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EN BANC G.R. No. L-17468 July 31, 1963

PILAR T. DEL ROSARIO, MARIANO V. DEL ROSARIO and SALVADOR V. DEL ROSARIO, petitioners-appellants, -versusHON. DAMIAN L. JIMENEZ, as Judge of the Municipal Court of Quezon City, Branch III, SANCHO R. JACINTO and DOMINGO BASCARA, respondents-appellees.

Cornelio S. Ruperto for petitioners-appellants. Vicente M. Magpoc for respondents-appellees. Damian L. Jimenez in his own behalf as respondents-appellees.
MAKALINTAL, J.: This case is before us on appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Branch II), dated June 4, 1960, dismissing appellants' petition for certiorari and mandamus to review four orders of the municipal court of Quezon City (Branch III) in civil case No. 5039 entitled "Sancho R. Jacinto, et al. vs. Pilar T. del Rosario, et al." That case was one of forcible entry under Rule 72, involving two parcels of land of which the plaintiffs, Sancho R. Jacinto and Domingo C. Bascara, now respondents-appellees, are the registered owners under transfer certificates of title Nos. 26531 and 26532, both issued by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. These lands had been acquired by them through purchase from the previous registered owner, J.M. Tuazon & Co., Inc. In their answer to the complaint the defendants, now petitionersappellants, claimed ownership of the same properties by purchase from one Macaria Fulgencio and her husband Carlos Javier and alleged that they were and had been in actual physical possession thereof even before the purchase from J.M. Tuazon & Co., Inc. by appellees. Appellants, after a second amended complaint had been filed by appellees, submitted their answer thereto dated October 2, 1958, including a "third-party complaint" against the plaintiffs themselves as well as against J.M. Tuazon & Co., Inc., from both of whom they prayed for an award of damages. In the meantime, after the action of forcible entry was filed, herein appellants commenced a suit for "reconveyance and/or recovery" of the same properties against appellees in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (No. 5230), and then, on November 4, 1958, filed a motion in the municipal court to suspend proceedings in the summary action before it until after the termination of the case in the Court of First Instance. On October 7, 1958 the municipal court denied admission of the third-party complaint; and on the following November 6 it likewise denied the motion to suspend proceedings. In both

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instances appellants moved to reconsider and were turned down in two other separate orders, dated October 24 and November 27, 1958, respectively. These are the four orders subject of appellants' petition for certiorari and mandamus, which was dismissed by the Court of First Instance of Rizal and now on appeal before us. The third-party complaint was improperly brought against appellees Jacinto and Bascara, since they were themselves the plaintiffs in the forcible entry case, as to whom a mere counterclaim would suffice. Insofar as J.M. Tuazon & Co., Inc. was concerned, the allegation against it is that it had entered into a compromise agreement with a certain Deudor in four civil cases in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, whereby it agreed to give priority to occupants of lands involved therein (including those now in dispute) in the matter of their purchase and that the ejectment suit filed by herein appellees was a violation of that compromise agreement. We fail to see how such "agreement to which appellees were strangers, could have anything to do with their right of action to recover the material possession of the lands in question. The prayer in the third-party complaint that J.M. Tuazon & Co., Inc. be sentenced to pay damages should be the subject, if at all, of a separate action so that matters extraneous to the issue of possession may not unnecessarily clutter the forcible entry case. The admission of a third-party complaint is discretionary with the court, and in the present instance there was no abuse of discretion in the order of denial complained of. With respect to the other order that denying appellant's motion to suspend proceedings it is enough to point out, first, that the action for "reconveyance and/or recovery" in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, which appellants claim should take precedence, was filed by them when the forcible entry case was already pending, and was obviously intended to delay the proceedings therein; and secondly, that the issue involved in the later action, which is one of title, is not prejudicial to the determination of the issue of summary possession. The very petition for mandamus and certiorari the dismissal of which is the subject of this appeal is likewise dilatory in nature, as shown by the fact that it is only one of the numerous actions previously resorted to by appellants and decided unfavorably to them. There was special civil action No. 5318, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VI, dismissed by Judge Andres Reyes for lack of jurisdiction and then refiled in Branch V (Quezon City), but again dismissed by Judge Nicasio Yatco on July 2, 1959; and subsequently, there was special civil action No. 5500, Court of First Instance of Rizal, dismissed by Judge Felix R. Domingo on July 8, 1959. Both of these actions were instituted after the ejectment case was filed by herein appellees and sought to suspend the trial thereof. There must be an end to the litigious rigmarole pursued by appellants. The decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Regala, JJ., concur.

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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-11114 December 27, 1957

CRESENCIANO TORREFRANCA, ET AL. plaintiffs-appellants, vs. FILOMENO ALBISO, defendant-appellee.

David C. Ocangas for appellants. Sofronio T. Camacho for appellee.

REYES, A., J.: The question for determination in this case is whether a justice of the peace court has the authority to revive its own judgment. It appears that on March 22, 1950, a judgment was rendered by the justice of the peace court of Carmen, Bohol, ordering the defendant in a forcible entry and detainer case to restore possession of a piece of land and pay damages to the plaintiffs. The judgment having remained unsatisfied for more than five years, the plaintiffs, on October 22, 1955, brought the present action to have it revived in the same justice of the peace court. The defendant opposed the action, but the court, after hearing, declared the judgment revived and again ordered what was necessary to be done in compliance therewith. The defendant appealed to the Court of First Instance, but as he failed to file a supersedeas bond, the plaintiffs asked for a writ of execution. With that motion still pending determination, the defendant on his part filed a motion for the dismissal of the case, contending that the Court of First Instance, as an appellate court, had no jurisdiction to try it because, according to him, the justice of the peace court itself did not have jurisdiction to entertain an action for the revival of a judgment. Upholding this contention and also holding the plaintiffs guilty of laches for failing to secure a writ of execution within five years, the Court of first Instance ordered the case dismissed. From that order, the plaintiffs appealed directly to this court, and we see that the question involved is purely legal. The appeal is well taken. Matters pertaining to the "execution, satisfaction and effect of judgments", are governed by the provisions of Rule 39, and Section 6 of that rule provides:lawphi1.net SEC. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. A judgment may be executed on motion within five years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action.

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This provision, and for that matter the whole of Rule 39, is applicable in inferior courts as Rule 4, which governs the procedure in those courts, expressly declares in its section 19. That section reads: SEC. 19. Application of certain rules. Rules 10, 12, 13, 14, 18, 28, 29, 30 and 39 applicable in inferior courts in cases falling within their jurisdictions and in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this rule. We see nothing in section 6 of Rule 39 that is inconsistent with Rule 4. Furthermore, the Judiciary Act of 1948 gives justice of the peace courts jurisdiction over actions of forcible entry and detainer and also empowers them (in its section 91) to issue all "process necessary to enforce their orders and judgments". Needless to say, the revival of a judgment is a necessary step in its enforcement where, as in the present case, the judgment, which has remained unsatisfied for more than five years, can no longer be executed upon mere motion and has to be enforced by action as provided in section 6 of Rule 39. The authority of a justice of the peace of court to revive its own judgment being clear, it was error to dismiss plaintiff's action on the theory that such authority did not exist. Holding the plaintiffs guilty of laches for failing to secure a writ of execution within five years from the entry of judgment, the lower court would also, on that ground, deprive them of their right to have the judgment revived. To that we cannot agree. It is clear that section 6 of Rule 39 gives the plaintiffs not only the right to enforce the judgment through the mere motion for execution within five years, but also, after the expiration of that period without the judgment having been satisfied, the right to bring an action for its enforcement within the time prescribed by the statute of limitations. We would be construing the section arbitrarily were we to hold that the right to bring that action is forfeited if the right to move for execution has not been exercised. In view of the foregoing, the order of dismissal is set aside and the case remanded to the court below for further proceedings. Costs against the defendants. So ordered.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.

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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-56 October 10, 1945

MAURICIO MIRANO, petitioners, vs. POMPEYO DIAZ, Judge of First Instance of Manila, et al. respondents.

Dionisio A. Hernandez for petitioner. Magsalin and Cacnio for respondents.

DE JOYA, J.: On June 11, 1945, the respondents Pedro Mossesgeld Santiago and Mercedes Alonzo Mossesgeld filed, in the Municipal Court of the City of Manila, a complaint against herein petitioner, for forcible entry and detainer, alleging that they were illegally deprived of the possession of the lot and house in question, by herein petitioner, by means of force and intimidation, since May 7, 1945. Petitioner, as defendant therein, moved for the dismissal of the case, stating that the alleged sale of the lot and house in question, now claimed by respondents, is null and void, as it was executed under a power of attorney, which had been forged, allegedly under duress. After hearing said petition for dismissal, the respondent municipal judge dismissed the case, for lack of jurisdiction, on the ground that the question involved is not one of possession but ownership. Respondents appealed to the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila, which, on motion of respondents, claiming that the question involved in the case is really one of possession and not of ownership, and that the respondent judge of the municipal court has jurisdiction to try the case, remanded it to the respondent municipal judge, for trial on the merits; and the trial has already been commenced. Petitioner tried to appeal from said order, but the respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila, holding that said order was interlocutory and unappealable, disapproved petitioner's record on appeal. At this stage of the proceedings, the defendant in said case for forcible entry and detainer filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in this Court, alleging the facts above stated, and asks for the annulment of the order of the respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila, declaring that the respondent judge of the municipal court has jurisdiction to try the case on the merits, at the same time remanding it to the latter for that

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purpose. Petitioner likewise asks that the respondent municipal judge be prohibited from taking further cognizance of the case. Respondent filed an answer, also alleging the facts above stated. On the date set for the hearing of the case before this Court, counsel for the parties appeared and argued the case. It is well-established doctrine in this jurisdiction that, in a forcible entry and detainer case, in any municipal court or justice of the peace court, when the case is dismissed, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, and an appeal is taken to the Court of First Instance, the only question to be determined is whether or not, the inferior court has jurisdiction to try the case on the merits (Rule 92; Carroll vs. Paredes, 17 Phil., 94; Davis vs. Director of prisons, 17 Phil., 168; U.S. vs. Bernardo, 19 Phil., 265). If the Court of First Instance should decide that the municipal court or justice of the peace court has jurisdiction to try the case, as correctly held in this case, it must be remanded to said court, for trial on the merits (Lucido vs. Vita, 25 Phil., 414). The order of the respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila, the Hon. Pompeyo Diaz, remanding the case to the municipal court, for its trial on the merits, is strictly in accordance with the law and authorities above cited. In order that a petition for certiorari may prosper, it is absolutely necessary to show that the respondent judge acted without jurisdiction or in excess thereof (De la Cruz vs. Moir, 36 Phil., 213). In the instant case, the respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance has acted strictly in accordance with law. The petition for certiorari and prohibition, being completely and absolutely devoid of merits, it is hereby dismissed, with costs.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Jaranilla, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon and Briones, JJ., concur. Moran, C.J., I hereby certify that Mr. Justice Hilado voted for the dismissal of the petition.

Separate Opinions

PERFECTO, J., concurring: Respondent Mossesgeld filed in the Municipal Court of Manila a complaint for forcible entry against the petitioner. The municipal court, after hearing, dismissed the case on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction in view of the allegation of ownership made by the petitioner.

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The plaintiffs appealed the case to the Court of First Instance of Manila, which upon motion of plaintiffs, ordered, on July 31, 1945, the case remanded to the municipal court, directing it to hear and make the necessary adjudication after finding that the municipal court had jurisdiction over the case. The defendant appealed from said order and filed a record on appeal, but the Court of First Instance disapproved the same for the reason that its order of July 31, 1945, was interlocutory in nature and no appeal would lie therefrom. We do not agree with this opinion. The order of July 31, 1945, is not interlocutory in nature. It disposed of finally the appeal interposed by plaintiffs against the order of dismissal issued by the municipal court. If, instead of appealing, plaintiffs had file petition for mandamus to compel the municipal court to proceed with and decide the forcible entry case, the decision of the Court of First Instance granting the petition would be substantially the same as the order of July 31, 1945. Undoubtledly, the decision granting the petition for mandamus would be appealable. The allegation of respondents to the effect that the order of July 31, 1945, did not dispose of finally the case in untenable. The same thing would have happened if, instead of appealing, plaintiffs resorted to a mandamus proceeding. The question presented in the appeal, or which would have been presented in the mandamus proceeding, would be exclusively whether of or not the municipal court had jurisdiction to try the forcible entry case, and that question was decided finally in the order of July 31, 1945, as would be in a decision granting mandamus for the same purpose.lawphil.net If petitioner had filed before this Court a petition for mandamus to compel the Court of First Instance of Manila to approve his record on appeal and give due course to his appeal, his action would, undoubtedly, have prospered.

certiorari proceedings, the question whether or not the municipal court has jurisdiction to try
and decide the forcible entry case. In this question, our conclusion is not favorable to the petitioner.

The petitioner decided to follow a different course by presenting squarely, in these

It appears that the plaintiffs filed the complaint, alleging that on May 7, 1945, they were deprived by force of the possession of the property in question. If this is the fact, the plaintiffs are entitled to respect in their possession. The possessors are entitled to be protected in their possession even against the real owner who ousted them by force. No one has a right to take justice in his own hands. The main purpose of the summary proceedings in a forcible entry case is to preserve order and peace. In view of the foregoing, we concur in the denial of the petition.

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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 47833 August 17, 1942

SALUD LIZO, plaintiff-appellant, vs. CAMILO CARANDANG, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

Aurelio Palileo for appellant. Rosales, Alampay and Alvero for appellees.
BOCOBO, J.: 1. FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINEE; WHAT DETERMINES JURISDICTION OF THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE COURT. It is well established that what determines the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace court in a forcible entry and detainer case is the nature of the action pleaded in the complaint. If the facts therein alleged constitute forcible entry and detainer, the justice of the peace court may validly try and decide the case, regardless of whether the facts pleaded are or are not proved at the trial. If, as in the instant case, the cause of action set forth in the complaint is one of forcible entry and detainer, although the facts proved at the trial do not support the cause of action thus alleged but one of reivindication, the court has jurisdiction to dismiss the action on the merits for lack of evidence. The dismissal, therefore of the action ordered by the justice of the peace court in this case upon failure of proof, was right and proper, but its further pronouncement that it had no jurisdiction over the question of ownership arising from the facts proved was immaterial. 2. ID.; ID.; APPELLATE JURISDICTION OF COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE. A similar confusion appears in the decision of the Court of First Instance which, acting upon the stipulation of facts on appeal, affirmed the conclusion of the justice of the peace court that it had no jurisdiction and, what is worse, upon that ground it dismissed the appeal. Affirmance of the judgment and dismissal of the appeal are two utterly incompatible ideas. By affirming the judgment, the Court of First Instance exercises its appellate jurisdiction, whereas by dismissing the appeal, it refuses to exercise appellate jurisdiction. 3. ID.; ID.; ID.; TRIAL "DE NOVO." Generally, the jurisdiction of a Court of First Instance on appeal is to hold trial de novo (Rule 40, section 9, Rules of Court), and by trial de novo is meant that the Court of First Instance shall try the case without regard to the proof presented in the justice of the peace court or to the conclusions reached by it. The Court of First Instance, therefore, should not affirm, reverse, or modify the ruling of the justice of the peace court, but it should make its own findings, lay down its own conclusions, and dispose of the case as if the same had never been tried before and had been originally commenced therein.

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4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. The only instance in which the Court of First Instance may affirm, reverse, or modify the ruling of the justice of the peace court is where the latter has disposed of the case upon a question of law without any trial. (See Rule 40, sections 10 and 11.) For instance, if a motion to dismiss is filed in the justice of the peace court on the ground that the complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and the motion is granted, the case being consequently dismissed, the Court of First Instance, on appeal by the plaintiff, can only review the ruling of the justice of the peace court and affirm or reverse it as the facts and the law of the case may warrant. Again, if the justice of the peace court refuses to try the case because it has no jurisdiction over the same according to the facts pleaded in the complaint, and accordingly dismisses the action, the Court of First Instance, on appeal by the plaintiff, can only review the ruling of the inferior court on the question of jurisdiction and affirm it if such order is right, or reverse it if it is wrong, in which event the case should be remanded to the inferior court for further proceedings. 5. ID.; ISSUE INVOLVED IS POSSESSION IN FACT, OR PHYSICAL POSSESSION OF REAL PROPERTY. In an action for forcible entry and detainer, the only issue is possession in fact, or physical possession of real property, independently of any claim of ownership that either party may put forth in his pleading. If plaintiff can prove prior physical possession in himself, he may recover such possession even from the owner, but, on the other hand, if he cannot prove such prior physical possession, he has no right of action for forcible entry and detainer even if he should be the owner of the property. 6. ID.; SUMMARY PROTECTION OF MERE FACT OF POSSESSION. Both in principle and on policy, the mere fact of possession should be summarily protected and upheld by the courts, independently from the question of ownership. 7. ID.; ID.; ONE OF THE REASONS FOR SUMMARY PROTECTION OF MERE FACT OF POSSESSION. To allow citizens to arrogate unto themselves the right to pass judgment upon their own claims of property rights would give rise to no end of turbulent wrangles and affrays. Precisely, justice of the peace courts, which are the instrumentalities of justice most available to the people, are called upon to settle questions of possession in a manner that brooks no delay, so that the community may not be continually thrown into a turmoil by violent acts of dispossession. For this reason justice of the peace courts should not so readily decline to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that the case involves a question of ownership. 8. ID.; ID.; ANOTHER REASON FOR SUMMARY PROTECTION OF MERE FACT OF POSSESSION. The fact of possession in itself has a positive value and is endowed with a distinct standing of its own in the law of property. True, by this principle of respect for the possessory status, a wrongful possession may at times be upheld by the courts, but this is only temporary and for one sole and special purpose, namely the maintenance of public order. The protection is only temporary because it is intended that as soon as the lawless act of dispossession has been suppressed, the question of ownership or of possession de jure is to be settled in the proper court and in a proper action. The larger and permanent interests of property require that such rare and exceptional instances of preference in the courts for the actual but wrongful possessor

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be permitted. Possession is at once the basis and the outward manifestation of ownership. It is the foundation upon which property rests because without possession, personally held or through an agent, or granted by contract to a lessee or usufructuary or the like, the right of dominion would become a delusion. For how else could the owner enjoy his lands and tenements? Consequently, to leave possession exposed to all manner of danger and threat would be to undermine property itself. The same reasons for safe-guarding ownership hold for guaranteeing possession. 9. ID.; ID.; ID. As an external expression of dominion, possession ought to be shielded. This visible sign or symbol of ownership should be preserved from all violence or chicanery because of the probability, nay the certainty in most instances, that the possessor is either the true owner or is entitled to the right of possession, as is the case of a lessee or a possessor in good faith. The ordinary course of affairs is that the actual possessor is either the owner or the holder of possession de jure. Hence, the presumption of ownership or of rightful possession. It would be a short-sighted norm to leave this token of the right of property unguarded just because of the scant possibility that the possession may be unlawful. It is wiser, by far, to risk such exceptional possibility, in order that the security of property in general may be the better cemented and consolidated. The law looks to the usual rather than the unusual state of human affairs. 10. ID.; ID.; ID.;MERITS OF CASE AT BAR. According to the facts agreed upon, the plaintiff was at most only a copossessor of A. C., and as such she could lay no claim to the exclusive possession of the property to the detriment of the defendants who had acquired the rights of A. C. Moreover, plaintiff was in truth no longer a copossessor, because of her refusal to return to the house at the request of A. C. and of the town mayor. Plaintiff having thus given up and abandoned her original right of copossession, there is no reason why the present possessors should be ejected from the property.

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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-22984 March 27, 1968

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MARGARITO SARONA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. FELIPE VILLEGAS and RAMONA CARILLO, defendants-appellees.

Aportadera & Palabrica for plaintiffs-appellants. Castillo Law Offices for defendants-appellees.
SANCHEZ, J.: The key question thrust upon us is whether the present is a case of forcible entry or one of unlawful detainer. The problem arose because on January 28, 1963, plaintiffs lodged with the Municipal Court of Padada, Davao, against defendants as complaint, styled "Unlawful Detainer." 1 They there aver that they are the absolute owners and in possession of a parcel of land in Paligue, Padada. Their complaint then proceeds to recite: 3. That on April 1, 1958, defendants entered upon said land Lot "F" constructed their residential house thereon and up to date remain in possession thereof, unlawfully withholding the possession of the same from the plaintiffs; 4. That the reasonable rental for said Lot is P20.00 per month; 5. That on December 28, 1962, plaintiffs demanded of defendants to vacate the premises and to pay the rentals in arrears but then defendants failed to do so; that defendants' possession thus became clearly unlawful after said demand; xxx xxx xxx

They asked that they be restored into possession, and that defendants be made to pay rents, attorneys' fees, expenses of litigation, and costs. Defendants met the complaint with a motion to dismiss on the sole ground of lack of jurisdiction of the municipal court. They say that the case is one of forcible entry, and the reglementary one-year period had elapsed before suit was started. The municipal court overturned the motion to dismiss.

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On May 15, 1963, defendants registered their answer. They reiterated the court's lack of jurisdiction, and by way of affirmative defenses, stated that plaintiffs have no cause of action, and that "the present residential house of the defendants was transferred to the present site after plaintiffs sold to defendants a portion of their land, which includes the site of the present house and from and after said sale, defendants have occupied the said portion legally and with the knowledge and consent of plaintiffs." They counterclaimed for damages. The municipal court's judgment directed defendants to vacate the premises, to pay plaintiffs a monthly rental of P10.00, from April 1, 1958 until possession is restored, and P200.00 as attorneys' fees, and costs. Defendants, on appeal to the court of First Instance of Davao, 2 renewed their bid to throw out of court plaintiffs' complaint for want of jurisdiction. Plaintiffs' opposition and defendants' reply thereto were also submitted. On December 26, 1963, the Court of First Instance of Davao dismissed the case. The court reasoned but that the suit was one of forcible entry and was started beyond the reglementary one-year period. Plaintiffs appealed to this Court. Plaintiffs' position is that the municipal court had original jurisdiction; that consequently the Court of First Instance had appellate jurisdiction. Their theory is that suit was well within the one-year period. They say that the parting date is December 28, 1962, when plaintiffs demanded of defendants to vacate the premises and pay rentals in arrears; and that the complaint was registered in court on January 28, 1963. Solution of the problem turns on this question: Is the complaint one of forcible entry or unlawful detainer? 1wph1.t 1. Section 1, Rule 70 (formerly Section 10, Rule 72) of the Revised Rules of Court, states that a person deprived of possession of land "by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth," or a person against whom the possession of any land "is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied," may at any time "within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper inferior court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession." The next legal precept, Section 2 of the same Rule, provides that the landlord may not sue his tenant for ejectment "for failure to pay rent due or to comply with the conditions of his lease, unless the tenant shall have failed to pay such rent or comply with such conditions for a period of fifteen (15) days, or five (5) days in the case of building, after demand therefor, . . . ." It is plain that the foregoing rules define two entirely distinct causes of action, to wit: (a) action to recover possession founded on illegal occupation from the beginning forcible entry; and (b) action founded on unlawful detention by a person who originally acquired possession lawfully unlawful detainer. 3

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The law and jurisprudence leave no doubt in our mind that what determines the cause of action is the nature of defendants' entry into the land. If entry is illegal, then the cause of action which may be filed against the intruder within one year therefrom is forcible entry. If, on the other hand, entry is legal but thereafter possession became illegal, the case is one of illegal detainer which must be filed within one year from the date of the last demand. 2. We observe a lack of precision-tooling in the complaint. Defendants' alleged entry into the land is not characterized whether legal or illegal. It does not say how defendants entered the land and constructed their residential house thereon. It is silent, too, whether possession became legal before plaintiffs made the demand to vacate and to pay rentals. Nor does the complaint as much as intimate that defendants are plaintiffs' tenants. So that the case would not come within the coverage of Section 2 of Rule 70 (summary action by landlord against tenant). Failure to specifically aver in the complaint facts which definitely show that plaintiffs' action is for forcible entry or unlawful detainer, is not to be lightly treated. Jurisdiction here challenged in a motion to dismiss depends upon, factual averments. The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. Where, as here, the only definite ultimate facts averred are that on April 1, 1958, defendants entered upon the land and constructed their residential house thereon, remained in possession thereof, and that demand to vacate and pay rentals only was made on December 28, 1962, well beyond the one-year period, the municipal court of Padada did not have jurisdiction. The want of jurisdiction is the more accentuated when we consider the facts that surfaced during the trial as found by the municipal court, viz: In the course of the hearing of this case it is clear that, according to the plaintiff, Margarito Sarona, the defendants transferred their house on April 1, 1958 to the litigated area which is designated as Lot F, (Exhibit "C-1") without their consent and permission. At that time he was just living 200 meters away from the lot. He requested the defendants not to place the said house in the litigated area but the defendants refused. He did nothing and only on December 28, 1962, when the formal letter of demand to vacate and to pay rental was made by the plaintiff through their lawyer, Atty. Palabrica, and addressed the said letter to the defendants but the defendants refused to vacate the area and to pay a rental of P20.00. . . . It is then too plain for argument that defendants entered the land on April 1, 1958 without plaintiffs' consent and permission; that plaintiff Margarito Sarona "requested the defendants not to place the said house in the litigated area but the defendants refused." The findings of the municipal court itself may not be downgraded in the present case. And this, for the reason that the complaint did not specifically state the manner of entry of defendants into the land legal or illegal. Since the parties went to trial on the merits, and it came to light that defendants' entry was illegal at the inception, the municipal court should have dismissed the case. That court cannot close its eyes to the truth revealed by plaintiffs' own evidence before it. A court of limited jurisdiction, said municipal court, should not have proceeded to render an on-the-merits judgment thereon. 4

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Clearly, plaintiffs' case fits in the jurisprudential precept of forcible entry. Because the entry is forcible. Long had it been made evident that in forcible entry cases, no force is really necessary In order to constitute the use of "force," as contemplated in this provision, the trespasser does not have to institute a state of war. Nor is it even necessary that he should use violence against the person of the party in possession. The act of going on the property and excluding the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily implies the exertion of force over the property, and this is all that is necessary. Under the statute entering upon the premises by strategy or stealth is equally an obnoxious as entering by force. The foundation of the action is really the forcible exclusion of the original possessor by a person who has entered without right. The words "by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth" include every situation or condition under which one person can wrongfully enter upon real property and exclude another, who has had prior possession, therefrom. If a trespasser enters upon land in open daylight, under the very eyes of the person already clothed with lawful possession, but without the consent of the latter, and there plants himself and excludes such prior possessor from the property, the action of forcible entry and detainer can unquestionably be maintained, even though no force is used by the trespasser other than such as is necessarily implied from the mere acts of planting himself on the ground and excluding the other party. 5 3. But plaintiffs would want to make out a case of illegal detainer upon their belated claim that they tolerated defendants' possession. To be observed on this point is that there has been no allegation in the complaint, and no showing during the trial in the municipal court, that possession of defendants ever changed from illegal to legal any time from their illegal entry to the demand to vacate. No averment there is in the complaint which recites as a fact any overt act on plaintiffs' part indicative of permission to occupy the land. Without resorting to mind-reading, we are hard put to conclude that there was such a change from illegal to legal possession of defendants until the demand to vacate was made. But even where possession preceding the suit is by tolerance of the owner, still, distinction should be made. If right at the incipiency defendants' possession was with plaintiffs' tolerance, we do not doubt that the latter may require him to vacate the premises and sue before the inferior court under Section 1 of Rule 70, within one year from the date of the demand to vacate. Because, from the date of demand, possession became unlawful. And the case is illegal detainer. 6 But will this rule as to tolerance hold true in a case where there was forcible entry at the start, but the lawful possessor did not attempt to oust the intruder for over one year, and only thereafter filed forcible entry suit following demand to vacate? Professor Arturo M. Tolentino states that acts merely tolerated are "those which by reason of neighborliness or familiarity, the owner of property allows his neighbor or another person to do on the property; they are generally those particular services or benefits which one's property can give to another without material injury or prejudice to the owner, who permits them out of friendship or courtesy." 7 He adds that: "[t]hey are acts of little disturbances which a person, in the interest of neighborliness or friendly relations, permits

14

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others to do on his property, such as passing over the land, tying a horse therein, or getting some water from a well." And, Tolentino continues, even though "this is continued for a long time, no right will be acquired by prescription." 8 Further expounding on the concept, Tolentino writes: "There is tacit consent of the possessor to the acts which are merely tolerated. Thus, not every case of knowledge and silence on the part of the possessor can be considered mere tolerance. By virtue of tolerance that is considered as an authorization, permission or license, acts of possession are realized or performed. The question reduces itself to the existence or non-existence of the permission." 9 A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word "tolerance" confirms our view heretofore expressed that such tolerance must be present right from the start of possession sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer not of forcible entry. Indeed, to hold otherwise would espouse a dangerous doctrine. And for two reasons: First. Forcible entry into the land is an open challenge to the right of the possessor. Violation of that right authorizes the speedy redress in the inferior court provided for in the rules. If one year from the forcible entry is allowed to lapse before suit is filed, then the remedy ceases to be speedy; and the possessor is deemed to have waived his right to seek relief in the inferior court. Second. If a forcible entry action in the inferior court is allowed after the lapse of a number of years, then the result may well be that no action of forcible entry can really prescribe. No matter how long such defendant is in physical possession, plaintiff will merely make a demand, bring suit in the inferior court upon a plea of tolerance to prevent prescription to set in and summarily throw him out of the land. Such a conclusion is unreasonable. Especially if we bear in mind the postulates that proceedings of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary in nature, and that the one year time-bar to the suit is but in pursuance of the summary nature of the action. 10 It is well to remember that after the lapse of the one year period, suit must be started in the Court of First Instance in an accion publiciana. Jurisdiction in the case before us is with the Court of First Instance. For the reasons given, the order of the Court of First Instance of Davao of December 26, 1963 dismissing the case for want of jurisdiction in the Municipal Court of Padada, is hereby affirmed. Costs against plaintiffs-appellants. So ordered.1wph1.t

15

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Angeles and Fernando, JJ. concur. Castro, J., took no part. Concepcion, C.J., is on leave.
Footnotes
1

Civil Case 164, Municipal Court of Padada, Davao entitled "Margarito Sarona, Antero Sarona, Ireneo Sarona, Lucila Sarona, Francisco Sarona, Felisa Sarona, and Montana Sarona, Plaintiffs, vs. Felix Villegas and Ramona Carillo, Defendants."

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2

16

Civil Case 4184, Court of First, Instance of Davao Sarona, et al., plaintiff, versus Villegas, et: al., defendants.1wph1.t
3

Medel vs. Militante, 41 Phil. 526, 530; Dy Sun vs. Brillantes, 93 Phil. 175, 177.

Cf . Iigo vs. Estate of Adriana Maloto, L-24384, September 28, 1967, citing cases.

Mediran vs. Villanueva, 37 Phil. 752, 756-757, quoted with approval in Santos vs. Santiago, 38 Phil. 575, 577-578.
6

3 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed., p. 287, citing Minute Resolution in Amis vs. Aragon, L-4735-4736-4684, April 28, 1951.
7

II Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1963 ed., p. 227, citing I Ruggiero 843; Emphasis supplied.
8

Id., citing 2-II Colin & Capitant 911; emphasis supplied. Ibid; emphasis supplied.
Monteblanco vs. Hinigaran Sugar Plantation, 63 Phil. 797, 802-803.

10

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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-1855 June 22, 1949

17

FELIPE C. ALVIAR, ET AL., petitioners, vs. SANTOS B. PAMPOLINA, Justice of the Peace of San Pablo, Laguna, RURAL PROGRESS ADMINISTRATION and THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF LAGUNA, respondents.

Juan S. Rustia for petitioners. Luis M. Kasilag and Lorenzo B. Vizconde for respondent Rural Progress Administration.
MORAN, C.J.: On May 25, 1935, more than 720 tenants filed an action (civil case No. 6663) in the Court of First Instance of Laguna against Colegio de San Jose, praying that defendant be compelled to respect its contracts of lease with plaintiffs on some parcels of lands located in San Pedro Tunasan, Laguna. After trial, judgment was rendered declaring that plaintiffs and their privies or agents had no longer any right to continue occupying the property in litigation and they were ordered to vacate and deliver the same to the defendant. On appeal, the judgement was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in a decision promulgated on July 31, 1940. The property was later purchased by the Commonwealth of the Philippines and came under the direct and exclusive management of the respondent Rural Progress Administration. On October 9, 1946, an action was filed in the Court of First Instance of the same province against the Rural Progress Administration and others by numerous plaintiffs allegedly the same plaintiffs in the former civil case No. 6663, or their agents or successor in interest. In this new complaint, registered as civil case No. 8039, it is prayed that the title of Colegio de San Jose on the property in the litigation and the sale in favor of the Commonwealth of the Philippines be declared null and void. Apparently, this second complaint was dismissed on notion of the Rural Progress Administration on the ground of res judicata and lack of cause of action, and from the order of dismissal an appeal was taken to this Court. Upon the other hand, the Rural Progress Administration filed several complaints for forcible entry and detainer of the same property and against the same plaintiffs, their agents or successors in interest in the justice of the peace court of San Pedro Tunasan, Laguna. To these complaints, the defendants filed motion for dismissal alleging that the justice of the peace court had no jurisdiction because there was already an action for title pending then in the Court of First Instance, which was civil case No. 8039 above mentioned. The justice of the peace denied the motion for dismissal on the ground that the facts alleged in the complaints constitute forcible entry and detainer falling within his jurisdiction. Wherefore, the defendants filed their action for certiorari in the Court of First Instance, which was dismissed after trial upon the ground that the proper remedy was appeal, and that, furthermore, the respondent justice of

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the peace had jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the persons of the parties. The order of dismissal was appealed to this Court. In the meantime, the cases for the forcible entry and detainer were tried by the justice of the peace court and judgment were rendered therein against the defendants which have become final and executory, some of them having been already executed and the others about to be executed. The defendants asked for suspension of execution, but because said petition was denied they filed the present petition for certiorari. There is no doubt that the justice of the peace court of San Pedro Tunasan, Laguna, had jurisdiction over all the cases for forcible entry and detainer filed with it by the Rural Progress Administration. The pendency of an action for title filed but he defendants against the plaintiffs in the Court of First Instance is no good ground for impugning the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace of the court. Furthermore, well known is the rule that an action for ownership is not a bar to an action for forcible entry and detainer. Whether title is necessarily involved in an action for forcible entry and detainer is a question of fact to be determined from the evidence presented by both parties at the trial, and that question can be reviewed only on appeal and not by certiorari proceedings in the Court of First Instance. If the justice of the peace court had jurisdiction over the forcible entry and detainer cases, then it had jurisdiction to try and render judgments therein and order the execution had been filed in the Court of First Instance to set aside the order of the justice of the peace court by which it assumed such jurisdiction; but if no writ of preliminary injunction was issued therein by the Court of First Instance against the justice of the peace court, the latter could continue trying and deciding the said cases and order the execution of the judgments rendered therein. Petition is dismissed with costs against petitioners.

18

Paras, Feria, Perfecto, Bengzon, Tuazon, Montemayor and Reyes, JJ., concur. Moran, C.J., Justice Pablo voted for dismissal.

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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-19370 April 30, 1964

19

GENARO PRADO, plaintiff-appellant, vs. APOLINARIO CALPO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

Romulo M. Abarcar for plaintiff-appellant. Tadeo and Tadeo, Jr. for defendants-appellees.
PAREDES, J.: On May 24, 1957, plaintiff Genaro Prado, filed with the Justice of the Peace Court of San Jacinto, Pangasinan, a forcible entry case against the defendants. On June 6, 1957, defendants presented their Answer, and interposed special and affirmative defenses, among which was the claim that defendant Dalmacio Cabrera was the owner of the property allegedly occupied by said defendants, having purchased the same from the Marciana Calpito, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale (Exh. 1) and for which he (Cabrera) was issued a TCT No. 23006 for said land in his name (Exh. 2). The Answer also averred that the Justice of the Peace Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the case, because it involved question of title over the property. A counter-claim in the sum of P500.00 for damages and P300.00 for attorney's fees, was also interposed. Before trial, defendants filed a Petition for Dismissal dated July 25, 1959, on the principal ground that since the question of title and/or ownership was necessarily involved, the JP Court had no jurisdiction thereof, for to determine who had the right of possession (the issue in forcible entry cases), a finding as to the title or ownership was imperative. Plaintiff opposed, claiming, among others, that the ground on which the same was based could only be resolve in a trial on the merits, for, whether title is necessarily involved in an action for forcible entry or not is a question of fact. On August 28, 1957, the JP Court denied the Petition for Dismissal and set the case for trial on the merits. On November 21, 1957, the JP Court rendered judgment, the pertinent portions of which read: A careful study of the evidence adduced by both parties, testimonial and documentary, clearly shows that the preponderance of evidence is in favor of the plaintiff. This Court can not see with valid reason the justification of the defendants in not presenting the supposed predecessor or predecessors of defendant Dalmacio Cabrera. ... . ... In action for forcible entry and detainer, the only issue is possession in fact, or physical possession of real property, independently of any claim of ownership and either party may put forth in his pleading, If plaintiff can prove prior physical possession in himself, he may recover such possession from the owner, ... .

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The defendants have never questioned the due execution or validity of the documents presented by plaintiff nor has plaintiff questioned the issuance of the TRANSFER CERTIFICATE No. 23006 issued in the name of defendant Dalmacio Cabrera nor any of the other documents presented by the defendant Dalmacio Cabrera. In the light of the foregoing considerations, this Court is of the honest opinion, and so holds, that the preponderance of evidence is in favor of the plaintiff, for which reason judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the herein defendants, to wit: (a) That defendants are hereby ordered to vacate the premises and restore unto the plaintiff the possession thereof ; (b) That defendants are hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally unto the plaintiff the sum of P50.00 per month from May 18, 1957 up to the time the land is actually delivered; (c) That defendants are ordered to pay jointly and severally unto the plaintiff the sum of P500.00 in concept of damages, moral and actual; and (d) That defendants are hereby ordered to pay the costs of this suit. Upon denial of defendants' Motion for Reconsideration and New Trial, they perfected their appeal to the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. Instead of presenting their Answer, defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss, again raising the same issue of jurisdiction of the inferior court. On December 17, 1958, the CFI without any hearing handed down an Order, of the following tenor: After a close scrutiny of the pleadings, and the jurisprudence on the matter, the court is constrained to grant the motion to dismiss. The land in question is presently covered by a certificate of title in the names of the defendants, the defense upon which defendants rely necessarily involves ownership, the registration of the property in question in their names. Possession is merely an attribute of ownership and the mere filing of a forcible entry case does not make possession superior in character to that of ownership. xxx xxx xxx

20

The lower court, therefore, should have dismissed the case when the evidence presented by the defendants involved the ownership of the property which (it is not denied but on the contrary admitted) is described in the certificate of title of the defendants for the reason that from then on it had lost jurisdiction to try the case. xxx xxx xxx

Actual Evidence of ownership have been introduced by the parties in the lower courts. Those consist of the deed of sale in plaintiffs' favor (Exh. A); deed of sale in favor of the

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vendor of plaintiff (Exh. D); and the deed of sale and transfer certificate of title No. 23006 in the name of defendant Dalmacio V. Cabrera (Exhs. 1 and 2). These proofs center on the ownership of the property described in the complaint which issue the power court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this case is hereby dismissed with costs against the plaintiff. Plaintiff moved for the reconsideration of the above Order, stating that trial on the merits would have been more consistent with law and equity. On January 16, 1959, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration. Thus, this appeal, plaintiffs-appellees alleging that the lower court committed three (3) errors, which center on question of whether or not, under the facts of the case, the JP Court had jurisdiction to entertain the case and CFI could legally take cognizance of the appeal. 1wph1.t The CFI erred in quashing the case, upon a mere motion to dismiss. The findings of the JP Court clearly show that the plaintiffs had prior physical possession of the disputed property and the alleged circumstance that the defendant Cabrera was the registered owner of the property, did not detract from the fact that plaintiffs had a right possession thereof which should be protected. Incidentally, We note that the Certificate of Title in the name of Cabrera was issued only on February 17, 1956; whereas the plaintiffs' right to occupy the premises was evidenced by a Deed of Sale of the property to them, dated November 28, 1947, executed by Ventura Garcia and his wife Maria Consuelo Frianeza, who bought the same property Gonzalo Sandoval, by virtue of a Deed of Sale dated May 2, 1938. When possession is the issue, an action for Forcible Entry and Detainer is the proper remedy. The CFI should have heard the case on the merits, and find whether the findings and conclusions of fact of the JP, regarding the prior possession of the plaintiffs and their subsequent dispossession by the defendants are correct or not. Insofar as the appeal with the CFI is concerned the latter did not have to delve into the issue of ownership, which could be threshed out in an action, to quiet title. Forcible entry and detainer lies even against the very owner of property. CONFORMABLY WITH THE FOREGOING, the Order of the CFI of Pangasinan, dated December 17, 1958, ordering the dismissal of the case, is hereby set aside and another entered, remanding the case to the said Court, further appropriate proceedings. No special pronouncement as to costs.

21

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon and Makalintal, JJ., concur.

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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-23756 December 27, 1969

22

JOVITO P. DIZON, plaintiff-appellant, vs. AGAPITA CONCINA, FLORENCIO PONGPONG, ANANIAS CONCINA and ROSITA REMITIR, defendants-appellees.

D. F. Valer for plaintiff-appellant. Ernesto P. Pilapil for defendants-appellees.

SANCHEZ, J.: Suit for forcible entry. The land involved is located in barrio Telegrafo, San Jose, Camarines Sur, bounded on the northeast by Cornelia and Marcelina Prado, Jovito P. Dizon and Felizardo Cilot, on the northwest by a canal, Jovito P. Dizon and Heirs of Lucio Pande, on the southeast by Asuncion Fuentebella and on the southwest by Rangas River and Felipe Capus before, now Jovito P. Dizon. The complaint filed on September 3, 1960 before the Justice of the Peace (Municipal) Court of San Jose, Camarines Sur, avers that on April 3, 1960, defendants, confederating together and helping one another, by means of force, strategy and stealth, unlawfully entered the southwestern portion of the property just described, having an area of 75 acres, more or less, ejecting therefrom plaintiff's encargado and depriving plaintiff of the possession thereof. Defendants' answer in the inferior court dated October 13, 1960 describes in paragraph 3 thereof two parcels of land both bounded on the north by Rangas River which is the southwestern boundary of plaintiff's land, and avers "[t]hat if the plaintiff refers to the land described in paragraph 3 hereof, he has no right over the same." The judgment of the inferior court, after trial, went for plaintiff. Defendants appealed. In the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, defendants in their new answer repeated the averments just mentioned. Then, on February 12, 1963, defendants filed an amended answer in the Court of First Instance. Their two parcels of land described as such in paragraph 3 of the two previous answers were there also in paragraph 3 consolidated into one. To be noted is that this consolidated parcel describes the boundary on the north by Rangas River (before), by Jovito P. Dizon (now). Then followed the following material amendments: "5. That during the strong typhoon sometime in the year 1948, the Rangas River which, prior thereto, was the natural boundary between the estates of the parties herein, suddenly changed its course by traversing the northern portion of the defendants' land separating from it the northern portion thereof; 6. That the old river bed has become dry and defendants have taken possession thereof and have never abandoned the possession of the segregated northern portion; 7. That if the plaintiff refers to the land described in paragraph 3 hereof and referred to in the two preceding paragraphs, then he has no right whatsoever over the same." This amended answer was

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admitted by the court on February 28, 1963, the court stating that the claim of ownership was "only for the purpose of showing the character and extent of possession." On March 23, 1963, plaintiff filed his amended complaint which repeats the description of his land showing that the southwest portion thereof is bounded, amongst others, by Rangas River. The disputed paragraph 3 of the amended complaint reads: "3. That on the SW which is bounded by the Rangas River and Felipa Capus now of the plaintiff there existed a portion which was periodically covered by water during rainy season and hence it was not included in the survey but later became higher thus forming an accretion to the plaintiff's property thru the gradual effect of the current of said river from which time then it was dedicated to pasture and to cassava and camotes up to April 3, 1960." Then follows the allegation of forcible entry. On May 13, 1964, defendants moved for the dismissal of the action, in the words of counsel, "for lack of jurisdiction because the land litigated before this Honorable Court by virtue of the amended complaint has not been litigated in the inferior court", and that there was "a change of theory and cause of action." They directed their criticism against paragraph 3 of the amended complaint just adverted to. On July 20, 1964, the trial court, declaring that "it was obvious that there is a change of subject matter which this court, as an appellate court has no jurisdiction", and that "there is a change of theory and cause of action, now that the plaintiff is proving that there was accretion which is different from that of the original case", dismissed the complaint, and directed the plaintiff "to reimburse the defendant Agapita Concina the sum of P300.00 representing the costs of survey of the property of the plaintiff. It is now plaintiff's turn to appeal on purely questions of law. 1. No serious question arises as to plaintiff's cause of action. It is forcible entry. The subject matter thereof merely is the material possession or possession de facto over the real property. Ownership or the right of possession as an attribute of ownership is not to be determined.1 The questions to be resolved simply are these: First, who had actual possession over the piece of real property? Second, was the possessor ousted therefrom within one year from the filing of the complaint by force, threat, strategy or stealth? And lastly, does he ask for the restoration of his possession?2 Mere posture of ownership by plaintiff or defendant does not take the case out of the jurisdiction of the trial court, unless the issue of material possession necessarily depends upon the question of ownership,3 which is not the case here. Any controversy over ownership rights could and should be settled after the party who had the prior, peaceful and actual possession is returned to the property.4 Here, plaintiff averred prior material possession; that he was ousted therefrom by means of force, strategy or stealth; and that this usurpation was done within the one year period prior to the filing of the suit in the inferior court. Succinctly did this Court explain in one case the nature of the forcible entry action: "In giving recognition to the action of forcible entry and detainer the purpose of the law is to protect the person who in fact has actual possession; and in case of controverted right, it requires the parties to preserve the status quo until one or the other of them sees fit to invoke the decision of a court of competent jurisdiction upon the question of ownership. It is obviously just that the

23

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person who has first acquired possession should remain in possession pending this decision; and the parties cannot be permitted meanwhile to engage in a petty warfare over the possession of the property which is the subject of dispute. To permit this would be highly dangerous to individual security and disturbing to social order. Therefore, where a person supposes himself to be the owner of a piece of property and desires to vindicate his ownership against the party actually in possession, it is incumbent upon him to institute an action to this end in a court of competent jurisdiction; and he cannot be permitted, by invading the property and excluding the actual possessor, to place upon the latter the burden of instituting an action to try the property right."5 2. But then the trial court, viewing the amendment set forth in paragraph 3 of the amended complaint, did rule that such amendment changed the subject matter over which as an appellate court it had no jurisdiction; and that because plaintiff would have to prove that there was accretion which was different from the original cause of action, a change of theory and cause of action likewise resulted. Misconception is right here apparent. To be observed is that in the original complaint the technical description of plaintiff's land6 shows that on the southwest its boundary is Rangas River. To coincide with this in a general way is that defendants' answer in the inferior court and their original answer in the Court of First Instance state that their two parcels of land, as they were originally described, place the boundary to the north of their properties as the same Rangas River. And, in their amended answer, the two parcels of land (this time consolidated into one) claimed to be owned by defendants were described by the latter as being bounded on the north by Rangas River (before), but by Jovito P. Dizon (now). But in paragraph 5 thereof, they do aver that the course of the river suddenly changed by traversing the northern portion of their lands, segregating each portion from the rest; but that, as alleged in paragraph 6, the old river bed had become dry, and defendants had taken possession of the same, and never abandoned such possession of the segregated northern portion; and that if plaintiff referred to the consolidated land, the northern portion of their land separated as well as the old river bed, then plaintiff, in the words of the amended answer, "has no right whatsoever over the same." It thus appears all along in plaintiff's original and amended complaints that his land was described as being bounded on the southwest by the Rangas River which actually separates it from defendants' land. If he made the additional averment in the amended complaint stating that on the southwest portion of his land bounded by the Rangas River a part was added by accretion, and that defendants forcibly entered the said southwestern portion, it was merely to clarify the issues of the case and to localize, more particularly, the land in dispute. Besides, this amendment was merely an offshoot of, and was made to meet, the averments in defendants' amended answer on appeal referring to the sudden change in the course of the Rangas River by traversing the northern portion of their lands separating it from the rest. Even on the assumption that there was an apparent conflict in the description of the disputed land as set forth in the two complaints, such a situation would not change the case from a forcible entry suit into a different action.7 The case must be tried and the identity of the land alleged in the complaint established, to determine whether or not plaintiff's rights have been violated.

24

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FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the order of the trial court of July 20, 1964 dismissing plaintiff's complaint and ordering him to reimburse defendant Agapita Concina in the sum of P300 is hereby set aside, and this case is hereby remanded to the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur with instructions to proceed until the determination thereof on the merits. Costs against defendants-appellees. So ordered.

25

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1

See for example: Mediran vs. Villanueva, 37 Phil. 752, 757; Masallo vs. Cesar, 39 Phil. 134, 137; Fuentes vs. The Justice of the Peace of Pila, 67 Phil. 364, 365-366; Lizo vs. Carandang, 73 Phil. 649, 650; Maddammu vs. Judge of Municipal Court of Manila, 74 Phil. 290, 231; Pitargue vs. Sorilla, 92 Phil. 5, 13; Arsenio vs. Marino, L-9299, December 18, 1956; Lequigan vs. Katalbas, 105 Phil. 645, 647; Subano vs. Vallecer, 105 Phil. 1264, 1265; De la Cruz vs. Burgos (1969), 28 SCRA 977, 983.
2

See: Section 1, Rule 70, Rules of Court.

Fuentes vs. The Justice of the Peace of Pila, supra, at p. 366. Mediran vs. Villanueva, supra, at p. 757; De la Cruz vs. Burgos, supra, at p. 483 (sic). Mediran vs. Villanueva, supra, at p. 757. This land is titled under the Torrens system. Subano vs. Vallecer, supra, at pp. 1264-1265.

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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-14889 April 25, 1960

26

NORBERTO LOPEZ, ET AL., petitioners, vs. HON. AMADO SANTIAGO, ETC., ET AL., respondents.

Magno, Estacio and Association for petitioners. Felix D. Soriano for respondents.
CONCEPCION, J.: This is an original action for a writ of certiorari and mandamus. Petitioners Norberto Lopez and Gregorio Lopez Jr., were plaintiffs in an action for forcible entry, docketed as Civil Case No. 55 of the Justice of the Peace Court of Alcala, Pangasinan. Respondent herein, except respondent Judge Honorable Amando S. Santiago, were the defendants therein. In due course said court rendered judgment on July 3, 1958, which was amended on July 16, 1958, sentencing the aforementioned to vacate the land in dispute and to pay to Norberto and Gregorio Lopez P100 a month from May 28, 1958 until the return of the land to the latter, plus P5.00, the value of a tree destroyed by said defendants, and attorney's fees. The defendants appealed to the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan presided over by respondent Judge, in which the case was docketed as Civil Case No. U-221 thereof. Sometime before October 14, 1958, Norberto and Gregorio Lopez filed with the latter court a motion for the executive of the aforementioned judgment, owning to the failure of the defendants to pay or deposit the amount of said monthly rental or compensation. By an order dated October 14, 1958, the motion was granted. Prior thereto, or on October 1, 1958 said defendants had moved for the dismissal of the case upon the ground that the subject-matter of litigation is a public land; that an investigation was then being conducted by the Bureau of Lands, in connection with a free patent application, filed by said defendants, covering the property in dispute, and a protest or opposition thereto filed by Norberto and Gregorio Lopez; and that all administrative remedies should first be exhausted by the latter before seeking recourse in civil courts. On November 10, 1958, respondent Judge issued an order denying the motion to dismiss, but reconsidering and setting aside said order of October 14, 1958 and holding in view of the administrative proceedings pending in the Bureau of Lands. A reconsideration of his last order having been denied by respondent Judge, the present case was instituted by Norberto and Gregorio Lopez, with the prayer that judgment be rendered. (a) setting aside the order of the respondent Judge of November 10, 1958, in Civil Case No. U-221 of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan insofar as it reconsider and set aside the previous order of execution of the judgment of the Justice of the Peace Court

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of Alcala, Pangasinan, with respect to the possession of the land involved in the litigation; (b) ordering the execution of the judgment of the Justice of the Peace Court of Alcala, Pangasinan in Civil Case No. 55 of said court, not only with respect to the damages adjudicated therein but also with respect to the possession of the parcel of land involved in the litigation; (c) ordering the respondent Judge to proceed with the hearing on the merits of the case; and (d) condemning respondents Jose Nato, et als. to pay the costs. It is well settled in the jurisdiction that, when the decision of a justice of the peace or municipal court in the forcible entry case is adverse to the defendant, and the latter has appealed therefrom, but fails, during the pendency of appeal, to pay the amount of the rental due from time to time under the contract or the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises, under the conditions set forth in Section 8, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court, it is the mandatory duty of the court of first instance to order the execution of the judgment appealed from (Arcilla vs. Del Rosario, 74 Phil., 445; Cunanan vs. Rodas, 78 Phil. 800). Yet, respondent Judge revoked the order for the execution of the aforementioned judgment of the Justice of the Peace Court of Alcala, despite the failure of the main respondents herein, as defendants in the case above referred to, to make the payment required in said section 8 of Rule 72, upon the following ground; It appearing that an order for the issuance of a writ of execution was issued by this Court on October 14, 1958, on the premise that the land in dispute is a private land and in view of the fact that the attention of this Court was called for the first time in the instant motion to dismiss that the land is a public land, the decision of the inferior court can not be executed, although the same becomes final, because the Director of Lands has direct executive control of the disposition and management of public lands. (Sec. 4, Commonwealth Act No. 141; Hernandez, et al. vs. Clapiz, et al., No. L-6812, March 26, 1956). Hence the order for the issuance of a writ of execution issued on October 14, 1958 is hereby reconsidered and set aside insofar as the restoration of the possession of the land in question is concerned. Respondent Judge thus seems to be under the impression that Rule 72 of the Rules of Court, relative to forcible entry cases, is applicable only to private lands, and that decision rendered against the defendants in such cases may not be ordered executed, the provisions of said Rule to the contrary notwithstanding, when the property involved is a public land. This view fails to consider in its true light the philosophy underlying the law on forcible entry cases. Commenting thereon, former Chief Justice Moran has the following to say: . . . the action for forcible entry and detainer is of statutory origin. Its purpose regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, is that the party in peaceable and quiet possession shall not be turned out by strong hand, violence or terror. In affording this remedy of restitution the object of the statutes is to prevent

27

breaches of the peace and criminal disorder which would ensue from the withdrawal of

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advantage must accrue to those persons who, believing themselves entitled to the possession of property, resort to force to gain possession rather than to some appropriate action in the courts to assert their claim. Such is the philosophy at the foundation of all action of forcible entry and detainer which are designed to compel the party out of possession to respect and resort to the law alone to obtain what he claim is his. It has been held that the determination of the respective right of rival claimants to

public land is different from the determination of who has the actual physical possession or occupation with a view to protecting the same and preventing disorder and breaches of the peace. A judgment of the court ordering restitution of the possession of a parcel of land to the actual occupant, who has been deprived thereof by another through the use of force or in any other illegal manner, can never be "prejudicial interference" with the disposition or alienation of public lands. On the contrary, if courts were deprived of jurisdiction over the cases involving conflicts of possession, the threat of judicial action against breaches of the peace committed on public lands would be eliminated, and a state of lawlessness would probably be produced between applicants, occupants or squatters, where force or might, not right or justice would rule. (Comments on the Rule
of Court by Moran, Vol. 2 [1957 ed.], pp. 284-285; emphasis ours.) In other words, public interest, public policy and public order demand that the party in peaceful possession of a land, independently of whether it is private in the nature or part of he public domain, be not ousted therefrom by means of force, violation or intimidation, regardless of the quality of his alleged right to the possession thereof, and that, whoever claims to have a better title or right thereto should seek, from the proper authorities, the legal remedies established therefor, instead of taking the law into their hands. In view of the foregoing, the order of respondent Judge, dated November 10, 1958, insofar only as it reconsiders and sets aside the aforementioned order of October 14, 1958, directing execution of the judgment of the Justice of the Peace Court of Alcala, is hereby annulled and said order of October 14, 1958, is, accordingly, reinstated, with costs against the main respondent herein. It is so ordered.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador and Barrera, JJ., concur.

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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-17468 July 31, 1963

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PILAR T. DEL ROSARIO, MARIANO V. DEL ROSARIO and SALVADOR V. DEL ROSARIO, petitioners-appellants, vs. HON. DAMIAN L. JIMENEZ, as Judge of the Municipal Court of Quezon City, Branch III, SANCHO R. JACINTO and DOMINGO BASCARA, respondents-appellees.

Cornelio S. Ruperto for petitioners-appellants. Vicente M. Magpoc for respondents-appellees. Damian L. Jimenez in his own behalf as respondents-appellees.
MAKALINTAL, J.: This case is before us on appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Branch II), dated June 4, 1960, dismissing appellants' petition for certiorari and mandamus to review four orders of the municipal court of Quezon City (Branch III) in civil case No. 5039 entitled "Sancho R. Jacinto, et al. vs. Pilar T. del Rosario, et al." That case was one of forcible entry under Rule 72, involving two parcels of land of which the plaintiffs, Sancho R. Jacinto and Domingo C. Bascara, now respondents-appellees, are the registered owners under transfer certificates of title Nos. 26531 and 26532, both issued by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. These lands had been acquired by them through purchase from the previous registered owner, J.M. Tuazon & Co., Inc. In their answer to the complaint the defendants, now petitionersappellants, claimed ownership of the same properties by purchase from one Macaria Fulgencio and her husband Carlos Javier and alleged that they were and had been in actual physical possession thereof even before the purchase from J.M. Tuazon & Co., Inc. by appellees. Appellants, after a second amended complaint had been filed by appellees, submitted their answer thereto dated October 2, 1958, including a "third-party complaint" against the plaintiffs themselves as well as against J.M. Tuazon & Co., Inc., from both of whom they prayed for an award of damages. In the meantime, after the action of forcible entry was filed, herein appellants commenced a suit for "reconveyance and/or recovery" of the same properties against appellees in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (No. 5230), and then, on November 4, 1958, filed a motion in the municipal court to suspend proceedings in the summary action before it until after the termination of the case in the Court of First Instance. On October 7, 1958 the municipal court denied admission of the third-party complaint; and on the following November 6 it likewise denied the motion to suspend proceedings. In both instances appellants moved to reconsider and were turned down in two other separate orders, dated October 24 and November 27, 1958, respectively. These are the four orders subject of

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appellants' petition for certiorari and mandamus, which was dismissed by the Court of First Instance of Rizal and now on appeal before us.1wph1.t The third-party complaint was improperly brought against appellees Jacinto and Bascara, since they were themselves the plaintiffs in the forcible entry case, as to whom a mere counterclaim would suffice. Insofar as J.M. Tuazon & Co., Inc. was concerned, the allegation against it is that it had entered into a compromise agreement with a certain Deudor in four civil cases in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, whereby it agreed to give priority to occupants of lands involved therein (including those now in dispute) in the matter of their purchase and that the ejectment suit filed by herein appellees was a violation of that compromise agreement. We fail to see how such "agreement to which appellees were strangers, could have anything to do with their right of action to recover the material possession of the lands in question. The prayer in the third-party complaint that J.M. Tuazon & Co., Inc. be sentenced to pay damages should be the subject, if at all, of a separate action so that matters extraneous to the issue of possession may not unnecessarily clutter the forcible entry case. The admission of a third-party complaint is discretionary with the court, and in the present instance there was no abuse of discretion in the order of denial complained of. With respect to the other order that denying appellant's motion to suspend proceedings it is enough to point out, first, that the action for "reconveyance and/or recovery" in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, which appellants claim should take precedence, was filed by them when the forcible entry case was already pending, and was obviously intended to delay the proceedings therein; and secondly, that the issue involved in the later action, which is one of title, is not prejudicial to the determination of the issue of summary possession. The very petition for mandamus and certiorari the dismissal of which is the subject of this appeal is likewise dilatory in nature, as shown by the fact that it is only one of the numerous actions previously resorted to by appellants and decided unfavorably to them. There was special civil action No. 5318, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VI, dismissed by Judge Andres Reyes for lack of jurisdiction and then refiled in Branch V (Quezon City), but again dismissed by Judge Nicasio Yatco on July 2, 1959; and subsequently, there was special civil action No. 5500, Court of First Instance of Rizal, dismissed by Judge Felix R. Domingo on July 8, 1959. Both of these actions were instituted after the ejectment case was filed by herein appellees and sought to suspend the trial thereof. There must be an end to the litigious rigmarole pursued by appellants. The decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs.

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Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Regala, JJ., concur.

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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-10313 March 28, 1960

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ISIDORA S. VDA. DE JESUS, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. LUCIANO DE LA CRUZ, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

Crispin D. Baizas for appellants. Valentin, Castro and Maranan for appellees.
GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.: This is an appeal from an order of dismissal. It appears that in a forcible entry case filed in the Justice of the Peace Court of San Antonio, Nueva Ecija, by Isidora S. Vda. de Jesus, et al. against Marcosa Villaronte and 11 others, judgment was rendered by said court on October 5, 1954 ordering the defendants to vacate the parcel of land involved in the case and restore possession thereof to the plaintiffs and also pay the latter five cavans of palay per hectare for the use of the land for each agricultural year beginning 1954-1955. In due time the defendants appealed to the Court of First Instance and the case was there docketed as Civil Case No. 1637 of that court. Thereafter, defendants filed their answer with a counterclaim and plaintiffs on their part filed an answer to the counterclaim. With the appealed case still pending trial, the plaintiffs asked for immediate execution because of the alleged failure of the defendants to file a supersedeas bond and to deposit the value of the use of the land as fixed in the judgment. The defendants opposed the motion, but on April 29, 1955 the court ordered the issuance of a writ of execution to have the defendants vacate the land and restore possession thereof to the plaintiffs. On May 19, 1955, the writ of execution was served on the defendants and all adverse occupants of the land but they all refused to vacate the premises. However, on June 9, 1955, plaintiffs were able to obtain an alias writ of execution and this time the sheriff, with the aid of the Philippine Constabulary, was able to eject the defendants and the other adverse occupants from the premises and to place the plaintiffs in possession thereof. Alleging that after the sheriff and the Constabulary had left the premises the defendants and the other adverse occupants re-entered the land, threatened the plaintiffs with physical harm and continued to occupy and exercise acts of possession and ownership over the land to the exclusion of said plaintiffs, the latter, on July 11, 1955, petitioned the court to declare the defendants and the said other occupants guilty of contempt of court. Acting upon the petition, the court in its order dated October 3, 1955, cited "over 20 persons" (actually 25, see briefs of the parties) including six of the twelve defendants to appear and show cause why they should

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not be dealt with in contempt. Not content with the contempt proceeding they had instituted, plaintiffs, on November 11 of that same year, filed a motion alleging that the defendants and other adverse occupants, after re-entering the land, cultivated and planted the same in bad faith and consequently lost or forfeited what was planted by them without right of indemnity in accordance with Article 449 of the new Civil Code. For prayer, plaintiffs asked that the court order the Philippine Constabulary to supervise the harvest and threshing of the palay on the land, and that the palay harvest be deposited either with the Constabulary or in any bonded warehouse. Acting upon the motion, the court on November 29, 1955, denied the prayer that the harvest be deposited in a bonded warehouse on the ground that the questions of the alleged re-entry and bad faith were to be decided in the contempt proceeding, but granted the prayer for the detail of Constabulary soldiers in the premises to maintain peace and order during the harvest and threshing of palay. On December 17, 1955, with the main case and the petition for contempt still pending hearing, the plaintiffs filed in the same Court of First Instance another civil action, which is now the subject of the present appeal. The new action is directed against 65 defendants, three of whom were already defendants in the former case. The complaint alleges that in the months of July, August and September, 1955, in disobedience to the orders of the court, and against the vigorous objection of the plaintiffs, defendants unlawfully and in bad faith occupied and cultivated the land in question and made plantings on the same, thereby depriving the plaintiffs who were themselves ready to cultivate and plant the said property of its use and enjoyment; that the defendants, despite the fact that they were sowers in bad faith and therefore not entitled to what they had planted, were harvesting the products of the land and appropriating them for their own use in violation of plaintiffs' rights. The complaint prayed (1) that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued immediately enjoining all the defendants and any other adverse occupant from taking and appropriating for their own use and consumption the palay being harvested from the land in question for the agricultural year 1955-56, after fixing the amount of the bond to be executed in favor of the defendants; (2) that the palay harvested be ordered deposited in any bonded warehouse or any place deemed convenient; (3) that after trial, a judgment be entered ordering that the palay harvested from the land in question forfeited by defendants in favor of plaintiffs without any right of indemnity; and (4) that defendants be restrained from further re-entering and cultivating the land in question. Answering the complaint, the defendant set up defenses which, as later supplemented, are to the effect that three of them, namely, Ruperto Tayao, Gavino Magno and Gregorio Mangulabnan, together with their co-defendants in the former case, have been in possession either by themselves or through their predecessors in interest, of the said land in question as homesteaders since 1914; that the said land being public land, they engaged the services of Atty. Teofilo de Jesus, plaintiffs' predecessor in interest, for the said attorney to secure a free patent for them on condition that his services would be paid with a portion of the products of the land, but that the said attorney, instead of complying with his trust, declared the land in his name for taxation purposes, had it also surveyed in his name, and instead of claiming the land for his clients in the Cadastral Case, he filed a claim in his own name, all this without the knowledge of the defendants, who discovered the same only recently; that defendants were planters in good faith; that they had not been legally dispossessed of the land by virtue of an alias writ of execution obtained by plaintiff; that they have been in continuous possession of the land in the belief that they have the right to do so as homesteaders and, also to harvest the same as such; that there was already a pending case (referring to Civil Case No. 1637) between

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the same plaintiffs and the three abovenamed defendants, the rest of their co-defendants, aside from their co-defendants in that former case," "being only paid workers and/or harvesters (manggagapas) of the defendants in Civil Case No. 1637 so that this case is but a duplication of said Civil Case No. 1637, and therefore, should be dismissed." In a supplemental pleading later filed, defendants also set up the defense that the Court of First Instance had no jurisdiction over the case. At defendants' instance, a hearing was held on the affirmative defenses. After said hearing, the court below sustained defendants and dismissed the complaint on the grounds that there is pending another action involving the same subject matter and issue and that it lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case because it is in effect one for forcible entry within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace Court. From that order, the plaintiffs appealed directly to this Court. The appeal is without merit. Plaintiffs' complaint in the present case is predicated on the allegations that defendants, after re-entering the land in question, cultivated and planted the same in bad faith, thereby forfeiting in plaintiff's favor whatever they may have planted. These allegations, it will be observed, are the same allegations plaintiffs have made in their motion for contempt, which is still pending hearing, and in their motion of November 11, 1955 both in the forcible entry case (Civil Case No. 1637). The two cases involve the same parcel of land and, apparently, the same plantings, the acts complained of in the present action being alleged to have been committed in July, August, and September, 1955, or before plaintiffs filed their incidental motions in the forcible entry case. To allow, therefore, the present complaint to be prosecuted as a separate and independent action would only encourage, instead of avoid, a multiplicity of suits. As ruled by the court in the forcible entry case when it acted upon plaintiffs' motion of November 11, 1955, the questions of the alleged re-entry and bad faith on the part of defendants are to be decided in the contempt proceeding. Obviously, the decision therein will necessarily dispose of the issues in the present complaint and conclude the controversy between the parties. Plaintiffs-appellants argue that they had never asked, as they could not, for the forfeiture of the palay harvest in the forcible entry case and that only 3 of the 65 defendants in the present action are defendants in that case. The contempt proceeding, however, filed by them in the former case is civil in nature, the object being the enforcement of their civil rights and remedies. The punishment would, accordingly, be remedial and for the benefit of the complainants. (Slade Perkins vs. Director of Prisons, 58 Phil., 271.) Considering that in said proceedings complete restitution to the injured party may be decreed (sec. 6, Rule 64), and that a judgment, except in default cases, may grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings, or even if the complaint contains no prayer for relief (Rule 35, sec. 8) there is no reason why forfeiture of the palay harvest, if warranted, may not be obtained by plaintiffs in their favor. At any rate, the contempt proceeding is still pending. If necessary, pleadings may still be amended to include the prayer for forfeiture. As to the alleged non-identity of parties, while only 3 of the 12 defendants in the forcible entry case and 20 of the persons cited for contempt therein are among the 65 defendants in the present case, it should be noted that the acts now complained of are the same acts alleged by

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plaintiffs in their incidental motions in the said forcible entry case. It is, therefore, difficult to see, as observed by the court below, how about 42 new occupants could have come in as to justify the filing of a new action. On the other hand, we are inclined to believe that, as alleged in the answer to the complaint, these additional defendants are mere hired workers or "harvesters (reapers) of the defendants in the former case and consequently cannot be held answerable for the palay allegedly harvested. Their inclusion as defendants in this case, apparently, is but an attempt to circumvent the proceedings in the forcible entry case, the court having previously denied plaintiffs' incidental motion therein to place the harvest in a bonded warehouse. In any event, even assuming that the 45 additional defendants are not mere workers but trespassers and strangers to other defendants, the allegations in the complaint filed in this case (as held by the court below), clearly make out an action for forcible entry. Paragraph 5 of the said complaint alleges that the defendants "without the consent and against the vigorous objection of the plaintiffs unlawfully and in bad faith occupied and cultivated the land in question." To exclude plaintiffs against their vigorous objection necessarily implies the use of a certain degree of force and/or intimidation. (Moran's Rules of Court, 1957 ed., Vol. 2, pp. 296297.) And the date of unlawful entry having been made, according to the complaint, in July, August and September, 1955, or within one year prior to the filing of the complaint, the same should therefore be filed with the Justice of the Peace Court which has exclusive jurisdiction over such cases. The fact that bad faith in planting is alleged and forfeiture of the harvest is prayed for would not take the complaint outside the jurisdiction of the Justice of Peace Court. . . . where the occupant has built on the land, especially where said building is substantial and valuable, the courts even in ejectment cases are bound to take cognizance of said fact and when they find that the construction or planting had been effected in good faith, instead of dismissing the complaint and suggesting to the parties to observe and follow the provisions of Art. 361 or Art. 448 of the old and the new Civil Code of the Philippines, respectively, and if they cannot agree, to file a new action, not only to enforce or defend the respective rights of the parties but to assess the value of the land of the improvement as well, the courts in order to avoid mutiplicity of actions and to administer practical and speedy justice may, as was done in this case, apply the provisions of the Civil Code relative to builders specially since there is no question as to the ownership of the land as shown by the certificate of title, and the ownership of the buildings. (Tayag et al. vs. Yuseco, et al., 97 Phil., 712.) In view of the foregoing, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellants.

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Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia, and Barrera, JJ., concur.

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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

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G.R. No. L-31822 July 31, 1972 JOSE SALCEDO QUIMPO, petitioner, vs. CATALINO DELA VICTORIA and FRANCISCA O. DELA VICTORIA, respondents.

Jose P. Arro for petitioner. Garcilaso F. Vega for respondents.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:p Petition to review the following orders of the Court Of First Instance of Davao, 16th Judicial District, Branch 11, in its Civil Case No. 6473, entitled Catalino dela Victoria, et al. vs. Jose Salcedo Quimpo: order of 29 July 1969 denying defendant-petitioner's motion to dismiss the complaint for forcible-entry for lack of merit, and granting the writ of immediate execution of the City Court decision of 16 January 1969 1 ; order of 16 August 1969, denying defendantpetitioner's motion for reconsideration thereof 2 ; and order of 12 November 1969 dismissing the defendant-petitioner's appeal from the aforesaid judgment of the City Court. The facts which led to the issuance of the disputed orders follow: On 2 May 1968, plaintiffs-respondents filed a complaint against defendant-petitioner with the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch I, docketed therein as Civil Case No. 6005, for quieting of title and recovery of possession with damages. 4 On 28 June 1968, plaintiffs-respondents filed another case against defendant-petitioner with the City Court of Davao City (Civil Case No. 1299-B) for forcible entry over the same parcel of land, subject-matter of Civil Case No. 6005, supra. Plaintiffs-respondents prayed in the later case for the court to order defendant-petitioner ... to vacate the premises and deliver the possession thereof to the former, and ordering defendant to pay the plaintiffs the amount of P500.00 a month as rental and the same to begin from the later part of March, 1968 until possession thereof shall be delivered to the plaintiffs, and the amount of P500.00 as attorney's fees. ...

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In a motion to dismiss dated 13 July 1968, 6 defendant-petitioner sought the dismissal of the complaint for forcible entry alleging the pendency of Civil Case No. 6005; but the City Court, in its order of 29 November 1968, denied the said motion "for the reason that there is no identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for and for the further reason that it does not appear that any judgment which would be rendered on the other action will amount to res adjudicata in the herein case." 7 The same court order set the case for hearing on 12 December 1968. On 12 December 1968, defendant-petitioner was declared in default for failure to file his answer to the forcible entry case and the City Court set the reception of plaintiffs-respondents' evidence for the following day. On 16 January 1969 the same court rendered its decision ... ordering the defendant ... to vacate the premises in question and deliver possession thereof to the plaintiffs; to pay ... the sum of FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00) a month as rental and the same to commence from March, 1968 until possession thereof shall be delivered to the plaintiffs; and to pay the costs. Defendant-petitioner then moved for the reconsideration of the aforesaid order of 29 November 1968 denying his motion to dismiss the complaint for forcible entry, and also the decision of 16 January 1969. However, his motion was denied in the City Court order of 4 March 1969. 8 Defendant-petitioner appealed to the Court of First Instance and it was docketed therein as Civil Case No. 6470. In a motion dated 5 July 1969, defendant-petitioner reiterated his arguments for the dismissal of the complaint for forcible entry as stated in his earlier motion in the City Court. In the meantime, plaintiffs-respondents moved for the issuance of an order for the immediate execution of the City Court decision of 16 January 1969. On 29 July 1969, the court a quo denied the motion to dismiss of 5 July 1969 for lack of merit, and at the same time granted the immediate execution of the City Court judgment. His motion for reconsideration having been denied, and his appeal dismissed, defendant filed the herein petition, claiming that the lower court 1. Did not acquire jurisdiction over the action for forcible entry, the verification of the corresponding complaint being void; 2. Erred in not dismissing the complaint for forcible entry filed a month after an action for recovery of possession and quieting of title had been filed by respondents against petitioner over the same cause of action, the same subject matter and the same parties; 3. Erred in granting the issuance of immediate execution before resolving the issue of the pendency of another action between the same parties over the same subject matter. 4. Erred in awarding P500.00 monthly rental in the complaint for forcible entry without any evidence as against the claim of P300.00 monthly rental in the action for recovery of possession and quieting of title; and

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5. Erred in dismissing the appeal of petitioner who has been declared in default, without considering that a legal issue on the ruling of the inferior court denying the motion to dismiss is raised. It is pointed out in the first assigned error that since the verification in the complaint for forcible entry does not comply with Section 6, Rule 7, of the Revised Rules of Court, the complaint is void; hence, the City Court, and subsequently the court a quo, did not acquire jurisdiction over the said case. The verification in question states: xxx xxx xxx I, CATALINO DE LA VICTORIA, under oath, allege: that I am one of the plaintiffs in the above-entitled case; that I have read the allegations thereof; that they are true and correct. xxx xxx xxx Section 6, Rule 7, Revised Rules of Court provides: ... Verification. A pleading is verified only by an affidavit stating that the person verifying has read the pleading and that the allegations thereof are true of his own knowledge. Verification based on information and belief, or upon knowledge, information and belief shall be deemed insufficient. Catalino dela Victoria, one of the plaintiffs (now respondents) clearly referred to the allegations in the complaint as having been read by him. However, while he stated that "they are true and correct," he omitted to state that said conclusion was reached of his own knowledge. The latter detail, however, is logically inferable since affiant was a party and it does not appear that he was verifying upon information and belief. If petitioner entertained doubt about the true character of the verification, he should have asked that it be made more definite. Moreover, even if We should find the verification insufficient, that insufficiency would not render the complaint for forcible entry, or the whole proceedings in the court below, void. This Court already held in several decisions that the requirement regarding verification is not jurisdictional, but merely formal. Thus, in Villasanta vs. Bautista, L-30874, 26 November 1970, 36 SCRA 160, 170-171, this Court ruled: 5. Finally a word on respondents' insistence on their contention, citing inapplicable appellate court decisions, that "a pleading which lacks the required verification is fatal and does not confer jurisdiction." Respondents' contention that petitioner Villasanta's (the corporation's) verification of the petition "that the allegations therein contained are true and correct" is "insufficient" for noncompliance with the Rule's requirement that affiant state the allegations are "true of his own knowledge" is untenable. The Court has consistently held that

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the reglementary phrase "true of his own knowledge" is not a talismanic formula, the use of which would insure the granting of a petition and non-use whereof would result in a decree of dismissal. It has ruled absence of verification not to be fatally defective in meritorious cases'. What is important is that the object of the Rule, to insure good faith and veracity in the material averments of the petition, be complied with, so that the court may properly act on the case. Here, the petition has complied with the requirement in form and in substance. Villasanta in effect certified of his own knowledge to the truth of the petition as a whole, but with reference to the averments in paragraph 8 of the petition as to respondents' acts of intrusion and coercion at the concession area on 15 August 1969, specifically submitted with the petition the affidavits of on-scene witnesses Cone and two other company officials attesting thereto of their own knowledge. Thus, while it is true that Section 1, Rule 70, of the Revised Rules of Court requires the verification of the complaint for forcible entry, the insufficiency of the same, or its being defective, is not fatal to the jurisdiction of the City Court or that of the court a quo to which the case was later appealed. This Court went to hold further in Oshita vs. Republic, 9 that ... While the petition now before Us was not verified, it was, however, subscribed and sworn to by the petitioner, and We believe that the lower court did not

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commit a reversible error when it denied the motion to dismiss the petition upon the ground of lack of jurisdictional. The jurisdiction of the court was not affected

by the absence of the proper verification of the petition. It may be stated here, though, that the lower court should have required appellee to have her petition verified before setting the case for hearing, in order to have the petition conform with the rule. 10 It will also be noted that defendant-petitioner raises the question of jurisdiction for the first time in this appeal, hence, he is now barred by laches. This Court ruled in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy 11 that

... a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.
L. R. 79). In the case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice can not be tolerated obviously for reasons of public policy. Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction power of the court ... And in Littleton vs. Burgos, 16

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Wyo, 58, the Court said that it is not right for a party who has affirm and invoked

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the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty. 12

Defendant-petitioner invoked the jurisdiction of the City Court when it sought to dismiss the complaint for forcible entry on the ground that the cause of action in this case is the same as in Civil Case No. 6005, supra. After defendant-petitioner was declared in default, and the decision rendered against him, said party again submitted to said jurisdiction by filing a motion for reconsideration of said decision. His motion having been denied, he appealed the case to the court a quo where he also filed a motion, dismiss the forcible entry case on the same grounds stated in a similar motion before the City Court. Thus, defendant petitioner voluntarily invoked and submitted himself to the jurisdiction of both courts. Having failed to obtain the relief sought from these courts, he can not now question the jurisdiction invoked. With respect to the second assignment of error, one the grounds for a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Revised Rules of Court is the pendency of another action between the same parties for the same cause. 13 In order that this ground may be availed of there must be, between the action under consideration and the other action, (1) identity of parties, or at least such as representing the same interest in both actions; (2) identity rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (3) the identity on the two preceeding particulars should be such that any judgment which may be rendered on the other action will regardless which party is successful amount to res adjudicata in the action under consideration. 14 While there may be identity of parties and subject matter in the forcible entry case and Civil Case No. 6005, for quieting of title, the rights asserted and the relief prayed for in the said cases are not the same. In the former case, to the legal right claimed is possession, while in the latter case, the legal right asserted is ownership. We can not assent to the proposition that the motion to dismiss should have been granted by the Municipal Court of origin, and sustained on appeal by the Court of First Instance, for the reason that the question of ownership was necessarily involved in the action for forcible entry (not for unlawful detainer), as is proved by the admitted pendency of the prior suit for quieting of title in the Court of First Instance. While the fact that triggered both actions was appellant Quimpo's forcible invasion of respondent's titled property in March of 1968, on the pretext that the part of respondent's land forcibly entered and occupied by him was part of the area covered by his pasture permit from the Bureau of Forestry, still the causes of action in the two cases are distinct from each other. In the action to quiet title the question involved is whether the pasture permit could include property for which O.C.T. No. P-2385 of the Registry of Deeds of Davao province had been previously issued to appellees de la Victoria. But in the forcible entry case, the issue is whether, assuming that Quimpo's pasture permit were valid, he had the right to forcibly eject the prior occupants, who were appellees de la Victoria, even destroying their improvements. In other words, in the quieting of title case, the Court must decide who had the better right. In the Municipal court, the issue was, in effect, whether an owner can take the law in his own hands. That he can not do so seems incontestable: it is not so much a question of possession as it is one of law and order. To require appellees de la Victoria to acquiesce to the high-handed conduct of appellant Quimpo, and to submit to his tour de force, until the

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superiority of their Torrens Title is finally adjudged, after God knows how many years, is undoubtedly against all justice and equity. It is contended in the next assigned error that immediate execution of the City Court decision in the forcible entry case should not have been granted pending a resolution of the issue of the pendency of another action between the same parties over the same subject matter. The contention is without merit. Section 8, Rule 70, of Revised Rules of Court not only authorizes but also requires the immediate execution of a judgment in plaintiff's favor. The said provision, taken in relation to that of section 10 of the same Rules, is mandatory, 15 the only exception being when the delay is due to fraud, accident, mistake, excusable negligence. 16 The purpose of the law is to prevent further damages to him caused by the loss of his possession. 17 However, defendant may stay execution (a) by perfecting his appeal and filing a supersedeas bond; and (b) by depositing from time to time, with the Court First Instance, during the pendency of the appeal, the amount or rents or the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the property as fixed by the justice of peace or municipal court in its judgment. 18 While defendant-petitioner perfected the appeal, he did not file a supersedeas bond and deposit the monthly rentals of P500.00 monthly fixed by the City Court. In the absent thereof, he can not be heard to complain against the immediate execution of the judgment which is legally sanctioned. Defendant-petitioner likewise questions the amount P500.00 as monthly rental of the subject parcel of land fixed by the City Court. The question of rental is a factual issue, and in the absence of proof to show that the said court abused its discretion in awarding the same, We are not inclined to disturb said finding. This award, however, may be raised as a defense in Civil Case No. 6005 for quieting of title where rental is also prayed for by plaintiffs-respondents for the possession of the land as incident to their claim of ownership. The issues raised against the decision of the City Court of Davao being unmeritorious, as previously shown, it becomes irrelevant to discuss the final question of whether defendantpetitioner can appeal the judgment of the inferior court which declared him in default. WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the orders appealed from, the same are hereby affirmed, with costs against defendant-petitioner.

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Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar and Antonio, JJ., concur.

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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

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G.R. No. L-31267 November 24, 1972 IGNACIA NEGRETE, plaintiff-appellant, vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MARINDUQUE and IGMEDIO MADERAZO, represented by his legal representative CATALINO MADERAZO, defendants-appellees.

Jose L. Desnarro Jr. for plaintiff-appellant. Restituto J. Opis for defendants-appellants.

MAKASIAR, J.:p Plaintiff-appellant Ignacia Negrete, an indigent widow over 70 years of age, appealed as a pauper from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Marinduque dated May 22, 1969 raising only questions of law (Annex "A", p. 6, rec.). Claiming that since 1945 she and her late husband had been in continuous and peaceful possession of a parcel of land with an area of nine (9) hectares more or less in Sitio Puting Buhangin, Mogpog, Marinduque (near the Marcopper Mines p. 8, rec.) and covered by Tax Declaration No. 8431 in her name, plaintiff-appellant Ignacia Negrete filed on July 28, 1956 a forcible entry suit against the defendant-appellee Igmedio Maderazo in the municipal court of Mogpog (docketed as Civil Case No. 51), alleging among others that on January 7, 1956, said defendant-appellee, through strategy, force, intimidation, and stealth unlawfully entered the northern portion of said parcel of land, said northern portion comprising an area of about four hectares. Defendant-appellee orally moved to dismiss the ejectment complaint on the grounds of lack of cause of action and improper venue, which motion to dismiss was denied by the court for lack of merit. Thereafter, defendant-appellee filed an answer asserting among others that the land he is presently cultivating in Sitio Puting Buhangin is a different land. To expedite the proceedings, the municipal court directed the chief of police of Mogpog to conduct an ocular inspection of the disputed land to determine whether the land area cultivated by the defendantappellee is the same land claimed by the plaintiff-appellant as the northern portion of her land under Tax Declaration No. 8431. After the trial, the municipal court rendered a decision dated September 15, 1956 in favor of defendant-appellee after finding that:

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There is no dispute as to the identity of the land alleged to have been unlawfully entered by the defendant. Despite the allegations of the defendant that the land he is presently cultivating is a different land from that claimed by the plaintiffs as the northern portion of the property, the ocular inspection made by the Chief of Police showed that it is the same land as shown by Exhibit "A" (also Exhibit "1") and verified by the parties during their oral testimony (at) the witness stand. The only question to be resolved now is: Did the defendant through force, strategy and stealth, unlawfully enter(ed) this land on January 7, 1956, thereby depriving the plaintiffs of its lawful possession? Plaintiffs' testimony both oral and documentary, is to the effect that they have been in continuous and peaceful possession of the whole parcel of land under Tax Dec. No. 8431 (which included the four hectares in dispute) since 1945, exercising acts of possession clearing the land and planting rice therein) until January 7, 1956, when defendant unlawfully entered the land and began cultivating it. Defendant on the other hand does not deny cultivating the land in the month of January, 1956, but he testified that he had been continuously cultivating the same land since 1951 when he bought certain portions of it and possessed the other portions as tenant of his brothers and sister-in-law. After considering all the evidence presented and the manner the witnesses testified on the witness stand, the Court is of the opinion and so holds that the preponderance of evidence is with the defendant that he had been in continuous and peaceful possession of the disputed land since 1951 and that, therefore, he was in the material and physical possession of the said land within the year prior to the filing of the instant complaint. The testimony of the defendant and his witness (Cresencia Oriendo) is more coherent, straightforward and clear. It may be that, as the plaintiffs claim, they have a strong and valid claim to the possession of the disputed portion as part of the whole parcel under Tax Dec. No. 8431 over which they allege possession incident to ownership, but then, the only issue on the instant case is possession de facto (possession for one year prior to the institution of the action) and not possession de jure incident to ownership. Defendant, Igmedio Maderazo, having proved by preponderance of evidence that he was in the material and physical possession of the land for more than one year immediately preceding the filing of the action on July 28, 1956, he has now the security that entitles him to stay in the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by either accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. (Moran. Vol. II, pages 238-239, citing Masallo vs. Cesar, 39 Phil. 134, and other cases). IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court finds that the defendant has not unlawfully entered the land in dispute on January 7, 1956 as alleged by the plaintiffs, he being in the material and physical possession of the said land prior to the date of the incident.

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WHEREFORE, this Court renders judgment in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiffs with costs against the plaintiffs. (Pp. 43-44, rec.). Instead of appealing from the aforesaid decision of the municipal court of Mogpog, plaintiffappellant filed on January 18, 1967 after the lapse of ten (10) years an action for recovery of ownership of property (reivindicacion) against defendant-appellee Igmedio Maderazo alleging that she is the owner of a piece of land of about nine (9) hectares situated in Barrio Puting Buhangin, Mogpog, Marinduque covered by Tax Declaration No. 8645 (annexed to the complaint as Exhibit "A"), having inherited the same from her late father Juan Negrete who was 150 years old when he died a year before the outbreak of World War II; that she and her predecessor-in-interest have been in possession of the same for about seventy (70) years; that shortly after liberation, defendant-appellee, claiming to be the owner thereof, entered the said land by means of force, intimidation, stealth and strategy and introduced improvements thereon consisting of about "100 coco trees and 28 boxes of rice paddies"; that until 1957 she repeatedly prohibited defendant-appellee from making any improvement thereon, but defendant-appellee threatened her and her representatives with bodily harm; and that she suffered damages in the amount of P6,000.00, by virtue of which she prayed for judgment declaring her to be the lawful owner of the land and for damages in the amount of P6,000.00 as well as costs (Annex "A", pp. 26-28, rec.). In his answer dated April 11, 1967 defendant-appellee averred that since liberation, he had been in possession of the northern portion of the questioned parcel of land and cultivated and introduced improvements on the same consisting of coconut trees and "boxes of rice paddies"; that, asserting ownership over the said northern portion and prohibiting anyone from cultivating the same, he specifically denies threatening the plaintiff or anyone else with physical harm; that he bought for P150.00 on August 30, 1954 the northern portion of about 3,700 square meters (Exhibit "A" states "the southern half () portion") which is now covered by tax declaration No. 25811 in his name from Tito Oriendo, who declared it for taxation in 1949 under tax declaration No. 16117; and that his possession over the northern portion of the disputed land had never been disturbed until July 28, 1956, when plaintiff-appellant instituted a civil suit against him for forcible entry in the municipal court of Mogpog, which decided the same in his favor on September 15, 1956, from which decision plaintiff-appellant did not appeal; and interposes as special defenses that plaintiff-appellant has no legal capacity to sue, that the action had been barred by the statute of limitation for plaintiff-appellant filed this present action over ten (10) years after he purchased the property, and the cause of action is barred by prior judgment, as well as a counterclaim (pp. 29-32, rec.). The disputed land of about nine (9) hectares is described in tax declaration Nos. 8431 (p. 43, rec.; p. 1, mun. court decision) and 8645 in the name of plaintiff-appellant as situated in Barrio Puting Buhangin, Mogpog, Marinduque, and bounded thus: "North, Benito Luisaga and Pantaleon Oriendo; East, Toribio Linga, Eustaquio Logmao Hilarion Bunag and B. Linga; South, Boac River, Modesto Lazo and Tomas Malimata, and West, Benito Luisa-Nazario Malimata, Pedro Luisaga and Hilarion Bunag" (p. 26, rec.). The deed of sale, executed and signed by Tito Oriendo as vendor and defendant-appellee Igmedio Maderazo as vendee, was notarized on August 30, 1954 by the municipal judge of Boac and stipulates:

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This DEED, made and executed by and between EGMIDIO MADERAZO, 48 years of age, a citizen of the Philippines, married (to) Cresenciana Oriendo with residence and postal address at Bo. Puting Buhangin, Boac, Marinduque, now and hereafter referred to as the VENDEE, and TITO ORIENDO, 55 years of age, married to Bonifacia Lazo, with residence and postal address at Bo. Dinapulan, Boac, Marinduque, now and hereafter referred to as the VENDOR. WITNESSETH That for and in consideration of the sum of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (P150.00), Philippine Currency, the receipt whereof hereby acknowledged to the entire satisfaction of the VENDOR, the said VENDOR does hereby, by this presents, SELL, TRANSFER, CONVEY, in a manner absolute and irrevocable, unto the VENDEE, his heirs and assigns, ONE-HALF (PRO-INDIVISO) SHARE of that certain real estate destined for agricultural purposes, heretofore under the actual possession and management of the VENDOR, which one-half share is more particularly bounded and described as follows: The southern HALF () PORTION containing approximately 3700 square meters without any improvements thereon of that parcel of coconut-forest land situated in Barrio Puyog, Boac, Marinduque, and which ONE-HALF SHARE is to be bounded on the North; by rest of the land; East: Sofia Oriendo; South: Pedro Oriendo; and West: Estero, delimited by madre cacao trees. That the VENDOR does hereby declare that the entire parcel is assessed in the year 1949 at P30.00 as per tax decl. 16117 in the name of the herein VENDOR; and that the parties hereto have agreed to record this instrument under Act 3344, the property involved not having been previously registered either under Act 496 or under the Spanish Mortgage Law; That the VENDOR does hereby covenant and agree with the VENDEE, his heirs and assigns, that he is lawfully seized in fee simple of the said one-half premises; that he has perfect right to convey the subject property, having adverse, physical and continuous possession and management over the same for more than 15 years; that it is free from all liens and encumbrances; and that he will warrant forever defend the title here in conveyed against the lawful claims of all persons whomsoever. (Exh. "A" or Annex "C", p. 33, rec.). On October 17, 1968, defendant-appellee Igmedio Maderazo died and was substituted on January 4, 1969 by his legal representative, Catalino Maderazo (p. 35, rec.; p. 2, CFI decision). In a decision dated May 22, 1969, the Court of First Instance of Marinduque rendered the following decision dismissing the case, thus: ... On January 21, 1969, the Court gave the parties time to file their respective memoranda after the parties agreed to submit the case for judgment based on their pleadings. The only issue here to be resolved is whether or not the cause of action is barred by the statute of limitation and whether or not the plaintiff is

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guilty of laches for not having instituted her action within 10 years from the date the defendant acquired the property by deed of sale. From the pleadings, the following facts are clear, to wit: that the land in question described in the complaint was bought by Igmedio Maderazo (deceased), the original defendant and later substituted by his son, the present defendant, from one Tito Oriendo by virtue of a Deed of Sale, marked as Exhibit "A", (page 110 of the Expediente). Said parcel of land was purchased by the defendant on August 30, 1954 (Exhibit ("A"). The plaintiff contends that the deed of sale (Exhibit "1", for the plaintiff and Exhibit "A", for the defendant) is void ab initio because it lacked the formalities required by law, and that the possession of the defendant by virtue of the sale made him (defendant) a mere trustee and therefore neither prescription nor laches may be set up as a defense by him. The contention of the plaintiff that the deed of sale is void lacks basis in law and fact. Said deed of sale was notarized by a Justice of the Peace (now Municipal Judge) and it is evident that all the essential elements of a contract are present, namely: (1) consent of the contracting parties (2) object certain which is the subject matter of the contract and (3) cause of the obligation which is established (Act 1319 New Civil Code). The deed of sale between Tito Oriendo and the father of the present defendant being a perfect deed of sale, the Court cannot agree to the allegation of the plaintiff that the defendant became a mere trustee by virtue of the deed of sale. There is no dispute as to the identity of the land subject-matter of the instant suit. There was an ocular inspection made by the Chief of Police of Mogpog when the same land was litigated there. Moreover, the present defendant (and his father who bought the land in 1954) has been in possession of the land since 1954 and therefore even if there was a flaw in their title, the defendant would still have acquired the land by virtue of acquisitive prescription, having possessed the land in good faith within a period of ten (10) years. There is good faith because the defendant's possession of the land is by virtue of a deed of sale (pp. 35-36, rec.). Plaintiff-appellant in her brief maintains that the longer court erred: (1) in not declaring that the deed of sale executed on August 30, 1954 by Tito Oriendo in favor of defendant-appellee Igmedio Maderazo refers to a different parcel of land situated in Barrio Puyog, Municipality of Boac, Marinduque, while the disputed parcel is situated in Barrio Puting Buhangin, Mogpog, Marinduque; (2) in admitting the said deed of sale as evidence of defendant-appellee's title and possession in good faith of the land in question; and (3) in holding that defendant-appellee acquired the land through ordinary acquisitive prescription by virtue of "his possession in good faith for the period of ten (10) years, and in not declaring that defendant-appellee's possession was

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interrupted by the forcible entry suit she instituted on July 28, 1956 in the municipal court of Mogpog. Plaintiff-appellant argues that the deed of sale in favor of defendant-appellee clearly describes the land as the it "southern Half () portion containing approximately 3,700 square meters ... situated in Barrio Puyog, Boac, Marinduque," and that this parcel is about 3 kilometers from the poblacion of Boac (p. 10, rec.), while the parcel of land in question is situated in Sitio Puting Buhangin, Municipality of Mogpog, far from the parcel of land sold to Igmedio Maderazo. Defendant-appellee could not therefore assert good faith in possessing the disputed lot; consequently, adverse possession of ten (10) years would not suffice. I The applicable statute on prescription of action for the recovery of a real property, is Article 1141 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which provides that "real actions over immovables prescribe after thirty years ... without prejudice to what is established for the acquisition of ownership and other real rights by prescription. The trial court found that defendant-appellee Catalino Maderazo (together with his late father, Igmedio Maderazo) has been in possession of the land since 1954 (p. 36, rec.), which factual determination is not impugned by the parties. The institution by plaintiff-appellant of the action for recovery of ownership of the land in question on January 18, 1967, after only about 13 years from 1954, interrupted the running of the prescriptive period of thirty (30) years (Art. 1155, Civil Code of the Philippines). The action was therefore filed well within the period prescribed in Article 1141. II However, defendant-appellee Catalino Maderazo insists that he has acquired ownership over the disputed parcel by ordinary prescription through adverse possession of only ten (10) years under Article 1134 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. But ordinary acquisitive prescription of immovables and other real rights thru adverse possession of ten (10) years, requires possession "in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law" (Art. 1117, Civil Code of the Philippines). In the absence of a just title or good faith, ownership of immovables can be acquired by extraordinary prescription thru an uninterrupted adverse possession of thirty (30) years (Art. 1137, Civil Code of the Philippines). After finding that defendant-appellee Catalino Maderazo "has been in possession of the land since 1954," the trial judge concluded that "even if there was a flaw in their title, the defendant would still have acquired the land by virtue of acquisitive prescription, having possessed the land in good faith within a period of ten (10) years. There is good faith because the defendant's possession of the land is by virtue of a deed of sale" (p. 36, rec.). The crucial issue therefore is whether the deed of sale executed by Tito Oriendo on August 30, 1954 in favor of the late Igmedio Maderazo could be considered as a valid basis for good faith

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and as a just title, in order to justify the acquisition of the disputed parcel of about 9 hectares by ordinary prescription thru adverse possession of only 10 years. The law defines a possessor in good faith as one who is not aware of any flaw in his title or mode of acquisition; and conversely, one who is aware of such a flaw is a possessor in bad faith (Art. 526, Civil Code of the Philippines). WE ruled that "the essence of the bona fides or good faith, therefore, lies in honest belief in the validity of one's right, ignorance of a superior claim, and absence of intention to overreach another." 1 A deed of sale, to constitute a just title and to generate good faith for the ordinary acquisitive prescription of ten (10) years, should refer to the same parcel of land, which is adversely possessed. In the case at bar, the deed of sale in favor of the deceased Igmedio Maderazo covers a parcel of land patently different from the disputed land owned by plaintiff-appellant as to area, location and boundary owners. The disputed parcel contains an area of about nine (9) hectares, and is situated in Sitio Puting Buhangin, Mogpog, Marinduque, as shown in Tax Declaration No. 8431 submitted as evidence by plaintiff-appellant at the trial of the ejectment case before the municipal court of Mogpog (see Decision of municipal court, p. 43, rec.) and in Tax Declaration No. 8645 attached as Annex "A" to the complaint in Civil Case No. 1395 for reivindicacion before the Court of First Instance of Marinduque (p. 26, rec.). Said Tax Declaration Nos. 8431 and 8645 particularly describe the questioned parcel of land as bounded on the north by Benito Luisaga and Pantaleon Oriendo; east, by Toribio Orlinga, Eustaquio Logmao, Hilarion Bunag and B. Linga; south, by Boac river, Modesto Lazo and Tomas Malimata and west, Benito Luisa-Nazario Malimata, Pedro Luisaga and Hilarion Buag (p. 26, rec.). This 9-hectare land is near the Marcopper Mines (p. 8, rec.) and therefore of great potential value. On the other hand, the parcel of land purchased on August 30, 1954 by the late Igmedio Maderazo from Tito Oriendo for P150 was assessed in 1949 at P30 per Tax Declaration No. 16117 and is described in the deed of sale, Exhibit "A", as "the southern HALF() PORTION containing approximately 3,700 square meters without any improvements thereon of that parcel of coconut-forest land situated in Barrio Puyog, Boac, Marinduque, and which ONE-HALF SHARE is to be bounded on the north: by the rest of the lot; east: Sofia Oriendo; south: Pedro Oriendo; and west: estero, delimited by madre cacao trees" (p. 33, rec.). If the southern half is only about 3,700 square meters, the northern half must also be about 3,700 square meters, or the entire lot of Tito Oriendo is only about 7,400 square meters in area very much less than nine (9) hectares, the area of the questioned parcel. It is therefore patent that the land sold by Tito Oriendo to the late Igmedio Maderazo is distinct from the land of plaintiff-appellant Ignacia Negrete as to location, boundaries and area. To repeat, the land of plaintiff-appellant is about nine (9) hectares and located in Sitio Puting Buhangin, Mogpog. The lot of defendant-appellee is only about 3,700 square meters and situated in Barrio Puyog, Boac. The two parcels have different boundary owners. As a matter of fact, defendant-appellee did not controvert the claim of plaintiff-appellant that Barrio Puyog is three kilometers from the town proper of Boac, Marinduque (pp. 15-16, rec. or pp. 9-10, appellant's brief). Defendant-appellee does not even insinuate that Barrio Puting Buhangin of

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Mogpog is adjacent to Barrio Puyog of Boac. Futhermore, defendant-appellee, in paragraph 2 of his answer to the complaint for recovery of ownership, admits that plaintiff-appellant "owns a piece of land at Puting Buhangin, Mogpog, Marinduque" (p. 29, rec.). The municipal court of Mogpog found that the disputed parcel of about nine (9) hectares is within the town of Mogpog. Defendant-appellee Igmedio Maderazo himself conceded before the municipal court of Mogpog that the land he is cultivating, which is subject matter of the forcible entry suit, is in Puting Buhangin; although he alleges that it is different from the land claimed by the plaintiff-appellant (p. 43, rec.). Defendant-appellee included in his brief an alleged report dated February 12, 1968 and purportedly signed by commissioners Constancio M. Marte allegedly representing the court, Teodoro Lagustin allegedly representing the plaintiff and Igmedio Maderazo allegedly for himself, stating that on their ocular inspection of the questioned land on February 12, 1968, they found out that the attached Sketch is the land in questioned as the plaintiff declared in the person of Miguel Malapit; and on the other hand the defendant and at the same time commissioner Igmedio Maderazo declared that the names stated in the said sketch are the persons in possession of each parcel with the approximate area of each. The commissioner also found out that the land in question is within the jurisdiction of Boac, Marinduque, February 12, 1968. Mogpog, Marinduque, February 12, 1968. (SGD.) CONSTANCIO M. MARTE Commissioner of the Court TEODORO LAGUSTIN Commissioner for the Plaintiff (SGD.) IGMIDIO MADERAZO Commissioner for Defendant As above reproduced, the said report appears to have been signed by only two commissioners, namely, Constancio Marte and Igmedio Maderazo. It was not signed by Teodoro Lagustin, the alleged commissioner of the plaintiff. Moreover, the alleged report states that Miguel Malapit represented the plaintiff. Yet in the spaces for the signatures of the commissioners, the name Teodoro Lagustin, not Miguel Malapit, appears as commissioner for the plaintiff. It would seem therefore that Teodoro Lagustin or Miguel Malapit did not agree to the entire report including its last paragraph stating that the land in question is within the jurisdiction of Boac, Marinduque, for which reason they did not sign the same. And precisely because neither Miguel Malapit nor Teodoro Lagustin, as commissioner for the plaintiff, signed the aforesaid alleged report, it was not submitted to the lower court, so that the trial court in its decision did not even remotely intimate about, much less approve, said alleged report. Said report was prepared obviously to sustain the position of defendant-appellee.

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Hence, defendant-appellee Catalino Maderazo, along with his late father Igmedio Maderazo, could not claim good faith in occupying said land of plaintiff-appellant on the basis of the said instrument of sale. If said appellee's position were to be sustained, it would be easy for anyone to acquire ownership of an untitled land belonging to another person by adverse possession of only ten (10) years on the basis of a document of sale covering a distinct parcel executed by a person who is a stranger to the land. This could not have been intended by the legislature; because forged deeds of conveyance could be conveniently interposed to oust the true owner from a land by adverse possession of only ten (10) years. To spawn such a monstrosity in the law was never contemplated by the statute, which is designed to engender social quietude. Appellee Maderazo admits in his answer in Civil Case No. 1395 that he is a resident of Barrio Puting Buhangin, Mogpog, Marinduque (pp. 26, 29, rec.). As the buyer, he knew what lot was sold to him. And having signed as vendee the deed of sale in his favor, he is conclusively presumed to have read the deed of sale, which clearly states that the southern half () portion containing an area of approximately 3,700 square meters, was the parcel he acquired from his vendor Tito Oriendo, which is located in Barrio Puyog, Boac, Marinduque. Appellee Maderazo therefore was aware and knew that the land sold to him is situated in Barrio Puyog, Boac, and is only about 3,700 square meters (less than half a hectare in area, not the land of about nine (9) hectares in Barrio Puting Buhangin, Mogpog belonging to the plaintiff-appellant. Defendant-appellee Catalino Maderazo cannot in good conscience assert honest belief in the validity of his right nor absence of intention to overreach another in view of the facts and circumstances aforestated. Moreover, there is no intimation in the record that vendor Tito Oriendo testified either in the forcible entry case before the municipal court, of Mogpog or in the reivindicatory action before the Court of First Instance of Marinduque that he owned a parcel of land situated in Puting Buhangin, Mogpog, Marinduque, or that the land he sold to the defendant-appellee is in Sitio Puting Buhangin, Mogpog, Marinduque. Defendant-appellee did not even submit any tax declaration or tax receipts in the name of his alleged vendor, Tito Oriendo, covering the disputed parcel of land of about nine (9) hectares. The case of Ortiz vs. Fuentebella is hardly applicable to the case at bar because of the following facts established therein: (1) Asuncion Fuentebella purchased, by means of a public instrument, a tract of land including a pasture land from Juan and Sotera Cano, who believed that the disputed pasture land sold by them was included in the land they inherited from their father Felipe Cano, and which they sold to Asuncion. As a consequence, Asuncion Fuentebella took possession of said pasture land, built a house and introduced other improvements thereon. The pasture land turned out to have a duly inscribed possessory information title in the name of Ramon Ortiz, father of Marcelina Ortiz, who in March, 1909, informed Asuncion by letter that her father Ramon Ortiz owns the said pasture land and requested Asuncion to desist from further introducing improvements thereon. (2) It was established that Juan and Sotera as well as their father Felipe Cano possessed the land "in the neighborhood" of the disputed pasture land. Consequently, the Supreme Court therein ruled:

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However it be, we do not regard as decisive the evidence presented to prove that the defendant's possession was in bad faith. The nullity of the greater part of her title is not sufficient argument to prove that she knew of the defect in her mode of acquisition of a tract of land as belonging to Juan and Sotera Cano, when it is now demonstrated in this case that neither Sotera, nor Juan Cano, nor even their father Felipe Cano, had at any time possessed it, but another tract in

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the neighborhood, possession whereof might easy have caused error on the part of the purchaser. Defendant's bad faith began after the warning given in a letter by the plaintiff's daughter in March, 1909, for after having received it she then had ground to doubt that Sotera and Juan Cano could transfer any title of possession in the following December. 2

In the case at bar, unlike Juan and Sotera Cano, there is no showing that Tito Oriendo erroneously believed in good faith that the disputed parcel of land of about nine (9) hectares belonging to the plaintiff-appellant is included in the deed of sale executed by him in favor of Igmedio Maderazo which sale covers only an area of 3,700 square meters, less than half a hectare. As repeatedly emphasized heretofore, Tito Oriendo could not possibly entertain such belief, considering the difference in boundaries, location and area between the parcel of land of about nine (9) hectares of plaintiff-appellant and the lot of about 3,700 square meters sold to defendant-appellee under Exhibit "A". Then again, it is not shown that the nine-hectare parcel of plaintiff-appellant is adjacent to the lot sold by Tito Oriendo to defendant-appellee Igmedio Maderazo. On the contrary, the claim of plaintiff-appellant that her nine-hectare parcel of land is within the Municipality of Mogpog and not within the Municipality of Boac, remains uncontroverted and is confirmed by her tax declaration Nos. 8431 and 8645 and by the decision of the municipal court of Mogpog in the forcible entry case as well as in the appealed decision of the Court of First Instance of the Marinduque (pp. 36, 43, rec.). Hence, not being a possessor in good faith, defendant-appellee Catalino Maderazo can acquire ownership over the disputed parcel of land of about nine (9) hectares belonging to plaintiffappellant only by extraordinary acquisitive prescription thru an uninterrupted adverse possession of thirty (30) years (Art. 1137, Civil Code of the Philippines). Since he occupied the same for only about thirteen (13) years from 1954 until 1967, when his adverse possession was interrupted by the filing of the action for reivindicacion on January 18, 1967 (Art. 1155, Civil Code of the Philippines), the claim of defendant-appellee is untenable. WHEREFORE, JUDGMENT IS HEREBY RENDERED (1) REVERSING THE APPEALED DECISION, (2) DECLARING PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT IGNACIA NEGRETE AS OWNER OF THE LAND OF ABOUT NINE (9) HECTARES DESCRIBED IN HER COMPLAINT, AND (3) DIRECTING DEFENDANT-APPELLEE CATALINO MADERAZO TO DELIVER TO SAID PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT THE POSSESSION OF AFORESAID LAND, TO VACATE THE SAME AND TO PAY THE COSTS. So ordered.

Page | Concepcion, C.J., Castro, Fernando, Barredo, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur. Zaldivar, J., concurs in the result. Teehankee, J., reserves his vote. Makalintal, J., is on leave.

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Footnotes 1 Bernardo et al., vs. Bernardo, 96 Phil. 202, 205. 2 Ortiz vs. Fuentebella, 27 Phil. 537, 546; emphasis supplied.