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13.

The Secular Israeli (Jewish) Identity:


An Impossible Dream?
Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi

C ertain similarities can be observed in secularization processes across societies.


Secularization is always gradual and relative, moving continually to a
pronounced decline in common religious beliefs and behaviors while maintaining
many rituals surrounding rites of passage. Life cycle rites, directly tied to individual
identity, survive even in highly secularized societies. Individual claims to identity
labels (i.e. I am Catholic) often persist in the absence of any beliefs or behaviors. If
religiosity is measured as a continuous variable, and an individual can be assigned
a score of zero to 100 based on commitment to religious beliefs and rituals, secular
individuals are those with scores at or close to zero.
The case of Israeli Jews who consider themselves secular is unique because of
its historical background, particularly the formal involvement of the state of Israel
in religious institutions. Zionism, and the State of Israel it created, represents one
response to the process of secularization among Jews, which has been more radical
than in any other religious group. Jewish secularization has been vigorous and
thorough ever since it started in the eighteenth century. It meant that Jewish
identity was maintained by individuals who completely stopped participating in
the behaviors inherent in the Jewish religion. This transformation amounted to
a conscious attempt to remake a religious community into a nationality.
Secularization in the Jewish case shows some universal features, together
with uniquely Jewish aspects. If secularization is measured by distance from the
historical dominance of religion, for Jews it has meant creating distance from the
historical, rabbinic (Orthodox) Judaism created in the Middle Ages.
Pre-modern Jewry had caste-like qualities, united by rules of excluding
impurity and preserving the integrity of endogamy. These rules were articulated
in the Talmud (canonized around 700 CE) and its derivative literature of

157
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rabbinical responsa, and led to the development of countless rituals during the
subsequent centuries. Jewish communities across the medieval world, from
Yemen to Germany, shared the same rules and could communicate easily and
agree on the correct wording of a bill of divorce (the most important document
in this tradition), the practice of ritual slaughter of animals for food, and
menstrual taboos. There might have been slight differences of emphasis or
practice between local communities but they all claimed to follow the Talmudic
injunctions and maintained their loyalty to the letter and spirit of the Talmud.
Jewish secularization in the modern period was tied to the rise of liberal
capitalism in Europe and the corresponding economic decline of most Jewish
communities. Three hundred years ago European Jewry was a small, marginal
group, completely outside the mainstream of social and cultural developments,
a minority of outsiders. In 1800, there were about 1.5 million Jews in Europe,
out of a European population of 100 million, and a world Jewish population of
some 2.5 million.
The modernization of European Jews, which took place between 1780 and
1880, meant social and cultural dislocation on a massive scale. Emancipation
for the Jews, the granting of citizenship and political rights, came against the
background of the general European decline of religion and feudalism and
the rise of secular nationalism, democracy, and socialism. The rise of the new
bourgeoisie and the appearance of the ideals of equality, popular representation,
and pluralism, which ran counter to religious traditions, made emancipation for
excluded groups possible.
Entry into the modern world via the granting of emancipation meant
the collapse of the internal Jewish consensus and society. Tearing down the
figurative walls of the ghetto and the concrete limitations on participation in
society brought about not just the weakening, but the destruction, of traditional
community structures. “Jewishness” was separated from Judaism, with the result
that most Jews today are such only in a sociological sense.
Secularized Jews were a European reality by the early 19th century, and
a significant majority in Western Europe by its end. By that time, the process
of secularization was making significant inroads into Jewish communities in
Eastern Europe. Most sociological Jews today are “assimilated” and far removed
from historic Judaism. In most cases, they have little idea what its traditions are.
Less than 10 percent of world Jewry today preserves historical Judaism.
The Zionist vision, created under the impact of the Enlightenment and
European nationalism and secularization, faces another kind of historical challenge
among Israeli Jews. While about half of Israeli Jews are of European descent,
the other half comprises individuals whose ancestors lived in the Islamic world.
13. The Secular Israeli (Jewish) Identity 159

Because that world has not experienced the Reformation or the Enlightenment,
European secularization has affected it to a minimal degree, and religion has
remained more powerful than secular nationalism. Thus, Israeli Jews of non-
European descent are often more religious than their European counterparts.

The Role of the State


The State of Israel formally regulates the religious involvement of its citizens in
many ways. The state maintains a list of recognized religions (16 at last count),
and classifies all its citizens (and resident non-citizens) according to religious
affiliation. Marriage and divorce can take place only within the (recognized)
religious group. Religious conversions from one recognized group to another are
registered and reported. Vital statistics are reported based on religion (e.g. “live
births by mother’s religion”).
Israel defines itself as the state of the Jewish people, meaning about 13 million
individuals, only about half of whom currently reside in Israel. Jews are viewed
by the state not only as a religious group, but as a national group as well. Yet
joining this national group is only possible through a religious conversion. Thus
the boundaries of the Jewish group are maintained by the system of religious
courts, as well as by civil authorities. Attempts to have the state recognize an
Israeli nationality (as distinct from citizenship) have been rejected time and again
by the courts, and this rejection is supported by a solid majority of the public.
The leadership of the state has always been totally non-observant. More­
over, leaders of the religious parties, which almost always participate in
governing coalitions, are always excluded from the really important decisions.
They are never involved in discussions about war, or the economy, and do not
even seem to aspire to be part of such fateful deliberations. Of all Israeli prime
ministers since 1948, David Ben-Gurion, Moshe Sharett, Levi Eshkol, Golda
Meir, Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres, Yitzhak Shamir, Ehud Barak, Binyamin
Netanyahu, Ariel Sharon, Ehud Olmert, and Menahem Begin, only the last ever
attended synagogue services outside of fulfilling an official or ceremonial duty,
and even he did so rarely. It is important to note also that Israel’s intellectual,
literary, scientific, and artistic elite is also overwhelmingly non-observant.
But at the same time the political leadership shows reverence for traditional
symbols of Jewish identity and especially identity boundaries. For example, the
prime minister of Israel will not be seen, while on an official visit abroad, to
be travelling on the Sabbath. Neither will the prime minister of Israel be seen
driving a car on Saturday in Jerusalem, even though he will not be seen in a
synagogue.
The state invests significant public resources in the maintenance of historical
160 Secularism & Secularity

Judaism. This is done by financing an expensive system of lifelong Talmudic


learning, in which more than 100,000 individuals are involved. Such a large
religious education system is unprecedented in Jewish history. In addition to
the Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox educational systems, there is a system of
rabbinical courts, where the judges enjoy the same salaries and benefits as civil
judges, and other systems that provide ritual purity for those who desire it, at
state expense. Most ultra-Orthodox men and a fair number of Orthodox men
are full-time religious professionals, creating a modern “priestly class.” These
occupations include those making sure that any menstruating Orthodox woman
can find a ritual bath close to home, and those engaged in support of the kosher
dietary taboos. Raising pigs and selling pork to Jews and Muslims is forbidden
by law, representing a symbolic victory of millennia of Jewish dietary taboos, but
the non‑observant can easily get around these limitations.
By law, Israeli Jews are not allowed to work on the Sabbath, and every year,
businesses pay fines if they are caught employing Jews in economic activities. A
business open on Saturday is immune if it can prove, with the help of government
identity cards, that its employees are non-Jews. Those handing out the tickets for
Saturday work are drawn from members of the Druze minority.
The whole enterprise of maintaining Orthodox traditions employs many
thousands of civil servants, all Orthodox. Ultra-Orthodox parties, which
currently hold 18 seats in the 120-seat Knesset, (and are openly non-Zionist),
act to increase religion budgets, and have a vital interest in maintaining the
system. However, they would not be able to do that without widespread public
support for the idea that the state should invest in maintaining the system of
Jewish Sabbath observance.
In Israeli society there is a clear, social line of division between two sub­
cultures, the religiously observant and the non-observant. About 20 percent of
the Jewish population continues to follow a historical Judaism where expectations
for public behavior are quite clear. The nature of Judaism as a religion of practice
makes this division both public and visible. Members of the two groups can
identify each other immediately by distinctive cues, such as dress (for example,
head coverings for Orthodox men and married women, and for the ultra-Orthodox
black coats, long beards, side locks, etc.).
The taboos concerning the Sabbath in Orthodox Judaism serve as the
best example of behavioral divisions. Traveling in motor vehicles on Saturday
(except for a real life‑saving emergency) is out of the question for members of the
religious subculture, as is watching television or using the telephone. In addition
to Sabbath observance, historical food taboos mean that intimate social contact
between the observant and the non-observant is limited. An observant Jew will
13. The Secular Israeli (Jewish) Identity 161

not have dinner at the home of a non-observant family.


In everyday discourse, finer distinctions are sometimes made. The varying
levels of religiosity among Israeli Jews are reflected in the following labels: Haredi,
denoting the very Orthodox, Dati (literally religious) denoting Orthodox, Masorti
(literally traditional) denoting those who are partially observant, and Hiloni
(literally secular) denoting the non‑observant. These Hebrew terms are widely used
in everyday life, and in both the spoken and written language.
However, what should be kept in mind is that most non-observant Jews
choose to take part in many Orthodox life-cycle rites. There is almost no support
for the idea of civil marriage, and only slight support for the idea of civil burial.
There is universal support for the idea of a religious conversion as the only way for
non-Jews to become Jewish. Nevertheless, this issue is under constant discussion
and debate in Israel. The non-observant claim that the rabbinical courts are too
strict in their requirements for converts, and expect these courts to change their
practices. The debate is provoked by so-called secular Israelis, who would like the
conversion process itself to be “easy” or “liberal” while nonetheless agreeing that
a religious conversion is the only way to join the “Jewish people.” Thus there can
be no serious challenge to the monopoly principle that confers Jewishness on those
undergoing the Orthodox rites of conversion, which are regarded as historically
authentic. This is clear in the case of group conversions, when non-Jews or “lost
tribes” from Ethiopia, Peru, or India, are recognized by the state as Jewish and only
gain citizenship following Orthodox conversions.
According to Talmudic law anybody born to a Jewish mother is Jewish. This
matrilineal rule is universally accepted in Israel. In Israeli identity discourse, as in
Orthodox religious discourse, nobody can be half-Jewish, or of Jewish descent.
Either you are Jewish or not. In the Israeli media, discussions of Jewish identity
often take the form of reporting on the presumed Jewishness of well-known
individuals around the world, and the list of great Jews is indeed interminable.
What is expressed when they are mentioned is justified pride in the
achievements of a distant cousin, together with special glee in exposing those
who have chosen not to call themselves Jews even if they had a Jewish mother.
Thus, special pleasure is taken in outing Marcel Proust, who wrote in 1896:
“...I am a Catholic, like my father and my brother, my mother is Jewish.”1
Israeli literary critics (who are self-described secularists; few Orthodox Jews read
Proust) will not miss a chance to comment on what they regard as Proust’s denial
of his true, objective, Jewishness. Israeli identity discourse, just like the classic
anti-Semitic thinking, does not allow a choice in self-definition. It is not just the
question of blood, but of the 23 maternal chromosomes.
162 Secularism & Secularity

Social Characteristics
Religiosity levels among Israeli Jews have been systematically measured in
numerous surveys. Ben‑Meir and Kedem2 have developed two indices, for
religious beliefs and for religious observance (behavior). These indices were based
on a 1970s survey of a stratified random sample of the urban Jewish population
in Israel.
The belief scale starts with the belief in the immortality of the soul (29 ­
per­cent agreement in the sample), then goes on to the belief in the coming of the
Messiah (36 percent), to belief in the Jewish people as chosen (57 percent), and
to the final item, belief in God (64 percent). Twenty-two percent did not drive
on Saturday, and 44 percent reported keeping to the dietary separation between
meat and milk. Seventy‑four percent claim to fast on the Day of Atonement, 88
percent light Hanukka candles, and 99 percent take part in the Passover meal.
Since the Ben‑Meir and Kedem3 benchmark study, there have been several
additional surveys assessing observance level among Israeli Jews. According to
Kedem,4 the levels of non-observance between 1962 and 1988 ranged from 22
percent to 32 percent of the Jewish population. Self-identification as a secular
Israeli means a lower likelihood of religious belief and a much lower likelihood
of religious observance.
The question of Jewish identity and self-definition is discussed quite often
in the Israeli media, and the results of systematic surveys reported regularly. A
2004 survey showed that 81 percent of Israel’s population defined themselves
as Jewish; 12 percent as Muslim; 3.5 percent as Christian (both Arab and non-
Arab); 1.5 percent as Druze; 1.5 percent as Atheist; and another 0.5 percent
as followers of other religions. Among Muslims living in Israel, 11 percent
defined themselves as very religious; 49 percent as religious; 21 percent
as not so religious; and only 18 percent as not religious at all. In terms of
religiosity, among Israeli Jews aged 20 and over, 44 percent defined themselves as
secular; 27 percent defined themselves as traditional; 12 percent as traditionally
observant; 9 percent as Orthodox; and 8 percent as ultra-Orthodox.
The ideological gap between the elements of the population with a European
Enlightenment heritage and those with a legacy of the Islamic world was clearly
demonstrated in this survey. In 2004, there was a particularly high prevalence
of the secular label, 63 percent, among native Israelis of European descent,
compared to 33 percent among native Israelis of Asian origin, and 25 percent of
native Israelis of North African origin. This was consistent with earlier surveys,
which showed higher levels of observance among Mizrahim (Eastern Jews).5
In terms of income, secular Jews had the highest levels, followed by the
Orthodox, the traditionally observant, and at the bottom the ultra-Orthodox.
13. The Secular Israeli (Jewish) Identity 163

Secular Jews also had the highest level of education, with 32 percent reporting
higher education.
A 2005 survey by Ephraim Yaar for the Shmuel Neeman Institute for
Advanced Study in Science and Technology at the Technion-Israel Institute of
Technology in Haifa reported that 41 percent of secular Israelis believed in God
(compared with 52 percent who did not). Sixteen percent of secular Jews believed
in heaven and hell, and 23 percent agreed with the statement that “nature is
spiritual or holy.” In a 2006 survey, 47 percent of the self-defined secular said
they believed in God, but only 6 percent observed the Sabbath prohibitions.

Politics and Ideology


In terms of political attitudes, it is routinely reported that higher levels of
religiosity among Israeli Jews are correlated with hawkishness and conservatism.
This finding parallels those reported for religions all over the world.6 Thus, an
April 2004 survey of attitudes toward the Sharon Gaza disengagement plan
showed that while 85 percent of the ultra-Orthodox opposed disengagement, as
did 67 percent of those defining themselves as “religious,” only 38 percent of the
“traditional” and 17 percent of the “secular” opposed it.
To properly appreciate the connection between Israeli secular culture and
Judaism, it is useful to examine the state education system. The state school
system in Israel for Jews (there is a separate system for Arabs) is divided into
two parallel sub‑systems, one religious and the other “secular.” Children of
the religious subculture (not the ultra-Orthodox), raised according to Jewish
Orthodox beliefs and behaviors, attend state religious schools. There is also
an independent orthodox system, which is state-financed, but directed by the
ultra‑Orthodox community.
What can be observed is that even the “secular” state schools follow a
curriculum with large doses of Old Testament texts and Orthodox law. The
stated rationale for that is that these are the building blocks of Jewish national
identity, and without them such an identity will be totally devoid of content and
meaning. The main difference between rabbinical Judaism and what is taught in
Israeli state schools is the relative absence of the Talmud, which is perceived as an
expression of Diaspora culture. In contrast, the state favors the Old Testament,
representing a mythic, glorious, Jewish past rooted in the “Promised Land” in
West Asia.
The Zionist conception of Jewish history offers a division into distinct
periods. Jewish history is divided into periods of activity and heroism (ancient
history and modern Zionism, before 135 CE, when the last rebellion against the
Romans ended, and after 1880, when Zionist settlement in Palestine began),
164 Secularism & Secularity

and the long period of submission and passivity (between 135 CE and 1880
CE). Thus the years when there was no Jewish sovereignty should be largely
erased from the collective memory.
Zionism, in rejecting rabbinical Judaism, started a “biblicalization” of
Jewish history and identity. Biblical Hebrew and biblical mythology became
the cornerstones of the new nationalism. The ancient Jewish past in the Holy
Land was seen as marked by activism, pride, and a readiness to fight and die
for national independence. The leap over the history of nearly 2000 years of
rabbinical tradition and Diaspora experience, aimed at landing in a past of
glorious national sovereignty, to be overshadowed only by future grandeur.
The reinterpretation of the Hebrew Bible started with nineteenth century
Hebrew literature and the Haskalah (Jewish Enlightenment) movement, which
discovered new heroes and new ideas in the ancient texts. Those who wanted to
revive Hebrew found the Bible to be a source of classical Hebrew style, and a
repository of great literature. Today’s interpretation of the Bible, as it is studied
in all Israeli schools, is a direct continuation of the 19th-century approach.
Observing a so-called secular Israeli nursery school today will demonstrate
that children as young as three are taught the Genesis story of the creation,
the Exodus story, starting with the baby Moses in the bulrushes, and so on.
These stories are taught every year in the same order, in connection with related
religious holidays. In elementary school they are taught as the starting point
of national history. Thus most non-observant adults in Israel believe in the
historicity of the Old Testament texts.
Following 19th-century revitalization ideals, secular Israelis often claim that
they represent a new, and still authentic, kind of Judaism, by trying to defend
their historically recent conception. Orthodox Jews have no such problem. They
don’t have to apologize because no one will ever doubt their Jewishness and
their Judaism, which are historically authentic. If you claim to be Jewish you
cannot gainsay these representatives of Jewish history and historical Judaism.
Thus, in any debate about Jewish identity, and there are many of those in Israel,
the secular side tends to be apologetic while the Orthodox side is confident and
secure.
Those who describe themselves as non-observant among Israeli Jews choose
to follow a pattern of minimal observance, which is still acceptable in terms of
the medieval rules of the rabbinate. “Secular” Jews claim a Jewish identity and
so inevitably follow the minimal requirements of Orthodox Judaism whereby
divorce (more important than marriage) can be handled only by rabbinical
courts. Beyond the minimal requirements, secular Jews also follow the rituals
of circumcision for male infants, mezuzah (door amulet), and bar-mitzvah for
13. The Secular Israeli (Jewish) Identity 165

boys at age 13. As a result the Orthodox rabbinate still views them as worthy
of Orthodox marriage and burial rites, because they are matrilineal Jews, whose
lineage is not marred by an improper divorce. The Orthodox have agreed to a
national consensus, which is rejected only by the ultra-Orthodox. The latter
refuse to marry members of the secular sub-culture, just as they will not marry
converts. This reasoning has to do with menstrual taboos, which make most
Jews in the world today impure in their eyes.
Secular Jewish Israelis are highly offended when the authenticity of their
Jewishness is challenged. This is done often enough, and easily, by Orthodox
spokesmen. All it takes is for the particular rabbi to refer to secular Jews as “rabbit
eaters” (referring to their non-observance of food taboos), or as “men having sex
with menstruating women.” In 1999, Rabbi Ovadiah Yosef, the leader of the
Shas ultra-Orthodox religious political party, described the justices of the Israel
Supreme Court, as men who had sex with menstruating women. This caused
a storm of denunciations from the secular camp. Yet the incident proved the
power of ancient taboos, and the vacuity of the notion of Israeli secular Jews. If
you are truly secular, why should you get upset over a factual description of your
disregard for ancient taboos?
Israel is an ideological state, a state with a mission, and the mission is to
revitalize Jewish identity in its ancient homeland. Most secular Jews in Israel are
committed to this mission. Whether secular or observant, there is a national
consensus around the overall Jewish identity label. Thus, so-called secular
individuals who are distant from the Talmudic tradition still help to keep its
spirit alive. Zionism is dedicated to preserving Jewish identity, though in a new
form. However, it cannot betray its links to a historical Jewish identity, which can
only in essence be religious.

Endnotes
1. Hayman, Ronald. Proust: A Biography. (New York: HarperCollins, 1990) p. 108.
2. Ben‑Meir, Yehuda and Peri Kedem. “Index of religiosity of the Jewish population of
Israel.” Megamot, 1979, 24, 353‑362. (Hebrew).
3. Ibid.
4. Kedem, Peri. “Dimensions of Jewish religiosity” Ed. Zvi Sobel and Benjamin Beit-Hal-
lahmi. Tradition, Innovation, Conflict: Judaism and Jewishness in Contemporary Israel.
(Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1991).
5. Ibid.
6. Beit‑Hallahmi, Benjamin, and Michael Argyle. The Psychology of Religious Behaviour,
Belief and Experience. (London: Routledge, 1997).

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