THIRD ZONE REVISITED

S.H. Horowitz
Life Fellow, IEEE Consultant , Columbus, Ohio

A.G. Phadke
Life Fellow, IEEE Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, Virginia

Abstract -- Zone 3 of a step-distance protection scheme has been identified as one of the contributing causes of cascading failures in power systems. The National Electric Reliability Council (NERC) has issued rules, and the IEEE Power System Relaying Committee (PSRC) has discussed recommendations to reduce the undesirable operation of this component of the protection chain. It is the purpose of this paper to reexamine the application of zone 3, to describe situations where it can be properly utilized, where it can be removed without reducing the reliability of the system protection and, if used, how it can be modified or set. A table is presented for a variety of station designs and protection schemes including two common local backup relay systems and the associated application of a remote third zone. Finally, the concept of critical locations is introduced which can assist the relay engineer in determining if potential zone 3 undesirable operations are a serious threat to the system and help determine if the expense and difficulty of removing zone 3 or modifying the relay or its associated station is justified. Index Terms Relaying, Step Distance Relaying, Third Zone, Computer Relaying, Adaptive Relaying, Hidden Failures, Back-up Protection, Blackouts, Catastrophic Failures

newer protection systems may well be justified. Some of these relief measures may be available in modern computer based relays, and some new ideas requiring further research and development are also presented. II. NERC RECOMMENDATIONS ON LOADABILITY OF THIRD ZONE SETTING OF RELAYS The unwanted operation of zone 3 due to load is perhaps the single most obvious protective relay characteristic that has been addressed following the August 14, 2003 blackout in North America. Recent National Electric Reliability Council (NERC) guidelines [1] have specified that third zone settings should not be encroached by load up to an extreme level of thermal overload on all series connected elements in the transmission line in question. A task force report by protection experts [2] has identified several conditions under which the NERC criteria can not be met. (One of the exceptions noted in reference [2] deals with steady state stability limit as an extreme loading scenario. We note however that steady state stability limits are rarely reached by power flows in any SINGLE transmission line. A much lower extreme loading limit is often the transient stability limit, and may well be the governing extreme limit to be considered as far as limits imposed by instability are considered). Subsequent directives by NERC have acknowledged that under the conditions specified in the Task Force report, exceptions to the NERC guidelines will be accepted after review by a NERC committee. Specifically, NERC has recommended that all Zone 3 relays on all transmission lines operating at 230 kV and above shall not trip under extreme emergency loading conditions. NERC guidelines define extreme emergency loading as 150% of the emergency current rating of a line, assuming a 0.85 per unit voltage and a load power factor angle of 30 degrees. Ratings of all series connected elements in a transmission path are known parameters, and loadability limits defined by the NERC guidelines based on these current ratings are easily established. However, it is not just the thermal rating of transmission facilities which should be the deciding criteria for the loadability limit of a transmission facility. The System Protection and Control Task Force Report rightly points out other phenomena which may impose different loading limits on certain facilities. These other considerations are documented as exceptions in reference [2] and they are presented as mitigating methods that should be considered. It is our purpose in this paper to be more specific; to identify in some detail methods which protection engineers should consider related to their individual situations. The present paper also provides other considerations, mainly having to do with overall protection system designs in use, substation structures, availability of communication links, and redundancy in protection system components which may dictate other additional constraints on the loadability of relay

I. INTRODUCTION Recent blackouts have led to a discussion of the role played by the third zone of step-distance protection schemes which are universally used to protect transmission and distribution lines. It is recognized that a power system and its protection equipment is designed in such a way that the system can ride through a sequence of credible contingencies without causing wide-spread outages. However, it has been observed that unwanted third zone operations caused by unexpected loading conditions have often contributed to the cascading outages eventually leading to major blackouts affecting millions of people. There have been various suggestions in the technical literature as to how to deal with this issue. They have ranged from proposals to completely eliminating the third zone from the protection engineers arsenal, to requiring that no third zone shall operate under extreme loading conditions. This paper examines the reasons why the third zone (and other over-reaching zones of protection) is considered to be necessary, the influence of various types of system configurations on protection requirements, and summarizes the failures in the chain of protective equipment which the third zone is designed to back up. The concept of critical system locations is introduced, such that restrictive loadability limits of the third zone at those locations would be particularly harmful from the point of view of cascading failures. It is then argued that it is essential to find alternatives to the third zone at those locations, and not a whole-sale revision of third zone settings on all protection systems. Finally, technical solutions which relieve some of the loadability restrictions are described, with a view that at critical locations the added expenditure of installing such

characteristics. It is of course possible in principle to change the substation configurations and protection system designs. However, to require this of ALL transmission facilities may require enormous manpower and capital expenditures, and may in fact not be necessary from the point of view of system reliability. This last point will be considered further in a following section. III. THIRD ZONE PRINCIPLE Non-pilot application of distance relaying is called step distance protection. Several zones are employed to protect a transmission line. The first zone, designated as Zone 1, is set to trip with no intentional time delay. To avoid unnecessary operation for faults beyond the remote terminal, Zone 1 is set for approximately 80-90% of the transmission line impedance. The second zone, designated as Zone 2, is to protect the remainder of the line with an adequate margin. Zone 2 relays have to be time delayed to coordinate with relays at the remote bus. Typical zone 2 time delays are of the order of 15-30 cycles.
A IA ZA C IM IN IF ZP Fault Figure 1: Example to illustrate third zone setting of a step distance relay at A in order to back-up the protection at C for the line CP. M N P

(two) lines present, the third zone setting for the relay at A would equal the impedance ZA plus about 120% of the impedance ZP. However, because of the contributions from the lines as shown in Figure 1, the third zone setting Z3 would be Z3 = ZA + 1.2 ZP{1 + [IB + IM + IN]/IA} If, for example, the contributions to the fault currents from all the lines were equal, the third zone setting would be ZA + 4.8 ZP. If, as is common in many relays, the third zone characteristic is a mho circle, the third zone setting would be as illustrated in Figure 2. It is obvious from Figure 2 that the loadability limit of the third zone setting for the system shown in Figure 1 is much reduced from what would have been the case for a simple two line configuration consisting of lines AC and CP. It should also be clear that relays at B, M, and N would have similar settings for their respective third zones. It should also be remembered that for relays using crosspolarization of various types, there would be a ballooning effect of the third zone because of the source impedance behind bus A, thereby reducing the loadability of the third zone further. The nature of ballooning will depend upon the type of cross-polarizing used, and may well affect the performance of the relay under balanced conditions as well. To a certain extent, the second zone of a step-distance protection scheme also suffers from the expansion caused by the in-feed to the fault current from neighboring circuits on the bus. However, since the second zone extension beyond bus C is quite small, the loadability problems caused by this expansion may not be as serious. In addition, zone 2 has a different rationale for its application and eliminating it is not an option. In the absence or failure of pilot relaying zone 2 is applied to protect the end of the line not covered by zone 1 and must overreach the end of the line. If the reach setting encroaches on any of the stressed system or loadability concerns, the reach can be reduced and time coordination can be employed without giving up the overreaching function. As discussed above, it is also well to remember that the second zone (along with the first zone) is designed to cover 100% of the transmission line by step-distance protection schemes. Disregarding pilot protection, it is not a back-up zone, although to a certain extent it does provide a limited
X ZA + 4.8 ZP

IB

Originally, Zone 3 was applied as a remote backup to Zones 1 & 2 of an adjacent line in the event that a relay or breaker failure prevented clearing the fault locally. Zone 3 operation must be delayed to coordinate with the several zone 2 relays that it overreaches. There are no standards in this regard but 90 cycles is a common timer setting. The reach setting however is a more complex problem and was the major impetus to our study and the subject of much of our further discussion. More recent protective packages used on many transmission lines include one or two sets of pilot relays and breaker failure protection schemes so that the possibility of a failure to trip locally for a line fault becomes less likely, and in such cases the use of a remote back-up protection provided by the third zone should be re-assessed. In addition, transfertripping schemes, if available, could also initiate tripping at the remote station, further reducing the need for a remote third zone. However there are still other considerations such as battery collapse, current or potential transformer faults, structural damage to the station, or system configurations that make local fault clearing impossible, and therefore remote zone 3 still has an appeal. Of course where pilot relaying is not in use, the case for providing zone 3 is strong. [4] The traditional application principle of a step-distance protection scheme is illustrated in Figure 1. Consider the problem of backing up the protection system of line CP from the step distance relay located at A. If these were the only

Reverse third zone ZA + 1.2 ZP ZA R

Loadability Limits
Figure 2: Loadability limits for the third zone of a two line bus, a five line bus, and a reverse third zone.

amount of back-up to the neighboring transmission lines. A variation of the third zone is the reverse third zone used by some protection engineers. In order to back up the protection at bus C of line CP in Figure 1, the step distance relay at bus C for line AC can provide a reverse-looking zone which covers 120% of the impedance of line CP taking into consideration the in-feed from the other circuits. This is illustrated by the dotted mho characteristic in Figure 2. It should be clear that the loadability limit of this reverse third zone is greater than that of the traditional third zone setting used at terminal A of the step-distance relay. As indicated in Figure 2, the setting for this element does not include the impedance of line AC. If this is a long line this reduction in reach may be significant and may be sufficient to bring the setting into compliance with loadability rules. It has another advantage in stations that have directional comparison pilot schemes. Often, in such schemes the carrier start uses a reversed mho element. This element can then serve both purposes. The primary disadvantage is the reliance upon local measuring and tripping. If these components fail then this element is of no use. Also, for convenience in setting, once a reverse zone 3 is used, it should be used throughout the system. Although this reverse third zone is identified as a third zone, it will be clear in the following section that its back-up function is not identical to that of the traditional third zone. IV. CONTINGENCIES COVERED BY THE THIRD ZONE It is well to enumerate the types of failures in the protection system at C for line CP (see Figure 1) which the third zone of the step-distance relay at station A is supposed to back-up. Although, in common usage, a protection system may mean only the relays, the actual protection system consists of many other subsystems, which contribute to the detection and removal of faults. [3] Figure 3 shows the basic elements of the protective chain. Referring to Figure 1, zone 3 at station A would serve as the remote backup for the relay at station C in the event that any of these components at that station fail and the fault is not cleared. Good engineering practice recognizes the possible failures and provides the necessary remedies.
Circuit breaker

protection for battery failure may not be necessary. However if only one battery is available, even with a SCADA warning it may be advisable to add zone 3 at the remote stations(s) if the failed battery is at a location which is not easily reached, and maintenance personnel may not have the time to correct the problem quickly. Relays: To cover any single relay failure, it is common practice to use multiple relays covering the phase and ground faults. At the higher voltages or at more critical stations there would be two sets of relays including pilot protection. One may therefore conclude that remote backup protection may be unnecessary, but care must be taken to be sure that no common mode failures exist within the circuitry of multiple relay sets.

Figure 4: Double bus, single breaker configuration.

Transducers At the lower voltage levels the transducers are not normally duplicated and a failure of the potential or current transformers could go unnoticed and result in a failure to trip. In this instance a Zone 3 remote backup would be desirable. At the higher voltage levels the current transformer secondary windings are duplicated, each serving a separate set of relays. The potential transformers or devices are also duplicated or fused separately to maintain integrity to each set of relays.
A

X
4

Fault 3 C

Relay

Transducers

Battery Figure 3: Elements of a protection system. Figure 5: Ring bus at station B. Circuit breaker 3 at B is assumed to have failed.

Batteries: If only one battery is available at the substation, a SCADA system alerts the engineering or operating department to take corrective action if the battery becomes defective. At the higher transmission voltage levels, it is not uncommon to provide two batteries, in which case providing back-up

Circuit Breakers Circuit breakers are not duplicated and failure of a circuit breaker to clear a fault must be considered. Circuit breaker failure tripping schemes are sensitive to system and station configuration. In some cases it is sufficient to open all local

breakers that can contribute to the fault upon detecting a breaker failure. This may not be sufficient, however, to clear a fault and a transfer trip scheme is required. This involves expenditures for communication equipment, which may not be justified, and a remote Zone 3 would be preferable. Referring to Figure 1, if the breaker serving the faulted line CP fails, all of the bus breakers must be tripped to isolate the fault. Figure 1, however, is not a realistic HV or EHV bus configuration and is presented only to illustrate the effect of in-feed. Reference [3] describes several substation bus arrangements. Each one presents an individual situation requiring individual solutions. It is not our purpose here to catalog all such bus arrangements but some examples are instructive. Breaker failure relays: Circuit breaker failure schemes are complex and vary with station and bus configurations. There is a correct distinction in most discussions between the failure of a circuit breaker to clear a fault due to failure of the initiating device (e.g. the protective relays) and a failure of the circuit breaker mechanism itself (e.g loss of insulating properties or mechanical linkage). In this discussion we make no distinction between these two failure modes. As EHV transmission systems matured, local back-up replaced remote back-up and breaker failure schemes started to evolve as a subset of local back-up protection. At first, a separate set of relays was used to initiate the required tripping but this quickly was replaced by a special isolated circuit that employed all of the protective relays that, at the same time that they initiated tripping the appropriate circuit breakers(s), they started a timer. When the timer timed out, a tripping relay opened all of the breakers that could see the fault for which the protective relays had operated. The timer was set just beyond the normal clearing time of the circuit breaker, usually in the order of 7-10 cycles. Bus configurations: Figure 4 shows a double bus, single breaker arrangement that is common in HV stations. If a breaker fails it is necessary to trip all of the breakers on its associated bus and the bus tie. This will clear the fault and a remote zone 3 is not required. If the station has been designed to maintain service to all areas from either bus then system integrity is not compromised. Another common HV transmission line configuration involves a tapped load. Sometimes it is not possible to set zone 2 to see the apparent impedance to the far end fault and not overreach other zone 2 relays at the remote terminal. In such cases a possible solution is to set a remote zone 3 to see the apparent impedance to the remote location. Figure 5 is a ring bus, common to EHV stations. Assume circuit breaker 3 at station B fails for the fault shown. The breaker failure scheme will trip breakers 2 and 4 at station B. The fault may be outside Zone 2 of relays at station C, and a Zone 3 at station C would be required to clear the fault. Figure 6 is an extension of the ring bus into a breaker and a half, probably the most common EHV bus arrangement. For a fault on line A with a failed middle breaker (2), breaker 3 is opened by the local breaker failure scheme, while the remote breakers on line B must be opened by transfer trip, which requires a communication channel to the remote site. Alternatively in the absence of a communication channel, the

remote zone 3 at the other end of line B must be set to see the fault. Note that this zone 3 setting could be made shorter because of the missing in-feed from other lines. However, since a zone 3 setting must encompass all possible system configurations, it must be set with all in-feeds included. Specific bus and station configurations and breaker failure schemes may modify this requirement. For a failure of breaker 1, it is necessary to trip all of the associated bus breakers, which isolates the fault from all of the remote terminals. System integrity may not be compromised since all of the other system elements remain intact. As each component failure is identified, a backup scheme capable of covering that failure must be designed. Of course, a catastrophic, physical failure such as earthquakes or storms that destroy the building, panels or multiple primary equipments will also require a remote backup system such as Zone 3. Included as a catastrophic failure is human error such as incorrect settings or equipment outages during maintenance. Table 1 identifies the specific failures of protection system elements and the coverage provided by three types of back-up protection systems. Although Figure 1 does not show actual HV or EHV bus configurations in use, we refer to that figure to identify the entries listed in Table 1. For instance, the remote back-up provided by zone 3 is located at station A. The fault is on line CP. The reverse zone 3 and breaker failure relays are located at station C. Although all the lines at station C are expected to have a reverse zone 3, the present discussion is considering the reverse zone 3 at station C on line CA. The various components whose failure is considered in Table 1 are also located at station C. Consider the first failure shown in Table 1. If station C has a single battery and it fails, neither the breaker failure protection, nor the reverse zone 3 would back-up line CP, since both these relays are located at station C. The zone 3 of the relay at station A is however not affected by this failure, and therefore it will provide the back-up for line CP. This is indicated by a Yes in the zone 3 column, and No in breaker failure and reverse zone 3 columns. The other failures are treated in the same fashion. Some failures in Table 1 indicate that more than one back-up protection scheme is capable of providing back-up protection for that failure. For example, in the second row of the table when a battery fails in a double battery station, all
1 A 2 B 3

Figure 6: Breaker and a half station configuration.

three back-up schemes will be able to function. This is indicated by a Yes in all three columns for this fault. Which

one of these back-up functions are used in practice is a matter most effective back-up protection. As stated before, the of engineering judgment. operating times of the zone 3 elements (whether conventional Table 1 clearly shows that in the absence of or reverse) are much slower than those of the breaker failure communication channel, duplicate transducers or batteries, schemes. and for certain bus configurations, remote zone 3 provides the Table 1
Failure of protection system components and the role of back-up protection schemes Back-up protection system Failed Element (in bold) Battery, in a single battery station One battery, in a double battery station Relay, in a non-redundant step-distance scheme Relay, in a redundant step-distance scheme Step-distance relay, in a step-distance and pilot protection scheme Pilot relay, in a step-distance and pilot protection scheme Potential device, with non redundant potential devices Potential device, with redundant potential devices Current transformer, with non-redundant current transformers Current transformer, with redundant current transformers Circuit breaker, in a single bus, single breaker station Circuit breaker, in a double bus, single breaker station Circuit breaker, in a ring bus station, without communication channel Circuit breaker, in a ring bus station, with communication channel Middle circuit breaker, in a breaker-and-half station, without communication channel Middle circuit breaker, in a breaker-and-half station, with communication channel Bus circuit breaker, in a breaker-and-half station Catastrophic station failure Remote Zone 3 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Local Breaker Failure No Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No Reverse Zone 3 No Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No

V. IMPROVING LOADABILITY OF THE THIRD ZONE Loadability problems of over-reaching zones of protection have been recognized since the early days of protection. Where third zone as a remote back-up zone is deemed to be necessary, certain technical innovations are available to alter its loadability limit. These innovations are more readily implemented in modern computer relays. However, even the electromechanical relays do have limited ability to improve their loadability. One thing to note is that load excursions are balanced phenomena, so that the presence of unbalanced currents (negative sequence) would indicate a fault, and thus loadability should not be an issue when negative sequence currents are present. Third zone characteristic for three phase faults is the only one where load conditions could be confused with remote faults. It is also unlikely that three phase faults would have a significant fault resistance, so that the third zone shape for such faults could be considerably modified to reduce the resistive reach of the relay, thus increasing the loadability of the relay. These and other improvements are generally available only in computer relays. Electromechanical Relays: The traditional electromechanical relays have fixed zone boundaries, and usually they are made up of circular shapes or straight lines. Directional relays can be applied as blinders restricting the mho circle of zone 3 to high X/R values as opposed to normal load power factor angles. As indicated

above, the presence of negative sequence current is a good indicator that a fault and not a balanced load condition exists. Some innovations in electromechanical relays have addressed the loadability problem by proposing the use of figure-8 shape (a forward offset characteristic) [5] in order to increase the loadability limits of relays, although this relay was designed, to our knowledge such relays have never been used in practice. Electromechanical relays continue to be used on the systems of today, and replacing all of them with more modern electronic or computer relays will require a significant expenditure. Electronic Relays: Electronic and computer relays offer many other alternative solutions to the loadability problem. Quadrilateral characteristics, which shape the protection zones to any desired shape are a definite improvement. Computer Relays: Computer relays have the potential for solving many of the problems which could not be addressed by conventional relays. Many computer relays now offer multiple groups of settings, so that zone 3 settings could be adapted to changing system configurations and the accompanying in-feed variations. Computer relays could also be made to block tripping if a balanced condition exists and the power factor of the line current is characteristic of system loading conditions. This approach is indeed reasonable and should provide security in the case of a heavy load. However one should take

note of the fact that often under unusual system conditions power factor may not always be a sure indicator that a load rather than a fault exists on the line. If one postulates communication between relays at a station, or with relays at remote stations, it may be possible to design more effective logic for differentiating between a load and a fault. Trending observed changes in line currents, correlating changes seen by different relays, using information received from control centers indicative of the state of the power system, etc. could all be integrated in computer relays with a very effective check on the operation of back-up protection systems. Adaptive Relaying: The intelligent supervision of zone 3 is an excellent example of adaptive relaying [6] with its capability to adjust its performance to match the prevailing power system conditions. The problem of the sensitivity of the zone 3 characteristic to emergency load or power system instability can be solved with the use of adaptive relaying principles. Several solutions have already been suggested using electromechanical or electronic relays. Each of these solutions is more readily applied with computer relays. Using computer logic instead of complex wiring immediately improves the reliability of the relay. Pre-fault load could be taken into account, and prevailing stability margins could be introduced into the relaying algorithms. The overwhelming thrust of the NERC rules and other instructions regarding the application of zone 3 elements has been to prevent its operation during emergency conditions. Although this is a desirable goal, it should be recognized that even with all the intelligence available to modern computer relays, the problem of distinguishing a fault from a heavy load in a relatively short time and using only the current and voltage signals available to the relay can not be solved in every single imaginable (and some unimaginable) power system scenarios. If zone 3 is the protection system of last resort, and if it is incorrectly prevented from operating when in should have done so, the consequences to the power system may be much worse than those resulting from an unwanted zone 3 trip. VI. DETERMINING CRITICAL LOCATIONS FOR LOAD ENCROACHMENT Hidden Failures in protection systems: The role of hidden failures in protection systems in creating cascading outages and catastrophic failures has received considerable attention in relaying literature. [7] Given that a certain number of hidden failures in protection systems are unavoidable it becomes necessary to determine which hidden failures are potentially most damaging to the power system. This requires the determination of regions of vulnerability and severity index of each possible hidden failure. [8] One may consider that tripping under load of a zone 3 is really a hidden failure. The technique described in references [7,8] can be applied to determine the zone 3 elements which are critical in the sense of their potential to create cascading failures if they tripped on unusual load excursions. It is at these critical locations that immediate corrective action must be taken. This may include elimination of zone 3 functions and providing alternative back-up

where significant amounts of vars are being transmitted, the protection systems, or possible replacement with computer relays with advanced load discriminating capability. VII. SUMMARY The following points are the key contributions of this paper: (1) Step distance protection scheme is one of the most commonly used back-up protection systems on HV and EHV transmission lines. Zone 3 is an over-reaching zone of protection which is considered the protection of last resort when certain elements of the protection chain fail. (2) Occasionally zone 3 is known to trip under heavy and unusual loading conditions, and thereby contribute to cascading failures of the power system. (3) Industry guidelines have been proposed in order to require that all zone 3 functions must be made immune to tripping under extreme loading conditions. It is clear that extreme loads can not be solely determined by the emergency ampere rating of all series connected equipment. It is also recognized that extreme loading conditions are not always easily or definitively determined. (4) Zone 3 protection can be removed, provided one replaces it with equivalent protection in other forms: using pilot relays, or computer relays, or both or a transfer trip capability. However, this solution for ALL zone 3 relays may be prohibitively expensive and unnecessary. If used, zone 3 settings must also consider other stressed system conditions such as voltage instability, generator loss of field, or system stability any one of which can encroach on the relay characteristic. Whether the contingencies listed or any other situations not specifically described here pose a significant threat of false trip by zone 3 must be must be evaluated before a decision to eliminate zone 3 is taken. (5) Techniques developed for hidden failure analysis of protective systems offer a tool for determining critical locations of zone 3 elements where corrective action must be given highest priority. On the other hand, there may be places on the power system where an insecure zone 3 has no possibility of contributing to a cascading failure of the power system. Clearly zone 3 relays at such locations need not be considered to be of a high priority for replacement. VIII. REFERENCES [1] NERC, August 14, 2003 Blackout: NERC Actions to Prevent and Mitigate the Impacts of Future Cascading Blackouts, February 10, 2004, North American Electric Reliability Council, Princeton, New Jersey. [2] NERC, System Protection and Control Task Force, Relay Loadability Exceptions, Determination and Application of Practical Relaying Loadability Ratings, September 2004, North American Electric Reliability Council, Princeton, New Jersey. [3] Power System Relaying, (book), Stanley H. Horowitz, Arun G. Phadke, Second Edition, Research Studies Press, 1995.

[4] IEEE Guide for Protective Relay Application to Transmission LinesIEEE Power Engineering Society, PSRC , IEEE Std C37.113-1999 [5] Relaying the AEP 765kV System, S.H. Horowitz, A.T. Seeley, Transaction paper 69C-28 PWR [6] Adaptive Transmission System Relaying, S.H. Horowitz, A.G. Phadke, J.S. Thorp, IEEE Summer Meeting, 1987. Trans. PWRD, Oct, 1988 pp 1436-1445.

[7] A.G. Phadke and J.S. Thorp, Expose Hidden Failures to Prevent Cascading Outages, IEEE Computer Applications in Power, Volume 9, No. 3, July 1996, pp 20-23. [8] C. Tamronglak, S.H. Horowitz, A.G. Phadke, J.S. Thorp, Anatomy of Power System Blackouts: Preventive Relaying Strategies, Transactions of IEEE on Power Delivery, Volume: 11, Issue: 2, April 1996, pp: 708 715.

IX. BIOGRAPHIES
S.H. Horowitz (LF 1990) is a consultant, author and lecturer. He joined American Electric Power Service Corp. (then American Gas and Electric) in 1950 and retired in 1989, having served as head of the System Protection Section, Assistant Head of the Electrical Engineering Division and Consulting Electrical Engineer. He is a Life Fellow of the IEEE, and a member of the National Academy of Engineering. He was chairman of the IEEE Power System Relaying Committee from 1975-1978 and chairman of Study Committee 34-Protection and Control of the International Conference on Large High Voltage Electric Systems (CIGRE) from 1980-1986. He co-authored a textbook with A.G. Phadke entitled, Power System Protection, edited the IEEE Press book, Protective Relaying for Power Systems, Volumes I and II, and has authored over two dozen technical papers. He was the editorin-chief of the Power Engineering Society magazine Computer Applications in Power from 1996 to 2002. A. G. Phadke (LF 2003) is a University Distinguished Professor (Emeritus) at Virginia Tech in Blacksburg, Virginia, USA. His primary research area is the microcomputer based monitoring, protection, and control of power systems. He is a co-author of two books on relaying: Computer Relaying for Power Systems, and Power System Relaying, and is the editor of and contributor to the book Handbook of Electrical Engineering Computations. He is a Fellow of IEEE and was awarded the IEEE Third Millennium Medal in 2000, named the Outstanding Power Engineering Educator by the IEEE in 1991, and received the Power Engineering Educator Award of the EEI in 1986. He received the IEEE Herman Halperin Transmission and Distribution award in 2000. He was the Chairman of the Technical Committee of USNC CIGRE, and Editor-In-Chief of IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery. Dr. Phadke was elected to the US National Academy of Engineering in 1993.