BASIC AND APPLIED SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, 1997,19(2), 163-182 Copyright 1997, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

Development and Validation of Velten-like Image-Oriented Anxiety and Serenity Mood Inductions
Robert C. Sinclair and Alexander S. Soldat
Department of Psychology University of Alberta

Carol A. Ryan
Department of Psychology Central Michigan University

Great interest has been shown in the effects of both naturally occurring and induced affective states on self-perception and judgment. However, mood inductions often underrepresent the construct mood and often cotitain confounds because inductiotis do not map onto orthogonal Valence x Arousal dimensions. It also is important that researchers in the area of the effects of affective states devise and use a more diverse array of mood indtiction techniques. Two studies were conducted in order to develop and validate Velten-like serenity and anxiety mood inductions. In Study 1, participants were randomly assigned to evaluating the valence or arousal content of self-referent statements designed to represent anxiety and serenity. The 59 statements rated as lowest on valence and highest on arousal were selected as atixiety statements. The 59 statements rated as highest on valence and lowest on arousal were selected as seretiity statements. In Study 2, the atixiety and serenity statements were organized so that they became progressively more representative ofthe mood they were intended to induce. Anxiety and serenity incubation instructions were developed. Participants, in a single group, were randomly assigned to mood induction conditions in a 2 (Valence: Positive vs. Negative) x 2 (Arousal: Active vs. Passive) factorial design. Modified Velten elation and depression inductions served as the active-positive and passive-negative inductiotis, respectively. The serenity and atixiety inductions served as the passive-positive and active-negative inductions, respectively. Participants read 60 mood-related statements at the rate of 1 per 15 sec and concetitrated on expedencRequests for reprints should be sent to Robert C. Sinclair, Department of Psychology, P220 Biological Sciences Building, University of Alberta, Edmonton, AB T6G 2E9, Canada. E-mail: sinclair@psych.ualberta.ca

164

SINCLAIR, SOLDAT, RYAN

ing the mood represented by the statements. Participants then read incubation instructions and focused, for 2 min, on events in their own lives that made them feel like the mood represented by the statements. The valence and arousal components of participants' affective states were measured. Results indicated that the anxiety and serenity inductions were effective. Furthermore, the use ofthe anxiety and serenity inductions, in conjunction with the modified Velten depression and elation inductions affords the opportunity to induce moods mapping onto 2 (Positive vs. Negative) x 2 (Active vs. Passive) orthogonal dimensions. Therapeutic implications, implications in terms of a new tool for research, and methodological cotisiderations are discussed. Affective states have great impact on our self-perceptions, our perceptions of the world, and our judgmental processes. A great deal of interest has been shown in the effects of naturally occurring affective states, for example, in the areas of depression and perceptions of control (e.g., Abramson, Alloy, & Rosoff, 1981; Alloy & Abramson, 1979, 1982; Alloy, Abramson, & Viscusi, 1981), worry and cognition (e.g., Borkovec, 1986; Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky, & Dupree, 1983), depression and social perception (e.g., Gleicher & Weary, 1991; Marsh & Weary, 1989; Weary, Elbin, & Hill, 1987; Weary, Jordan, & Hill, 1985), remediation of depressive affect (e.g.. Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990), and depressive realism (e.g., Ruehlman, West, & Pasahow, 1985). In addition, a number of researchers have attempted to study the effects of laboratory analogues of naturally occurring affective states. Through the use of mood induction procedures, researchers have addressed the effects of happiness and sadness on responses to persuasion (e.g.. Bless, Bohner, Schwarz, & Strack, 1990; Sinclair, Mark, & Clore, 1994), incubation (e.g., Borkovec et al., 1983; Sinclair, Mark, Enzle, Borkovec, & Cumbleton, 1994), affective states on mood-congruent processing (e.g.. Bower, 1981; Kwiatkowski & Parkinson, 1994; Mathews & Brendan, 1983; Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Snyder & White, 1982), and mood on judgment (e.g., Isen, 1984, 1987; Martin, Ward, Achee,&Wyer, 1993;Schwarz, 1990; Sinclair, 1988; Sinclair & Mark, 1991,1992, 1995; Sinclair, Mark, & Clore, 1994). Methods of inducing affective states may have implications in understanding naturally occurring affective states, as well as therapeutic implications in terms of the use of imaging techniques for the treatment of affective disorders. One of the most common methods of inducing moods is through the use of the Velten (1968) elation, neutral, and depression inductions. Indeed, according to our count from the Social Sciences Citation Index (1981-1993), the Velten procedure received 333 citations in the years 1981 to 1993. Although the Velten procedure is not without its critics (e.g., Buchwald, Strack, & Coyne, 1981; Frost & Green, 1982; Isen & Gorgoglione, 1983; Polivy & Doyle, 1980; Rholes, Riskind, & Lane, 1987; Riskind & Rholes, 1985a, 1985b; cf. Clark, 1983, 1985), recent work suggests that a modified Velten procedure with an incubation procedure, in which participants read guided imagery instructions and focus on events in their own lives that represent the mood suggested by the Velten procedure for a 2 min period, is effective in

ANXIETY AND SERENITY

165

creating relatively long-lasting induced moods (i.e., 35 min) that arefreeof demand characteristics on subsequent judgments (see Sinclair, Mark, Enzle, et al., 1994). As we became more sophisticated in the study of the effects of affective states, we realized that the concept mood often is preoperationalized poorly, with most researchers discussing the effects of broadly defined "good" versus "bad" moods (see Sinclair & Mark, 1992). Thus, the construct mood has inadequate construct validity, which can threaten the construct validity of cause (Cook & Campbell, 1979); that is, our inferences about the true causal construct may not be valid. Consider the Velten (1968) mood induction technique. The elation induction results in both increased positive affect and increased arousal relative to the neutral induction. The depression induction results in decreased positive affect and decreased arousal relative to the neutral induction (see Sinclair, 1988). Thus, valence and arousal are confounded. Consider viewing films about the Holocaust (see Isen & Daubman, 1984); this type of induction may involve both negative affect and high arousal. Indeed, with most mood induction procedures, the confounding of the valence and arousal components of the induced moods can lead to alternative explanations for mood effects (e.g., Sinclair & Mark, 1995). If mood effects are additive, both valence and arousal (or one or the other) could explain the effects of much research. Indeed, it is unclear whether effects in most mood research could be arousal based because valence and arousal are not factorially manipulated (cf. Easterbrook, 1959; Kahneman, 1973; Yerkes & Dodson, 1908; Zajonc, 1965). Furthermore, as we gain more knowledge about the effects of affective states, we realize it is important to develop new methods of inducing different moods mapping onto the diverse circumplex of affective states experienced in our lives (Russell, 1980). Thus, the need for such manipulations is of import because it is unclear whether, for example, induced depression leads to effects similar to those resulting from induced anxiety, or whether induced elation leads to effects similar to those resulting form induced serenity. Finally, inductions of well-defined affective states that adequately map onto naturally occurring affective states are necessary if studies of induced affect are, in fact, going to have implications in therapy and in understanding affective disorders. The purpose of this research was to develop Velten-like mood inductions that could be used in conjunction with the Velten elation and depression inductions to factorially manipulate the valence and arousal components of induced moods. Developing such inductions would afford researchers the opportunity to address whether the effects of affective states are a result of valence, arousal, their additive, or interactive effects. This is relevant because even early conceptualizations of feelings involved orthogonal valence and arousal components (e.g., Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957; Wundt, 1907; cf. Schlosberg, 1954), and because such conceptualizations of affective states received more contemporary support (e.g., Russell, 1980; Tanaka and Huba, 1984a, 1984b, showed that affective states and affective traits are composed of orthogonal valence and arousal dimensions). We chose to develop anxiety and serenity inductions because these inductions appear

166

SINCLAIR, SOLDAT, RYAN

to map well onto Russell's circumplex model of affect. The choice of anxiety and serenity appears to be sensible and to have face validity because such affect words and phrases as serene, content, at ease, satisfied, relaxed, and calm represent the low-arousal-positive-valence quadrant ofthe circumplex and such affect words as tense, afraid, alarmed, and (/wfrewed represent the high-arousal-negative-valence quadrant. Because affect words such as depressed, sad, gloomy, droopy, and miserable represent the low-arousal-negative-valence quadrant and affect words such as aroused, excited, delighted, and happy represent the high-arousal-positivevalence quadrant, it appears that inductions involving elation, depression, anxiety, and serenity would adequately represent all quadrants of the circumplex. Furthermore, the development of such inductions is a step toward a multioperationalizational approach to the understanding ofthe effects of induced moods on judgments.

STUDY 1 Method Participants. The participants were 188 undergraduate psychology students enrolled in introductory, developmental, or social psychology classes at Central Michigan University. All were volunteers who received extra credit toward their final grade for participation. Item construction. A total of 118 sentences were designed to relate to anxiety and worry (e.g., "I couldn't relax or calm down now if I had to" and "A sense of foreboding and dread fills me with fear"; see Andrews & Borkovec, 1988). Eighty sentences were designed to relate to serenity (e.g., "I'm calm and content^I feel like I could doze off any time" and "I feel a wave of tranquillity over me right now"). The sentences were compiled so that there were four lists of 198 items, each with a different randomized order of items. Procedure. Participants were run in groups of 10 to 50. They were told the experimenter was attempting to validate stimuli for future research. Participants were assigned randomly to one of two rating conditions in blocks of two within gender. Half the participants read instructions asking them to rate the valence of each of 198 self-referent sentences on a 5-point Likert scale. The anchors were 1 {extremely negative), 2 {negative), 3 {neutral), 4 {positive), and 5 {extremely positive). The other half read instructions asking them to rate the arousal content
Other conceptualizations of the structure of affect have been offered. For example, Watson and Tellegen (1985) presented a two-factor model for the structure of mood and argued that rotating the major axes of Russell's (1980) circumplex results in positive affect and negative affect factors.

ANXIETY AND SERENITY

167

of the sentences on a 5-point scale. The anchors were at 1 {extremely passive), 2 {passive), 3 {neutral), 4 {active) and 5 {extremely active). After completing the ratings, participants were debriefed and thanked for participating.

Results and Discussion Means were computed for each of the items. The 59 items lowest on valence and highest on arousal were identified as anxiety items. The 59 items highest on valence and lowest on arousal were identified as serenity items.^ Scale scores were created for the 59 anxiety and 59 serenity items based on the mean of both the valence and arousal ratings. These scores were subjected to a 2 (Rating: Valence vs. Arousal) X 2 (Sentence: Anxiety vs. Serenity) mixed-model analysis of variance (ANOVA). Rating served as the between-group factor, and sentence served as the within-subjects factor. There was a significant Rating x Sentence interaction, F(l, 186) = 143.98, p < .0001. Analyses of simple effects indicated that the anxiety sentences (M - 2.08) were rated as more negative than the serenity sentences (M = 3.69), at the/? < .01 level. Furthermore, the anxiety sentences were rated as more active (M = 3.31) than the serenity sentences (Af - 2.62), at the/? < .01 level. The results suggested the anxiety and serenity sentences represented activenegative and passive-positive moods, respectively. Based on these results, modified Velten-like anxiety and serenity inductions were created. They were designed to be similar to the Sinclair, Mark, Enzle, et al. (1994) modified Velten elation and depression inductions with incubation. Participants were exposed to either the modified Velten elation, serenity, anxiety, or modified Velten depression inductions to assess whether these inductions were effective in inducing Positive versus Negative x Active versus Passive mood states. Thus, Valence (Positive vs. Negative) and Arousal (Active vs. Passive) mood induction procedures were factorially manipulated, and participants' moods were measured.

STUDY 2 IVletiiod Participants. Participants were 51 introductory psychology students at Central Michigan University. All were volunteers who received extra credit toward their final grades for participating.

Tifty-nine items were selected to afford the opportunity to use these inductions in conjunction with the 60-item Velten elation and depression inductions.

168

SINCLAIR, SOLDAT, RYAN

Construction of the serenity and anxiety inductions with incubation. The mood statements were typed individually on 3.67-in. x 8.00-in. cards that were stapled together to form a booklet. The first page of the booklet indicated which mood induction condition was represented in the booklet (i.e., "These statements are designed to make you feel serene" and "These statements are designed to make you feel anxious" for the serenity and anxiety inductions, respectively). For both the serenity and anxiety inductions, the initial statement, marked Card I, was "Today is neither better nor worse than any other day" (Velten, 1968). The remaining 59 statements, marked Card 2 to Card 60, were organized to become progressively representative of the mood the booklet was designed to induce (based on the data from Study 1). In the serenity packet, the second statement was "I feel mentally alert and calm," and the last statement was "I feel so calm, so happy, so serene, so relaxed, so nice." In the anxiety packet, the second statement was "I'm an incredibly anxious person," and the last statement was "My life is so full of things that make me worried that I can't handle it. I feel like I'll explode with tension." The complete lists of statements and mean valence and arousal ratings for the serenity and anxiety inductions are presented in Table 1 and Table 2, respectively. The final page of the packet contained incubation instructions similar to those developed for the modified Velten elation and depression inductions (Sinclair, Mark, Enzle, et al., 1994). The incubation instructions for the serenity induction were: Now that you're feeling very serene, concentrate on this feeling. Feel it getting stronger and stronger; more and more peaceful. Let it continue to build. Think about things that have happened in your life that have made you feel very, very serene; like listening to soothing music, or walking along the beach on a warm summer day, or sitting by a fire sipping hot chocolate without a care in the world. Concentrate on it. Let yourself feel very calm, tranquil, very peaceful, very laid-back. As you do, you'll feel the mood build. It'll become more and more serene. This in turn will make you think of other things in your life that have made you feel very, very serene. The mood will continue to build. Feel it become more serene. Feel it get stronger and stronger. It will happen. Do and think whatever you can to build this very serene mood. Feel very, very serene. Close yotir eyes. Begin now. The incubation instructions for the anxiety induction were: Now that you're feeling very anxious, concentrate on this feeling. Feel it getting stronger and stronger; more and more worried. Let it continue to build. Think about things that have happened in your life that have made you feel very, very anxious; like an upcoming test, or telling your parents that you need more money, or like being frightened about your future. Concentrate on

TABLE 1 Mean Ratings on Valence and Arousal for the Serenity Staten^ents Valence Statement 1. Today is neither better nor worse than any other day. 2. I feel mentally alert and calm. 3. I'm pleased to be in collegeI'm leaming a great deal. 4. Sometimes it feels good to get away from the noise by going to a park. 5. Mistakes I make don't bother me, I leam from them, I'm human. 6. I usually feel at ease when I meet new people. 7. I like to take my time doing things. 8. This is one of those days when I'm not feeling bogged down with schoolwork. 9. I feel that I maintain a hopeful, optimistic attitude. 10. I enjoy inviting my friends over for tea and quiet conversation. 11. Today is fine. 12. Whether I'm with others or alone, I can feel relaxed and content. 13. I find that I'm most creative when I'm in this mood. 14. This might just tum out to be an easy day for me. 15. I'm satisfied with my life right now. 16. This spring should be a relaxing time for me. 17. The warmth of summer will be approaching soon; I can almost feel the calm. 18.1 feel like humming quiet music to myself and taking a long walk. 19. The moming hours are the quietest time for me. 20. Everything seems to just naturally fall into place. No worries. 21. My parents are proud of me, and I feel secure and comfortable with this. 22. I have a fresh outlook on life. I'm secure in my optimism. 23. My friends have remarked on how calmly I cope with life's pressures. 24. I feel knowledgeable and wise today. 25. I feel a calm acceptance of everyone. 26. I like to imagine myself high up on a mountain top, fresh air, so quiet. 27. I feel a quiet serenitylike curling up with a book. 28. I feel laid-back and content. 29. I'm not worried about my future. Things will go well. M sd M Arousal sd

3.66 4.06 3.75 3.65 3.53 3.41 3.25 4.01 3.73 3.58 3.67 3.53 3.48 3.76 3.66 3.75 3.69 3.29 3.38 4.12 4.03 3.48 3.84 3.68 4.01 3.42 3.48 3.75

0.76 0.83 0.75 0.93 0.94 0.76 1.13 0.80 0.85 0.81 0.89 0.87 0.92 0.73 0.91 0.95 0.86 0.87 1.16 0.94 1.07 1.07 0.91 0.86 1.03 0.91 1.00 1.02

2.93 3.35 2.97 2.82 2.77 2.61 2.53 3.18 2.88 2.79 2.81 2.72 2.56 2.87 2.66 2.82 111 lyi 2.43 3.08 2.95 2.53 2.78 2.62 2.82 2.38 2.45 2.65

0.94 1.05 1.19 1.11 1.08 1.09 1.22 1.09 1.17

1.16
1.16 0.95 1.02 1.09 1.08 1.31 1.24 1.15 1.05 1.17 1.15 1.12 1.05 1.04 1.42 1.17 1.03 1.07 (Continued)

169

TABLE 1 (Continued)

Valence Statement 30. I feel a certain quiet sureness in everything that I do. 31. I feel like I know myself well, I feel wise. 32. What can I say . . . I'm just so calm. 33. I do feel serene and calm today. 34. My motto is to take it one day at a time^no rush. 35. I'm an accepting and honest person. 36. I feel free and unencumbered. 37. I can almost imagine a sea breeze blowing gently through my hair. 38. I feel calm and sure of myself right now. 39. The smell of spring blossoms soothes me. 40. Life is to be enjoyed, not worried about. 41. I like to savor these quiet moments. 42. I could just slip off my shoes and sit back and relax. 43. My muscles feel loose and heavyso relaxed. 44. I feel that I have a certain inner peace. 45. I'm glad that I can take it easy today. 46. I could really go for a lazy day at the beach. 47. I'm relaxed and clearheaded. 48. This has been a really peaceful day for me. 49. I have confidence that life will go well for me. 50. With each passing day, I feel more relaxed and sure of my life. 51. If your attitude is relaxed, then things are relaxed. I am relaxed. 52. I'm calm and content^I feel like I could doze off any time. 53. Never have I felt as content as I feel at this moment. 54. Nothing can make me feel anxious today. 55. I'm feeling quite peaceful now. 56. It fills me with a quiet irmer peace to know that I am appreciated by such wonderful friends. 57. I feel like I have no cares in the world. 58. I'm feehng wonderfully calm and pleased today. 59. I don't think I've ever felt so peaceful as I do right now. 60. I feel so calm, so happy, so serene, so relaxed, so nice. M sd M

Arousal sd

3.57 3.91 3.41 3.49 3.55 4.21 3.62 3.77 3.77 3.85 3.95 3.94 2.47 3.37 3.66 3.67 3.87 3.71 3.47 4.17 3.78 3.79 3.35 3.56 3.42 3.55 4.28 3.23 3.75 3.53 387

1.01 0.87 0.97 0.97 0.93 0.73 0.99 0.93 0.92 0.92 0.77 0.84 1.10 0.93 0.80 0.88 0.94 0.90 1.20 0.87 1.00 0.87 0.98 1.38 1.32 0.95 0.94 1.34 1.03 1.39 1.13

2.55 2.86 2.31 2.41 2.50 3.16 2.59 2.68 2.66 2.64 2.86 2.79 3.54 2.21 2.51 2.51 2.74 2.50 2.29 3.04 2.52 2.41 2.11 2.22 2.12 2.25 3.01 1.93 2.31 2.08 2.21

1.03 1.15 1.16 1.09 1.14 1.24 1.18 1.21 1.17 1.27 1.26 1.27 1.25 1.10 0.92 1.07 1.59 1.16 1.00 1.26 1.01 1.19 1.09 1.08 0.99 1.00 1.33 0.96 0.95 1.03 1.12

170

TABLE 2 Mean Ratings on Valence and Arousal for the Anxiety Statements Valence Statement 1. Today is neither better nor worse than any other day. 2. I'm an incredibly anxious person. 3. I'm haunted with thoughts about myself and how I come across to others. 4. I feel distressed by thoughts that disturb me. 5. I'm worried that the potential for nuclear war may get a lot worse. 6. School makes me fret with concem in general. 7. I feel needled and badgered with racing thoughts. 8. It takes too much effort to try to relaxI feel too agitated. 9. I think about the same aggravating things day after day. 10. I'm afraid that the potential for disaster may get a lot worse. I am afraid for my life. 11. I'm edgy and very worried. 12. My mind is troubled and harried. 13. I feel incredibly vexed and concemed today. 14. I wish that I could stop thinking about things that make my blood run cold. 15. My mind is sometimes racingI couldn't relax if I wanted to. 16. I can't communicate because I'm too confused in my mind. 17. I'm plagued by my racing mind. 18. There have been days when I felt unnerved and anxious and unable to do anything. 19. It seems like my body may start to shake and tremble. 20. I feel like I'm on pins and needles today. 21. Even when I try to relaxI'm always worded. 22. I feel hounded by my own thoughts. 23. I have too many concemsI don't know what to do. 24. I'm so tense that I'm having trouble remembering things. 25. It's so frightening, how tense I feel. 26. I have the feeling that I will never calm down. 27. My mind is racing with all the concems and problems that make me anxious. 28. r ve lain awake at night worrying about things. M sd M Arousal sd

2.31 2.26 2.38 2.21 2.47 2.21 2.10 2.21 2.16 2.08 2.27 2.10 2.24 2.49 2.07 2.15 2.47 2.03 2.15 2.06 2.06 2.15 2.02 1.98 2.03 2.40 2.34

0.94 1.06 0.92 0.92 0.94 1.00 0.80 0.94 1.07 0.94 1.03 0.89 0.98 1.10 0.85 0.98 1.10 0.92 0.78 0.93 0.89 1.02 0.82 0.80 0.91 1.06 1.05

3.36 3.21 3.31 3.21 3.51 3.18 3.16 3.27 3.20 3.16 3.46 3.18 3.21 3.63 3.11 3.31 3.54 3.09 3.34 3.24 3.16 3.31 3.17 3.16 3.17 3.54 3.60

1.21 1.28 1.17 1.21 0.96 1.30 1.19 1.16 1.31 1.35 1.19 1.34 1.30 1.19 1.26 1.33 1.25 1.42 1.33 1.28 1.28 1.27 1.29 1.38 1.44 1.22 1.19 (Continued)

171

TABLE 2 (Continued)

Valence Statement 29. There have been days that I have worried so much about things that I seemed to do little else. 30. I feel so alone and scared. 31. r m much more anxious than when I was youngerI seem to be getting worse. 32. Too often I have found myself filled with a sense of dread, thinking worrisome thoughts when I definitely should have been studying. 33. My mind is troubled and full of dread about my future. 34. I'm beginning to feel so uptight that I'm getting more and more worried thoughts. 35. I'm horribly concemed about my family life. 36. All of my fears and nightmares seem to be taking possession of me. 37. It has occurred to me more than once that studying is basically useless because I feel too restless and agitated to concentrate. 38. I'm an incredibly uptight person. 39. I'm terribly tense and annoyed by my thoughts^I can't work. 40. I'm so worried that I can't concentrate on anything. 41. I worry so much that I can't stand it. 42. I'm getting nervous and anxious, I can feel the muscles in my body getting more and more tense. 43. I'm too scaredI don't know what to do. 44. When I feel this anxious, I fear that I may have a heart attack. My health may not be as good as it's supposed to be. 45. Every now and then I feel so worried that I can't sit still or get anything accomplished. 46. I can't think of anything except my worries. 47. I couldn't relax or calm down now if I had to. 48. At times I've been so fearful and scared that I ran away from important problems rather than face them. 49. No matter how hard I try, I can't stop this feeling of panic and doom. 50. I've lain awake nights unable to sleep because I'm so terrified about things. 51. It feels like I may start trembling like a leafI'm unable to work on the things I know I must get done. M sd M

Arousal sd

2.24 1.91 2.39

1.11 0.99 1.06

3.35 2.98 3.54

1.32 1.40 1.06

2.38 2.18 2.02 2.06 1.69

1.12 0.92 0.95 0.97 0.92

3.55 3.32 3.27 3.30 2.98

1.24 1.15 1.37 1.29 1.49

2.08 2.06
2.00

0.96 0.89 0.96 0.91 1.05

3.31 3.31 3.31 3.30 3.21

1.33 1.32 1.33 1.47 1.47

2.03 1.83

2.11 1.91

1.00 0.99

3.45 3.26

1.44 1.45

1.83 2.31 1.90 2.02

0.88 1.01 0.95 0.98

3.19 3.53 3.33 3.38

1.49 1.12 1.40 1.43

2.00 1.76 1.89

1.01 1.01 1.15

3.33 3.10 3.41

1.36 1.50 1.38

1.85

0.93

3.34

1.47 (Continued)

172

ANXIETY AND SERENITY TABLE 2 (Continued) Valence Statement 52. I can't stop worryingmy whole life makes me feel like I'm going to burst. 53. I'm so scared that I feel like my hair is standing on end. 54. Sometimes I feel like I might have a panic attack. 55. I'm so afraidmy whole life makes me feel tense and worried. I feel like I have no control. 56. A sense of foreboding and dread fills me with fear. 57. At times I've been so worried that I've had trouble sleeping and facing problems. 58. My life is so full of things that fill me with dread that I can't stand it. 59. I feel paralyzed with fearsome very important decisions are almost impossible to make. 60. My life is so full of things that make me worried that I can't handle it. I feel like I'll explode with tension. M sd M Arousal

173

sd

1.90 1.78 1.98 1.85 1.82 2.05 1.63

1.09 0.89 1.03 0.98 0.87 1.20 0.B8

3.43 3.26 3.43 3.38 3.34 3.71 3.32

1.44 1.61 1.40 1.45 1.30 1.17 1.49

1.71

0.99

3.45

1.45

1.87

0.94

3.68

1.20

it. Let yourself feel very jittery, worried, very anxious, very terrified. As you do, you'll feel the mood build. It'll become more intense, more anxious. This in turn will make you think of other things in yotir life that have made you feel very, very anxious. The mood will continue to build. Feel it become more intense. Feel it get stronger and stronger. It will happen. Do and think whatever you can to build this very anxious mood. Feel very, very anxious. Close your eyes. Begin now.

Procedure. Participants were run in a single group and were randomly assigned to mood induction conditions, in a 2 (Valence: Positive vs. Negative) x 2 (Arousal: Active vs. Passive) factorial design, in blocks of four within gender. The modified Velten elation induction served as the active-positive manipulation, and the modified Velten depression induction served as the passive-negative manipulation. The new serenity and anxiety inductions served as the passive-positive and active-negative inductions, respectively. Participants were told that the experimenter was attempting to validate a new mood induction procedure. It was emphasized that this procedure was in its.

174

SINCLAIR, SOLDAT, RYAN

developmental stages and that participants should respond very honestly on the mood measure they would later complete so as to prevent future use of an ineffective mood induction that the experimenter mistakenly believed to be effective (see Sinclair, Mark, Enzle, et al., 1994).' Participants were given oral instructions indicating they would read self-referent, mood-related statements at the rate of one per 15 sec. They were asked to concentrate on the mood associated with each statement and to think of things in their own lives that refiected the mood represented by each statement. Furthermore, they were told that after they had read the last statement, they would read a set of incubation instructions designed to build the mood even more, and that they would sit for 2 min concentrating on building the mood. Finally, they were told that if the mood induction became too uncomfortable, they could raise their hands, and the experimenter would terminate the procedure. Participants then read written instructions like the standard Velten (1968) instructions. These differed slightly from the standard instructions because the incubation period was discussed (see Sinclair, Mark, Enzle, et al., 1994). Participants read a set of 60 mood-related statements at the rate of one card per 15 sec."* Then participants sat for 2 min with their eyes closed while concentrating on building the mood (Sinclair, Mark, Enzle, et al., 1994). After the incubation period, participants completed a 20-item mood measure. They were asked to indicate the degree to which they agreed that each item described how they felt "right now, today" on 5-point Likert scales anchored at 1 {strongly disagree), 2 {disagree), 3 {neither agree nor disagree), 4 {agree), and 5 (strongly agree). The items were (1) very bad, (2) very sedate, (3) very good, (4) very aroused, (5) very negative, (6) very active, (7) very positive, (8) very passive, (9) very alert, (10) very happy, (11) very sad, (12) very tired, (13) very miserable, (14) very quiet, (15) very activated, (16) very glad, (17) very inactive, (18) very unhappy, (19) very pleased.

One aspect of the Study 2 procedures should be discussed in terms of its possible impact on demand characteristics. The oral instructions to the mood induction indicated that we were developing the mood induction for use in future research and that we did not know whether the group induction was effective. Participants also were told that it would be obvious to them what type of mood we were attempting to induce and, thus, that it was important for participants to respond honestly on the mood measure (i.e., "the way that you really feel") they completed later because if we believed the induction was effective when, in fact, it was not, our future research would be in jeopardy. These instmctions were included to create a demand for honesty when reporting mood. Thus, we believe these instructions created a counterdemand characteristic and reduced the impact of demand on self-reported mood. The statement "Today is neither better nor worse that any other day" serves as the first statement in the Velten inductions and was inserted as the first statement in the anxiety and serenity inductions (and was followed by the 59 statements developed in Study 1). We developed our anxiety and serenity inductions to be used in conjunction with the 60-statement modified Velten elation and depression inductions (Sinclair, Mark, Enzle, et al., 1994); however, we believe that researchers interested in using our anxiety and serenity statements could select a smaller series of statements based on the data presented in Tables 1 and 2. This could result in more quickly administered inductions.

ANXIETY AND SERENITY

175

and (20) very stimulated. Finally, participants were debriefed, and those in either negative mood induction condition were exposed to the elation induction prior to leaving the laboratory.

Results and Discussion In a factor analytic study, Sinclair and Mark (1995) demonstrated that items 1, 3, 5,7,10,11,13,16,18, and 19 load on a valence factor, and that the remaining items load on an arousal factor. Items 1, 2, 5, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, and 18 were reverse scored, and valence and arousal scale scores were computed based on the mean of the items previously shown to load on the respective factors. High valence scores (5) indicated positive affect; low scores (1) indicated negative affect. High arousal scores (5) indicated active states; low scores (1) indicated passive states. The valence and arousal scales had internal consistency estimates of .97 and .93, respectively. A 2 (Induction-Valence) x 2 (Induction-Arousal) x 2 (Scale: Valence and Arousal) mixed-model ANOVA was conducted. Induction-valence and Inductionarousal were between-group factors and Scale was the within-subject factor. There was an Induction-Valence x Scale interaction, F(l, 47) = 56.64,/? < .0001. On the valence scale, participants in the positive induction conditions reported more positive affect (Af=4.26) than did participants in the negative induction conditions (M = 2.02), at the /7 < .0001 level, based on an analysis of simple main effects. However, the positive (M = 3.02) and negative (M = 2.69) induction conditions did not differ on arousal. There also was an Induction-Arousal x Scale interaction, F(l, 47) = 18.36, p < .0001. Participants in the active conditions (M = 3.53) reported more active mood states than did participants in the passive conditions (M = 2.27), p < .0001. However, the active (M = 3.23) and passive (M = 3.09) conditions did not differ on the valence scale. The three-way interaction was not significant. The results indicate that the anxiety and serenity inductions led to the affective changes they were designed to induce. These inductions, in conjunction with the Velten elation and depression inductions, afford the opportunity to induce moods mapping onto 2 (Valence: Positive vs. Negative) x 2 (Arousal: Active vs. Passive) orthogonal dimensions (Osgood etal., 1957; Russell, 1980; Tanaka & Huba, 1984a, 1984b; Wundt, 1907).^

Sinclair and Mark (1995) showed a similar pattem of effects on a manipulation check. Furthermore, Sinclair and Mark showed that the modified Velten neutral induction (Sinclair, Mark, Enzle, et al., 1994) leads to self-report of affect that falls between, and differs from, the positive and negative induction conditions, and that the neutral induction leads to self-report of activity that falls between, and differs from, the active and passive induction conditions.

176

SINCLAIR, SOLDAT, RYAN

GENERAL DISCUSSION Through the use of inductions such as those developed in the two studies reported here, researchers should be able to address which affective states and which components of affective states (e.g., valence vs. arousal) contribute to the effects of affect on judgments (see Sinclair & Mark, 1992). In related work, using the inductions developed here (in conjunction with an unrelated second study paradigm), Sinclair and Mark (1995) showed that the valence component of induced moods affects differential accuracy on estimates of correlation coefficients from scatterplots (people in negative moods, regardless of arousal level, were most accurate; Sinclair & Mark, 1995, also showed similar effects with only the modified elation and depression inductions). Furthermore, aroused participants were marginally less accurate than were unaroused participants (cf. Easterbrook, 1959; Kahneman, 1973; Yerkes & Dodson, 1908; Zajonc, 1965). However, valence and arousal did not interact. Thus, the inductions can be used effectively to study the effects of affective states on judgments.* Of course, as Sinclair and Mark (1992, 1995) noted, one must expect the relative contributions of the valence and arousal components of affective states to effects on judgment to vary as a function of the affective state and the task. Consistent with this logic and with the suggestion that more diversity is needed in operationalizing affective states (Sinclair & Mark, 1992, 1995), Bodenhausen, Sheppard, and Kramer (1994) showed that induced anger and induced sadness differentially impact on social judgments, with angry individuals making most use of stereotyped information; in this case, it appears that the arousal component of affective states had its effect. Future research might develop and address the effects of other image-oriented mood inductions on judgmental processes (e.g., jealously, anger, worry, guilt, mirth, etc.); however, the development of the inductions described here is a step toward the multioperationalizational approach to understanding the effects of mood. Further research also might address the psychophysiological correlates of our anxiety and serenity inductions to assess whether the inductions result in differential perceptions of somatic arousal, true

It is difficult to see how the mood induction instmctions would create demand characteristics for the correlation estimation task. It seems unlikely that participants would infer that we expected (and found) negative mood subjects to be more accurate on their estimates (see Sinclair & Mark, 1992,1995, for details). The effectiveness ofthe manipulated mood on the correlation estimation task also renders implausible another potential criticism. It might be argued that drawing participants' attention to their mood states, through both the induction and incubation instmctions, could result in an induction that influences mood but not other judgments (Schwarz & Clore, 1983). However, a variety of judgments have been affected by the Velten technique (e.g., time estimation, Hawkins, French, Crawford, & Enzle, 1988; mood congment recall of life events, Snyder & White, 1982) and by the modified Velten technique (e.g., adherence to equity, Mark & Sinclair, 1995; accuracy of performance appraisal judgments, Sinclair, 1988; social justice orientations, Sinclair & Mark, 1991,1992; and responsiveness to primacy and to attractiveness, Sinclair & Mark, 1992). Thus, the revised Velten technique and the new anxiety and serenity inductions, like the original Velten technique, affect both mood and other judgments.

ANXIETY AND SERENITY

177

differences in somatic arousal, or both. However, Friedman and Thayer (1991) showed that serene versus anxious imagery inductions (similar to our incubation instructions) result in differential psychophysiological responses, such as electroencephalogram (EEG) and electromyogram (EMG) activity. The two major advantages ofthe serenity and anxiety inductions developed here are that the inductions provide (a) the ability to induce a more diverse array of affective states and (b) the ability to test for individual, additive, and interactive effects ofthe valence and arousal components of affective states (when the anxiety and serenity inductions are used in conjunction with the modified Velten elation and depression inductions). However, these inductions provide some additional advantages. First, as illustrated, the inductions can be administered to large groups with all conditions represented in the same group. This eliminates the problems encountered when groups of participants are exposed to one mood induction condition and then areti-eatedas the unit of analysis (e.g., inflated probability of committing a Type-I error, violation of assumptions of independence, etc.; see Sinclair, Mark, Enzle, et al., 1994, for an extended discussion of this issue). Second, group administrations with all conditions represented greatly reduce the likelihood of experimenter bias effects because (a) all participants are exposed to identical oral instructions across conditions, and (b) the experimenter remains blind to conditions. Third, group administrations are more economical because numerous people can participate in a single session. Finally, as Sinclair, Mark, Enzle, et al., noted, carefully designed studies using mood inductions with reverse demands in the oral instructions, and using mood inductions in conjunction with unrelated second study paradigms and suspiciousness probes, can reduce greatly the likelihood that demand characteristics can account for effects on critical outcome measures (see Sinclair, Mark, Enzle, et al., 1994, for an extended discussion). Indeed, Velten-like procedures have been criticized as producing demand characteristics (Buchwald et al., 1981; Polivy & Doyle, 1980). However, we argue that the plausibility of a demand characteristic explanation depends on the specific procedures used, and several procedures can be employed to reduce demand in studies involving the modified Velten and our anxiety and serenity inductions. For example, Sinclair (1988) used the Velten elation, neutral, and depression inductions to assess the effects of mood state on impression formation. An unrelated second study paradigm was employed in which subjects thought they were participating in two unrelated studies, one validating a new mood induction procedure and a second designing a new teacher evaluation metric. Refinements to this procedure can greatly reduce the plausibility of a demand characteristics explanation. In particular, researchers can make it appear random (Sinclair & Mark, 1992), arbitrary (Sinclair & Mark, 1992,1995), or unusual (Mark & Sinclair, 1995; Sinclair, 1988) for the mood induction "study" to precede the "study" in which the dependent variable is measured. If it appears to participants that it is unusual, random, or accidental that the mood induction (and measure) precedes the dependent measure task, it seems unlikely they would deduce the correct hypothesis. Moreover, it is

178

SINCLAIR, SOLDAT, RYAN

sometimes possible to design one's study such that any demand characteristics would have an effect opposite to their predicted effects (see Mark & Sinclair, 1995, for an example). Furthermore, we advocate the use of a funnel-type debriefing procedure to assess demand characteristics along with analyses including and excluding suspicious participants (see Page, 1975). Sinclair employed these procedures with the modified Velten elation, neutral, and depression inductions. Very few participants were identified as suspicious. Additional analyses conducted both including and excluding suspicious participants revealed comparable effects on impression formation. Thus, it would be difficult to argue demand characteristics as the basis for effects found in Sinclair's study. Mark and Sinclair and Sinclair and Mark (1991, 1992, 1995) similarly eliminated potential demand characteristics explanations for mood effects found in their studies. Thus, we suggest several procedures render demand explanations implausible (Mark & Sinclair, 1995; Sinclair, 1988; Sinclair & Mark, 1991, 1992, 1995), and these should be used by researchers interested in the effects of mood on social and cognitive processes.

CONCLUSIONS The anxiety and serenity inductions developed in this research provide a useful tool for those interested in the effects of an array of specific affective states. Furthermore, the serenity induction may have therapeutic implications in the treatment of anxiety. The induction involves a simply administered guided-imagery technique that may prove effective in reducing anxiety, especially if paired with progressive relaxation. We also note that multiple operationalizations of affective states should lead to a better understanding of the roles of affect in our perceptions of the world. Finally, we are not arguing that Velten-like inductions are particularly better or worse than any other induction technique. For example, Velten-like techniques
'AS Polivy and Doyle (1980) pointed out, the Velten procedure seems to provide clear demand characteristics. Nevertheless, Polivy and Doyle interpreted their results as indicating that, although demand characteristics may contribute to the effects ofthe Velten induction, tme mood changes result. This argument is consistent with our own position and with recent evidence that the effects of Velten-like inductions cannot be wholly accounted for by a demand characteristics explanation (Sinclair, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990). We attempted to reduce the role of demand in potentially inflating mood differences by introducing a demand for honesty. Moreover, although demand characteristics may contribute to measures of mood, it is difficult to explain the results of carefully designed studies, employing a convincing unrelated second study paradigm, in which mood effects are apparent on dependent measures that are seen as unrelated to the mood induction (e.g., Sinclair, 1988; Sinclair & Mark, 1991, 1992, 1995). Furthermore, demand explanations can be rendered less plausible by testing effects that are counterintuitive or nonobvious, perhaps because they take the form of complex interactions involving factors unknown to the participant. In addition, the careful assessment of demand characteristics may allow the researcher to estimate the effects of demand. Finally, there appears to be no evidence indicating that a well-designed and well-executed study using Velten-like procedures is more prone to demand characteristics than is a study using any other mood induction.

ANXIETY AND SERENITY

179

have been criticized on the basis that they may involve cognitive as well as affective activation and because they do not separate somatic and self-evaluative components of mood (see Rholes et al., 1987; Riskind & Rholes, 1985a, 1985b; cf. Clark, 1983, 1985). However, these arguments can be leveled against most mood induction techniques. Films about the Holocaust certainly involve cognition (e.g., Isen & Daubman, 1984). Music inductions have been shown to affect cognitive processing (metaphor interpretation; Wellens, Palermo, Sinclair, & Thayer, 1992). In fact, it is likely that moods, both induced and naturally occurring, comprise both affective and cognitive components. In any case, we illustrate a method that can be used to explore the effects of mood on judgment through the separation ofthe valence and arousal components of moods as defined by Wundt (1907), the Russell (1980) circumplex, and others (e.g., Osgood et al., 1957).

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The research was supported by Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada Grant 410 930122 to Robert C. Sinclair. We thank Amy Chmilar, Bruce Friedman, Curt Hoffman, Kama Jamieson, Dan King, Lynda King, Mel Mark, Frederick Rhodewalt, and two anonymous reviewers for their comments on a previous draft of this manuscript and Tom Borkovec for providing the statements used to develop our anxiety induction.

REFERENCES
Abramson, L. Y., Alloy, L. B., & Rosoff, R. (1981). Depression, and the generation of complex hypotheses in the judgment of contingency. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 19, 35-45. Alloy, L. B., & Abramson, L. Y. (1979). Judgment of contingency in depressed and non-depressed students: Sadder but wiser? Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 108, 441-485. Alloy, L. B., & Abramson, L. Y. (1982). Leamed helplessness, depression, and the illusion of control. Joumal of Personality and Social Psychology, 42, 1114-1126. Alloy, L. B., Abramson, L. Y., & Viscusi, D. (1981). Induced mood and the illusion of control. Joumal of Personality and Social Psychology, 41, 1129-1140. Andrews, V. H., & Borkovec, T. D. (1988). The differential effects of inductions of worry, somatic anxiety, and depression on emotional experience. Journal of Behaviour Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 19, 21-26. Bless, H., Bohner, G., Schwarz, N., & Strack, F. (1990). Mood and persuasion: A cognitive response analysis. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 16, 331-345. Bodenhausen, G. V., Sheppard, L. A., & Kramer, G. P. (1994). Negative affect and social judgment: The differential impact of anger and sadness. European Joumal of Social Psychology, 24, 45-62. Borkovec, T. D. (1986). Worry: Physiological and cognitive process. In P. Eilen & O. Fontaine (Eds.), Behavioral therapy: Beyond the conditioning framework (pp. 86-103). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. Borkovec, T. D., Robinson, E., Pruzinsky, T., & Dupree, J. A. (1983). Preliminary exploration of worry: Some characteristics and processes. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 36, 129-148.

180

SINCLAIR, SOLDAT, RYAN

Bower, G. (1981). Mood and memory. American Psychologist, 36, 129-148. Buchwald, A. M., Strack, S., & Coyne, J. C. (1981). Demand characteristics and the Velten Mood Induction Procedure. Joumal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 49, 478-479. Clark, D. M. (1983). On the induction of depressed mood in the laboratory: Evaluation and comparison ofthe Velten and musical procedures. Advances in Behavioural Research & Therapy, 5, 27-49. Clark, D. M. (1985). The Velten Mood Induction Procedure and cognitive models of depression: A reply to Riskind and Rholes (1985). Behaviour Research & Therapy, 23, 667-669. Cook, T. D., & Campbell, D. T. (1979). Quasi experimentation: Design and analysis issues for field settings. Chicago: Rand McNally. Easterbrook, J. A. (1959). The effect of emotion on cue utilization and the organization of behavior. Psychological Review, 66, 183-201. Friedman, B. H., & Thayer, J. F. (1991). Facial muscle activity and EEG recording: Redundancy analysis. Electroencephalography and Clinical Neurophysiology, 79, 358-360. Frost, D. O., & Green, M. L. (1982). Velten Mood Induction Procedure effects: Duration and postexperimental removal. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 8, 341-347. Gleicher, F., & Weary, G. (1991). The effect of depression on the quantity and quality of social inferences. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 61, 105-114. Hawkins, W. L., French, L. C , Crawford, B. D., & Enzle, M. E. (1988). Depressed affect and time perception. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 97, 275-280. Isen, A. M. (1984). Toward understanding the role of affect in cognition. In R. S. SruU & T. K. Wyer (Eds.), Handbook of social cognition (Vol. 3, pp. 179-236). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. Isen, A. M. (1987). Positive affect, cognitive processes, and social behavior. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 20, pp. 203-353). New York: Academic. Isen, A. M., & Daubman, K. A. (1984). The infiuence of affect on categorization. Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology, 47, 1206-1217. Isen, A. M., & Gorgoglione, J. A. (1983). Some specific effects of four affect-induction procedures. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 9, 136-143. Kahneman, D. (1973). Attention and effort. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Kwiatkowski, S. J., & Parkinson, S. R. (1994). Depression, elaboration, and mood congruence: Differences between natural and induced mood. Memory & Cognition, 22, 225233. Mark, M. M., & Sinclair, R. C. (1995). Mood, perceived justice, and categorization breadth: A processing strategy perspective. Unpublished manuscript. The Pennsylvania State University, University Park. Marsh, K. L., & Weary, G. (1989). Depression and attdhutional complexity. Personality ami Social Psychology Bulletin, 15, 325-336. Martin, L. L., Ward, D. W., Achee, J. W., & Wyer, R. S., Jr. (1993). Mood as input: People have to interpret the motivational implications of their moods. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 64, 317-326. Mathews, A., & Brendan, B. (1983). Mood and self-reference bias in recall. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 21, 233-239. Morrow, J., & Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (1990). Effects of responses to depression on the remediation of depiessivs alfsct. JourruU of Personality and Social Psychology, 58, 519-527. Osgood, C. E., Suci, G. J., & Tannenbaum, P. H. (1957). The measurement of meaning. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. Page, M. M. (1975, August). A demand characteristics explanation of operant and classical verbal conditioning. Paper presented at the 83rd annual convention of the American Psychological Association, Chicago. Polivy, J., & Doyle, L. (1980). Laboratory induction of mood states through the reading of self-referent mood statements: Affective changes or demand characteristics? Joumal of Abnormal Psychology, 89, 286-290.

ANXIETY AND SERENITY

181

Rholes, W. S., Riskind, J. H., & Lane, J. W. (1987). Emotional states and memory biases: Effects of cognitive priming and mood. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 52, 91-99. Riskind, J. H., & Rholes, W. S. (1985a). The cognitive model of depression and mood-induction procedures: A reply to Clark (1983). Behaviour Research & Therapy, 23, 663-666. Riskind, J. H., & Rholes, W. S. (1985b). The Velten Mood Induction Procedure and cognitive manipulation: Our response to Clark (1985). Behaviour Research & Therapy, 23, 671-673. Ruehlman, L. S., West, S. G., & Pasahow, R. J. (1985). Depression and evaluative schemata. Joumal of Personality, 53, 46-92. Russell, J. A. (1980). A circumplex model of affect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 39, 1161-1178. Schlosberg, H. (1954). Three dimensions of emotion. Psychological Review, 61, 81-88. Schwarz, N. (1990). Feelings as information: Informational and motivational functions of affective states. In R. M. Sorrentino & E. T. Higgins (Eds.), Handbook of motivation and cognition: Foundations of social behavior (Vol. 2, pp. 527561). New York: Guilford. Schwarz, N., & Clore, G. L. (1983). Mood, misattribution, and judgments of well-being: Informative and directive functions of affective states. Joumal of Personality arui Social Psychology, 45, 513-523. Sinclair, R. C. (1988). Mood, categorization breadth, and performance appraisal: The effects of order of information acquisition and affective state on halo, accuracy, information retrieval, and evaluations. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 42, 22-46. Sinclair, R. C , & Mark, M. M. (1991). Mood and the endorsement of egalitarian macrojustice principles versus equity-based microjustice principles. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 17, 369-375. Sinclair, R. C , & Maik, M. M. (1992). The influence of mood state on judgment and action: Effects on persuasion, categorization, social justice, person perception, and judgmental accuracy. In L. L. Martin & A. Tesser (Eds.), The construction of social judgments (pp. 165-193). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. Sinclair, R. C , & Mark, M. M. (1995). The effects of mood state on judgemental accuracy: Processing strategy as a mechanism. Cognition & Emotion, 9, 417-438. Sinclair, R. C , Mark, M. M., & Clore, G. L. (1994). Mood-related persuasion depends on (mis)attributions. Social Cognition, 12, 309-326. Sinclair, R. C , Mark, M. M., Enzle, M. E., Borkovec, T. D., & Cumbleton, A. G. (1994). Toward a multiple-method view of mood induction: The appropriateness of a modified Velten mood induction technique and the problems of procedures with group assignment to conditions. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 15, 389-408. Sinclair, R. C , Metzger, R., & Borkovec, T. D. (1990). Mood schema, demand characteristics, and response time: The effect of mood state on response time to affectively laden stimuli. Unpublished manuscript. University of Alberta, Edmonton, Canada. Snyder, M., & White, P. (1982). Mood and memories: Elation, depression, and the remembering of one's life. Joumal of Personality, 50, 149-167. Social science citation index. (1981-1993). Philadelphia: Institute for Scientific Information. Tanaka, J. S., & Huba, G. J. (1984a). Confirmatory hierarchical factor analyses of psychological distress models. Joumal of Persormlity and Social Psychology, 46, 621-635. Tanaka, J. S., & Huba, G. J. (1984b). Stmctures of psychological distress: Testing confirmatory hierarchical models. Joumal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 52, 719-721. Velten, E. A. (1968). A laboratory task for the induction of mood states. Behavior Research and Therapy, 6, 473^82. Watson, D., & Tellegen, A. (1985). Toward a consensual structure of mood. Psychological Bulletin, 98, 219-235. Weary, G., Elbin, S., & Hill, M. G. (1987). Attributional and social comparison processes in depression. Joumal of Personality and Social Psychology, 52, 605-610.

182

SINCLAIR, SOLDAT, RYAN

Weary, G., Jordan, J. S., & Hill, M. G. (1985). The attributional norm of intemality and depressive sensitivity to social information. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 49, 1283-1293. Wellens, T. R., Palermo, D., Sinclair, R. C , & Thayer, J. F. (1992). Mood and metaphor interpretation. Unpublished manuscript. New York University, New York. Wundt, W. (1907). Outlines ofpsychology. New York: Engelmann. Yerkes, R. M., & Dodson, J. D. (1908). The relation of strength of stimulus to rapidity of habit-formation. Journal of Comparative Neurology of Psychology, 18, 459-482. Zajonc, R. B. (1965). Social facilitation. Science, 149, 269-274.

182