National Commission On Terrorist Attacks Upon The United States

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
COMMISSION SENSITIVE
DRAFT DRAFT DRAFT
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES
Minutes of the July 31, 2003 Meeting
The Chair called the Commission to order at 9:04 AM on July 31, 2003. All
Commissioners were in attendance.
Minutes. The minutes of the July 8, 2003 meeting were agreed to, after the incorporation
of several minor changes.
Access to White House Documents. The Vice Chair summarized the key points of an
agreement reached between the Commission and the White House regarding access to EOF
and NSC documents:
1) Commissioners and key staff will have access to highly sensitive NSC and White
House documents. Individuals with access may share information with other colleagues
on a need to know basis. This agreement goes beyond access granted to the Joint
Inquiry and Congress, hi rare cases, access to certain documents may be reserved for
only the Chair and Vice Chair, but the Commission can then request wider access.
2) Commissioners and staff who take notes may bring them back to the Commission's K
Street office. The notes will be reviewed for proper classification on the spot, or, in
some cases, within 1-2 business days. Portion marking will expedite the process. Highly
classified material will be transported via approved courier channels.
3) Direct quotes from documents are permissible; however, the Commission will exercise
restraint and will not endeavor to recreate documents with verbatim notes. The
presumption is that the Commission will not quote directly from presidential
deliberative documents. (Commissioner Ben-Veniste observed that the agreement
allows for this issue to be subject to later discussion.)
4) The Commission will be granted access to circulated drafts on a case-by-case basis; the
Commission will not see uncirculated drafts.
5) The Commission is not prohibited from taking notes on draft documents.
6) The agreement further recognizes the Commission's need for access to this material in
order to complete its work. The Vice Chair noted that Judge Gonzales emphasized,
again and again, conciliation. He noted that Judge Gonzales is committed to working
with the Chair, Vice Chair, and staff on any problems that may arise.

Commissioner Ben-Veniste asked how the Commission is handling the review of

redactions in EOF documents. The Executive Director stated that he, the Chair, Vice Chair,
and General Counsel were allowed to review redactions, and-aekteothat he had reviewed all
of the redactions to date. The Executive Director observed that the body of redactions was
not controversial, but that he had made a request to the White House—in writing—to
reconsider fourêdactions. Three of the four redactions obscured the policy context of a
decision, and1 fourth dealt with covert action. Commissioner Roemer agreed that such a
request shoum be made in writing. Commissioner Ben-Veniste suggested that it would be
helpful to have annotations next to redactions stating the subject matter of, and rationale
for, each redaction.
Commissioner Ben-Veniste inquired if any documents had been limited to review by the
Chair and Vice Chair. The General Counsel Ban Marettsresponded that, to date, the
continuity of government information was the only such information limited to review by
the Chair and Vice Chair, but addea that the Commission already knew about this
exception.
Commissioner Fielding described the agreement as a phenomenal breakthrough.

Commissioner Roemer concurred that the agreement brought the Commission into
uncharted territory and had broken new ground. While access isn't completely there, he
added, the agreement established ground rules for access to material that the Joint Inquiry
did not get. The Vice Chair added that everything will depend upon implementation of the
agreement. There will be bumps in the road, but the Judge has committed to working
through them.
Commissioner Roemer expressed his concern that the NSC documents frequently record
announcements of meetingsJbujfno documentation appears in connection with those
meetings in terms of minutes or follow-up. The Executive Director noted that such
documents may not actually exist, but for cases in which they do, they are encompassed by
the recently-submitted EOF Document Request No. 3. He noted further that this will be a
key question of access for the Commission,
Commissioner Roemer then asked if the Commission would gain access to the pre-9/11
"draft" of NSPD-9. He observed that a document is not a draft if it has been circulated
through everyone and given to the President. The Executive Director agreed with this
assessment. The General Counsel stated that NSPD-9 was the Commission's first request to
view a circulated draft, which, according to the agreement, can be done on a case-by-case
basis. Commissioner Gorelick expressed her belief that it should be an easy case. The
Executive Director stated that Judge Gonzales had yet to make a decision, and that the
Chair and Vice Chair would follow-up.
Commissioner Gorelick inquired as to whether the White House documents could be

arranged in chronological order. She added that the Commission ought to compile an
integrated timeline of events on 9/11, reconciling various times and time zones involved in

various accounts. She went on to observe that there was deep confusion in the public
between the Commission and the Joint Inquiry.
Senator Cleland inquired as to whether the Commission would have access to the same
information as Bob Woodward did. The Executive Director explained that the Commission
would have much greater access.
Moussaoui Agreement. Commissioner Ben-Veniste inquired about the impact on the

Commission's Moussaoui agreement if the criminal trial is not completed by the
publication date, or furthermore, if the case is dismissed altogether and moved to a military
tribunal. The General Counsel stated that they had not discussed the latter point, but that the
understanding was, based on language in the letter, that the agreement only applied to the
court trial.
Declassification. Based on his experience with the declassification of the Joint Inquiry
report, Commissioner Roemer asked how the Commission was going to write and publicize
an unclassified report if the source material for the report itself is classified. Commissioner
Ben-Veniste inquired as to what mechanism the Commission would have in place if there
are objections to the report's declassification. He also asked what, if anything, the
Commission could learn from the Joint Inquiry declassification process. The Executive
Director responded by stating that the Commission intends to write an unclassified report
and submit it to pre-publication review. He added that it is a more favorable position for the
Commission to assert that the report is unclassified, than to write a classified report and
force the Commission through the •traditiortaideclassification process.
The General Counsel suggested that the Commission build in a couple of months to allow
for the declassification process. Commissioner Gorton stated that the Commission should
use all of the time it has to write the report. Commissioner Gorelick expressed concern that
there was no time to build in a couple of months before the May 2004 deadline, and asked
if the statute would allow for declassification in the two months beyond the deadline. The
General Counsel said that the statute would probably accommodate this.
The Chair concurred that the Commission's report should be written so that it is
automatically released to the public. The Vice Chair noted that it will take a lot of work on
the part of the staff to limit the points of difference before the report goes to the White
House for review. He added that he and the Chair would try to get an agreement from the
White House to act very quickly. Commissioners Gorelick and Fielding concurred that the
White House would want the report to be released as soon as possible.
FBI Access. The Vice Chair announced that the Commission had received the FBI timeline
and was granted access to the PENTTBOM's digital files at FBI Headquarters. The
Executive Director and General Counsel added that electronic access to the PENTTBOM
file enables the staff to search it on site, and obviates the need for further document
requests as to this material.

Commissioner Gorelick observed that although the Commission does not have physical
custody of some documents, the Commission's access to such documents should be
memorialized. She suggested that the Commission put both the White House and FBI on
notice, and stated that it wasjiot tenablejo close down the Commission without a record of
its access to theseâterials>Tne^Geêralôunsel suggested that the Commission could
create its own record by either describing the documents or archiving the documents the
Commission reviews. Commissioner Gorelick restated her preference that these agencies
create a set of what was accessible to the Commission and include that set in the archives
when the Commission concludes.
Hearings. The Chair voiced the staffs strong preference for the hearing schedule to resume
in January 2004, allowing time to conduct interviews and review documents for the
remainder of the calendar year. He circulated a proposal endorsed by all team leaders and
staff.
The Vice Chair said that his approach was to give some deference and weight to staff
considerations; the proposal, which suggests a moratorium on public hearings until January,
is ambitious with 12-13 days of hearings planned in 2004. He observed that this schedule,
in addition to Commission meetings, would require a very heavy time commitment from
Commissioners. He added that the proposal leaves the Commission open to criticism for
not doing anythingfano grv^s me irrfpression that the Commission is inactive. He suggested
that they might heaVl-off such criticism by issuing a press release stating what the
Commission will accomplish between now and January. Commissioner Fielding
encouraged the Commission to announce the hearing schedule as soon as possible.
The Vice Chair added that the Commission needs to adopt a more aggressive hearing
format, go into each hearing with specific objectives, and instruct the witnesses to answer
questions succinctly.
The Chair noted that the Commission had promised to provide another interim report to the
public in September. He suggested that they could issue another in October or November.
Commissioner Gorton recommended that the next interim report include how many
individuals had been interviewed, how many documents had been received, and a schedule
of Commission activities.
Commissioner Ben-Veniste applauded the first interim report, stating that it was successful
beyond his wildest expectations, and resulted in the White House looking at the
Commission in a completely different light. He added that the report gave the country a
look at the Commission and that almost all of the op-eds were unfailingly supportive of the
Commission. He went on to suggest that the Commission consider a schedule of closed
hearings and entertain the idea of Commissioner subcommittees, which is permitted by the
statute. The closed hearings, he asserted, would enable the Commission to develop
information in a private session before conducting a public inquiry.

Commissioner Gorton stated his support for Commissioner Ben-Veniste's proposal, with
the caveat that the schedule should not interview with staff work. He expressed his belief
that what the Commission says at the end is what matters most.
Commissioner Cleland expressed his concerns regarding the hearing proposal, stating that
it gives the appearance of the Commission shutting down. He added that it is not the time to
retreat in light of the Joint Inquiry report and heightened terrorist threats. He observed that
part of the Commission's product is not just the final report, but giving the country the
sense that things have been investigated.
Commissioner Lehman concurred that a measure of the Commission's effectiveness will be

the public's perceptionfand recommended monthly hearings. He added that there are many
issues that the Commission could expose publicly (such as some of the problems he
encountered during his visit to Kennedy Airport). He suggested that the Commission
consider issuing interim findings and recommendations on issues such as the visa-waiver
program. The Vice Chair wondered if the Commission could identify 4-5 recommendations
that could be made immediately. The Executive Director noted that guidance had been give O
to staff to forward recommendations if they were of an immediate nature and applicability
to make a difference in terms of security.
Commissioner Ben-Veniste suggested a follow-up to the FAA/NORAD hearing, picking up

on the aviation issues raised by Commissioner Lehman.
Commissioner Gorelick stated that the staff proposal has a lot of merit. She wondered if
there were three policy-oriented topics that the Commission could consider for daylong
hearings on prospective issues for which less preparation is required, such as, "Who is
defending our nation?" She added that the Commission has a mandate to bore into the
historical facts, but also to look at prospective issues. She also suggested that the Chair
deliver a speech at the National Press Club that combines process and substance.
Commissioner Roemer observed that media's appetite had increased measurably given the
recent release of the Joint Inquiry report. The Commission, he said, has a real opportunity
to bond with the American people; to let them know why the Commission exists and what
it is going to accomplish. He then proposed a hybrid schedule that called for a speech in
September, issuing policy recommendations in October, and holding a hearing in
November. He suggested that the Commission select 2-3 issues that wouldn't take a great
deal of staff work, such as congressional oversight, detainees, or intelligence jointness.
The Executive Director stated that the Commission was now in a zero-sum situation, and
that all hearings, regardless of their length and scope, required significant staff time. He
contended that the Joint Inquiry's investigation ended prematurely due to an ambitious
hearing schedule, and that the report suffered as a result.
The Vice Chair recommended that the Commission accept the 2004 hearing proposal and
requested that the staff prepare a proposal outlining a menu of possible fall events.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 5

A
Commissioner Thompson concurred but believe.that the Commission should move forward
immediately on the idea of a National Press Club speech. He added that the Commission
should not expect any Administration principal to appear more than once.
Commissioner Ben-Veniste inquired about the status of the budget, and if it allowed for the
hiring of additional staff. The Executive Director stated that the Commission was currently
in a satisfactory financial position, and that it had hired new professional staff members in
recent weeks.
Aircraft as Weapons. The Executive Director presented a SECRET'briefing on the issue

of "aircraft as weapons." The presentation and subsequent discussion clustered around two
major sets of questions:
1. Assuming that there was an intelligence failure in warning about the danger of aircraft
as weapons, when did that failure occur? hi other words, when should analysts in
possession of the relevant information have come to the conclusion that seems so
obvious in hindsight? This "when" question leads immediately to another: Why?
2. If analysts had done their job just as we would hope they would, just how would
intelligence have made the jump to preventive policies? hi other words, what would a
success have looked like?
After the conclusion of the SECRET-level briefing, discussion ensued.
Commissioner Ben-Veniste thought it was important to go through the matters (just

concluded) in a hearing format. The Executive Director agreed, but that it would require a
staff presentation in order to bring forward the material effectively.
Commissioner Fielding asked when we should have known about the use of aircraft as
weapons. The Executive Director said that we should have known by the summer of 2001,
for sure. He added that, if everything had gone right, we could have had strategic warning
of this priority threat in the 1998-99 time frame. Had this gone right, Richard Clarke
would have gotten the PC and the NSC geared up, and he would have jabbed at the FAA
and others to act.
Commissioner Ben-Veniste expressed his interest in the historical record; when were there
suggestions about hardening cockpit doors, who made those suggestions, and what
happened to them? Also, what was the standard training for flight crews on responses to
hijackings?
Staffer Johnstone expressed his doubt that the system could have responded, even if there
had been adequate warning. The screening system in airports was not calibrated to stop
knife blades of 4 inches or less; it was calibrated to stop handguns. Any analytic
breakthrough in understanding the use of aircraft as weapons would have fallen flat, in the
absence of a system to stop the hijackers.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY t

Commissioner Roemer said that we—and the hijackers—both should have understood the
nature of the serious threat of aircraft as weapons from the date (1994) of the Cessna crash
into the White House.
Commissioner Gorton expressed his skepticism as to whether we could have caught the
details of the 9/11 plot and pieced them together in time. He expressed that the only way
to have prevented it was to have understood that al-Qaeda wanted to get us, and that we had
to get them first.
The Vice Chair stated that he was impressed with the presentation. He wanted to know the
staffs conclusions as to what happened, and what didn't happen—and why. He also wanted
to know what the Commission should recommend to prevent such actions in the future.
At 1 PM, the Commission meeting concluded.

DRAFT DRAFT DRAFT
The Chair called the Commission to order at 9:04 AM on July 31, 2003. All
Commissioners were in attendance.
and NSC documents:
y on a need-to-know basis. This agreement goes beyond access granted to the Joint
Inquiry and Congress. In rare cases, access to certain documents may be reserved for
only the Chair and Vice Chair, but the Commission can then request wider access.
some cases, within 1-2 business days. Portion marking will expedite the process. Highly
classified material will be transported via approved courier channels.
order to complete its work. The Vice Chair noted that Judge Gonzales emphasized,
again and again, conciliation. He noted that Judge Gonzales is committed to working
with the Chair, Vice Chair, and staff on any problems that may arise.


redactions in EOF documents. The Executive Director stated that he, the Chair, Vice Chair,
and General Counsel were allowed to review redactions, and that he had reviewed all of the
redactions to date. The Executive Director observed that the body of redactions was not
controversial, but that he had made a request to the White House—in writing—to
reconsider four redactions. Three of the four redactions obscured the policy context of a
decision, and the fourth dealt with covert action. Commissioner Roemer agreed that such a
request should be made in writing. Commissioner Ben-Veniste suggested that it would be
helpful to have annotations next to redactions stating the subject matter of, and rationale
for, each redaction.
Chair and Vice Chair. The General Counsel responded that, to date, the continuity of
government information was the only such information limited to review by the Chair and
Vice Chair, but that the Commission was already informed of this exception. The
Executive Director described a couple of other documents that were also being handled in
this way.

added, the agreement established ground rules for access to material that the Joint Inquiry
did not get. The Vice Chair added that everything will depend upon implementation of the
agreement. There will be bumps in the road, but the Judge has committed to working
through them.
announcements of meetings, but no documentation appears in connection with those
meetings in terms of minutes or follow-up. The Executive Director noted that such
documents may not actually exist at all, or in a circulated form. In cases where minutes
were prepared but only circulated internally, they will be picked up by the recently-
submitted EOF Document Request No. 3.
"draft" of NSPD-9. He stressed the significance of this document. The Executive Director
agreed with this assessment. The General Counsel stated that NSPD-9 was the
Commission's first request to view a circulated draft, which, according to the agreement,
can be done on a case-by-case basis. Commissioner Gorelick expressed her belief that it
should be an easy case. The Executive Director stated that Judge Gonzales had yet to make
a decision, and that the Chair and Vice Chair might need to press the point directly with
him.

arranged in a single chronological set rather than in parallel sets separated by classification
or records categories. On a separate matter, she added that the Commission ought to

compile an integrated timeline of events on 9/11, reconciling various times and time zones
involved in various accounts. She went on to observe that there was deep confusion among
the public about the difference between the Commission and the Congressional Joint
Inquiry.
information as Bob Woodward did. The Executive Director explained that the Commission
would have greater access.

tribunal. The General Counsel stated that they had notdiscussed the latter point, but that
understanding J**BS, based on language in the letter, that the agreement only applied to the
current case. ^
an unclassified report if the source material for the report itself is classified. Commissioner
Ben-Veniste inquired as to what mechanism the Commission would have in place if there
are objections to the report's declassification. He also asked what, if anything, the
Commission could learn from the Joint Inquiry declassification process. The Executive
and submit it to pre-publication review. He explained why this is a stronger position legally
and procedurally than one in which the report is treated as classified and then must go
through the traditional declassification process.
The General Counsel suggested that the Commission build in time to allow for the cJt6fo*\^ iXw
dedasSSwE^n process. Commissioner Gorton stated that the Commission should use all
of the time it has to write the report. Commissioner Gorelick expressed concern that there
was no time to build in a couple of months before the May 2004 deadline, and asked if the
statute would allow for declassification in the two months beyond the deadline. The
General Counsel said that the statute would probably accommodate this.
automatically released to the public. The Vice Chair noted that it will take a lot of work on
the part of the staff to limit the points of difference before the report goes to the White
House for review. He added that he and the Chair would try to get an agreement from the
White House to act very quickly. Commissioners Gorelick and Fielding concurred that the
and had also been granted electronic access to the PENTTBOM's case files at FBI
Headquarters. The Executive Director and General Counsel added that such access to the

PENTTBOM file enables the staff to search it on site, easing the need for further document
requests as to this material.
notice, and stated that it was not tenable to close down the Commission without a record of
its access to materials from these agencies. The General Counsel suggested that the
Commission could create its own record by either describing the documents or archiving
the documents the Commission reviews. Commissioner Gorelick restated her preference
that these agencies create a set of what was accessible to the Commission and include that
set in the archives when the Commission concludes.
staff.
\f is ambitious,with 12-13 days of hearings planned in 2004. He observed that this schedule,
not doing anything during the remainder of this year, and gives the impression that the
Commission is inactive. He suggested that they might head-off such criticism by issuing a
press release stating what the Commission will accomplish between now and January.
Commissioner Fielding encouraged the Commission to announce the hearing schedule as
soon as possible.
of Commission activities.
beyond his wildest expectations, and resulted in the White House looking at the

Commissioner Gorton stated his support for the staffs emphasis on getting the report done.
He expressed his belief that what the Commission says at the end is what matters most.

the public's perception and recommended monthly hearings. He added that there are many
issues that the Commission could expose publicly (such as some of the problems he
encountered during his visit to Kennedy Airport). He suggested that the Commission
consider issuing interim findings and recommendations on issues such as the visa-transit
problem. The Vice Chair wondered if the Commission could identify 4-5 recommendations
that could be made immediately. The Executive Director noted that guidance had been
given to staff to forward any policy recommendations that were ready for presentation to
the nation in an interim report.
Commissioner Ben-Veniste suggested a follow-up to the FAA/NORAD hearing, picking up

on the aviation issues raised by Commissioner Lehman.
historical facts, but also to look at prospective issues. She also suggested that the Chair
to bond with the American people; to let them know why the Commission exists and what
it is going to accomplish. He then proposed a hybrid schedule that called for a speech in
deal of staff work, such as congressional oversight, what had been learned about the plot
from the detainees, or more unified management of the intelligence community -
converging with legislation that Senator Graham was introducing.
The Executive Director stated that the Commission was now in a zero-sum situation in that
all hearings, regardless of their length and scope, required significant staff time. He

contended that the Joint Inquiry's investigation had been hampered by its hearing schedule
and that the report suffered as a result.
requested that the staff prepare a proposal outlining a menu of possible fall events.
Commissioner Thompson concurred, but believed that the Commission should move
forward immediately on the idea of a National Press Club speech. He added that the
Commission should not expect any Administration principal to appear more than once.
Commissioner Ben-Veniste inquired about the status of the budget, and if it allowed for the
in a satisfactory financial position, and that it had hired new professional staff members in
recent weeks.
Aircraft as Weapons. Aided by staff from Teams 2 and 7, and by Ernest May, the
Executive Director led an extended, classified discussion of the intelligence and policy
issues surrounding the pre-9/11 threat assessment of "aircraft as weapons." The
presentation and subsequent discussion clustered around two major sets of questions:
as weapons, when did that failure occur? In other words, when should analysts in
intelligence have made the jump to preventive policies? In other words, what would a
Commissioner Ben-Veniste thought it was important to go through the matters (just

concluded) in a hearing format. The Executive Director replied that it would require a staff
presentation in order to bring forward the material effectively. There was then a brief
discussion noting the virtues of the approach Eleanor Hill had adopted in providing
collective staff summaries in order to frame issues discussed in some of the Joint Inquiry's
hearings.
The Vice Chair stated that he was impressed with the presentation. He wanted to know the
staffs conclusions as to what happened, and what didn't happen—and why. He also wanted
to know what the Commission should recommend to prevent such actions in the future.
At 1 PM, the Commission meeting concluded.

DRAFT DRAFT DRAFT
The Chair called the Commission to order at 9:04 AM on July 31, 2003. Chairman Kean,
Vice Chair Hamilton, and Commissioners Ben-Veniste, Cleland, Fielding, Gorelick,
Gorton, Lehman, Roemer, and Thompson were present.
and NSC documents:
Inquiry and Congress. In rare cases, access to certain documents will be reserved for
only the Chair and Vice Chair at first, but the Commission can then request wider
x
2) Commissioners and staff who take notes may bring them back t® the Commission's K
some cases, within 1 -2 business days.-Paraâph clas^cariDjft*vill expedite the process.
Highly classified material will be transported via approved courier channels.
order to complete its work, and Judge Gonzales is committed to working with the
Chair, Vice Chair, and staff on any problems that may arise.


redactions in EOF documents. Executive Director Philip Zelikow stated that he, the Chair,
Vice Chair, and General Counsel were allowed to review redactions, and added that he had
reviewed all of the redactions to date. The Executive Director observed that the body of
redactions was not controversial, but that he had made a request to the White House—in
writing—to reconsider four redactions. Three of the four redactions obscured the policy
context of a decision, and fourth dealt with covert action. Commissioner Roemer agreed
that such a request should be made in writing. Commissioner Ben-Veniste suggested that it
would be helpful to have an annotation stating the subject matter of, and rationale for, each
redaction.
Chair and Vice Chair. General Counsel Dan Marcus responded that, to date, the continuity ,, i
of government information was the only such information limited to review by the Chgir nl fV^'lvVlF'
and Vice Chair, but added that the Commission already knew about this exception. / >
1 tf)^/
added, the ground rules established by this agreement are unprecedented.
announcements of meetings but, for the next two months, no documentation appears in
correlation with those meetings. The Executive Director noted that such documents may
not actually exist, but for cases in which they do, they are encompassed by the recently-
submitted EOF Document Request No. 3.
through everyone and given to the President. The Executive Director agreed with this
assessment. The General Counsel stated that NSPD-9 was the Commission's first request to

information as Bob Woodward. The Executive Director explained that the Commission


court trial.
< /
Declassification. »ased on his experience with the declassificalion of the Joint Inquiry
an unclassified report if the source material for the report itself is classified. The Executive
Director responded by stating that the Commission intends/to write an unclassified report
by paraphrasing classified material and eliminating its sources and methods. He added that
it isjnore favorable position for the Commission to assert/the report is unclassified, than to
write a classified report and force the Commission through the traditional declassification
process.
Commissioner Ben-Veniste inquired as to what mechanism the Commission would have in

place 0 if there are objections to its classification. He also asked what, if anything, the
Commission could learn from the Joint Inquiry declassification process.
The General Counsel suggested that the Commission buildfin f a couple of months to allow
use all of the time it has to-write the report. Commissioner Gorelick expressed concern that
there was no time to builopn a couple of months before the May 2004 deadline, and asked
if the statute would allow for declassification in the two months beyond the deadline. The
General Counsel said that the statue would probably accommodate this.
automatically released to the public. The Vice Chair noted that it will take very skillful
work on the part of the staff before the report goes to the White House for review. He
added that it is reasonable to foresee real glitches, but that they would try to get an
agreement to act very quickly. Commissioners Gorelick and Fielding concurred that the
Executive Director and General Counsel added that electronic access to the PENTTBOM , M I
file enables the staff to search it on site, and obviates the need foiraocument requests/"" ^ "^ i ,1
Y Vtor ft WHW
Commissioner Gorelick observed/that although the Commission does not have physical
custody of some documents, -tbm the Commission's access to such documents should be
memorialized in some way. She suggested that the Commission put both the White House
and FBI on notice, and stated that it was not tenable to close the Commission down without
a record of its access to these materials. The General Counsel suggested that the

staff.
The Vice Chair said that his approach was to give respect and deference to staff; the
proposal, which suggests a moratorium on public hearings until January, remained
ambitious with 12-13/ays of hearings in 2004. He observed that this schedule, in addition
to Commission meetings, would require a very heavy time commitment from
Commissioners. He/added that the proposal leaves the Commission open to criticism for
not doing anything/ and gives the impression that the Commission is inactive. He suggested
that they might headloff such criticism by issuing a press release stating what the
A
of what the Commissioiy activities.
O*1"
and resulted in the White House looking at the Commission in a completely different light.
He added that the report gave the country a look at the Commission and that almost all of
the op-eds were unfailingly supportive of the Commission. He went on to suggest that the
Commission consider a schedule of closed hearings and entertain the idea of Commissioner
subcommittees, which is permitted by the statute. The closed hearings, he asserted, would
enable the Commission to develop information in a private session before conducting a
public inquiry.


the public's perception. He added that there are many issues that the Commission could
expose publicly (such as some of the problems he encountered during his visit to Kennedy
Airport). He suggested that the Commission consider issuing interim findings and
recommendations on issues such as the visaJwaiver program. The Vice Chair wondered if
the Commission would identify 5-6/items QB recommendations that could be made
immediately. A> 1-, „ J
hearings on prospective issues for which less preparation is required, sfuch as, "Who is
historical facts, but also to look at prospective issues. She also aad'suggested that the Chair
to bond with the American people; to let themjwhy the Commission exists and what it is
going to accomplish. He then proposed a hybrid schedule that called for a speech in
deal of staff work, such as congressional oversight, detainees, or intelligence jointness.
that all hearings, regardless of their length and scope, required significant staff time. He
hearing schedule, and that the report suffered as a result.
requested that the staff prepare a proposal for outlining a menu of possible fall events. He
added that the Commission should not expect any principal to appear more than once.
Commissioner Ben-Veniste inquired about the status of the budget, and(n if Allowed for the
in a satisfactory financial position, and that they have hired five new professional staff
members in recent weeks.
Aircraft as Weapons. The Executive Director presented a SECRET briefing on the issue


DRAFT DRAFT DRAFT
The Chair called the Commission to order at 9:04 AM on July 31, 2003. Chajrffian Kean,
Vice Chair Hamilton, and Commissioners Ben-Veniste, Cleland, Fielding-Xjorelick,
Gorton, Lehman, Roemer, ajtra Thompson were present.
and NSC documents:
Inquiry and Congress. In rare cases, access to certain documents witt1>e~reserved for
only the Chair and Vice Chair atfiKDt, but the Commission can then request wider
access.
some cases, within 1-2 business days. Paragraph classification will expedite the process.
Highly classified material will be transported via approved courier channels.
order to complete its work, j«dOu3gTtjonzales Is committed to working with the
Chair, Vice Chair, and staff on any problems that may arise.
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redactions in EOF documents/Executive Director Philip-Zolikow stated that he, the Chair,
Vice Chair, and General Counsel were allowed to review redactions, and added that he had
reviewed all of the redactions to date. The Executive Director observed that the body of
redactions was not controversial, but that he had made a request to the White House—in
writing—to reconsider four redactions. Three of the four redactions obscured the policy
context of a decision, and fourth dealt with covert action. Commissioner Roemer agreed
that such a request should be made in writing. Commissioner Ben-Veniste suggested that it
would be helpful to have an annotation stating the subject matter of, and rationale for, each
redaction.
Chair and Vice Chair/General Counsel SwSteJ&fcs responded that, to date, the continuity
of government information was the only such information limited to review by the Chair
and Vice Chair, but added that the Commission already knew about this exception.

uncharted territory and had broken new ground. While access isn't completely there, he /
added, thecground rules «gteMiohqd byjhja aascmont oro unpreffaiitentpri P(r> *** '^
^— '
Commissioner Roemer expressed his concern that the NSC documents frequently record '
announcements of meetings but, fer the next two month^ no documentation appears in
«v v>c t *•» "nrrnlntinn "•ith those meetings. The Executive Director noted that such documents may
not actually exist, but for cases in which they do, they are encompassed by the recently-
submitted EOF Document Request No. 3. ^^t^/(î^ •**-«*• *Ai£ t*si££ t~*
h Wvvv<, Commissioner Roemer then asked if the Commission would gain access to the pre-9/11
t~f \^\K4AM&
trl «*>. through everyone and given to the President. The Executive Director agreed with this
' assessment. The General Counsel stated that NSPD-9 was the Commission's first request to

information as Bob Woodward/The Executive Director explained that the Commission


court trial.
an unclassified report if the source material for the report itself is classified.yfllie Executive
paraphrasing plgggifiod rnntnriil nnH pliminnring itc cnim^c ^nH mothnHt: He added that
it is more favorable position for the Commission to assert the report is unclassified, than to
write a classified report and force the Commission through the traditional declassification
process. ^^.^....„„»„...-.._. .,~. --•-••--- - • — • •
f s^"~^** V~t-v***^ S I
Commissioner Ben-Veniste inquired as to what mechanism the Commission would have in
if there are objections to i«K;lassification. He also asked what, if anything, the
'ommission could learn from the Joint Inquiry declassification process.
The General Counsel suggested that the Commission build-in a couple of months to allow
use all of the time it has to write the report. Commissioner Gorelick expressed concern that
there was no time to build-in a couple of months before the May 2004 deadline, and asked
if the statute would allow for declassificjiiOTJnJhe two months beyond the deadline. The
General Counsel said that the statug'would probably accommodate this. "7fc
automatically released to the public. The Vice Chair noted that it will take very okillful ft
work on the part of the staf£before the report goes to the White House for review. He
-"•"" added that it it rfMganftble I'o' feWSLi iidl glUclm, buJJbnfây would try to get an
agreementjto act very quickly. Commissioners Gorelick and Fielding concurred that the
/ WhiteHouse would want the report to be released as soon as possible.
Executive Director and General Counsel added that electronic access to the PENTTBOM
W,,
* /j
file enables the staff to search it on site, and obviates the need for/document
I
requests.
/ L a
custody of some documents, -tfest-the Commission's access to such documents should be
memorialized jgrsomajirfty. She suggested that the Commission put bothjhe White House
and FBI on notice, and stated that it was not tenable to close(meCommission|downUvithout
a record of its access to these materials. The General Counsel suggested that the

Staff
o«
/•" -5 tx>»^ f
The Vice Chair said that his approach wasô give-respcCPsnd deference to staf^ftne
proposal, which suggests a moratorium sn public hearings until January, luiiiuiiiltt &
ambitious with 12-13 days of hearings (n 2004. He observed that this schedule, in addition
to Commission meetings, would require a very heavy time commitment from
not doing anything, and gives the impression that the Commission is inactive. He suggested
that they might head-off such criticism by issuing a press release stating what the
of \*fastabe Commission activities.
and resulted in the White House looking at the Commission in a completely different light.
He added that the report gave the country a look at the Commission and that almost all of
the op-eds were unfailingly supportive of the Commission. He went on to suggest that the
Commission consider a schedule of closed hearings and entertain the idea of Commissioner
subcommittees, which is permitted by the statute. The closed hearings, he asserted, would
enable the Commission to develop information in a private session before conducting a
public inquiry.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ^J Y*'
COMMISSION SENSITIVE^ ^ Q
retreat in light of the Joint Inquiry report atidTieightened terrorist threats. He observed that
part of the Commission's producj^not just the final report, but giving the country the
sense that things have been investigated. . s*
/ /
Commissioner Lehman cdncurred that a measurgôf the Commission's effectiveness will be
the public's perception^ He added that there are many issues that the Commission could
expose publicly (such as some of the problems he encountered during his visit to Kennedy
Airport). He suggested that the Commijîon consider issuing interim findings and
recommendations on issues such as the visa-waiver program. The Vice Chair wondered if
the Commission vjEoukL^dentify •Safatems of recommendations that could be made
immediately.
historical facts, but also to look at prospective issues. She also aod" suggested that the Chair
Commissioner Roemer observed that media's appefcifehad increased measurably given the
6 to bond with the American people; to let theirpvhy the Commission exists and what it is
going to accomplish. He then proposed a hybrid schedule that called for a speech in
lk>
Vk-v**^
,-. deal of staff work, such as congressional oversight, detainees, or intelligence jointness.
%^ JH/'
* i»Wi"
**T fy
*l5:> f, that all hearings, regardless of their length and scope, required significant staff time. He
hearing schedule, and that the report suffered as a result. „ / . . /^,~
//0tviAlv\\$1~f<** •*rV_
The Vice Chair recommended that the Commission acceptlfie 2004 hearing proposal and
requested that the staff prepare a proposal^jTbutlinkfg a menu of possible fall events i He
"^V added that the Commission should not expect any/principal to appear more than once.
^t
, / Commissioner Ben-Veniste inquired about the status of the budget, andât^fjallowed for the
^ hiring of additional staff. The Executive Director stated that the Commission was currently
r* in a satisfactory financial position, and that Jfrey bavfiîred m& new professional staff
members in recent weeks.
Aircraft as Weapons. The Executive Director presented a SECRET briefing on the issue


notice, and stated that it was not tenable to close down the Commission without a record of
its access to materials from these agencies. The General Counsel suggested that the
staff. «•»*.---
is ambitious, with 12-13 days of hearings planned in 2004. He observed that this schedule,
not doing anything during the remainder of this year, and gives the impression that the
Commission is inactive. He suggested that they might head-off such criticism by issuing a
press release stating what the Commission will accomplish between now and January.
Commissioner Fielding encouraged the Commission to announce the hearing schedule as
soon as possible, &'fn&Jr /$ u^^f M^L (^Wt^K^^vVA dz^&&*£ i-u<*£v,
public in September. He suggested that the Commission could issue another in October or
November. Commissioner Gorton recommended that the next interim report include how
many individuals had been interviewed, how many documents had been received, and a
schedule of Commission activities.
Commissioner Ben-Veniste applauded the first interim report, stating that it wa&successful
hfcynnfThig wildest pYppptat4t°>tw and resulted in the White House looking at the


National Commission On Terrorist Attacks Upon The United States

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DRAFT DRAFT DRAFT

Minutes of the July 31, 2003 Meeting

5) The Commission is not prohibited from taking notes on draft documents.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Commissioner Ben-Veniste asked how the Commission is handling the review of

Commissioner Fielding described the agreement as a phenomenal breakthrough.

Commissioner Gorelick inquired as to whether the White House documents could be

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Moussaoui Agreement. Commissioner Ben-Veniste inquired about the impact on the

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Commissioner Lehman concurred that a measure of the Commission's effectiveness will be

Commissioner Ben-Veniste suggested a follow-up to the FAA/NORAD hearing, picking up

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 5

Aircraft as Weapons. The Executive Director presented a SECRET'briefing on the issue

After the conclusion of the SECRET-level briefing, discussion ensued.

Commissioner Ben-Veniste thought it was important to go through the matters (just

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY t

At 1 PM, the Commission meeting concluded.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

DRAFT DRAFT DRAFT

Minutes of the July 31, 2003 Meeting

5) The Commission is not prohibited from taking notes on draft documents.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Commissioner Ben-Veniste asked how the Commission is handling the review of

Commissioner Fielding described the agreement as a phenomenal breakthrough.

Commissioner Gorelick inquired as to whether the White House documents could be

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 2

Moussaoui Agreement. Commissioner Ben-Veniste inquired about the impact on the

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 4

Commissioner Lehman concurred that a measure of the Commission's effectiveness will be

Commissioner Ben-Veniste suggested a follow-up to the FAA/NORAD hearing, picking up

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Commissioner Ben-Veniste thought it was important to go through the matters (just

At 1 PM, the Commission meeting concluded.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

DRAFT DRAFT DRAFT

Minutes of the July 31, 2003 Meeting

5) The Commission is not prohibited from taking notes on draft documents.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Commissioner Ben-Veniste asked how the Commission is handling the review of

Commissioner Gorelick inquired as to whether the White House documents could be

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 2

Moussaoui Agreement. Commissioner Ben-Veniste inquired about the impact on the

Commissioner Ben-Veniste inquired as to what mechanism the Commission would have in

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 3

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 4

Commissioner Lehman concurred that a measure of the Commission's effectiveness will be

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

DRAFT DRAFT DRAFT

Minutes of the July 31, 2003 Meeting

5) The Commission is not prohibited from taking notes on draft documents.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY -£<^i*- ***- A^H- 1

Commissioner Ben-Veniste asked how the Commission is handling the review of

Commissioner Fielding described the agreement as a phenomenal breakthrough.

Commissioner Gorelick inquired as to whether the White House documents could be

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Moussaoui Agreement. Commissioner Ben-Veniste inquired about the impact on the

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 3

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 4