122: Philosophy of Mathematics Essay VIII: The Lwenheim-Skolem Theorem James van Horne Prof.

Adrian Moore 21 May 2013 The Lwenheim-Skolem Theorem and its Impact At first glance, the Lwenheim-Skolem Theorem is one of the more surprising and perplexing theorems that arise in conjunction with set theory. On a relatively nave formulation, the Lwenhem-Skolem (LS) Theorem says that any first-order theory that has a model, which is to say is consistent, has a countable model. This in turn gives rise to the apparent contradiction that is commonly known as Skolems Paradox. In this essay, we shall consider how significant the implications of the LS Theorem actually are and what in particular those implications pertain to. The seemingly paradoxical state of affairs known as Skolems Paradox can be coaxed out by taking the standard model for Zermelo-Frankel (ZF) set theory and applying the LS Theorem. The standard model of ZF contains sets that are uncountably infinite, such as the power-set of , and whose existence we can prove by recourse to Cantors Theorem. However, the statement of the existence of such uncountably infinite sets will also hold for the domain of the countable model of ZF that is guaranteed by the LS Theorem. Thus, we are led to conclude, there is a model of ZF that takes sets that are actually countable to be uncountable. There is an influential line of thought that suggests that in order to address this problem, we need to introduce relativity to our notions of countability and uncountability. While a set may be uncountable in some system, they argue, from an outside system and in some absolute sense, it may actually be countable. To quote Benacerraf, If the theory is consistent, it has a countable model in which sets proved to be uncountable within the theory must be denumerable, since the entire domain of the theory may be enumerated (88). One of the more sophisticated relativist accounts that provides an explanation of how uncountability can be relative to a system while still allowing some absolute type of countability is given by Wang. This system takes a hierarchy of systems based on the orders of the objects that each system deals with. Each level in the hierarchy that we go up adds in all of the sets whose members are determined by predicates over the lower order objects. As a result, a system of order has sets that it sees as uncountable but which are countable in the system of order +2. Thus every set is either countable or uncountable relative to a given . This allows us to define a set as absolutely uncountable if it is not countable for any . While this account would explain the conundrum we found in Skolems Paradox, there is a problem that Resnik points out. Namely, To vindicate his claim the Skolemite has to show that the set of all real numbers is countable. No such set appears in Sigma [, Wangs system of order ] for each (431). One response to Resniks argument might be that he is platonistically assuming the existence of a set

of all real numbers. While we will later return to the question of how the LS Theorem impacts the foundations of mathematics and the assumptions we make about it (especially as to intended models for set theories), this is not necessary to deal with the present issue. The reason for this is that we can escape Skolems Paradox and avoid having to answer the relativists suggestions by noticing that an error is made in developing Skolems Paradox. Specifically, the error is in thinking that no element of a countable model can be uncountable. As Benacerraf notes, There is no result in model theory that implies that the set of real numbers in the unit interval cannot be an element of some countable model for ZF so long as its members arent also elements of that model(102). The Paradox that we encountered is, bluntly, a mistake. The LS Theorem gives no more than a proof that if consistent, then ZF has non-standard models. There is, however, a stronger version of the LS Theorem that should receive more of our consideration. The downward or transitive submodel version of the LS Theorem is dependent upon the Axiom of Choice, but gives the more significant result that any transitive model of ZF has a transitive countable submodel. A submodel is a structure where the domain is a subset of the original domain and the sentences of the original model will be true when restricted to the new domain. As the model is transitive, every element of the domain is a subset of the domain, and so the relation of set membership will be interpreted as in the original model. Hence, in both models, will be the same countably infinite set and so we conclude that the issue of Skolems Paradox arises as we can take the powerset of in both models. However, once again, this does not drive us to need to relativize countability. Instead, let us consider an explanation from Crispin Wright, who writes, The trouble is that in the supposition that if Zo [or ] is an element of [a transitive model] D and [a submodel] D, then the fact that the Power Set Axiom holds for both domains, without reinterpretation of its sole non-logical constant, is a guarantee that PZo is an element of both domains as well. This is simply incorrect (119). Rather, what is shown by this application of the LS Theorem is simply that there is a set satisfying the Powerset Axiom in each model, but not that these two power sets are the same. We are making an intersystematic identification of sets that is not justified. Nothing gives us good reason to think that the set that satisfies the Powerset Axiom when applied to in a transitive uncountable model will be anything like the set fulfilling the same role in the countable submodel. This unjustified equivocation across systems gives rise to the misunderstanding and, indeed, is enough to see that the LS Theorem is not a significant threat to axiomatic set theory. While the LS Theorem, as I have presented it, is not much of a problem, it does show us some interesting things about set theory. Shortly, we will consider its implications to the foundations of mathematics, and at that point our interest will shift to considerations of the intended interpretations of systems and the like, but first I would like to briefly deal with a different application of the LS Theorem that I strongly disagree with.

This particular application is Hilary Putnams attempt to use LS Theorem to obtain results on a general theory of meaning. Putnam writes:
If we are told, axiomatic set theory does not capture the intuitive notion of a set, then it is natural to think that something else our understanding does capture it. But what can our understanding come to, at least for a naturalistically minded philosopher, which is more than the way we use our language? And the Skolem argument can be extended, as we have just seen, to show that the total use of the language (operational plus theoretical constraints) does not fix a unique intended interpretation any more than axiomatic set theory by itself does (Putnam 1977).

This is a challenge put to the philosophy of language and meaning. But, as Benacerraf notes, it depends completely on a question-begging Skolemization of our theory of the world. As the LS Theorem applies only to countable first-order theories, it seems wildly implausible that we would be able to come up with a countable first-order theory describing the world or all use of language. For one, such an attempt would beg the question since it would have to be expressed in a language. Let us now consider what impact the LS Theorem might have on the foundations of mathematics. In the present day, mathematicians and philosopher alike tend to accept that axiomatic set theory serves well as a foundation for mathematics, but it is worth considering that Skolem attempted to used his results to object to just this. The problem propounded was that if we are to get a firm foundation for mathematics from axiomatized set theory, then it should be in some sense fixed and invariable. But if we apply the LS Theorem and do away with transfinite cardinals, mathematics seems to be anything but fixed. Further, it seems that our intended interpretations of the set theory will have little bearing on mathematics if we choose to base it on set theory. For instance, the relativist can actually argue via Ockhams razor that it is preferable to use a model with less ontological commitment, and so we should actually accept a countable model for mathematics if we want to accept axiomatic set theory as a foundation. However, this seems to me to be putting the shoe on the wrong foot. We develop axiomatic set theories to capture, as best as possible, our practice of mathematics. As a result, there is an intended model for each system and the relativists argument ignores the fact that we do approach axiomatic set theory with a bias toward this intended interpretation. While the considerations that the relativist makes us consider appear to be relevant to some extent, at most they ought to make us note that there are other possible ways to interpret set theory and as a result, perhaps, unorthodox ways of thinking about mathematics. However, as Hart says, the significance of relativity for Skolems philosophical claims is Precious little, except perhaps to the effect that if Skolem needs assumptions stronger than ZF to infer results intended to cast doubts on ZF, then the force of his criticism is obscure. Skolems use of the LS theorem to impugn an axiomatic basis for mathematics is relatively weak and has little impact on how we think about the foundations of mathematics. If we are to take away from this discussion, it is that while it is very interesting that consistent first-order theories always have countable models, the LS

Theorem really has little impact on the philosophy of mathematics or the philosophy of meaning. Hart rather amusingly writes of the enquiry into Skolems Paradox that, [E]ventually one is left with only a slightly irritated, dulled boredom. While I do not leave the pursuit of these questions quite as disenchanted as Hart, the LS Theorem certainly does not provide the exciting results that its initial formulation seemed to promise.