Mandamus; Private individuals who seek to procure the enforcement of a public duty (e.g.

the publication in the Official Gazette of Presidential Decrees, LOI, etc.) are real parties in interest in mandamus case.The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizens legal personality in the aforementioned case apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor General, the government officer generally empowered to represent the people, has entered his appearance for respondents in this case. Same; Statutes; Fact that a Presidential Decree or LOI states its date of effectivity does not preclude their publication in the Official Gazette as they constitute important legislative acts, particularly in the present situation where the President may on his own issue laws.The clear object of the abovequoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignorantia legis non excusat. It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. 1.STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; RELIEF FROM MISTAKE.Act No. 75, granting relief from judgments obtained by mistake, applies to mistakes of fact and not to mistakes of law committed by the trial court. Zulueta vs. Zulueta 2.CIVIL PROCEDURE (OLD); PRESCRIPTION.Where the court is given power to fix a definite time within which a certain action must be commenced the petition of one of the parties to extend that time until the adoption of a proposed new procedure is without merit and should be denied. ORIGINAL APPLICATION for relief from an order of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo. LUCIANO DELGADO, plaintiff and appellant, vs. EDUARDO ALONSO DUQUE VALGONA, defendant and appellee. 1.USURY; RECOVERY OF USURIOUS INTEREST IN ACTION; ATTORNEY'S FEE.When the right of action to recover interest paid upon a usurious contract is established, a reasonable fee should be allowed to the debtor-plaintiff for services rendered by his attorney in the matter of the recovery of such interest. 2.ID. ; IGNORANCE OF USURY LAW.Ignorance of the provisions of the Usury Law does not relieve a party from the legal consequences of the making of an usurious contract into which he has voluntarily entered. 3.ID. ; ACTION TO ANNUL USURIOUS CONTRACT; RESTORATION OF CONSIDERATION AS CONDITION PRECEDENT TO RELIEF.Where the debtor in a usurious contract institutes an action to obtain relief therefrom, he will be required, as a condition precedent to relief, to restore what was received by him at the time the contract was made, upon the principle that he who seeks equity must do equity. APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur. Gloria, J.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. Manuel Gallego and Gibbs & McDonough for appellant. Cavanna, Aboitiz & Agan for appellee. STREET, J.:

The parties to this action are residents of the municipality of Goa, in the Province of Camarines Sur, the plaintiff, Luciano Delgado, being a planter of local prominence, while the defendant, Eduardo Alonso Duque Valgona, is 739 740 No. L-21013. August 17, 1967. UNIVERSAL CORN PRODUCTS, INC., ET AL., petitioners-appellants, vs. RICE AND CORN BOARD, ET AL., respondentsappellees. Statutes; Statutory Construction; Statutes operative prospectively.It is a rule of statutory construction that all statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective operation unless the purpose and intention of the Legislature to give them retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used. In every case of doubt, the doubt must be resolved against the retrospective effect. No. L-14406. June 30, 1961. MARCELINO BUYCO, petitioner-appellee, vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK,ILOILO BRANCH, Iloilo City, respondent-appellant. Obligations and Contracts; Payment; Backpay Certificate; PNB refusal to accept certificate may be compelled by mandamus.Following the ruling of this Court in Florentino v. Philippine National Bank, L8782, (52 O.G. 2522), the latter can be compelled by mandamus to accept acknowledgment of backpay certificate in payment of petitioners obligation with the bank. Words and Phrases; Vested right or vested interest defined.A vested right or a vested interest may be held to mean some 683

VOL. 2, JUNE 30, 1961 683 Buyco vs. Philippine National Bank

right or interest in property that has become fixed or established, and is no longer open to doubt or controversy (Graham v. Great Falls Water Power & Town Site Co. [Mont] 76 Pac. 808, 810, citing EvansSnider-Buel Co. v. McFadden, 10 Fed. 293, 44 CCA, 464 L.R.A. 900). Statutory Construction; Laws shall generally have no retroactive effect.Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided (Art. 4, NCC), for it is said that the law looks to the future only and has no retroactive effect unless the legislator may have formally given that effect to some legal provisions (Lopez vs. Crow, 40 Phil. 997), and that statutes are to be construed as having only prospective operation, unless the purpose and intention of the Legislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used, and that in case of doubt the same must be resolved against retrospective effect (Montilla v. Agustinian Corp., 24 Phil. 220). Statutes; Effect of amendment on accrued rights.After an act is amended, the original act continues to be in force with regard to all rights that had accrued prior to such amendment (Fairchild v. U.S., 91 Fed. 297; Hathaway v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 99 F. 534). APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo. Fernan, J.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Nos. L-22511 and L-22343. May 16, 1966. ANDRES E. LAZARO, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, respondent. Customs law; Importation contrary to Central Bank Circulars 44 and 45 is subject to forfeiture.Where the shipment was not covered by any import license nor release certificate from the Central Bank of the Philippines as required by Circulars 44 and 45, said goods are subject to forfeiture within the purview of Section 1363(f) of the Revised Administrative Code (Pascual vs. Commissioner of Customs, L-10929, June 30, 1959). Same; Nature of forfeiture proceedings.Central Bank Circular 133 cannot abate a forfeiture case. Forfeiture proceedings are civil in nature and not criminal (Roxas vs. Sayoc, 100 Phil. 448). Same; Central Bank Circulars 44 and 45 are part of customs law.Central Bank Circulars Nos. 44 and 45, being regulations issued pursuant to law and enforceable by the Bureau of Customs, form part of said customs law. Their violation, therefore, comes within the purview of Section 1363 (f) of the Revised Administrative Code. ; Same; Central Bank Circular 133 re-enacted Circulars 44. and 45.Central Bank Circular 133 has not exactly repealed Central Bank Circulars 44 and 45, but rather it re-enacted them when it provided therein that all existing regulations not inconsistent with the circulars are deemed incorporated and made integral parts thereof by reference. Statutory construction; Republic Act No. 1410.Republic Act No. 1410 cannot be given a retroactive effect so as to defeat any act or transaction effected or undertaken during the life of Circular 45. Indeed, under Article 4 of the New Civil

No. L-20563. October 29, 1968. CEBU PORTLAND CEMENT COMPANY, petitioner, vs. COLLECTOR (NOW COMMISSIONER) OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent. Constitutional law; Statutory construction; Statute operates prospectively unless the contrary is made manifest; Tax laws operate prospectively unless retrospective effect is expressly declared or clearly implied.Petitioner contends that since the purpose of Republic Act No. 1299, which became effective on June 16, 1955, amending section 246 of the National Internal Revenue, was merely to clarify the meaning of "minerals" and "mineral products" in said section, the section should be construed as if it had been originally passed in its amended form, so that cement should be considered as "mineral product" even bef ore the enactment of Republic Act 1299, and theref ore exempt from the sales or percentage tax. Held: It is a settled rule in statutory construction that a statute operates prospectively only and never retroactively, unless the legislative intent to the contrary is made manifest either by the express terms of the statute or by necessary implication. In every case of doubt, the doubt must be resolved against the retrospective effect. There is nothing in the context of the provision in question that would manif est the Legislature's intention to have the provision apply to taxes due in the past. On the other hand, the use of the word "shall" gives the unmistakable impression that the lawmakers intended this enactment to be effective only in futuro. Furthermore, careful perusal of the explanatory note to House Bill No. 3251, later approved as Republic Act 1299, and the portions of the record of the discussions in Congress, reveals nothing that would suggest that the amendment was enacted to operate retrospectively. Indeed, like other statutes, tax laws operate prospectively, whether they enact, amend or repeal, unless as aforesaid, the purpose of the Legislature to give re790

790 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Cebu Portland Cement Co. vs. Collector of Internal Revenue trospective effect is expressly declared or may clearly be implied from the language used. Taxation; National Internal Revenue Code; Cement a manufactured product not exempt from percentage tax prior to Republic Act 1299.Before the enactment of the amendment (Republic Act 1299) to section 246 of the Tax Code, when cement was not yet placed under the category of either "minerals" or "mineral products" it was not exempt from the percentage tax imposed by section 186 of said code, and was therefore, taxable as a manufactured product. No. L-32743. February 15, 1974.* PRIMITIVO ESPIRITU AND LEONORA A. DE ESPIRITU, petitioners, vs. RICARDO CIPRIANO and THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE,RIZAL,BRANCH XV, respondents.

Rental Law; Statutory Construction; Prospective operation of statutes which affect substantive rights. The statute affects substantive rights and hence a strict and prospective construction thereof is in order. Article 4 of the New Civil Code ordains that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided and that where the law is clear, the duty of this Court is equally plain. We must apply it to the facts as found. The law being a temporary measure designed to meet a temporary situation, it had a limited period of operation as in fact it was so worded in clear and unequivocal language that No lessor of a dwelling unit or land X X X shall, during the period of one year from May 31, 1970, increase the monthly rental agreed upon between the lessor and lessee prior to the approval of this Act. Hence the prohibition against the increase in rentals was effective only from March, 1970, up to March, 1971. Outside and beyond that period, the law did not, by its express terms, purport to give a retroactive operation. Same; Same; Statutes have no retroactive effect unless otherwise provided therein.Well-settled is the principle that while the Legislature has the power to pass retroactive laws which do not impair the obligation of contracts, or affect injuriously vested rights, it is equally true that statutes are not to be construed as intended to have a retroactive effect so as to affect pending proceedings unless such intent is expressly declared or clearly and necessarily implied from the language of the enactment. Same; Increase in rentals; When consent of lessee to increase not essential to validity of said increase; Case at bar.Established and undisputed is the fact that the increase in the rental of the lot involved was effected in January, 1969, while the law in question took effect on June 17, 1970, or after a period of one year and a half after the increase in rentals, had been effected. It is argued that there was no perfected contract covering the increased rate of rentals and conversion thereof into monthly payments of P30 effective January 1969, as the lessee did not give his consent thereto. This argument is devoid of merit. There is nothing in the stipulation of facts to show that his consent to the increase in rentals and change in the manner of payment was essential to its validity. There was no more subsisting No. L-28774. February 28, 1980.* DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. HERMOGENES CALUAG, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and SPOUSES HONESTO G. NICANDRO and ELISA F. NICANDRO, respondents. Contracts; When a person not principally or subsidiarily obliged in a contract may file an action to nullify the same.This Court, in Teves v. Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation, held that a person who is not obliged principally or subsidiarily in a contract may exercise an action for nullify of the contract if he is prejudiced in his rights with respect to one of the contracting parties, and can show the detriment which could positively result to him from the contract in which he had no intervention. We applied this exception to the rule in Yturralde v. Vagilidad; De Santos v. City of Manila; and Baez v. Court of Appeals. It cannot be denied that respondent spouses stand to be prejudiced by reason of their payment in full of the purchase price for the same lots which had been sold to the petiNo. L-34882. August 24, 1976.* J. AMADO ARANETA, petitioner, vs. ALFONSO DORONILA, A. DORONILA RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT, INC., and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

No. L-35643. August 24, 1976.* ALFONSO DORONILA and A. DORONILA RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT, INC., petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL AS TRIBUNAL, JUDGE BENJAMIN H. AQUINO, THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF RIZAL, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, and J. AMADO ARANETA, respondents. Appeals; Failure of winning party to allege that original record on appeal was filed out of time coupled with fact that appellant filed the same within a period much earlier than generally transpires for filing record on appeal which is taken judicial notice of, lends persuasiveness to conclusion that the said record on appeal was filed on time.We take judicial notice of the fact that ordinarily, appellants are given not less than said period of ten days within which to comply with an order to amend the record on appeal and that it would take at least one week before the court can consider and rule on the objection of appellee plus another one week to issue and serve the correspoding order. So, assuming that the Doronilas filed their original record on appeal as early as May 31, 1971, which is already rather extraordinary, since generally, the record on appeal is filed some days later, they still had a total of 24 days from May 31 to make a timely appeal by filing their amended record on appeal. In other words, their reglementary period would have expired on June 24, 1971. No. L-17915. January 31, 1967. TEODORO M. CASTRO, petitioner and appellant, vs. AMADO DEL ROSARIO as Commissioner of Civil Service, DOMINADOR AYTONA, as Secretary of Finance, MELECIO R. DOMINGO, as Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and TOMAS C. TOLEDO, respondents and appellants. Quo warranto; Nature of proceeding.A quo warranto proceeding is one to determine the right to the use or exercise of a franchise or office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim is not wellfounded, or if he has forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege. The action may be commenced for the Government by the Solicitor General or by a fiscal; or a person claiming to be entitled to a public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another may bring an action in his own name. Where a private person files the action, he must prove that he is entitled to the controverted position, otherwise respondent has a right to the undisturbed possession of his office. (Acosta vs. Flor, 5 Phil. 18). Waiver of rights.Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. Waiver must be predicated on concrete grounds. The evidence must be sufficient and clear to warrant a finding that the intent to waive a right is unmistakable. No. L-15645. January 31, 1964. PAZ P. ARRIETA and VITALIADO ARRIETA, plaintiffs-appellees, vs. NATIONAL RICE AND CORN CORPORATION, defendant-appellant, MANILA UNDERWRITERS INSURANCE CO., INC., defendantappellee. Obligations and contracts; Liability for non-performance; Failure to put up letter of credit within agreed period.One who assumes a contractual obligation and fails to perform the same on account of his inability to meet certain bank requirements which inability he knew and was aware of when he entered into the contract, should be held liable in damages for breach of contract.

Under Article 1170 of the Civil Code, not only debtors guilty of fraud, negligence or default but also every debtor, in general, who fails in the performance of his obligations is bound to indemnify for the losses and damages caused thereby. Same; Same; Meaning of phrase "in any manner contravene the tenor" of the obligation in Art. 1170, Civil Code.The phrase "in any manner contravene the tenor" of the obligation in Art. 1170, Civil Code, includes any illicit task which impairs the strict and faithful fulfillment of the obligation, or every kind of defective performance. Same; Same; Waiver of breach of contract not presumed.Waivers are not presumed, but must be clearly and convincingly shown, either by express stipulation or acts admitting no other reasonable explanation. Same; Payment of award; Philippine currency.In view of Republic Act 527 which specifically requires the discharge of obligations only "in any coin or currency which at the time of payment is legal tender for public and private debt", the award of "damages in U S. dollars made by the lower court in the case at bar is modified by converting it into Philippine pesos at the rate of exchange prevailing at the time the obligation was incurred, or when the contract in question was executed. No. L-24421. April 30, 1970. MATIAS GONGON, petitioner, vs. COURT OP APPEALS,THE SPOUSES AMADA AQUINO,and RUFINO RIVERA,THE OFFICE OF THE LAND TENURE ADMINISTRATION,and THE OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. Land Tenure Administration; Sale of lots to occupants; Preference in sale of public lots where parties are not in equal footing.The order of preference in the disposition of public lands established in Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 539, namely, the first choice is given to the bona fide tenants, the second to the occupants, and the last to private individuals, should be observed if the parties stand on an equal footing or under equal circumstances. But where the parties affected are not in equal footing such as when one of the parties already has a bigger lot, then the one who still has no lot should be given the preferential right to purchase in order to carry out the avowed policy of the law to give land to the landless. Same; Same; Same; Preferential right of tenant to purchase public lot cannot be waived.The preferential right of a tenant under Commonwealth Act No. 539 to purchase a public land could not be validly waived, such waiver being against public policy as provided in Article 6 of the new Civil Code which was the same rule in the old Civil Code. PETITION for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. Enrique M. Fernando for petitioner. Bengzon & Bengzon for respondents spouses Amada Aquino, et al.

Solicitor General for other respondents. No. L-29746. November 26, 1973.* INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE EMILIO CAMON.CONCEPCION EREETA, administratrix-appellee, vs. IGNATIUS HENRY BEZORE,ELWOOD KNICKERBOCKER, and MARY IRENE FALLON MCCORMICK, claimantsappellants; MARTINIANO O. DE LA CRUZ, administrator. Waiver; Right subject of waiver must be in existence.It is essential that a right, in order that it may be validly waived, must be in existence at the time of the waiver. Sales; Interpretation of terms in deed of sale not necessary where said terms clear.The words accrued and accruing in the deed of sale are not obscure and, as the lower court declared, are in fact positive and categorical enough to include accrued allotments No. L-25245. December 11, 1967. FRANKLIN BAKER COMPANY OP THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. MAURICIO ALILLANA and WORKMENS COMPENSATION COMMISSION, respondents. Workmens Compensation Act; Extension of disability period; Case at bar.The only issue in this case is whether or not the Workmens Compensation Commission has the power under Section 18 to extend the period of disability under Section 14 of the Workmens Compensation Act. Held: This Court has already ruled that said maximum period of 208 weeks as fixed in Section 14 can be extended under Section 18, as amended by Rep. Act 772. The right of the Workmens Compensation Commissioner to reopen a case already decided by him is an innovation introduced by Republic Act 772 particularly, Sec. 13 thereof, amending Sec. 18 (last par.) of the original Workmens Compensation Law, Act 3428 and is solely for the benefit of the employee as may be gathered from the proviso that the Commission may from time to time cause examination of the condition of the disabled laborer, with a view to extending, if necessary, the period of compensation. Same; Waiver; Case at bar.That the disabled employee has signed a satisfaction receipt does not result in waiver; the law does not consider as valid any agreement to receive less compensation than what the worker is entitled to recover under the Act. APPEAL from an order of the Workmens Compensation Commission.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Paulino Manongdo for petitioner. Paciano C. Villavieja and M.E. Lanzona, Jr. for respondents. BENGZON, J.P., J.:

Franklin Baker Co. of the Philippines, a domestic corporation engaged in producing copra, on July 19, 1947 took Mauricio Alillana into employment, as truck loader. In 1956 he was assigned as washer. Four months later, he became shell collector therein, performing duties of this nature: To pick up unshelled coconuts from a moving conveyor; place them in a caritilla and hand them to the shellers; four times during the 8-hour work, he and some No. L-27828. February 27, 1970. THE SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION (Formerly San Miguel Brewery, Inc.), petitioner, vs. MACARIO CRUZ and the COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents. Labor law; Industrial Peace Act; Dismissal; When acceptance of benefits amounts to waiver of right to contest the validity of employers act of dismissing an employee.As a rule, the acceptance of benefits such as separation pay and terminal leave benefits would not amount to estoppel or waiver of right of employee to contest his illegal dismissal. But where dismissed employee not only specified, and obtained, payment of retirement gratuities due him in & lump sum but even applied for disability benefits with the Social Security System, never protested his alleged illegal dismissal nor demanded reinstatement for more than 3 years from his dismissal, there is waiver of the right -to contest the validity of the dismissal. Same; Same; Same; Elements.The elements for the operation of laches are present where there are present (a) conduct on the part of the employer that gave rise to the situation on which the complaint is made, which is the retirement of the complainant for physical disability; (b) delay in the assertion of complainants rightthe lapsing of a period of 3 years which is neither explained nor justified; (c) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the respondent employer