APPROACH TO PROLIFERATION RISK ASSESSMENT

BASED ON MULTIPLE OBJECTIVE ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK

SOLUTION OF RESOURCE ALLOCATION PROBLEM FOR IDENTIFICATION OF
COST-EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO REDUCE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION RISKS
Andrianov A., Kuptsov I.
Obninsk Institute for Nuclear Power Engineering of NRNU MEPhI
GLOBAL 2013: International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Conference, September 30 October 3, 2013
ADVANCED TOOLS DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATION FOR
PROLIFERATION RISK AND RESISTANCE STUDIES IN INPE
CONTENTS
Introduction
1. Framework for proliferation risk and resistance assessment studies
2. Current status and trends in quantitative proliferation risk assessment
3. MCDM methods for proliferation risk and resistance assessment
studies
4. Evaluating the attractiveness of HEU production scenarios at a
clandestine enrichment facility using centrifuge enrichment technology
5. Solution of resource allocation problem for identification of cost-
effective measures to reduce nuclear proliferation risks
6. Additional examples of tools application
Conclusion
INTRODUCTION
At the present time it is deeply recognized that there is no absolutely proliferation-free
technical, institutional solutions and measures from all possible nuclear and
radiological threats. The possible additional measures to increase proliferation resistance
towards one of the potential threats will all accompany reducing the proliferation resistance
to other threats. This leads to the fact that in each case it is necessary to take into account
the specific features of the nuclear infrastructure, possible proliferator scenario
(motivations, intentions, capabilities) and an appropriate decision should be based on a
reasonable compromise.
There is a growing understanding that the problem of proliferation risk and resistance
assessment and optimizing resources allocations is multi-criteria. The criteria
characterizing different aspects of proliferation scenarios are conflicting by nature. This
means that improving the value of one criterion leads to a decrease in the values of other
criteria.
The development and application of state-of-the art multiple criteria decision making
(MCDM) for the proliferation risk and resistance assessments and optimization of resource
allocations in multi-objective formulation is urgently necessary. Based on this techniques
decision support tools intend to highlight conflicts and find compromises in the decision
making process related to the proliferation risk and resistance assessments.
FRAMEWORK FOR PROLIFERATION RISK AND
RESISTANCE ASSESSMENT STUDIES
PROLIFERATION RISK AND RESISTANCE
ASSESSMENT STUDIES IN INPE & NNRU MEPHI
APPLICATIONS:
Materials, facility, NFC, nuclear
power system levels
Local, national, region, global
levels
SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT:
DeTRAS
RANSE Risk Assessment-VM
Nuclear Fuel Cycle Calculators
Simple MCDM toolbox
Uncertainty Calculator
METHODOLOGY DEVELOPMENT:
Taxonomy of proliferation resistance and risk
assessments
Approaches based on multi-objective
analysis framework
Probability risk analysis approaches
Integrated approaches (jointing scenarios
based and multi-attributive based)
Materials flows analysis for PR studies
Optimization of resource allocation
EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES:
Textbooks
Monographs
Training materials
Lecture courses
The main
assessment
framework
standpoints:
multicriteriality,
uncertainty,
dynamics &
evolution
Proliferation aspects
should be considered
taking account others
problem areas:
resources,
economics, waste
management

THE MAIN POINTS IN THE ASSESSMENTS
MULTICRITERIALITY
UNCERTAINTY
DYNAMICS &
EVOLUTION
Different levels for considerations and
assessments:
materials level, the facility level, the
NFC level, the nuclear power level.
PROLIFERATION
RISK AND
RESISTANCE
ASSESSMENT
BASIC TOOLS FOR RISK ASSESSMENT
SIMPLE MCDA TOOLBOX
Technology
To perform calculation based on the proposed concept
systematic implementation of MCDM and uncertainty analysis
techniques the specialized software was developed
UNCERTANTY CALCULATOR
DIALOG SYSTEM OF STOCHASTIC
MULTIOBJECTIVE OPTIMIZATION
INTERACTIVE SYSTEM FOR VISUAL
ANALYSIS OF FEASIBLE SET
BORDERS
CURRENT STATUS AND TRENDS IN QUANTITATIVE
PROLIFERATION RISK ASSESSMENT
CURRENT STATUS AND TRENDS IN QUANTITATIVE
PROLIFERATION RISK ASSESSMENT
Current status
no concept of proliferation risk and methodology for its assessment, in the general
case decision-making procedure is not formalized
variety of attributive and scenario approaches for proliferation risk assessment
most of models are oriented on the analysis of situations where the proliferator is
a State
Some trends
accounting multiple proliferator goals, the dynamics of event development and
uncertainty of initial data
consideration of situations where proliferator is non-State actors
development of proliferation act models to identify the relationship between model
parameters and risk indicators
increasing practical use (recommendations for improving nuclear security
measures, cost optimization, etc.)
Scenario based
approaches
Probabilistic risk analysis (M.
Golay , G. Rochau , J. Hill, D.
Sentell and others)
Markovian Method (R. Bari , A.
Rumyantsev and others)
Graph-analytical and
probabilistic methods
(vulnerability assessment
software - ASSESS, EASI,
SAVI, VEGA, SAPE)
Attributive based
approaches
MAUA (I. Papazoglou ,
C. Heising, P. Silvennoinen,
S. Ahmed, R. Krakowski,
W. Charlton, and others)
Barriers to proliferation
(Proliferation Vulnerability Red
Team, TOPS, PRPP GIF
working group, SAPRA)
Evaluation of the materials
from the disposition of excess
weapons materials
Cost estimates (inspection
cost estimate, overcoming
barriers cost estimates)
Game theory based
approaches
Study of the nuclear
deterrence mechanism
Identification of the most
effective inspection strategy
Identification of the adversary
interception strategies
PROLIFERATION RISK AND RESISTANCE
ASSESSMENT APPROACHES
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SCENARIO- AND
ATTRIBUTIVE-BASED APPROACHES
Probabilistic risk analysis Multi-attributive approaches
Main concept Probability of event Utility function
Authors G. Rochau, A.Rumyantsev, M.Bunn, and
others
V.Charlton, P.Silvennoinen, R.Krakovski,
R.Brogli, and others
Advantage Ability to construct a chain of events and
accounting different system level factors
Accounting the relationship with
technological features
Disadvantage Low sensitivity to technological
attributes
Need to assess and aggregate different
characteristics of a system in a common
set of units
No single model or approach is sufficient to cover the entire landscape of adversary scenarios and
support the decisions to be made by decision makers.
Development of integrated approach based on the combination of PRA and multi-attributive models is
important and it may be done based on multiple-objective analysis framework.
Such integrated approach allows to overcome the limitations of PRA and multi-attributive models, thus
extend the range of their application.
MCDM METHODS FOR PROLIFERATION RISK AND
RESISTANCE ASSESSMENT STUDIES
MODM: base methods
Combinatorial optimization
problems
JMetal GA framework
NSGA-II, MOCHC algorithms
Fuzzy hybrid algorithm FMOCHC
Neural Net joined with GA
optimization
etc
THE MAIN COMPONENTS OF MCDM TECHNIQUES
MCDA: base methods
MAVT (aggregation)
AHP (pairwise comparison)
TOPSIS (distance to ideal point)
PROMETHEE (pairwise comparison based on
preference functions)
MAUT (uncertain criterion values)
Fuzzy MAVT (MAVT joined with fuzzy theory)
ProMAA (distributed criterion values and weights)
etc
Multiple criteria decision making (MCDM) techniques are a tool aimed at
supporting decision makers faced with making numerous and conflicting
assessments. MCDM techniques intend to highlight conflicts and find compromises in
the decision making process. Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) and Multi-
Objective Decision Making (MODM) are the main components of MCDM.
A large number of MCDA techniques have been developed to deal with different
kinds of problems (MAVT, AHP, TOPSIS, PROMETHEE, etc.). At the same time each
technique has pros and cons and can be more or less useful depending on the
situation.
The methods of MODM for multi-objective optimization problem solving are various: a priori methods; a
posteriori methods; adaptive methods; methods based on the preliminary construction of the Pareto set
approximation.
MULTIPLE CRITERIA DECISION MAKING (MCDM)
Criteria identification
Problem formulation, goals, formalization
Formation of alternatives
Criteria assessment
Summary tables
DM/Exp/St-H preferences



Weighting Scoring
Aggregation
Uncertainty analysis
Final Recommendations
E
E
Experts, Stakeholders,
Decision Support Tools
(DST)
Experts,
Stakeholders,
KB
Models, Expert-
Stakeholders judgments
DST
Expert Judgments,
DST
DST, Expert Judgments
Decision Maker, Experts,
Stakeholders
DST, Models
Experts-Stakeholders for
Decision Maker
BASIS FOR PROPOSED APPROACH
In contrast to approaches to the selection of optimal solution based on one of a criteria set
(or a convolution of a number of them) in the proposed approach the methods are
implemented of the vector formulation of a problem based on the principle of compromise,
which provides for an acceptable set of values of all factors.
At the same time this approach offers no unique solution, but only the region of
reasonable (rational, compromise) solutions. Finding out a unique solution remains the
prerogative of an expert.
This approach is the foundation of most state-of-the-art methods of multiple criteria
decision-making theory, where the basic concept is the notion of a set of nondominated
(efficient, Pareto, Pareto-optimal) solutions - the Pareto set.
Informally, the Pareto set is defined as a set
where the value of any particular criteria
can be improved only at the expense of
another criteria. Thus, any solution from the
Pareto set can not be optimized
simultaneously on all individual criteria.
EXAMPLE OF RISK INDICATORS
Risk indicators Proliferator goals Counteraction goals
Proliferation time (PT) minimize maximize
Proliferation cost (PC) minimize maximize
Proliferation technical difficulty (PTD) minimize maximize
Material type quality (MTQ) maximize minimize
Detection probability (DP) minimize maximize
Counteraction resource (CR) maximize minimize
A set of risk indicators have to be defined by experts
taking into account their potential application for
different elements of nuclear infrastructure.
Specific form of risk indicator may be defined based
on multi-attributive analysis or proliferation act model
The described method of analysis has the following features:
account of the relationship between variables and the influence of this dependence on the value of integrated indicators;
construction of various realizations of the proliferation act;
meaningfulness of the process of scenario development and modeling that allows an expert to get an idea of proliferation act and the
possibilities of its implementation, identify critical elements, as well as possible barriers.
The disadvantages of the approach are:
the need to construct a model of proliferation act and identify relationships between variables;
the need for significant qualitative study of the model (to create multiple models corresponding to each scenario, selection and
analysis; uncertainty boundaries of scenarios);
limited number of possible combinations of variables (the number of scenarios to be considered in detail and the number of variables
subject to variation is limited, since an excessively large amount of information predictive power and its practical value is reduced).
GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF APPROACH
EVALUATING THE ATTRACTIVENESS OF HEU
PRODUCTION SCENARIOS AT A CLANDESTINE
ENRICHMENT FACILITY USING CENTRIFUGE
ENRICHMENT TECHNOLOGY
PROBLEM STATEMENT
To evaluate the attractiveness of different scenarios of HEU clandestine
production in quantities of 1 SQ using centrifuge enrichment technology taking
into account that proliferator has already a cascade of enrichment and it is
possible to add new centrifuges to this cascade on daily basis.
.

ACCOUNTING OF PROLIFERATORS INTENTIONS
min max
min max
min max
...
i
i
i
PT PT PT
PC PC PC
CR CR CR
s s

s s

s s

1
min( ) min( ) min( ) max( ) min( ) min( )
PT PC PTD MTQ DP CR
k k k k k k
i i i i i i
i
PT PC PTD MTQ DP CR
R
PT PC PTD MTQ DP CR

(
| | | | | | | | | | | |
= (
| | | | | |
( \ . \ . \ . \ . \ . \ .

"Aggressive" strategy - proliferator seeks to achieve his goals in the shortest possible time without stint
on resources.
"Hidden" strategy - proliferator seeks the lowest cost to achieve his goal by making his actions the most
inconspicuous.
"Moderate" strategy - proliferator seeks to moderate risk of detection, cost and reasonable time to achieve
his goal.
Ways of defining a set of scenarios, taking into account probable proliferators
strategy:

1) Formation of criterion restriction


2) Construction of aggregate indicator
RISK INDICATORS AND INFRASTRUCTURAL
RESTRICTION FOR HEU PRODUCTION SCENARIOS
0
( , , , , , )
c c c
heu te in d
PT PT x x x N C N =
.

0
( , , )
c c
d
PC PC N N PT =
( )
c
PTD PTD C =
( )
heu
FMT FMT x =
RISK INDICATORS
INFRASTRUCTURAL RESTRICTIONS

=
=
=
0 ) x ( f
...
0 ) x ( f
0 ) x ( f
N
2
1

Amounts and type of available source materials

Type of centrifuge and their total number
etc.
- time needed to produce 1 SQ of HEU
- total number of centrifuge involved in the program
- centrifuge capacity
- HEU enrichment
TRADEOFFS BETWEEN RISK INDICATORS FOR
ACQUISITION OF LEU FOR HEU PRODUCTION
IMPACT OF PROLIFERATOR CAPABILITIES ON
PT AND PC RISK INDICATORS
Parameter lower boundary upper boundary
Feed enrichment, %; 0.71% 4%
HEU enrichment,

%; 90%
Tails assay, %; 0.1% 0.7%
Initial number of centrifuges, centr.; 0 1000
Number of daily running centrifuge, centr./day; 0 10
Centrifuge capacity, kg SWU/yr; 1 6
MARGINAL FEASIBLE PROLIFERATION
SCENARIO SET
To determine the marginal feasible proliferation
scenario set it is necessary to identify those
scenarios, which satisfy the Pareto optimality
(non-domination) condition and a set of
infrastructural constraints.
Marginal feasible proliferation scenario set -
are a set of scenarios for which the value of any
particular indicator can be improved only by
expense of the values of at least one of the other
indicators.
INTERACTIVE DECISION MAP VISUALIZING
FEASIBLE PROLIFERATION SCENARIO SET
The calculations are made on the assumption that the goal is to produce 1 SQ of HEU with 90%
enrichment. The non-colored area is principally not achievable for proliferator. Ultimately, scenarios from
marginal feasible proliferation scenarios may be ranked with accounting technological capabilities and
proliferator strategy. This procedure may be realized based on formulated a posteriori aggregated risk
indicator risk function or by a set of criteria constrains unique for each proliferator groups and
circumstances.
CATEGORIZING SCENARIOS WITH ACCOUNTING
PROLIFERATORS STRATEGY
Initial number of
centrifuge, centr.
Number of daily
running centrifuge,
centr./day
Centrifuge capacity,
kgSWU/yr
Feed
enrichment, %
Tails assay,
%
HEU
enrichment,
%
766 964 7 5,9 3,9 0,6 90
648 6 0 1,7 1,6 0,6 90
44 46 0 1,1 1,0 0,3 90
404 11 2 1,6 1,8 0,6 90
587 14 1 1,4 1,2 0,5 90
Proliferation time (PT),
day
Proliferation cost
(PC), centr.
Proliferation technical
difficulty (PTD),
kgSWU/yr
Fissile material
type (FMT), %
Proliferator
strategy
766 0,2 966,2 5,9 90 Aggressive
648 182,5 9,3 1,7 90 Hidden
44 71,7 58,0 1,1 90
Moderate

404 32,0 72,3 1,6 90
587 55,8 62,8 1,4 90
RISK INDICATORS VALUES
ADVERSARY PARAMETERS
SUMMARY OF EVALUATING THE ATTRACTIVENESS
OF HEU PRODUCTION SCENARIOS
The results of evaluation of different types of attractiveness of initial nuclear
materials, as starting points for developing nuclear weapons, quantitatively confirm
the question posed in a number of studies, thesis that existed for a long time and the
widespread opinion of a greater risk associated with the HEU and plutonium: the risk
of LEU proliferation is considerably higher than in the case with other types of
nuclear materials, mainly due to its availability and low detectability of use as
compared with other materials.
It should be noted that the risk of NED creation from HEU, if HEU and LEU equally
available to the proliferator, will be much higher. However, in assessing risks
consideration must be also given to possible ways of acquisition of nuclear materials
and further handling. As a result of implementation of some measures focused on
direct use materials, the risk associated with LEU is increased, which is today
considerably higher than in the case of HEU, despite the technical difficulties
associated with the need to further enrichment of LEU. This requires the introduction
of stronger measures at sites with LEU realization to ensure physical protection, the
quantitative characteristics of which can be identified through calculations and
experts activities with risk assessment models.
SOLUTION OF RESOURCE ALLOCATION PROBLEM
FOR IDENTIFICATION OF COST-EFFECTIVE
MEASURES TO REDUCE NUCLEAR
PROLIFERATION RISKS
PR ASSESSMENT BASED ON THE CONTROLLED
FINITE MARKOV CHAIN APPROACH
Scenario-based risk assessment model
In this approach, risk, damage and probability are
understood as follows:
risk is the product of the estimated damage
from the threat realization by the threat
realization probability
with the uncertainties estimation in the
damage extent and in the threat event
probability;
damage is the cost volume for overcoming the
consequences of the threat event realization in
the form of financial and other losses;
probability of a threat event is the frequency of
the threat event realization.
The time until the threat event and the
counteraction event are over may vary, influencing
so the probability of successful completion for each
event, the probability of realization and the duration
of the resulting event.
The resulting event duration is determined by the
length of the shortest minimum-duration event
The developed software package (Dr. A. Rumyantsev, NRC KI) based on extended
scenario model realizing the controlled finite Markov chain approach, is a flexible
environment that enables experts to specify with any degree of detail the sequence of
threat and counteraction events leading to the resulting event.
The software is actually a constructor like Lego that allows from the individual elements
to construct a detailed chain of events taking into account time factor, uncertainty and
capability for multifactor processing of scenarios indicators.
SCENARIOS
RESULTING EVENT
CHARACTERISTICS
THREAT
CHARACTERISTICS
COUNTERACTION
CHARACTERISTICS

risk
(c.u.)
rate risk
(c.u./ year)
duration event
(days)
event
probability (%)
threat cost
(c.u.)
threat probability
(%)
counteraction
costs (c.u.)
counteraction
probability (%)
NED creation * * * * * * * *
RDD, RED creation * * * * * * * *
sabotage * * * * * * * *
SOFTWARE RANSE_RISK_ASSESSMENT-VM
Here and below are presented the calculation results for adversary scenarios for hypothetical
nuclear infrastructure taken from a scenarios library realized in the software.
THE STRUCTURE OF RESULTS OF RISK ASSESSMENTS OF ADVERSARY SCENARIOS FOR
HYPOTHETICAL NUCLEAR INFRASTRUCTURE
Resources allocation problem to improve the effectiveness of counteraction system involves the following
optimization problem:
HOW TO ALLOCATE THE LIMITED RESOURCES SO THAT THE EFFECT MEASURED BY THE PROBABILITY OF
RESULTING EVENTS IS DECREASED AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE?
( )
0 0
1
1
N
t c
i i
i
p p p
=
=
[
( )
0
1
1 ( )
N
c t
i i
i
p p p c
=
= o
[
1
N
t
i
i
c C
=
=

.

The formulated problem is nonlinear. As a multipurpose method for solving the problem stochastic
optimization methods can be proposed (random search, low-discrepancy sequences, and genetic
algorithms).
RESOURCES ALLOCATION PROBLEM TO IMPROVE
THE COUNTERACTION SYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS
limitation on the total amount of resources
probability of the resulting event before upgrading the
counteraction system
probability of the resulting event after upgrading the
counteraction system

( )
c t
i i
p c o
relative increase in probability of counteraction event
from additional cost
0.1 1 10 100 1 10
3

0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
additional cost
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c

c
o
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e
a
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s

p
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o
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a
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i
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i
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i
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e
n
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THE RELATIVE INCREASE IN COUNTERACTION
EVENT PROBABILITIES FROM RESOURCES
To solve the resources allocation problem to improve the effectiveness of counteraction system it is first
of all required by experts to assess the relationship between costs and probabilities of different
countermeasures. These relations in general case are nonlinear.
Functions varies from 0 to 1 and has a typical form shown in Fig. This type of function is determined by the
following fact:
zero investment will not increase the effectiveness of the counteraction system
infinite investment will reduce the probability of the resulting event to zero.
( )
c t
i i
p c o
Model problem for four different countermeasures shows that
ultra-large additional costs may not result in a corresponding
effect, and therefore further increasing additional costs beyond
a certain level makes no sense.
Different volumes of resources are allocated differently
between countermeasures. It should be noted that unlimited
improving efficiency of one element of the counteraction
system without improving it in other elements may not have
the desired effect in the efficiency of the counteraction system
as a whole.
Level of Investment
T
o
t
a
l

c
o
s
t
.

N
a
t
i
o
n
a
l

c
u
r
r
e
n
c
y

u
n
i
t
s

REDUCING RESULTING EVENT PROBABILITY AND
DISTRIBUTION OF COSTS
Counter measures 1
Counter measures 2
Counter measures 3
Counter measures 4
SUMMARY ON SOLUTION OF RESOURCE
ALLOCATION PROBLEM
Proposed methodology of selection of cost-effective measures can be
applied for systematic design of cost-effective system to reduce nuclear
proliferation risks associated with a national nuclear infrastructure. The
methodology enables the expert to select the cost-effective measures
depending on availability of resources.
The performed analysis with different number of possible measures
confirm the conclusions that the implementation of extra-large costs may
not produce the required effect, and the increase in resources above a
certain level does not look sensible.
Diversification in improving the effectiveness of other measures seems
more rational and efficient for the whole system than the unlimited
improvement of the effectiveness of only one measure.
ADDITIONAL EXAMPLES OF TOOLS APPLICATION
performing NFC material flows analysis for
proliferation risk assessment studies
obtaining cost-effective measures of risk reduction
considering whole scenarios set for the entire nuclear
infrastructure

PROLIFERATION POTENTIAL OF
GLOBAL NUCLEAR POWER SYSTEMS
DEVELOPING NUCLEAR POWER STRUCTURES
Considered nuclear power structures:
once-through uranium NFC with no restrictions on uranium resources (I);
closed U-Pu NFC with and without restrictions on the locations of FR and the limitations on the amount of
available natural uranium (II, III);
closed U-Pu-Th NFC with restrictions on the location of FR and the amount of available natural uranium
(IV).
Indicators characterizing the proliferation potential of scenarios:
Potential productivity of fissile materials, SQ/year
Total amount of fissile materials in NFC - Amounts of direct- and indirect-use nuclear materials, SQ
Different structures of developing nuclear power systems are comparable by indicators "total
amount of fissile materials in NFC" and "potential productivity of fissionable materials".
The improvement of one indicator is achieved by worsening another. It is impossible to make
definitive judgments about the prospect of a nuclear power structure and the NFC type from the
non-proliferation viewpoint based on material flow assessment, without a detailed analysis of
the proliferation scenarios and specification of acting national and international systems of
nonproliferation regime management.
PROLIFERATION RISK INDICATORS
Scenarios
Total amount of fissile materials
in NFC, 10
6
SQ
Potential productivity of
fissionable materials, 10
6
SQ/yr
I 4.1 6.2 33 362
II 2.2 4.3 455 664
III 3.0 5.1 302 370
IV 1.9 4.0 420 480

COST-EFFECTIVE PLUTONIUM MANAGEMENT
STRATEGIES
0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6
0.9
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
Pu multirecycling and forming of balance of
Pu production and consumption
Preventing the accumulation of separated Pu
Consumption of
different accumulated
Pu forms
Increasing nuclear proliferation risk importance



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a
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i
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t
a
l

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o
s
t
s

The relative increase of scale of nuclear proliferation risks
Relative attractiveness of
plutonium on different NFC stages
Cost-effective strategy for plutonium management and related technological options may be
obtained by means of trade-off strategies calculation on criteria minimizations of the total
discounted costs and the plutonium risk exposure. Trade-off curve identifies additional cost
related to implementation of measures for reduction proliferation risks associated with plutonium.

DETRAS - DECISION TREES RISK ASSESSMENT
SOFTWARE
Limitations. Omitting a key node may
render the tree useless, while adding a
few nodes to a decision tree can explode
the tree's size. It can also be difficult to
obtain or elicit probability estimates,
especially where human reliability is
concerned.
Advantages. The above trees can focus analysis upon
scenarios that have chosen outcomes and can provide a
graph that depicts a system. Other risk analysis
techniques (e.g., probabilistic risk analysis) also use
these trees.
Fig. Missile fire
DeTRAS 1.0 is the software for simple risk assessment based on decision trees
methodology. Expanded functionality of the software (graphics, reporting, uncertainty
evaluation, cost optimization) is available in the extended version of the software.
The software was developed by the team of the Department of General and Special
Physics of Institute of Nuclear Power Engineering (Obninsk, Russia).
- Decision nodes - represented
by square
- Event nodes -
represented by circle
- Final nodes - represented
by triangle
WHOLE THREAT SCENARIO SET
A variety of nuclear and radiological threats and the risks related to the possible adversary action
modifications requires simultaneous consideration of all possible scenarios for the whole nuclear
infrastructure.
A common way of quantifying the risks is to assign a numeric value to them by multiplying event
probabilities and consequences together. However, a problem with this is that high-
probability/low-impact risks get the same score as high-impact/low-probability risks, about which
experts may well have very different view.
Probability and impact matrix is a well-known tool for assigning category risk from high to low
levels by comparing two parameters: event probabilities and consequences.
The areas of concept usage:
identify the most dangerous scenarios, or the
best way of organizing the counteraction system;
ranking, sorting and classification of the
scenarios, which allows dividing scenarios on
predefined homogenous groups ("unacceptable",
"acceptable", "partially acceptable");
screening/filtering aimed at identifying a
smaller set of scenarios for further analysis.
CONCLUSION
Assessment of proliferation scenarios based on multiple objective analysis framework
may be used as one of tools in the proliferation risk and resistance assessment toolbox.
This technique can be integrated into different approaches of risk assessment, thus
extending the field of their possible application. Using integrated approach meets state-
of-the-art requirements to the problem of assessing adversary scenarios allowing to
manage with the available methodological difficulties.
Lack of general methodologies for decision-making in multi-criteria formulation in the
area of proliferation risk and resistance assessments, complicates the procedure of
formulating a coordinated vision of a preferable technological and institutional solutions
and measures, balanced on different benefits and losses.
MCDM techniques application allow searching for compromises between the conflicting
factors that determine the proliferation risk and resistance and calculating corresponding
trade-off rates; carrying out multifactor analysis of alternatives and choosing, ranking,
sorting corresponding options.
Thank you
for attention