PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (OUTLINE) Art.

2 EFFECTIVITY OF LAWS (Bar Q-1990) -When a law does not provide for its effectivity, it shall take effect after the expiration of the 15-day period following the completion of its publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation (as amended by EO No. 200-June 18, 1987). -The phrase unless it is otherwise provided solely refers to the 15-day period and not to the requirement of publication. -If the law provides for a different period, shorter or longer than the 15-day period, then such shorter or longer period, as the case may be, shall prevail. Taada vs. Tuvera 146 SCRA 448 Must all laws be published and what must be published? -Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. Non-publication means violation of the due process clause guaranteed by the Constitution. -All statutes, including those of local application and private laws or laws that name a public place in favor of a favored individual or laws that exempt an individual from certain prohibitions or requirement, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity. EO 200 allows the publication of laws in a newspaper of general circulation due to erratic releases of the Official Gazette and of its limited readership. Must decisions of the SC be published to be binding? -The SC held in the case of De Roy vs. CA (157 SCRA 757) that there is no law requiri ng the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court. (As laid down in the case of Habaluyas, Inc. vs. Japzon, 138 SCRA 46, the 15-day period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended. In the case at bar, the parties filed a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration. At the time of the filing of the motion however, the Habaluyas decision has yet to be published.) -Ordinances are governed by the Local Government Code. Art. 3 - IGNORANCE OF THE LAW (85,96) -Covers all domestic laws but only applies to mandatory or prohibitive laws not on permissive or suppletory laws. -Foreign laws are likewise excluded because we do not take judicial notice of foreign laws as well as judgments/decisions rendered by their courts. These are factual matters that must be pleaded and proved before our courts in the absence of which it is presumed that their laws are the same as our laws ( principle of processual presumption). -Not applied with equal force to minors, they occupy a privilege position before our laws. Neither would this apply to laws susceptible of 2 or more interpretations. MANZANO vs. SANCHEZ 354 SCRA 1 -It is significant to note that in their respective affidavits executed on March 22, 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge Sanchez himself, Manzano and Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage. Also, in their marriage contract, it was indicated that both were separated. The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses for a long time already is immaterial. Legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie much less authorize the parties to remarry. This holds true all the more when the separation is merely de facto, as in the case at bar. -Neither can respondent judge take refuge on their joint affidavit that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for 7 years. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five years does not sever the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Such cohabitation is merely a ground for exemption from marriage license it could not serve as a justification for respondent judge to solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage. -Respondent Judge Sanchez demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage. The maxim ignorance of the law excuses no one has special application to judges, who should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence. And when the law transgressed is simple and elementary, the failure to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Art. 4- PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OF LAWS as a general rule. Exceptions: 1. If the laws are remedial in nature. Atienza vs Brillantes, Jr. 243 SCRA 32 Brillantes prior marriage was celebrated in 1965 without the requisite license so when he married de Castro in Los Angeles, California in 1991, he believed in good faith that he was capacitated to marry.

Accordingly, Art. 40 does not apply as his prior marriage was governed by the New Civil Code which does not require any court decree of nullity if void ab initio. SC held: Article 40 of the Family Code applies to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides Article 256 of the same Code is given retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice vested rights. Article 40 is a rule of procedure and Brillantes has not shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of Art. 40. Casupanan and Capitulo vs Laroya August 26, 2002- Lawyers Review/September 30, 2002 The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure must be given retroactive effect considering the well-settled rule that x x x statutes regulating the procedure of the court will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of the passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. CANCIO vs. ISIP November 12, 2002 -The modes of enforcement of the civil liabilities are provided for in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Though the assailed order of the trial court was issued on March 20, 1998, the said Rules, which took effect on December 1, 2000, must be given retroactive effect in the instant case considering that statutes regulating the procedure of the court are construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Other exceptions: 2. Penal laws favorable to the accused provided he is not a habitual delinquent. 3.Curative laws. 4. Emergency laws. 5. Laws creating new rights. and 6. Tax laws. Article 6. Waiver (04) Requirements of a valid waiver: 1. the waiving party must actually have the right he is renouncing or it must be in existence at the time of the waiver; 2. he must have the full capacity to make the waiver; 3. the waiver must be clear and unequivocal; 4. the waiver must not be contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs or prejudicial to a 3rd person with a right recognized by law; and 5. when formalities are required for its validity such as an express condonation of a debt the formalities must be complied with. GUY vs. CA 502 SCRA 151 (September 15, 2006) - To be valid and effective, a waiver must be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a party to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not be attributed to a person when its terms do not explicitly and clearly evince intent to abandon a right. In this case, there was no waiver of hereditary rights. The Release and Waiver does not state with clarity the purpose of its execution. It merely states that Remedios received P300,000.00 and an educational plan for her minor daughters by way of financial assistance and in full settlement of any and all claims of whatsoever nature and kind x x x against the estate of the late Rufino Guy Susim. The document did not specifically mention minors hereditary share in the estate of Sima Wei, it cannot be construed as a waiver of successional rights. - Moreover, assuming that Remedios truly waived the hereditary rights of the children, such waiver will not bar the latters claim. Any inheritance left to minors or incapacitated persons may be accepted by their parents or guardians. Parents or guardians may repudiate the inheritance left to their wards only by judicial authorization. -Parents and guardians may not therefore repudiate the inheritance of their wards without judicial approval. This is because repudiation amounts to an alienation of property that must pass the courts scrutiny in order to protect the interest of the ward. Not having been judicially authorized, the Release and Waiver of Claim in the instant case is void and will not bar private respondents from asserting their rights as heirs of the deceased. - Furthermore, it must be emphasized that waiver is the intentional relinquishment (abandon) of a known right. Where one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a consent given under a mistake or misapprehension of fact. - In the present case, private respondents could not have possibly waived their successional rights because they are yet to prove their status as acknowledged illegitimate children of the deceased. Petitioner himself has consistently denied that respondents are his co-heirs. It would thus be inconsistent to rule that they waived their hereditary rights when petitioner claims that they do not have such a right. Hence, the invocation of waiver must fail. Article 9- In case of silence, obscurity, or insufficiency of laws no judge shall decline to render judgment. Applies only civil cases not to criminal proceedings because of the principle that there is no crime when there is no law punishing it (nullum crimen, nulla sine poena lege).

SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC 537 SCRA 373 (October 19, 2007) Silverio successfully underwent sex reassignment surgery and petitioned the court that his name be changed from Rommel Jacinto to Mely and that his sex shall also be changed from male to female to reflect the result of said surgery. The Republic opposed the same alleging that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration. Issue: May the trial court apply Article 9 of the Civil Code on the ground of equity? It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that no judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law. However, it is not a license for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend it. In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines becomes particularly important in this case where the claims asserted are statute-based. It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be recognized as having successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to fashion a law on that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can only apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of government, Congress. Art. 15 ADHERENCE TO NATIONALITY THEORY (75,78,81,83,87,95,97,98,99,02,03,04, 05) RENVOI DOCTRINE where the conflict rules of the forum (ex. Philippines) refer to a foreign law (ex.USA), and the latter refers it back to the internal law, the law of the forum (Philippine law) shall apply (Aznar vs. Garcia, 7 SCRA 95). TRANSMISSION THEORY if the foreign law refers to a 3rd country, the laws of said country should govern; this situation is a variety of the renvoi doctrine (ex. If B, a nationality of Canada who is a resident of the Philippines and has properties in Switzerland dies, his estate shall be governed by the laws of Canada based on Article 15 but if the laws of Canada states that it is the law of the place where the property is situated that will be applied then the laws of the 3rd country will govern in the distribution of his estate.) Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr. 39 SCRA 139 Is Article 15 applicable to aliens who are married to Filipino citizens? -Owing to the nationality principle embodied in Art. 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines provided they are valid according to their national law (Cf. Art. 26 (2) Family Code). Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera 174 SCRA 653 -Reiterated the Van Dorn decision. -In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law in the matter of status of persons. Garcia a.k.a. Grace Garcia- Recio vs. Recio October 2, 2001 -A marriage between 2 Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code. -But a divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws. Therefore, before our courts can recognize a foreign divorce decree, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient. Under Rule 132 Sections 24 and 25, a writing or document may be proven as public record of a foreign country by either (1) official publication of the writing or document or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. QUITA vs. CA 300 SCRA 406 Fe and Arturo were married in 1941. After the relationship turned sour Fe went to the US and in 1954 obtained a decree of absolute divorce. Fe got married thrice. In 1972, Arturo died intestate. Fe is now claiming her right over the estate of the deceased spouse. The SC remanded the case to the lower court to determine whether the second marriage of the spouse during the subsistence of the first marriage was contracted before or after her changed of citizenship. Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her 1st divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and Fe could very well lose her right to inherit from Arturo. (re: Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law).

ELMAR O. PEREZ vs. CA, CATINDIG January 27, 2006 Filipino spouses Tristan and Lily decided to separate from each other and upon advice of a friend obtained a divorce from the Dominican Republic through an attorney-in-fact who instituted a divorce action under its laws. On April 30, 1984, the spouses filed a joint petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership. Three months later, the Dominican Republic ratified the divorce by mutual consent of Tristan and Lily. On July 14, 1984, Tristan married Elmar in the State of Virginia, USA. Elmar later on learned that the divorce decree issued by the court in the Dominican Republic dissolving the marriage of Tristan and Lily was not recognized in the Philippines and that her marriage to Tristan was void under Philippine law. When confronted, Tristan assured her that he would obtain an annulment of his marriage with Lily. He also promised that he would adopt their son so that he would be entitled to an equal share in his estate. In 2001, he filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lily. Elmar then filed a motion for leave to file intervention claiming that she has an interest in the matter in litigation that was granted by the lower court. Tristan however, opposed the motion by filing a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA. The CA nullified the decision of the lower court. Went to SC via certiorari. Issue: Does Elmar have a legal interest in the annulment case between Tristan and Lily? SC: Legal interest, which entitles a person to intervene, must be in the matter in litigation and of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by direct legal operation and effect of judgment. Such interest must be actual, direct and material, and not simply contingent and expectant. The claim of petitioner, that her status as the wife and companion of Tristan for 17 years vests her the requisite legal interest, lacks merit. Under the law, she was never the legal wife of Tristan hence her claim of legal interest has no basis. When they got married in 1984, Tristan was still lawfully married to Lily. The divorce decree obtained by Tristan and Lily from the Dominican Republic never dissolved the marriage bond between them. It is basic that laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. Hence, if a Filipino regardless of whether he/she was married here or abroad, initiates a petition abroad to obtain an absolute divorce from spouse and eventually becomes successful in getting an absolute divorce decree, the Philippines will not recognize such absolute divorce. When Tristan and Lily got married in 1968, their marriage was governed by the provisions of the Civil Code which took effect on August 30, 1950. In Tenchavez vs. Escano we held: (1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code (RA No. 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and neither is the marriage contracted with another party by the divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree of divorce, entitled to validity in the country. SAN LUIS vs. SAN LUIS February 6, 2007 Felicisimo T. San Luis contracted 3 marriages during his lifetime. His 1st marriage was terminated when his wife died leaving behind 6 children. Five years later Felicisimo married Mary Lee, an American citizen with whom he had 1 child. The marriage ended when Mary Lee divorced Felicisimo. The decree of absolute divorce was granted in December 1973. He then contracted his 3rd marriage in June 1974 with Felicidad. When he died, Felicidad sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimos estate and prayed that letters of administration be issued to her. Two of the children of the 1st marriage filed a motion to dismiss citing as ground, among others, that Felicidad has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death was still legally married to Mary Lee. SC: In resolving the issue, there is no need to retroactively apply the provisions of the FC, particularly Article 26 (2) as there is sufficient jurisprudential basis to rule in the affirmative. The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. involved a marriage between a foreigner and his Filipino wife, which marriage was subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his interest in the properties from the conjugal partnership should be protected. The Court, however, recognized the validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest in the properties acquired by the Filipino spouse after the divorce. Petitioners (heirs of Felicisimo) cited Articles 15 and 17 par. 3 of the Civil Code in stating that the divorce is void under Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are concerned. However, in the light of the SCs ruli ng in Van Dorn, the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated in his own country if the ends of justice are to be served. The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimos surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of Felicidad and Felicisimo under the laws of the USA. In Garcia vs. Recio, the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular official of the

Philippines who is stationed in the foreign country where the document is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. With regard to Felicidads marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, USA, she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved. FELICITAS AMOR-CATALAN vs. CA and ORLANDO CATALAN and MEROPE BRAGANZA 514 SCRA 607 (February 6, 2007) Felicitas and Orlando were married in June 1950 in Pangasinan but migrated to the United States after the marriage. Allegedly, they became naturalized citizens thereof and after 38 years of marriage or in 1988, they divorced. Two months after the divorce, Orlando married Merope in Pangasinan. Felicitas then filed a petition for declaration of nullity with damages against Orlando and Merope alleging that Merope had a prior subsisting marriage with one Eusebio Bristol. Orlando and Merope moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground of lack of cause of action as Felicitas was not a real party-in-interest. SC: A divorce obtained abroad may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it before it can be recognized by our courts. It must be proved considering that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest and must be based on a cause of action. Thus, in Ninal vs. Badayog (328 SCRA 122), the Court held that the children have the personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of the marriage of their deceased father to their stepmother as it affects their successional rights. Significantly, Section 2 (a) of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, which took effect on March 15, 2003, specifically provides: A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of a void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. In fine, petitioners personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage cannot be ascertained because of the absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained and the same did not allow Orlandos remarriage, then the trial court should declare respondents marriage as bigamous and void ab initio. On the contrary, if it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained which allowed Orlando to remarry, then the trial court must dismiss the petition on the ground that Felicitas lacks legal personality to file the same. Art. 16 par. (1)-law governing real and personal property is the law of the place where the property is situated exception in cases of succession it is the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration par. (2) (76,77,84,85,86,89,91,95,98,01,02,04). Art. 17 par. (1) Doctrine of Lex Loci Celebrationis (75,77,78,81,85,91,93,95,96,98,02,03) (2) - Rule respecting Prohibitive Laws Tenchavez vs. Escao 15 SCRA 355 May our courts recognize a decree of divorce validly obtained abroad by spouses who are Filipino citizens? -The SC applied par. 3 of Article 17. -For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or effect to a foreign decree of absolute divorce between Filipino citizens would be a patent violation of the declared public policy of the State, specially in view of the third paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code. -The court also applied Article 15 of the same Code. See also GARCIA-RECIO vs. RECIO and ROEHR vs. RODRIGUEZ Article 19 Golden Rule of the Civil Code (81) Globe Mackay Cable Radio Corp. vs. CA 176 SCRA 778 -This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of ones rights but also in the performance of ones duties. The imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment during the investigations of Tobias transgress the standards of human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code. The Court has already ruled that the right of the employer to dismiss an employee should not be confused with the manner in which the right is exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. FAR EAST BANK (FEBTC), NOW BANK OF THE PHIL. ISLANDS, vs. PACILAN, JR. 465 SCRA 372 Facts: Pacilans current account was closed by FEBTC on the ground that his account was improperly mishandled. This was due to Pacilans issuance of 4 checks to different persons with an aggregate of amount of P7,410.00 but the balance of his current deposit was only P6,981.43 resulting to the dishonor of Check No. 2434886. Pacilan then complained in writing to the bank about the closure of his account and when he did not receive any reply from FEBTC he sued the bank for damages. He alleged that the closure of his

account was unjustified inasmuch as he immediately deposited the following day an amount sufficient to fund the check. Moreover, the closure exposed him to criminal prosecution for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. The indecent haste that attended the closure of his account was patently malicious and intended to embarrass him. He alleged that he is a prominent and respected leader in the civic and banking communities (as cashier of Prudential Bank). The alleged malicious acts of the bank besmirched his reputation and caused him social humiliation, wounded feelings, insurmountable worries and sleepless nights. Held: The elements of abuse of rights are the following: (a) the existence of a legal right or duty; (b) which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. Malice or bad faith is at the core of the said provision. The law always presumes good faith and any person who seeks to be awarded damages due to acts of another has the burden of proving that the latter acted in bad faith or with ill motive. - Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence, dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty due to some motives or interest or ill will that partakes the nature of fraud. Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. Malice is bad faith or bad motive. - In the case at bench, the facts as found by the court a quo and the appellate court, do not establish that, in the exercise of this right, FEBTC committed an abuse thereof. Specifically, the 2 nd and 3rd elements for abuse of rights are not attendant in the present case. The evidence presented by the bank negates the existence of bad faith or malice on its part in closing Pacilans account on April 4, 1988 because on said date the same was already overdrawn. Further, it was shown that in 1986, the current account of Pacilan was overdrawn 156 times due to his issuance of checks against insufficient funds. In 1987, the said account was overdrawn 117 times for the same reason. Again, in 1988, 26 times. There were also several instances when Pacilan issued checks deliberately using a signature different from his specimen signature on file with bank. All these circumstances taken together justified the banks closure of Pacilans account on April 4, 1988 for improper handling. UYPITCHING et al vs. QUIAMCO (December 6, 2006) In 1982, as settlement of the civil aspect of a criminal case filed by Quiamco against Davalan, Gabutero and Generoso, the latter surrendered to the former a red Honda XL- 100 motorcycle and a photocopy of its certificate of registration. Quiamco asked for the original certificate of registration but the 3 never came back to see him again. The motorcycle was parked in an open space inside Quiamcos business establishment visible and accessible to the public. It turned out however that Gabutero bought the motorcycle on installments secured by a chattel mortgage from Ramas Uypitching Sons, Inc. that was managed by Atty. Ernesto Ramas Uypitching. The mortgage indebtedness was assumed by Davalan but stopped the payments in 1982 and told the corporations collector that the motorcycle had been taken by Quiamcos men. Nine years late r, Uypitching accompanied by policemen went to Avesco (the business establishment of Quiamco) to recover the motorcycle. While the leader of the police team P/Lt. Vendiola asked for Quiamco, Uypitching paced back and forth uttering Quiamco is a thief of a motorcycle. Unable to find Quiamco, and upon Uypitchings instructions and over the objection of Quiamcos clerk, they took the motorcycle. Uypitching then filed a criminal for qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing Law but was dismissed by the Office of the City Prosecutor. Later, Quiamco filed an action for damages against Uypitching for the following: 1. unlawful taking of the motorcycle; 2. utterance of a defamatory remark (that Quiamco was a thief) and 3. precipitate filing of a baseless and malicious complaint. According to complainant, the acts humiliated and embarrassed him and injured his reputation and integrity. ISSUE: Is Quiamco entitled to damages? SC: Petitioners claim that they should not be held liable for petitioner corporations exercise of its right as seller-mortgagee to recover the mortgaged vehicle preliminary to the enforcement of its right to foreclose on the mortgage in case of default. They are clearly mistaken. True, a mortgagee may take steps to recover the mortgaged property to enable to enforce or protect its foreclosure right thereon. There is, however, a welldefined procedure for the recovery of possession of mortgaged property: if a mortgagee is unable to obtain possession of a mortgaged property for its sale on foreclosure, he must bring a civil action either to recover such possession as a preliminary step to the sale, or to obtain judicial foreclosure. Petitioner corporation failed to bring the proper civil action necessary to acquire legal possession of the motorcycle. Instead Uypitching descended on Quiamcos establishment with his policemen and ordered the seizure of the motorcycle without a search warrant or court order. Worse, in the course of the illegal seizure, Uypitching even mouthed a slanderous statement. No doubt, the corporation, acting thru Uypitching blatantly disregarded the lawful procedure for the enforcement of its right, to the prejudice of Quiamco. Their acts violated the law as well as public morals, and transgressed the proper norms of human relations. This basic principle of human relations is embodied in Article 19 of the Civil Code. Also known as the principle of abuse of rights, it prescribes that a person should not use his right unjustly or contrary to honesty and good faith, otherwise he opens himself to liability. It seeks to preclude the use of, or the tendency to use, a legal right (or duty) as a means to unjust ends. There is an abuse of right when it is exercised solely to prejudice or injure another. In this case, the manner by which the motorcycle was taken was not only attended by bad faith but also contrary to the procedure laid down by law. Considered in conjunction with the defamatory statement, petitioners exercise of the right to recover the mortgaged vehicle was utterly prejudicial and injurious to Quiamco. The precipitate act of filing an unfounded complaint could not in any way be considered to be in accordance with the purpose for which the right to prosecute a crime was established. Thus, the totality of petiti oners actions showed a

calculated design to embarrass, humiliate and publicly ridicule Quiamco. Triple costs against petitioners, considering that Ramas Uypitching is a lawyer and an officer of the court, for his improper behavior. CEBU COUNTRY CLUB, INC. (CCCI), DAPAT, et. al. vs. ELIZAGAQUE January 18, 2008 Sometime in 1987, San Miguel Corporation, a special company proprietary member of CCCI, designated Elizagaque as a special non-proprietary member. In 1996, Elizagaque filed with CCCI an application for proprietary membership. The price of a proprietary share was around P5 million, Unchuan however, offered to sell a share for only P3.5 million but Elizagaque bought the share of a certain Butalid for only P3 million. Elizagaques application for proprietary membership was deferred twice by the board and eventually, disapproved his application. Eligaque wrote the Board thrice for reconsideration but no reply was ever made by CCCI. In 1998, Elizagaque filed a complaint for damages against CCCI. SC: As shown by the records, the Board adopted a secret balloting known as the black ball system of voting wherein each member will drop a ball in the ballot box. A white ball represents conformity to the admission of an applicant, while a black ball means disapproval. A unanimous vote of the directors is required pursuant to the amendment made in Section 3 of its articles. Obviously, the board has the right to approve or disapprove an application for proprietary membership. But such right should not be exercised arbitrarily. Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code on the Chapter on Human Relations provide restrictions. In rejecting respondents application for membership, the petitioners violated the rules governing human relations, the basic principles to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of social order. Petitioners committed fraud and evident bad faith in disapproving respondents application. The amendment to Section 3 of CCCIs amended by-laws requiring the unanimous vote of the directors present at a special or regular meeting was not printed on the application form respondent filled and submitted to CCCI. What was printed thereon was the original provision of Section 3 which was silent on the required number of votes needed for admission of an applicant as a proprietary member. The explanation that the amendment was not printed on the application form due to economic reasons, flimsy and unconvincing. Such amendment, aside from being extremely significant, was introduced way back in 1978 or almost 20 years before Elizagaque filed his application. It cannot be fathomed why such a prestigious and exclusive golf country club whose members are affluent, did not have enough money to cause the printing of an updated application form. It is thus clear that respondent was left groping in the dark wondering why his application was disapproved. He was not even informed that a unanimous vote of the Board members was required. When he sent a letter for reconsideration and an inquiry whether there was an objection to his application, petitioners apparently ignored him. At the very least, they should have informed him why his application was disapproved. The exercise of a right, though legal by itself, must nonetheless be in accordance with the proper norm. When the right is exercised arbitrarily, unjustly or excessively and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. Petitioners disapproval of respondents application is characterized by bad faith as found by both the trial and appellate courts. As to petitioners reliance on damnum absque injuria or damage without injury, suffice it to state that the same is misplaced. In Amonoy vs. Gutierrez (351SCRA731), we held that this principle does not apply when there is an abuse of a persons right, as in this case. Art. 20 Acts Contrary to Law (78,03) Art. 21 Acts Contrary to Morals (75,81,82,96) 1) Bunag, Jr. vs. CA 211 SCRA 440 -In this jurisdiction, we adhere to the time honored rule that an action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, the acts of petitioner in forcibly abducting private respondent and having carnal knowledge with her against her will, and thereafter promising to marry her in order to escape criminal liability, only to thereafter renege on such promise after cohabiting with her for 21 days, irremissibly constitute acts contrary to morals and good customs. These are grossly insensate and reprehensible transgressions that indisputably warrant and abundantly justify the award of moral and exemplary damages, pursuant to Article 21. 2) Wassmer vs. Velez 12 SCRA 648 -Mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21. 3) Tanjanco vs. CA and Santos 18 SCRA 994 -No case is made under Article 21 of the Civil Code. The plaintiff, a woman of adult age, maintained intimate sexual relations with appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual passion, for had she been deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the

defendant, she would not have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year, without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage.

BUENAVENTURA vs. CA & ISABEL LUCIA SINGH BUENAVENTURA, March 31, 2005 Is the aggrieved spouse in a marriage declared void by reason of psychological incapacity of the other spouse entitled to moral and exemplary damages under article 21 of the New Civil Code? SC: It must be noted that Article 21 states that the individual must willfully cause loss or injury to another. There is a need that the act is willful and hence done in complete freedom. It is contradictory to characterize acts as a product of psychological incapacity, and hence beyond the control of the party because of an innate inability, while at the same time considering the same set of acts as willful. By declaring Noel as psychologically incapacitated, the possibility of awarding moral damages on the same set of facts was negated. The award of moral damages should be predicated, not on the mere act of entering into the marriage, but on specific evidence that it was done deliberately and with malice by a party who had knowledge of his/her disability and yet willfully concealed the same. If the award of moral damages has no basis in fact and in law then it follows that the grant of exemplary damages cannot stand since the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages are imposed in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. Neither can there be a ground for attorneys fees and expenses for litigation since the act of Noel in filing the complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage is grounded on his psychological incapacity which as already explained is a mental incapacity causing an utter inability to comply with the obligations of marriage. Art. 22 Unjust Enrichment REPUBLIC vs. LACAP 517 SCRA 255 (March 2, 2007) In 1992, Lacap, who was doing business under the name Carwin Construction, was awarded the contract for the concreting of Sitio 5 Bahay Pare by the District Engineer of Pampanga. On October 29, 1992, the Office of the District Engineer of San Fernando, Pampanga found the project 100% completed in accordance with the approved plans and specification and was then issued Certificates of Final Inspection and Acceptance. When Lacap sought to collect payment, the DPWH withheld the payment because COA disapproved the final release of funds on the ground that the contractors license of Lacap had expired at the time of the execution of the contract. The District Engineer then sought the opinion of the DPWH Legal Department whether the contracts of Carwin for various rehabilitation projects were valid although its contractors license had already expired when the projects were contracted. Its Legal Department opined that since RA 4566 known as the Contractors License Law does not provide that a contract entered into after the license has expired is void and there is no law which expressly prohibits or declares void such contract, the contract is enforceable and may be paid, without prejudice to administrative liabilities that may be imposed on the contractor and the government employees or officials concerned. In a subsequent letter to the Legal Department, the District Engineer requested clarification whether Carwin should be paid for works accomplished despite an expired license at the time the contracts were executed. Mejia, Director III of the Legal Department recommended payment reiterating its earlier opinion. Yet, despite such recommendation, no payment was made. Thus, in July 1995, Lacap filed a complaint for damages and specific performance against the Republic. SC: The wordings of RA 4566 are clear. It does not declare, expressly or impliedly, as void contracts entered into by a contractor whose license had already expired. Nonetheless, such contractor is liable for payment of the fine prescribed therein (Section 35 of said law states: x x x x. or use an expired or revoked certificate or license, shall be guilty of misdemeanor, and shall, upon conviction, be sentenced to pay a fine of not less than five hundred pesos but not more than five thousand pesos.). Besides, Article 22 of the Civil Code embodies the maxim Nemo ex alterius incommode debet lecupletari (no man ought to be made rich out of anothers injury). This article is part of the chapter of the Civil Code on Human Relations, the provisions of which were formulated as basic principles to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of the social order, x x x designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of good conscience, x x x guides human conduct that should run as golden threads through society to the end that law may approach its supreme ideal which is the sway and dominance of justice. The rules thereon apply equally well to the Government. Since Lacap had rendered services to the full satisfaction and acceptance of petitioner, then the former should be compensated for them. To allow petitioner to acquire the finished project at no cost would undoubtedly constitute unjust enrichment for the petitioner to the prejudice of the respondent. Art. 26 (77) Acts though not constituting a criminal offense but may produce a cause action for damages, prevention and other relief.

Art. 27 Liability of Public Officers Ledesma vs. CA and Delmo 160 SCRA 449 -Ledesma, then President of the West Visayas College, was adjudged liable for damages under Article 27 of the Civil Code for failure to graduate a student with honors. Ledesmas behavior relative to Miss Delmos case smacks of contemptuous arrogance, oppression and abuse of power. It cannot be disputed that Violeta Delmo went through a painful ordeal that was brought about by Ledesmas neglect of duty and callousness. Arts. 29, 30, 31 Civil Action for Damages (Art. 31-88,03,06) -Civil actions arising from felonies are based on the principle that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable Article 100, RPC. Exceptions where no civil liability shall arise: 1. The fact from which the civil action may arise did not exist; 2. The accused did not commit the crime; or 3. No crime existed but prescription of the criminal action does not bar the filing of civil action for damages. -Only the civil aspect arising out of the offense charged is deemed instituted in the criminal case except if 1. There is a reservation; 2. There is a waiver of the civil action; or 3. The complaining party institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. Exception to the exception reservations of civil action arising from violations of BP 22 shall not be allowed or recognized. -Actions premised on quasi delicts and other independent civil actions such as civil action not based on the act or omission complained of as a felony but on some other sources of obligation (Art. 31), violation of ones civil liberties, whether direct or indirect, committed by a public official or employee or by a private individual (Article 32), fraud, defamation, or physical injuries [intentionally committed and used in its generic signification] (Art. 33), refusal of any member of the municipal or city police force to render aid or assistance in times of danger to life or property without just cause (Art. 34), and quasi-delict (Art. 2176) may be filed separately by the complainant/plaintiff without any reservation of the right to file a separate civil action (2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure). The no reservation clause has retroactive effect, the same being a rule of procedure (Casupanan vs. Laroya, Cancio vs. Isip cases). The failure to make a reservation in the criminal action is not a waiver of the right to file a separate and independent civil action based on these articles of the Civil Code. Cases: 1) Padilla, et al. vs. CA 129 SCRA 558 -Article 29 merely emphasizes that a civil action for damages is not precluded by an acquittal for the same criminal act or omission. -There is nothing contrary to the Civil Code provision in the rendition of a judgment of acquittal and a judgment awarding damages in the same criminal action. The two can stand side by side. A judgment of acquittal operates to extinguish the criminal liability. It does not, however, extinguish the civil liability unless there is a clear showing that the act from which civil liability might arise did not exist. 2) People vs. Bayotas 236 SCRA 239 -Does death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil liability? Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard the death of the accused prior to the final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso stricture. -Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of the used, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. CANCIO vs. ISIP November 12, 2002 Is the dismissal of an estafa case a bar to the institution of a civil action for collection of the value of the checks subject of the estafa case? An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to 2 separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the RPC; and (2) independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as a felony [e.g. culpa contractual or obligations arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34 and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code]; or (b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal action [Article 33, Civil Code]. Either of these 2 possible liabilities may be enforced against the offender subject, however, to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission or under both causes. In the case at bar, a reading of the complaint shows that the cause of action is based on culpa contractual, an independent civil action. It is respondents breach of the contractual obligation that served as basis of the complaint. The nature of a cause of action is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint not by the claim of the party filing the action. -Being an independent civil action arising from contracts, it may be filed separately and prosecuted independently without any reservation in the criminal action. Under Article 31 of the Civil Code when the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained

of as a felony, e.g. culpa contractual such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. Thus, not being deemed instituted in the criminal action based on culpa criminal, a ruling on the culpability of the offender will have no bearing on said independent civil action based on an entirely different cause of action, i.e. culpa contractual. SANTOS vs. PIZARRO 465 SCRA 232 (July 29, 2005) Facts: In April 1994, Viron Transit driver Sibayan was charged with reckless imprudence resulting to multiple homicide and multiple physical injuries for which Sibayan was eventually convicted in December 1998. As there was a reservation to file a separate civil action, no pronouncement of civil liability was made by the MCTC. In October 2000 Santos filed a complaint for damages against Sibayan and Rondaris, the president and chairman of Viron Transit. Viron Transit moved for the dismissal of the complaint citing, among others, prescription alleging that actions based on quasi delict prescribe in 4 years from the accrual of the cause of action. Held: Petitioners expressly made a reservation of their right to file a separate civil action as a result of the crime committed by Sibayan. On account of this reservation the MCTC did not make any pronouncement as to the latters civil liability. Although there were allegations of negligence on the part of Sibayan and Viron Transit, such does not necessarily mean that petitioners were pursuing a cause of action based on quasi delict, considering that at the time of the filing of the complaint, the cause of action ex quasi delicto had already prescribed. Besides, in cases of negligence, the offended party has the choice between an action to enforce liability arising from crime under the Revised Penal Code and an action for quasi delict under the Civil Code. An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to 2 separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e. (1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the RPC; and (2) independent civil liabilities (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or (b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal proceedings. While the cause of action ex quasi delicto had already prescribed, petitioners can still pursue the remaining avenue opened for them by their reservation, i.e., the surviving cause of action ex delicto. This is so because the prescription of the action ex quasi delicto does not operate as a bar to an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime especially as the latter action had been expressly reserved. We held that the dismissal of the action based on culpa aquiliana is not a bar to the enforcement of the subsidiary liability of the employer. Once there is a conviction for a felony, final in character, the employer becomes subsidiarily liable if the commission of the crime was in discharge of the duties of the employees. This is so because Article 103 of the RPC operates the controlling force to obviate the possibility of the aggrieved party being deprived of indemnity even after the rendition of a final judgment convicting the employee. FRIAS vs. SAN DIEGO-SISON 520 SCRA 244 (April 3, 2007) Frias entered into an agreement with Sison whereby the latter shall buy the house and lot of the former covered by TCT No. 168173 for a sum of P6.4 million pesos with a down payment of P3 million although Frias actually received only P2 million because the check covering the P1 million was dishonored. The buyer was given 6 months to decide whether to buy the property or not and if she does, she is given another 6 months to pay the balance of P3.4 million. Frias is also given the right to offer the property to a 3rd party within the 6month period and if sold to said 3rd party, to return the down payment to Sison with interest based on prevailing compounded bank interest. But if there is no other buyer and Sison should also decide not to buy the property, Frias has another 6 months within which to pay the P3 million with compounded bank interest for the last 6 months only and the 3 million shall be treated as a loan with the property as security. There was no buyer and after the lapsed of the period, Sison decided not to buy the property. Frias failed to pay the amount despite demand so Sison instituted a complaint for sum money. The debtor was later investigated for perjury and false testimony when Frias made a false report of the loss of owners copy of TCT No. 168173, executing an affidavit of loss and by filing a petition for the issuance of a new owners duplicate of title. When the civil case was decided against her and was ordered to pay Sison the amount due plus damages, she claimed that such award is without basis because she was acquitted in the case for perjury and false testimony. SC: Article 31 provides that when the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings regardless of the result of the latter. While petitioner was acquitted in the false testimony and perjury cases filed by respondent against her, those actions are entirely distinct from the collection of sum of money with damages filed by respondent against petitioner. Frias act of trying to deprive respondent of the security of her loan by executing an affidavit of loss of the title and instituting a petition for issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 169173 entitles respondent to damages. Moral damages may be awarded in culpa contractual or breach of contract cases when the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong. It partakes the nature of fraud. Art. 32 Violation of Rights (88) MHP Garments, Inc. vs. CA

236 SCRA 227 -Despite the sufficiency of time, they did not apply for a warrant and seized the goods of private respondents. In doing so, they took the risk of a suit for damages in case the seizure would be proved to violate the right of private respondents against unreasonable search and seizures. -Petitioners argument that it was the Philippine Constabulary that conducted the raid and their participation was only to report the alleged illegal activity of private respondents, the Court, citing Aberca vs. Ver (160 SCRA 590), in explaining the liability of persons indirectly responsible, held: The decisive factor in this case in our view, is the language of Article 32. The law speaks of an officer or employee or person directly or indirectly responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. In the case at bar, petitioners were indirectly involved in transgressing the right of private respondents against unreasonable search and seizure. Article 33 Independent Civil Actions (76,81,83,88) 1) Reyes vs. Sempio-Diy and Malicsi 141 SCRA 208 -Because the accused had pleaded guilty upon arraignment and was immediately sentenced, there was no chance for the aggrieved party to present evidence in support of her claim for damages and to enter a reservation in the record to file a separate civil action. The Court then allowed the complainant to pursue the action for damages. 2) Yakult Philippines vs. CA 190 SCRA 357 -Although the separate civil action in this case was without previous reservation in the criminal case, nevertheless since it was instituted before the prosecution presented evidence in the criminal action, and the judge handling the criminal case was informed thereof, then the actual filing of the civil action is even far better than a compliance with the requirement of an express reservation that should be made by the offended party before the prosecution present its evidence. -The purpose of this rule requiring reservation is to present the offended party from recovering damages twice for the same act or omission. 3) Casupanan vs Laroya August 26, 2002 May an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence validly file, simultaneously and independently, a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private complainant in the criminal case? - The accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or omission he is accused of in the criminal case. This is expressly allowed in par. 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 that states that the counterclaim of the accused may be litigated in a separate civil action. This is only fair for two reasons. First, the accused is prohibited from setting up any counterclaim in the civil aspect that is deemed instituted in the criminal case. Second, the accused who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke Article 2177 of the Civil Code, in the same way that the offended party can avail of this remedy which is independent of the criminal action. To disallow the accused from filing a separate civil action for quasi-delict, while refusing to recognize his counterclaim in the criminal case, is to deny him due process of law, access to the courts, and equal protection of the law. - Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil action in Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with the criminal action but may be filed separately by the offended party even without reservation. Article 36 Prejudicial Question (88,97) A prejudicial question is one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. 2 elements: 1. the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related with to the issue raised in the criminal action; and 2. the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. - If present the criminal action shall be suspended as the resolution of the issue in the civil determines the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal. But court has no authority to motu proprio suspend or dismiss the criminal action but only upon petition of the defendant in accordance with the Rules of Court (Yap vs. Paras, 205 SCRA 605). - Petition (generally, by the accused) to suspend the criminal proceedings may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. If the criminal action has already been filed in court for trial, it shall be made in the same criminal action before the prosecution rests its case. Where Prejudicial Question was considered even if one action is not criminal but administrative. 1) Quiambao vs. Osorio

158 SCRA 674 -The actions involved in the case at bar being respectively civil and administrative in character, it is obvious that technically, there is no prejudicial question to speak of. Equally apparent, however, is the intimate correlation between said two (2) proceedings, stemming from the fact that the right of private respondent to eject petitioner from the disputed portion depends primarily on the pending administrative case. Where the cases are both civil in nature. 1) City of Pasig vs COMELEC 314 SCRA 179 -The City of Pasig argues that there is no prejudicial question since the same contemplates a civil and criminal action and does not come into play where both cases are civil as in the instant case. The SC held that while this may be the general rule, this Court has held in Vidad vs RTC of Negros Oriental, Br. 42, that, in the interest of good order, we can very well suspend action on one case pending the outcome of another case closely interrelated or linked to the first. Other cases: 2) Umali vs. IAC 186 SCRA 680 -No prejudicial question. -Even if the civil case were to be finally adjudged to the effect that the said deed of sale should be annulled, such declaration would be of no material importance in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case, the latter involving violation of BP 22.

3) Tuanda vs. Sandiganbayan 249 SCRA 342 -All the elements of a prejudicial question are clearly and unmistakably present in this case. There is no doubt that the facts and issues involved in the civil action and the criminal case are clearly related. The filing of the criminal case was premised on petitioners alleged partiality and evident bad faith in not paying private respondents salaries and per diems as sectoral representatives, while the civil action was instituted precisely to resolve whether or not the designation of private respondents as sectoral representatives were made in accordance with law. 4) Bobis vs. Bobis July 31, 2000 -Not every defense raised in the civil action may be used as a prejudicial question to obtain the suspension of the criminal action. -Respondent thought of seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage only after petitioner sued him for bigamy. The obvious intent therefore, is that respondent merely resorted to the civil action as a potential prejudicial question for the purpose of frustrating or delaying his criminal prosecution. Beltran vs. People 334 SCRA 106 - The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid 2 conflicting decisions. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. -The accuseds argument that he could be acquitted of the charge of concubinage should his marriage be declared null and void, suffice it to state that even a subsequent pronouncement that his marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense. -In the case at bar it must be held that parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and purposes. Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his wife before the judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage runs the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy for concubinage. 5) Philippine Agila Satellite, Inc. (PASI) vs. Lichauco 496 SCRA 588 (July 27, 2006) Then DOTC Secretary Lagdameo, Jr. confirmed, by letter, the governments assignment of Phil. orbital slots 161E and 153E to PASI for its Agila Satellites. PASI thereupon undertook preparations for the launching, ownership, operation and management of its satellites by, among other things, obtaining loans. In connection with the loan, PASI President de Guzman later informed Landbank President and CEO Lapuz about the assignment of the orbital slots and requested the banks confirmation of its participation in a club loan amounting to US$11 million, the proceeds of which would be applied to PASIs interim satellite. Lapuz sent a copy of the letter to then Undersecretary Lichauco who denied the assignment of the 2 orbital slots to PASI but that PASI is only getting 144E orbital slot. Subsequently, Lichauco issued a Notice of Offer for several orbital slots including 153E. Claiming that the offer was made without its knowledge and that another company was awarded for orbital slot 153E, PASI filed a complaint for injunction, nullity and damages against Lichauco and

the unknown awardee. A month later PASI filed a complaint against Lichauco before the Of fice of the Ombudsman for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Upon evaluation by the said office it found the existence of a prejudicial question and recommended its dismissal. The recommendation was approved by then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto. Issues: 1. Whether there exists a PQ and, in the affirmative, 2. whether the dismissal of the complaint on that account is proper. Held: If the award to the undisclosed bidder of orbital slot 153E is, in the civil case, declared valid for being within Lichaucos scope of authority to thus free her from liability for damages, there would be no prohibited act to speak of nor would there be basis for undue injury claimed to have been suffered by PASI. The finding by the Ombudsman of the existence of a prejudicial question is thus well taken. If the complaint has prima facie merit, however, the investigating officer shall recommend the adoptions of the action enumerated from (b) to (f). When in the course of the actions taken by those to whom the complaint is endorsed or forwarded, a prejudicial question is found to be pending, Section 6, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court should be applied in a suppletory character. As laid down in Yap vs. Paras, said rule directs that the proceedings may only be suspended, not dismissed, and that it may be made only upon petition, and not at the instance of the judge alone or as in this case, the investigating officer. To give imprimatur to the Ombudsmans dismissal of petitioners complaint due to a prejudicial question would only not run counter to the provision of Section 6 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. It would sanction the extinguishments of criminal liability, if there be any, through prescription under Article 89 vis-vis Articles 90 and 91 of the Revised Penal Code. OMICTIN vs. CA and LAGOS 512 SCRA 70 (January 22, 2007) Omictin, Operations Manager Ad Interim of Saag, Phils., filed a complaint of estafa against Lagos due to the latters refusal, despite repeated demands, to return the 2 company vehicles entrusted to him while he was still the president of the firm. Lagos moved for the suspension of the criminal proceedings due to the existence of a prejudicial question in view of a pending case before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filed by the latter against Omictin, Saag Pte. (S) Ltd., Ng, Yeo and Tan. The case before the SEC stemmed from the appointments of Tan as President Ad Interim and Omictin as Operations Manager Ad Interim of Saag Phils., Incorporated. Saag (S) Pte. Ltd. is a foreign corporation organized under the laws of Singapore. Lagos was appointed Area Sales Manager in the Philippines where he was authorized to organize a local joint venture corporation known as Saag, Phils., with Saag (S) Pte. Ltd. as the majority stockholder and Lagos was appointed as one of the directors. Due to intra-corporate disputes, 2 of the directors resigned and divested their shares in Saag Corporation. Lagos resigned as president while retaining his post as director. He later requested Executive Director Yeo to call for a board meeting because in their joint venture agreement (JVA) between Saag Phils. and Saag (S) Pte. Ltd. it was agreed that should the controlling interest in the latter company be acquired by any other person or entity without his prior consent, he has the option to either require the other stockholders to purchase his shares or terminate the JVA and dissolve Saag Phils., Inc. No meeting was made, instead Tan was appointed as president ad interim and Omictin as operations manager ad interim. Thus, the SEC case. SC: Ultimately, the resolution of the issues raised in the intra-corporate dispute will determine the guilt or innocence of Lagos in the crime of estafa. One of the elements of estafa with abuse of confidence under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC is a demand made by the offended party to the offender. Logically, under the circumstances since the alleged offended party is Saag Phils., Inc., the validity of the demand for the delivery of the subject vehicles rests upon the authority of the person making such demand on the companys behalf. Lagos is challenging petitioners authority to act for Saag Phils., Inc. in the corporate case. If the supposed authority of petitioner is found to be defective, it is as if no demand was ever made, hence, the prosecution for estafa cannot prosper. MAGESTRADO vs. PEOPLE and LIBROJO 527 SCRA 125 (July 10, 2007) Librojo filed a criminal complaint for perjury against Magestrado. It was alleged that Magestrado executed an affidavit of loss before a notary public stating therein that he lost Owners Duplicate Copy of TCT No. N-173163 when in truth the said title was surrendered by Magestrado to Librojo as security for a loan. Subsequently, Magestrado filed a motion for suspension of proceedings based on a prejudicial question because he alleged that Civil Cases No. Q-98-34348 to 9, cases for cancellation of mortgage, delivery of title and damages and recovery of a sum of money, must be resolved first before the criminal case may proceed since the issues in the said civil cases are similar or intimately related to the issues raised in the criminal action. SC: A perusal of the allegations in the civil cases are principally for the determination of whether a loan was obtained by petitioner from Librojo and whether Magestrado executed a real estate mortgage involving the property covered by TCT No. N-173163. On the other hand, the criminal case involves the determination of whether petitioner committed perjury in executing an affidavit of loss to support his request for issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 173163. It is evident that the civil cases and the criminal case can proceed independently of each other. Regardless of the outcome of the 2 civil cases, it will not establish the innocence or guilt of the petitioner in the criminal case for perjury. The purchase by Magestrado of the land or his execution of a real estate mortgage will have no bearing whatsoever on whether petitioner knowingly and fraudulently executed a false affidavit of lass.