182)........................................................................................................................63 Table 12 The Gujarat Assembly Election Results in 1998 (total seats: 182)........................................................................................................................63 Table 13 The Gujarat Assembly Election Results in 1995 (total seats: 182)........................................................................................................................63 Table 14 The Gujarat Assembly Election Results in 1990 (total seats: 182)........................................................................................................................63 Table 15 The Gujarat Assembly Election Results in 1985 (total seats: 182)........................................................................................................................64 Table 16 The Gujarat Assembly Election Results in 1980 (total seats: 182)........................................................................................................................64 Table 17 Effective number of parties in Orissa........................................................................65 Table 18 Results of the 2004 Orissa Assembly Election..........................................................66 Table 19 Results of the 2000 Orissa Assembly Election..........................................................66 Table 20 Results of the 1995 Orissa Assembly Election..........................................................67 Table 21 Results of the 1990 Orissa Assembly Election..........................................................67 Table 22 Results of the 1985 Orissa Assembly Election..........................................................67 Table 23 Effective number of parties in Uttar Pradesh.............................................................69 Table 24 Results of the 2007 Uttar Pradesh Assembly Election..............................................70 Table 25 Results of the 2002 Uttar Pradesh Assembly Election..............................................71 Table 26 Results of the 1996 Uttar Pradesh Assembly Election..............................................71 Table 27 Results of the 1993 Uttar Pradesh Assembly Election..............................................72 Table 28 Results of the 1991 Uttar Pradesh Assembly Election..............................................72 Table 29 Results of the 1989 Uttar Pradesh Assembly Election..............................................72 Table 30 Results of the 1985 Uttar Pradesh Assembly Election..............................................73 Table 31 Results of the 1980 Uttar Pradesh Assembly Election..............................................73 Table 32 Effective number of parties in Kerala........................................................................75 Table 33 Results of the 2006 Kerala Assembly Election.........................................................76 Table 34 Results of the 2001 Kerala Assembly Election.........................................................76 Table 35 Results of the 1996 Kerala Assembly Election.........................................................77 Table 36 Results of the 1991 Kerala Assembly Election.........................................................78 Table 37 Results of the 1987 Kerala Assembly Election.........................................................78 Table 38 Results of the 1982 Kerala Assembly Election.........................................................79 Table 39 Results of the 1980 Kerala Assembly Election.........................................................79 Table 40 Effective number of parties in Rajasthan...................................................................81 102 Table 41 Results of the 2003 Rajasthan Assembly Election....................................................82 Table 42 Results of the 1998 Rajasthan Assembly Election....................................................82 Table 43 Results of the 1993 Rajasthan Assembly Election....................................................83 Table 44 Results of the 1985 Rajasthan Assembly Election....................................................83 Table 45 Results of the 1980 Rajasthan Assembly Election....................................................83 Table 46 Effective number of parties in Maharashtra..............................................................85 Table 47 Results of the 2004 Maharashtra Assembly Election................................................86 Table 48 Results of the 1999 Maharashtra Assembly Election................................................86 Table 49 Results of the 1995 Maharashtra Assembly Election................................................87 Table 50 Results of the 1990 Maharashtra Assembly Election................................................87 Table 51 Results of the 1985 Maharashtra Assembly Election................................................88 Table 52 Results of the 1980 Maharashtra Assembly Election................................................88 Table 53 Effective number of parties in Bihar..........................................................................89 Table 54 Results of the 2005 Bihar Assembly Election...........................................................90 Table 55 Results of the 2000 Bihar Assembly Election...........................................................91 Table 56 Results of the 1995 Bihar Assembly Election...........................................................91 Table 57 Results of the 1990 Bihar Assembly Election...........................................................92 Table 58 Results of the 1985 Bihar Assembly Election...........................................................92 Table 59 Results of the 1980 Bihar Assembly Election...........................................................93 103 List of Figures Figure 1 The theoretical relationship between party competition and a state's response to antiminority polarization and violence (ENVP = effective number of parties)........................18 Figure 2 Territorial election results for the Lok Sabha election in 2004..................................46 Figure 3 The modified Wilkinson’s hypothesis of relationship between party competition and a state's response to anti-minority polarization and violence....................................................94 104 List of Diagrams Diagram 1 Support for main political parties in 1996 election according to religion..............29 Diagram 2 Support for main political parties in 1998 election according to religion..............30 Diagram 3 Communal Violence and Riots in 1950-1995 and 2001-2008 ...............................58 Diagram 4 Total deaths per year in communal violence, Gujarat............................................60 Diagram 5 Total deaths per year in communal violence, Orissa..............................................65 Diagram 6 Total deaths per year in communal violence, Uttar Pradesh..................................69 Diagram 7 Total deaths per year in communal violence, Kerala..............................................75 Diagram 8 Total deaths per year in communal violence, Rajasthan.........................................81 Diagram 9 Total deaths per year in communal violence, Maharashtra....................................85 Diagram 10 Total deaths per year in communal violence, Bihar.............................................89 105 List of Abbreviation AIMIM – All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimen AV – alternative vote BJD – Biju Janata Dal BJP – Bharatiya Janata Party BSP – Bahujan Samaj Party CPI – Communist Party of India CPI (M) – Communist Paty of India (M) DMK – Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam ENVP – effective number of parties FPTP – first past the post electoral system INC – Indian National Congress JD(U) – Janata Dal (U) LF – Left Front LJNSP – Lok Jan Shakti Party MP – Member of Parliament N – Effective number of parties in assembly NCM – National Commission for Minorities NCP – Nationalist Congress Party NDA – National Democratic Alliance NHRC – National Human Rights Commission OBCs – Other Backward Classes PR – proportional representation RJD – Rashtriya Janata Dal SAD – Shiromani Akali Dal SC – Schedule Caste SHS – Shivsena SP – Samajwadi Party ST – Schedule Tribe STV – single transferable vote UPA – United Progressive Alliance USA – United States of America USCIRF – United States Commission on International Religious Freedom 106 Appendix 1 – Political map of India – Union States and Territories Source: Maps of India 107 Appendix 2 – Structure of Indian population Percentage distribution of population by religious communities India - 1961 to 2001 Census (without excluding Assam and J&K) Source: Census of India 2001 Decadal growth rates of religious communities, India – 1961 to 2001 Census (without excluding Assam and J&K) Source: Census of India 2001 Percentage of population by religious communities and their residence, India - 2001 Source: Census of India 2001 108 Population by religious communities and residence, India - 2001 Source: Census of India 2001 Literacy rate (Persons) by religious communities and residence, India- 2001 Source: Census of India 2001 109