Psychodynamic Practice Vol. 15, No.

2, May 2009, 161172

Transference and countertransference as existential themes in the psychoanalytic theory of W.R. Bion
David A. Walters*
Department of University Studies, Keyano University College, 8115 Franklin Avenue, Fort McMurray, Canada; and Department of Psychology, University of Chester, Chester, UK

The origins of todays humanistic and existential schools of psychotherapy may be seen to lie in the philosophical theories of existentialists such as Soren Kierkegaard and Jean-Paul Sartre. In their focus on being and self, some therapies converge meaningfully with the aims and methods of depth psychotherapy including the later psychoanalytic theory of W.R. Bion. In rather remarkable ways, Bions views of mental growth and the active counter/transferential process may be seen as conceptually closer to Kierkegaards notions of relational being and truth and to Sartres interplay of subjectivity and objectivity than they are to certain of Freuds classical constructs. Bion conceives of psychoanalysis as a mutual activity, one where the transference dynamic is characterized by client-and-therapist-asrelationally-present. More than this, the active investment of the analysts person in the countertransference parallels existentialisms notion of relational being. As a form of joint-feeling and mutual exploration, the patients emotions, conicts, and neuroses are seen as intimately related to similar experiences both felt and expressed by the analyst. While neutrality and objectivity remain priorities in Freuds initial theory of analysis, Bions thought reects a transference dynamic characterized by the essential ingredient of comradeship. It is not that Bions theory is necessarily the only (or the best) example of an existential counterpart to psychoanalytic theory. It is dicult, however, not to be inspired by elements of his framework that resound clearly with the more powerful tenets of existentialism. While it is primarily the schema of transference/countertransference examined in the current paper, Bions later writings also examine other themes that may too be considered as existential in direction. Keywords: psychoanalysis; transference; countertransference; W.R. Bion; existentialism; Soren Kieregaard; Jean-Paul Sartre

*Email: david.walters@keyano.ca
ISSN 1475-3634 print/ISSN 1475-3626 online 2009 Taylor & Francis DOI: 10.1080/14753630902811367 http://www.informaworld.com

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Introduction: Existentialism and psychoanalysis In its focus on being and self, existentialism may be viewed as converging meaningfully with the aims and methods of some forms of depth psychotherapy. While writing primarily from the perspective of religious philosophy, in many ways the views of Soren Kierkegaard (known as the father of existentialism) may also be described as keenly psychological (Evans, 1990). What Kierkegaard conveys (both for his nineteenth-century contemporaries and for later readers) is the notion that one must essentially gain an understanding of core self (i.e. of personality), or what may also be known as ones spiritual nature (Evans, 1990, p. 116). While Kierkegaards thought was not so much concerned with the practice of psychotherapy (indeed, as a profession it was yet to be born), he described his vocation as an authorship marked by the desire to instruct (or by the art of pedagogy) (Walters, 2008). As such, Kierkegaard, Jean-Paul Sartre, and other existential philosophers guide their readers to a place of decision-making, to the adoption of greater responsibility in addressing life junctures where action must meet choice, where lingering at points of reection and developing greater insight are given over to a new way of being. As part of this venture, Kierkegaards (1946a [18341842]; 1946b [1846]) ultimate goal may be seen as that of encouraging relational being, i.e. adopting the position that lifes meaning and satisfactions rest in the deepening connections between an individual and his or her social world. In furnishing the method and inspiration for such connection Kierkegaards writing may be seen as possessing a psychotherapeutic thrust. His emphasis on relational being continues in current-day models of existential psychotherapy where an undisputed centrality rests in the relationship between therapist and client (Spinelli, 2007, p. 59). Yet, the idea that this primary relationship mirrors the wider social world of its participants is also argued by classical psychoanalysis. Contemporary understandings of transference (and its complement, countertransference) may be seen as reexamining both the nature and depth of Freuds notion of the analysts investment in this relationship (cf. Billow, 2000). Relational being and the analytic transference Seen as forming a common pillar within existential and psychoanalytic practice, this notion of relational being may also be viewed as fundamental to the tackling of deep (and often unconscious) issues. Certainly, the analysis of resulting conicts (described by Freud, Klein, Bion and others as pivotal to psychoanalysis) can usefully be considered through an existential lens, i.e. conceptualized in terms of self, being, and relatedness (cf. Billow, 2000). Freuds concern with setting the right tone in analysis, with establishing a sense of authority consistent with social conventions of his

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time, as well as with the heavy responsibilities involved, included the notion of the consulting room as a place apart (Walters, 2007). In viewing doctor and patient in this rst articulation of talking therapy, Freud argued that a particular type of relationship was sought, one relying on the depth of unconscious inuences when working with everyday thoughts, feelings, and behaviours (Flett, 2007). In reconciling (or in fact exorcizing) any internal demons arising from earlier development, the introspection (and corresponding outward-looking process) of psychoanalysis required careful consideration not only of physical boundaries (i.e. consulting room) but also of personal boundaries (Kupers, 1993; Menaker, 1990). No doubt this reected Freuds allegiance to professional integrity, care for his charges. Further developments in Freudian theory saw growing concern with creating a transference neurosis in the doctor-patient relationship, one believed to hold the key to bringing about a cure within psychoanalysis. As such, classical transference may be seen as involving projection of a patients particular ways of loving (and hating) that which results as part of the individuals physical constitution as well as his or her childhood development onto the person of the analyst (cf. Freud, 1953). In the case of W.R. Bion, despite his analysis with Melanie Klein and eventual emergence as a leading Kleinian in London, the full corpus of his writings demonstrate many departures from the theory of both Freud and Klein (Symington, 1990; Symington & Symington, 1996). However, any parallels or similarities existing in the notions of Bion and those of the more recent existential therapies appear to have gone largely unnoticed. Perhaps best known for his theory of beta elements (a theory of thinking based on unprocessed emotional experience), Bions reputation as an innovative psychoanalyst (but obtuse communicator) has steadily grown, both in Britain and internationally (Symington & Symington, 1996). Of direct concern to this consideration of existential psychoanalysis is the fact that Bion (particularly in his later works) paints a picture of psychoanalysis as dialectical process, i.e. one where self may be seen as related to a universe of ever expanding meaning (Ogden, 2004). Viewed essentially as an existential theme, one may argue that Bion exercises an understanding of relational being within his own particular frame of psychoanalysis one where this type of existential transference may be seen as fundamental to the process of psychoanalysis, to emergence of the unconscious and the reparation of childhood development. In an important sense Bions understanding of the analytic transference seeks a new order, an understanding informed by emotionality:
We can be so well educated that it is almost impossible to realize that life may have a meaning. Therefore, some process has to be discovered by which we could forget what we have learned in order to be sensitive to the fundamental thoughts or feelings which may still have survived . . . it is dicult to remain blind to the possibility that we now know so much that we are virtually incapable of being wise (Bion, 2005b, p. 66).

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Bions phenomenology of the analytic hour Just as Kierkegaards focus is largely phenomenological, at times Bion too reects on what it is like for the analyst to be an integral member of a mutual, collaborative (i.e. dialectical) transference. In this sense Bion is engaged in developing a phenomenology of the analytic hour. He selects two principles as his underlying assumptions, the emergence of truth and [that of] mental growth . . . [essentially] the mind grows through exposure to truth (Symington & Symington, 1996, pp. 23). Hence, Bion proposes that personal growth and the idea of truth are formed together through the emotional experience of psychoanalysis or through the transference required of this particular type of relational being. While Bion is in agreement with classical analysis in its emphasis on the importance of primal emotions such as love and hate (but with other emotions such as curiosity as well), the role or function of these in transference may be seen as more existential, certainly than Freud expressed. While neutrality and objectivity remain priorities in Freudian analysis, Bion talks of a transference dynamic characterized by the essential ingredient of comradeship. He does this by describing the importance of developing emotional links, i.e. sadness in this case, between analyst and patient:
This sad event, this experience of sadness where did it originate? Could it be located in some geographical place? Or could it originate in the mind of the analyst? Or could it originate in the relationship between two people? Let me take refuge in the relatively reasonable explanation and say it originates in the relationship between these two people you can see how rational that would be, how in accordance with theories of transference and countertransference and so forth (Bion, 2005b, p. 64).

Given Bions agreement with classical notions that a type of concerned control should be exercised by the analyst over his or her personal countertransference (Billow, 2000), i.e. one likely to include objectivity (in order to arrive at truth), there may be surprise at Bions corresponding emphasis on the fact that psychoanalysis should provide a personally relevant process for analyst as well as analysand. As such, the process of transference is likely to include expressions of primal feelings, but more than this, the ways in which such feelings resonate with the analysts perceptions and experience may also make for their legitimate expression in countertransference. This intimate pairing of subjectivity and objectivity (a theme emphasized by existentialism) possesses parallels with the understanding of many current-day therapists that analysis is not possible without establishing a therapeutic alliance:
The therapist must bring her own subjectivity into the work if she is to be suciently sensitive to the clients eorts . . . the therapists own presence is needed continually to develop an eective therapeutic alliance (Mahrer, A., 1986, in Bugental, 1987, p. 49).

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In his later work Bion appears to view the foundations of love, hate, and curiosity as transferential building blocks, materials which also make for process, a type of collaborative discussion and sharing that, if optimized, make for a journey of self-conscious growth through the deliberate action of a psychoanalysis characterized by existentialism. Hence, the mutuality and wisdom required of seeking and gaining objective truth essentially comprise Bions theory of the psychoanalytic transference. These ingredients not only form the basis for meaningful dialogue within the transference relationship but also they essentially create any sense of emotional support, and the dynamism of motivation, required of Bions psychoanalysis. It is the analysts ability to express openness and receptivity (essentially love) to the patient that importantly parallels the maternal or ideal stance within analysis. This brand of countertransference reects: basically an openness to, and a willingness if necessary to be changed by, the patients experience (Frosh, 1999, p. 305). Limitations of the classical notion of countertransference Such is the intuitive appeal of Freuds notion of transference that it is dicult to neglect its relevance to existentialisms notion of relational being. The manner of experiencing and expressing strong emotions may be seen as so much a product of any individuals past that these come to form an intrinsic part of personality and its expression. For this reason, the patients core experiences of social connection are bound to make their presence known in psychoanalysis (i.e. through the transference and in life generally) (Menaker, 1990, p. 104). However, in an eort to protect the objectivity of the facilitative role, in fact to ensure that the analyst may serve well as a type of tabula rasa or blank slate (to receive and to perhaps prompt the emergence of unconscious dynamics), classical analysis has in fact limited the analysts person and role to that of impartial observer. Associated more with the early Freudian period, such methods of simply reecting back the transference essentially negates the countertransferential role of the analyst. As such, he or she is meant to remain a nonperson in the name of fostering the development of the transference (Menaker, 1990, p. 103; Simon, 1990). While adoption of a fully neutral position on the part of analyst is not easily achieved, historic perspectives have at times argued that the analysts countertransference reactions should be either minimized or suppressed (cf. Menaker, 1990, p. 167). It is thought that the possible expression of the analysts neurotic feelings is likely to confuse the patients transference, as well as the viability of any resulting interpretation by analyst (Frosh, 1999, p. 301). Even in the case of some object-relations analysts countertransference has the potential risk of detracting from formation of a legitimate relationship with the patient, given that unresolved conicts in analysts may rise to the fore (Frosh, 1999, p. 301). This risk is not, however,

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sucient to dissuade Bion from arguing that the analyst must demonstrate both the aection and care of humanism, at the same time that it fosters the objectivity and truth that psychoanalysis is meant to provide:
As analysts we have to be disciplined to a situation where, whatever the facts are, we do not allow them to make us run away or do the opposite fall in love. We are supposed still to remain analysts. We are not obliged to become inhuman people who cannot love or hate: we are still supposed to retain the capacity to have feelings of love and hate and all the other feelings which go with them, but at the same time we are supposed to remain disciplined (Bion, 2005a, p. 30).

Hence, over recent decades, psychoanalytic theory has come to challenge the view that the analyst should restrict his or her role to one of excavating the unconscious and communicating relevant ndings to the patient. In fact a good number of older psychoanalytic writers as well (e.g. Money-Kyrtle, Paula Heimann (1950), Betty Joseph, Harold Searles) have adopted views on countertransference that underline the benets of mutual relating and, because of this, run parallel to Bions existentialism. For example, Carl Rogers school of person-centred psychotherapy (overlapping with some of Bions professional years) reected (and continues to demonstrate) the democratic values of Middle America in its early arguments for a psychotherapeutic relationship characterized by egalitarian principles. That is, despite essentially classical psychoanalytic training in the earlier part of his career, Rogers argued that it was the demonstration of authenticity and transparency on the part of analyst that resulted in a non-status quo type of therapy. Today there are some who have clearly recognized the debt that Rogers theory owes to existential phenomenology (cf. Spinelli, 2005). Certainly, Spinellis (2007, p. 59) notion of client-[and-therapist]-asrelationally-present may also be seen as consistent with the value of an essentially existential type of transference relationship:
Within the existential psychotherapeutic relationship, the therapist is the other who serves as representative of all others in the clients wider world relations. But, just as importantly, the therapist is also the other who challenges the clients beliefs and assumptions regarding others and their impact upon his or her way of being (Spinelli, 2005, p. 174).

It is not that the analysts investment in the countertransference negates the presence of objectivity or the exercise of personal boundaries within the analysis. Rather, it is the analysts seasoned perspective and experience of truth that enhances clarity of thought and purpose, which demonstrates a way (and a method) forward.
The man who pretends that his view of life is determined by sheer reason . . . fails to grasp the elementary fact that he is not a pure thinker, but an existing individual (Bretall, 1946, p. xx) discussing Kierkegaard.

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Not only will the unconscious give way to conscious manifestations (of conict, obstacle, and illusion) within mutual relating (or relational being), but the past imprint of others will also make their presence known. As such, the analytic encounter marked by mutual concern and a type of brotherly largesse is likely to provide an invaluable type of experiential immediacy. From a phenomenological perspective, the mutual handling of positive and negative emotions between therapist and client is:
a demonstration of the analysands growing respect for and trust in the therapist and of the analysands acceptance that no revelation will threaten the analytic relationship, and by implication, the analysands sense of being. As such, . . . the clients felt experience towards the therapist is neither symbolic nor substitutive. Rather, it is as direct and real as any other interpretative experience and should be considered as such (Spinelli, 2005, p. 191).

Countertransference as active engagement While this immediacy may importantly convey the analysands pressing worldview, a more active engagement of analyst also opens considerations of past and future, introduces notions of shared-reection, personal exchange, if you will a type of communion. Such interplay of objectivity and subjectivity within analysis (marked by existentialism) is adeptly described here by Jean-Paul Sartre (1953, p. 58):
This comparison allows us to understand better what an existential psychoanalysis must be if it is entitled to exist. It is a method destined to bring to light, in a strictly objective form, the subjective choice by which each living person makes himself a person; that is, makes known to himself what he is . . .

When built upon that brand of trust and mutual respect which is clearly felt and expressed in overt and tangible ways, the potential for problem resolution and psychic growth expands exponentially (cf. Cohn, 1997; Spinelli, 1997, 2001; Strasser & Strasser, 1997). A related understanding of countertransference has been seen in the Kleinian stance, one obviously referenced by Bions personal theory. Here it is more a matter of specic emotional responses brought about in the therapist (versus unresolved conicts), i.e. by specic qualities of the patient (Frosh, 1999, p. 301). A specic dimension of any resulting understanding is likely to be the analysts (at times) unconscious comprehension of the patients unconscious functioning (cf. Heimann, 1950). Greenberg and Mitchell (1983, p. 389) express the same point in the following formulation:
Countertransference provides the crucial clues to the predominant transferential congurations, since transference and countertransference reciprocally generate and interpenetrate each other. Countertransference is an inevitable product of the interaction between the patient and the analyst rather than a simple interference stemming from the analysts own infantile drive-related conicts.

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From such a stance, one very much like Kierkegaards notion of relational being and Sartres interplay of subjectivity and objectivity, Bions theory may be understood as employing a type of countertransference [one where] the analyst come[s] to understand the patients emotions, conicts, and resistances [i.e. through the patients transferences] (Billow, 2000, p. 2). Together these views may be joined to represent a way of analytic understanding, one related to the more recently-articulated ideas of intersubjectivity, perspectivism, and co-constructionism forwarded by Gabbard (1997); Gergen (1999); Gill (1994); Leary (1994), and others. Rather than conceptualize countertransference as an emotional diculty that envelopes the analyst and his or her clarity of thought and direction (i.e. one that may derail analysis), Bion argues that when sucient psychological separation is maintained this emotional connexion serves as a therapeutic opportunity (Bleandonu, 1994). Establishing eective client-therapist boundaries that do not work against co-construction of the analytic experience requires what Bion (1963) discusses as an ability to distinguish the countertransference enactment (a negative or harmful expression) from countertransference possibilities that may lead to a fuller (and essentially more meaningful) collaborative process. If the countertransference [enactment] is operating in the analytic session, the analysand is unlucky and so is the analyst. The time to have dealt with it was in the past, in the analysts own analysis (Bion, 1975, p. 88). By way of extension, classical psychoanalysis has argued that a type of (unconscious) resistance arises in the analyst as a response to the patient and his or her issues, a notion that has been taken up in various forms and has often resulted in an argument that analysts should strive to divest themselves of countertransference feelings (Frosh, 1999, p. 301). While Freud did not argue that there should be no feelings experienced for patients in analysis, he did believe that these should be fully conscious and their expression postponed until therapeutic interactions had come to an end (Frosh, 1999, p. 301). While at points in his theory Bion also exercises a more classical (constrained) notion of countertransference, he is quick to distinguish the enactment as a phase and as a type of emotional response which is likely to precede the more optimal response (Billow, 2000, p. 104). Bion is consistent with his Kleinian colleagues in noting the importance of the containing function of psychoanalysis, a type of emotional holding or the provision of safety produced by the analysts active involvement but also through the discovery of truth that comes about as a result of relational being (or the existential transference).
The analyst is consequently involved in an interpersonal interaction that operates on several levels, including that of the interpenetration of the unconscious world of one participant by the other (Frosh, 1999, p. 302).

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In a similar way Kristeva describes a dual role for the analyst, one where both holding and interpretation are required of an actively involved analyst who essentially sits upon a precarious bridge:
The analyst situates herself on a bridge where, on the one hand, the maternal position gratifying needs, holding (Winnicott) and on the other the paternal position the dierentiation, distance and prohibition that produces both meaning and absurdity are intermingled and severed, innitely and without end (Kristeva, 1983, p. 246).

Importantly, Bion (1970; 1997 [1962]) views his own theory as taking on the uidity and change that characterize much of the world. According to Ogden (2004, p. 285), the experience of reading Bions later work conveys a sense of psychoanalysis as a process involving a movement toward innite expansion of meaning. As such, Bion (1975) dierentiates between selfserving (or solely self-involved) counter-transference enactments (these being largely unconscious) with what he terms passion. It is by active awareness of the analysts primal feelings (love, hate, curiosity) that he or she comes to employ such feelings (and their awareness) as a central organizer of meaning within the analytic session (Billow, 2000, p. 103). It is as if the common emotional experience and language of counter/transferential dialogue come to deepen the psychoanalytic venture. Bions further view of optimal passion sees the analysts process of integrating and using his (or her) most basic (and in this sense powerful) emotions in order to identify even more closely (and relevantly) with analysand. The process appears to be neither straightforward nor formulaic:
Take these two people the analyst and the analysand who have met at one point. I dont know what spiritual route the analyst has taken, the journey that his mind has taken between the point at which it is supposed it began its existence and the point at which it became coincident with an entirely dierent personality coincidental and real. Let us suppose that these two points go on with their journey: the analyst and analysand continue to live; they dont stop at psychoanalysis; they dont stop at this point at which they are real and coincident. I was taught to call that conjugate complex . . . . I think we ought to consider, as if it were real, that the analyst and analysand still continue to exist even when analysis is over, when those two points, which are real and distinct, real and coincident in the analysts consulting-room, continue in a space about which I know nothing (Bion, 2005a, p. 31).

Conclusion: Bions psychoanalyis as existential There appears to be a large degree of convergence between existentialisms (and more specically, Soren Kierkegaards) notion of relational being and the qualities of relationship put forward by Bions understanding of transference and countertransference in psychoanalysis. In rather remarkable ways, Bions views of mental growth and the active counter/transferential process are

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conceptually closer to Kierkegaards notion of the emergence of truth, and to Sartres (cf. 1953, 1957) interplay of subjectivity with objectivity, than they are to some of Freuds classical analytical constructs. This is not to say that Freud would have necessarily objected to those views put forward by W.R. Bion that appear to take on an existential tone in their importance and articulation. In essence, however, the ways of observing and relating as a self- or existential analyst dier remarkably from those of the Freudian analyst (Menaker, 1990, p. 108). More than this, the method and aspirations of existential analysis see the building of an understanding (or knowing) between analyst and patient that speak of Bions notions of trust and sharing that is a notion of transference/countertransference that is distinctly mutual and relational (rather than distant and apart). It is not that Bions theory is necessarily the only (or the best) representative example of an existential counterpart to psychoanalytic theory. Rather, in their historical timeframe, Bions ideas are sure to reect the broader inuence of his reading and writing, eects of the wider psychoanalytic world in which he worked, as well as the cultural values and social zeitgeist of his time. Today, it is perhaps dicult to say whether Bions emphasis on the analysts greater engagement in psychoanalysis has been more a result of his context and experience, or rather that it served as a stimulus for what has proven to be a major shift in the theory and methods of psychotherapy (e.g. self-oriented humanism and person-centred therapy). Spinelli (2005, p. 193) also notes the psychoanalytic shift of Daniel Stern (2004) and others with regard to now moments and the we focus that essentially parallel Bions notion of reverie as part of the transferential interrelation between analyst and client. Importantly, Bions later writing reects great openness to the uidity of psychoanalytic process, both the sense of an ever-changing course in analysand and (at a macro-level), the re-working of theory and method as part of the evolution of psychoanalysis. While Bions notions of containment, passion, pain, and transformation in psychoanalysis may also be seen to reect fundamental existential themes, the present discussion might best conclude by underlining his view that it is not transference itself that serves as the essence of psychoanalysis, but rather where this process takes its participants on their life journeys:
The idea of the transference and the countertransference has been extremely productive, provocative and growth-stimulating. But, like every really good idea, like anything which provokes or stimulates growth, it makes itself out of date at once . . . The idea that . . . I am a blood relation, a father or mother is transient; it is a temporary idea on the journey of your life. From that point of view the technical term transference . . . is an idea that you have on the way you transfer it to me as a temporary measure on your way to what you really think or feel. At the same moment the new idea that you have is a temporary one and will be discarded sooner or later. It is another of these places where you stop on your own particular journey (Bion, 2005, pp. 27, 28).

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