George Bealer - The Possibility of Philosophical Knowledge

Ridgeview Publishing Company
The Philosophical Limits of Scientific Essentialism Author(s): George Bealer Source: Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 1, Metaphysics (1987), pp. 289-365 Published by: Ridgeview Publishing Company Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2214149 . Accessed: 22/09/2013 11:12
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Ridgeview Publishing Company is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Philosophical Perspectives.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 193.198.212.4 on Sun, 22 Sep 2013 11:12:16 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Philosophical Perspectives, 1, Metaphysics, 1987
THE PHILOSOPHICAL LIMITS OF SCIENTIFIC ESSENTIALISM1

George Bealer Reed College
Part 1: The Autonomy of Philosophy 1. WillScience Eclipse Philosophy? as thenature interested insuchquestions are typically Philosophers of substance,mind,intelligence, perception, knowledge,wisdom, the truth, explanation, causation, freedom, purpose, goodness, duty, and happiness.Typically, virtues, love, life, theyare not interested in such questionsas the natureof water,heat,lemon,arthritis, or the distinction betweenbeech and elm. These questionsbelong to and philosophers are not,as philosophers, empirical science, typically them.In beinginterested in such things as the natureof interested the virtues, do not want mind,intelligence, and life,philosophers to knowwhatthosethings whatthose justhappento be, butrather mustbe. It is not enough thatthe virtueof pietyhappened things to be whatEuthyphro a philosopher wantsto knowwhat exhibited; on a satisfactory pietymustbe. It is a requirement philosophical thatitshouldholdnecessarily. A philosopher wishesto know theory whatmind, thevirtues, sense: life, and so forth really are in a strong what theyhave to be, not just what theyhappen to be. Since the timeof Plato,philosophers have nearlyall agreed that, at leastin mostcases, theanswerto a philosophical questionshould in ancient be a necessarynot contingent truth. Plato and Aristotle have taught and Hume and Kantin modernphilosophy philosophy
290 / George Bealer us that experience alone cannot tell us whethera given truthis necessary.Of course,by relying on the testimony of an authority, one can learnthata giventruth is necessary.But how, ultimately, do the originalauthorities learn it? By examiningexperience,the original authorities can learnmerely thatsomething is so; theycannot learn thatit is necessarily so. As Kantsays in the introduction to his Critiqueof Pure Reason, "Experiencetells us, indeed,what is, but not that it mustnecessarilybe so, and not otherwise."No amountofexperience(waivingtestimony) can ever reveal whether thatis so is necessary. something According to Plato,Aristotle, Kant, and mostother philosophers, this kindofmodal knowledge ultimately demands anothersource beyond experience,namely,reason. Knowledge thata giventruth is necessary demands that theoriginal authorities use reason. But does theirknowledgealways rely on reason alone, without theuse ofany empirical evidenceor justification?Kant seems to thinkso: "If,then,a judgment is thought with that is, in such a mannerthatno exceptionis strict universality, allowed as possible,it is not derivedfromexperience,but is valid absolutelya priori."(B4, my emphasis)This Kantianthesisis cerAn originalauthority could come to know thata tainlytoo strong. is necessaryas follows. thepersoncoulduse givenproposition First, of thattype (forexample, reason alone to know thatpropositions are necessaryiftrue.Second, the permathematical propositions) son could use experience(forexample,counting, or usmeasuring, to discoverthatthe proposition is true.Then, by ing a computer) the first bitofa prioriknowledgeand the second bit of combining a posteriori the personcan infer thatthe proposition knowledge, is to Kant'sthesis, thisperson'sknowledge that necessary. So, contrary the proposition is necessarywould not be absolutelya priori;its is at least partlyempirical. justification To avoidthis a philosopher kindofcounterexample, be tempmight ted to modify the strongKantianthesisas follows:if it is possible to know thata givenproposition is necessary, thenit is possible to know thisablosutely a priori;no empirical evidence is needed. For example,ifit is possibleto know thata certainmathematical propositionis necessary,then it is possible to know thiswithout any empiricalevidence (counting, measuring, testimony, etc.); reason thesisis whatKant alone suffices. (Itis reasonablethatthismodified ofthemodified Kantian The relevance thesis wantedto defend.) really forphilosophy timeto timerely is plain. Philosophers mightfrom
/ 291 Essentialism Limitsof Scientific on empirical science to reach their conclusions that various truths are indeed necessary.However,such reliance philosophical Kantianthesisis ifthe modified on empiricalscience is inessential right. It is always possible to obtain our modal philosophical thesisis right, Kantian a priori.Ifthemodified knowledgeabsolutely of the empiricalsciences. independent is in principle philosophy is thatphilosophy Kantianthesis-and itscorollary The modified acoftheempirical sciences-has had nearlyuniversal independent have (CertainAristotelians of philosophy. ceptance in the history Kanthemodified In recent years,however, been dissenters.) perhaps essentialists scientific tianthesishas come undersevere attackfrom and a greatmany Shoemaker, Boyd,Devitt, Putnam, Kripke, (Matson, thatthereare truths is the doctrine essentialism Scientific others).2 evidence is usthatcan be knownto be necessaryonlyifempirical thereare essences thatcan be knownonly with ed; more briefly, hold essentialists science.For example,scientific theaid ofempirical identities (e.g., thatwater = H20, thatcertaintypesof natural-kind with atomic thatgold = theelement energy, thatheat = meankinetic number79) are necessaryiftrue,and theyholdthatitis impossible the aid are truewithout fora personto know thatsuch identities essentialistsare right,the of empirical science. So if scientific are necessarycannotbe absolutely knowledgethatsuch identities a priori, as the modifiedKantian thesis requires. Instead, this itis essenaposteriori; knowledgemustalwaysbe (at least)partially tiallya posteriori.3 thatis,let us supis correct; essentialism Let us suppose scientific heat,gold,etc.) (water, pose thatthereare genuinecounterexamples to the modifiedKantian thesis. There is neverthelessa natural science theviewthatempirical thatpreserves ofthis thesis weakening cannot eclipse philosophy:for (most of) the central truthsof it to be necessary, ifit is possibleto knowthese truths philosophy, a priori, without absolutely is possibleto knowthemto be necessary the aid of empiricalscience. This is the thesisof the autonomyof (This thesis is vague; later on I will replace it with philosophy.4 more precise.) something Kantian the modified contradicts essentialism scientific Although oftheautonomy ofphilosophy. thethesis itdoes notcontradict thesis, are some truths (e.g., asserts onlythatthere essentialism For scientific that water = H20, etc.) that can be known to be necessaryonly science.Itdoes notassertthatall knowable withtheaid ofempirical
292 / George Bealer necessarytruths can be knownto be necessaryonly withthe aid thatmostscientific essenofempirical science.Indeed,I shouldthink witha fully tialists recognizethatthisradical view is inconsistent Trueenough, a personcould elaborated presentation oftheir position. come to know, say, that necessarilywater = H20 absolutelya forexample,exclusively on thebasis ofthe testimony of posteriori, cannotgo on forever; one others.However,thechain oftesitmony of the authorities water musthave come to know thatnecessarily = H20 by another route. Scientific essentialists reconstruct this otherroutealongthefollowing lines.(Ofcourse,thereare variations, but none of themaltersthe pointat issue, namely,thatthereare some truths thatcan be knownto be necessaryabsolutely a priori.) First, the authority in questionuses reason alone to establishthat certain sorts ofnaturalpropositions ofthetypein question-namely, kind identities-arenecessaryiftrue.Second thisperson uses exthat variouslaboratory experiments) to establish perience(namely, in questionis true.Then,by combining the the specific proposition bit of a prioriknowledgeand the second bit of a posteriori first thepersoninfers thattheproposition abouttheessence knowledge, of water is necessary.As Kripkesays, "Philosophical analysistells ofthetypein question] cannotbe conus thatthey[i.e.,propositions tingentlytrue, so any empirical knowledge of their truth is automatically empiricalknowledgethat they are necessary.This characterization applies, in particular,to the cases of identity and ofessence."(P. 159, and Necessity, statements Naming emphasis added.) Now consider the first bit of a priori knowledge,namely,the that certaintypes of knowledge of the philosophicalproposition a natural-kind identitiesare necessary if true. By performing philosophical analysisverysimilarto thatwhichled to thisbit ofa we can obtainanotherbitofa prioriknowledge, prioriknowledge, like the originalone are namely,that philosophicalpropositions themselvesnecessaryiftrue.So given thatwe can know a priori is true,we can know a thatthe originalphilosophical proposition priorithatit is necessary.The upshotis thatthe radicalgeneralizaat least one of the is inconsistent: essentialism tion of scientific elaboratedpresentation used in the fully philosophical propositions the essentialism can be knownto be necessarywithout ofscientific is not crucialto my aid of empiricalscience. (This littleargument I includeit only forthe autonomyof philosophy; largerargument
/ 293 Essentialism Limitsof Scientific purposes.) forheuristic essenofscientific a less radicalgeneralization Thereis, however, and philosophically appeal to philosophers thathas enormous tialism ofphilosophy It is thatmost ofthe centraltruths inclinedscientists. cannotbe knownto be necessary(and, indeed,cannot be known) withoutthe aid of empiricalscience. That is, most philosophical thethesis evidence.Accordingly, relyon empirical knowledgemust wouldhave wouldbe false; philosophy ofphilosophy oftheautonomy empiricalscience. This doctrine independencefrom no significant with local scienessentialism, and it is contrasted is global scientific about the farweaker doctrinethatcertaintruths essentialism, tific naturalistic items(water,heat, gold, etc.) cannot be knownto be a priori. necessaryabsolutely ofdifferent posihave advocateda spectrum philosophers (In fact, Putnam essentialism. Hilary tionsbetweenglobaland local scientific Mostcontemporary toward theglobalposition. once seemedinclined essenofmindgo wellbeyondlocal scientific philosophers materialist in determinscienceis theauthority fortheythink empirical tialism, and relations suchas pain,percepqualities ingtheessencesofmental tion,knowledge,and the like. On thisscore,at least, Kripketends thatpain has forhe thinks essentialism, moretowardlocal scientific essence thatpainhas no material no material essenceand,therefore, thatonly the empiricalsciences could discover.) Global scientific essentialism impinges upon traditional issues. It also theoretical inquirynot only in specific philosophical method.For example, affects traditional philosophical significantly in the course of philosophicaldialecticone would oftenadvance One's a prioriinexamples(usuallycounterexamples). hypothetical notthecase) tuition thattheexampleis possible(i.e.,notnecessarily thatitis possible.However,global to establish would usuallysuffice thistraditional invalidates procedure.For exscientific essentialism in metaphysics (or philosophy ample,suppose thatin an argument (i.e., example oflifeforms ofbiology)you proposethe hypothetical but livingbeings)whose bodies are composednot of hydrocarbons essentialism, your of something else. Withthe advent of scientific now be dismissedas follows:"You are notjustified example might in acceptingthatexample as genuinely possible.For all you know, you are mistakinga mere epistemic possibilityfor a genuine will possibility Onlya genuinemetaphysical possibility. metaphysical that dialectic.But to determine win yourpointin thismetaphysical
294 / George Bealer yourexample is metaphysically possibleyou mustfirst consultempirical science (specifically, biology),for empiricalscience might reveal that your example is not really possible." (Accordingto ofthe notionofepistemic Kripke's explication possibility,5 whenwe have an intuition ofa mereepistemic possibility thatlifeforms could have nonhydrocarbon bodies, thisamountsto the following intuition:thatitis metaphysically possiblethatsomeone in qualitatively thesame epistemic situation as we are in couldassertsomething true thathave nonhydrocarbon by saying, "Thereare lifeforms bodies." Now thepointis supposedto be thatthisepistemic intuition tellsus the word 'life'might not nothing about life,forthe personuttering mean lifeat all butsomething else instead.However,in youroriginal lifeis whatyou were interested metaphysical dialectic, in.) Notice, however, that this way ofdismissing candidate hypothetical examples can be attempted at virtually everyturnin philosophical inquiry. Thus, if global scientific essentialism were true,a massive revolution in philosophical methodwould be in order. I holdthatglobalscientific essenSo willscienceeclipsephilosophy? tialism is demonstrably falseand thatthe autonomyof philosophy is not threatened essentialism. by scientific My reason forthinking thisis broadly"transcendental": local scientific essentialism actually In theidiomofKant, oftheautonomy ofphilosophy. implies thethesis ofphilosophy is one ofthe"conditions ofthepossibiltheautonomy essentialism. ity"of local scientific The arguments forthese bold claims comprisea good part of a book, whichis now underway.In the presentpaper mypurposeis to presentthe arguments in broad outline.Beforecomingto the I willintroduce some handyterminology and give arguments proper, some examples thathelp to motivatethe view intuitively. 2. Categoryand ContentConcepts For convenienceof expositionI will freely use the idiomof concepts; at mostpointswe could paraphraseaway talk of concepts. For example,ratherthansayingthatI believe thatthe conceptof a compositional itemina givenhypothetical stuff appliesto a certain case, we could say simplythatI believe thatthe item in the case is a compositional stuff. And ratherthan sayingthatI possess the conceptof being F, we could say thatI standin some basic intentionalrelation(belief, desire,decision,memory, perception, etc.) to
Essentialism / 295 Limitsof Scientific theconinvolving theproposition that...F...(i.e.,to someproposition cept of being F). argument, I will findit conveNow to statemy "transcendental" more technicalvocabulary. nientto restatemy claim in a slightly For the purposesat hand, we may divide our conceptsinto three and content concepts, concepts, category generaltypes:naturalistic thesethreetypes stage ofour investigation, concepts.(Atthe initial of them shouldbe viewed as "dummytypes":no precisedefinition and the boundariesbetween them may be left need be ventured, to some theycan be characterized deliberately vague. Nevertheless, to be those conceptsfor conceptsare intended extent.)Naturalistic essentialism holds;theyinclude,forexample, whichlocal scientific beech, elm,and the conceptsof water,heat,gold,lemon,arthritis, to includethe so forth. and content conceptsare intended Category concepts in terms of which (most of) the central questions of Examplesof categoryconceptsare the philosophy are formulated. ofstuff, functional qualistuff, substance, compositional stuff, concepts etc. Excause, reason,person, action,artificial, natural, ty,quantity, phenomenalqualities(pain, conceptsare familiar amplesofcontent (knowetc.) and basic mentalrelations itchiness, tingling-sensation, deciding,loving,etc.). ing,perceiving, Ifscientific essenIn thisidiommyclaimmaybe statedas follows. naturalistic concepts, involving tialismis trueofvariousnecessities and involving exclusively category necessities thenitcannotholdfor is true,then content essentialism concepts.That is, iflocal scientific and content conknowablenecessities exclusively category involving a priori.Giventhat(mostof)thecenceptsare knowableabsolutely in termsof tralquestionsof philosophy are formulated exclusively categoryand contentconcepts(thisof course needs to be shown), essentialism is true,so is the thesis it followsthat,iflocal scientific can Ifa philosophical of the autonomyof philosophy. proposition be known to be necessary,it is possible forthisknowledgeto be a priori;empirical science is in principle never obtainedabsolutely needed. I willgive a few argument, Beforecomingto my"transcendental" our position. The argument does not ride on examples to motivate is these examples. ButI think important theyshow thatsomething have providedso far, scientific essentialists from thepicture missing is a satisfactory and theysuggestthatwhatis missing philosophical theoryof our categoryand contentconcepts.
296 / George Bealer examine Our chemists argument. twin-Earth Let us recallPutnam's samplesof water here on Earthand discoverthatall such samples we may are composed of H20. Fromthistheyconclude(correctly, suppose) thatall and onlysamplesofwaterhereon Earthare composed of H20. Our astronautsvisitingon twin Earth discover fromwater; indistinguishable macroscopically samples of a stuff however,these samplesare composedof XYZ, not H20. The quessamplesofwater are really thesampleson twinEarth tionis whether is thatthey intuition essentialists' else. The scientific or ofsomething examples likethis, from are justnot samplesofwater.Generalizing all and onlysamples necessarily, concludethat, essentialists scientific to repeat,is based of waterare composedof H20. This conclusion, that, although the samples on twin Earth are on the intuition speaklike samples of water,theydo not,strictly macroscopically ing,count as samples of water because theyare not composed of England, Now I wishto consideran analogousexample involving which,as you know,is well knownforitscuisine.Suppose that,at and all stew,6 a certaintime,the onlyfood in Englandwas mutton stewis commutton stewin Englandwas food.As you know,mutton MPT. boiled potatoes,and boiled turnips: posed of boiled mutton, Englandtraveledto twinEnglanddown south, Now voyagersfrom veal scallopini,and even bread, where theydiscoveredfettucini, and so on; likewheat,cream,garlic, whichare composedof things not MPT at all. Should they phone home and say, "Lots of tasty, no food"?Because afterall, to eat here; butsorry, things nutritous from the twinno MPT. Ofcourse not.Butwhyis thiscase different Earthcase? like this.Unlikewater,whichis The answer mustbe something In the twin-Earth stuff.7 food is a functional stuff, a compositional This knowledge stuff. case we know thatwater is a compositional about compositional withour generalcategorialintuitions together ifall and onlysamplesofwater our intuition that, stuffs determines from XYZ, then on Earthare composed of H20 and,ifH20 differs the samplesof XYZ on twinEarthare notsamples of water.In the Food has stuff. case we knowthatfoodis a functional twin-England eating foodis foreating.(Orperhapsfoodis fornutritious a function; The questionis very subtleand complex,but or just fornutrition. we need notsettleit here.)To studywhat foodis, one does not inits funcinsteadone investigates directly; vestigateitscomposition
H20.
Limitsof Scientific Essentialism / 297 tion. (Of course,to studyeatingand/or nutrition one mighteventuallywant to go to a chemistto determine how thisfunction can be fulfilled in specialcases.) Itis for thisreasonthatthetwin-England example,unlikethe twin-Earth example,does notlead one to conall and onlyfoodis composedofmutton cludethat, necessarily, stew (MPT) whereasin the case of waterthe discovery thatall and only wateron Earthis composedof H20 does lead one to concludethat, necessarily, all and only water is H20. In the twin-England example,fettucini, scallopini, bread,and so forth fulfill thefunction offood; therefore, even iftheir composition differs from thatofmutton stew, theycountas food.The difference, turnson knowledge therefore, ofcategories, specifically, thatwateris a compositional stuff and,by food is a functional stuff. contrast, One can makethesame point foodwitha moreserious concerning example. For example,suppose our chemists discoverthatall and only samples of foodof the kindswe eat are composed of certain withvarioustraceelements, and supposeour complexhydrocarbons some stuffs, not composspace cadets travelto twinEarthand find ed of those chemicalsCl,...,Cn, but insteadcomposed of alternate chemicalsKl,...,Km. thatthesestuffs Suppose,finally, actuallyhave greatnutritional value and thattheytasteverygood and are very digestable.We would not phone home and say, " No food here." There is no doubtthatthesestuffs would be food.They justwould be different kindsof foodthanthose we have on Earth.However, XYZ is not a different kindof water;it is not water at all. The explanation is thatfoodis a functional stuff: thevarioustwin-earth stuffs have therelevant function. By contrast, wateris a compositional stuff: water is H20; XYZ is something else.8 Consider Now, examples like thiscan be multiplied indefinitely. fuel. There was a time when the only available fuelswere solid rapidly oxidizable hydrocarbons. But this fact did not lead our ancestors to discount petroleum as fuel when this liquid was discovered and burned, nor did it prevent twentiethcentury from technologists counting plutonium as fueleven thoughit is not rapidlyoxidizable. The explanationis thatfuel,unlikewater,is a functional it is forsomething. stuff; The reason we count wood, and plutonium as kindsoffuelis theyhave (orare essenpetroleum, tiallysuitedto achieving)thisfunction. Airand earthmight be similar. (WhatI have to say about air and earthhere is speculative;my other,less speculativecomments do
298 / George Bealer notdependon itin anyway.) The air on Earthis primarily nitrogen, and oxygen.On twin carbondioxide, Earth, bycontrast, theair might be composed of somethingdifferent. Althoughtwin Earthlings breathethe air (and flyairplanesin it),our astronauts tell us, "Do notbreathethe air herebecause it is toxicto us." Ifthisis right, air would seem notto be a straightforward compositional stuff. Instead, whethersomething is air would have to do withits havingan appropriate role in a suitablekindof environmental system(a planet or otherproto-ecosystem). Ifso, air would seem to be a kindof environmental (proto-ecological) stuff. It has a certainrole in an environmental as a whole.Now ifair is likethis, system certainly earth is too: clay,loam,sandyloam,sand,humus, and so forth are all kinds ofeartheven though In this theyare quitedifferent compositionally. 'water'reallydenoteda compositional case, one wonderswhether stuff all along; conceivably, 'water'has undergonea kindof meanfrom a termfor an environmental or functional to term stuff ingshift Iftherehasbeen a meaning that fora compositional stuff. would shift, violateone ofthe doctrines essentialists. espousedby scientific (See the next sectionforwhat is meantby a meaningshift and why it violatesscientific now at least, essentialist doctrine.) However,right we are inclined to treat'water'as a compositional-stuff term. Accorifit is truethatall and onlysamplesof waterhere on Earth dingly, seem are composedof H20, we would,usingtwin-Earth reasoning, to concludethat, all and onlysamplesofwater entitled necessarily, are samples of H20. Here is anotherexample,one thathas particular philosophical imtheconceptofperson.Ourdoppelgangers on twin portance, namely, Earth(thetwinEarthlings) are persons.However,theyare certainly for nothomosapiensaccording to scientific essentialist doctrine, they lack boththegenetics and evolutionary ofhomosapiens.This origins seems to show thatthe concept of person is not the concept of a it is a moral-intellectual notion.Furtherbiologicalspecies. Rather, membersofhomo sapiens,personson twin more,unlikeindividual ofwater;theyare composedmostly Earthare notcomposedmostly of XYZ. Person certainly notion. is not any kind of compositional For a finalexample,considerlife.All livingthingson Earthare macromolecules ofH20 plus certain composedmostly composedof variousaminoacids. Thiswould notlead us to concludethatthebelike the livingbeingson Earth ings on twinEarthmacroscopically wouldbe alive.I suspect ifwe survey werenotalive.Surely, they that,
Limitsof Scientific Essentialism / 299 an appropriately wide variety ofexamples,we would discoverthat thenotionoflifeis a certainkindofAristotelian proto-psychological notion. Now an important qualification is in order.In suggesting thatlife is perhaps a proto-psychological notionor thatperson is a moralI might intellectual notion, ofcoursebe making mistakes. However, at thispointthereis no need to be corrector certainabout these philosophical matters. After all,ignorance aboutthesematters would, on the view I will be defending, be only one more instanceof the paradoxofanalysis. Knowledge aboutthesematters arisesat theend of the analytical endeavor;it need not be presentat thebeginning. The above examples suggestthatthe intuitions thatdrive scientificessentialism are indexed to various categories.On thisview, ofcategory and thenecessary and sufficient knowledge concepts conditionsforan item'sfalling undera categoryconceptmustbe mattersthatcan be investigated antecedently to the researchesof emscientists. Thissuggests pirical thatourquestions concerning category concepts can be exploreda prioriin a whollytraditional way inof empirical dependently science. This,at least,is the sortof thing thatwillfollowas a corollaryfrom my "transcendental" argument thatlocal scientific essentialism theautonomy ofphilosophy. implies We now move on to outlinethe argument. 3. Two Epistemological ProblemsforScientific Essentialism: Intuitionsand Determinateness I have said thattheargument is broadly "transcendental." The goal is to lay bare the conditions fora satisfactory scientific essentialism. I reservetheterm'scientific (Hereafter to refer essentialism' to local scientific whenI deal withglobalscientific essentialism; essentialism, I will always say so explicitly.) When we thinkof early modern we may isolate two centralproblems:the originof epistemology, ideas and the groundofknowledgeoftruths. Scientific essentialists inherit a versionofeach oftheseproblems. Theyneed a way ofsolvwithout ing both of themsimultaneously contradiction. On the surfaceat least, the two problemsare independent: one can be a rationalist on one ofthemand an empiricist on the other, or an empiricist on one and a rationalist on the other.Locke, for answerto thequestionofthe originof example,gave an empiricist ideas buta moderate rationalist answerto thequestionoftheground
300 / George Bealer For even thoughhe attackedthe docof our knowledgeof truths. trineofinnateideas and defendedthethesisthatall ideas are derived from experience, he held that there was purely rational indeed, he made use of demonstrative knowledgeof some truths; a prioriknowledgein his famous what he thought was absolutely of the existenceof God. cosmologicaldemonstration essentialists inherit a versionof each of I have said thatscientific theseproblems, theoriginofideas and thegroundofknowledgeof truths. argument is to show that The goal of my "transcendental" contradiction unlesstheyadopt theycannotsolve thembothwithout a certain epistemologicaltheorythat implies the thesis of the autonomyof philosophy. According the groundof our knowledgeof truths. Considerfirst to the modifiedKantian thesis,if a truthcan be known to be a priori, itnever must thatknowledgecan be absolutely necessary, be a posteriori. evidenceis neverneeded in orderto know Empirical to scienof a givennecessarytruth thatit is necessary.According nametific thereare variousnecessary truths, essentialism, however, thatcan be knownto naturalistic necessities, ly, those concerning be necessary only if empirical evidence is used. That is, our is essennecessities are necessary thatcertain naturalistic knowledge a priori.The problemis it cannotbe absolutely tiallya posteriori; theconclusion this:empirical evidencejuston itsown cannotjustify thata given truth else is needed in order is necessary.Something to justify thismodal step.9 In our earlierreconstruction of how scientific essentialists bridge a prioriknowledgeofa certhe modal step,we saw thatabsolutely is invoked.(In our example tain generalphilosophical proposition was thatcertaintypesof natural-kind the philosophical proposition is thegroundof identities are necessaryiftrue.)But whatprecisely the scientificessentialist'sknowledge of this sort of general philosophical proposition?The answer is that ultimatelythis it [intuKripketellsus: "I think knowledgeis justified by intuition. I really myself. tion]is very heavy evidence in favorof anything, don'tknow,in a way,whatmoreconclusiveevidenceone can have intuitions about anything."'0 (For our purposes,we may identify of a concept the applicability withnoninferential beliefsregarding identicalto are notstrictly to a hypothetical case."I Or ifintuitions modal tie with such beliefs, theyare mentalstateshavinga strong them.)
/ 301 Essentialism Limitsof Scientific used in scienexamples of intuitions Here are some well-known itwas possithat intuitions The Kripkean arguments. tific essentialist Godel for it was possible that Alexander; not to teach Aristotle ble for theorem;that not to discoverthe incompleteness (versusSchmidt) of heat"]; it is possiblethatheat shouldnot produceS ["sensations thatifgold is in factthe elementwithatomic number79, thenin likegold were macroscopically another possibleworld,ifsomething but did not have atomic number79, it would not be gold; and so intuitions that,ifall and only twin-Earth And the Putnamian forth. samplesofwateron Earthwere composedofH20 and iftherewere a twin Earth containing samples of XYZ (* H20) that are just like water,thenthese samples of XYZ would macroscopically not be water; and so forth. to use intuitions essentialists Now forthe problem.If scientific any evidential bridgethe modal step, what gives these intuitions answerto this a satisfactory mustfind Scientific essentialists weight? Kantian denial ofthe modified withtheir questionthatis consistent thesis. wouldgiveus to believethemodalstep essentialists Some scientific as evidence.Theyseem on intuitions without relying can be bridged withlogic alone (namethatthemodal stepcan be bridged to think oflogicand ly,Leibniz'slaw plusmodallogic)or witha combination ofnames, reference theory thedirect a theory oflanguage(namely, havingno Fregean the theorythatnames are rigiddesignators'2 sense). However,it is easy to show thatthisaccountjuston itsown logic plus the theorythatnames is deficient on two counts.First, not havingFregean senses does not by itself are rigiddesignators theory logico-linguistic themodalstepat issue.A muchricher bridge to names, inaddition that, a theory to theeffect is needed:specifically, For example,descriptions are rigid designators. certain descriptions moleculesare constituted whose consitituent suchas 'thecompound withatomic ionsand one oxygenion','theelement oftwo hydrogen (Such descriptions and so forth. energy', number79', 'mean kinetic 'the numberof planets', descriptions are quite unlikethe nonrigid Lake Tahoe', etc. But filling stuff predominantly 'thecompositional thatare needtheory oflogico-linguistic Second,theprinciples why?) and, the modal step are themselvescontroversial ed to justify of theirown. Whatjustifies are in need of a justification therefore, theseprinThe data used to justify principles? theselogico-linguistic (forexample,the sortofintuitions ciplesare, once again,intuitions
302 / George Bealer Kripkeappeals to inNamingand Necessity and thesortofintuitions thatPutnam appeals to in"The Meaning of'Meaning"'). In controversial areas oflogic and linguistic theory the use ofintuitions as data is crucial.(I argue forthisassessmentin detail later.) Because scientific essentialists must ultimately use intuitions to the modal step,theyare obliged to have (an overall theory justify thatis consistent with) a satisfactory theory ofwhyintuitions should have any evidentialweight.This demand is dramatizedwhen we remember thatcritics ofscientific essentialism (e.g., neo-Humeans, Quineans,and skeptics) mighthold thatmodal intuitions are mere beliefs no evidential having After weight whatsoever. all,some beliefs thatpop intoa person'smind(e.g., a gambler'shunches)have no evidentialweightand should simplybe disregarded in theoretical reasoning.What distinguishes intuitions from such beliefs? For example,Kripke's intuition thatitwas possiblefor notto teach Aristotle Alexanderis utterly forthe conclusionthat crucialto hisargument thename 'Aristotle' does notexpress, as a descriptive sense,theproofbeingtheteacherofAlexander.Without perty theintuition Kripke Butwhyshouldthemerebelief wouldhave no argument. thatitwas Aristotle notto teach Alexanderprovideany evidential possiblefor thatit reallywas possibleforAristotle supportforthe proposition notto teachAlexander? to use thatpropositionWhyis itlegitimate as opposedtoa proposition abouta givenslotmachine thata gambler might happento fancy-in further theoretical reasoning? Similarly, Putnam'stwin-Earth styleintuitions are utterly crucialto his argumentthat,ifwater = H20, thennecessarily water = H20. Without theseintuitions Putnamwouldhave no argument. Butwhy should a mere belief-that,ifall and onlysamplesof wateron Earthwere composedof H20 and iftherewere a twinEarthcontaining samples ofXYZ (* H20) thatare macroscopically justlike water,thenthese samplesofXYZ wouldnotbe water-provide any evidential support? to use thisbelief-as opposed to yourhunches Whyis it legitimate at the race track-in further theoretical reasoning? There are versionsof rationalism, whichwe will review below, thatprovidea coherentexplanationof why intuitions (as opposed to hunches)have evidentialweight.But scientific essentialism has called rationalism into question;indeed,its denial of the modified Kantian thesisin connectionwithnaturalistic necessitiesis tantamountto a rejectionof all the familiar unrestricted versionsof rationalism. a new theory ofwhatgivesintuitions their Consequently,
/ 303 Limitsof Scientific Essentialism essentialists are goingto be evidentialweightis needed ifscientific is justified. able to explain why the modal step in theirargument is thefollowing: scienOne such "theory" theintuitions thatsupport be used as evidence;anti-scientifictific essentialism maylegitimately essentialist be used as evidence.But intuitions may notlegitimately ad hoc. Ifan acceptabletheory this"theory" wouldbe unacceptably thesis cannotbe found, we must takeseriously theskeptical empiricist that intuitionshave no evidential weight, that their use in a hangoverfrom thegood-oldraphilosophical arguments is merely givenby scientific tionalist days.Ifthiswere so, thenthearguments would essentialists would notbe justified, and scientific essentialism thereis a crying demand fora have to be abandoned. Therefore, new theoryof why intuitions should have any evidentialweight. raI willargue thatthe leadingtraditional theories-unrestricted and coherentism-are unrestricted Platonism, empiricism, tionalism, withscientific or else theyfailto explain essentialism inconsistent the evidential statusof intuitions. Myconclusionis thatthe onlyacthatis consisceptable theoryof the evidentialstatusof intuitions one that tentwith(local) scientific essentialism is a two-tier theory, and content concepts from naturalistic concepts. segregates category This theoryincorporates explanationof the a formof rationalist theapplicability ofcategory evidential status ofintuitions concerning cases thatare specifiedexand contentconcepts to hypothetical in terms ofcategory and content Thiscircumscribconcepts. clusively withscientific essentialism. ed rationalist explanationis consistent essentialist At thesame time,itcan be used to explainwhyscientific intuitionsabout the applicability of naturalisticconcepts to These intuitions are deterstatus. hypothetical cases have evidential category minedby traditional rationalist intuitions regarding relevant withour knowledge ofthecategories and content conceptstogether intuiitemsinvolved.Whatgives the naturalistic of the naturalistic in thisway statusis thattheyare determined tionstheirevidential and content intuitions whoseevidential status intuitions, by category rationalist can be explained independently by the circumscribed scientific essentialism. contradicting (This explanatheorywithout tion will be set forth more fully later.) about Consideran example, say, Putnam'stwin-earth intuition water:Ifall and onlysamples ofwateron Earthwere composed of similar samplesofXYZ(* H20) on twin H20, thenmacroscopically is intuition Earthwould not be samples of water. This naturalistic
Bealer 304 / George inrationalist ofthefollowing many instances justone ofinfinitely If stuff: of compositional concept the category regarding tuition complex stuff havea certain ofa compositional samples paradigm notqualify would that composition then items lacking composition, intuiPutnamian The specific stuff. as samples ofthecompositional intuition by thissortofcategorial tionaboutwateris determined stuff. withourknowledge thatwateris a compositional together thecategorial theory, rationalist thecircumscribed given However, whythespecific and thisexplains weight, has evidential intuition weight. has evidential intuition naturalistic kinds ofphenomena. twoother alsoexplains theory two-tier (This intuianti-scientific-essentialist it explains whyourapparent First, but possibilities, metaphysical be aboutgenuine tions cannot really we do notreally possibilities: mereepistemic must be about instead thecorbecause possibilities suchmetaphysical haveintuitions about that wouldbe needed and content principles category responding with unintuitive. arethemselves Second, such intuitions todetermine thepatterns thetwo-tier explains much thesametechniques, theory and as food, life, fuel, person, in ourintuitions aboutsuchmatters intheprevious section. Thesetwokinds which we discussed so forth, theories on all other mysteries remain unexplained ofphenomena in somedetaillater.) are discussed Thesematters ofintuition. theonly anexplanation-indeed, Thetwo-tier thus provides theory have intuitions whythe pro-scientific-essentialist explanation-of thescienthat doesnotcontradict an explanation status, evidential Herethen thesis. Kantian essentialists' denialofthemodified tific A condition on ofour"transcendental" argument. is onecomponent this modalstepis that essentialists' ofthescientific thejustification ofintuitions be true. On this status two-tier oftheevidential theory one of the two tiers-namely, the conceptscomprising theory, a priori totraditional andcontent susceptible concepts-are category investigation. philosophical of earlymodern problem We come now to thesecondcentral viewwas that modern ofideas.The early theorigin epistemology, orare possessed from innately ideasare gotten experience certain call "Lockean operations," by meansofwhatwe might and,then, ideas.There ideastoobtain allother these combines a person "given" viewto thatof thisearlymodern from ofthought is a continuity heldthat a perAllthese philosophers Frege). Russell (andprobably or by either in experience son has various givenconcepts-given
Limitsof Scientific / 305 Essentialism reason-and these givenconceptsare combinedsomehow(say, by various logical operations)to formcomplex descriptive concepts. Every concept is eithera given concept or a complex descriptive from thegivenconcepts. On this conceptformed approach,concepts givenin experienceare conceptsofphenomenalqualitiesand basic mentalrelations; theytherefore wouldbe cases ofcontent concepts. And the conceptsgivenby reason would be cases of categoryconnaturalistic cepts.As a result, concepts-forexample,the concepts ofwater,heat,gold,lemon,arthritis, beech,elm-would have to be from and content complexdescriptive formed concepts category concepts. But in thiscase, a personin commandof any of these complex descriptive conceptswould be in a positionto analyze them a priori, thepersonshouldbe able to define absolutely and, in turn, all theassociatednaturalistic items-water, heat,gold,and so fortha priori. absolutely Butthis outcome essencontradicts Oocal)scientific which Kantian tialism, themodified thesis. repudiates (Thisisthepoint ofthe modified contactbetweenthe repudiation Kantianthesisand the repudiation of the descriptivist theoryof names.) To avoid thisproblem, scientific essentialists need to find an alternatetheory ofwhatittakesto possessa naturalistic To meet concept. thisdemand,theyturn to thecausal theory. (I use theterm liberally: theories and baptism-cum-naming-chain historical-explanation theoriesare to be countedas versionsof the causal theory.) This theoryprovidesan alternateexplanationof the originof (at least some of)our ideas: to possess a concept(ofthe right sort)a person need onlybe properly situatedin the world;in particular, the person need onlybear appropriate causal(historical, relasocio-linguistic) tionsto items intheworld. The strategy ofour"transcendental" argumentwill be this.We will suppose thatsome versionofthe causal is right forvariousnaturalistic theory and we willthentry concepts, to determine the conditions requiredin orderforit to be rightin at leastthosecases needed for thetruth oflocalscientific essentialism. If,as scientific we were to throw out (partof)thetradiessentialists, tionaltheoryand to adopt insteada versionof the causal theory, whatwouldbe requiredin orderfor the new view to be satisfactory forourpurposes? Our answerwillbe this.On anycausal theory that is satisfactory forour purposes, a personwitha naturalistic concept mustpossess background categoryand content concepts,concepts whose possessionmustbe explainedindependently by a traditional thatinsures that theseconcepts theory maybe investigated absolutely
306 / George Bealer a priori. Beforewe go any further, an important pointofclarification is in order.In thepresentcontext, when we speak ofa theory (explanation,account)ofwhat it is to possess a concept,we mean a theory thatspecifies the generalconditions that,as a matterof logical or metaphysical necessity, are necessaryand/orsufficient forpossessing the concept.We do not mean a theorythatgives a causal explanationofwhyin thecourse ofone's lifeone has come to possess a certainconcept.Thus, we are seeking"formal causes" not "efficientcauses."Itis especially to keep this inmind important distinction when we speak of the causal theoryor the historical-explanation forthereis a temptation is giving theory, to think thatsucha theory inthedeductive-nomological an efficient-causal explanation (perhaps of a specificmental occurrence.On the contrary, format) such a of conditions thatare, theoryaims to providea generalstatement as a logical or metaphysical necessity, necessaryand/orsufficient forthe possessionof a concept.Itjust so happensthatthese conditionsinvolvecausal (historical, socio-linguistic) features. (The causal is a helpful theoryof perception analogy.This theoryaims to provide conditions thatare necessaryand/orsufficient forsomeone x is thatthe factthatA should thatA; the key condition perceiving cause itto appear to x thatA. Thisis a causal theory because simply the notionof causation figures into thiscondition.) is right, a primary is that Now ifscientific essentialism requirement therelevantnaturalistic thatour relevant conceptsbe determinate, naturalistic conceptsbe possessed determinately. To see what this comes to, consideran example of indeterminateness. requirement Suppose I say, "Whatis the weightof thatship?"Do I mean with or without themast, thesails,theengine, thereserve thedeckfittings, the galley the stateroom engine,the radarequipment, furnishings, stove? Do I mean down to the ton,pound,ounce, gram,or what? WhenI said,"What Well,I justdo nothave an answerthesequestions. is the weightof thatship?"I did not ask a determinate question.A of questionshave equal claim to being what I asked, and plurality thereseems to be no factofthe matter as to whichone I did ask.13 Consideranotherexample.Suppose thatyou introduce a new term havitto variousclosed plane figures 'multigon' simply by applying coning several sides. You have never consciouslyand explicitly sidered the question of whether trianglesand rectangles are Whensomeone asks you thisquestion, multigons. you do notknow
/ 307 Limitsof Scientific Essentialism to favor one answeror the whatto answer.You have no inclination information, empirical other(eventhough you have all thepertinent enough and you are more than intelligent you are fully attentive, 'multigon' might figures). Yourterm to identify elementary geometric simply withmorethanfour sides,or itmight mean closedplane figure mean closed plane figure. (In mydictionary each oftheseis entered as a meaningof'polygon'.) Each has equal claimto beingthe meanterm'multigon'. But thereseems to ing of your newly introduced it seems be no factofthe matter regarding whichone itis. Rather, thatyou have no determinate concept. As I have said, if scientific essentialismis right,the relevant it will not do forthem naturalistic concepts mustbe determinate; logicalto be indeterminate. To see why, recall the once-popular of"scientific definitions." to thistheory, According positivist theory definition" (e.g.,thatwater = H20, when scientists offer a "scientific with atomic thatheat = meankinetic energy, that gold = theelement a new concept or number 79, etc.), they are merelystipulating indeterminate concept.Eitherway, the "precisifying" a previously it does not definition" "scientific producesa mere "meaningshift"; thewell-worn examdiscovery. Consider report a genuineempirical 'fish'. On thislogical-positivist once literally view,'fish' ple oftheterm realizedthatitwouldbe moreuseful appliedto whales,butscientists mammals.They accorto have a termthatexcluded thesefish-like itexpresseda conceptwith 'fish' so thatthereafter redefined dingly thisnew,circumscribed extension.Or,on a commonvariantofthis did not expressa singledeterminate concept view, 'fish' previously had the effect offinally at all, and the"scientific definition" singling a plurality ofcandidateconcepts,a particular conceptas out,from to scientific essenthe determinate meaningofthe term. According whenscientists definition," they givea "scientific tialists, by contrast, are not redefining or precisifying. Rightfromthe start,it was made an empirical necessarythatwhales were not fish.Biologists about the essence ofthe naturalkindfish; theymade an discovery "it"that about theessence a singledeterminate empirical discovery all along. was under investigation is inconsistent withthese essentialism The reason thatscientific view or theoriesis this.On eitherthe redefinition "meaning-shift" ofstipulative definition" is a form theprecisification view,a "scientific is in a posithe persondoingthestipulating definition. Accordingly, tion to know a priorithatwhat is said is true (e.g., thatwater =
308 / George Bealer

H20, that heat = mean keneticenergy,that gold = the element withatomic number79, etc.).14It would be just be a case of oldfashioned analytic a prioriknowledge. Butthiscontradicts thescientific essentialist thatwhatis said in suchcases must doctrine be essena posteriori. Ifitwere notessentially a posteriori, tially themodified Kantianthesiswould be true;in turn, scientific essentialism would be false. (To geta better picture ofwhatis goingon here,consider Kripke's meter-stick example. The term'meter'was introduced by a person who stipulated thatone meterwas the lengthofa certainstick.Acto Kripke, at themoment ofthestipulation thepersonknows cording a priori thatone meter is thelength and this ofthatstick, is so despite thefact thattheproposition thatone meter is thelength ofthatstick is contingent. Now ifthe "meaning-shift" view were correct, then our scientists would have stipulated, not discovered,thatwater = H20, that heat = mean keneticenergy,that gold = the element withatomic number 79,and so forth. Accordingly, thesethings would be knowna priori bythescientist thestipulation. Thisa priori making fromthe kindin the meter-stick knowledgewould differ example inasmuchas what is knownby the scientist is necessary,not conThe upshotwould be that all the supposedlya posteriori tingent. necessities associatedwithscientific essentialism wouldturnout to be knowablea priori,and thusthe modified Kantianthesiswould be right after all. To avoid thisoutcome,scientific must essentialists therefore reject "meaning-shift" theories.) Summing up, the second part of our "transcendental" argument concernstheneed to givea nontraditional, ofthe causal explanation determinateness ofour naturalistic essenconcepts.Whenscientific tialists tryto work out such a theoryin detail,theyare, I will try to show,unableto accountfordeterminateness by purelycausal (or mechanisms. The reason is thattheformation purely"externalist') ofa new naturalistic ofa newde re thought concept(ortheformation or the introduction of a new name) runs into a fatalproblem of underdetermination ifexclusively causal resourcesare (ambiguity) invoked.Whena personappearsto form a new naturalistic concept a de re thought ofa new naturalistic itemor to introduce (or to form a name forthe item),the act will always be underdetermined (amcausal or "externalist" resourcesare involvbiguous)ifexclusively ed. The thoughtor referenceis determinate only if the person employsbackground categoryand contentconcepts.So just as in
Limits ofScientific Essentialism / 309 thecase oftheproblem oftheevidential status ofourintuitions, so inthecase oftheproblem ofthedeterminateness ofourconcepts, scientific essentialists willbe forced to adopta two-tier theory that separates naturalistic from concepts andconbackground category tent concepts. of the concepts To explainthe determinateness the occupying lower tier, namely, thenaturalistic concepts, scientific essentialists must with supplement thepurely causaltheory that another theory emphasizes ourcategory and content concepts. Butthen thequestion arises, howarewe toexplain thedeterminate possession ofthese category and content An attempt to use a causaltheory concepts? toexplain thedeterminate possession ofthose concepts would lead toa vicious explanatory regress: theexplanation wouldhaveto invokeantecedently possessed andcontent category whose concepts wouldin turn be in need ofexplanation, possession and so on ad infinitum. A noncircular ittakes condition for what topossess a concouldthus never be stated. Itfollows ceptdeterminately that some other besides thecausalmodel, will(atleastat somestage) model, be neededto explain thedeterminate possession of(at leastsome and content I willarguethat of)ourcategory theonly concepts.15 isa traditional, satisfactory model noncausal onethat meshes exactthetwo-tier oftheevidential lywith status ofintuition theory that is already needed byscientific essentialists. there Otherwise, would be no satisfactory ofthedeterminate explanation ofour possession naturalistic and therewouldbe no explanation of the concepts evidential statusof the scientific essentialists' intuitions about naturalistic items. essentialists Scientific wouldbe unableto solve the two fundamental epistemological problems confronting their theory. Theoverall conclusion be this. will There must be an autonomous levelofcategory and content concepts, determinate possession of whichmustbe explainedin a traditional, noncausalway and ofwhich theoretical knowledge a priori. maybe obtained absolutely then can scientific essentialists haveboth a satisfactory Only causal ofthedeterminateness theory ofournaturalistic concepts andalso a satisfactory ofwhatgivesintuitions explanation their evidential ofwhat weight and,inturn, themodal inthearguments jusitifes step a posteriori for necessities. essentially However, (most of)thecentral ofphilosophy are formulated in terms questions of exclusively Itwillfollow, andcontent that category insofar concepts. therefore,
310 / George Bealer as the answers to these questionscan be known at all, they can known absolutelya priori,withoutthe aid of empiricalscience. Hence, the autonomyof philsophy. In the book on the autonomy thatis nowunderway, I plan to showhow all this ofphilosophy sheds and on a greatmanyspecific new light bothon philosophical method from philosophical problems and epistemology ranging metaphysics to philosophical and moralphilosophy. psychology In theremainder ofthepaper I willpresentinsome detailthefirst component ofour "transcendental" argument, whichdeals withthe evidentialstatusof intuitions. Followingthat,I will sketchthe second component, whichdeals withthe determinateness ofour conhowto argue"transcendentally" cepts.I willclose bysketching that (most of) the centralquestionsof philosophyare formulated exclusivelyin termsof categoryand contentconcepts.These three "transcendental" arguments yield the thesis of the autonomyof philosophy. Part II: The Evidential Status of Intuitions 4. The Dependencyof Scientific Essentialism on Intuitions "I thinkit [intution] is very heavy evidence in favorof I reallydon't know, in a way, what more anything, myself. conclusiveevidence one can have about anything." Saul Kripke, Namingand Necessity. The first to show is thatthe modal step made by scientific thing cannotbe bridged oflogic by uncontroversial principles ,essentialists or linguistic of logic or linguistic theory. Anyprinciples that theory wouldbridge themodalstepare themselves controversial and,hence, in need ofjustification. After oflogicand all, manyallegedprinciples linguistic theoryare false.How does one tellwhichones are true? as evidence. I will beginby arguing Ultimately, by usingintuitions thatthisassessment holdseven fora principle as sacrocanct as Leibniz's law. The pointis not to challengeLeibnitz's law butratherto lay bare itstheoretical status.After to principles that that,I willturn are controversial by anyone's standards. oflogic thatis frequently A principle used in scientific essentialist is the principle of the necessity of identicals. That is, for arguments all x and y, ifx is identicalto y, thennecessarily x is identicalto
Limits ofScientific Essentialism / 311

y. Thisprinciple follows from Leibniz'slaw together withtheprinciple ofthereflexivity ofidentity and thenecessitation rulefrom quantifiedmodal logic.16 However, thereare a numberofprima facie to Leibniz'slaw, such as the ship of Theseus. At counterexamples time tl, the ship is wood,. Over time,however,woodl is slowly replaced by a new quantity of wood, wood2.At timet2,the ship is wood2.But,manifestly, wood1is notwood2.However,Leibniz'slaw impliesthat,ifat t1the ship is wood1 and at t2the ship is wood2, thenwood1is wood2.Because theconsequent is manifestly we false, have a primafacie counterexample to Leibniz'slaw. One approach is just to concludethatLeibniz'slaw, in fact,does not holdin itsunqualified form. Another approachwould save Leibniz's law from candidatecounterexamples such as thisby multiplyingthesensesof'is':notonlyis therean 'is' ofidentity, butalso there is an 'is' of constitution. Correlatively, one multiplies the objects floating therein the water. Notonly is therethe ship,but also the wood. These two itemshave exactlythesame size, shape,location, and weight.Ifthe shipweighstentons,thenwhen Herculeslifts it, he is actually twoten-ton lifting items simultaneously. And thereare manymoreitemsfloating therebesides the shipand the wood: for of molecules,the collectionof example,thecollection(or quantity) of subatomic besides atoms,and thecollection particles. Moreover, ship-of-Theseus styleidentity puzzles,thereare otherproblemsfor Leibniz'slaw; forexample,identity puzzles involving office-holders. To solve these problemsone mustmultiply the senses of 'is' even nextan 'is' offunction or role,and,in turn, one must further, positing entitieseven further. multiply Are therereallyso manyentities? It is notobvious thatsavingunLeibniz's law yieldsthebestlogico-linguistic Followqualified theory. a very ing an idea of Paul Grice,George Myro has constructed formulated time-relativized elegant,rigorously logicthatmight yield a simpleroveralltheory.17After all, nearlyeveryonealreadyholds that mustbe time-relativized; moststatements onlythencan we consistently assert,forexample, thatthe ship is red at t1and not red at t2. A fullytime-relativized logic is simplyone in which this is to all statements, statements. generalized including identity (GeneralThisgeneralization ity, you willrecall,is a theoretical virtue.) opens up the possibility that,just as the ship can be red at tbut not red to the wood at t1but notidentical at t2,so the shipcan be identical one to give up Leibniz's to it at t2.In thisway,such a logicpermits
312 / George Bealer to avoidtheontological and law in itsunqualifed form and,thus, the prima facie linguistic complications needed tosavethelawfrom law in an counterexamples. (Nevertheless, one can keepLeibniz's Nowjustas there is a timeunproblematic time-relativized form.) "world"-relative logic.18 In relative logic, there is a corresponding of contingent, as opposedto thislogic one finds the prospect consider a "possible world" in necessary, identities. Forexample, nowoodwasreplaced ofTheseus during theinterwhich intheship Theninthat world" theship, which val between "possible t,andt2. wasidentical towood,at tl,would still havebeenidentical towood, is a "possible world" inwhich theship at t2. So there would be idenintheactual "world" theshipis identicaltowood,at t2.However, at t2.Itfollows that theidentity oftheshiptowood2 ticaltowood2 to this"world." is onlyconat t2is relative Hence,thisidentity logic contingent identities arepertingent. Since ina "world"-relative ofidenticals wouldnothold. mitted, theprinciple ofthenecessity So therelativized theory wouldgo. Nowthepoint hereis notto denyor evento challenge Leibniz's justifying it overthetimelaw. The point is to showtheneed for or"world"-relativized Buthowcanthat theory. justificarelativized law from thewealth ofcandidate To save Leibniz's tionbe given? one'sontology andone's oneneedstocomplicate counterexamples, that there areother theories also logico-linguistic thoery. However, thecombetween handle those examples. Howdoesoneadjudicate Leibnizian andthecompeting theory peting theories-the classical or"world"-relativized theory? There is noalternative time-relativized them Buttheories ofwhat? What buttocompare as wholetheories. andto are these theories to systematize designed dataor evidence thevarious Thedataarejust releourintuitions concerning explain? between thetwotheories, one must vantexamples. To adjudicate theseexa wholebodyof intuitions concerning gather together whichof the competing amples,and thenone mustdetermine and explains them. theories bestsystematizes So, ifthewayscientific themodal essentialists justify stepis toinof voke Leibniz's theprinciple ofthenecessity law-and, in turn, must theseprinciples. Buttheonlywaywe identicals-they justify that a theory have of justifying is to construct theseprinciples thebodyofourintuitions therelevant exregarding systematizes thejustification ofthemodalstepwould at bottom amples. Thus, arerequired scientific essentialists rely on intuitions. Consequently,
The PhilosophicalLimitsof Scientific Essentialism / 313 to have an epistemological theory thatexplainswhysuch intuitions should have any evidentialweight. Besides theprinciple ofthe necessity ofidenticals, thetheory that namesare rigid designators is also often to justify used in theattempt the modal step. But what justifies the theorythatnames are rigid designators? The arguments forthistheory are plainly for intuitive, attributed to Frege,that example,theargument againstthe theory, names are synonymous to definite descriptions. But thisargument makes liberal use of intuitions cases: the regardinghypothetical thatAristotle did notteachAlexander, thepossibility possibility that Godel did notdiscoverthe incompleteness the possibility theorem, thatwater is not the liquidfilling the riversand lakes, thatheat is not the cause ofS [i.e.,"sensations-of-heat"], and so forth. Butwhat is itthatmakesthesepossibilites evident? The answeris thatwe find themintuitive. Butwhat is it thatgives an intuition any evidential Ifthe rigid-designator weight? theory ofnames is used to justify the modal step,the scientific essentialist once again needs a theoryof whatitis thatgivesthesupporting intuitions their evidential weight. Some people might challengeour conclusionby holdingthatthe thatnamesare notsynonymous Mill-Kripke-Putnam theory todefinite descriptions is reallyjustan ordinary empirical theory, namely,an oflanguage.According to thisview,scientific essenempirical theory tialists do notrelyon intuitions as evidence,forexample,theintuitionthatitwas possiblefor Aristotle notto teachAlexander.Rather, scientificessentialists merely invoke commonplace empirical knowledgeabout our nativelanguage,forexample,theknowledge thatthestring 'It was possiblefor Aristotle not to teach Alexander' is a truesentenceinour nativelanguage(ortheknowledgethatthe 'Aristotle did notteach Alexander'is a possibly string truesentence in our native language).19Now it is true that this linguistic knowledgeis partlyempirical; it is based in part on our empirical knowledge of the syntax and semanticsof our native language. our syntactic 'It was possible Specifically, knowledgethatthestring forAristotle not to teach Alexander' is a sentence in our native language.Plusour semantical knowledge thatinour nativelanguage 'It was possibleforAristotle not to teach Alexander'is trueifand not to teach Alexander.20 only ifit was possible forAristotle (This semantical knowledge derives from the underlyingsemantical knowledgethat in our native language 'possible' means possible, 'Aristotle' means Aristotle, 'not' means not, 'teach' means teach,
314 / George Bealer 'Alexander' meansAlexander, andoursemantical knowledge that thetruth conditions ofa wholesentence are determined bycertain rules andthemeanings oftheconstituent compositional expressions ofthesentence.) Buthowdoesempirical linguistic knowledge ofthis biconditional helpusto gettoknowledge oftheleft hand side,that that'It was possibleforAristotle is, to knowledge notto teach Alexander' is a true inournative Wefirst sentence language? need
axiomsof is arrived at by a proof from thisa prioriknowledge our on intuitions. number theory resting ultimately By analogy,
it is a priori.And inguistic knowledgeis a posterori;in the latter,
knowledge that itwas possible for Aristotle nottoteachAlexander. So we are right backwhere we started; theidea ofrelying on empirical linguistic knowledge was justa run-around. exAntecedent tralinguistic knowledge that itwaspossible for Aristotle not toteach is required in orderto get the empirical Alexander linguistic knowledge that 'Itwaspossible for Aristotle nottoteach Alexander' is a true sentence inournative language. Howdo we getthis antecedentextralinguistic either we or the knowledge? Ultimately, authorities uponwhom we relymust use intuitions as evidence. Thosewhodisagree with this conclusion havean inflated viewof what knowledge of the syntaxand semantics of our language amounts to.Consider an analogy. Howdo we know that thestrings 'Stock markets in 1929'and'Thesquarerootoftwois irracrashed tional' in ournative are true sentences To be sure, this language? ofthesyntax is based inparton empirical knowledge knowledge andsemantics ofournative markets in1929' language: 'Stock crashed ifandonly isa true sentence inournative ifstock language markets in1929; crashed root oftwoisirrational' 'Thesquare isa true sentence in ournative ifand only ifthesquarerootoftwois irralanguage tional. theunderly(Knowledge ofthese biconditionals derives from ingsemantical knowledge that 'stock' means stock, 'markets' means 'crashed' means andso forth, markets, crashed, plusthesemantical thetruth ofa wholesentence are deterknowledge that conditions oftheconmined rules and themeanings bycertain compositional stituent ofthesentence.) Butone'sknowledge ofthese expressions biconditionals is hardly sufficient. One mustin additionhave oftheright handsides.Thatis,one must havetheexknowledge markets in 1929andthat that stock crashed tralinguistic knowledge In theformer thesquarerootoftwois irrational. case,thisextral-
to have knowledge oftheright handside,namely, theextralinguistic
Limits ofScientific Essentialism / 315 knowledge that thestring 'Itwaspossible for Aristotle notto teach Alexander' is a true sentence inournative language rests partly on ourempirical knowledge ofthesyntax andsemantics ofournative language. Butthisempirical linguistic knowledge does notsuffice; extralinguistic knowledge-namely, that itwas possible for Aristotlenottoteach Alexander-is alsorequired. Andthis extralinguistic is based on intuition. knowledge A third where intuitions areusedinjustifying themodal point step is this. Evenifonetakestheprinciple and ofnecessity ofidenticals therigid-designator theory ofnames tobe evident, those twotheories do notbythemselves inorder toreach justify themodal step needed natural kinds. scientifically interesting necessitites concerning For thefollowing consider water is identical toH20; example, argument: water is identical to H20.Notice that therefore, necessarily 'H20' is not a nameat all, but rather a description.21 (Or at leastit is a shortfor something like 'the compound disguised description, molecules ofwhich consist oftwohydrogen ionsand one oxygen ion'.Ifyoudoubt then thepresent this, throughout paragraph just I just mentioned.) replace the term'H20' withthe description rather than a name, Leibniz's lawplus Because'H20'is a description thetheory that namesarerigid do not theabove designators license To dramatize that thismodalargument has notice argument. this, is identical to thecompond thesameform as thefollowing: water wateris Lake Tahoe;therefore, predominantly filling necessarily, identical to the compound Lake Tahoe. If predominantly filling law and therigid-designator the Leibniz's theory ofnames licensed earlier wouldalso license thelatter But argument, they argument. is plainly thelatter invalid. So itwillnotdo to holdthat argument law and therigid-designator the Leibniz's ofnames licenses theory is needed, earlier Somefurther argument. logico-linguistic principle like'H20'and descripone that between distinguishes descriptions tionslike'thecompound Lake Tahoe'. predominantly filling Themissing principle evidently isthat theformer arerigid descripis one that tionswhereasthe latter are not.(A rigid description inevery inwhich theitem thesameitem world" designates "possible therigid-designator ofnames tells usnothing exists.) However, theory are notnames. aboutthis. So howdo we knowthat Descripitions like'thecompound anddescriptions like'H20'are rigid descriptions essenLakeTahoe'arenot? scientific predominantly filling Evidently, theformer idenneeda theory towhich tialists according descriptions
Bealer 316 / George the do not.However, thelatter whereas theessenceofitems tify a traditional willrequire theory ofthis andjustification formulation use will makeliberal Thisinvestigation inmetaphysics. investigation that'H20' conclusion as evidenceforthetheoretical of intuitions identify becausethey arerigid descriptions andkindred expressions denote. So, onceagain,thejustificathey oftheitems theessences on theuse ofintuidependent tionofthemodalstepis at bottom tionsas evidence. to avoidtheconclua while) (atleastfor Thereis a wayoftrying ofbeing theproperty are neededto showthat intuitions sionthat ofbeingthecomtheproperty to water whereas H20 is essential one could LakeTahoeis not.Namely, filling poundpredominantly pure thesis about strong philosophical extremely thefollowing adopt ifT is a purescientific (as opposedto an theory theories: scientific T is necessary. The and ifT is true, then theory) appliedscientific theory; thatwater = H20 is a pure scientific trueproposition that water = the compound however,the true proposition theory. scientific an applied LakeTahoeisonly filling predominantly that onecaninfer from thestrong thesis, philosophical Consequently, infer this iftrue, butonecannot isnecessary theformer proposition In this way, the strong in the case of the latterproposition. themodal stepinthescientific suffices tobridge thesis philosophical allows this thesis hardly invoking However, essentialists' argument. in as evidence on intuitions to avoidrelying essentialists scientific version a very strong is really just thesis After all,this thelongrun. ofthe inourearlier reconstruction essentialism. Indeed, ofscientific thesis couldjustbe thisstrong essentialists' scientific argument, ofnaturalthesis that certain theweaker modal types for substituted adfacing iftrue. So therealquestion are necessary kind identities is evidently it.Butthere thesis is howtojustify ofthestrong vocates intuitions aboutindividual no way to do so exceptby consulting sortof in particular the standard cases, including hypothetical essentialists. byscientific cases invoked hypothetical there is thestrong thesis, ofjustifying In addition to theproblem an in individual cases whether of determining also the problem inthis thesis. Any inthe senseinvoked ispurely scientific hypothesis in this sense scientific that is purely statement identity descriptive wouldplacean extraThisfact outan essence. willin effect single force that a burden on every might burden purescientist, ordinary to go wellbeyond ofdaily empirical as a matter practice, scientists,
/ 317 Essentialism ofScientific Limits investigations philosophical andtoengageina priori investigations emalter radically might thesis thestrong Accordingly, ofessence. upon be dependent might science of science: conceptions piricist upon wouldnot be dependent philosophy (although philosophy science). must essentialists is thatscientific conclusion The inescapable their in modal the step to justify as evidence intuitions use ultimately justify to intutions to use entitled ever is one But why arguments. of couldhaveall sorts all,a person After conclusion? a theoretical be used to that couldnotlegitimately beliefs crazynoninferential about Whatmakesour intuitions conclusions. theoretical justify inthese as with hunches, Perhaps, just different? cases hypothetical radical is what of course, (This, weight. no evidential carry tuitions orskepwe notbe Quineans should hold. Why andskeptics Quineans So couldnotbe justified. essentialism wereso,scientific Ifthis tics?) that extheory needan epistemological essentialists scientific plainly status. haveevidential plainswhyintuitions traditional four promising critically be toexamine will Mystrategy and coherentism, empiricism, rationalism, of intuition: theories than reasonsofspace be briefer for must (Thissurvey Platonism. canbe made ofargument lines themain I hopethat wish. onewould unless they fail three theories thelatter is that Myconclusion clear.) namely, a problem, leaveuswith that will But rationalism. presuppose There essentialism. with scientific is inconsistent rationalism that full theory thetwo-tier wayout.Namely, one satisfactory willbe only connaturalistic from concepts andcontent category separates that essentialists willservescientific that ofintuition cepts.The theory and holds for category that theory rationalist be a circumscribed will holds for that theory ofderived form anda special concepts content concepts. naturalistic ofwhy theories traditional promising ofthe thesurvey Butnowfor weight. have evidential intuitions 5. Rationalism attennormal, that a sincere, with an example. Suppose We begin it to by applying 'multigon' the new term introduces tiveperson that we sides.Suppose several having closedplanefigures various the is either this newterm with he expresses that theconcept know conor themorerestrictive ofbeinga closedplanefigure concept
318 / George Bealer ceptofbeing a closedplanefigure with morethanfour sides.(As I mentioned earlier, these twoconcepts are listed inthedictionary as alternate ofthecommon meanings noun'polygon'.) Butwe do notknowwhich ofthesetwoconcepts is hisconcept ofmultigon. Whatdetermines theanswer? Whatis required forhisconcept of multigon tobe that of a closed plane figure rather than that ofa closed planefigure with more than four sides? Intuitively, thematter would be settledby how the personapplies his conceptto decisive hypothetical cases. Suppose that, uponattentively considering the caseinnormal cognitive theperson circumstances, makes confidently thenoninferential itispossible judgment that for a three-sided closed planefigure to be a multigon. Then, hisconcept intuitively, of multigon isthat ofa closedplanefigure rather than that ofa closed planefigure having morethanfour sides.Ifthisnormal, attentive personconfidently judges thata three-sided figure could be a multigon, howcould hisconcept be that ofa closed with plane figure morethanfour sides? no sense.Or suppose Thismakes that, upon attentively thecase innormal considering cognitive circumstances, theperson makesthenoninferential confidently if judgment that, a figure werethree-sided itwouldnotbe a multigon. or four-sided, Then, intuitively, theperson's concept ofmultigon is that ofa closed planefigure with more than four sides. This would settle ourquestion. Forifinnormal cognitive circumstances this attentive normal, isconfident person aboutthis howcould extremely simple question, hebe mistaken that hereally (assuming theconcept possesses determinately)? hecannot. If Intuitively, this assessment isright, theanswer toourquestion ofthetwoconcepts concerning which istheperson's residesin the person's in normal concept circapacity cognitive cumstances tojudgecorrectly thedecisive cases.The hypothetical personpossessesthe conceptdeterminately onlyif he has this cognitive capacity. Thissort ofinsight inone wayoranother) (perhaps qualified providesthekeyto therationalist oftheevidential ofintheory status tuitions. torationalists, ifa noninferential According is of judgment a type cannot that, byitsnature, then itmay go wrong, legitimately be usedin thejustification ofother a judgments. If,byitsnature, ofjudgment hasthis kind ofstrong type modal tietothetruth, then ofthat judgments count as evidence type (ordata).On the rationalist a person's theory, however, noninferential abouttheapjudgments ofconcepts to elementary plicability hypothetical cases do indeed
Limits ofScientific Essentialism / 319 havethis kind ofstrong modaltieto thetruth. Indeed, a necessary condition ofhaving theconcept is that theperson's noninferential judgments about the applicability of the conceptto elementary hypothetical casesmust be true (atleast when relevant auxilary conditions are met). Butan intuition is(either identical toor at leastintimately boundup with) a noninferential judgment abouttheapplicability ofa concept to a hypothetical case. Itfollows, therefore, thatintuitions countas evidence. Thisinbroadoutline is whatI meanbya rationalist theory ofthe evidential status ofintuitions. itplainly Although needs tobe qualified invarious ways, this type oftheory doeshaveconsiderable intuitive appeal.Naturally, there are several distinguishable versions ofthe theory, someofwhich are reminiscent ofone important historical figure or another. For illustrative purposes I willnowlay outin a bitmoredetail themoderate rationalist version. The larger lineof ourargument wouldnotbe lostbyskipping aheadto thenextsectionat this point. As I haveindicated, therationalist theory oftheevidential status ofintuitions is a kindoftruth-based theory. to a truthAccording basedtheory ofevidence, certain ofbeliefs types nature have bytheir a strong modaltietothetruth (i.e., necessarily, arealways they true, mostly true, probably or normally The idea is that this true, true). modaltietothetruth makes beliefs a strong ofthis ones that type in using couldnotfailto be justified insubsequent person reasoning. Accordingly, such beliefswould countas evidence.On a moderate a proposition truth-based a theory, is evidence (data)for iftheperson believes theproposition person noninferentially and, necessarily, mostoftheperson's in proposinoninferential beliefs tionsofthattypeare true. Wewill callthefollowing the moderate thesis: rationalist necessarily,mostofa person's noninferential beliefs abouttheapplicability this ofa concept to elementary From casesare true.22 hypothetical thesis and themoderate truth-based ofevidence, itfollows theory that a person's noninferential beliefs abouttheapplicability ofa concasescount as evidence for thepercepttoelementary hypothetical son.Butintuitions usedinjustifying scientific (atleasttheintuitions beliefs arenoninferential about theapplicability ofconessentialism) cases.(Orifintuitions are notstrictly identical ceptstohypothetical tosuchnoninferential thecontents ofone'sintuitions neverbeliefs, thelessmustby and large coincidewiththe contents of such
320 / George Bealer noninferential beliefs.) Itfollows, therefore, that a person's intuitions about theapplicability ofa concept toelementary hypothetical cases count as evidence for the person. This, then, isa moderate rationalist explanation ofwhytheseintuitions have evidential weight. Thisexplanation ofwhy intuitions haveevidential weight depends on themoderate rationalist thesis (thethesis that, necessarily, most ofa person's noninferential beliefs abouttheapplicability ofa concepttoelementary hypothetical casesaretrue). Thisthesis is related to a version oftheprinciple ofcharity, theprinciple that in interpreting thespeechandaction ofothers we must assume (atleastat theoutset) that most oftheir beliefs aretrue. However, therationalist thesis is far morecautious. It does notrequire thatmostofa person'sbeliefs-including empirical beliefs-be true. itrequires Rather, that only most ofa person's beliefs aboutthe ofhisconapplicability ceptsto hypothetical cases be true. The reasonforthis is caution that itseemsin principle possible for a person notto havemostly true empirical beliefs. (Forexample, a person couldhavea vastarrayofsuperstitous andquack-scientific beliefs. Ora person couldbe subjected to systematic trickery-perceputal illusions,drugs, hyponosis, brainwashing. Andmany philosophers holdthat a personcouldsuffer from one ofthetraditional skeptical possibilitiesthe-brain-in-the-vat, systematic hallucination, or dream.) Moderate rationalists avoidthis problem byrequiring only that most ofa person's beliefs aboutthe applicability of a conceptto elementary hypothetical cases must be true. Beliefs ofthis special typeare far for holdno matter safer, they what contingent situation theperson ortheworld isactually in.Indeed, these beliefs areas weakas possible:they concern a concept whether only toa situation whose applies features arebuilt into thecase. Therefore, auxilary right there is no on theperson's dependency auxilary empirical information. These arethebeliefs that anynormal wouldhaveiftheperson person truIfa person lyhastheconcept. seemsto us nottomakemostly true about the applicabilty judgments of the conceptto elementary hypothetical cases, thatwould indicate, not thatthe personis butrather that theperson does notreally havetheconmistaken, Or so moderate ceptto beginwith. rationalists wouldhold. Thisbrings us to themoderate rationalist ofwhatitis to theory a theory thatyields possessa conceptdeterminately, the above moderate rationalist thesis as an inmmediate consequence. Having a determinate is notlikehaving a stamp on your forehead concept
Limits ofScientific Essentialism / 321 or having (an inscription of)a predicate inthe"belief box"inyour brain.The rationalist view of determinate conceptpossession is Kantian: it is notpossible broadly forthere to be a disconnected a disconnected "piece ofa mind" (e.g., ofa concept possession without an associated for theconcept capacity applying toelemencorrectly tary hypothetical cases).A disconnected pieceofa mind is no more a disconnected than possible a mind pieceofspace;like comes space, as an integrated, whole.According synthesized to moderate rationalists, having a determinate concept requires having a mental akin a vivid orperfect capacity-broadly imagination pitch-except that itisa cognitive capacity. Specifically, a determinate having concept requires a cognitive for having capacity mostnecessarily making ly truejudgments regarding the applicability of the conceptto cases that theperson elementary hypothetical might consider. Letus be moreprecise. Suppose that a person hassomeconcept k butwe do notknowwhich itis. Letc be somefamiliar concept k might be theconcept ofbeing a multigon, concept. (Forexample, which we discussed at theoutset ofthis andc might section, be the of beinga closedplanefigure or theconcept concept of beinga closedplanefigure with morethan four What isrequired for sides.) theperson's k is tobe this familiar concept c?Themoderate concept rationalist capacity theory provides a necessary condition. Letthe that proposition ...k... be an elementary hypothetical case.Suppose that theperson werecarefully to sort ofthis form propositions into twoclasses, thosehe believes to be true and thosehe believes not to be true. Thentheperson's k would concept be c onlyifmost of thepropositions that...c...associated with thefirst classare really true andmost ofthepropositions that ...c...arereally nottrue (where theproposition that ...c...is justliketheproposition that ...k...exc takesk's place).23 ceptthat rationalist Summing ofwhatis up,themoderate capacity theory a person for to possessa concept required has the determinately moderate rationalist thesis as an immediate as we consequence. But, this saw earlier, thesis a moderate rationalist of yields explanation haveevidential ifcorrect, status. whyintuitions moderate raThus, tionalism wouldbe able to solve our first the problem, namely, evidential status ofintuitions, a (partial) solution toour just bygiving second theproblem ofdeterminate problem, namely, concept possession.It must be acknowledged itseventual need for that, despite moderate rationalism iseconomical andat significant qualifications,
322 / GeorgeBealer leastinitially plausible. moderate NowI believe that allrationalists would bewisetomodify invarious would be either rationalism ways.A preferrable position Forpresent purposes dialectical rationalism orholistic rationalism. ofthem there is no needtospell outthese positions. Oneadvantage in a position that, is thatthey putrationalists to statea condition butsufficient for on their viewat least, would be not only necessary approach a person thedeterminate possession ofa concept. On this a concept ifandonly iftheperson possesses possesses determinately incognitivecertain intellectual thecapacity capacities: specifically, the tomost elemenlyidealcircumstances toapply concept correctly theconcept tomost tary hyppothetical casesandtocorrectly subject idealcircumstances elementary logical manipulations. Cognitively arethose achieved at theend(versus thebeginning) ofphilosophical ofone'sindialectic orat theendofthetheoretical systematization or theoretical tuitions, wherethroughout theprocess of dialectic there issufficient clarity (attentivness), systematization distinctness, By elementary logical intelligence, memory (andperhaps desire). we meanto include under the inmanipulations, decompositions likeconjunction, negation, verses offundamental logical operations and so forth.24 existential generalization, singular predication, inmyprojected bookon ofrationalism are examined (Theseforms theautonomy ofphilosophy.) What isitfor a person topossess oneconcept rather determinately A desideratum epistemology isthat than another? for anyacceptable of there should be someobjectively describable intellectual feature possessing one theperson that marks this distinction. Thatis,ideally, in some objectively thananother shouldconsist conceptrather feature oftheperson. Rationalism strives to describable intellectual theperson's suchan intellectual capacity provide feature, namely, incognitively idealcircumstances togetat modal andlogical truths that holdofone butnottheother On this view,a concept concept. isnot that onecanjust a free-floating upon independentthing happen Thedeterminate posseslyofone'scorrelative cognitive capacities. sionofa concept is notan "atomic" a person cannot phenomenon: havea disconnected a mind comesas wholecloth. pieceofa mind; wouldhave us believe. Or so rationalists Letus nowreturn toourlarger lineofargument andtheproblem a pertorationalists, oftheevidential status ofintuitions. According has a concept unlesstheperson son cannot possess determinately
/ 323 Essentialism ofScientific Limits of theapplicability about capacity tomakejudgments an associated havea strong judgments cases,which to hypothetical theconcept arise from that thejudgments reason, Forthis tietothetruth. modal a person that ofjudgment are thesort capacity ofthis theexercise intheoretical in usingin subsequent couldnotfailto be justified (data) for as evidence qualify would Therefore, suchbeliefs ferences. implies ofdeterminateness theory Thustherationalists' theperson. ofintuitions. status theory oftheevidential their ofthe theories we willsurvey twoalternate In thenext sections, Ourconandcoherentism. ofintuitions, empiricism evidential status to reduce are unsatisfactory or they willbe that either they clusion we willshowwhyrationalism Following that, a rationalist theory. modificaas itstands; it requires significant be satisfactory cannot essento save scientific tionifit is to be ofany helpin theeffort willbe that ourconclusion toPlatonism; finally We willturn tialism. that is accepableis a specialcase of ofPlatonism theonlyversion rationalism. thismodified 6. Empiricism andonly exarethose whowish tocount experiences, Empiricists about one's impropositions evidence.Elementary periences,as that mayjust aretheonlysort ofpropositions experiences mediate other everyone Virtually ownbe usedtojustify propositions. on their willnotprovide an versions ofempiricism simple wouldagreethat modal ofthesort scienconclusions rich reaching evidential basisfor version a sophisticated There is,however, espouse. tific essentialists thatis morepromising. ofempiricism emwho wishto maintain essentialists sophisticated Scientific This andothers. a strategy usedbyQuine toadapt try might piricism that thesis elementary proon theempiricists' is grounded strategy one'sbasicdata.The constitute aboutone's experiences positions that can there are other propositions perhaps idea is to showthat conclusion ofderived data.One couldreachthis thestatus acquire of thetruth between is a positive correlation that there byshowing tobelieve anda person's disposition derived datapropositions these thosepropositions. relies on evolutionary version ofthisstrategy theory. A leading that there basisforconcluding an evolutionary One hopesto find ofproofa certain thetruth between type is a positive correlation
324 / George Bealer type. So, position and a disposition to believepropositions ofthat as inner states) for example, ifwe takesenseexperiences (construed tobe ourbasicdata,we might bythis strategy be abletoshowwhy present exobservational beliefs (that is,beliefs aboutimmediately ternal data.The arguobjects) should acquire thestatus ofderived itsbeing proment is that there are goodevolutionary grounds for bablethat a person aboutimwillbelieveelementary propositions mediately present external objectifand onlyifthosepropositions itis probable are true. Forexample, we evolved insucha waythat a person that is running at him from wouldbelievea tiger directly ifandonly thefront ifthere is indeed a tiger directly at him running isplain. from thefront. Theevolutionary advantage ofthis correlation A similar inthe account canbe attempted for testimony. Ourbeliefs content ofwhatother peopletellus do notcount as basicdatafor After aresimply empiricists. all,thebasicdatainthecaseoftestimony senseexperiences ofsounds and theseecertain (e.g.,thehearing testimony ofothers ingofcolors, shapes, andmotions). Nevertheless, thestatus ofderived a cordataifonecouldestablish might acquire ofothers relation between ourbeliefs inthecontent ofthetestimony Ifan empiricist and thetruth ofthat sucha content. can establish evolutionary theory correlation empirically, perhaps by invoking (e.g.,an appropriate doctrine in sociobiology) or a game-theoretic ofcooperative thecooperative acactivities explanation (specifically, be able oflinguistic then theempiricist might tivity communication), to conclude thattestimony indeedhas thestatus ofderived data. with thesamegeneral toour regard Quinehasattempted strategy He does notaccordto suchbeliefs the elementary logicalbeliefs. he produces an evolutionary status ofbasicdata. However, argucorrelation between ment for thethesis that there is a general our ofsuch After beliefs andthetruth beliefs. all,havelementary logical reasonenhances ourmeans/ends beliefs ingtrue elementary logical thatenhance to chooseactions our ourcapacity ingand,in turn, to conclude Ifthis wereright, one wouldbe entitled survival. that, are notbasicdata,nevertheless beliefs although elementary logical dataand,hence, thestatus ofderived maybe usedin they acquire other justifying propositions. onefirst conInsummary, onthesophisticated empiricist strategy, andthen one usesthe one'sbestempirical scientific structs theory, between a ceris a correlation or notthere to see whether theory Ifone'sbest ofthosebeliefs. and thetruth taincategory ofbeliefs
Limits ofScientific Essentialism / 325 scientific does establish sucha correlation, then empirical theory in ofderived beliefs that are accorded thestatus data. category who wishto be emThe question facing scientific essentialists piricists is this. Canthis be usedto sophisticated empiricist strategy inthecase ofderived data(atleast modal intuitions thestatus accord tojustify the ofthemodalintuitions usedbyscientific essentialists intheir itcannot. modal step Theanswer isthat arguments)? (Indeed, inQuine's isthethesis that implicit general attack on modality modal intuitions cannot be accorded evidential status or anyother bythis empiricist strategy.) theproblem to follow To see what thesophisticated is,letus try We are toldto consult ourbestcomprehensive empiricist strategy. for thepurpose ofcomparing ourtheories about empirical theory thebeliefs theories peopleareliableto haveandourcorresponding aboutthewaytheworld is. We might ourbest actually represent with thefollowing comprehensiveempirical theory diagram: THEORY COMPREHENSIVE EMPIRICAL
Thecircle within thec rcl uepeetsorthois aboutth beliefspelehv
be accorded thestatus ofderived data.However, when sophisticated themodal beliefs seekananalogous correlation between empiricists peopleareliable tohaveandmodal truths affirmed byourbestcomprehensive empirical will find hold that none. theory, they they Why?
Because the comprehensive empiricaltheoryestablishesa significant positivecorrelation between observational beliefsand observational truths, and the truth betweenbeliefsin others'testimony logical beliefsand of others'testimony, and between elementary elementary logical truths, each of thesethreetypesof beliefsmay
outside that circle peopleare liableto have.The entries represent our corresponding theories aboutthe way the worldactually is.
326 / George Bealer Becausethey hold that ourbest comprehensive empirical theory can do itsjob-namely, andexplaining predicting experiences-perfectly wellwithout a stand taking on anymodals. Thatis,theyholdthat our bestempirical theory can do itsjob perfectly wellwhilejust all modalstatements eliminating from thetheory. (Echoing Hume, is exactly whatwe must do ifwe are really Quineholdsthatthis consistent theresulting empiricists.) Theyholdthat comprehensive empirical theory issimpler than itscompetitors and isjustas good in all other honored in thepredicrespects byempiricists (namely, tion andexplanation Ifthis ofexperiences). isright, thecomprehensiveempirical that modal theory justeliminates propositions is betterthanall thecompeting theories that takestands on modalproTheupshot would be that positions. ourbest comprehensive empirical theory doesnotestablish anypositive correlation between themodal beliefs a person isliable tohaveandthetruth ofthose beliefs. Unlike observational beliefs inthetestimony ofothers, andelemenbeliefs, one'smodal tary logical beliefs, beliefs couldnotbe accorded derived evidential status bythesophisticated empiricist strategy. Consewould be ofno helptothescientific essentialist quently, empiricism inmeeting thedemand to explain theevidential status oftheintuitions thatare used to justify scientific essentialism. Somesophisticated to avoidthis conclusion empiricists might try a person's byincluding the"inner among experiences experience" ofhaving a modalintuition. a modalintuition wouldthus (Having be counted as a Lockean ofreflection experience ora Russellian exofintrospection). What the ofthese "inperience explains occurrence perexperiences"? Most contemporary would to empiricists attempt modal intuitions explainwhypeople have their by meansof a naturalistic towhich ourdisposition cybernetic theory according to havethese intuitions isjust "hard-wired" orisjust a causalbyproduct ofan efficient brain onthis organization. kind ofempiricist However, there is no independent theory, reasonto holdthatintuitions that are just"hard-wired" or thatare justbyproducts ofefficient brain aretied tothetruth. evenif"hard-wired" modal organization Indeed, intuitions onceupon a time enhanced thebiological fitness ofhuman thiswouldnotbe evidence thattheseintuitions beings, had any correlation tothetruth. ananalogy: positive evenifitwere (Consider to turn outthat there is a "hard-wired" to haveracist or disposition sexist beliefs and thatonceupona timethisdisposition somehow human enhanced thiswouldnotbe evidence thatthese survival,
Essentialism / 327 Limits ofScientific is the causal explanation beliefs are true.)So if thisnaturalistic modal intuitions, then ofwhy peoplehavetheir simplest explanation ofderived evidence be accorded thestatus modalintuitions cannot empiricist strategy. on thesophisticated is not that thenaturalistic, causalexplanation Suppose, however, explanation is basedon instead that thesimplest simplest. Suppose possession, for a rationalist theory ofdeterminate concept capacity On this earlier). themoderate rationalist theory (described example, a cognitive capacity, a concept requires having theory, possessing abouttheapthecapacity to makemostly true judgments namely, cases.So ifa oftheconcept to elementary hypothetical plicability thequestion hasa given concept andiftheperson considers person hypothetical ofwhether theconcept applies to a given elementary to judgethequestion willbe activated capacity case, theperson's it does (or does will(inmostinstances) and theperson judgethat Thisstyle of does(doesnot)apply. not)applyjustin case itreally between theelemenestablishes a positive correlation explanation intuitions a person is liable tohaveandthetruth ofthose tary modal ifthiswerethesimplest ofwhy explanation intuitions. Therefore, then these intuitions modal elementary intuitions, peoplehavetheir onthesophisticated emevidential status would be accorded derived piricist strategy. modal ofwhy havetheir people (Platonists alsohavean explanation ofabstract intuitions. Intuitions are a kindof"direct perception" a ofwhether whenintelligent thequestion peopleconsider truths: toan elementary instances case,inmost hypothetical concept applies ifindeed itdoesapply that itapplies andthey "seedirectly" they just ifindeed itdoes notapply itdoes notapply. that just"see directly" this"direct perception" capacity theory, Thus,liketherationalist between modal elementary establishes a positive correlation theory So ifthis thesimplest exintuitions and thetruth. theory provided would be acintuitions then they ofwhy ourmodal occur, planation statuson the sophisticated cordedderivedevidential empiricist is defensi9 we showthat, insofar as this Insection theory strategy. ofthecircumscribed rable,itmaybe viewedas a specialvariant thediscussion, we will advance. To simplify therefore, tionalist theory of thePlatonist until we will defer consideration theory later.) separate that therationalist the theory implies capacity Notice, however, ofphilosophy. elaborate onthis later.) oftheautonomy (I will thesis can extheonly So ifthis empiricists wayinwhich theory provides
328 / George Bealer plaintheevidential status ofintuitions, empiricists maynotadopt global scientific essentialism. Indeed, thesituation is probably much worse for empiricists. Ifthe rationalist capacity theory ofdeterminate weretrue, concept possession there would be a strong modal tiebetweenthese intuitions andthetruth. Nowsuppose that a truth-based approach tothetheory ofevidence iscorrect (There isgreat intuitive for this support approach, anditis a component ofan attractive explanation ofa basictenet ofempiricism, namely, that allelementary propositions about one'scurrent experiences arebasicdata.See notes 22 and25.)Then, ontherationalist capacity theory, intuitions would havethestatus ofbasicdata notderived data,as sophisticated empiricists would haveus believe. Thus, sophisticated empiricists would no longer be able to holdthatonly elementary propositions about one'scurrent are basicdatapropositons. A vastarray experiences ofnonexperiential must be admitted as basicdata,propropositions about the applicability of conceptsto all mannerof positions hypothetical cases. Thus,a basic tenetof empiricism-that only elementary aboutone'scurrent are basic propositions experiences data propositions-would be contradicted. ofwhy we have Summing up,ifthenaturalistic causalexplanation ourelementary modal intuitions isthe then emsimplest explanation, cannot theevidential status ofourintuitions. Onthe piricism explain iftherationalist other isthesimplest hand, capacity theory explanationofwhywe haveourintuitions, thenempiricism doesnotprovidescientific essentialists with a waytoavoidthelarger we claims are trying to defend, thatthethesis of theautonomy of namely, istrue andglobal scientific essentialism isfalse. philosophy Moreover, to thetheory ofevidence, thisway givena truth-based approach oftrying to explain theevidential status ofintuitions conactually tradicts modalintuitions wouldbe among empiricism: elementary ourbasicdata, as rationalists claimed allalong. Thus, empiricism promises tobe nohelpinmeeting thedemand toexplain theevidential statusof theintuitions thatare used in justifying local scientific essentialism. 7. Coherentism intocoherentism, there are no privileged beliefs According that, of oftheir to a person's theoretical dependently belonging system of beingevident to the person. have the status beliefs, (ustified)
Limits ofScientific Essentialism / 329 Only when systematized theoretically do a person's beliefs havethe A belief status ofbeingevident to a person. that belongs to a peris evident son'stheoretical system to theperson; one that does not is not. Butletuslookmore carefully at what theoretical systematization must be. According tooneaccount, theoretical systematization conin finding sists a maximally consistent simply bodyofone'sbeliefs in(i.e.,a consistent bodyofone's beliefs thatwouldbe rendered to it).Thisaccount consistent beliefs by adding anyofone'sother is plainly inadequate. Fora person couldhavesucha bodyofconsistent beliefs butnevertheless quiteunjustified beliefs. Forexample,consider a gambler with a hostofbeliefs aboutwhatnumbers willcomeup on roulette wheels, on dice,inlotteries, at theraces, andso forth. Atthetime he hasthem, these beliefs do not, we may he contradict hisother beliefs. that suppose, (Orifthey do,suppose thebeliefs andthat the justdisregards contradicted by hishunches beliefs hishunches, do form a maximally he regards, including conthegambler's beliefs sistent this is possible.) Butplainly body. Surely are notjustified. Fora moreextreme example, supposesomeperverse scientists offalse insome havemadean effort toproduce a widevariety beliefs behavioral and him todrugs, poorsoul.Theysubject modification, ofdetailTheeffect ofall this isthat theperson hasa host hypnosis. in very ed beliefs abouttheexploits ofpresumed creatures distant places(e.g., Mars, Alpha Centauri, etc.). He also hasdetailed beliefs tobe actually about other "worlds" that hebelieves existing although notspatially connected toour"world" notconnected tothe three (i.e., we arelocated). dimensional he hasbeliefs space inwhich Finally, abouta vastarray and ofundecidable mathematical propositions, he hasbeliefs aboutnewdomains ofmathematical objects. (Forexhave hebelieves that there areabstract that ample, objects, bizarrons, the structure of the natural numbers butare notnatural exactly nor arethey set-theoretical orproperty-theoretic constructs. numbers, from all other Theyare different sorts ofabstract objects we know are otherwise likenatural of,and yetthey exactly numbers.) Now theperverse doallofthis so that theresulting scientists very carefully are consistent beliefs with of)theperson's other beliefs. (most Conthese far-out beliefs toa maximally consistent sequently, belong body inbelievoftheperson's beliefs. Butclearly theperson isnot justified ingthesethings.
330 / George Bealer A rational agent must domore than merely havea maximally consistent Inaddition bodyofbeliefs. to having (most of)hisbeliefs be theperson consistent, must assemble hisbeliefs into a theory, that is,a system ofpropositions that includes general, law-like propositions that servetoexplain ifnotinfull (atleast schematically detail) thevarious specific propositions in thesystem. Butletus suppose that,knowing of thisrequirement, the perverse scientists have already supplied theperson with a bodyoffar-out law-like beliefs that do just that. He hasfar-out law-like beliefs from which hecould, ifhe tried, deducehisspecific beliefs aboutwhat is going on indistantplacesand in other "worlds" and about, say,thecontinuum He justfinds hypothesis and bizarrons. all these himself believing bothgeneral and specific; buthe has no idea why.Would things, thebeliefs induced by theperverse scientists be justified? Hardly. What ismissing isthat theperson must havea theory that explains (orat leastprovides a schematic explanation of)whyhehimself has cometobelievethevarious that he believes. Butsuppropositions posethat theperverse scientists areawareofthis requirement, too, and thattheyhave accordingly thepersonwithfar-out supplied theoretical beliefs that do justthis. For example, thatthe suppose to believethathis personhas been hypnotized by thescientists various beliefs aboutdistant are producplacesand other "worlds" ed byoracular with contact these hisvarious beliefs placesandthat aboutundecidable ofmathematics and bizarre parts newtypes of abstract from theMuseof Mathematics objectsresult whispering associated mathematical truths to himduring hissleep. Plainly theperson wouldstill notbe justified. A person cannot thepropositions hebelieves this kind offarjustify justbysupplying outexplanation ofwhyhe has cometo believe thesepropositions. The problem is that notanyold explanation willdo. To be justifed, theperson must, havethesimplest minimally, explanation. (Or,at least, theperson must haveattempted thesimplest to find explanaButsurely there isa simpler available tothefellow tion.) explanation thantheone he has offered. Nowletussuppose that theperson doesseekthesimplest explanation. Andletus suppose that theresulting identifies exexplanation thesourceofall hisfar-out beliefs. Forexample, itstates that actly havesubjected scientists him todrugs, behavioral modificaperverse andhypnosis that tobelieve allthese far-out tion, causedhim things. Butletus suppose after at this that, having arrived simplest explana-
/ 331 Essentialism ofScientific Linmits hepreviousthings allthefar-out inbelieving persists theperson tion, places, distant about propositions and general lybelieved-specific types new bizarre ofmathematics, parts undecidable "worlds," other these believes he why of explanations magical and objects, abstract of arhas After one be clearly unsatisfactory. would This propositions. one ofone'sbeliefs, oftheorigin explanation at thesimplest rived is notafwhosetruth byreasonto abandonthebeliefs is obliged truth-affirmingthe this (Call explanation. by thatvery firmed example. for beliefs, perceptual Consider requirement.) explanations is a there believethat ofwhyI presently explanation The simplest is a tablehere;the there likethis: be something tableheremight isa tablehere, there tomethat causesittoappear here being table's a tablehere. is there that belief my produces appearance and this as thetruth inasmuch ofmybelief thetruth affirms Thisexplanation ofwhyI havethis thetableis hereis partoftheexplanation that belief. thetruth-affirmingwith is supplemented coherentism when Only a satisfacofbeing a chance doesitstand requirement explanations tothe letus return inmind, conclusion this With epistemology. tory the for helpaccount might theory of howthecoherence question essenscientific tosupport areinvoked that intuitions useofthemodal is to be theory ifthecoherence that, We have discovered iialism. modalintuiwe havethese ofwhy explanation oursimplest ofhelp, oftheseintuitions. thetruth affirms be one that tionsmust areavailable-rationalist ofexplanation sorts two speaking, Broadly capacitorationalist According andcausaltheories. theories capacity is that a concept forpossessing condition a necessary tytheories, of the conceptto about the applicability a person'sintuitions So explanatietothetruth. havea strong cases must hypothetical of(atleastmost truth the toaffirm serve theories basedonsuch tions So essentialism. ofscientific usedinsupport intuitions of)themodal iftherationalist is met requirement thetruth-affirming-explanations has his ofwhya person explanaion is thesimplest theory capacity "direct based on Platonist (Explanations or hermodalintuitions. theories, toPlatonist According this. arealsolike theories perception" when truths: ofabstract perception" of"direct area kind intuitions a conofwhether thequestion peopleconsider intelligent normal, case,in mostinstances hypothetical to an elementary ceptapplies doesappifandonlyifittruly itapplies that just"see directly" they ofsomedefiaretheresult butthey canoccur, misfires ly.Ofcourse,
332 / George Bealer inthe ciency cognitive circumstances. Asthecognitive circumstances approach theidealinrelevant respects, theoccurrence ofan intuitionis nothing buttheunmediated "seeing" ofan abstract truth. So the truth-affirming-explanations requirement wouldbe metifthe Platonist "direct perception" theory were simplest. However, I believe that, insofar as this theory isdefensible, itmay be viewed as a special variant ofthecircumscribed rationalist theory we will soonadvance. To simplify things, letus defer consideration ofthis Platonist theory until section 9, whereitwillbe examined in detail.) Besidesrationalist capacity theories, thereare variouscausal theories. The leadingcausal theories are naturalistic cybernetic theories to theeffect that modalintuitions are just"hard-wired" or that arejust they a byproduct ofeconomical brain organization. The problem isthat these naturalistic explanations do notaffirm thetruth of one's modalintutions. Theseexplanations do notprovide any reasonto think that modalintuitions thatare just"hard-wired" or that arejust byproducts ofefficient brain organization areinanyway tiedtothetruth. Evenifinourevolutionary history a certain "hardwiring" orefficient brain organization happened toenhance biological fitness, that wouldnotby itself indicate thatassociated beliefs are true. (Recall theexamples ofracism and sexism in the mentioned previous section.) So ifa naturalistic causal explanation is truly andifitis thesimplest satisfactory ofwhy explanation we haveour modal intuitions, the truth-affirming-explanations requirement would notbe met.On this alternative, therefore, one wouldbe obliged to abandon one'smodal intuitions. Theupshot isthat onthis alternative scientific essentialists wouldbe unableto justify their theory. Supposeinstead thattherationalist capacity-theory explanation oftheorigin ofourmodal issimpler intuitions than thevarious causal explanations. Since this affirms thetruth of(most explanation of) these modalintuitons, scientific essentialists wouldhavesucceeded infindingan account oftheevidential status oftheintuitions use they in support oftheir position. that Notice, however, this account differs little from theoriginal rationalist ofa priorievidence. theory thisaccount Indeed, maybe viewedas a kindof "transcendental deduction" oftherationalist ofa priorievidence from theory the coherence ofjustification. theory tie If,becauseoftheir necessary tothetruth, beliefs ofa certain (most) areguaranteed type necessarily tosurvive ina person's best theoretical we canknow systematization, inadvance that beliefs ofthis will type bejustified always regardless
Limits ofScientific Essentialism / 333 oftheother properties that theperson's best theoretical systematizationmight turn outto have.Beliefs that arelikethis arepriveliged and,accordingly, may be accorded thestatus ofdataindependently ofother considerations. So iftherationalist indeed capacity theory provides thesimplest explanation, a person's intuitions about theapofa concept plicability toelementary caseswill be like hypothetical this. Accordingly, they wouldhavea privileged status: would they Thiswouldbe the inevitable countas data.25 conclusion even if one'sstarting point werecoherentism rather thana foundationalist ofdata (whether theory truth-based or rule-based). The above conclusion depends on the assumption thatthe rationalist capacity theory provides an explanation oftheorigin ofour modal intuitions tnat issimpler than thevarious causalexplanations. Butsuppose this notso; suppose instead that somenaturalistic causal explanation issimplest. Thiskind ofexplanation doesnotaffirm the truth ofourmodalintuitions, themodalintuitions specifically, used insupport ofscientific essentialism. Itfollows that on thecoherence theory (as explicated above)these intuitions wouldnotbe justified and so in turn scientific essentialism wouldnotbe justified.26 Ouroverall is this. Either conclusion, coherentism therefore, does notvalidate scientific essentialism, orifitdoes,itdoes notprovide a genuine alternative to a traditional rationalist ofa priori theory evidence. inthequestfor Thus, a satisfactory oftheevidentheory tialstatus ofintuitions, scientific essentialists haveyettofind a way to avoidrationalism. 8. Natural Rationalism Theseconsiderations givescientific essentialists reason for taking rationalism very seriously. Butthere isa problem: as they stand, the various versions ofrationalism areinconsistent with scientific essentialism. They that imply pretty much anyelementary necessity could inprinciple bejustified a priori. absolutely However, scientific essentialism maintains that a great many elementary necessities cannot be justified except bya posterori means. Letmeexplain this conflict. Consider moderate rationalism. Takethefollowing clearcentral, cuthypothetical cases:a puddle ofwater with init;a pudhydrogen dle ofwater with in it;a puddleofwaterwith oxygen H20 in it;a ofwater with puddle phofapproximately ofwater 7; a puddle that, whensubjected to hydrolysis, yields-two for H2molecules every 02
Bealer 334 / George essentialism Ifscientific casespossible? andso on.Arethese molecule; acare indeed Therefore, possible. water= H20,they is true andif that most havetojudge rationalism, youwould tomoderate cording ofwater, After all,you havetheconcept suchcases are possible. for having thecapacity requires theconcept ofwater and having theconcept applies aboutwhether mostly true judgments making Nowtakethefollowcasessuch as these. toelementary hypothetical cases: a puddleof waterwith hypothetical clear-cut ing central, with ofwater onlyH502in it;a puddleof onlyHO3in it;a puddle XYZ(* H20) only ofwater with water with only NaClinit;a puddle when subthat, with ofwater ph 1; a puddle init;a puddle ofwater yieldsone H2 moleculeforeverytwo 02 jected to hydrolysis, and essentialism ofscientific and so on. Giventhetruth molecule; Therefore, accasesare notpossible. that water= H20,these given are they tomoderate judgethat youwouldnot rationalism, cording andhaving ofwater, youhavetheconcept For, as before, possible. to makemostly having thecapacity theconcept ofwaterrequires theconcept appliesto elementary aboutwhether truejudgments As yousort Nowletusgeneralize. casessuchas these. hypothetical theconcept ofwater whether all thepossible casesjudging through aboutpossible H20 truejudgments you willmakemostly applies, non-water. But being things water andpossible non-H20 items being you casesinwhich be unabletofind any,oranybuta few, youwill of items to be wateror possible samples non-H20 judgepossible Your bestaccountof thiswouldbe that waterto be non-H20. aresamples ofH20.Since, all andonly samples ofwater necessarily about judgments tothemoderate rationalist thesis, your according themoderate tietothetruth, havea strong casesmust hypothetical conyour them (data).Consequently, as evidence rationalist counts ofwaterare samples that all and only clusion samples necessarily to moderate rationalists. What be justified according ofH20 would inferences youbase all thisevidence and thetheoretical is more, a priori.However, thisoutcome conuponitwouldbe absolutely toscientific essentialism, for according essentialism, tradicts scientific inbelieving that all andonly necessarily a person couldbe justified itis impossiare samples a posteriori; ofwater ofH20only samples this. a priorijustification forbelieving ble to havean absolutely thesamereason, scientific essentialism is also inconsisFormuch in versions ofrationalism, including tent with all theother familiar and holistic rationalism.27 dialectical particular
Limits ofScientific Essentialism / 335 So here Theonly isourdilemma. satisfactory theory oftheevidentialstatus ofintuitions that we have found so faris therationalist theory, which consists oftherationalists' capacity-theory ofdeterminate concept possession andtheir truth-based theory ofevidence. Andinthenext section weshall see that Platonism isalsounsatisfactoryunlessit presupposes a certain version ofrationalism. As it stands, however, thefull rationalist theory contradicts scientific essentialism. So howcan scientific essentialism be saved? A radical answer istogiveupallforms ofrationalist theory ofdeterminate concept possession (including thenew,circumscribed form ofrationalism I willpropose below)and toputin itsplacea purely ofdeterminateness for all concepts. causaltheory ofthis (Examples ofpurely kind causaltheory would be a radical externalist baptismhistoricalcum-naming-chain theoryand a radical externalist Later on I willindicate explanation theory. why suchpurely causal as theories ofdeterminateness. FornowI willconcentheories fail trateon howpoorly a satisfactory theymeshwith theory of the a rationalist evidential ofintuitons.) Unlike status capacity theory, a purely causaltheory ofdeterminateness makes theoccurrence of trueintuitions aboutelementary cases (rather mostly hypothetical intuitions aboutsuch a nonrathan, say,mostly false cases)looklike chancephenomenon. The sortofnoncognitive causalcontional, ina purely do notrationally deternections specified causaltheory mine a person's oftheconcept to judgments abouttheapplicability casesanymore than confronted hypothetical being with, say,a pair of dice rationally a gambler's determines hunches about what will numbers comeuponthediceduring a craps Ifthe game. gambler itis a matter ofpureluck. as faras a purely getsitright, Likewise, ofdeterminate if causaltheory isconcerned, concept possession your it noninferential abouthypothetical that judgments cases areright, is a matter ofpureluck.Forthis thepurely causaltheory reason, to theexplanation a person's contributes ofwhy intuitions nothing shouldhaveany evidential status at all. So whatcan an advocateof a purely of detercausal theory minateness status ofintuitions? Given the say abouttheevidential ofempiricism andcoherentism and given that failure causal purely allforms ofrationalist theorists ofdeterminateness, reject theory they have no alternative but dogmatism. (There are still Platonist theories-"direct perception"Platonismand rule-of-evidence Butinthenext I will theories are Platonism. section showthat these
Bealer 336 / George causaltheorists Thatis,purely causaltheorists.) ofno helptopurely thatsome modal intuitions-or mustjust declaredogmatically ofevidence do havethestatus intuitions-simply all modal perhaps Thisresponse no explanation. facthaving and thatthisis a brute is unacceptable.Afterall, various opponentsof scientific and skeptics-hold empiricists Quinean example, essentialism-for weight that haveno evidential beliefs aremere that modal intuitions Some beliefsthatpop into a person'smind(e.g., whatsoever. be simply andshould weight haveno evidential hunches) gambler's What justification. theory conducted in rationally disregarded that Ifitis declared from suchbeliefs? modal intuitions distinguishes are notfree essentialists scientific distinction, is no relevant there essentialism Scientific onthem. conclusions modal strong tobasetheir the to be a meredogma.(Furthermore, wouldbe seen ultimately an exI will below provides propose rationalist theory circumscribed with that isconsistent ofintuitions oftheevidential status planation tothe will tobe superior prove theory So this scientific essentialism. of See thediscussion power. inexplanatory causaltheory dogmatic point.) onthis more for inthenext section Platonism rule-of-evidence causaltheory thepurely adopting with problem There isa further essentialist for itisproblem anyscientific Indeed, ofdeterminateness. ofrationalist all forms rejects causaltheorist, who,likethepurely thenew,circumscribofdeterminateness (including theory capacity scientific essenAswe haveseen, ina moment). I will ed form propose all intuitionsperhaps mustholdthatsome intuitions-or tialists have that someintuitions only ofevidence. Suppose havethestatus essentialists cannot very Scientific Which ones? thestatus ofevidence. brute intuitions confact, as an unexplainable that, welljustdeclare inand intuitions are evidential with essentialism sistent scientific consider Forexample, essentialism arenot. with scientific consistent Aristotle didnotteachAlexintuitions possibly (that theKripkean the incompleteness Godel did not discover ander;thatpossibly S ["sensations-of-heat"]; doesnot heat produce that possibly theorem; ifall and only intuitions and the Putnamian (that, and so forth) were ofH20 andifthere on Earth werecomposed ofwater samples samples of XYZ [* H20] that are a twin Earth containing ofXYZ woulk thenthesesamples justlikewater, macroscopically these Contrast pro-scientific-essentialis andso forth.) notbe water; intuition anti-scientific-essentialist ourold-fashioned intuitions with ii with no hydrogen ofwater is a puddle there possibly (e.g.,that
Limits ofScientific Essentialism / 337 it, thatpossibly thereis a hot thing withno rapidly moving microscopic parts, etc.). Suppose dogmatic causal theorists just declare brute theKripkean that, as an unexplainable and Putmanian fact, intuitions have thestatus of evidence butthe old-fashioned antiscientific-essentialist intuitions do not. Thisdeclaration would appear to be basedon thefollowing admit as evidence thoseinprinciple: tuitions that getyour favorite and dismiss theory to comeouttrue as nonevidential all intutions that go against yourfavorite theory. Ifthis is howscientific essentialists their is wholly proceed, theory unjustified. The alternative is to claimthatall-not justcertain favoredintuitions havethestatus ofevidence (at least prima facie).Butin thiscase, whatis one to say aboutthemultitude ofourapparent anti-scientific-essentialist intuitions that there isa puddle (e.g., possibly ofwater with no hydrogen initor that there isa hotthing possibly withno rapidly Iftheseintuitions are moving microscopic parts). taken atfacevalueandifallintuitions haveevidential status (atleast thenscientific primafacie), essentialism wouldturn outnotto be for "half" ofour justified, facieevidence wouldcontradict it. prima Theupshot would be a stalemate between and scientific essentialists their opponents. To avoidthis, must scientific essentialists hold that, like all otherintuitions, our apparentanti-scientificalthough, havethestatus essentialist intuitions ofevidence (atleast prima facie), seemtocontradict Inreality, they only scientific essentialism. they aremisreported intuitions that with areactually consistent scientific essentialism. Thisisthestandard linetaken essentialists. byscientific Theusual diagnosis given bythese scientific essentialists isthat, unlike ourpro-scientific-essentialist ourapparent anti-scientificintuitions, essentialist intuitions arereally intuitions ofmere epistemic possibility rather thanofgenuine metaphysical possibility. that this is right. this use ofthedistinction Suppose Nevertheless, betweenmetaphysical and epistemic leaves scientific possibility essentialists with a puzzling Do we haveanyintuitions one question. aboutthemetaphysical ofa puddleof way or another possibility water with no hydrogen initorthemetaphysical ofa hot possibility withno rapidly thing The answer, it moving microscopic parts? be this. Whenone suppresses all auxilary seems,must empirical that beliefs contaminate one's intuitions might (e.g.,theempirical = H20andthat beliefs that water heat= meankinetic one energy), does notreally havean intuition one wayor theother aboutsuch
338 / George Bealer matters. Most scientific essentialists I haveaskedtakethis lineabout their ownintuitions. Atanyrate, this is what they are forced tosay ifthey claimthat all genuine intuitions havethestatus ofevidence atleast prima facie. After all,when wescrupulously suppress allauxiliary empirical beliefs that might contaminate ourintuitions (inparticular, our empirical beliefs thatwater= H20 and thatheat = meankinetic energy), we certainly do nothave theintuition that itis metaphysically for there tobe a puddle with impossible ofwater no hydrogen in it or thatit is metaphysically impossible forthere with to be a hotthing no rapidly moving microscopic parts. So if we do haveintuitions onewayor theother aboutthesethings, our are metaphysically intuitions wouldhave to be that they possible. Butin thiscase,we wouldfind ourselves right backin thesortof andscientific stalemate essentialism mentioned above, would notbe justified. So if, as they scientific facie must, essentialists grant prima evidentialstatus toall correctly reported intuitions, they must acknowledge the following phenomenon. Whenit comesto thestandard antiwe lackrealintuitions scientific-essentialist one way or examples, theother about whether they aremetaphysically possible; butwhen itcomestothestandard we do pro-scientific-essentialist examples, about whether aremetaphysically haverealintuitions they possible. Butthis posesa problem. Why isthe cutjusthere? Thisphenomenon is a complete on thepurely causal theory. mystery whoabandon thefull ofdeterminateness So those rationalist theory infavor ofa purely causaltheory areleft with these questions. First, why nottreat intuitions on a parwith, say,gamblers' hunches; what gives intuitions anyevidential status whatsoever? Second, given that someorall intuitions count as evidence, are theintuitions that why whereas that scientific essentialism evidential those support genuinely itareeither A purely nonevidential ornonexistent? causal go against theory is entirely silenton thesequestions; theyare complete The result is thatscientific mysteries. essentialism cannotbe inan acceptable whoadopts tegrated into epistemology byanyone a causaltheory. purely both essentialism isunacceptable ona purely Summing up,scientific causal theory and on thefull rationalist The onlyway to theory. answer the above questions-andtherebyto save scientific with a synthesis ofrationalism andthecausaltheory. essentialism-is Thatis,we should to "naturalize notbe trying we epistemology";
ThePhilosophical ofScientific Limits Essentialism / 339 shouldbe trying to "rationalize naturalism." Thissynthesis of rationalism andnaturalism isa new, circumscribed form ofrationalism, which we willcall natural rationalism. It goesas follows. Ifthedeterminate possession ofall concepts is explained bya rationalist theory, thenscientific essentialism is false.Ifinstead the determinate ofall concepts possession isexplained bya purely causal theevidential theory, basisofscientific essentialism is a mystery. However, ifthepossession ofsomeconcepts, namely, category and content concepts, isexplained bya rationalist theory andthepossessionofnaturalistic isexplained concepts bya moderate causaltheory designed tomeshwith this limited rationalist theory, thedilemma is avoidedand theproblems willbe solved. According tonatural rationalism, ourconcepts divide into twotiers, one comprised ofcategory andcontent and theother, of concepts Onthefirst naturalistic concepts. tier areconcepts that arebynature intelligible, concepts whoseessential relations to one another are accessible to reason at leastinprinciple sufficient atten(i.e.,given andmemory). On thesecond tiveness, intelligence, tier, bycontrast, areconcepts arenot that a great oftheir bynature intelligible; many essential relations tooneanother andcontent con(andtocategory Nowon this cepts)are openonlyto empirical hypothesis. theory, thedeterminate possession ofa category or a content conconcept ina cognitive sists thecapacity incognitively ideal capacity, namely, to correctly theconcept to hypothetical circumstances cases apply interms characterized ofother andcontent conexclusively category andtocorrectly theconcept with cepts manipulate logically respect toother andcontent category attheclose concepts. (Seetheremarks ofsection 10 for an important ofclarification.) Sincetheidenpoint ofa category orcontent isuniquely fixed tity concept bythetotality ofsuchrelations to other and content thepatcategory concepts, incognitively idealcircumstances, oftheperson's tern, application andlogical oftheconcept with toother manipulation respect category and content determines theidentity oftheperconcepts uniquely son'sconcept. Becauseincognitively idealcircumstances theseapand manipulations must be correct, plications merely possessing andcontent that reasoninprinciple insures category concepts (i.e., in cognitively whenexercised ideal circumstances) musthave a tothetruth them. about essential relations pathway among Category and content at leastin the thus are by nature concepts intelligible dialectic ideal(i.e.,attheendoftheideally conducted philosophical
340 / George Bealer or theoretical systematization of intuition givensufficient attentiveness, intelligence, and memory). Ofcourse, there isno supposition that human beings couldeverfully achieve cognitively idealcirinall respects. cumstances However, ina number ofcaseswe could inprinciple approximate cognitively idealcircumstances inrelevant respects, enough to insure thedeterminateness ofa central coreof our category and content concepts. Thisrationalist theory ofdeterminateness for category and content does notcontradict concepts scientific essentialism. Scientific essentialism wouldbe contradicted onlyiftheconditions required thepossession for ofnaturalistic werealso provided concepts bya rationalist theory. Buton natural rationalism they are not.Instead, a moderate naturalrationalism offers causal theory of deterfor the minateness naturalistic concepts. Butwhy dointuitions about to hypothetical applicability ofnaturalistic concepts cases (inparcount as evidence? Causal ticular, pro-scientific-essentialist intuitions) elements ontheir owncannot this. Thekeyto theexplanaexplain tion is ourintuitions theapplicability andconabout ofourcategory tent whoseevidential status insured by concepts, is independently thecircumscribed and acrationalist theory ofconcept possession andconofevidence. Thesecategory truth-based companying theory tent with ourknowledge ofthenaturalistic items intuitions, together of aboutthe applicability involved, determine all our intuitions to hypothetical we have naturalistic cases. Forexample, concepts theapplicability ofthecategory suchcategorial intuitions regarding tothecategory ofa compositional stuff concept concept (as opposed withour of a functional This sort of intuition stuff). together thesort that water isa compositional stuff knowledge yields exactly ofintuitions The intuition about invoked essentialists. by scientific water inPutnam's twin-earth is just one ofinfinitely many example intuition aboutcompositional instances ofthefollowing categorial ofW at someplaceP weresamples stuffs W:Ifall andonly samples andthere werea placeP' just stuff ofa complex compositional UnV that ofa complex stuff likeP except there aresamples compositional that ofW at XYZ (* UnV) are macroscopically justlikethesamples ofXYZwould notbe samples ofW. Similarly, these P, then samples that lakes theKripkean intuition that, say,itismetaphysically possible ofthe notcontain water is one ofinfinitely instances should many stuffs W intuition aboutcompositional following general categorial L ofnatural Itismetaphysically fluid containers: andkinds possible
Limits ofScientific Essentialism / 341 Andthisgeneralizes. thatLs should notcontain W.28 Allourintuitions regarding the applicability ofnaturalistic concepts to hypothetical cases are determined in this way by ourcategory andcontent intuitions with ourknowledge together ofthe categories ofthenaturalistic items involved. Given that ourcategory andcontent intuitions havethestatus ofevidence, inso do theassociated tuitions abouttheapplicability ofnaturalistic concepts. Herethen is an explanation of the evidential statusof our pro-scientificessentialist intuitions. Butwhatabouttheold-fashioned anti-scientific-essentialist intuitions. According to natural rationalism, all ourintutions aboutthe ofnaturalistic to hypothetical applicability concepts casesaredetermined intheindicated and content intuitions waybyourcategory with ourknowledge ofthe ofthenaturalistic together items categories thekeyto theexplanation involved. Thisprovides ofwhy theantiintuitions scientific-essentialist are never reallyabout genuine The generalcategorial that metaphysical possibilities: principles would determine suchnaturalistic intuitions do nothold. intuiitively for theproposition that itismetaphysically Consider, example, possiblefor there tobe a puddle ofwater no hydrogen. This containing is an instance ofthefollowing general for categorial principle comstuffs W and U: Itis metaphysically positional for there to possible be sample ofW containing no U. But, this doesnothold. intuitively, thefollowing in(Onthecontrary, holds general categorial principle Itis metaphysically tuitively: possible for there tobe compositional stuffs W and U suchthat, necessarily, everysample ofW contains we haveno corresponding U.)Forthis reason, intuition naturalistic to theeffect itis metaphysically that for there possible tobe a puddleofwater no hydrogen. Thegeneral containing categorial princiwoulddetermine ple that this naturalistic intuition does intuitively nothold. ourold-fashioned anti-scientific-essentialist Consequently, intutition thatpossibly thereis a puddleof watercontaining no must be aboutthemere hydrogen rather than epistemic possibility a genuine metaphysical possibility. We havejust wedo not havean anti-scientificexplained why really essentialist intuition to theeffect it is metaphysically that possible for there tobe a puddle ofwater no hydrogen. Butitis containing that we do not alsotrue havethe counter-intuition either. That really is,whenwe suppress all auxilary beliefs that conempirical might = H20), taminate ourintuitions theempirical belief that water (e.g.,
342 / George Bealer we do not really havean intuition totheeffect itismetaphysically that impossible for there tobe a puddle ofwater containing nohydrogen. The explanation parallels that justgiven. The proposition at issue isan instance ofthefollowing categorial principle for compositional stuffs W andU: Itis metaphysically there impossible for tobe a samnoU. But, pleofW that contains intuitively, this categorial principle itis metaphysically does nothold. (Indeed, possible for there to be stuffs compositional W andU suchthat, possibly, there is a sample ofW that contains noU.)However, tohavethenaturalistic intuition that itis metaphysically possible for there tobe a puddle ofwater no hydrogen, this containing categorial about principle compositional stuffs wouldhavetobe intuitive. Becauseitis not, we do notreally have theassociated intuition naturalistic aboutwater. Thosewho claimto havethisnaturalistic intuition havejustfailed to suppress their orperhaps fully contaminating auxilary empirical beliefs; they are stillmisreporting their intuitions, say,by confusing epistemic with possibility metaphysical possibility. The upshot is thatwe do notreally have anyintuition one way or theother themetaphysical ofa puddle concerning of possibility water no hydrogen. Andthis containing toother generalizes issues ofmetaphysical likethis. Theonly intuitions we haveconpossibility natualistic items cerning genuine metaphysical possiblilites involving intheindicated are those determined andcontent waybycategory intuitions together withour knowledge of the categories of the naturalistic items. intuitions arelikethis, Although pro-scientific none oftheold-fashioned anti-scientific intuitions are. Incidentally, natural rationalism can be used in analogousways to explainall the inourintuitions, fascinating patterns insection uncovered contwo, and so forth.) cerning food, fuel, person, life, This, then, is a intuitive, andnon-ad economical, hoc wayofexthecut inourintuitions falls where itdoes.Natural plaining why right rationalism doesexactly what isneeded tosavescientific essentialism. Itprovides an epistomological account oftheevidential status ofthe that intuitions are usedto defend scientific and itexessentialism, the plains anti-scientific-essentialist intuitions weseem why other, that tohavecannot be intuitions about genuine metaphysical possibilities andso must be intuitions aboutmere epistemic possibilities. Accortheotherwise cutbetween that intuitions count dingly, mysterious as evidence andourother, regarding genuine metaphysical possibility intuitions about is notan aronly apparent metaphysical possibility
Limits ofScientific Essentialism / 343 bitrary orad hoc cutat all.Andthus we havefound a waytomake scientific essentialism epistemologically acceptable, a fully satisfactory explanationof the evidentialstatus of its supporting
intuitions.29
9. Platonism Is there no alternative to natural rationalism? Whataboutsome I willnowshowthat kind ofPlatonist epistemology? Platonists who at leastimplicitly acceptscientific essentialism must acceptnatural rationalism. Platonist theories oftheevidential status ofintuitions "direct theories and rule-ofcome in two varieties, perception" are suggested evidencetheories. Godel's (Bothvarieties by Kurt philosophical workon mathematical knowledge although Godel between seemednotto distinguish tothe"direct them.30) According perception" theory, intuitions are a kindof"direct perception" of thequesabstract truths: whennormal, intelligent peopleconsider tion a concept ofwhether applies toan elementary hypothetical case, in most that itapplies ifand only instances they just"see directly" misfires arethe ifittruly doesapply. (Of course, canoccur, butthey in the cognitive circumstances. As the result of somedeficiency the theidealinrelevant cognitive circumstances approach respects, is nothing ofan intuition buttheunmediated occurrence "seeing" IfthePlatonist "direct were ofan abstract truth.) perception" theory itwouldcertainly be necessarily that are true, true; is,ifintuitions a kindof"direct thennecessarily perception," theyare a kindof onthePlatonist "direct "direct perception." Accordingly, perception" intuitions havea strong modaltietothetruth. Nowsuppose theory, that a truth-based ofevidence is correct. theory (On a truth-based ifbeliefs a type ofbelief as evidence ofthat theory, qualifies type havea strong modaltietothetruth. Thereis great intuitive support for this sort oftheory, anditisa component ofanattractive explanation oftheempiricist that about one's tenet elementary propositions arebasicdata.) the"direct current experiences Then, given perception"theory, it wouldfollow thatintuitions have the statusof Inthis intandem with evidence. way"direct perception" Platonism, an explanation oftheevidena truth-based ofevidence, theory yields tialstatus ofintuitions. Theother isa rule-of-evidence Onthis ofPlatonism variety theory. there is a closeepistemological between theory analogy empirical
344 / George Bealer and philosophy): mathematics, science(logic, scienceand a priori ofoursense systematization oftheoretical is theresult theformer of systyematization thelatter, theresult oftheoretical perceptions; Inempirical propositions science allsense-perceptual ourintuitions. and theyremainso (ustified) are takenas primaface evident empirical ofone'sbestcomprehensive theformulation throughout ittooacquires thestatus of is formulated, Oncethis theory theory. The are illusory. Ofcourse, somesenseperceptions beingevident. propositions, will theassociated sense-perceptual besttheory identify status havebeenisolated, they losetheir andoncethese propositions a priori Platonism, torule-of-evidence According ofbeingevident. exceptthat theorizing to empirical is wholly analogous theorizing are taken Allintuitions playtheroleofsenseperceptions. intuitions the andthey remain so throughout as prima faceevident (ustified), is fortheory. Once thistheory formulation ofone's besta priori evident. some Ofcourse, ittooacquires thestatus ofbeing mulated, willidentify which theory One'sbest a priori aremistaken. intuitions lose their status they havebeenisolated, theseare,andonce they as beingevident. tointuitions a strong Platonism attributes perception" Now"direct itis able togivean exand becauseofthis, modaltieto thetruth, ofa truthofintuitions bymeans oftheevidential status planation a rule-ofa truth-based approach, basedtheory ofevidence. Unlike to describeour rulesof merely evidenceapproachis content ofas functioning rather these rules aretobe thought where evidence, trial. usedina courtroom liketherules ofevidence (Thisapproach on thequestion ofperceptual is thuslikethattakenbyChisholm ofinductive andbyStrawson on thequestion knowledge.) knowledge that can uncertaintypesof proposition Such rules identify our Specifically, be usedtojustify other propositions. problematically beliefs are evident and, rulesof evidencetellus thatperceptual ofa concept theapplicability that intutions concerning analogously, these Furthermore, cases are evident. to elementary hypothetical one arone'sperceptual beliefs, rulestellus that, bysystematizing tell theserules that is evident. Similarly, theory rivesat a physical at an a priori one arrives one'sintuitions, us that, bysystematizing thatis evident. or philosophical) mathematical, theory (logical, ofPlatonism. What I do notwish to challenge thesetwoversions to rationalism. I wishto do is to showtheir relationship that intuiLetus suppose I begin with Platonism. rule-of-evidence
Limits ofScientific Essentialism / 345 tions areprima facieevident. Someone might dogmatically declare that this tobe brute fact isinprinciple unexplainable. (Thedogmatic theprevious heldthis, causaltheorist from section too.)However, there would be a considerable gainintheorectical economy andexwe could planatory power if, using antecedent principles, derive the principle thatintuitions are primafacieevident. Ockham's razor deemsa theory other fewer superior if, things being equal,itposits than a competing principles theory. Thisisoneimportant advantage ofnatural Itrelieson a theory ofevidence rationalism. a (namely, that is supported ofintuitive truth-based theory) bya wealth data, this that isa strong andusing there modal tie theory plusthethesis between a person's intuitions andthe onecanthen derive ruletruth, of-evidence Platonism as a consequence. this thesis is not Moreover, itself a first principle. It is a consequence ofthenatural rationalist ofwhat itisfor topossess theory a person a concept determinately, a theory that ofintuitive data.What is also supported bya wealth of determinate wouldrule-of-evidence theory concept possession Platonists adoptina comprehensive theory? too Presumably, they wouldbe forced in thedirection ofthenatural rationalist answer, for their them to honor and to systematize thevery theory obliges intuitions that this Theconclusion is that natural rasupport theory. it tionalism doesnotcontradict rule-of-evidence Platonism; rather, is a simpler, more that rule-ofexplanatorily powerful theory yields Platonism evidence as a consequence. Other things being equal,such a theory shouldbe adoptedas superior. Indeed,thisconclusion followsby the verystandards advocatedby rule-of-evidence thatwe shouldadoptthe theory thatis the Platonists, namely, ofourintuitions. simplest comprehensive systematization Butthisis notall. We haveseenthat, ifscientific essentialism is there inourintuitions. itcomes must be a curious When justified, "cut" tothestandard we lackrealinanti-scientific-essentialist examples, onewayortheother tuitions about whether aremetaphysically they whenitcomes but tothestandard possible; pro-scientific-essentialist we do have real intuitions about whether examples, theyare isthecutjusthere? Intheir bestcommetaphysically possible. Why a priori what prehensive theory, explanation wouldbe adopted by rule-of-evidence Platonists whoarescientific essentialists? Aswe have theoriesmake this seen, purely causal (radical externalist) a complete Thesimplest is that phenomenon mystery. explanation provided by natural rationalism. (Or perhaps "direct perception"
346 / George Bealer of-evidence Platonists who are scientific have this essentialists decisivereasonforsupplementing their ratheory withnatural tionalism (orperhaps "direct perception" Platonism). Theconclusion is that rule-of-evidence Platonism doesnotprovide a serious alternative to natural rationalism. Bytheir very ownstandards, rule-ofevidencePlatonists are forced to accept natural rationalism (or perhaps "direct perception" Platonism). I have two So letus nowturn to "direct Platonism. perception" observations tomake. Thefirst thequestion concerns ofhowonthis theaforementioned theory "cut"in ourintuitions is tobe explained? Suppose that a person could(at leastinprinciple) have"direct ofalltypes ofmetaphysical perceptions" possibilities, induding those theapplicability ofnaturalistic concerning to hypothetical concepts in terms cases characterized ofnaturalistic concepts. Then, bythe inference route characterized at theoutset oftheprevious section, theperson could(atleastinprinciple) knowabsolutely a priori that essenwater = H20, thereby scientific necessarily contradicting tialism. Thus, like unrestricted rationalism, unrestricted "direct Platonism is inconsistent with essentialism. perception" scientific Short ofgiving theonlyplausible up scientific essentialism, way for tosolvethis "direct Platonists wouldbe to perception" problem thenatural mimic rationalist solution. Accordingly, they would hold thata personcannothave "direct perceptions" of all typesof but onlyof thosethatconcern metaphysical possibilities the apofcategory and content to hypothetical plicability cases concepts interms characertized ofcategory andcontent exclusively concepts. However, likenatural rationalism, this circumscribed "direct perception" theautonomy Platonism implies ofphilosophy thesis. Allthat is needed toshowthis is thepremise, will which be discussed below, that (most of)thecentral questions ofphilosophy are formulated in terms ofcategory andcontent Theconclusion isthat concepts. "direct Platonism no hopefor perception" provides essenglobal scientific tialists; on this Platonist theory, localscientific essentialism implies theautonomy ofphilosophy. observation Mysecond about"direct Platonism conperception" cerns thequestion ofhowonthis errors inintuition arepossitheory ble. Fortheanswer letus turn to theanalogy Platonists drawbetweensense perception and intuition. Whatmakesan erroneous senseperceptual belief theperceived itself could possible? First, object
Platonism; see below.)Therefore, by theirveryown standards rule-
ofScientific Essentialism / 347 Limits itmight be a fake ora cleverly be somehow defective (for example, ofthesort). Second, there constructed physical illusion orsomething in theobservation conditions. Third, there couldbe an aberration intheperson's senseorgans. Fourth, thepercouldbe an aberration of a undertheinfluence son'sperceptual belief couldbe formed falseopinion or desire. Nowifno such strongly countersuggestive woulderrors in perceptual belief problematic factor werepresent, theanswer be metaphysically Intuitively, is yes.For inpossible? ofthephysical signal tuitively thelawsgoverning thetransmission could, as a metaphysical possibilfrom theobject tothesenseorgans infact from whatthey are. (My argument doesnot ity, be different it is heuristically in setting useful dependon this claim.However, between and Platonist ordinary senseperception up thecontrast "direct perception.") inone'sintuitions on"direct Letusnowsee howerrors arepossible we areinterested intheapplicabiliPlatonism. perception" Suppose or content to a hypothetical case concept tyofa givencategory interms ofcategory andcontent concepts. characterized exclusively that relevant tothecase are explicitly First, suppose all distinctions butcentral, clear-cut, marked and thatthecase is notborderline totheaboveconcondition is analogous andvivid. Thisdistinctness notbe defective dition thattheobjectofsenseperception should that atinanyway.Second, theperson givesthecase full suppose inthecase.This allofthedistinctions marked tention, noting clearly that in to thecondition is moreor lessanalogous clarity condition theobservation conditions should be good.Third, sense-perception that theperson hasample intelligence. So,for example, the suppose theperson fails to"get" theBarber situation is notlikeoneinwhich with a person can tellstraight off that Paradox: ampleintelligence, a barberwho shaves all and only people who do not shave Thisintelligence themselves is notmetaphysically possible. condiinsenseperception orlessanalogous that is more tothecondition tion a person's should senseorgans be well-functioning. Fourth, supall relevant philosophical pose thatour personhas gonethrough and supofhisintuitions, dialectic and theoretical systematization theprocess condiall oftheother cognitive pose thatthroughout have been metand that tions(distinctness, clarity, intelligence) therehas been neither memory lapse nordistracting throughout more orlessthesameroleas thecondidesire. Thiscondition plays should be no countersuggestive insenseperception there tionthat
348 / George Bealer If andtheoretical systematization ofone's dialectic beliefs ordesires. the idealconditions, in suchcognitively intuitions wereconducted resulting from distorting intuitions effect wouldbe thatimpure (doxa) would be idenorother mere opinions philosophical "pictures" tified and discharged. conditions aremet, isitmetaphysically possiIfallthese cognitive concouldbe inerror ble that at theendoftheprocess theperson hisintuition about theapplication andlogical manipulation cerning and concategory ofcategory and content concepts visa visother case, errorstillseemed In the sense perception tentconcepts? metaphysically possible becauseitseemed metaphysically possible causation ofthesense that therelevant lawsgoverning theexternal Butin thecase ofintuition experience couldhavebeen different. from ofthesignal ofthetransmission there simply is no counterpart ofthecontingency theobjectto thesenseorgans. So thequestion are no oftheassociated causallawscannot comeup:there simply If"direct perception" suchlaws at workin thecase ofintuition. medium. Indeed, thewhole there is no "external" Platonism isright, In of"direct Platonism is that intuition is direct. point perception" "internal" idealcircumstances all potential deficiencies cognitively insuch itisimpossible notto"seedirectareremoved; circumstances andcontent conrelations among category necessary ly"therelevant are is whatthe"direct Platonists Orat leastthis perception" cepts. error-free Butthiscapacity fornecessarily committed to holding. isjust a strong incognitively idealcircumstances "direct perception" rationalism. form ofthekind ofcognitive bynatural capacity posited implies isthat Platonism "direct perception" The upshot, therefore, on whether thetruth ofnatural rationalism. (Weneedtakenostand theconverse holds.) implication that rationalism a genuine tonatural So inourquest for alternative we have come can also servetheneedsofscientific essentialism, rais that(someform Ouroverall conclusion of)natural up short. Itprovides for an adequate scientific essentialism. tionalism isneeded status oftheevidential theonly account satisfactory epistomological and essentialism that are usedto defend scientific oftheintuitions betofthe otherwise "cut" theonly mysterious explanation plausible andourother, intuitions apparent weenourpro-scientific-essentialist ratheaid ofnatural intuitions. anti-scientific-essentialist Onlywith essentialism be made epistemologically tionalism can scientific acceptable.
Limits ofScientific Essentialism / 349 10. The Determinateness ofOurNaturalistic Concepts Although natural rationalism theproblem solves oftheevidential ofpro-scientific status intuitions, there is still thequestion ofwhat isrequired topossess a naturalistic concept determinately. After all, twoproblems confront scientific essentialism-the evidential status ofourintuitions andthedeterminate possession ofournaturalistic Natural concepts. rationalism and the accompanying truth-based theory ofevidence provides theonly satisfactory solution tothefirst problem. This theory incorporates a circumscribed rationalist account ofthedeterminate ofourcategory possession andcontent concepts anda moderate causalaccount ofthedeterminate ofour possession naturalistic concepts. Butwhatarethedetails ofthis causaltheory? My thesisis thatcausal theories are unsatisfactory unlesssupplemented with thetheory that our thought andtalk about naturalistic items ismediated bya background ofappropriate category andcontent for concepts thecircumscribed which rationalist theory ofdeterIfthis thesis can be defended, thenatural minateness holds.31 rationalist solutions to thetwoproblems facing scientific essentialism willmesh perfectly. Theperfectness ofthefit will be thefinal confirmation that scientific essentialism on natural depends rationalism. I havesaidthat a satisfactory causaltheory must be supplemented with thetheory that ourthought and talkaboutnaturalistic items ismediated bybackground andcontent category for which concepts a rationalist ofdeterminateness In thesequelto this theory holds. is planned essay, which for thesecondvolume ofthis I will series, givetheargument forthisthesis in detail. Butit is possible to indicate someparts oftheargument here. As we haveseen,there are twoversions ofthecausaltheory-the radical, purely causalversion andthemoderate, natural rationalist version. Ontheradical version, a person hasa concept ofa naturalistic item iftheperson issuitably situated withrespectto the item;the personneed not employ andcontent mediating category concepts. Onthemoderate version, theperson notonly be suitably must with situated totheitem respect butalso must employ andcontent mediating category concepts (or logicalcombinations ofcategory and content concepts). Ourarguisdesigned ment toshow that the natural rationalist moderate, theory is acceptable buttheradical theory is not. The problem with theradical is underdetermination: "extheory ternal" features ofthesituation fixtheobjectofa do notuniquely
Bealer 350 / George andpointing, inthe person's thought. Forexample, merely looking, for thinking of water, direction ofa quantity ofwater doesnotsuffice stuff. The object ifthere isone,could thecompositional ofthought, monoxide, just as well be H20-with-exactly-those-impurities, hydrogen compound, and dihydrogen compound, oxygen compound, various functional stuffs so forth. Besides these compositional stuffs, drink, washing liquid, might be theobject ofthought, for example, andso forth. Andvarious institutional stuffs might be the solvent, Drink for sacredwater or National (if objectofthought, example, Drink of a certain werechanged from, say, the National country general stuff notionswhisky towater during Prohibition). Orvery functional stuff, liquid, orevenmatcompound, compositional stuff, teritself. theobject ofthought notevenbe a stuff at Finally, might ofwater or someindividual all; itcouldbe theparticular quantity that is constituted ofwater(e.g.,a parsubstance by that quantity ticular kindto which thatindividual substance lake)or a natural thequantity ofwater is (i.e., belongs (e.g., lake)or theplacewhere I claim a determinate that theonly ofthought object there). waythat is byemploying relevant and concan be fixed mediating category tentconcepts. is there? Whatalternative After settle thequestion. Merely uttering the word 'water' doesnot couldbe a fluent oftwolanguages, English all,theperson speaker English (in which (in which 'water'refers to H20) and twin-Earth toXYZ).Istheperson ofH20 orofXYZ?The thinking 'water' refers theterm this utters case is underdetermined. When speaker bilingual than ofwater rather 'water', what determines whether heisthinking is determined to refer to water. XYZ?Perhaps this by hisintention intention as opposedto Butwhatdetermines whether he has this to refer totheother stuff? this is determined theintention Perhaps to speakEnglish rather thantwin-Earth If English. by hisintention theanswer in having this intention? is Surely so, whatis involved andcontent that he must be employing relevant concepts. category ofthis wouldata broadly Gricean intention Forexample, analysis to the persona richarrayof philosophically tribute important ofintenandcontent theconcepts category concepts-for example, andso forth. (Of ding, thinking, wanting, perceiving, cause,reason, neednot theparadox ofanalysis showsus that theperson course, have an articulated awareness ofusing theseconcepts.) conscious wouldholdeven ifourperson is a monolThe sameconclusion 'water' would notguarantee ingual English speaker. Merely uttering
/ 351 Essentialism ofScientific Limits Theperson ofwater. isthinking speaker English that a monolingual mouthing be just he might instead, attention; notbe paying might off intospace. wordsand staring further What havemadea slipofthetongue. might Ortheperson to whatone is dotopayattention inorder be met must conditions be met must conditions further a language? What speaking ingwhile Thesementheterm'water'? byuttering torefer to intend inorder be must The person vacuum. occurin a cognitive tal acts cannot Anyplausible and content concepts. category relevant employing analysis) Gricean anybroadly (for example, intention ofthis analysis and content ofcategory array a rich tothespeaker would attribute concepts. in looking (andevenpointing) Merely another example. Consider of for thinking does notsuffice oftheshipofTheseus thedirection ofthewood.Whatis the be thinking instead theship.You might theexternal environment; Itdoesnotlieintheexternal difference? oftheshipor youare thinking is thesamewhether environment andconcategory lieinthemediating must thewood.Thedifference you are employing. tentconcepts tothink that, concede might externalists radical Nowsophisticated conandcontent category mediating employ ofthewood, youmust no such oftheship, to think also holdthat, cepts.Buttheymight isthe metaphysicalthe ship because arerequired concepts mediating This mostsalient)item in the context. ly basic (or otherwise to menI havetime ofdefects. hasa wealth response sophisticated tiononlyone. oftheship(including youarethinking Consider anycase inwhich category anymediating not employing oneinwhich youareallegedly similar Therecouldalwaysbe an externally or content concepts). and in which ofthewoodinstead youare thinking case in which more is neither concepts andcontent category useofmediating your than itis inthecase toyouphenomenologically norlessinevidence youareusing allegedly ofthe ship(where inwhich youarethinking (i.e., claim externalist it.Thesophisticated Just try nosuchconcepts). and category the useofmediating ofthewoodrequires that thinking does not oftheshipdoesnot)simply butthinking content concepts forin each case, theuse of reality, thephenomenological match is equallyin evidence and content concepts category mediating But intheother. intheone case than no more phenomenologically, toagree beenforced havealready externalists radical sophisticated
352 / George Bealer concepts must be usedinthinkthat mediating category andcontent thefaithful-and theoretically uniformingofthewood.Therefore, in reality is to say that wayto characterize thephenomenological bothcases(thinking oftheshipand thinking ofthewood)youare and content concepts. employing relevant category conscious awareness Ofcourse, typically youhaveno articulated, using ofemploying suchcategory andcontent concepts. However, ofdowithout an articulated, conscious awareness concepts having exwidespread phenomenon which radical ingso is an extremely ternalists must countenancefor independent reasons. (This extotheparadox ofanalysis, for phenomenon has closeaffinities The Foranother consider theduck/rabbit example. ample. analogy, whether situation is thesameexternally yousee a duckora rabbit; at thedifference seeing a duckandseeing a rabbit is tied, between in thewayyouconceptualize to differences thesitualeastinpart, tion.Of course,you need not have any articulated, conscious awareness Butthishardly showsthat anyconcepts. ofemploying there concepts. You must be. Otherwise, you are not employing ofthedifference seebetween would be nosatisfactory explanation ofcharacterizing the a rabbit.) So ourmethod inga duckandseeing no specialtheoretical that apparatus ship/wood example requires externalists themselves. would not be needed Thus, byradical already is justas simple as thesophisticated radical externalist ourmethod Atthesametime, more uniform istheoretically method. ourmethod externalist method inasmuch as itdoes than thesophisticated radical that a fundamentally different mechanism isatwork nothypothesize inthinking ofthewood. inthinking than theoneat work oftheship externalist ourmethod Andunlike thesophisticated radical method, as theuse faithful tothephenomenological inasmuch is fully reality isequallyin evidence andcontent ofmediating concepts category inthecase ofthinking oftheshipas itis inthe phenomenologically these ofthewood.(I should case ofthinking emphasize againthat lines of oneofmany considerations provide only phenomenological radicalexternalism.) argument against sophisticated with a question. Howon ourmoderate theory Butnowwe areleft andconofourmediating can thedeterminate category possession tentconcepts be explained? If,as in thecase of thedeterminate thedeterto explain we tried of naturalistic concepts, possession ofa moderate causal ofthese minate concepts bymeans possession the in a vicious we wouldgetcaught explanatory regress: theory,
ofScientific / 353 Linmits Essentialism ofmediating concepts determinate possession category andcontent category would require thedeterminate possession ofother mediating and content andso onad infinitum. We thus wouldhave concepts, ofthedeterminate failed to givea satisfactory possesexplanation theoriginal orthe sionofanyofthese concepts, naturalistic concept andcontent Forthis there is associated category concepts. reason, no reasonable alternative buttoexplain thedeterminate possession and content ofanother ofthecategory theory. concepts bymeans isnoneexcept thecircumscribed ofdeterButthere rationalist theory innatural that is incorporated This is exactminateness rationalism. ly whatwe set outto show. Animportant ofclarification isnowinorder. If scientific essenpoint iftherecent tialism isright ofindividualism (and, relatedly, critique a person in philosophy ofmind is right), couldbe deeply ignorant a givennaturalistic about whether conceptapplies to relevant andnevertheless theperson could havenumerous hypothetical cases, theconcept. Forexample, a person couldbe wholbeliefs involving itis metaphysically for there lyinthedark aboutwhether possible ofwater no hydrogen, andyettheperson tobe a puddle containing for that water couldhavecountless beliefs aboutwater, example, andso forth. a peris wet, clear, potable, thirst-quenching, Similarly, sonwhoisdeeply what arthritis iscould nevertheless ignorant about he hasarthritis in his havebeliefs aboutarthritis, for example, that ownthigh. is whatwe would conver(Atleastthis say ineveryday a person's sations about beliefs. Similar casesexplored intheliterature example, includePutnam's beech/elm example,Fodor'sbriscut exKripke's Londres/London example, and the Castaneda-Perry ina somewhat that waya peramples.) Notice, however, analogous orcontent soncould be deeply about a given conignorant category seemto havevarious about it.Forexbeliefs ceptandnevertheless ample,having overheard philosophers talking aboutAristotelian are primary substances, someone might say,"I think that substances stuffs." Atleastineveryday wewould basis conversation, sayon this thattheperson does believethatsubstances are stuffs. Or having overheard artists aboutuncommon a person might talking colors, that is a shadeofyellow." Atleastineveryday mauve say,"I think conversation we wouldsay on thebasis of thisthatthe person this believesthat mauveis a shadeofyellow. Let us supposethat about beliefs isliterally correct. wayoftalking (Wemaycallbeliefs
In thisterminology, a person like these cognitivecommitments.32
354 / George Bealer can be cognitively committed to a proposition whilebeing deeply ignorant aboutessential properties andrelations oftheconcepts involved, including evencategory and content concepts.) The above examples show that there isa modeofpossessing category andcontent concepts that doesnot require the person tohavetheassociated cognitive capacity required bynatural rationalism (i.e.,thecapacity in cognitively idealcircumstances to correctly applyand logically theconcept manipulate visa vis other category and content conInfact, ofpossessing cepts). this mode category andcontent concepts isexactly inwhich like that all naturalistic conecepts must be possessButthis fact ed,themodeexplained byourmoderate causaltheory. with is entirely consistent natural rationalism. Indeed, themain point ofnatural rationalism is that modeinwhich there must be another andcontent not category concepts (but naturalistic concepts) canbe themodeexplained rapossessed, namely, by thecircumscribed tionalist model. Heredeterminate possession ofa concept consists ina cognitive capacity, namely, thecapacity incognitively idealcircumstances to correctly cases applytheconceptto hypothetical intenns ofother andcontent concharacterized exclusively category andtocorrectly theconcept with cepts manipulate logically respect to other category and content concepts.33 Thedeterminate ofnoconcept-whether a naturalistic possession a category ora content everbe exconcept, concept, concept-can plained justby "external" causalmechanisms. Causalfactors must be accompanied andconbytheemployment ofrelevant category tent concepts whose determinate possession is explained instead by thecircumscribed theemployment of rationalist model. Forwithout andcontent would suchbackground category concepts, ourthought of be undetermined, and unless thedeterminate always possession thesecategory and content concepts wereexplained by the circumscribed rationalist there would be a vicious theory, explanatory if thepossession regress. Furthermore, ofrelevant category andcontent inthis there would concepts couldnot be explained fashion, be no wayto explain status intuitions theevidential ofournaturalistic ourpro-scientific-essentialist (including intuitions). For,as we have ofthese intuitions onthat ofrelestatus seen,theevidential depends andtheevidential status ofthe vantcategory andcontent intuitions, tietothe which latter from their modal intuitions derives strong truth, rationalist can be insured onlyby thecircumscribed theory. Thisis exactly what we setoutto show.Bothin theexplanation
Limits ofScientific Essentialism / 355 oftheevidential status ofpro-scientific essentialist intuitions and in theexplanation ofthedeterminateness ofournaturalistic concepts, thecircumscribed rationalist theory ofthedeterminateness for our category andcontent concepts seems tobe unavoidable. This perfectnessoffit-that thesame theory seemstobe unavoidable inboth thefinal confirmation explanations-is ofthetheory. 11. TheAutonomy ofPhilosophy Fromtherationalist theory ofdeterminateness forourcategory and content the thesisof the autonomy concepts, however, of philosophy follows directly. Allthat is required is thepremise that (most of)the central questions ofphilosophy areformulated interms ofcategory andcontent Thefull for this concepts. argument premise mustbe deferred to the projected of book on the autonomy philosophy. However, I can makea fewsuggestive to inremarks dicatethedirection oftheargument. Thenatural rationalist oftheevidential status ofproexplanation scientific-essentialist intuitions ofwhy (andtheassociated explanation we lack genuine anti-scientific-essentialist two intuitions) provides kinds of"transcendental" test-onefor and one category concepts for ofthenatural rationalist excontent concepts. One component planation makes use ofgeneral that determine categorial principles another naturalistic (orfailto determine) corresponding intuitions; component makes useofthedistinction between epistemic possibility and metaphysical The former a possibility. component provides "transcendental" testforcategory thelatter concepts; component one forcontent provides concepts. thesystem that would be Consider ofgeneral categorial principles invokedin the best natural rationalist of our proexplanation A catalogue ofcategory can scientific-essentialist intuitions. concepts be extracted from this ofgeneral Our system categorial principles. thesis is that thecategory usedinformulating concepts (most of)the ofphilosophy central will tothis questions belong catalogue. Strong for is already at hand.Byconstructing ourbest this thesis support we ofthepro-scientific-essentialist provisional explanation intuitions, we can extract a provisional When ofcategory catalogue concepts. do this, we already find listofphilosophically an impressive important category concepts: matter, composition, function, purpose, cause, Ifwe press ahead andso forth. sensible quality, living being, person,
356 / George Bealer with this method, I believethat (nearly) every philosophically important category concept willeventually be addedtoourcatalogue. Theexplanation ofourapparent anti-scientific-essentialist intuitions depends on the distinction betweenepistemic possibility and metaphysical possibility. Butwhatis epistemic possibility? The explication ofthis notion turns on thenotion ofqualitatively identical epistemic situation. Epistemic situations are qualitatively thesame ifthey only involve thesamecontent concepts (phenomenal qualities andconscious operations ofmind). So as wesort through thediverse that must be invoked epistemic possibilities toexplain awayourapparent anti-scientific-essentialist intuitions, wewill obtain a catalogue ofcontent Evena provisional concepts. catalogue already contains an impressive ofphilosophically list important content concepts: senandso sing, feeling, loving, knowing, acquaintance, consciousness, forth. Anotherstyle of "transcendental" argumentexploits the ofscientific dependence essentialism onourmoderate causalexplanationofthedeterminateness ofournaturalistic concepts. To explain howa person can determinately possessa specific naturalistic conone must invoke further whosedeterminate cept, concepts possessionmust rationalist model. These be explained bythecircumscribed are category and content if further concepts concepts. Therefore, is ofthis itmaybe addedto our we can showthat a concept type, ofcategory andcontent alternate catalogue concepts. Bythis route, we might confirmabe abletogetadditional "transcendental" then, in a number ofphilosophically tionthat important concepts belong our catalogue. we can,I think, these three "transcendental" Bypursuing strategies, theconcepts of)thecentral showthat usedinformulating (most questions ofphilosophy arecategory andcontent concepts. Wehaveseen that is committed toa limited rationalist localscientific essentialism Butthis raofthedeterminate ofthese theory possession concepts. ifa proposition tionalist theory implies that, involving exclusively canbe known tobe necessary, then andcontent category concepts a priori, without inprinciple itcanbe known tonecessary absolutely essentialism theaidofempirical scientific science. Therefore, global theautonomy of essentialism is untenable. Local scientific implies philosophy.
Limitsof Scientific / 357 Essentialism Notes 1. Thispaperis a revised and expanded transcription from tapesofthe talkI gave at thespring 1986 Greensboro Conference on Identity and Existence. I alsospokeon this material that at Dartmouth spring CollegeandCUNY Graduate Center. Thisiswork inprogress. A sequelon theproblem ofthedeterminateness ofourconcepts the isplanned for nextvolume of thisseries. And a bookon thegeneral topicof the philosophical limits ofscience is nowunderway. Mywarmest thanks toMark Bedau, Tyler Peter vanInwagen, Burge, Jerrold J.Katz, George Myro, C.D.C.Reeve,SteveRieber, DavidRosenthal, Nathan Salmon, Ernest Adam andJames Sosa,NeilThomason, Tomberlin. Thompson, 2. Wallace I. Matson, "Against Induction andEmpiricism," Poceedings of the Aristotelian Society, SaulKripke, 1962, 143-158. Namingand Necessi1980(originally ty, Cambridge, Mass., andNecessipublished as "Naming inSemantics of ty," Natural D. Davidson andG.Harman, Language, eds., Dordrecht, 1972). HilaryPutnam, "The Meaningof 'Meaning'," II:AMind, Philosophical andReality, Papers 215-271 Cambridge, Language, inMinnesota (originally in thePhilosophy published Studies ofScience VII:Language, andKnowledge, K. Gunderson, Mind, ed.,Minneapolis, 1975). 3. SaulKripke states that theses likethemodified Kantian "involve thesis theobscure notion ofthepossibility ofa priori knowledge, butto the extent that thenotion is clarified byrestricting ittoa priori knowledge ofa standard I argue human sort, against inthetext." [such theses] (P. 159f., andNecessity) Naming However, andNecessity Naming attempts toclarify thenotions ofpossibility andofa priori Ifitissucknowledge. thenotion cessful, ofthepossibility ofa priori be knowledge cannot for itis bydefinition obscure, a priori simply that is possiknowledge ble.AsI read Naming andNecessity, itsprimary thesis isjust thedenial ofthemodified Kantian Thatis,itsprimary thesis. is that thesis there = H20-thatitis impossiare somenecessary that water truths-e.g., ble fora person to knowa priori to be necessary. The restriction to human no roleinthethesis beings plays ifitdid, orin thearguments; a goodbitofthephilosophical interest would be lost.So whenKripke ofthestandard speaksofknowledge human he probably sort, intends torule outknowledge obtainable byan infinite (versus finite) intelligence or by whatKantcalls"original intution" (B72,B138-139, B145). 4. Thisthesis is (pretty tothefollowing: much) equivalent for (most of)the central truths ofphilosophy, ifitis possible to know them to be true, itis possible to know to be true them a priori. A "proof" absolutely of this isthis. For(most) (near) central equivalence philosophical propositions a priori that thefollowing p, we know principle holds: p is true ifandonly ifp isnecessary. Accordingly, itis possible toknow a priori that if andonly if itispossible p istrue toknowa priori that pisnecessary. itis possible to know that ifandonly Similarly, ifitis possible p is true to know that From p is necessary. these twobiconditionals, the(near) follows equivalence directly.
358 / George Bealer and Necessity. p. 104,Naming 141-4, 150-3, especially 5. Pp. 103-5, for a mutton is notquite stewhasingredients this accurate, 6. Ofcourse, they do notin count as foodeventhough that (e.g.,piecesofturnip) ofinaccuracy of)mutton stew.Thiskind count as (quantities isolation supForexample, slightly. theexample bymodifying can be avoided is chocolate. Ifourspace atsometime theonly food on Earth posethat should they Earth, plainly rather than chocolate ontwin cadets find carob itismicroscopically (andmacroscopically) itas food eventhough count perfume. example, consider Foranother Why? different from chocolate. ofP,..pn. is composed all andonlyperfume hereon Earth Suppose they Nevertheless, do nothavethosechemicals. On twin they Earth, smell very nice;indeed, ofMl.Mm. Thesestuffs havestuffs composed from idistinguishable let us supposethattheyare observationally for andwrists these totheir necks stuffs Earthlings apply P1.Pn. Twin brought aresubsequently Infact, these stuffs of nice. smelling thepurpose when ourspace Certainly tobe usedfor thesamepurpose. backtoEarth incounontwin were correct these stuffs Earth, they cadets discovered are(nonfraudently) marketed Later stuffs on,these them as perfume. ting their chemical that be given backon EarthHowcan this as perfumes from constitution differs Pl,...,Pn, we neednotventure a precise oftheconcepts analysis 7. Atthis stage, ofanalysis stuff. As theparadox ofcompositional stuff andfunctional notthebeginning, is called for attheend, analysis us,a precise teaches thefollowing principles provisional ofan analytical However, inquiry. composia stuff is purely purposes: be illuminating for heuristic might ofitall havethesamecomsamples ifand only if, necessarily, tional of ifandonly for family iscompositonal somefixed if, a stuff position; stuff eachsample ofthe original necessarily, stuffs, compositional purely Ininthat fixed family. stuffs ofsomepurely compositonal iscomposed arenotlike functional stuffs) functional stuffs (oratleastmost tuitively, A functional stuff are defined function. this. Functional stuffs bytheir of samples ofthevarious thecomposition something; is essentially for arefortheright a functional makes no difference as longas they stuff thing. water andXYZare drink stuff. Both 8. Ofcourse, likefood, is a functional of drink. kinds oflearning that a given truth isnecessary 9. 1amsuppressing thepossibility ofan authority. Thepoint isthat ultimateonthebasisofthe testimony empirical authority, must go beyond youor theoriginal lysomeone, Inanyevent, evidence inorder tolearn that a given truth is necessary. evidence tojustify do infact scientific essentialists empirical go beyond andwithout themodal make liberal useintuitions as evidence, They step. ofthemodal step. this useofintuitions would havenojustification they 10. P. 42,Naming and Necessity. possible 11. Onetype that ofa (metaphysically) ofhypothetical case isjust situapossible characterized (metaphysically) case,that is,a concretely ingiving a counterexample toa cantion ofthesort one might invoke for didate cases-thatitwas possible definition. Kripke's hypothetical
/ 359 Essentialism The PhilosophicalLimitsof Scientific ofcase. ofthis type etc.-areexamples Alexander, nottoteach Aristotle bymeans inlanguage case is expressed type ofhypothetical Another ifsuchand suchwerethecase,thenso conditional: ofa subjunctive twin-Earth situation. Putnam's be alsobe thecase inthat andso would case. ofthistypeofhypothetical case is an example ifitdenotes thesameitem designator a rigid is,bydefinition, 12. A term exists. theitem in which world" "possible in every andPreciseness," ofInterpretation a Theory "Toward Naess, 13. See Arne ed.,Urbana, L. Linsky, ofLanguage, and thePhilosophy inSemantics 1952,248-269. as thelinguistic be viewed may thus definition sucha stipulative 14. Giving (onthetraditional concept descriptive a complex offorming counterpart wouldbe in a ofideas);in each case theperson oftheoirgin theory an associated analytic proposition. a priori to know position should ofdeterminateness a theory what about precise 15. Letmebe more which know kbut we do not concept a person hassome do.Suppose that k might be (Forexample, itis.Letc be somefamiliar concept. concept andc might which we justdiscussed, a multigon, theconcept ofbeing ofbeing or theconcept ofbeing a closedplanefigure be theconcept for is required What sides.) with morethanfour a closedplanefigure ofdeterfamiliar c?A theory concept k istobe this theperson's concept theperson's concept this question: to answer minateness is designed if.... Itis understood that only c ifand/or k is identical totheconcept k and theperson's concept hand sidedoesnottrivially identify theright ina noncirsidespecifies, theright hand thefamiliar concept c; rather, aresufthat andthecircumstances features oftheperson cular fashion, k to be thefamiliar concept for theperson's necessary and/or ficient c. concept we often seek identity In metaphysics willbe helpful. An analogy criteria for for example, for items ofa given ontological type, criteria a physical object doesittakefor What theidentity ofphysical objects. should tell criteria s' Ouridentity s tobe somefamiliar object physical if.... Itis understood that theright s' ifand/or only us:s is identical-to hand theright s and s'; rather, identify handside does nottrivially aresuffeatures ofs ands' that ina noncircular fashion, sidespecifies, hand theright for s to be s'. (Forexample, necessary ficient and/or of ofs'.) A theory that s be theclosest-continuer sidemight specifiy itis answering a questhat is quiteanalogous except determinateness thanmetaphysics. rather tionin epistemology is correct that someother theory, ourargument Incidentally, suppose thedeterminate toexplain possesthecausaltheory, is needed besides Thenwe andcontent concepts. sionof(atleastsomeof)ourcategory anti-individualism, an argument radical against will alsohaveproduced andcontent concepts) evencategory that no concepts (not thedoctrine are "inthehead." x = x' inthis derivation ofthe necessity 'x = x' to'Necessarily 16. To gofrom rule tothe thenecessitation weneedtoapply open-sentence ofidenticals, onModal Kripke Considerations Logic," 'x = x'. However, in"Semantical
360 / George Bealer restricts application ofthe necessitation rule toclosed sentences inorder to blockthederivation oftheconverse oftheBarcanformula. Those advocating theindicated derivation ofthenecessity ofidenticals from Leibniz's law needto patchup thisdetail. 17. George Myro, "Identity andTime," inPhilosophical Grounds ofRationality: Intentions, Categories, Ends, R.E.Grandy andR. Warner, eds.,Oxford, 1986,383-409. 18. Thistheme is mentioned in "Identity by Myro andTime," p. 408 n. 19. Quineholds that there are no purely behavioral tests for synonymy or a widely analytic equivalence. Consider believed, contingently true iden= theteacher tity sentence (e.g.,'Aristotle ofAlexander', 'Gold= the metal usedfor international stablizing currencies') or a widely believed, contingently true biconditional (e.g.,'Allandonlyaqueousitems arecomposed ofthecompound predominantly that fills therivers and lakes'). Relative toextensional the relevant contexts, linguistic behavior inconnection with these will inconexpressions resemble that observed nection with genuine synonyms or genuine analytic equivalents. For this reason, thenonsynonymy ornonanalytic-equivalence oftheexpressionswillbe reliably revealed onlyby examining speechbehavior relative to appropriate intensional contexts, specifically, modaland counterfactual contexts. Butwhyrelyon this speech behavior? What reasonis there to think that ordinary speakers (scientific essentialists, forexample) are usingtheir wordstruly in thesespecialcontexts? Knowledge ofthesemantics ofthelanguage (e.g.,that 'A' meansthat 'A' is true A and that in thelanguage ifand onlyifwhat 'A' meansis is notenough to guarantee thatthewords willbe applied true) truly inmodal andcounterfactual that contexts. Thereason for thinking they willbe is that their is basedon underlying application judgments (e.g., itwas possible thejudgment that for Aristotle notto teach Alexander, areintuitive. a person's Butwhy trust intuitive We etc.)that judgments? havenowcomefull circle. Thebehavioral masks an strategy merely relianceon the intuitions of speakersregarding implicit relevant metaphysical possibilities. The paradoxof analysis the problem of usingpurely compounds behavioral tests for or analytical Consider exsynonymy equivalence. whose oranalytical ishighly nontrivial. pressions synonymy equivalence inconRelative toextensional therelevant behavior contexts, linguistic inconnecnection with these willresemble that observed expressions tion with andnonanalytic-equivalents. Thesynonymy or nonsynonyms oftheexpressions canbe uncovered analytical equivalence only byexthemodal intensional amining usageinappropriate contexts, specifically, inhigh andcounterfactual contexts that would arise quality philosophical Butwhy trust that these dialectic. ordinary speakers apply expressions in these contexts? Answer: their behavior is basedon truly linguistic their about thehypothetical But intuitive casesinvolved. judgments why trust their intuitions? We are backto ouroriginal question. itisinpart semantical 20. Alternatively, basedonour intensional knowledge 'Itwas possible Aristotle notto teach that in ournative for language
/ 361 Limitsof Scientific Essentialism

Alexander'means thatit was possibleforAristotle not to teach Alexina language anderand oursemantical knowledge thata sentence is true if and only if what it means is true. These two bits of semantical derivedsemanticalknowledge:in our knowledgeyieldthe following native language 'It was possibleforAristotle not to teach Alexander' is true ifand only ifit is truethatit was possible forAristotle not to teach Alexander.But how do we go from knowledgeof thisbiconditionalto knowledgeof itslefthand side? Presumably our by invoking antecedent oftheright handside,thatis,our extralinguistic knowledge not to teach knowledgethatit is truethatit was possibleforAristotle Alexander. But on what is thisantecedentextralinguistic knowledge run-around based? This is where we started. The empiricallinguistic adds nothing. 21. In thisparagraphthe definite descriptions 'H20' and 'the compound ions and one oxygenion' moleculesofwhichconsistof two hydrogen are understood as havingnarrowscope. This is the onlyreadingthat would make scientific essentialism the concluinteresting; otherwise, to asserting the necessaryidentity ofx to sion would amountsimply x. The scientifically interesting conclusion is one thatmakesa substanand to getthesubstantive tiveassertion, conclusion one mustinterpret the definite as havingnarrowscope. descriptions 22. The moderate classical empiricist analogueofthisthesis is that, necessariof a sensibleconly,mostof a person'sbeliefsabout the applicability cept (i.e., a conceptof a sensiblequality)or a reflective concept (i.e., a conceptof an "innerfeeling'or of a consciousoperaionof mind)to actual cases of the person'scurrent experiencesare true. examTo feeltheintuitive pullofthistheory, considerthefollowing attentive ple. Suppose thata normal, personhas a certain conceptthat he dubs chromaticity. Let c be the conceptof beinga color otherthan black,white, or gray,and let c' be the conceptof beinga color other than black, white,gray, or red. Suppose that the person's concept to c or to c', butwe do notknowwhich. chromaticity is identical either Then,intuitively, ifthe personwere to applyhis conceptchromaticity to a vividshade of red he is sensing, thenhisconceptwould be c, not c'. On the otherhand,ifhe were to hold thatit does notapply to this would be c', not c. Now we have herea case (i.e., shade, chromaticity a vivid shade of red) that is encountered in sensation.The situation, is quite the same with hypothetical nevertheless, cases except that cases can be encountered in sensation;most only some hypothetical In either ofthemcan be encountered onlyinthought. situation, however, the rationalist of determinate capacitytheory conceptpossession(see a simple, unified about below)wouldprovide explanation why judgments the applicability ofconceptsto these elementary cases mustbe mostly withthe moderatetruth-based true.This,together of evidence, theory ofintuitions yieldsa simple, unified explanation oftheevidential status and of one's noninferential beliefs about one's currentconscious conditions. 23. For example, suppose thatk is the conceptof being a multigon, and
362 / George Bealer that c is theconcept ofbeing a closedplanefigure with more suppose thematter, theperson than four sides.Suppose that, uponconsidering possibly there is a cirwereto makethenoninferential judgment that an eliptical a spiral andso on.Then multigon, cular multigon, multigon, to c, for itis in fact not theperson's concept k would notbe identical thanfour sidesshould be possible that closed planefigures with more hand, suppose circular, eliptical, spiral, andso on. On theother that, thematter, theperson weretomakethenoninferenuponconsidering tialjudgments that there is a multigon withfive sides,that possibly thereis a multigon withsix sides,thatpossibly thereis a possibly concept k multigon with sevensides, and so forth. Thentheperson's couldbe c, for itis infact that with more possible closedplanefigures than four sides should seven sides, andso forth. havefive sides, sixsides, 24. Thesefundamental in mybook logical operations are characterized and Concept, 1982. Quality Oxford, A point that a person ofclarification is in order here.To determine cases, we must hastheindicated cognitive capacity tosort hypothetical be abletodetermine havedeterminate that theperson concepts, already theother in thehypothetical cases and in namely, concepts involved theory should not thelogicalmanipulations. The rationalist capacity be viewedas a vestige ofverificationism. However, detertherefore in having consist the minate possession ofa concept couldnevertheless Atleast isa theoretical possibility indicated kind ofcognitive capacity. this Onthis inthelogical of andConcept. what would theory, theory Quality in having in order for a concept toconsist the be required possessing a concept is that therelation ofpossessing indicated cognitive capacity be a connection andmetaphysically basicrelation). (that is,a logically a person's 25. A corollary oftherationalist isthat judgments capacity theory orintrospective) willalsobe abouthisimmediate experiences (sensory like ofother this. Accordingly, they toowill count as dataindependently considerations. This isjust the traditional that ourexempiricist theory periences count as data.Thus, we wouldalso havea "transcendental ofthis deduction" traditional ofa posteriori evidence theory empiricist theframework theory ofjustification. givenwithin ofthecoherence 26. Besides therationalist a simpler that theory provides holding capacity than do naturalistic causalexplanations, is there no other explanation tosavescientific There coherentists essentialism? wayinwhich might try theformal on satisfactory comis.Namely, tostrengthen requirements is one that might be prehensive theoretical systems. This requirement to insure that thecoherence itself is counted neededinorder theory as justified to thecoherence theory, by itsownstandards. According inthecoherence Given theabove what the belief itself? theory justifies belief should be thrown this truth-affirming-explanations requirement, itstruth. But outunlessthesimplest ofitsorigin affirms explanation ofthis seemnotto oftheorigin belief naturalistic causalexplanations that causaltheory affirm So on theassumption a naturalistic itstruth. are obliged to thesimplest coherence theorists provides explanation, their inthecoherence To avoid this abandon belief self-defeating theory.
Limitsof Scientific Essentialism / 363 outcome, coherentists might havenochoice but tostrengthen thetruthaffirming-explanations requirement as follows. (Ina full development, specialstepswould haveto be taken to avoiddifficulties that arisein connection withGodel'ssecond incompleteness theorem and the Montague-Kaplan paradox oftheknower.) Consider various explanations oftheorigin ofyour belief in a particular theory ofjustification T and oftheorigin ofthespecific intuitions youwould ordinarily use insupport ofthis theory T. Thetruth ofthe theory T andthe T-supporting intuition plays no roleinsomeofthese explanations; inother explanations, thetruth ofthetheory T andtheT-supporting intuitions doesplay a role.We maycall thelatter explanations T-affirming. Andwe may calla comprehensive ifitincludes theoretical system a TT-affirming affirming explanation. (Forexample, letT be coherentism. Thenan explanation will be coherentism-affirming ifthetruth ofcoherentism and ofyour coherentism-supporting intuitions a roletheexplanation plays oftheorigin ofyourbelief incoherentism and oftheorigin ofyour Andyour coherentism-supporting intuitions. comprehensive will theory be coherentism-affirming if itincludes a coherentism-affirming explanation.) Therevised requirement would be this: a person should all drop beliefs thatare not affirmed by the person's simplest coherentismaffirming comprehensive Nowthe question theory. is whatis your simplest coherentism-affirming comprehensive Whatever theory? its other itincludes features, thesimplest coherentism-affirming explanation oftheorigin ofyour belief incoherentism andoftheorigin ofyour So which explanation intuitions. coherentism-supporting is this? Naturalistic causalexplanations arenotcoherentism-affirming, so they are out of the running. In viewof this, yoursimplest coherentismandinturn affirming explanation, your simplest coherentism-affirming I conjecture, comprehensive basedon thecirtheory, would, be that cumscribed rationalist I willsketch in thenext In this theory section. backtoa rationalist case,however, youareonceagain ofa priori theory evidence. For younowmay implement the above"transcendental deduction" ofa rationalist theory within thecoherentist framework. Theupshot is that, evenwithin intuitions theapplicability coherentism, about ofa concept tohypothetical casesnecessarily will havea privileged status as data independently of theotherdetails of yourbesttheoretical ofyourbeliefs. systematization 27. Thereis another out the problem withthe familiar way to bring unrestricted versionsof rationalism. Considertwin Earth. My that to my ontwin Earth doppelganger hasa concept wte corresponds waterconcept intuitions the apwe. My doppelganger's regarding ofhisconcept to hypothetical plicability casesfit thesamepattern wte as do myintuitions theapplicability of myconcept regarding we to cases.Thatis,thepattern ofmy hypothetical intuitions doppelganger's mimics thepattern ofmyintuitions. exactly So there would be no difference in thesorting that we wouldgo through procedures concernto hypothetical ofweandwte, ingtheapplicability respectively, cases, andthere be no difference would inthelogical towhich manipulations
364 / George Bealer So according to the we would submit we and wte,respectively. concept possession, my unrestricted rationalist theories ofdeterminate However, according doppelganger andI must havethesameconcept. possession that isespoused tothecausaltheory ofdeterminate concept andI havedifferent concepts. byscientific essentialists, my doppelganger inthis we should consider nota single pairs Strictly speaking, example we should consider all ofournaturalitstic concepts (e.g.,we andwte); ofournaturalistic Thephilosophical point, pairs concepts simultaneously. application andlogical manipulahowever, isthe same: the pattern inmy is indistinguishable from the tions ofmyfamily ofnaturalistic concepts inmydoppelganger's andlogical manipulations of pattern application ofnaturalistic concepts. So, according to the hiscorresponding family ofdeterminate unrestricted rationalist theories concept possession, his Butthis contradicts naturalistic concepts would be thesameas mine. ofdeterminate concept possession advocated byscienthecausal theory tific essentialists. 28. Bythesametoken, that itismetaphysically intuition possitheKripkean ble for something to be hotandyetnotcauseS ["sensations-of-heat"] intuition about internal nonis determined byofthefollowing categorial qualiaG:Itismetaphysically relational physical qualities F andsensible ofsome forsomething to be F and yetnotcause members possible speciesofsentient beingto senseG. ifnatural we must be able 29. Notice that, rationalism is to be successful, thecategories ofthenaturalistic items to explain howwe couldknow modalknowledge. ofwhich we havea posteriori How,forexample, that an item such as water isa compositional stuff andthat do we know Itturns or foodis instead a functional stuff? an item suchas perfume isan easycorollary ofourmoderate theanswer tothis outthat question a determinate ofwhat isrequired for conform ofcausaltheory having will item. Forreasons ofspace,theexplanation ceptofa naturalistic haveto awaitthesequelto thepresent paper. inPhilosophy of Is Cantor's Continuum 30. Kurt "What Problem?", Godel, andH. Putnam, eds.,CamMathematics, second edition, P. Benacerraf andexpanded ofa paperofthe 470485 (revised version bridge, 1983, in TheAmerican Mathematical vol. that sametitle Monthly, appeared 54, 1947, 515-525). 31. Thus,as I mentioned doubles as an argument argument earlier,the that no concepts which isthedoctrine radical against anti-individualism, are "inthehead." and content concepts) (notevencategory was introduced 32. This notionof cognitive commitment by me in inthesolution andConcept) toassist "Pragmatics" (section 39,Quality and Perry. ofpuzzlesposedby Mates, Kripke, Castaneda, Burge, ofconvic33. Thejudgments wouldmakehereare examples theperson toallofhis A person hascognitive commitments tions inacquaintance. a person has inacquaintance, notconversely. but convictions Typically, hisconvicthat are notamong a great commitments many cognitive the a pivotal roleinsolving tions inacquaintance. This distinction plays Pierre intheprevious note.Forexample, mentioned Kripke's puzzles
Limitsof Scientific Essentialism / 365 x ispretty hasa cognitive commitment tothelogical falsehood that and = x = Londres), x is notpretty (where London butthis proposition is notoneofhis convictions inacquaintance. Theamnesiac hasa cognitive to the logicalfalsehood thatx ? x (wherex = the commitment butthis is notoneofhisconvictions inacquainamnesiac), proposition I fail torecognize inthemirror, I havea cognitive tance. When myself to thelogical x * x (where x = me),but commitment falsehood that is notoneofmyconvicitons inacquaintance. Andso on.Formore this on this, see section 39, Quality and Concept.

George Bealer - The Possibility of Philosophical Knowledge

Transféré par

Informations du document

Description originale:

Titre original

Copyright

Formats disponibles

Partager ce document

Partager ou intégrer le document

Options de partage

Avez-vous trouvé ce document utile ?

Ce contenu est-il inapproprié ?

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

George Bealer - The Possibility of Philosophical Knowledge

Transféré par

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

Ridgeview Publishing Company

Philosophical Perspectives, 1, Metaphysics, 1987

THE PHILOSOPHICAL LIMITS OF SCIENTIFIC ESSENTIALISM1

308 / George Bealer

Limits ofScientific Essentialism / 311

it is a priori.And inguistic knowledgeis a posterori;in the latter,

to have knowledge oftheright handside,namely, theextralinguistic

Thecircle within thec rcl uepeetsorthois aboutth beliefspelehv

/ 361 Limitsof Scientific Essentialism

Vous aimerez peut-être aussi