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Execution of Judgment Pending Appeal BP 881 and other election laws do not specifically provide for the execution

pending appeal for judgment in election cases, unlike the Election Code of 1971. The failure of the extant election laws to reproduce Sec 218 of the Election Code of 1971 does not mean that the execution of judgment pending appeal is no longer available in election cases. The Supreme Court has explicitly recognized and given approval to execution of judgment pending appeal in election cases filed under existing laws. The rationale why execution pending appeal is allowed in election cases is to give much recognition to the worth of a trial judges decision as that which is initially ascribed by the law to the proclamation by the board of canvassers. Governed by Sec 2, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil procedure. Execution pending appeal should be based upon good reasons and a combination of two or more of them will suffice to grant execution pending appeal: i. Public interest involved or will of the electorate ii. The shortness of the remaining portion of the term of the contested office iii. Length of time that the election contest has been pending ( Ferno vs COMELEC 328 SCRA 52) iv. Filing of bond as a condition for the issuance of a corresponding writ of execution to answer for the payment of damages which the aggrieved party may suffer by reason of the execution pending appeal (Ramos vs COMELEC 286 SCRA 189) Execution pending appeal cannot be ordered on the basis of gratuitous allegat ions that public interest is involved and that the appeal is dilatory. (Camlian vs COMELEC 271 , 271 SCRA 757) A motion for execution pending appeal filed after the expiration of the period of appeal can no longer be granted ( Relampagos vs Cumba 243 SCRA 690)

EFFECT OF FILING AN ELECTION PROTEST,QUO WARRANTO 1. As a general rule, the filing of an election protest or a petition for quo warranto precludes the subsequent filing of a pre-proclamation controversy, or amounts to the abandonment of one earlier filed. (Maruhom vs. COMELEC,331 SCRA 473) 2. The filing of an election protest results in abandonment of a pre-proclamation case even if the protest alleged it was filed as a precautionary measure, if he did not explain why.(Laodenio vs. COMELEC,276 SCRA 405) 3. The rule that the filing of a protest implies abandonment of the pre-proclamation case does not apply if: i. The protest was filed as a precautionary measure (Mitmug vs. COMELEC,230 SCRA 54) ii. The board of canvassers was improperly constituted, as when the Municipal Treasurer took over the canvassing without having been designated. (Saman vs. COMELEC,224 SCRA 631) Substitution of Candidacy Sec. 77 BP 881; Sec. 12, RA 9006 If after the last day for filing certificates, a candidate dies, withdraws or is disqualified, he may be substituted by a person belonging to his party not later than the mid day of election. Said certificate may be filled with any board of election inspectors in the political subdivision where he is an electorate of the country, with the COMELEC. (Domingo vs. City Board of Canvassers, GR No. 105365, June 2, 1992) Even if the withdrawal was not under oath, the certificate of the substitute cannot be annulled after the election.

Such technicality of the original candidates withdrawal of his certificate of candidacy cannot be used to override the peoples will in favor to the substitute candidate. The legal requirement that the withdrawal be under oath will be held to be merely directory and the candidates failure to observe the requirement is considered a harmless error. Hence the bona fide certificate of the substitute candidate cannot be assailed. The votes in his favor should be counted. (Villanueva vs. COMELEC, 140 SCRA 352) In case of valid substitutions after the official ballot have been printed, the votes cast for the substituted candidates shall be considered as many votes but shall not invalidate the whole ballot. For this purpose, the official ballots shall provide spaces where the voters may write the name of substitute candidates if they are voting for the latter. (See. 12, RA 9006) There is nothing in the Constitution or statute which requires as condition precedent that a substitute candidate must have been a member of the party concerned for a certain period of time before he can be nominated as such. (Sinaca vs. Mula, 315 SCRA 266)

A valid certificate of candidacy is likewise an indispensable requisite in the case of a substitution of a disqualified candidate under the provisions of Sec. 77 of the Election Code . . . The concept of a substitute presupposes the existence of the person to be substituted, for how can a person take the place of somebody who does not exist or who never was... A disqualified candidate may only be substituted if he had a valid certificate of candidacy in the first place because, if the disqualified candidate did not have a valid and seasonably filed certificate of candidacy, he is and was not a candidate at all. If a person was not a candidate, he cannot be substituted under Sec. 77 of the Code . . . . While Sec. 78 of the Election Code enumerated the occasion where a candidate may validly substitute there is no mention of the case where a candidate is excluded not only by disqualification but also by denial and cancellation of his certificate of candidacy (Miranda vs. Abaya, 311 SCRA 617) In case of valid substitutions after the official ballots have been printed, the votes cast for the substituted candidates shall be considered as stray votes but shall not invalidate the whole ballot. Sec. 12, RA 9006. amending Sec. 12 of RA 8436) Withdrawal of Certificate of Candidacy Form written declaration under oath. There was no withdrawal of candidacy for the position of mayor where the candidate, before the deadline for filing certificates of candidacy, personally appeared in the COMELEC office, asked for his certificate of candidacy and intercalated the word vice before the word mayor and the following day wrote the election registrar saying that his name be included in the list of official candidates for mayor. (Vivero vs. COMELEC, L 81059, Jan 12, 1989) Since his certificate of candidacy for the office of board member was filed by his party, and the said party had withdrawn the nomination which withdrawal was confirmed by the candidate under oath, there was substantial compliance with Sec. 73. His filing under oath within the statutory period of his individual certificate for candidacy for the separate office of mayor was, in effect, a rejection of the party nomination on his behalf for the office of board member. (Ramirez vs. COMELEC, L-81150, Jan 12, 1992)