1/30/2004

Interview of Donald Rumsfeld

Assumed duties as Secretary of Defense on January 20, 2001

I. General Themes
A. What is the role of CT in United States defense policy?
1. Mission: what is the CT mission within OSD/DoD?

i. Related questions: what were the pending military plans or

proposals regarding UBL and A-Q in Afghanistan (for
example, TLAMS), the various modifications to plans,
proposals for response to the USS Cole attack, and associated
issues regarding the Cole attack (we recognize the Cole took
place prior to his assuming duties at Defense)? Do you recall
plans developed in CENTCOM (INFINITE RESOLVE)?
1. Do you recall hearing about the Shelton 13 options or
the Newbold comprehensive plan, both developed in
late 2000?

2. What was your assessment of who was responsible for

the USS Cole attacks? When were you informed that UBL
was responsible for the attacks? Do you recall any
discussions regarding a possible retaliation for the attacks?
If not, why were there no considerations for a retaliatory
strike? Was there a deliberate decision not to attack or was
this an inadvertent action on the part of the new
administration? Were there concerns about a major attack
on the U.S. if the U.S. retaliated for the Cole?

ii. What did you know about these plans? What briefings took
place on these plans? How were these plans conveyed to the
leadership within OSD? To the President? To the National
Security Advisor?

iii. How does the DoD CT mission figure into defense

transformation? What new capacities should be built? When
was this need for transformation recognized?

iv. Provide your assessment of the role of DoD in defense of the

home against terrorist attacks, including responsibility for
NORAD.

B. What is the role of Secretary of Defense in United States CT policy

formulation?

Prepared by: B. Jenkins

with input from Teams 2 and 8.
1/30/2004

1. When attending PC or other NSC meetings, what was the standard

operating procedures for memorializing the conclusions reached at these
meetings?

C. Provide information on your interactions with key offices in

OSD/DoD/Combatant Commands in the development of related to CT policy
formulation and operations planning.

1. DSD, USD/P, ASD SO/LIC, CJCS, J3, GENICOM, SOCOM and

JSOC

II. Priority of CT within OSD, including during the transition

A. At the time you assumed office in OSD in 2001, what were the most
significant threats to the U.S. national security?

B. Where did counter terrorism fall in that list of threats?

C. Did you receive a transition briefing when you assumed office in January
2001?
a. Who briefed? Who else attended the briefing?
b. Do you recall what issues were discussed? Was counter terrorism one
of the issues briefed? What priority was given to CT?

D. According to Benjamin and Simon, when Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz came to

office, their focus was missile defense and military restructuring. Rumsfeld's
attention was on military doctrine, including existing guidance that US forces
needed to be able to fight two wars.
a. Please comment.

E. Also according to Benjamin and Simon, the last year of the Clinton
administration, the JSC began developing a project they planned to launch in
2001. However, when they were briefed, the Pentagon's new leadership killed the
project.
a. Please comment.

III. Intelligence Support to the Warfighter

A. How would you define "actionable intelligence?"

B. Provide an assessment of the intelligence provided to DoD to support plans

for a CT operation against UBL and A-Q in Afghanistan prior to 9-11.

Prepared by: B. Jenkins

with input from Teams 2 and 8.
1/30/2004

IV: The CSG

A. What was your view of the role of the CSG in CT policy prior to 9-11?
1. Was it an effective interagency mechanism for USG CT efforts?

B. Do you recall how decisions made in the CSG were integrated into the PC
decision making process?

C. Did OSD and DoD trust the decision making process within the CSG?

D. What are your views of Richard Clarke who chaired the CSG in his capacity
as National Coordinator for Counter Terrorism?

V: The Role of the Military in CT

A. What was your position prior to 9-11 about the use of military force in
Afghanistan (including SOFs, larger conventional force, cruise missiles, etc.)?

B. Was it possible for the military to have a more aggressive position prior to 9-
11?

C. What were some of the limitations on the use of military operations in

Afghanistan pre 9-11? Please be specific (e.g., collateral damage, lack of
public support, problems with actionable intelligence, diplomatic issues with
Pakistan and Uzbekistan, CT was a law enforcement mission, limits imposed
by the NCA, no search and rescue capabilities for SOFs, etc)

D. Was the military too focused on force protection and anti-terrorism rather than
on more offensive actions?

E. On June 21-22, 2001, the Pentagon placed US forces in six countries on

THREATCON Delta; The Fifth Fleet was put out to sea in Bahrain; Navy
Minesweeping Ships in Bahrain ordered back to sea in response to "credible
terrorist threat" information. Please provide details on the decision making
process leading to these actions.

VI: The Predator

A. What advantages would the Predator provide to the military in Afghanistan pre-
9/11?

B. What role did you play in the decision making on the various issues of
contention in 2001 regarding the use of an armed Predator?

Prepared by: B. Jenkins

with input from Teams 2 and 8.
1/30/2004

C. What was your position on the outstanding issues (funding, C2, OSD oversight
responsibility) under debate regarding the use of an armed Predator?

D. Do you have any knowledge of the May 25, 2001 Table Top Exercise on the
weaponized Predator?

E. How did the use of the Predator, armed or without the Hellfire missile, fit into
CT policy?

VII: Military to Military Contacts

A. How did military to military contacts with representatives from relevant
countries (e.g., Pakistan) support the overall DoD CT mission?
a. How did it support the overall USG CT mission?

B. Please describe some of your contacts and how you believe those contacts
supported the fight against terrorism.

C. Should the USG and DoD have promoted more mil-to-mil contact with
countries like India, Pakistan and Uzbekistan?

VIII: Homeland Defense and Homeland Security

A. Do you recall any discussion about the establishment of a command within the
U.S. for homeland defense prior to 9-11?

B. To what extend did you begin to think about homeland security prior to 9-11?
1. See reference to Quadrennial Defense Review in the Wolfowitz MFR.

2. In his historical interview Rumsfeld was asked the following questions:

Q: To what extent had you begun to think about homeland security prior
to 9-11?
A: We had been engaged in what was called the Quadrennial Defense
Review. So, well, prior to September 11 we had been talking about the
defense of the homeland and discussing how we were going to be able to
deal with that problem. We had elevated it to the top of our priority list.

Q: Did the QDR change very much after September 11?

A: Because of all of the concerns we had about intelligence and about
homeland defense, I suppose it didn't change as much as one might think.
I hope that September 11 informed it in some ways. I don't remember the
timing.

Prepared by: B. Jenkins

with input from Teams 2 and 8.
1/30/2004

IX: Immediate Response and the Attacks

Team 8 Input
See Binder, Section VI.

X. Decision to go to War
A. What were the policy choices that were debated and that ultimately led to the
NCA decision to go to war?

C. What were the competing issues?

D. The military appeared to have no plans for a large operation in Afghanistan.

Any comments to this (see "Bush at War")

XI: Team 2 Questions

A. Who is responsible for the search for UBL? CIA? Defense Special Forces?
How is that going today?

B. Are you confident that Pakistan and Afghanistan are willing to make the tough
choices to fight A-Q in the months and years ahead? Are they too fragile to
rely upon?

C. On what basis have you supported increased funding for intelligence? What is
the strategy? How does this strategy fit into the larger Government-wide
efforts to fight the war on terrorism?

D. Are you satisfied with the quality of the intelligence you receive? Is the
, quality of the analysis up to your standards? Are you satisfied with the quality
of national intelligence support the Department receives from the DCI?

E. What problem were you trying to resolve by establishing the new position of
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence? What role does his office play in
the management and oversight of Defense Intelligence?

XII: Questions Based on Secretary Rumsfeld's Memorandum

and Final Questions
A. Is DoD winning the global war on terrorism (GWOT)?
1. Is DoD changing fast enough to fight the GWOT?
2. How is success in the GWOT measured? What are the metrics by which
success is measured?

Prepared by: B. Jenkins

with input from Teams 2 and 8.
1/30/2004

B. What are some of the specific changes that have taken place within OSD
(policy formulation and structure) in its effort to win the GWOT?
a. What other changes are needed to better fight the GWOT?

C. Please provide information on your statement on September 9,2001 that

you would suggest a POUTS veto when the Senate Armed Services
Committee tries to divert $600 million from NMD to DoD's CT budget.
Source: Washington Post article

D. We have heard in prior interviews that the office of ASD SO/LIC is not
adequately staffed to address with the GWOT. Can you comment on this
statement?

E. Both you and President Bush have discussed the defense transformation that is
central to winning the Global War on Terrorism. In January 2002, you
outlined six key transformational goals in a Speech at the National Defense
University. General Myers stated that his goal is to foster changes that result
in a dramatic improvement over time in the way a combatant commander
wages war. Please update us on how this is progressing.

F. Does the U.S. have a broad, integrated and comprehensive plan to combat
terrorism? Are the various instruments working well together (diplomacy,
intelligence, military, financial, etc)

G. Describe the adequacy of intelligence provided today to the warfighter? Has it

improved since 9-11? If so, in what ways?

H. Assess the role of the Predator in war in Afghanistan post 9-11.

I. Provide an assessment of joint CT operations between the CIA and SOFs post
9-11.
a. Should there be a joint force of CIA paramilitary and SOFs rather than
two separate entities to combat terrorism?

J. Discuss the role of NORTHCOM, its subordinate commands and the new
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense in CT efforts within the
US.
a. provide an assessment of OSD relations with the Department of
Homeland Security.

K. Discuss the decision making process leading to the establishment of SOCOM

as a supported command in the GWOT.

L. What role can the military play in winning the hearts and minds of those who
might one day become our enemies?

Prepared by: B. Jenkins

with input from Teams 2 and 8.
1/30/2004

M. Lessons learned

N. Recommendations

O. What should we have asked?

Prepared by: B. Jenkins

with input from Teams 2 and 8.
 WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions

SERIES: Team 3,9/11 Commission
NND PROJECT NUMBER: 52100 FOIA CASE NUMBER: 31107

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 12/15/2008

BOX: 00006 FOLDER: 0001 TAB: 38 DOC ID: 31209475

COPIES: 1 PAGES: 1
_ACCESS _
The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

FOLDER TITLE: Jenkins'/Hurley's Notes: Rumsfeld Interview

DOCUMENT DATE: 01/29/2004 DOCUMENT TYPE: E-Mail Printout/fProfs Notes)

FROM: Heitkotter

TO: Front Office

SUBJECT: Transport to Secretary Rumsfeld's Interview

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s):

9/11 Personal Privacy

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE
 Pagel ofl

Mike Hurley

From: Dan Leopold

Sent: Thursday, January 29, 2004 4:21 PM
To: Team 2; Team 3; Front Office; Nora Coulter; Jutta Freyer Price
Cc: Karen Heitkotter
Subject: Rumsfeld interview

All:

As you know, the Rumsfeld interview is from 2-4 p.m. tomorrow. I just found out that the interview will be held in
room 3E928. The attendees from DoD in addition to Rumsfeld will be as follows:

Steve Cambone (and possibly his military assistant)

Larry DiRita
William Haynes (General Counsel)
General Braddock (possibly?)

As far as the Commission attendees, I have the following people:

Vice Chair Hamilton

Commissioner Ben-Veniste
Mike Hurley
Steve Dunne
Bonnie Jenkins
Philip Zelikow
Kevin Scheid
Chris Kojm

Karen is currently arranging van service to pick everyone up and take them to the Pentagon's River Entrance.
She will be sending around an email when the transportation plans are finalized.

Please let me know if you have any questions.

Thanks,

Dan Leopold

1/29/2004
 WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions

SERIES: Team 3,9/11 Commission
NND PROJECT NUMBER: 52100 FOIA CASE NUMBER: 31107

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 12/15/2008

BOX: 00006 FOLDER: 0001 TAB: 46 DOC ID: 31212214

COPIES: 1 PAGES: 6

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

FOLDER TITLE: Jenkins'/Hurley's Notes: [Rumsfeld Inteview]

DOCUMENT DATE: DOCUMENT TYPE: Note/Notes

FROM:

TO:

SUBJECT: Rumsfeld interview prep, documents

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s):

9/11 Classified Information

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE
 Page 1 of 1

Mike Hurley

From: Kevin Scheid

Sent: Monday, January 12, 2004 7:05 PM
To: Front Office
Cc: Team 2; Team 3
Subject: Suggested Intel-related questions for Secretary Rumsfeld

Front Office:

The following suggested questions are for Secretary Rumsfeld from Team 2. They seek to provide some insights
into Intel-related Commission issues:

• Who is responsible for the search for UBL? CIA? Defense Special Forces? How's it going?
• Are you confident that Pakistan and Afghanistan are willing to make the tough choices to fight al
Qa'ida in the months and years ahead? Are they too fragile to rely upon?
• On what basis have you supported increased funding for intelligence? What's the strategy? How
does this strategy fit into the larger Government-wide efforts to fight the war on terrorism?
• Are you satisfied with the quality of the intelligence you receive? Is the quality of the analysis up to
your standards? Are you satisfied with the quality of the national intelligence support the Department
receives from the DCI?
• What problem were you trying to solve by establishing the new position of Undersecretary of Defense
for Intelligence? What role does his office play in the management and oversight of Defense
intelligence?
• How do you judge the effectiveness of the Department's counterterrorism efforts?

KJS

1/12/2004