Alexandre Todorov 6/13/13

Explaining the Process of revival

Analyzing relations between the Bulgarian state and its Turkish minority. The relationship between the Bulgarian state and its Turkish minority has always been complex and fluid, shifting between periods of hostility and cooperation. By examining the political, cultural and economic position of the Turkish minority, the process of forced assimilation during the 1970's and 80's can be explained as an attempt by the Bulgarian state to preserve its communist economic system in the face of a declining labor force. This was a decision based less on a definite threat from a rise in Turkish or Islamic nationalism than so much the threat of population loss. It can be also shown that Bulgarian nationalism itself was not a strong factor in the decision making behind the process and that in fact national relations between the Turkish and Bulgarian ethnic groups is defined more by coexistence than by confrontation. By including the change in policy following the collapse of the economic system, it can be seen that once the communist system collapsed, any incentive to continue attempts at assimilation halted. In short, the Bulgarian attempted assimilation of the Turkish population was a recent and temporary phenomenon based upon an economic need for labor, not long standing clashes of nationalism or of influence between the Turkish and Bulgarian ethnic groups. On the matter of sources within this paper. The issue of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria is difficult to research primarily thanks to a lack of English language writing about the matter. Bulgaria has never occupied the same place in the European eye as its more famous neighbor Greece and more importantly, its association with the Warsaw Pact meant that there is relatively little American writing about the matter. As such, much of the corpus on the issue as presented to the outside world takes the form of propaganda and other sympathy based measures. Thus, much of the research for this paper had to rely on hard data as to the Turkish position within the Bulgarian economy of the past and present, as well as Bulgarian parliamentary data. In short, it primarily relies on information and news found

throughout the web. Though this is imperfect, the fact remains that most available books on the subject are from the mid 80's to the early 90's and are unusable as academic material. Secondly, a defining of the term revival process will be useful. For the purposes of this paper, the revival process was the efforts, by the Bulgarian government, to remove Turkish names, language and other forms of culture from Bulgaria. The process fully began in 1984-85 and culminated in the mass emigration of Turks in 19891. The intent of the revival process was the forced integration of the Turks into the Bulgarian ethnic group and was based upon a theory that the Bulgarian Turks were converted Bulgarians and were never separated from the ethnic group in the first place2. The main proponent for the process was Todor Zhikov, the head of the Bulgarian communist regime and it occurred with the full support of the Soviet Union, in what has been theorized was a trial of a program that the Soviets wished to implement themselves3. When speaking about Bulgaria's relationship with its Muslim minority, it's important to consider the traditional models of majority/minority ethnic group hostility. These primarily revolve around several different aspects of society and competition for influence within them. The first is unskilled labor competition, the second is white collar sector control, and the third is control of political power. Though mostly generic, doing so helps place the unique position of the Bulgarian Turks in perspective and helps avoid the standard tropisms that come to mind on the issue of minority groups and their position in society. This will help analyze the possible reasons that may have inspired the Bulgarian government to crack down on its Turkish minority during the revival process of 1984-1985, by presenting the position of the Turkish minority within the Bulgarian economy and state. Competition over the unskilled labor market is by far the easiest to define. It generally emerges thanks to an over saturated labor market, combined with declining opportunities for those without higher education or other specialized skills. This can seen in much of the backlash against immigrants
1 Zaman, 109 2 Petkov, 42 3 Petkov, 45

within Southern Europe during the current economic crisis. Unskilled labor competition is primarily a factor in poorer economies who are suffering a labor surplus. The presence of Hispanics in the United States for example, where they compete with other blue collar workers for a shrinking pool of hard labor jobs. The minority group in and of itself does not pose a threat to the ruling cultural groups, since they are primarily competing for low paying jobs with little attached political, economic or cultural power. However, they are a threat to the lower classes of the main group, especially in times of economic contraction, White collar control is a bit harder to define. The best example of this would be the Jewish population in Germany, or the Igbo in Nigeria, wherein you have an ethnic minority group with is disproportionately represented in the white collar sector of the economy as well as in academia. Here, resentment is less fueled by competition for jobs as it is by the threatening position the minority group supposedly plays to the character of the nation. What makes this especially threatening is that a strong minority intelligentsia, especially one with strong aims towards nationalism, poses the risk of dividing the country. Even more importantly, having greater control of high paying jobs, as well as greater access to education fuels resentment amongst the majority groups. Political control is also fairly easy to establish. Essentially, a minority group with political power and influence disproportionate to its size is able to keep a stranglehold on political power. The best examples of this are in the Middle East, such as in Iraq or Syria, where a religious/ethnic minority has held political control and thus used it to redistribute economic control amongst its members. The economic position of the Bulgarian Turks was unlikely to place them in any sort of antagonistic role to the other main groups of Bulgaria. As a group, Turks have been extremely poor and primarily concentrated in a few certain regions of Bulgaria45. In fact, average Turkish income has normally been around 2/3 that of the average Bulgarian salary and they have also usually been harder

4 Crampton, 443 5 Liakova, 12

hit by unemployment than their Slavic neighbors6. For example, during the current economic crisis, Bulgarian employment is around 67% while Turkish employment is closer to 49%7. With a population concentrated on nomadic shepherding in the north and south, tobacco and wheat farming, and traditional textile works, Turks have occupied an isolated economic niche within the nation, a niche which has steadily declined in prosperity8. Though this does reflect modern times (micro economic data from the Communist era is hard to attain/verify) this also happens to line up with the Turkish situation before the arrival of communism, pointing to a strong continuity9. None of these positions have ever been dominated by Bulgarian workers and nor does there appear to be any form of strong economic competition between the groups which may explain the Government's crackdown. Nor does lack of economic growth fully explain the problem either. Bulgarian GDP growth, from 1985-1989 varied from 2-5% and never dipped into the negatives until 1989 with the collapse of the Warsaw Pact10. Considering that population growth remained stagnant during these years, the average person was not getting poorer in a way that might explain a sudden backlash11. The withdrawal of the Turkish labor force from the market during the period leading up to the general collapse of the nation actually caused the massive slowdown of the economy. When the minority went on strike to protest the revival process, supply chains and agricultural work collapsed12. Nowhere was this more visible than during the harvest of 1989. With the collapse of the Turkish labor force which would have otherwise done the work, Zhikov's government was forced to pull Bulgarians out of the other sectors of the economy and put them to work in the fields. Not only did this bring about a public relations backlash amongst Bulgarians, it also contributed to a poor harvest, further harming the Bulgarian economy13. With a stagnant birthrate and an increasingly industrialized Bulgarian labor force, the
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Liakova, 12 Liakova, 13 Crampton, 456 Crampton, 233 Miller, 35 Crampton, 374 Cramption, 387 Crampton, 388

Turkish population was crucial for the maintenance of the rural sectors of the Bulgarian economy. Until the collapse of the autarchic policies of the communist regime and the Bulgarian entry into the free market, Bulgaria could not afford to lose those rural sectors. This reflects a historical trend, as the same rural sectors also propped up much of the pre communist regime. The end of the strong free market economies of Europe in the late 1800's made the Turks even more important. Turkish farmers controlled most of Bulgaria's tobacco production and agriculture and as a result were responsible for much of its foreign revenue14. In fact, by 1918, Bulgaria had a veritable monopoly on Europe's tobacco market, providing 70% of its export revenues, revenues which were feuled by Turkish labor15. This remains true to this day, in 2005 the MRF caused a crisis in the government thanks to its opposition to the privatization of Bulgartabak, the state owned tobacco company16. This was based on the continuing strong employment of ethnic Turks in the industry. Ironically enough, though they are crucial in the production of tobacco, the Turkish minority has had little power over the companies themselves and the revenue from them. They are primarily located in the working sectors of the industry, more likely to be picking the leaves than selling them17. This duality of lack of control and necessary labor means that as a minority group, the state not only depends on them (though this has lessened over time) yet has little to fear from them besides a withdrawal from the labor pool. The primary engine of the Bulgarian economy during the period leading up to the revival process was heavy industry, the labor force of which was dominated by Bulgarians. As mentioned above, the Turkish population was primarily concentrated in rural areas, with their dominant work revolving either around traditional textiles or agricultural work18. There was little Turkish penetration into the blue collar workforce and they were proportionally underrepresented in the cities, where the
14 15 16 17 18 Crampton, 104 Brown, 21 http://sofiaecho.com/2005/01/28/644305_mrf-turnaround-on-bulgartabac Miller, 274 Yamam, 84

heavy industries were concentrated. This remains a fact of life going into modern times. According to the latest census, the Turkish population is still concentrated in the rural areas near the Romanian and Greek border19. This can be tracked through the 2009 parliamentary election results, wherein the MRF, the party representing the Turkish minority, is almost non existent in Sofia, and barely better in the other major cities of Veliko Tarnovo or Plovdiv. They were a bit better represented along the Black sea coast, including the cities of Varna and Burgas. The most recent elections on the 10th of may have reduced even this. Election results of the MRF are a good way to deal with the inconsistencies in the Bulgarian census and the problems it has accurately registering minority groups. Since MRF is primarily an ethnic rights party and its center left platform is already covered by other Bulgarian political parties, it lacks almost any support outside of the Turkish minority. There is one area in which the Turkish minority does have some influence on the nation, parliamentary politics. The Turkish political groups have always been completely reliant upon the ruling government itself, because without it they lack any chance at power20. As an ethnic group, they are not large enough to form a strong enough power base and as a member of a diaspora, the home country has had little ability to pursue their interests while they were under assault. Bulgaria was protected by its alliance with the Soviet Union and membership in the Warsaw pact, meaning that Turkey had little pressure to apply on them21. Even during the worst periods of the revival process, when Turkey was able to at least gain the sympathy of the United States and NATO, the Soviet Union's protection meant that little action could be taken22. The government barely mentioned the harsh ongoing crackdown in their official statement on the matter, preferring to instead call for calm and peaceful relations23. However, even as a minority, they are often sizable enough to tip the balance
19 20 21 22 23 http://www.nsi.bg/census2011/PDOCS2/Census2011final_en.pdf Crampton, 203 Brown, 75 Petkova, 43 Neuburger, 169

towards either of the two sides, meaning that in parliamentary politics, or even during the times of the Tsar, they were a useful group to court24. This can be seen with the rise of the MRF in parliamentary politics. However, during the communist years the Turkish minority group played a minor role at best within the communist party and never got to the point of being a solid block of influence25. Though there was some historical basis of a Turkish presence in Bulgarian politics, from independence to the communist years, Turkish political influence never reached a point that a Bulgarian government would feel threatened by it. In conclusion, the Turkish minority has never posed a great threat to the ruling government and nor does it compete with the Bulgarian ethnic group for influence. Politically speaking they have rarely if ever actually posed a political threat to the main government. Economically, they were and remain continually underemployed and primarily segregated into economic circles Bulgarians aren't parts of26. Even demographically, they are so small to begin with that even with an increased birth rate, they were not growing fast enough to pose a true threat to the ethnic basis of the nation. This does not even count the periodic phases of emigration, which further reduced the population. Even in terms of industrial control, they were constrained to two rural areas, neither of which are particularly wealthy. Thus, it can be reasonably said that the Turkish minority was not attacked because it competed with the main Bulgarian ethnic group or the Bulgarian government. So, why did the Bulgarian government go to such great lengths to attempt to forcefully strip it of its nationalism? The core arguments, from both within and outside of the Bulgarian government as to the process of revival revolve around three primary issues. First, the matter of Turkish nationalism and rising Islamic consciousness. Secondly, weakness within the Bulgarian government prompting it to attempt to focus the energy of its citizenry elsewhere. Thirdly, the weakness of Bulgarian demographics and the need for labor within the communist system.
24 Crampton, 208 25 Cramption, 302 26 Petkova, 44

A common explanation is that the internal hostility was based on nationalism and the previous years of conflict between Bulgaria and Turkey. This is the primary argument offered by many of the Turkish and European views of the process of revival, especially during the late 1980's27. In short, the process was based on Bulgarian bitterness towards the Turks thanks to the years of occupation when it was part of the Ottoman empire. Though the narrative is a relatively accepted one, downtrodden conquered rebelling against their overlords, creating a blood feud, it is lacking in real base. For most of Bulgaria's history, it has been the Serbians and Greeks who have always controlled the center spot of the primary national enemy, not the Turks28. First and foremost, Turkey does not pose the same threat to Bulgaria's territory in the same way the other two countries do. There are few territorial claims it could make against Bulgaria, nor was there any strong interest in pursuing military conflict against the nation. Meanwhile, the issue of Macedonia and territories along the Black sea coast means that Greece and Serbia have a strong interest in insuring that the Bulgarian state remains weak. Plus, the different international politics surrounding the foundation of the three nations meant that Greece and Serbia have always had to keep a watchful eye on the nation and often used their international allies, England and France respectively, to attempt to check the Bulgars and their Russian benefactors29. Nowhere is this best seen than in the struggle over the Bulgarian national church. Bulgarian nationalism, like most of the other national communities in the Orthodox millet, was centered around its national orthodox church. However, while under the rule of the Ottoman empire, the Greek national church, in a throwback to the Byzantine days, attempted to ensure that it was the only one allowed to practice, giving it a functional hegemony over the other orthodox communities30. This not only gave the Greek community more power over the other Orthodox nations that it had ever had, it also allowed a sizable amount of preferential economic treatment within the empire. Greek merchants and
27 28 29 30 Karpat, 187 Daskalov, 34 Crampton, 49 Payne, 305

administrators rose quite high in the Ottoman ranks, especially during the 1600 and 1700's31. It is only with the aftermath of the attempted Bulgarian revolution of 1876 that the desire for independence and hostility towards the Turks begins to emerge. The initial revolt almost died before it got off the ground, barely a sixth of the men the revolutionaries assumed would join the movement actually came32. Plus, many Bulgarians actually supported the Ottomans and passed on information to the authorities. It took all of a month and a half to suppress the revolution. Yet, it was the news of this repression that lead to Bulgaria's actual independence. Bulgaria had always suffered from being out of the public eye in London and other capitals, compared to the Greek diaspora, which was able to muster a good deal of international good will. Dramatized accounts of Turkish massacres in the country was filtered out, through British journalists as well as through the American colleges in Istanbul33. Russia was finally given the freedom to act. Disraeli, the pro-Ottoman prime minister at the time, was forced by public opinion to change his stance against the empire. An attempted conference to resolve the issue in Istanbul failed to bring the empire to terms and soon Russia was able to declare war34. Within a year, Serbia and Bulgaria were born again as nation states thanks to the treaty of Paris. Even then, there was far from a united consensus on whether to push for independence or not. The treaty of Paris offered a sundered Bulgaria, occupying approximately half of the territory it does today. Some argued that independence was a poor decision, as they believed the Bulgarian community's power would be less that what it would be as a part of the Ottoman empire35. Not to mention, Bulgaria was born surrounded by hostile neighbors. Dobruja, in the north, was disputed between it and Romania. Even worse, after merging with an additional slice of ethnic Bulgarian territory, eastern Rumelia, in 1885, Serbia went to war to prevent the unification. Greece attempted to join it, fueled by popular protest and public worry of what would be the largest state in the Balkans, however, British diplomatic
31 32 33 34 35 Yaman, 49 Daskalov, 40 Crampton, 120 Crampton, 129 Daskalov, 51

efforts calmed the situation in the country. Serbia was defeated, but even more importantly, the Turkish population of Bulgaria did not pose any problems and even formed a key part of the Bulgarian army that defeated the Serbs36. Turkish service in the war as well as the lack of Bulgarian reprisals against the Turks following independence points to the lack of hostility between the two ethnic groups. There was no concerted effort to divest Turkish landholders of their considerable property within the country, though those who had fled had a much harder time recovering their assets37. The Bulgarian government itself was at least accepting to its new minority, Turks did play a small role in the new parliament, though in smaller proportion to the seize of their population38. Even though it had the backing of Russia and Turkey was at one of its weakest points, there was little attempt to suppress Turkish nationalism, or force them out of their role in society. The transition to Bulgarian rule was far from violent and the Turkish minority was at least left alone in the new nation. We can see this idea preserved even within the historiography of the Bulgarian communist party. The official textbooks surround the matter of the revolution against the Turks emphasized the class struggle aspect, rather than the nationalistic aspect39. Levski's writings already planted the seed for this, as he and his clique amongst the independence movement primarily saw the wealthy Turkish land owners as their primary enemy40. Within his writings there is little energy devoted towards attacking the Turks themselves as the enemy of the Bulgarian nation. Even within Zhikov's speeches on the Turks, there is relatively little mentioned of the national character of the years of occupation41. He even goes so far as to welcome the Turks that were living in Bulgaria, perhaps against their will, seeing them as converted Bulgarians, not Turks. The communist state did not view the Turkish minority as a separate ethnic group and nor did it attempt to rely upon the Ottoman empire to stoke hatred against the Turks or
36 37 38 39 40 41 Cramption, 138 Dobrin, 7 Yaman, 46 Daskalov, 187 Daskalov, 195 Petkova, 53

to legitimize its actions. Bulgarian history played a minor if non existent role in the decision of assimilation. Another argument set forth along the same lines goes in a different direction, arguing that the process was just a product of the extreme hatred of nationalism of the Bulgarian communist party. Communist parties in general tend to be extremely hostile towards any form of nationalism, in many cases even the national consciousness of their majority group42. Though the BCP persecuted those who self identified as Macedonian or Turkish, they also did the same to those who over identified themselves as Bulgarians, rather than communists43. Thus, the logic goes that the entire process of revival is purely a product of the communist party and its politics. Though there is some truth to this, I would argue that without the economic factors, the Communist party would not have tried to pull such an aggressive move against the Turkish population. It is true that some of the process of assimilation did begin before the 1980's, with the banning of Turkish language newspapers, for example. However, the direct conversion of Turks to a form of Bulgarian nationality goes beyond the general trends in Communist assimilation. The Bulgarian government was explicitly taking steps to impose a Bulgarian national consciousness, not a communist one44. We can contrast this with the Soviet Union's approach to its ethnic minorities, as it also attempted to suppress ethnic nationalism, yet it never attempted to enforce its own dominant ethnicity on its minorities, instead, it pushed a form of communist solidarity. Emphasizing any form of nationalism would weaken the communist ideology. In comparison to the arguments over nationalism, which I believe are overstated, one of the primary reasons for why Zhikov pushed so strongly on the matter appears to have been the problem of the rising tide of Islamic identity and fundamentalism. Following the Iranian revolution of 1979, Turkey and the Turkish minority group in Bulgaria began to show more and more influences of Islam45. For example, Turkish radio, which many of the Turkish minority group in Bulgaria listened, began to
42 43 44 45 Brown, 75 Neuberg, 189 Neuberg, 195 Karpat, 152

have more Islamic content on it46. There was also the problem that the Pomak community, the Bulgarian Muslims who usually self identified as Bulgarians first, were growing in consciousness of their Islamic identity, potentially creating another internal threat as well as non assimilated group of people47. However, Islamism and violent resistance by the Turkish and Pomak population only became a problem after the passing of the harsh law, not before it48. Even then, there were relatively few attacks in response to a fairly brutal program. An undetermined number of Turks were killed by the police (the number of casualties is controversial), in response of which there were several bombings or attempted bombings. There was also the matter of secular Turkish nationalism, not just Islamic nationalism. The approach of the party's propaganda wings towards the revival process does help back up this explanation of a central government's fear of an independent minority. We have repeated examples of the Turkish minority being presented as a potential fifth column, who would never be able to fully integrate into the Bulgarian nation49. They were even presented as a group whose sole goal was to reunite with Turkey, preferably also leading to some form of land annexation by the Turkish republic50. In short, the reasoning goes that Zhikov and the Bulgarian communist party acted to remove what they saw was a potential threat to Bulgaria. However, there are several problems with this argument, as it goes against the entire purpose of the revival process in the first place. The Bulgarian government explicitly rejected emigration agreements between it and the Turkish republic on several occasions and its attempt to forcefully convert Turks into Bulgarians does not concur with a government trying to isolate and protect itself from a minority51. If it truly feared them as potential spies, it would have gone to as great of lengths as possible to ensure the removal of the Turkish ethnic group from the state, such as by forced or willing
46 47 48 49 50 51 Karpat, 161 Karpat, 153 Karpat, 165 Petkova, 42 Petkova, 44 Petkova, 46

emigration back to Turkey. Not to mention, by removing the specific articles that the Turkish ethnic group used to isolate itself from the majority, the Bulgarian government would be allowing the potential fifth column to infiltrate the primary ethnic group. If the government assumed the group was an international threat, they would have instead taken action to isolate and concentrate it, not diffuse it. A good model of this would be the Soviet Union's approach to its minorities, where it ensured that most ethnic groups where kept separate and concentrated, especially those it perceived to be a threat to its existence. By examining the actions of the Bulgarian government, it does not seem that Turkish nationalism was so much a worry as was Islamic consciousness. Of course, the true irony in all of this is that attacks by the Turkish minority on Bulgarian targets only begun after the beginning of the revival process in 1984, Zhikov created his own enemy52. Returning to the matter of emigration, the Bulgarian approach to it betrays the true cause behind the revival process, demographics. Turkish nationalism was not so much an internal problem but an external problem, if it grew too strong than the Turkish government would have greater power to demand the reopening of the borders. This would have caused a labor shock that the Bulgarian state could not handle. Bulgaria had been facing a demographic crisis for several decades, which meant that the labor force was in a dire situation of a labor shortage rather than surplus53. The communist system, cut off from much of the international markets, was politically dependent on universal employment, both as a form of exercising political control, but also as a statement of legitimacy of rule54. Thus, the system it built was in many ways tied to the necessity of full utilization of the labor pool, and with the voracious Soviet desire for heavy industry and materials to feed, Bulgaria needed to keep every worker it could going to ensure maximum results55. As seen in the case of the 1989 stoppage of Turkish labor,

52 There is some controversy over whether or not the attacks began before or after the beginning of the process. Zaman, in his thesis argues that the attacks lead to the beginning of the process (Zaman, 107) while Crampton states that they occurred because of the beginning of the process. Since the Politburo voted in June to begin, while the attacks occurred in August, I tend to side with them being a result of and not cause of the process. 53 Brown, 230 54 Dobrin, 77 55 Ibid

this also rendered it incredibly vulnerable to withdrawal of labor. Without an excess unemployed segment to fill gaps, such as in a normal market economy, the only way to ensure the basics of the economy were sound was to cannibalize other parts for workers56. Encouraging immigration or allowing it to fill the void was also out of the question, thanks to the communist system. To elaborate, it was in 1982 that the true problem of Bulgarian demographics began to become apparent to the state. Instead it was based on a longstanding fear of the decline in the Bulgarian birth rate. By the 1960's, demographers were predicting that the Bulgarian population would either have a 0% growth rate or even enter into decline, while at the same time the birth rate amongst the Turkish population was rising57. At first this was seen as positive factor, a sign that Bulgaria was modernizing and entering the industrialized world. However, by 1982, when Dzagharov published his paper on the issue of the demographic collapse, it had become a matter of crisis58. Not only was the Bulgarian population growth stagnant, but the Turkish and Gypsy populations were still growing, increasing their presence in the nation. This population was not only seen as a potential cultural threat, thus the over hyped fears that by 2000, Bulgaria would be majority Turkish and Gypsy (which lacks any basis in reality), but also as a much needed labor force59. As a group, this would provide close to 1.5 million laborers, who also were in the process of rediscovering their national consciousness, a dangerous combination for the nation. It can be argued that this is not so much a matter of demographics as it was of nationalism, though the need for workers was ever present, why would it be that an increase in the Turkish growth was a threat unless its weakening of Bulgarian nationalism was taken into account? The problem with this theory is that first and foremost, the increased growthrate would not be enough to significantly change the ethnic make up of the country. In fact, it would realistically only increase the Turkish

56 57 58 59

Crampton, 388 Cramption, 345 Yaman, 103 Neuberg, 196

proportion to 15% of the country from 13%60. Also, the issue of emigration returns once more, if the Tukish population was a potential threat to the main ethnic group, all the Bulgarian government had to do was open up the border once again. This was in fact what it did in 1989 when political pressure on the state became too much and it allowed close to 300,000 Turks to make the journey to Turkey in order to lessen the problem61. Even more importantly, it appears that the Bulgarian state actually lied about the demographic details and that the Turkish growth rate was in fact declining at a faster rate than the Bulgarian, though it still remained the higher of the two62. It appears that the argument of the Bulgarian majority being swamped by an ever increasing minority was a public excuse for the process, not an actual reason behind it. In short, if the Bulgarian communist regime was going to maintain its economic system, it badly needed to at least maintain its current labor force, if not increase it. This meant that the decline of the Bulgarian population, which would imply an aging of it too, would pose a serious threat to the potential growth of the economy. Thus, in order for it to survive, it needed to not only ensure that the Turkish minority group remained within the country but also prevent any outside attempts to allow emigration. Though it may have presented propaganda presenting the Turks as outsiders who could never be reintegrated, the actions of the government speak louder than its words. It in fact viewed the Turkish minority as a Bulgarian population in need of reassimilation and the violence that ensued took it by surprise. In the end, it was not so much the growth of the Turkish population but the stagnation of the Bulgarian population that helped push forward the revival process. However, this seems to have been completely reversed following the collapse of the communist regime. Thus, the question is, why the great transition in the Bulgarian state's treatment of the Turkish minority group? The actual governing groups and politics did not change too much going into the 1990's, in fact the dominant political parties remained those tied to the old Communist regime63. Nor
60 61 62 63 Cramption, 394 Zaman, 108 Zaman, 107 Miller, 101

did the demographics change at all, in fact the problem got even worse, as thousands of Bulgarians also emigrated from the nation, even before the collapse of the communist system in 1991. Excepting a period lead by the center left of the ex-Tsar Ferdinand and the center-right's time in the spotlight from 2009-2013, the Bulgarian Socialist party has been the dominant force in Bulgarian politics64. In fact, many of the same people have made the transition between communist and socialist politics and their influence in the economy is even greater than their presence in politics. The corruption surrounding much of the privatization of the Bulgarian economy is an example of this65. First and foremost, the transition in the Bulgarian economy has meant that it even with its demographic problems, Bulgaria has transitioned from a labor shortage to an extreme surplus. Even with marked emigration and the gradual recovery of the economy, from 2003 to 2013, Bulgaria has averaged a 10% unemployment rate66. Even with this, its a marked advance from the previous decade, where unemployment often ran closer to 15%67. Plus, the decline of the tobacco industry's importance in the Bulgarian economy has meant that the Turkish minority's labor is less important than it once was. The total amount of tobacco produced by the country has fallen by two thirds since the collapse of the communist regime and its subsidies for the industry68. Whereas a century ago, tobacco occupied 70% of Bulgaria's export revenue, now it barely makes a dent compared to the more important industrial exports69. Even more importantly, with the gradual decline in smoking rates all across Europe and in Bulgaria itself, its importance in the domestic economy is also shrinking. Whereas in 1994, tobacco occupied 30% of agricultural revenues, now it has declined to around 10% and even then it continues to fall70. With this fall also comes a decline in the importance of integrating the Turkish labor force. The economy, which was once heavily ethnically segregated is now beginning to enter into a more mixed

64 65 66 67 68 69 70

Crampton, 400 Miller, 207 http://www.indexmundi.com/g/g.aspx?c=bu&v=74 (data based on CIA World Factbook) Ibid http://www.indexmundi.com/agriculture/?country=bg&commodity=tobacco&graph=exports Miller, 288 Miller, 185

modern stage, thanks to the combined collapse of the tobacco market and heavy industry. More importantly, the rise of the Turkish left parties has meant that now the Turkish ethnic group's loyalty is crucial for the maintenance of a left wing coalition in parliament. The balance of power in Bulgaria has radically shifted between the left and the right over the past two decades. Beginning with the collapse of the conservatives following their victory in 1992, the rise of the centerleft with Tsar Simeon in 2001 as well as the victory of the right in 2009, the Turkish MRF has emerged as one of the few stable parties71. Since its rise to prominence it has been able to consistently grow its support amongst the electorate, growing from an average of 6-8 percent in the 1990's to around 12-14% in the 2000's72. This is not enough to be the leader of a coalition in and of itself, but enough to make it an important part of a coalition. For example, the current parliament is split between 4 parties, GERB, the center right, the Bulgarian socialist party, Ataka, the hard xenophobic right and the MRF. With the BSP winning 84 seats, Gerb winning 97, Ataka winning 23 and the MRF winning 36, the MRF is crucial part of the ruling left wing coalition73. With the rise of parliamentary elections, the Turkish minority now occupies a king making role in the governments of the left wing. Unless the BSP or a newly arisen center left party is able to capture a majority on its own, it has to turn to the MRF. Finally, there is also the matter of the ending of the cold war and the reentry of the Eastern European states into the world market. Thanks to the sanctions on both the former Yugoslavia and Iraq and the collapse of COMECON, Bulgaria lost its primary trading partners74. Thus, it had to replace them with new sources, of which Turkey is one of the most important. Right now, Turkey accounts for 1.5 billion Euros of Bulgarian exports and 1.1 Billion euros of imports, on a total economy of roughly 40 billion euros75. This trade surplus is a key supplier of hard capital to the Bulgarian economy and is one of the reasons why the Bulgarian lev remains the strongest and most stable European currency.
71 72 73 74 75 Crampton, 467 http://electionguide.org/election.php?ID=144 (the rest of the elections are also located at this website). http://parliament.bg/en/electionassembly Miller, 205 http://www.economy.gov.tr/index.cfm?sayfa=countriesandregions&country=BG&region=8

Though the full switch to the Euro, which has been a goal of the Bulgarian government for a long time, may change this, it does not change the importance of Turkish capital in the economy. In addition, much of Bulgaria's trade with Turkey lies in raw materials and other remnants of Bulgaria's former heavy industry focus, which helps support many of the poorer and more rural areas of the country, especially those lacking in agricultural wealth76. Even this is considered a low point, thanks to the economic recession in Bulgaria as in 2008 it accounted for 3.2 billion euros of exports77. While Bulgaria is not as crucial in Turkey's economy, thanks to the enormous disparity in size between the two, it happens to control the primary land routes and highways between Turkey and Europe78. These economic ties have also manifested itself in other forms, such as the Bulgarian parliament's decision to reject a bill recognizing the Armenian genocide79. This decision was in part based on the desire to continue to maintain good relations with its southern neighbor, as well as the before mentioned importance of the MRF, as at the time it was an important part in the left's coalition government. Even more importantly, in 2010 the Bulgarian parliament also moved to recognize the revival process and the expulsion of 1989 as a form of ethnic cleansing, though this did occur during the reign of the GERB right wing coalition so it remains to be seen how the process will be treated now that the socialists are back in power80. With the changed economy and its strong trade ties with Turkey, the Bulgarian government has completely changed in its approach to its Turkish minority. This leads to the core conclusion of this paper, which is that the revival process was a side product of the Bulgarian communist system. Upon examination of the economic system in Bulgaria before and after the Communist party took power, normal relations between the Turks and Bulgarians are primarily dominated by calm as well as separation. Be it in the early years, when Turkish grown tobacco fueled the Bulgarian state, or in the post communist years, when the modern Bulgarian
76 http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=125668 77 http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=125668 78 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkeys-land-trade-to-europe-in-danger.aspx? pageID=238&nID=47261&NewsCatID=345 79 http://sofiaecho.com/2012/01/11/1742599_bulgarias-parliament-turns-down-resolution-on-armenian-genocide 80 http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=113074

economy no longer has a need for Turkish labor, without a system in continual need of labor, there has normally been little incentive to forcefully assimilate the Turkish population. It does not have enough of an effect on Bulgarian nationalism to prop up a governement and nor is it worth provoking the Turkish government. Instead, it was a calculated risk taken to ensure the maintenance of the labor pool, in the face of both internal and external challenges.

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Neuburger, Mary. The Orient Within: Muslim Minorities and the Negotiation of Nationhood in Modern Bulgaria. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2004. Print. Petkova, Lilia. The Global Review of Ethnopolitics 1.4 (2002): 42-59. Web. Yaman, Emrah. The Turkish Minority in Changing Bulgaria. Thesis. Bogazici University, 2003. N.p.: n.p., n.d. Print.