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Tamia Hawthorne Period 4

Chapter 5 Objective Questions


1. 1) Scott v. Sanford (1857) Facts of the Case: Dred Scott was a slave in Missouri. From 1833 to 1843, he resided in Illinois (a free state) and in an area of the Louisiana Territory, where slavery was forbidden by the Missouri Compromise of 1820. After returning to Missouri, Scott sued unsuccessfully in the Missouri courts for his freedom, claiming that his residence in free territory made him a free man. Scott then brought a new suit in federal court. Scott's master maintained that no pureblooded Negro of African descent and the descendant of slaves could be a citizen in the sense of Article III of the Constitution. Question: Was Dred Scott free or slave? Conclusion: Decision: 7 votes for Sandford, 2 vote(s) against Legal provision: US Const. Amend. 5; Missouri Compromise Dred Scott was a slave. Under Articles III and IV, argued Taney, no one but a citizen of the United States could be a citizen of a state, and that only Congress could confer national citizenship. Taney reached the conclusion that no person descended from an American slave had ever been a citizen for Article III purposes. The Court then held the Missouri Compromise unconstitutional, hoping to end the slavery question once and for all. 2) Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) Facts of the Case: The state of Louisiana enacted a law that required separate railway cars for blacks and whites. In 1892, Homer Adolph Plessy--who was seven-eighths Caucasian--took a seat in a "whites only" car of a Louisiana train. He refused to move to the car reserved for blacks and was arrested. Question: Is Louisiana's law mandating racial segregation on its trains an unconstitutional infringement on both the privileges and immunities and the equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment? Conclusion: Decision: 7 votes for Ferguson, 1 vote(s) against Legal provision: US Const. Amend 14, Section 1 No, the state law is within constitutional boundaries. The majority, in an opinion authored by Justice Henry Billings Brown, upheld state-imposed racial segregation. The justices based their decision on the separate-but-equal doctrine, that separate facilities for blacks and whites satisfied the Fourteenth Amendment so long as they were equal. (The phrase, "separate but equal" was not part of the opinion.) Justice Brown conceded that the 14th amendment intended to establish absolute equality for the races before the law. But Brown noted that "in the nature of things it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce

Tamia Hawthorne Period 4 social, as distinguished from political equality, or a commingling of the two races unsatisfactory to either." In short, segregation does not in itself constitute unlawful discrimination. 3) Brown v. Board of Education (1954) Facts of the Case: Black children were denied admission to public schools attended by white children under laws requiring or permitting segregation according to the races. The white and black schools approached equality in terms of buildings, curricula, qualifications, and teacher salaries. This case was decided together with Briggs v. Elliott and Davis v. County School Board of Prince Edward County. Question: Does the segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race deprive the minority children of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the 14th Amendment? Conclusion: Decision: 9 votes for Brown, 0 vote(s) against Legal provision: Equal Protection Yes. Despite the equalization of the schools by "objective" factors, intangible issues foster and maintain inequality. Racial segregation in public education has a detrimental effect on minority children because it is interpreted as a sign of inferiority. The long-held doctrine that separate facilities were permissible provided they were equal was rejected. Separate but equal is inherently unequal in the context of public education. The unanimous opinion sounded the death-knell for all forms of state-maintained racial separation. 4) Hernandez v. Texas (1954) Facts of the Case: Pete Hernandez, an agricultural worker, was indicted for the murder of Joe Espinoza by an all-Anglo (white) grand jury in Jackson County, Texas. Claiming that MexicanAmericans were barred from the jury commission that selected juries, and from petit juries, Hernandez' attorneys tried to quash the indictment. Moreover, Hernandez tried to quash the petit jury panel called for service, because persons of Mexican descent were excluded from jury service in this case. A Mexican-American had not served on a jury in Jackson County in over 25 years and thus, Hernandez claimed that Mexican ancestry citizens were discriminated against as a special class in Jackson County. The trial court denied the motions. Hernandez was found guilty of murder and sentenced by the all-Anglo jury to life in prison. In affirming, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found that "Mexicans are...members of and within the classification of the white race as distinguished from members of the Negro Race" and rejected the petitioners' argument that they were a "special class" under the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Further, the court pointed out that "so far as we are advised, no member of the Mexican nationality" challenged this classification as white or Caucasian.

Tamia Hawthorne Period 4 Question: Is it a denial of the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause to try a defendant of a particular race or ethnicity before a jury where all persons of his race or ancestry have, because of that race or ethnicity, been excluded by the state? Conclusion: Decision: 9 votes for Hernandez, 0 vote(s) against Legal provision: Equal Protection Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice Earl Warren, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment protects those beyond the two classes of white or Negro, and extends to other racial groups in communities depending upon whether it can be factually established that such a group exists within a community. In reversing, the Court concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment "is not directed solely against discrimination due to a 'two-class theory'" but in this case covers those of Mexican ancestry. This was established by the fact that the distinction between whites and Mexican ancestry individuals was made clear at the Jackson County Courthouse itself where "there were two men's toilets, one unmarked, and the other marked 'Colored Men and 'Hombres Aqui' ('Men Here')," and by the fact that no Mexican ancestry person had served on a jury in 25 years. Mexican Americans were a "special class" entitled to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. 5) Korematsu v. United States (1944) Facts of the Case: During World War II, Presidential Executive Order 9066 and congressional statutes gave the military authority to exclude citizens of Japanese ancestry from areas deemed critical to national defense and potentially vulnerable to espionage. Korematsu remained in San Leandro, California and violated Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34 of the U.S. Army. Question: Did the President and Congress go beyond their war powers by implementing exclusion and restricting the rights of Americans of Japanese descent? Conclusion: Decision: 6 votes for United States, 3 vote(s) against Legal provision: Executive Order 9066; U.S. Const. amend. 5 The Court sided with the government and held that the need to protect against espionage outweighed Korematsu's rights. Justice Black argued that compulsory exclusion, though constitutionally suspect, is justified during circumstances of "emergency and peril." 6) Reed v. Reed (1971) Facts of the Case: The Idaho Probate Code specified that "males must be preferred to females" in appointing administrators of estates. After the death of their adopted son, both Sally and Cecil Reed sought to be named the administrator of their son's estate (the Reeds were separated). According to the Probate Code, Cecil was appointed administrator and Sally challenged the law in court.

Tamia Hawthorne Period 4 Question: Did the Idaho Probate Code violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Conclusion: Decision: 7 votes for Reed, 0 vote(s) against Legal provision: Equal Protection In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the law's dissimilar treatment of men and women was unconstitutional. The Court argued that "[t]o give a mandatory preference to members of either sex over members of the other, merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings on the merits, is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. . .[T]he choice in this context may not lawfully be mandated solely on the basis of sex." 7) Craig v. Boren (1976) Facts of the Case: An Oklahoma law prohibited the sale of "nonintoxicating" 3.2 percent beer to males under the age of 21 and to females under the age of 18. Curtis Craig, a male then between the ages of 18 and 21, and a licensed vendor challenged the law as discriminatory. Question: Did an Oklahoma statute violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause by establishing different drinking ages for men and women? Conclusion: Decision: 7 votes for Craig, 2 vote(s) against Legal provision: Equal Protection In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that the statute made unconstitutional gender classifications. The Court held that the statistics relied on by the state of Oklahoma were insufficient to show a substantial relationship between the law and the maintenance of traffic safety. Generalities about the drinking habits of aggregate groups did not suffice. The Court also found that the Twenty-first Amendment did not alter the application of the Equal Protection Clause in the case. 8) Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978) Facts of the Case: Allan Bakke, a thirty-five-year-old white man, had twice applied for admission to the University of California Medical School at Davis. He was rejected both times. The school reserved sixteen places in each entering class of one hundred for "qualified" minorities, as part of the university's affirmative action program, in an effort to redress longstanding, unfair minority exclusions from the medical profession. Bakke's qualifications (college GPA and test scores) exceeded those of any of the minority students admitted in the two years Bakke's applications were rejected. Bakke contended, first in the California courts, then in the Supreme Court, that he was excluded from admission solely on the basis of race.

Tamia Hawthorne Period 4 Question: Did the University of California violate the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, by practicing an affirmative action policy that resulted in the repeated rejection of Bakke's application for admission to its medical school? Conclusion: Decision: 5 votes for Bakke, 4 vote(s) against Legal provision: Equal Protection Split Vote No and yes. There was no single majority opinion. Four of the justices contended that any racial quota system supported by government violated the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., agreed, casting the deciding vote ordering the medical school to admit Bakke. However, in his opinion, Powell argued that the rigid use of racial quotas as employed at the school violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The remaining four justices held that the use of race as a criterion in admissions decisions in higher education was constitutionally permissible. Powell joined that opinion as well, contending that the use of race was permissible as one of several admission criteria. So, the Court managed to minimize white opposition to the goal of equality (by finding for Bakke) while extending gains for racial minorities through affirmative action 9) Adarand Constructors v. Pena (1995) Facts of the Case: Adarand, a contractor specializing in highway guardrail work, submitted the lowest bid as a subcontractor for part of a project funded by the United States Department of Transportation. Under the terms of the federal contract, the prime contractor would receive additional compensation if it hired small businesses controlled by "socially and economically disadvantaged individuals." [The clause declared that "the contractor shall presume that socially and economically disadvantaged individuals include Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, Asian Pacific Americans, and other minorities...." Federal law requires such a subcontracting clause in most federal agency contracts]. Another subcontractor, Gonzales Construction Company, was awarded the work. It was certified as a minority business; Adarand was not. The prime contractor would have accepted Adarand's bid had it not been for the additional payment for hiring Gonzales. Question: Is the presumption of disadvantage based on race alone, and consequent allocation of favored treatment, a discriminatory practice that violates the equal protection principle embodied in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment? Conclusion: Decision: 5 votes for Adarand Constructors, 4 vote(s) against Legal provision: Equal Protection Yes. Overruling Metro Broadcasting (497 US 547), the Court held that all racial classifications, whether imposed by federal, state, or local authorities, must pass strict scrutiny review. In other

Tamia Hawthorne Period 4 words, they "must serve a compelling government interest, and must be narrowly tailored to further that interest." The Court added that compensation programs which are truly based on disadvantage, rather than race, would be evaluated under lower equal protection standards. However, since race is not a sufficient condition for a presumption of disadvantage and the award of favored treatment, all race-based classifications must be judged under the strict scrutiny standard. Moreover, even proof of past injury does not in itself establish the suffering of present or future injury. The Court remanded for a determination of whether the Transportation Department's program satisfied strict scrutiny. 2. Equality of opportunity is the idea that the government cant interfere with the peoples chances to pursue whatever they please based on their religion, race, gender, etc. Equality of results is that everyone gets the same rewards or results, which isnt supported by the American government. With given fair opportunity, the results will depend on the persons themselves. 3. By stating that the states arent allowed to deny to anyone equal protection of the laws, the Fourteenth Amendment is the only reference to equality in the entire Constitution, and has the force to ensure equal rights for all Americans. The equal protection of laws is defined as allowing equal protection of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness to all citizens, including people of different races, genders, religions, etc. 4. In the case Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court held that school segregation was inherently unconstitutional because it violated the Fourteenth Amendments guarantee of equal protection. In Plessy v. Ferguson, colored and white people were given equal opportunity in different accommodations, and Brown v. Board of Education refuted this by abolishing school segregation. 5. De jure segregation is considered to be by law segregation, while de facto is also known as in reality segregation. With de jure segregation, separations between different races is written in law. De facto segregation, on the other hand, is more dependent on circumstances. For example, when children are assigned to schools near their homes and those homes are in neighborhoods that are racially segregated for social and economic reasons, this would be a situation of de facto segregation, since no laws caused it. 6. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 made any for of racial discrimination illegal. By doing this, segregation was abolished and blacks were given all the same opportunities that whites had. Throughout the 1950s and 60s, there were several policies that helped the cause of racial equality, such as the promotion of voting rights, access to public accommodations, open housing, etc. Through the Civil Rights Act, all of these policies and more were solidified and definite based on the abolishment of racial discrimination universally. 7. The civil rights movement definitely didnt strictly apply to the rights of blacks, but also to other minority groups. This includes Native Americans, who were forced off their land and into reservations. Through cases such as Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, this minority group was able to get more rights. Hispanic Americans were subject to a lot of discrimination in the south, and cases like Hernandez v. Texas allowed some non-discriminatory laws to work in their favor. Women also had to fight for their right to vote, which finally allowed for the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment.

Tamia Hawthorne Period 4 8. Significant milestones in the journey for gender equality include womens fight for the right to vote, fair work environments and sexual harassment. After women advocated the right to vote for a long time, the Nineteenth Amendment was finally ratified. Different situations of gender discrimination were solved through cases such as Reed v. Reed and Craig v. Boren. In workplaces, there was a fair amount of comparable worth and general wage discrimination. Women also had to deal with a lot of sexual harassment in the workplace, and eventually cases such as Harris v. Forklift Systems and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton brought these issues to light and solved them. 9. The most important milestone for disabled people was the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, which required employers and administrators of public facilities to make reasonable accommodations and prohibited employment discrimination against people with disabilities. 10. Affirmative action is the idea of giving special attention or compensatory treatment to some previously disadvantaged group. This leans the idea of equality of opportunity more towards equality of results. One side argues that Americans owe it to these previously harshly treated groups to give them special treatment, while others dislike the idea of equality of results. 11. Equality and individual liberty will more than likely conflict in the way that equality tends to favor majority rule. And if the majority wishes to deprive the minority of certain rights, individual liberty would therefore be compromised.