ALLEGHENY COLLEGE

POLITICAL SCIENCE 610 SENIOR PROJECT

William True Click to Dissent: Political Internet Use in Authoritarian Arab Regimes

Department of Political Science

April 5th, 2012

William True

Click to Dissent: Political Internet Use in Authoritarian Arab Regimes

Submitted to the Department of Political Science of Allegheny College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Arts.

I hereby recognize and pledge to fulfill my responsibilities as defined in the Honor Code and to maintain the integrity of both myself and the College community as a whole.

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Approved by:

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Table of Contents
Chapter I: Introductions, Literature Review & Methods
A. Introduction B. Literature Review C. Methodology 1 1 2 10 12 12 14 17 22 24 27 36 37 37 38 48 57 60 65 66

Chapter 2: Empirical Model & Findings

A. Internet Penetration B. Internet Censorship & Regulation C. Trust in Government D. Openness of Civil Society E. Protest F. Findings G. Summary of Results

Chapter III: Case Studies

A. Introduction B. Iran C. Oman D. Summary of Case Studies

Chapter IV: Conclusions

Acknowledgements Works Cited

Chapter I: Introduction, Literature Review & Methods

A. Introduction Beginning in late 2010, countries in the Middle East and North Africa have experienced a period of great political unrest. In what became colloquially known as the Arab Spring, popular protest against oppressive autocratic regimes took place in countries ranging from Morocco to Bahrain, and in several countries resulted in the overthrow of those regimes. In the case of Egypt, the use of social media became a topic of contention between the media and scholars; popular narrative suggested that the Internet had been crucial in forcing President Hosni Mubarak from power (Gustin, 2011), while others suggested that such opinions are exaggerated and utopian (Alexander, 2011; Morozov, 2011). In the face of potential political protest, many authoritarian regimes turn to censorship to suppress dissent, but it is unclear how important a role online censorship plays in sustaining an autocracy. If the Internet can be used to assist disillusioned peoples in organizing measurable political dissent, when is that most likely to occur? In the following paper, I will examine scholarly literature surrounding the question of when the Internet can contribute to organizing political protest in Arab autocracies. I will then theorize several variables which would affect how likely the Internet would be in assisting people under an authoritarian regime to protest. After hypothesizing which Arab countries would be most susceptible to the influence of Internet-organized protest, I will compare my hypothesis with data on the number of protests in the countries I examine. I will attempt to address some of the discrepancies between Arab countries by exploring the cultural and political atmosphere through different case studies, and will then summarize the findings of my paper.

B. Literature Review When can the Internet contribute to organizing political protest in Arab autocracies? I will examine scholarly literature on questions related to my topic. The Oxford English Dictionary defines the Internet as a global computer network providing a variety of information and communication facilities to its users, and consisting of a loose confederation of interconnected networks which use standardized communication protocols. (Internet, 2011) For the purposes of this paper, access to the Internet is defined as the access of websites by either computer or mobile device. My paper will address when access to this network can plausibly assist in organizing political dissent in Arab authoritarian states. It is also important to define what I mean by Arab autocracies. These are countries in the Middle Eastern and North African regions, spanning from Morocco to Iran. Included in this region are the countries of Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Oman, the Palestinian territories, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, Yemen, and the two aforementioned countries. According to the Economist Intelligence Units Democracy Index (2011), Israel does not qualify as a semi-authoritarian regime, so I have excluded it from my study; all other countries are designated either semi-authoritarian or authoritarian regimes. Censorship has been a politicized practice since the times of ancient Greece and has been justified as protecting the public from morally vitriolic speech (Newth, 2010). Under this blanket term, governments and bodies of power have also censored politically charged methods of speech. As new technological innovations have spread, so have the methods of censorship. The invention of the printing press made publishing controversial material more economically

feasible, but the Catholic Church began to ban and burn these books as well as punish authors of heretical works like Galileo and Thomas More (Newth, 2010). Similarly, the emergence of daily newspapers and the postal system in developed countries like Britain were tempered by governmental censorship due to a worry that unlimited access to information would be harmful to society and public morals (Newth, 2010). In recent history, the Soviet Union provides a model of censorship on a wide scale. In 1922, the USSR established a governmental censorship branch to control all print media and fine arts from doing anything politically subversive. The Soviets also adopted the policy of book burning in countries they occupied (Newth, 2010). Censors were called upon to go through predistributed works and media broadcasts and edit out what they found to be controversial. Those who worked in censorship would periodically destroy the records of their activities to remove any evidence of their practices, but much of their instructions were given in person or over the telephone, making their task more secretive (Lauk, 1999). However, dissidents adapted to these restricting policies and began to illegally publish material and smuggle it across the Soviet Union (Newth, 2010). The most famous example of this is samizdat, which involved the reproduction and redistribution of western texts, the importation of basic printing and repographic technologies and the circulation of material across national borders (Johnston, 1999). There were many subcategories of samizdat, including radizdat, which refers to the dissemination of broadcasted works that were copied onto tape. These materials were not limited to dissenting intellectuals, and the types of samizdat varied from region to region (Johnston, 1999). It is nearly impossible to determine the effect that samizdat had on the political environment within the

USSR since their practices were so secretive, but the presence of samizdat indicates that even in the highest levels of oppression, there is the possibility for a nuanced network of dissent. With the Internet, the world is presented with a new form of media that could potentially change the atmosphere in politically oppressive countries. Instead of hand-to-hand dispersion of material, there is the potential to access subversive materials from the comfort of ones home and to organize political protest without ever speaking ones fellow dissidents. In that context, the most prevalent question is whether the Internet is a tool which can be effectively used against the establishment. There are strong opinions on both sides, ranging from emphatic propagation of the Internets democratizing power to condemnations of those authors for their utopian outlook. The more fervent supporters of this position claim that the Internet can help sweep Arab nations into a democratic state (Abdulla, 2007; El Gody, 2007). This argument contends that contemporary information and communication technologies (ICTs), including the Internet, have eroded the states ability to monopolize communication (Murphy, 2011). As new technologies arise, the authoritys ability to censor is slowly diminished (Eickelman, 1999). These scholars look to past ICTs and their effect on the region, including the Saudi Arabian ban on faxes and photocopies and the successful dispersion of ideology through cassettes and pamphlets (Eickelman, 1999). The problem with these examples, and this opinion in general, is that these scholars tend to focus solely on how the people of an oppressive regime might subvert authority rather than also examine how that regime might prevent this type of discontent from spreading or suppressing its dissemination. It takes an idealistic approach to the issue rather than looking at the democratizing power of the Internet from a balanced perspective. The supposed slow erosion

of the states capacity to censor assumes that when informed citizens begin to actively oppose the state, the state is powerless to act against the will of their people. Censorship is not a static process; as new ways of communication develop, institutions innovate new ways to disrupt those communications. There is an assumption that the efforts of the people will always be more powerful than the efforts of the state when it comes to online censorship, and that may not be the case. In contrast to these optimists, there are many scholars who view the democratizing potential of the Internet as a myth generated by a sensationalized media. These authors examine both the ways in which the people can use the Internet for their benefit as well as the ways in which dictatorial rulers can use it for their benefit. It is illustrated that many of the things which seem beneficial for the people are actually more beneficial for the government; for instance, the Internet allows regimes to streamline their distribution of public goods, generating a substantial amount of goodwill towards the ruler (Kalathil & Boas, 2003). Because of state measures taken to control its use and access, those who wish to organize cannot form a cogent platform, and are physically isolated by the individualistic nature of Internet use (Lynch, 2011). Access to the Internet in Arab autocracies is often overpriced and slow (Dutta & Coury, 2003), lending itself to the elite and wealthy who have no need or desire to disrupt the status quo by using the Internet for political means (Kalathil & Boas, 2003; Best & Wade, 2009; Burkhart & Older, 2003). Furthermore, opposition parties are effectively prevented from organizing online due to control mechanisms, and the sophistication of state propaganda grows to encompass new mediums, including the Internet (Kalathil & Boas, 2003). Other governments have the support of their people in censorship; for instance, in Saudi Arabia, censorship of subjects like pornography and

religion is supported by a fundamentalist Islamic base (Boas, 2006). One scholar suggests that, in the case of the Egyptian Revolution, there was a severely limited causal relationship between the Internet and public protest since protests continued after the government cut the Internet off (Lynch, 2011). The complete dismissal of the Internet as an agent for political change has one main flaw, in that it tends to ignore what could potentially happen in the future to focus on the urgency of the immediate. As Internet penetration increases in the Arab world, many of the negative points these scholars point out have the potential to change for the better. As more people become more Internet-savvy, the potential for people to outmaneuver government control mechanisms and use the Internet to enlighten the masses also grows, and that is a potential that cannot be discounted. Additionally, the statistical data utilized by many of these scholars has become invalid; for example, in 2001, only 1% of Egyptians used the Internet (Dutta & Coury, 2003); ten years later, nearly 25% of the population had access to the Internet (Internet World Stats, 2012). This explosion in Internet growth is not limited to Egypt and addresses the concern that the Internet is solely limited to the elite. In the middle of these two extremes lies a moderated point of view which contends that, while the Internet may not immediately pose a threat to dictatorial regimes, it can in the future. These proponents of the Internets power to democratize suggest that its use may open the public sphere of the Arab world (Murphy, 2006) and pose a challenge to future generations of Arab dictators (Lynch, 2011). Specifically cited are the theories that the Internet reduces transaction costs, or the figurative and literal price that people pay to communicate with each other, and that it raises visibility of instances of oppression when they occur. As one scholar puts it, the slope

of the freedom curve favors the citizens (Zittrain & Palfrey, 2008), meaning that over an extended period of time, the emancipating qualities of the Internet can win out over institutional oppression systems. This position is much more convincing, as it examines the Internet as a tool to be used rather than a shining beacon of idealism and virtuosity. There is no definitive way to predict the effects that increased Internet penetration will have, but there is a good possibility that it will benefit oppressed peoples across the Arab world. For all the countries in the Arab world to employ tactics to thwart potential political dissidents, it speaks of an innate fear of the potential democratizing power of the Internet. The question then becomes: how effective can Internet censorship be? While a few scholars argue that the efforts of users to circumvent government regulation will always surpass the governments efforts to block their free access to information (Abdulla, 2007), there is a consensus that, although censorship may not be a foolproof way to prevent access to undesirable content, it is effective enough to prevent any kind of measurable dissent. The opinion is that states rarely seek a foolproof system of censorship for the Internet (Kalathil & Boas 2003; Boas, 2006) because no form of technological access prevention is perfect (Zittrain & Palfrey, 2008) and, given the proper knowledge and motivation, blocking access at higher levels of sophistication is nearly impossible to block (Fielder, 2011). Technical mechanisms, combined with societal pressure and a fear of legal repercussion, are enough to prevent most people from daring to use the Internet to form a platform of political dissent (Kalathil & Boas 2003; Boas 2006). If the Internet serves to undermine the authority of Arab autocracies, why would some regimes seek further Internet penetration in their society? Put simply, the answer is money. The

advent of the Internet has opened up an entirely new world for entrepreneurs and investors to invest in an infinite resource, rather than rely on the finite supply of oil possessed by many countries. Governments look to diversify their economy in order to ensure the longevity of their reign, and as mentioned before, the Internet can also be used to maximize the efficiency of social programs for the people (Kalathil & Boas, 2003). This leads to another important hurdle authoritarian regimes must cross: can the Internet be socially restricted while still being utilized for economic growth? For scholars that have studied this question, the answer is clear: it is possible to use the Internet for economic growth while simultaneously stifling social and political use. In fact, authoritarian states often look to each other for advice on how best to manage their economy while suppressing the public (Kalathil & Boas, 2003). Additionally, independent businesses are more likely to work with an oppressive regime than try to circumvent their authority, allowing the government to maintain a modicum of control over capitalist ventures (Kalathil & Boas, 2003). The most popular example of an authoritarian regime reaping the benefits of Internet capitalism while maintaining a stranglehold on online discourse is China, which has established one of the worlds largest economies despite being ruled by a communist regime. The Chinese government uses financial incentives to persuade businesses to comply with governmental regulation, influencing the firing of private sector employees who overstep the boundaries which the Chinese Communist Party has established (Martin, 2009). This is another example of how the fear of retribution can keep a population from organizing measurable political dissent. In questioning whether economic development brought about by the Internet has a democratizing power, there is no definitive answer. Some scholars posit that economic

development can only generate political change in societies with a relatively developed civil society (Inglehart & Welzel, 2010), while other studies suggest a weak link between growth and democratization due to the increased sophistication of autocrats (Bueno de Mesquita & Downs, 2005). To restrain potential dissent, dictatorial regimes often seek to raise the cost of coordination goods: goods which allow political coordination, but do not affect the economy (Bueno de Mesquita & Downs, 2005). As the Internet can be used as both a commercial and coordination good, the ability to restrain one while developing the other is very powerful.

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C. Methodology The question I will answer is when the Internet could potentially assist in coordinating measurable political dissent within Arab autocracies. I hypothesize that the Internet can only assist in organizing political protest under specific circumstances. First, there must be a moderate to high level of Internet penetration within the country; if the Internet cannot reach enough of the population, its potential is rendered useless. I will measure the percentage of each countrys population that has access to the Internet according to information aggregated on the website, as well as the number of Internet users in each state. Second, the presiding authoritarian presence must utilize a low level of Internet filtering, surveillance and restriction; if the appropriate legal and technical measures are in place to prevent the majority from mostly free interaction, its benefits are virtually crippled. To determine a low level of governmental regulation, I will proxy the level of regulation by counting the number of censorship tactics enacted by each government, according to the work of Ahmed El Gody (2007). Third, there must be relatively low trust in government in order for the Internet to help organize protest. I will examine voter turnout and the level of corruption within government as measurements for this variable, as they demonstrate how willing people are to participate in political activity, and if government consistently abuses the trust of its citizens. Finally, I expect the Internet to be of use in countries with a relatively undeveloped civil society, as it acts as a virtual meeting place. To measure the openness of a countrys civil society, I will examine the number of non-governmental organizations within each country, which indicates how involved citizens can be in societal life.

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After determining which countries I feel are most likely to be susceptible to Internetorganized protest, I will examine how these variables may be logically applied to the Arab world between the year 2000 and December of 2010, before the Arab Spring began in earnest. To define protest, I will examine newspaper databases and count the instances in which both protest and Internet and protest occurred in these countries between those dates; the former indicates the amount of newsworthy political dissent generated in that period, while the latter indicates the importance of the Internet to protest in that country. After that, I will examine two countries that have similar independent variables, yet vary in the amount of protest experienced. I will attempt to explain how the circumstances in those two countries have led to different results, and what role the Internet has played in the development of political protest in these countries.

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Chapter II: Empirical Model & Findings

A. Internet Penetration Internet penetration may be the most important factor in estimating whether the Internet can assist political dissenters in organizing their efforts. To be an effective organizational tool, I hypothesize that the Internet has to be accessible to a large enough percentage of people. The size of a population also contributes to the importance of Internet penetration. If a country has high Internet penetration but only has 600,000 citizens, the Internets use in organization is dramatically decreased; there is less need for the Internet in a small society where word of mouth is equally effective. Furthermore, government propaganda and censorship is exponentially more effective when there are fewer targets. If a country has low Internet penetration but a large population, less penetration is necessary for Internet-based organization to occur, as thousands can still be mobilized without significant infrastructure. Table 2-1 reflects both the percentage of the population which can access the Internet in Arab countries, as well as the number of users this percentage entails. Regarding this variable, the worst-case scenario for Arab authoritarian regimes would be high Internet penetration with a large population, as it maximizes the potential of the Internet to be a very useful communicative medium. Of the countries I am examining, three have these characteristics: Iran, Saudi Arabia and Morocco. Next, while Egypt has only moderate Internet penetration, it has a very large base of Internet users, making it susceptible to online political organization. Countries with high penetration and a moderately large population are somewhat likely to experience the effects of the politicized Internet; Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Lebanon, Oman and Palestine fit this criteria.

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Syria, Algeria and Yemen both have low penetration but a moderate number of Internet users, making them somewhat likely to be affected by online organization. Next, countries with high penetration and small populations are not likely to be affected by the Internet; this includes Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar. Finally, both Iraq and Libya are highly unlikely to be affected by political Internet use; Iraq has an extremely low rate of Internet penetration and a moderate user base, while Libya has both low penetration and a very small number of users.
Table 2-1: Internet Penetration in the Arab World Country Algeria Bahrain Egypt Iran Iraq Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Libya Morocco Oman Palestine (West Bank) Qatar Saudi Arabia Syria Tunisia United Arab Emirates Yemen Internet Users (% of population) 13.4 57.1 26.4 46.9 4.3 30.5 42.4 33 5.9 49 57.5 58.9 66.5 43.6 19.8 36.3 69 10.8 Number of Internet Users 4,700,000 694,009 21,691,776 36,500,000 1,303,760 1,987,400 1,100,000 1,367,220 391,880 15,656,192 1,741,804 1,512,273 563,800 11,400,000 4,469,000 3,856,984 3,555,100 2,609,698 (Internet World Stats, 2012)

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B. Internet Censorship & Regulation There are a multitude of mechanisms, both legal and technical, that can be implemented to deny access to the Internet and filter out any unwanted material. Ahmed El Gody details the numerous methods Arab countries employ to stifle what he calls Internet-based democratization (2007, p. 223). This is the most comprehensive list of tactics and their employment that I was able to find, and serves as the basis for this projects understanding of governmental control of the Internet. For the purposes of this project, it is important to briefly summarize the numerous technical and legal methods by which Arab autocracies can prevent or control access to undesirable material. El Gody finds that governments can employ nine different methods of restriction (2007, p. 224-9), the first of which is to establish laws which restrict free expression online and force citizens to obtain a permit in order to access the Internet. Regimes can also employ content filtering, which is the practice of using devices placed between the user and their desired content to prevent or restrict their access. Another practice is tapping and surveillance, which constitutes monitoring and watching the online activities of Internet users. Governments can also impose fees or taxes on Internet users to prevent the poor and underprivileged from gaining access. The slow development of ICT networks is another way for regimes to prevent access to their people, as is using state-controlled Internet providers to facilitate monitoring the activity of users. Autocracies can also control both hardware and software. The former means requiring governmental approval for the purchase and registration of hardware, while the latter means regime-developed software used to censor material sold under the pretense of virus protection or child safety. A less direct approach is the idea of self-censorship, in which autocracies create an

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atmosphere of intimidation to indirectly dissuade citizens from accessing or publishing controversial material.
Table 2-2: Internet Censorship & Regulation in the Arab World
Country Laws/ Regulations Content Filtering Tapping/ Surveillance Pricing Infrastructure Control Telecom Control Hardware Control Software Control SelfCensorship

Algeria Bahrain Egypt Iran Iraq Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Libya Morocco Oman Palestine (West Bank) Qatar Saudi Arabia Syria Tunisia United Arab Emirates Yemen

! ! ! !

! ! ! ! !

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !

! !

! ! !

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !

! ! ! !

! !

! !

! ! ! ! ! !

! ! ! ! ! !

! ! ! ! !

! ! ! ! !

(El Gody, 2007, p. 231)

Theoretically, the number of tactics that authoritarian Arab regimes employ are inversely proportional to their risk of being threatened by Internet-organized political dissent. El Gody includes a table which reveals which countries employ which tactics (2007, p. 233), a table which I have recreated (Table 2-2). The table has been modified to exclude Israel and Sudan, as

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the former is a functional democracy and the latter is outside my area of focus. Of the nine potential methods of regulation, content filtering is by far the most common practice, as one form or another is employed by every country in the region. The next two most common practices are telecommunications control and self-censorship; the combination of legal threats and surveillance often creates an atmosphere of oppression which makes potential dissenters less likely to act against a regime. The least common practice, hardware control, slows the growth of the Internet to a virtual stop, which is not the goal of any regime, save a select few. Of the countries El Gody examines for Internet censorship practices, none employ more than six or less than three of these tactics. When it comes to the variable of Internet regulation, Iraq, Kuwait and Oman are the countries most susceptible to the politicization of the Internet, while countries like Algeria, Bahrain, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Tunisia are least vulnerable to online organization. Egypt, Jordan, Libya and the UAE are not likely to be affected by the political effects of the Internet, while Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, Qatar and Yemen are somewhat likely to be affected by political use of the Internet.

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C. Trust in Government A population that does not trust their government to act on their behalf and in their best interests is dangerous to the presiding regime. If a publics grievances reach a boiling point, the result is political dissent and outright protest. In this way, the Internet becomes an important communication tool between those who desire to act against the machinations of their oppressive leadership. I. Voter Turnout In most authoritarian regimes, there is still the capacity for public involvement in government. Often, monarchies and authoritative democracies will hold parliamentary or presidential elections to give citizens the impression that their voice will be heard. The voter turnout in autocracies can be used to measure a countrys satisfaction with their governments current policies. If a country is complacent, the voter turnout will not be particularly high or low, but if the population is uneasy, that turnout can increase or fall dramatically. If an election has high turnout, I hypothesize that this indicates an extreme desire for policy change, while a low turnout indicates a populations lack of faith in government to enact effective and beneficial policy.
Table 2-3: Voter Turnout in Arab Countries from 2000-20101 Country Voter Turnout (% of registered voters) 2002 - 46.17 2004 (Pr)* - 58.07 2007 - 35.51 2009 (Pr) - 74.56 2002 - 53 2006 - 73.60 2010 - 67 Voter Turnout (% of eligible population) 2002 - 45.08 2004 (Pr) - 53.60 2007 - 32.02 2009 (Pr) - 65.86 2006 - 36.41

Algeria

Bahrain

1 All

elections are parliamentary, unless indicated by (Pr), meaning presidential election

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Country

Voter Turnout (% of registered voters) 2005 - 28.13 2005 (Pr) - 22.95 2010 - 27.47 2001 - 72.76 2005 - 59.76 2008 (Pr) - 26 2009 - 84.77 2005 - 79.63 2010 - 64 2003 - 57.75 2007 - 54 2010 - 53 2006 - 91.92 2008 - 59.41 2009 - 59 2000 - 44.97 2005 - 46.47 2009 - 53.98 N/A 2002 - 51.61 2007 - 37 2007 - 62.7 2005 (Pr) - 45.56 2006 - 77.70 N/A N/A 2003 - 63.45 2007 - 56 2004 - 86.41 2004 (Pr) - 91.52 2009 - 89.4 2009 (Pr) - 89.45 N/A 2003 - 74.98 2006 (Pr) - 65.16

Voter Turnout (% of eligible population) 2005 - 19.75 2005 (Pr) - 22.95 2010 - 16.16 2001 - 86.42 2005 - 67.62 2008 (Pr) - 12.14 2009 - 75.52 2005 - 89.22

Egypt

Iran

Iraq

Jordan

2003 - 44.19

Kuwait

2006 - 19.42 2008 - 12.29 2000 - 61.12 2005 - 54.75 2009 - 66.34 N/A 2002 - 39.98 2007 - 27.83 2007 - 13.28 2005 (Pr) - 46.02 2006 - 57.65 N/A N/A 2003 - 50.05 2007 - 41.52 2004 - 64.2 2004 (Pr) - 68 2009 - 80 2009 (Pr) - 85.22 N/A 2003 - 71.34 2006 (Pr) - 62.89 (Voter Turnout, n.d.)

Lebanon Libya Morocco Oman Palestine (West Bank) Qatar Saudi Arabia Syria

Tunisia

United Arab Emirates Yemen

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The data for voter turnout, provided by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) and compiled in Table 2-3, is often confusing. In countries like Iran, Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine, the percentage of the eligible population that voted is sometimes larger than the percentage of registered voters who cast their vote, which indicates either a statistical inaccuracy or potential voter fraud. Reliable data for municipal elections in Libya, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE were not found. Data for voter turnout compared to the eligible voting population is preferable to data compared to the number of registered voters, as it indicates the political involvement of the country on a broader level. In the majority of Middle Eastern autocracies, voter turnout from 2000 to December of 2010 was neither particularly high or low. Algeria, Bahrain, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine and Syria all had moderate voter turnout, both in the percentage of registered voters and of the eligible population. This indicates a relatively stable relationship between state and society in that time. Iraq, Tunisia and Yemen had very high levels of voter turnout among the eligible population, indicating a strong desire for policy change; in the case of Iraq, this can be explained by the imposition of democracy by the United States following the overthrow of Saddam Husseins autocratic regime. Both Kuwait and Oman averaged moderate voter turnout among registered voters, but the number of registered voters was a very small portion of the eligible population, which indicates a lack of faith or interest in the workings of government. Moroccos voter turnout is fairly low, but nowhere near as low as in Egypt, where around 80% of the eligible voting population did not participate in presidential or parliamentary elections. Iran is anomalous, averaging high voter turnout in three parliamentary elections in the decade while achieving very low turnout during

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the 2008 presidential election. Such wild fluctuation indicates a disconnect between the workings of government and the faith of its people in its ability to function properly. II. Corruption Because I could not find a measure of trust for every country I am exploring, I have decided to examine another potential source of trust in government: corruption. Corruption includes, but is not limited to, bribery of public officials, kickbacks in public procurement, [and the] embezzlement of public funds (Transparency International, 2010). If a government is corrupt and is known to be corrupt, one can logically hypothesize that the citizens of that state will not be able to fully trust the actions of its leadership. Transparency International has quantified the relative corruption of countries around the world since 1995 and is a reliable source to examine the levels of corruption within Arab autocracies.
Table 2-4: Corruption in Arab Autocracies Country Algeria Bahrain Egypt Iran Iraq Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Libya Corruption Index 2.9 4.9 3.1 2.2 1.5 4.7 4.5 2.5 2.2 Country Morocco Oman Palestine (West Bank) Qatar Saudi Arabia Syria Tunisia United Arab Emirates Yemen Corruption Index 3.4 5.3 N/A 7.7 4.7 2.5 4.3 6.3 2.2 (Transparency International, 2010)

The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) measures each country on a scale from 0 to 10, 0 meaning a countrys government is entirely corrupt and 10 meaning a countrys government is very clean. These results have been compiled in Table 2-4. The CPI did not record the perceived

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corruption of the Palestinian territories. Of the eighteen countries I am examining, Iraq, Iran, Yemen and Libya are the most corrupt, and would theoretically be the most likely to experience high levels of protest. Syria, Lebanon, Algeria, Egypt and Morocco are moderately less corrupt but are still somewhat likely to be demonstrated against. Tunisia, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Bahrain are almost equally clean and corrupt, and Oman and the UAE are more honest in their actions than dishonest, lending their regimes credibility and making them fairly trustworthy. Most surprising is Qatar, a government which Transparency International quantifies as less corrupt than both the United States and the United Kingdom. According to this index, the people of Qatar should trust their government to perform the tasks they set out to do, more so than many fully developed democracies.

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D. Openness of Civil Society The World Bank defines civil society as the non-governmental and not-for-profit organizations that have a presence in public life, expressing the interests and values of their members or others, based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic considerations (Defining civil society, 2010). In many autocratic regimes, legal restrictions and social norms are in place to prevent people from taking an active role in civil society, preventing them from organizing or communicating politically. In place of an open civil society, the Internet can act as a virtual meeting place for discussion of anything from music to politics. I hypothesize that the Internet can be especially effective in organizing political dissent in the absence of an open civil society. Nongovernmental organizations are defined by the Encyclopedia Britannica as voluntary group of individuals or organizations, usually not affiliated with any government, that is formed to provide services or to advocate a public policy (Nongovernmental organization, 2012). In closed civil societies, the number of nongovernmental organizations will be low due to a regimes oppression of dissenting viewpoints. The World Association of Non-Governmental Organizations (WANGO) maintains a database of registered NGOs in all regions of the world, including Arab countries, and serves as the foundation for this measurement.
Table 2-5: Number of Nongovernmental Organizations Country Algeria Bahrain Egypt Iran Iraq Number of NGOs 15 16 93 0 30 Country Morocco Oman Palestinian Territories Qatar Saudi Arabia Number of NGOs 25 1 22 5 21

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Country Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Libya

Number of NGOs 105 11 87 6

Country Syria Tunisia United Arab Emirates Yemen

Number of NGOs 17 28 22 6 (Worldwide NGO Directory, 2012)

According to this measurement, Iran has by far the most closed civil society with zero listed nongovernmental organizations; this indicates that the Internet would be a likely place for the organization of political protest. Oman, Qatar, Libya, Kuwait and Yemen also have a very low number of NGOs, indicating that their civil society is mostly closed. Countries with a slightly more open civil society include Algeria, Bahrain, Syria, Saudi Arabia, the Palestinian territories and the UAE. Even more open civil societies exist in Morocco, Tunisia, and Iraq, where the chances of online dissent would be moderate. Furthest down the spectrum, Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon have an exponentially higher degree of freedom within their civil society, and are least likely to be susceptible to the organization of political protest through the Internet.

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E. Protest In this model, the dependent variable is protest. In his book, Theories of Political Protest and Social Movements, Karl-Dieter Opp defines protest as the joint (i.e. collective) action of individuals aimed at achieving their goal or goals by influencing the decisions of a target. (Opp, 2009) I hypothesized that countries which were determined to have high Internet penetration, low regulation, low trust in government and closed civil societies will be more likely to experience political protest organized on the Internet. To measure the amount of protest in each country, I counted the number of times the word protest was used in the New York Times from 2000 to December of 2010. This is a reasonable measurement because, if a protest is reported on, it can be reasonably assumed that it was somewhat important, especially in a newspaper with as many possible stories each day as the New York Times. To perform this count, I searched the ProQuest database for the following: [country] and protest. After recording the number of results I received, I then searched for the following: [country] and Internet and protest. This search gives a more accurate depiction of how important a role the Internet could have played in organizing protest within Arab autocracies. I recorded the results and compiled them in Table 2-6 below. Because Palestine is not an official country and would not yield proportionate results, I instead searched for Palestinian and protest.
Table 2-6: Mentions of Protest in New York Times Country Mentions of Protest in New York Times 113 41 Mentions of Internet and Protest in New York Times 10 4

Algeria Bahrain

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Country

Mentions of Protest in New York Times 427 1026 2358 389 153 375 111 98 22 918 92 306 279 37 83 101

Mentions of Internet and Protest in New York Times 50 124 239 33 15 45 7 11 1 76 9

44

Egypt Iran Iraq Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Libya Morocco Oman Palestine (West Bank) Qatar Saudi Arabia Syria Tunisia United Arab Emirates Yemen

28 6 11 16 (Basic Search, 2012)

When the results of both searches are compared to each other, an interesting coincidence can be found: for nearly every ten instances of the word protest found in the New York Times for each country, there is one instance of the word Internet; this would indicate that the presence of the Internet influenced the course of political protest about 10% of the times in which protest occurred. This percentage differs slightly in each country, but it is an interesting trend.

26

Iraq, Iran and Palestine yielded by far the most results in both searches. This indicates that there is a high level of discontent with the status quo and their citizens are taking action to change this. In the case of Iraq, the search would take into account both protests in Iraq against their government as well as protests worldwide against the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, which makes the search unreliable in establishing anything more than an atmosphere of protest around the country. Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Syria had a significant number of hits in the search, which suggests a moderate level of unrest within the country from 2000 to 2010. Kuwait, Algeria, Libya, Yemen, Morocco, Qatar, and the UAE received moderate hits through this search, while Bahrain, Tunisia and Oman garnered very few results.

27

F. Findings In this section, I will compare the results found for each independent variable with the dependent variable of protest experienced in each Arab country. Before doing so, I find it necessary to exclude two countries from this comparison: Iraq and Palestine. In both cases, the level of protest cannot be objectively seen as valid due to extenuating circumstances. In Iraq, the American invasion of the country has sparked international protests against the United States, and any number of stories found in the New York Times database search could have been covering those protests rather than internal protests against the Iraqi government. In Palestine, a quasi-state in constant dispute with Israel, support of and opposition to their cause has spread to all parts of the world, making the distinction between protests inside the state and protests around the world impossible to make. Therefore, I have excluded these two countries from further analysis due to the possibility of skewing the results. I. Internet Penetration In comparing Internet penetration with the measured level of protest, I find little correlation between the two. The countries with the lowest level of protest (Oman, Tunisia, Bahrain, the UAE, Qatar and Morocco) all have moderate to high levels of Internet penetration; in fact, the UAE and Qatar have the most Internet penetration of any country in the Arab world. Iran, Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia also have moderate to high levels of Internet penetration, but those countries also experienced high levels of protest. Egypts moderately low Internet penetration yielded the second-highest level of protest, while Kuwaits relatively high penetration resulted in less the number that Egypt garnered. The countries with the lowest Internet penetration (Yemen, Libya and Algeria) had moderate levels of protest. In the graph

28

below (Chart 1), the percentage of the population with access is paired with each countrys protest results. One can see that, in a line of best fit, there is little variation between the average levels of protest experienced in countries with high and low penetration. These results have led me to conclude that Internet penetration does not have a substantive effect on the level of protest experienced in Arab countries.
Chart 1: Internet Penetration vs. Protest 1500

Measured Incidences of Protest

1125

750

375

17.5

35.0 Internet Penetration (% of population)

52.5

70.0

When it comes to the number of people using the Internet, the results are equally sporadic. Although the Internet-using populations of Oman and Jordan are nearly the same, Oman experienced dramatically less protest from 2000 to 2010. With nearly 4 million users, Tunisia was predicted to yield fairly large numbers of protest; instead, Tunisia measured the second-lowest level of protest. Egypt and Iran, the two countries with the largest number of

29

online citizens, experienced the highest number of protests. Bahrain, Qatar and Libya, all countries which experienced low to moderately low protest, had less than a million Internet users, as predicted. Despite having over 15 million users, Morocco experienced a lower level of protest than Libya, which had the smallest number of Internet users. Lebanon and Kuwaits similarity in online population does not coincide with their difference in protest experienced. However, the trend of larger Internet-using populations yielding more incidences of protest (as demonstrated in Chart 2) leads me to conclude that there is a strong correlation between the likelihood of protest and a large online population.
Chart 2: Online Population vs. Protest 1500

Measured Incidences of Protest

1125

750

375

10,000,000

20,000,000

30,000,000

40,000,000

Size of Online Population (# of Internet users)

30

II. Internet Regulation

Chart 3: Internet Regulation vs. Protest 1500

Measured Incidences of Protest

1125

750

375

3.0

3.5

4.0

4.5 Number of Regulatory Tactics

5.0

5.5

6.0

The results of comparing Internet regulation with the counted incidences of protest are intriguing. The country with the lowest noted level of protest, Oman, also had the lowest number of regulatory tactics; Kuwait, which had the same number of regulatory tactics, had nearly seven times the incidence of protest, but was still moderate. Tunisia and Bahrain were among the most regulatory countries, but had a very low level of protest. Three of the six countries who experienced the most protest also employed the strictest regulation (Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Iran), and of the other three (Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt), both Jordan and Egypt employed the second-highest level of regulation. In Chart 3, a clear trend can be seen between the number of regulatory tactics used and the amount of protest a country experiences. In direct contrast to my hypothesis, it appears that the more regulatory tactics a country employs, the more likely it is that protest is to occur. These results may be due to the specific types of regulatory measures

31

employed; for instance, the high price of Internet access in some countries may not be as intrusive or effective as laws and regulations put in place to criminalize certain aspects of Internet use. III. Trust in Government Quantifying the voter turnout of these countries is a difficult process to do in a limited space. I have taken into account the average percentage of voter turnout, how well that represents the eligible population, the trends in voting percentage, and the possibility of voter fraud (Table 2-7). I hypothesized that countries with moderate turnout, moderate representation and minimal fluctuation would be least likely to experience protest. The countries which did not have reliable election data (Qatar, the UAE, Libya and Saudi Arabia) experienced low to moderate protest, indicating that political participation does not necessarily prevent protest. The country with the lowest protest, Oman, had moderate turnout in its elections among registered, but low turnout among eligible citizens. Tunisia had very high turnout in both categories, which I predicted would indicate high protest; this was not the case. Most countries had turnout consistent with the level of protest they experienced. The main exceptions to this were Morocco and Yemen, who, despite having fairly low and high turnout respectively, were among the lower levels of protest. Jordan also had moderate turnout, but a high level of protest. While Lebanon had moderate turnout, the potential for voter fraud is evident in the disparity between the turnout of registered voters and of the eligible voting population. The two countries with the most protest, Egypt and Iran, were the most extreme cases of turnout on both ends. In Egypt, the voter turnout never went above 30%, which predicted high protest. Iran had the theoretical perfect storm for increased protest: high turnout, high representation, wide fluctuation

32

and the possibility of voter fraud. This leads me to conclude that very low voter turnout or wildly fluctuating turnout has a strong connection to high levels of protest.
Table 2-7: Voter Turnout versus Measured Incidences of Protest Country Voter Turnout Moderate with mild fluctuation (moderate representation) Moderate (moderate representation) Very Low (low representation) High with wide fluctuation (high representation, possible fraud) Moderate (moderate representation) Moderate with mild fluctuation (low representation) Moderate (moderate representation, possible fraud) N/A Fairly Low with mild fluctuation (fairly low representation) Moderate (low representation) N/A N/A Moderate (moderate representation) Very High (high representation) N/A Measured Incidences of Protest 113

Algeria

Bahrain Egypt

41 427

Iran

1026

Jordan

389

Kuwait

153

Lebanon Libya Morocco

375 111 98

Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia Syria Tunisia United Arab Emirates

22 92 306 279 37 83

33

Country Yemen

Voter Turnout Fairly High (fairly high representation)

Measured Incidences of Protest 101

Chart 4: Level of Corruption vs. Protest 1500

Measured Incidences of Protest

1125

750

375

10

Corruption Index Level

In terms of corruption, the five countries with the lowest measured protest levels are among the least corrupt governments. The country which experienced the most protest, Iran, was also one of three countries with the highest corruption; the other two, Yemen and Libya, experienced moderate protest. The second-most corrupt countries, Lebanon and Egypt, experienced a significant level of protest. While Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Jordan are relatively clean, they also experienced significant protest. The cleanest countries (Bahrain Oman, the UAE and Qatar) experienced a low level of protest, as predicted. Due to the generally positive correlation between a low level of corruption and low levels of protest, as well as the trend of

34

higher corruption leading to higher protest (Chart 4), I can conclude that the level of corruption correlates with the level of protest experienced in Arab countries. IV. Openness of Civil Society I hypothesized that the Internet would assist in organizing protest in societies with a limited degree of openness. In the most extreme case of protest, this holds true; Iran has no registered NGOs with the World Association of Non-Governmental Organizations (WANGO). However, the country with the second fewest registered NGOs, Oman, experienced the least protest, which somewhat negates the positive result on the other end.
Chart 5: Openness of Civil Society vs. Protest 1500

Measured Incidences of Protest

1125

750

375

37.5

75.0

112.5

150.0

Number of Non-Governmental Organizations

Besides Iran, the three countries with the most protest were the three most open civil societies; Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon averaged around 95 registered NGOs between them. After them, Tunisias 28 NGOs are the next highest, but yield the second-lowest protest. However, the discrepancy between Lebanons 87 NGOs and Tunisias 28 is huge, and cannot be overlooked.

35

Algeria, Bahrain, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, and Yemen all have relatively closed civil societies, yet did not experience a large amount of protest. The UAE, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia have a similar number of NGOs, yet Saudi Arabia experiences dramatically larger numbers of protest. In Chart 5, a clear trend towards high protest in countries with open civil societies is observed. From these results, I can conclude that an open civil society correlates with a higher level of protest in Arab autocracies, but there is no conclusive correlation between closed civil societies and high levels of protest.

36

F. Summary of Results In this chapter, I hypothesized how four variables (Internet penetration, Internet regulation, trust in government, and the openness of civil society) would affect the amount of protest experienced in Arab countries. I predicted that countries with high Internet penetration and a large online population would be more likely to experience high levels of protest. Second, I posited that countries with low levels of Internet regulation would be more vulnerable to the effects of politicized Internet use. I also predicted that countries whose populations had little faith in their government would be more likely to organize political protest online. Finally, I hypothesized that countries in which open civil interaction was restricted would also be more likely to experience Internet-organized protest. After comparing these four variables with the level of protest experienced in Arab countries, I must make modifications to my empirical model. I found that, while a large online population did coincide with high levels of protest, high Internet penetration did not have a positive or negative correlation. My prediction for the effect of Internet regulation was also incorrect, as I observed a correlation between a high level of regulation and a high level of protest. My predictions about trust in government were accurate, as corrupt governments and governments with extraordinary voter turnout were found to be more likely to experience protest. Finally, my hypothesis concerning the openness of civil society was incorrect; I observed a positive correlation between a large number of non-governmental organization and a high level of protest.

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Chapter III: Case Studies

A. Introduction In my findings, I observed that several countries with similar dependent variables had vastly different measurements when their independent variables are quantified. Of those countries, none are as wildly disparate as Iran and Oman, who were found to be the countries with the highest and lowest levels of protest respectively. Both countries have relatively high Internet penetration and a very closed civil society, with a difference in the size of the online population, Internet regulation and trust in government. To account for these differences, I will explore recent events as well as the cultural and societal atmosphere in both Oman and Iran to understand why instances of protest were much higher in Iran than in Oman. I will specifically focus upon the use of the Internet as a political tool in each country, as well as how the citizens of each country perceive the leadership of their government.

38

B. Iran In Chapter 2, I found Iran to have a high level of Internet penetration as well as a very large online population, which I found to be a positive contributor to the number of protests. Iran is one of the most oppressive regimes in the Arab world when it comes to Internet regulation, which I found to correlate with the amount of protest a country experiences. Additionally, Irans records for voter turnout wildly fluctuate from very high to very low participation, and because a larger percentage of the population voted than did a percentage of registered voters, I concluded that there was a possibility for voter fraud. Both of these were found to correlate with an increased likelihood in Internet-organized protest. Irans government is one of the most corrupt in the region, which also correlates with a high level of protest. Finally, Iran has a very closed civil society with zero registered non-governmental organizations, but the effects of a society restricted to that degree were found to be inconclusive. When taken as a whole, I predicted that Iran would experience a high level of protest, and it did. I. Background The Islamic Republic of Iran is led by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, a Shiite cleric. Khamenei controls all three branches of Irans government, either directly or indirectly. The President of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, was chosen in a public election in 2005 and reelected in 2009; however, each candidate for President is examined and approved by an appointed panel of twelve members called the Council of Guardians, providing Khamenei with a method of control over each candidate (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor [BDHRL] Iran, 2010; Freedom House [FH] Iran, 2011). Irans unicameral legislature, the Islamic Consultative Assembly (or Majles), is also publicly elected. All the candidates, as well as any legislation

39

proposed by the Majles, is reviewed by the Guardian Council before it is passed (BDHRL Iran, 2010). The judicial branchs power is derived from Sharia law, an Islamic code of law which strictly presides over social and political behavior (FH Iran, 2011). Through these methods of control, Khamenei was able to enact restrictive social and political policies. Additionally, Khamenei directly controls Irans army, the Revolutionary Guard, tightening his oppressive grip. Corruption within the Iranian government is widespread and problematic. The Iranian clergy has been able to gain tremendous economic wealth through tax-free companies because of the Ayatollahs firm hold on political power. Former Revolutionary Guard members receive special privileges within the government, including appointment to positions and the ability to pick and choose government contracts (FH Iran, 2011) President Ahmadinejad also instituted wealth-redistribution efforts, which have effectively catered almost exclusively to military and paramilitary groups, (FH Iran, 2011) further cementing Khameneis autocratic leadership. II. Political and Civil Liberties The citizens of Iran have very few political and civil liberties under the repressive regime of Ayatollah Khamenei. The nature of the Islamic Penal Code in Iran allows for the arbitrary application of vague statutes and the abuse of power (U.N. Human Rights Council [UNHRC], 2012). Different articles of the Code criminalize the insult of Islam or the Ayatollah, disturbing the peace, antigovernment propaganda, and collusion against the government. One bill currently in legislation, the Parties and Associations Law Reform Plan, would prevent those who associate with antigovernment groups from forming or joining political parties (UNHRC, 2012). In April of 2010, the courts banned two parties from participating in political activities due to suspected collusion with foreign powers (FH Iran, 2011). These laws place severe

40

restrictions on the ability of Iranian citizens to publicly organize or even discuss the problems that the abuse of power is causing for average Iranian citizens, and could push them toward other outlets of discussion. All traditional media outlets are heavily monitored by the Iranian government, and regulation of the press is an important part of Khameneis strategy to maintain power. The government controls all domestic radio and television broadcast, and the possession of satellite dishes to receive international media is outlawed. Iran has also begun to jam broadcasts from overseas to further insulate the population from potentially subversive material. Additionally, the government must approve the publication of all books, and inspects foreign books for incendiary or controversial subjects (FH Iran, 2011). Iran has also cracked down on domestic news publications since the 2009 election protests, a subject I will explore later. Since that time, 42 journalists have been imprisoned, and 150 have fled the country from fear of persecution and arrest. Some reporters in Iran reported to the United Nations that the National Security Council directly censored newspapers by telling them what issues to cover through memos or telephone calls; the reporter said that authorities used to tell us before what not to write, and now they are telling us what to write as well [emphasis added] (UNHRC, 2012). These factors make it nearly impossible to physically publish material in opposition to the government, and open the door wider for online writing or blogging to become a dominant form of communicating dissenting viewpoints. The Iranian justice system is riddled with violations of human rights and judicial practices. The United Nations reports a multitude of frequent infractions of the written law, including the abandonment of due process, failure to present warrants before the conducting of

41

unlawful searches, and the imprisonment of people without a charge (UNHRC, 2012). On several occasions, lawyers were not allowed to see their clients or defend them in court, and the trial itself is often quick and a formality. Prisoners are subject to solitary confinement, electric shocks, beatings, threats against the lives of loved ones, and are sometimes forced to make videotaped confessions (UNHRC, 2012). According to the report, over 650 executions took place in 2011 alone either publicly or in secret, and while Iran recently instituted a ban on stoning, it is not strictly enforced (UNHRC, 2012). Though not necessarily illegal under domestic law, many of these practices are in direct violation of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations, 1948), a declaration which Iran voted in favor of. Such horrific practices serve the government to establish a societal fear of their power, but also may be a potential source of grievance for a large online population. Many different social groups are subject to the defamatory and discriminatory practices of the Iranian government. While the conditions in Iran for women have drastically improved in recent years, there is still systematic oppression on a different level. Many women do not have equal access to educational and professional opportunities, and quotas limit the number of women that can participate in specific academic programs (UNHRC, 2012). Independent labor unions are formally outlawed, and when they arise, their members are charged with crimes like propaganda against the system (UNHRC, 2012). Religious minorities are subject to intense persecution, especially the Bahais. Members of this religion are subject to random arrest and accused of trying to subvert Islam. Hundreds of Bahais have been arrested, tried and sentenced in recent years, and intense pressure from the government has left the Bahai deprived of property, employment and education (UNHRC, 2012). Discrimination is rampant among ethnic

42

minorities, particularly the Kurds. The United Nations reports that Kurds frequently face death sentences for crimes like sedition and corruption on earth. Their land is arbitrarily taken from them, they are denied employment and fair trials, are tortured and subject to secret executions (UNHRC, 2012). Another publicly oppressed group are lesbians, gays, bisexuals and the transgendered community. Homosexuality is a crime under the Islamic Penal Code, and offenders face execution. Additionally, the government employs its vague statutes to arbitrarily punish those who choose to display immoral behavior (UNHRC, 2012). With so many groups systematically oppressed by the government, it is highly probable that their respective plights have contributed to the high levels of protest within Iran. III. Major Protests Iranian elections in recent years have been the cause of growing concern both internally and internationally. In the 2008 parliamentary election, it was noted that, even though many votes had gone uncounted and voting stations were still open, the results of the election were announced anyway (UNHRC, 2012). Members of the Majles protested, and the government ordered that all results be kept private until the official count was released the next morning. However, that count was the same as those reported by the media earlier, and although candidates were allowed to submit complaints, Khamenei declared the results official the same day, making any complaints pointless (UNHRC, 2012). The next year, during the 2009 presidential election, the state prevented the representatives of candidates opposing Ahmadinejad from monitoring polling stations; additionally, similar to the year prior, the results were announced before all the polls were closed (UNHRC, 2012). A witness for the United Nations reported that text messages, which were used by campaigns to communicate with each other, had

43

been interrupted. There were 3 million more votes cast than ballots distributed, and several campaign workers for opposing candidates were arrested (UNHRC, 2012). This led the author of a United Nations report to declare that these occurrences indicated that the authorities conspired to commit electoral fraud and to allay suspicion and protests (UNHRC, 2012). A nationwide protest against the results of the election began on June 13th, after it was revealed that Ahmadinejad had won by a margin of nearly 30 points. Thousands of Iranians rallied in Tehran, which led Khamenei, who had initially supported the result, to agree to an investigation of voter fraud (CNN, 2009); as of 2012, these investigations have not come to fruition (UNHRC, 2012). Following increased protests, Iran prohibited foreign media outlets from going into the streets and reporting, an example of their strict censorship of independent media. While protests continued off and on for the rest of the year, Ahmadinejad was sworn in for his second term in office, and Khamenei retained his power, partially due to the efforts of security forces under his control, which policed all demonstrations and prevented further largescale gatherings (FH Iran, 2011). In July of 2010, the Majles passed legislation which pushed parliamentary elections in 2010 back to 2013 in a sign of the hard-line leaderships concerns about dwindling popular and elite support (FH Iran, 2011). IV. Internet Usage & Regulation Irans history of Internet development has been conflicted between the desire for economic growth and the need to suppress political dissent. In the 1990s, the Internet was introduced by the private sector as a means of diversifying the economy and removing it off of its dependence on oil production. Seeing the potential economic benefits of widespread Internet use, President Mohammad Khatami heavily funded the introduction of Internet infrastructure

44

during his tenure from 1997 to 2005 (United States Institute of Peace [USIP], 2011). However, as infrastructure and penetration increased, the government saw a need to clamp down on the potential use of the Internet as a political catalyst. In 2001, Ayatollah Khamenei issued a decree to end private Internet service providers; to continue to provide access, companies were made to obtain a license from state service providers (USIP, 2011), effectively giving the government a monopoly on Internet access. The first group to successfully use the Internet as a political tool in Iran were women, who used blogs and websites as gathering places because of oppressive Islamic cultural standards. Through them, women were able to spread news of their condition, mobilize protests and connect with womens groups across the world (Razzaghi, 2011). Despite the strict regulation by the Iranian government, women were able to distribute and receive dissenting material and act on behalf of their causes. Since then, single-issue campaigns have been the most effective examples of political action, as greater gender equality and the formal abolishment of stoning as a sentence have been the result of significant online campaigns (Razzaghi, 2011). In the immediate wake of the 2009 presidential election, the Internet proved to be of the utmost importance in organizing protest. Through the use of social networks like Facebook and Twitter, Iranian citizens were able to provide the international community with real-time updates on the election, including the Revolutionary Guards crackdown on peaceful protests. Image and video sharing websites like YouTube allowed Iranians to give the world undeniable proof of the injustices that were being perpetrated by the presiding authority (BBC News, 2009). For example, the shooting death of Neda Agha-Soltan was captured by video cameras and uploaded to YouTube (Fathi, 2009), where it became a powerful symbol of the Iranian peoples struggle

45

against tyranny. Additionally, blogs around the world began to compile this information and provide media outlets with up-to-date information about the election and closely monitor the proceedings, even without bodies on the ground. Even though the Iranian authorities would eventually take action against Internet resistance and quell it for the most part, The 2009 protests demonstrated how effective online mobilization could be for the governments opposition. After the election protests in 2009, the government realized that the economic benefits of Internet access did not outweigh the potential risks of political Internet use. A more sophisticated system of regulation was put in place to grant authorities even more direct control over domestic Internet use. Because of their control of the Iran Telecommunications Company, which provides the country with the majority of their Internet access, the government has the ability to virtually shut down the Internet within the country at any given time (Razzaghi, 2011). With this control, connection speed can also be slowed to a crawl, making use more difficult for the entire population. The government also began ordering blog hosting websites to remove dissenting posts while replacing them with a wide array of pro-government propaganda (USIP, 2011). In specific instances, the Revolutionary Guards Cyber Army, consisting of hackers and computer programmers paid high salaries to be complicit in the governments actions, will hack oppositional websites or websites deemed immoral (Razzaghi, 2011). In addition to increased online monitoring, the battle against oppositional Internet usage has also been waged in the legal realm. As of 2012, Iranian authorities have 19 netizens in incarceration (Press Freedom Barometer [PFB], 2012) for various crimes ranging from the insult of Islam to plotting against government. One of the groups most heavily persecuted are womens rights activists, with one blogger receiving a year in prison and a 30-year ban from journalism.

46

Another womens rights activist, 18-year-old Navid Mohebbi, was originally sentenced to three years in prison for activities contrary to national security, but was released a few months later (Reporters Without Borders [RWB], 2011). The authorities have also begun to use censorship of pornography as a way to arrest political dissidents. Saeed Malekpour, an Iranian with dual citizenship in Canada, and Vahid Asgari were both sentenced to death for purportedly creating an image-hosting program which was then used by third parties to upload pornography. Reporters Without Borders reports that these individuals were actually managing several oppositional websites, and that they have been charged with the crime of indecency to give their punishment a firmer sense of validity (RWB, 2011). Despite the risks of using the Internet for political purposes, dissidents have continued to defy authority and use it as a tool for dissemination and organization. Savvy Internet users utilize proxy sites, alternate software, and website archives to circumvent governmental regulation. Even after recent condemnations of their usage, the youth majority continues to use Facebook, YouTube and other social mediums to convey their message to the rest of the world (Razzaghi, 2011). The Green Movement, a group of Iranian citizens who grew out of the movement for political-civil rights, (Razzaghi, 2011) rose to prominence during the 2009 protests as one of the leading voices of the opposition. Some private citizens have also begun hacking governmentcontrolled websites, like the official site of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the Islamic Republic News Agency. These attacks are taken as a foil to the attacks of the Revolutionary Guards Cyber Army, and effectively communicate the populations discontent with the status quo in Iranian society.

47

V. Conclusion ! In Iran, it is entirely understandable why the Internet has been viewed by the international

media as a democratizing tool. The combination of a thoroughly corrupt autocracy, severe limitations on personal freedom of speech and association, and the extreme alienation of cultural minorities and women all serve as potential causes of grievance. Because laws prevent them from expressing these grievances publicly, these alienated groups, as well as those who perceive and are offended by these injustices, turn to the Internet as a means of communicating both domestically and internationally. As 70% of the population was born after the Iranian Revolution (USIP, 2011), during which the secular Shah was overthrown by a populist conservative Islamic movement, the country is relatively young and capable of circumventing government control of the Internet to achieve its means. I will expand on this later in the chapter.

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C. Oman ! To briey summarize, I observed that while Oman has a high level of Internet

penetration, the online population is relatively small, which would not affect the likelihood of Internet-assisted protest. Oman also employs a fairly low level of Internet regulation, which did not coincide with high levels of protest. Parliamentary elections in Oman had a high registered voter turnout, but were not representative of the population eligible to vote; as this was a slight inconsistency, I concluded that it had a small chance of positively affecting the possibility of Internet-organized protest. Finally, I found that Oman had a very closed civil society, which I found to be inconclusive in determining the level of protest within a country. When taken as I a whole, I assumed that Oman would experience a low level of protest, specically protest organized online, and I was partially correct; I did not expect Oman would experience as little protest as I measured. I. Background ! The Sultanate of Oman is an absolute monarchy, controlled by Sultan Qaboos bin Said

Al-Bu Said. Located on the easternmost point of the Arabian Peninsula, Oman has a population of approximately three million people, five hundred thousand of whom are non-nationals (Central Intelligence Agency [CIA], 2012). After taking over during a coup in 1970, Qaboos promised to modernize Oman as a whole (EDC, 2011); this plan has been implemented with moderate success. Historically an oil-rich country, Omans reserves have begun to deplete in recent years, although with recent developments in oil recovery techniques, their output is on the rise (Export Development Canada [EDC], 2011). In 1998, the government proposed a plan called Vision 2020, which sought to diversify Omans economic portfolio and move away from an oil-based economy by using the profits from oil reserves to fund infrastructure development.

49

Although their reserves are not nearly as large as other countries in the Arabian Peninsula, their accessible government makes them a more popular destination for oil-seeking companies and nations like the United States (Petrochemicals Middle East [PME], 2010). Apart from its oil exports, tourism is one of Omans main sources of domestic income (CIA, 2012). In 2011, the GDP per capita in Oman was over $26,000, which provides Omani citizens with a relatively comfortable life (CIA, 2012). Approximately 75% of the countrys population are Ibadi Muslims (CIA, 2012), an Islamic offshoot that characterizes itself as fundamentally different from other Islamic sects. A spiritual descendant of the Khawarij sect, Ibadi Muslims do not see practitioners of other faiths as unbelievers whose guilt merits the capital punishment, (Hoffman, n.d.) but rather as people who have not recognized Gods blessings. Rather than completely disown those who do not closely follow Islam, Ibadi Muslims dissociate themselves with that person and do not seek good friendship (Hoffman). Because of this, Oman has a closed civil society, not born of governmental oppression but of cultural tradition. While Oman has made democratic progress in the past few decades, all legislative decisions rest with the Sultan. In 1991, Qaboos ordered the establishment of the Shura Council, a bicameral representative body with the intention of bridging the gap between citizens and government (Travel Document Systems [TDS], 2012). Open elections were held for this Council in 2000, and in 2003 all Omani citizens over the age of 21 were granted the right to vote (EDC, 2011). However, the Shura Council has no legislative power, only the authority to advise the Sultan on regional matters of concern (TDS, 2012). The Omani legal system is a combination of the traditional penal system and sharia law, which settles issues of personal status and family

50

law. All of these courts serve beneath the Ministry of Justice, which affirms the systems separation from the other branches of the Sultans rule (Background note). Although the Omani councils are male-dominated, women have become better represented in recent years. In 2005, the Sultan expanded his State Council from 53 to 59 people, including nine women (Background note). II. Political & Civil Liberties The United States Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor reports that the government generally respect[s] the human rights of its citizens (BDHRL Oman, 2010). Despite this, Oman still employs vague laws against its own citizens which prevent them from freely communicating or associating with each other. Political parties are forbidden in Oman, as they would challenge the rule of the Sultan (FH Oman, 2011). All speech critical of the Sultan, the state itself, or any of its officials is illegal; additionally, any messages of any form that violate public order and morals or are harmful to a persons safety (BDHRL Oman, 2010) is forbidden, which is applicably vague. The government requires advance permission before any public gatherings happen, and has the ability to prevent them from taking place if desired. Although nongovernmental organizations are permitted within the country, they are required to register with the Omani government; this process allows them to block the foundation of human rights organizations (FH Oman, 2011). While there are independent media sources within Oman, they generally share the opinion of government-controlled media outlets (BDHRL Oman, 2010). This leads me to conclude that there is a measure of self-censorship employed within the country. The Ministry of Information is permitted to review both domestically and internationally produced media and

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books before publication; this process is only occasionally employed, as the limited number of publishers in Oman makes widespread distribution of dissenting material very difficult (BDHRL Oman, 2010). The government also prevents academic institutions from publishing and distributing material on sensitive subjects (FH Oman, 2011). Three authors have been forbidden from making public or media appearances due to material which was allegedly critical of the government or detrimental to national security. Two of them, Abdullah al-Riyami and Mohamed al-Yahyai, were convicted of creating an antigovernment organization, although they were later given pardons by the Sultan (BDHRL Oman, 2010). The Omani justice system has also been the cause of some scrutiny, although generally the courts follow consistent models. There is no requirement of a trial by jury, and although arbitrary arrest and detention are prohibited, there is no necessity for a warrant when searching a building (FH Oman, 2011). Freedom House reports that independent observers were not permitted regular access to Omani prisons to assess their conditions; although there have been allegations of inhumane conditions, no tangible results have been produced from their investigations (BDHRL Oman, 2010). Through their laws and regulations, the Omani government runs the risk of alienating various societal groups. Although the government allows committees of workers to voice their grievances and promote interests, unions are forbidden among government workers, domestic workers and the armed forces (FH Oman, 2011). Additionally, the unions that are allowed to exist must notify the government before conducting any meetings; the law also dictates that strikes may not take place unless the employer of a workforce has been given three weeks notice (BDHRL Oman, 2010). Oman formally prohibits discrimination based upon gender, although

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it still happens with frequency. The justice system has not criminalized the acts of domestic violence, spousal rape, or female genital mutilation; sexual harassment is not formally illegal either (BDHRL Oman, 2010). Men are favored in civil court because of their gender, especially in matters of marriage, divorce, inheritance, and custody battles (FH Oman, 2011). Homosexuality is criminalized, and carries a jail sentence of anywhere from six months to 3 years; because of the religiosity of Ibadi Muslims, the subject of homosexuality is not widely spoken of (BDHRL Oman, 2010). Although the official religion of Oman is Islam, people of other religions are allowed to practice their faith, so long as they do not publicly preach their faith; non-Muslim organizations are also required to register with the authorities. Additionally, Islamic places of worship are expected to conform to state wishes; standard sermons are distributed amongst imams, and it is expected that the imams stay within the outlines (FH Oman, 2011) of these prewritten sermons. III. Major Protests As shown in my empirical chapter, there were minimal levels of protest within Oman from the year 2000 to 2010. In 2011, however, with the Arab Spring in full effect, Oman experienced its first major protests. These protests began peacefully at the end of January, when approximately 200 protesters congregated near the governments housing ministry (Ferris-Lay, 2011). They remained peaceful until the end of February, after pressure from the protests caused Sultan Qaboos to issue a decree which, among other things, raised the value of governmentprovided stipends to university students, shuffled the Sultans cabinet, and created a bureau with the intention of implementing fair prices for material goods (Al Jazeera, 2011). Despite these attempts at appeasement, the protests turned violent days afterward, when protesters in the city of

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Sohar blocked access to ports, oil refineries and factories, demanding better pay, lower prices the abolition of all taxes [and] an end to corruption (Bakri, 2011). Protestors set cars, homes, a police station, and a supermarket on fire (Reeve, 2011). When the Sohar police clashed with protesters, Reuters reported that six people were killed, while the state media of Oman reported only two. In response to this violence, Qaboos met the protesters request for more jobs by hiring 50,000 people to work in the government sector (Bakri, 2011). Despite these protests, the Sultans popularity did not suffer. While Omani citizens demanded an end to corruption in government, they held the Sultan himself in high esteem. According to one citizen, the Omanis love the Sultan and respect and consider him a father to them (Bakri, 2011). A young Omani citizen, Ghada al-Harthy, proclaimed: We are not Tunisia, we are not Libya. Our leader is loved, he is not corrupt and I would be willing to lay out my life on the line for him (Nicoll, 2011). In early March, a pro-Qaboos march took place which was larger than any protest of the governments alleged corruption or inefficiency (Nicoll, 2011). Despite the actions of antigovernment protesters, the wide appreciation for Qaboos, combined with the democratic and social reforms he enacted in response to escalating protest, granted his position increased safety. Protests eventually began to die down after Sultan Qaboos fired several members of his cabinet and hired a new series of ministers and cabinet officials on March 5th (Reuters, 2011). After demands for the government to release arrested protesters, Qaboos pardoned 234 people in mid-April (al-Shaibany, 2011). The last major protest took place in midMay of 2011, when the army was called in to break up a sit-in in the port of Salalah that had been ongoing since February 25th (Muscat Daily Operation, 2011). While many protesters

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were arrested, most were freed nine days later due to pressure from local sheikhs (Muscat Daily Protesters, 2011). IV. Internet Usage & Regulation The Internet in Oman has been controlled by the government since its installation. In 1997, the government-controlled Oman Telecommunications Company (shortened to OmanTel) began providing services to the country, and has been the majority provider of service to the entire country ever since. The only other provider in the company is the privately owned Oman Mobile (OpenNet Initiative [ONI], 2009). In fact, the government has publicly asked for ISP competitors in the country, but their request has not been taken up. In 2008, the Internet only reached 17% of the country (ONI, 2009); in recent years, that penetration has exploded to nearly 60%, as I found in my empirical chapter. This increase in penetration came with a price for Omani netizens, as a decree from Sultan Qaboos in 2008 ordered the expansion of government Internet regulation, including blogs and forums (ONI, 2009). The Internet in Oman is subject to the same restrictions as traditional media: any material which could disturb the peace, violate national security, defame someone or criticize the Sultan and other government officials is banned from publication. Additionally, OmanTel requires that Internet users sign agreements not to publish antigovernment material and not to carry out unlawful activities that would contradict the values of Oman (ONI, 2009). The government monitors all phones, emails and chat rooms, although they are not allowed to access this information unless based on an order from a competent court (ONI, 2009). Oman has taken a further step by closely monitoring Internet caf use. The Telecommunications Regulatory Authority, which oversees the regulation of Internet access in Oman, bans voice communication

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in Internet cafs, requires caf owners to monitor and log the activity of users, and forbids access to computers in areas not clearly visible from the main room (ONI, 2009). The authorities have blocked many circumvention tools which could be used to get around government censorship (ONI, 2009), and many sites have disclaimers which open before entering that warn users that they may be accessing antigovernment material; this tactic could possibly be used to create an environment of self-censorship when it comes to Internet use (BDHRL Oman, 2010). It was not until recently that an online dissident had been arrested in Oman; in February of 2012, Muawiya Alrawahi was for talking openly about his lack of religious belief, his disillusionment with Oman, and his loss of faith in the ruler Sultan Qaboos (Saldanha, 2012). Alrawahi also discussed his affiliations with General Khamis Al Ghraibi, who had been imprisoned for allegedly spying on Oman on behalf of the United Arab Emirates. However, there has been little to no public backlash; many frequenters of an Omani forum agree that the government took appropriate action because of his insults toward both Islam and the Sultan (Saldanha, 2012). There is no organized online dissidence in Oman, which is consistent with my findings in the second chapter. V. Conclusion In Oman, we observe a country which is fairly happy with the current system of government. This can be attributed to multiple factors, among them the reliability and relative cleanliness of the government. Despite being an autocracy, the Omani government is a fairly trustworthy government; Sultan Qaboos track record of economic and social reform has granted him iconic status within Omani society, and further restriction against any slanderous remarks directed toward him or other government officials further cement his legacy. Qaboos

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accomplishments shield him from criticism, but the Omani government is not immune to public pressure. The comprehensive nature of Omans media regulation system efficiently suppresses dissent while Omans strict Ibadi Muslim society makes this suppression culturally acceptable. For the most part, the citizens of Oman are allowed to interact freely, and because of economic and social prosperity under the presiding regime, there is little desire to change the status quo. The Internet cannot play a role in political dissent within a country if there is no desire for political change, and that is the current nature of Omani politics.

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D. Summary of Case Studies At a cursory glance, Iran and Oman seem like fairly similar countries. Both are autocracies who rely on oil as their main source of domestic income, are explicitly Islamic states, have highly developed Internet infrastructure, extensive Internet penetration and equally sophisticated forms of regulation, and both restrict the political and civil liberties of their citizens. Despite these similarities, Iran and Oman experienced vastly different levels of protest between 2000 and 2010. It is in the details of these similarities that the reasons for the differences in protest become apparent. One important difference between Oman and Iran is the reasoning behind their closed civil societies. In Iran, the government is so wary of political dissent and opposition that they have effectively prevented citizens from interacting normally. Oman, on the other hand, is a civil society that is closed because of the principles of the Ibadi sect of Islam. The people of Oman accept the dictations of the government because they are in accordance with their religious principles; in Iran, the governments wishes are often against the will of the people and do not appeal to moral sensibilities, but rather work towards strengthening the stranglehold Ayatollah Khamenei and the Revolutionary Guard have on power. Another distinction between the two countries is the esteem in which their ruling parties are held. This can be seen in the most significant protests each country has undergone. The Iranian presidential elections of 2009 were very likely fraudulent, and the people of Iran recognized this immediately because of similar happenings the year before. In response, the authorities physically crushed all political opposition on the street, a response guaranteed to create controversy and a sense that the presiding authority does not have the peoples interests in

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mind. In contrast, when protesters in Oman called for social reform, more jobs and the removal of corrupt bureaucrats, Sultan Qaboos agreed to their requests almost in their entirety. Right beside protests for higher wages were Omani citizens carrying signs showing their faith in and support for the Sultan. Systematic abuses of power are another key factor that differentiate Iran from Oman. Minority groups in Iran are under aggressive attack from the government, authorities arbitrarily use vague statutes to target political opposition, violations of basic privacy and decency occur with regularity, and many prisoners are subject to torture and even execution. Apart from laws which forbid defaming or insulting government officials, Omans legislative, judicial and penal systems are mostly transparent and fair. Although women are often discriminated against, this is due to the Islamic tradition of the country, as the government has formally banned discrimination based upon gender. As far as the Internet is concerned, both trust and government and the nature of each countrys civil society have an impact on its use by citizens for political means. In both countries, access is available to the majority of the population, but the conditions and injustice within Iran make it extremely susceptible to online organization despite a high level of regulation. Economic contentment and societal calm are two of Omans most impressive attributes, given the totalitarian regime ruling the country. As they are more concerned with surveillance than with punitive action, Oman has not taken action against online dissidents until very recently, while Iran has a track record of imprisoning netizens for potentially fabricated crimes. The importance of Internet population size could be the cause of the significant difference between the two societies protest levels. While both countries have a similar level of Internet

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penetration, Iran has an online population over ten times the size of Oman. With more people comes an increased likelihood of Internet-savvy users being able to disseminate information damaging to the reputation and credibility of the regime. 70% of Irans citizens were born after 1979 and grew up in a more technologically advanced society, which further increases the likelihood of Internet use for subversive purposes.

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Chapter IV: Conclusions

In this paper, I have sought to determine when the Internet can be used to organize political protest against authoritarian regimes in the Arab world. To do this, I tested several variables which I believed would have a positive correlation with high levels of protest in countries spanning from Morocco to Iran. I predicted that high Internet penetration and large online populations, low governmental Internet regulation, low trust in government, and closed civil societies would coincide with high levels of protest. My predictions were partially correct. I found a positive correlation to exist between large online populations, low trust in government and high levels of protest. Contrary to my hypothesis, I observed that countries with high governmental Internet regulation and open civil societies to have a positive correlation with high protest. I also found that there is no correlation between a high level of Internet penetration and a high level of protest. In my case studies of Oman and Iran, I observed two countries with high Internet penetration and very closed civil societies, but differences in the number of Internet users, the type of Internet regulation, and the faith in the countries governments. In Chapter 2, I found that a positive correlation existed between open civil societies and high protest; however, Iran had both the most closed civil society and the highest level of protest, while Oman had a similar civil society, yet almost no protest. I found that the reasons behind the closed nature of both countries societies were vastly different and could explain why Iran experienced so much more protest. This would suggest that the openness of a countrys civil society only affects protest levels depending on the governments entanglement in civil society. Additionally, Omani citizens

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believe that their government acts in accordance with public and religious belief, while the Iranian government has acted against public will on many occasions. These two case studies relate to my central hypotheses in multiple ways. The disparity in measured protest supports my hypothesis that the size of an online user base has a significant effect on protest, but contradicts my assumption that high Internet penetration has that same effect. Even though Omans population has greater access to the Internet, Iran experienced more protest. The cases of Iran and Oman also directly contradict my original hypothesis that greater Internet regulation leads to less protest; according to my measurements, Omans regulations were half as extensive as Iran, yet their measured protest was significantly lower. My prediction of a correlation between greater corruption and high protest is also supported. Irans closed civil society and high protest support would appear to affirm my hypothesis, but a similarly closed society in Oman yielded extremely low protest. The relationship between closed civil societies and Internet-organized protest, in the case of these two studies, remains inconclusive. There are parts of my paper which I feel could be challenged empirically or examined more closely. First, the practice of measurement can always result in errors; numbers can be miscalculated or vary slightly even after thorough double-checking and the sources of my measurements may not be credible or accurate despite by best efforts. Another potential problem comes in my selection of proxies for the variables. The way in which I measured each countrys level of protest has the most potential for error. The international influence on the protest count, meaning protests in other countries about domestic issues, was something I tried to eliminate but could not guarantee. Additionally, The New York Times may have reported differently about different countries based on reader interest, world status, economic importance, and a host of

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other factors that could misrepresent the actual level of protest in some countries. Given enough time, I would like to find an improved way to distinguish between protest within and outside the Arab countries I examined, be it through manually examining each article found to match my search criteria, or establishing a better definition of protest. My interpretation of voter turnout is subjective, as there are a number of factors which I felt could influence voter participation, and due to this subjectivity could have been interpreted incorrectly. With a greater knowledge of empirical models, I would like to find a way to quantify voter turnout and code this variable in a way to make it more understandable. In measuring the openness of civil society, the database I used is a registry with voluntary participation; this means that the count may not be representative of the actual number of non-governmental organizations in the country. Given time, I would like to more accurately determine the number of NGOs in a country with greater accuracy than an optional database. This may involve researching domestic compilations of NGOs, which would require a significantly better understanding of foreign registration systems, something I do not currently possess. Additionally, the censorship tactics I used to measure governmental Internet regulation come from an article published in 2007. A lot of time has passed since then, and governments could have significantly changed their approach toward the proliferation of the Internet. My model also weighs each method of censorship equally, which may not be accurate; for instance, high Internet pricing may be more effective in regulating Internet use than the regulation of software installation. With time and proper funding, I would like to do two things concerning this variable. First, I would update El Godys list of censorship tactics to include any recently developed tactics, as well as determine which countries have adopted new methods of online

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censorship. I would also like to weight each method according to its determined efficacy in order to create a more comprehensive measurement of this variable. The research that I have done contributes to the literature in a number of ways. A lack of correlation between high levels of protest and Internet penetration suggests that the Internet itself is not enough of a catalyst to affect political change, and requires other conditions to be present in order to be used effectively. In the discussion of the potential for the Internet to be a democratizing force, this supports the idea that the Internet may pose a threat to authoritarian regimes in the future (Murphy, 2006; Lynch, 2011; Zittrain & Palfrey, 2008). As time goes on, the number of citizens with greater knowledge of the Internets intricacies will increase, and will be able to communicate with each other despite the governments best efforts; this is evident in the Iranian populations young, Internet-savvy population which continues to bypass government regulation. The idea that social and cultural norms play a large factor in determining the efficacy of political Internet use supports the theory that governments do not need a foolproof system of restriction (Kalathil & Boas, 2006; Boas, 2006; Zittrain & Palfrey, 2008). In Oman, the combination of religious norms and governmental regulation have rendered the Internet virtually useless in generating protest. There are many different paths that scholars could take in further examining the use of the Internet in authoritarian regimes. If I had the time and resources, I would like to explore the relative importance of each variable to the usefulness of the Internet. To do this, I would have to determine what the positive correlations between each independent variable and the dependent variable means, then determine which is the most important in determining the efficacy of online resistance. In the Arab world, Islam is the predominant religion, and I would like to examine the

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connection between the religiosity of a nation and the effectiveness of political Internet use. Do the principles of Islam, cultural traditions and the strictness of belief stifle the effectiveness of the Internet? Another avenue to explore would be the contrast between private sector Internet infrastructure development and governmental infrastructure development. In some countries, the groundwork for high Internet penetration is laid by private companies, while in others, the government oversees the entire implementation process. Does the manner in which the Internet spreads across a country affect the efficacy of online organization? Additionally, the link between economic prosperity and the level of protest in Arab countries is something I was not able to explore. While Internet access is relatively expensive in most Arab countries, there is not a clear relationship between poverty and the effectiveness of political Internet use. Does poverty or a lower standard of living affect the use of the Internet as a tool for enacting political change? Finally, although I was able to briefly explore this area, the connection between the severity of human rights violations in Arab countries and the experienced levels of protest is something I would like to examine further. If high rates of abuse of power lead to high levels of political Internet use, I would like to explore specifically how the information about human rights violations is communicated over the Internet.

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Acknowledgements I would like to thank the students, faculty and staff at Allegheny College for providing me with the opportunity to learn and live in such an open and welcoming environment. This paper has been a much more difficult journey than I had anticipated, and I would not have been able to do it without such a strong support system. I would like to specifically thank Professor Shanna Kirschner for her advice, support and willingness to listen to all of my concerns regarding this project. Going into Allegheny, I was not sure what field I wished to pursue academically, and courses I have taken with Professor Kirschner have validated my choice to study political science numerous times. I would also like to thank Professor Ward Jamison and Vicki Jamison for their unwavering support of both my academic and extracurricular activities. I have grown as a person immensely under their tutelage since my freshman year, and I have been able to achieve things I would not have thought possible four years ago. Thank you. Lastly, I would like to thank my family, specifically my mother and father, for their love and support, both emotional and financial. Im indebted to them both in more ways than I could ever hope to repay, and could not possibly have completed my time at Allegheny without them. I love you both. To anyone I did not mention, you are not forgotten, just temporarily misplaced as I was writing this. Thank you all.

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