L. Accountability of Public officers 1. G.R. No.

166715 August 14, 2008ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (formerly AASJS)1 OFFICERS/MEMBERS SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, ROMEO R. ROBISO, RENE B.GOROSPE and EDWIN R. SANDOVAL, petitioners,vs.HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, HON. GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO, JR., in his capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and HON. ALBERTO D. LINA, in his Capacity as Commissioner of Bureau of Customs, respondents. Facts: Sometime in 2005 RA 9335, also known as the attrition act, was instituted. This law imposed a system of rewards and punishment upon government officials who belonged to the BOC and the BIR. The main gist of the law was that officials belonging to these departments would be rewarded for collections in excess of the set quotas, and punished by dismissal if unable to reach the same quotas. AGPL contests the constitutionality of the law, claiming among many other alleged negative effects, that it will encourage the public officials of both these departments to become mercenaries and lead them away from the proper performance of their duties. Issue: Will the regularity of the performance of the duties of the officials of the BIR and BOC be cast into doubt as a result of this law? Held: Public officers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties.

Petitioners claim that the implementation of RA 9335 will turn BIR and BOC officials and employees into "bounty hunters and mercenaries" is not only without any factual and legal basis; it is also purely speculative. A law enacted by Congress enjoys the strong presumption of constitutionality. To justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal one.16 To invalidate RA 9335 based on petitioners baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but also of the executive which approved it. Public service is its own reward. Nevertheless, public officers may by law be rewarded for exemplary and exceptional performance. A system of incentives for exceeding the set expectations of a public office is not anathema to the concept of public accountability. In fact, it recognizes and reinforces dedication to duty, industry, efficiency and loyalty to public service of deserving government personnel 2 (HINDI KO MAKITA KAHIT FULL TEXT. IBANG YEAR LUMALABAS) 3 Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC A.M. No. 3135 April 15, 1988 MIGUEL CUENCO, complainant, vs. HON. MARCELO B. FERNAN, petitioner. RESOLUTION PER CURIAM:

Complainant Miguel Cuenco has filed an untitled pleading dated 27 March This presumption necessarily obtains in favor of BIR and BOC officials and 1988 which, considering the melange confus of allegations therein, the employees. RA 9335 operates on the basis thereof and reinforces it by Court treats as a consolidated: providing a system of rewards and sanctions for the purpose of encouraging (1) Second Motion for Reconsideration of the decision dated 23 July 1987 the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC to exceed their revenue rendered by the Third Division of the Court in the Consolidated Petitions in targets and optimize their revenue-generation capability G.R. No. L-41171 (entitled "Intestate Estate of the Late Vito Borromeo. andcollection.15The presumption is disputable but proof to the contrary is Patrocinio Borromeo-Herrera v. Fortunate Borromeo, et al."), G.R. No. required to rebut it. It cannot be overturned by mere conjecture or denied 55000 (entitled "In the Matter of the Estate of Vito Borromeo, Deceased. in advance (as petitioners would have the Court do) specially in this case Pilar N. Borromeo, et al. v. Fortunato Borromeo"), G.R. No. 62895 (entitled where it is an underlying principle to advance a declared public policy. Page 1 of 26

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"Jose Cuenco Borromeo v. Court of Appeals, et al."), G.R. No. 63818 (entitled "Domingo Antigua, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al."), and G.R. No. 65995 (entitled "Petra Borromeo, et al. v. Francisco P. Burgos, etc., et al."); (2) Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's En Banc Resolution of 17 February 1988 in this case; and (3) Compliance with the directive in aforesaid Resolution of 17 February 1988 requiring complainant Cuenco "to show cause why he should not be administratively dealt with for having made unfounded and serious accusations against Mr. Justice Fernan." A. On the Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision in the Consolidated Petitions The record of the Vito Borromeo estate proceedings discloses that the 23 July 1987 decision of the Court in the five (5) Consolidated Petitions mentioned became final and executory on 19 October 1987 and that Entry of Judgment was made on 24 March 1988. There is thus no need to discuss here the arguments made by complainant Cuenco in respect of the Court's decision therein on the matter of attomey's fees of Mr. Cuenco and all the other lawyers concerned. B. On the Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of the Court in Administrative Case No. 3135 The present administrative case for disbarment filed by complainant Cuenco against Mr. Justice Fernan was previously dismissed by the Court "for utter lack of merit" in a Per Curiam Resolution issued on 17 February 1988 on, inter alia, the ground that complainant had failed altogether to substantiate his charges against Mr. Justice Fernan. The Court also held that, under the Constitution, removal from office of a Member of the Supreme Court can be effected only through impeachment, and not indirectly through disbarment proceedings. To the extent that the Court can understand complainant Cuenco's untitled pleading, complainant would now seek reconsider consideration of the Court's Resolution on the following grounds:

1. That in the estate proceedings of the late Vito Borromeo, Mr. Justice Fernan "made up his mind that some persons have to be declared heirs of Vito Borromeo" and that the several petitions for declaration of heirs were heard jointly at the law office of Atty. now Justice Fernan in Cebu City; 2. That it is unlikely that Mr. Justice Fernan "had a stony face, was motionless, expression less, without uttering words, views, opinions, so that he did not assert any influence [during] long deliberations [of the Consolidated Petitional], hence, "it is impossible to deny Justice Fernan's participation in the preparations of the 32-page decision of the Third Division of the Supreme Court [in the Consolidated Petitional];" consequently, Mr. Justice Fernan not only "voted for his exoneration which is naturally seriously anomalous," but he also acted as respondent, his own counsel for himself and judge of himself three conflicting positions rolled into one;" 3. That "[t]he decision of the Third Division in the five cases is open to the suspicion that Justice Fernan is protecting Judge Burgos, and Attys. Antigua and Estenzo for violating the provisions of the Civil Code;" and 4. That "[t]he theory that Mr. Justice Fernan is not accountable for any grave misconduct except by impeachment proceeding, is not absolute. In its Resolution of 17 February 1988 in this case, the Court found complainant Cuenco's charges against Mr. Justice Fernan to be "completely unsupported by the facts and evidence of record." We find in the present instance that complainant Cuenco, in his untitled pleading, has once more failed to submit any proof whatsoever to substantiate the statements made by him therein which are so extravagant as to be preposterous. 1. As pointed out in the Court's 17 February 1988 Resolution of this case, Special Proceedings No. 916-R for probate of the will of the late Vito Borromeo was instituted in 1952, while it was in 1954 that the "heirs" referred to by complainant Cuenco in his

pleading claimed rights of ownership over thirteen (13) parcel of land which they sought to be excluded from the estate of the decedent. Upon the other hand, Mr. Justice Fernan's involvement in the Vito Borromeo estate Page 2 of 26

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proceedings began only on 7 August 1965 and ended on 19 February 1968, long after said "heirs" had surfaced and asserted their respective claims against the decedent's estate. There is, therefore, no rational basis for the assertion of complainant Cuenco that Mr. Justice Fernan "made up his mind that some persons have to be declared heirs of Vito Borromeo." Complainant Cuenco further asserts that the several petitions for declaration of heirs filed by the different claimants to the estate of the late Vito Borromeo "were heard jointly at the law office of Atty. now Justice Fernan in Cebu City." It will be noted from the 23 July 1987 decision of the Court in the Consolidated Petitions that said petitions for declaration of heirship were heard jointly by the trial judge not by Mr. Justice Fernan sometime during or after the month of December 1968, after probate of the will had been disallowed by the probate court, and after Mr. Justice Fernan had already withdrawn as counsel for two (2) of the instituted heirs in the Vito Borromeo estate proceedings. 2. The record explicitly shows that Mr. Justice Fernan inhibited himself from participating in the deliberations on the Vito Borromeo estate cases and, in fact, did not take part in the resolution thereof. This fact of nonparticipation is manifested in the annotation appearing beside Mr. Justice Fernan's signature: "No part I appeared as counsel for one of the parties." Complainant Cuenco, however, continues simply to ignore this express statement on the record and, instead, presents his own personal notions of the "true" facts and circumstances of this case. The record, however, is entirely bereft of any suggestion that Mr. Justice Fernan had in any way influenced any Member of the Third Division of the Court or participated in the deliberations and resolution of the estate cases. 3. We are unable to understand Cuenco's assertion that the Decision of the Courts' Third Division in the Consolidated Petitions "is open to the suspicion that Justice Fernan is protecting Judge Burgos, and Attys. Antigua and Estenzo for violating the provisions of the Civil Code."

impeachment,not by a disbarment proceeding, it suffices to furnish Mr.Cuenco a copy of the extended Resolution of this Court dated 15 April 1988 on this same topic. C. On Compliance with the Resolution of l7 February 1988 in Administrative Case No. 3135. The Court finds the explanation given by complainant Cuenco to be totally unsatisfactory. Complainant Cuenco vehemently denies acting in bad faith in filing the present administrative complaint against Mr. Justice Fernan and suggests that his acts have been "misunderstood" by the Court. Complainant, however, has failed to present a shred of evidence to support the very serious charges he has made against Mr. Justice Fernan. In his untitled pleading, complainant Cuenco has not only declined to prove the accusations he has made against Mr. Justice Fernan but has also chosen to make additional statements and charges so extravagant and so clearly uninformed as to require no discussion. Because the Court cannot assume that complainant Cuenco is totally unaware of the nature and gravity of the charges he has made against Mr. Justice Fernan and which he has completely failed to support with anything but his own bare assertion, the Court is compelled to conclude that those accusations were made in bad faith. ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved: a) to DENY Mr. Cuenco's Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of the Court dated 23 July 1987 in G.R. Nos. L-41171, 55000, 62895, 63818 and 65995, said decision having become final and executory; b) to DENY, with finality, complainant Cuenco's Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of this Court dated 17 February 1988 in Administrative Case No. 3135; and

c) to FIND Mr. Cuenco guilty of misconduct as a lawyer and an officer of the 4. On the statements made by complainant Cuenco concerning the rule Court. referred to in the per curiam Resolution of 17 February 1988 that a Member of the Supreme Court may be removed from office only through Page 3 of 26

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Complainant Cuenco is hereby severely REPRIMANDED and WARNED that the same or similar misconduct in the future will be dealt with more severely by the Court. Were it not for complainant Cuenco's advanced age, frail health and prior service to the country, the Court would have imposed a more severe penalty in this case. 4. In re: Raul Gonzales Facts: Gonzales was the Tanodbayan or Special Prosecutor. He forwarded a letter-complaint to Justice Fernan. The letter was said to be from concerned employees of the SC (an anonymous letter). The letter was originally addressed to Gonzales referring to the charges for disbarment sought by Mr. Miguel Cuenco against Justice Fernan, and asking him (Gonzales) to do something about it. The Supreme Court furnished a copy to Gonzales, the per curiam Resolution of the SC, dismissing the charges made by Cuenco against Justice Fernan for lack of merit. In that resolution, Cuenco was asked to show cause why he should not be held administratively liable for making serious accusations against Fernan. Issue: Whether or not a Supreme Court justice can be disbarred during his term of office Held: A public officer (such as Justice Fernan) who under the Constitution is required to be a Member of the Philippine Bar as aqualification for the office held by him and who may be removed from office only by impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment during the incumbency of such public officer. Further, such public officer, during his incumbency, cannot be charged criminally before the Sandiganbayan, or any other court, with any offense which carries with it the penalty of removal from office. Another reason why the complaint for disbarment should be dismissed is because under the Constitution, members of the SC may be removed only by impeachment. The above provision proscribes removal from office by any other method. Otherwise, to allow such public officer who may be removed solely by impeachment to be charged criminally while holding his office with an office that carries the penalty of removal from office, would be violative of the clear mandate of the Constitution. The effect of impeachment is limited to the loss of position and disqualification to hold any office of honor, trust or profit under the

Republic. Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office. But the party convicted shall nevertheless be held liable and subject to prosecution, trial and punishment according to law. The court is not saying that the members and other constitutional officer are entitled to immunity from liability. What the court is merely saying is that there is a fundamental procedural requirement that must be observed before such liability ma be determined. A member of the SC must first be removed from office, via the constitutional route of impeachment, and then only may he be held liable either criminally or administratively (that is, disbarment), for any wrong or misbehavior in appropriate proceedings 5. Francisco vs. HR Ernesto Francisco, Jr. vs. The House of Representatives G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003 Carpio Morales, J.: Facts: On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution which directed the Committee on Justice to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). Then on June 2, 2003, former President Joseph Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices. The complaint was endorsed and was referred to the House Committee in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was sufficient in form, but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. On October 23, 2003, a second impeachment complaint was filed against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a Resolution of

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Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives. Issues: 1. Can the Court make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense? 2. Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional. 3. Whether or not the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution. Held: 1. No. Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for impeachment, two of these, namely, other high crimes and betrayal of public trust, elude a precise definition. 2. Yes. The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they give the term initiate a meaning different from filing. 3. Yes. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution. In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed on June 2, 2003 and the second impeachment complaint filed was on October 23, 2003, it violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period. 6. G.R. No. 193459 February 15, 2011

GUTIERREZ vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE (by Cristian Saba, DLSU-COL) FACTS: * On 22 July 2010, Baraquel, et al. filed an impeachment complaint (First Complaint) against Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez (petitioner) based on betrayal of public trust and culpable violation of the Constitution. * On 3 August 2010, a Second Complaint was filed by Reyes, et al. against the same respondent also based on betrayal of public trust and culpable violation of the Constitution. * On 11 August 2010, the two complaints were referred by the House Plenary to the Committee on Justice at the same time. * On 1 September 2010, the Committee on Justice found the First and Second Complaints sufficient in form. On 7 September 2010, the Committee on Justice, found the First and Second Complaints were sufficient in form. * On 13 September 2010, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Supreme Court seeking to enjoin the Committee on Justice from proceeding with the impeachment proceedings. The petition prayed for a temporary restraining order. Petitioner: She invokes the Courts expanded certiorari jurisdiction to "determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." Public Respondent: The petition is premature and not yet ripe for adjudication since petitioner has at her disposal a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of the proceedings before public respondent. Public respondent argues that when petitioner filed the present petition on September 13, 2010, it had not gone beyond the determination of the sufficiency of form and substance of the two complaints. Hence, certiorari is unavailing.

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* The following day, during the en banc morning session of 14 September 2010, the majority of the Court voted to issue a status quo ante order suspending the impeachment proceedings against petitioner. (Note: In urgent cases, it is a matter of practice for the Court that all the Justices should have been given time, at least an hour or two, to read the petition before voting on the issuance of the status quo ante order. Unfortunately, this was not done.) * Section 3(5), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that "no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year." ISSUE #1: Does the Supreme Court have the power to determine whether public respondent committed a violation of the Constitution in the exercise of its discretion relating to impeachment proceeding? HELD: YES, under the doctrine of expanded judicial review. The Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr,"judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review. There exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.

HELD: NO. In the present petition, there is no doubt that questions on the validity of the simultaneous referral of the two complaints and on the need to publish as a mode of promulgating the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the House (Impeachment Rules) present constitutional vagaries which call for immediate interpretation. The unusual act of simultaneously referring to public respondent two impeachment complaints presents a novel situation to invoke judicial power. Petitioner cannot thus be considered to have acted prematurely when she took the cue from the constitutional limitation that only one impeachment proceeding should be initiated against an impeachable officer within a period of one year. ISSUE #3: When is an impeachment complaint deemed initiated? HELD: There are two components of the act of initiating the complaint: the filing of the impeachment complaint AND the referral by the House Plenary to the Committee on Justice. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated (meaning, filed and initiated), another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period. ISSUE #4: Do the Impeachment Rules provide for comprehensible standards in determining the sufficiency of form and substance? HELD: YES. Contrary to petitioner contention, the Impeachment Rules are clear in echoing the constitutional requirements and providing that there must be a "verified complaint or resolution," and that the substance requirement is met if there is "a recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the committee.

In fact, it is only in the Impeachment Rules where a determination of sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment complaint is made Indubitably, the Court is not asserting its ascendancy over the Legislature in necessary. This requirement is not explicitly found in the Constitution which this instance, but simply upholding the supremacy of the Constitution as the merely requires a "hearing." ( Section 3[2], Article XI). In the discharge of its repository of the sovereign will. constitutional duty, the House deemed that a finding of sufficiency of form ISSUE #2: Is the petition premature and not yet ripe for adjudication? and substance in an impeachment complaint is vital "to effectively carry out" the impeachment process, hence, such additional requirement in the Impeachment Rules. Page 6 of 26

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ISSUE #5: May the Supreme Court look into the narration of facts constitutive of the offenses vis--vis petitioners submissions disclaiming the allegations in the complaints? HELD: NO. This issue would "require the Court to make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislature (Francisco vs. House of Representatives.) ISSUE #6: Was petitioner denied of due process, because of the delay in the publication of the Impeachment Rules? HELD: NO. The Supreme Court discussed the difference between publication and promulgation. To recall, days after the 15th Congress opened on July 26, 2010 or on August 3, 2010, public respondent provisionally adopted the Impeachment Rules of the 14th Congress and thereafter published on September 2, 2010 its Impeachment Rules, admittedly substantially identical with that of the 14th Congress, in two newspapers of general circulation. Citing Taada v. Tuvera, petitioner contends that she was deprived of due process since the Impeachment Rules was published only on September 2, 2010 a day after public respondent ruled on the sufficiency of form of the complaints. She likewise tacks her contention on Section 3(8), Article XI of the Constitution which directs that "Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section." Public respondent counters that "promulgation" in this case refers to "the publication of rules in any medium of information, not necessarily in the Official Gazette or newspaper of general circulation." While "promulgation" would seem synonymous to "publication," there is a statutory difference in their usage. The Constitution notably uses the word "promulgate" 12 times. A number of those instances involves the promulgation of various rules, reports and issuances emanating from Congress, the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman as well as other constitutional offices.

To appreciate the statutory difference in the usage of the terms "promulgate" and "publish," the case of the Judiciary is in point. In promulgating rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the Supreme Court has invariably required the publication of these rules for their effectivity. As far as promulgation of judgments is concerned, however, PROMULGATION means "the delivery of the decision to the clerk of court for filing and publication. Promulgation must thus be used in the context in which it is generally understoodthat is, to make known. Since the Constitutional Commission did not restrict "promulgation" to "publication," the former should be understood to have been used in its general sense. It is within the discretion of Congress to determine on how to promulgate its Impeachment Rules, in much the same way that the Judiciary is permitted to determine that to promulgate a decision means to deliver the decision to the clerk of court for filing and publication. It is not for the Supreme Court to tell a co-equal branch of government how to promulgate when the Constitution itself has not prescribed a specific method of promulgation. The Court is in no position to dictate a mode of promulgation beyond the dictates of the Constitution. Inquiries in aid of legislation under Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution is the sole instance in the Constitution where there is a categorical directive to duly publish a set of rules of procedure. (Neri vs. Senate) Even assuming arguendo that publication is required, lack of it does not nullify the proceedings taken prior to the effectivity of the Impeachment Rules which faithfully comply with the relevant self-executing provisions of the Constitution. Otherwise, in cases where impeachment complaints are filed at the start of each Congress, the mandated periods under Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution would already run or even lapse while awaiting the expiration of the 15-day period of publication prior to the effectivity of the Impeachment Rules. In effect, the House would already violate the Constitution for its inaction on the impeachment complaints pending the completion of the publication requirement. (Just like what happened in this

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case, where the complaint was filed even before the 15th Congress open its first session) Given that the Constitution itself states that any promulgation of the rules on impeachment is aimed at "effectively carry[ing] out the purpose" of impeachment proceedings, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion when the House deemed it proper to provisionally adopt the Rules on Impeachment of the 14th Congress, to meet the exigency in such situation of early filing and in keeping with the "effective" implementation of the "purpose" of the impeachment provisions. In other words, the provisional adoption of the previous Congress Impeachment Rules is within the power of the House to promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the avowed purpose. Moreover, the rules on impeachment, as contemplated by the framers of the Constitution, merely aid or supplement the procedural aspects of impeachment. Being procedural in nature, they may be given retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason for this is that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws." In the present case, petitioner fails to allege any impairment of vested rights. It bears stressing that, unlike the process of inquiry in aid of legislation where the rights of witnesses are involved, impeachment is primarily for the protection of the people as a body politic, and not for the punishment of the offender. ISSUE #6: When do we reckon the start of the one-year ban? Petitioner contends that it is reckoned from the filing of the first impeachment complaint against her on July 22, 2010 or four days before the opening on July 26, 2010 of the 15th Congress. She posits that within one year from July 22, 2010, no second impeachment complaint may be accepted and referred to public respondent.

HELD: Francisco doctrine states that the term "initiate" means to file the complaint and referral of the complaint to the Committee on Justice. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period. Therefore, the one-year period ban is reckoned not from the filing of the first complaint, but on the date it is referred to the House Committee on Justice. Petitioner submits that referral could not be the reckoning point of initiation because "something prior to that had already been done. This is wrong. Following petitioners line of reasoning, the verification of the complaint or the endorsement by a member of the House steps done prior to the filing would already initiate the impeachment proceedings. ISSUE #7: Does an impeachment complaint need to allege only one impeachable offense? Petitioner argues that public respondent gravely abused its discretion when it disregarded its own Impeachment Rules, which provides that "the Rules of Criminal Procedure under the Rules of Court shall, as far as practicable, apply to impeachment proceedings before the House." Petitioner invokes the application of Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure on one offense per complaint rule. To petitioner, the two impeachment complaints are insufficient in form and substance since each charges her with both culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust. HELD: The Constitution allows the indictment for multiple impeachment offenses, with each charge representing an article of impeachment, assembled in one set known as the "Articles of Impeachment." It, therefore, follows that an impeachment complaint need not allege only one impeachable offense. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and FORMER DEPURTY OMBUDSMAN FOR VISAYAS ARTURO C. MOJICA GR No. 146486, 4 March 2005, Chico-Nazario, J. (Second Division)

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The enumeration in the Constitution of the impeachable officers is exclusive. The Ombudsman is only one man, not including his Deputies. Thus, only the Ombudsman, not his deputies, is impeachable. On 29 December 1999, twenty- two officials and employees of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, led by its two directors, filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman requesting an investigation on the basis of allegations that then Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, herein private respondent Arturo Mojica, committed (1) sexual harassment against Rayvi Padua- Varona, mulcting money from confidential employees: James Alueta and Eden Kiamco and (3) oppression against all employees in not releasing P7,200.00 in benefits of OMB- Visayas employees on the date the said amount was due for release. Fact-finding investigation was conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman and the report was referred by the Ombudsman to a constituted Committee of Peers which initially recommended that the investigation be converted into one solely for purposes of impeachment. However, this recommendation was denied by the Office of the Ombudsman and following the stand of the Office of the Ombudsman that the Deputy Ombudsmen and The Special Prosecutor are not removable through impeachment. On 18 December 2000, despite the expiration of private respondent Mojica's term of office, the Court of Appeals nevertheless rendered the assailed Decision on the grounds of public interest. CA ruled that the Deputy Ombudsman is an impeachable officer. Thus, OMB's appeal. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the Ombudsmans Deputies are impeachable 2. Whether or not the Deputy Ombudsman may be held criminally and/or administratively liable HELD: Order of the CA is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaints in Criminal Case No. OMB-0-00-0616 and Administrative Case No. OMB-ADM0-00-0316 are REINSTATED and the Office of the Ombudsman is ordered to

proceed with the investigation relative to the above cases. Ombudsman's Deputies Not Impeachable The Deputy Ombudsman is not an impeachable officer. Sec. 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution states that The President, the Vice- President, the members of the Supreme Court, the members of the Constitutional Commissions and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from Office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. RECENT JURISPRUDENCE POLITICAL LAW Records of the Constitutional Commission, as well as the opinions of leading commentators in Constitutional Law reveal that the term Ombudsman in Sec. 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution refer to the rank in itself. The Ombudsman is only one man, not including his Deputies. Leading legal luminaries on the Constitution are one in their opinion as to whether or not the Deputy Ombudsman is impeachable. All of them agree that the enumeration impeachable officers in Section 2, Article XI of the 1986 Constitution, is exclusive. In their belief, only the Ombudsman, not his deputies, is impeachable. How then to explain our earlier pronouncement in Cuenco v. Fernan, as later cited in In Re: Raul M. Gonzales, Jarque v. Desierto and LastimosaDalawampu v. Dep. Ombudsman Mojica and Graft Investigator Labella which reads: To grant a complaint for disbarment of a Member of the Court during the Members incumbency, would in effect be to circumvent and hence to run afoul of the constitutional mandate that Members of the Court may be removed from office only by impeachment for and conviction of certain offenses listed in Article XI [2] of the Constitution. Precisely the same situation exists in respect of the Ombudsman and his deputies (Article XI [8] in relation to Article XI *2+) all of whom are constitutionally required to be members of the Philippine Bar?

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A dictum is an opinion that does not embody the resolution or determination of the court, and made without argument, or full consideration of the point. Mere dicta are not binding under the doctrine of stare decisis. The succeeding cases of In Re: Raul M. Gonzales and Jarque v. Desierto do not tackle the impeachability of a Deputy Ombudsman either. Nor, for that matter, does Lastimosa-Dalawampu v. Deputy Ombudsman Mojica and Graft Investigator Labella , which, as previously mentioned, is a minute resolution dismissing a complaint for disbarment against the herein private respondent on the basis of the questioned obiter in Cuenco v. Fernan and the succeeding cases without going into the merits. Thus, where the issue involved was not raised nor presented to the court and not passed upon by the court in the previous case, the decision in the previous case is not stare decisis of the question presented. Criminal and Administrative Liability of Deputy Ombudsman As to whether or not the private respondent, then Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, may be held criminally and/or administratively liable, we likewise resolve the issue in favor of the petitioner. The rule that an impeachable officer cannot be criminally prosecuted for the same offenses which constitute grounds for impeachment presupposes his continuance in office. Hence, the moment he is no longer in office because of his removal, resignation, or permanent disability, there can be no bar to his criminal prosecution in the courts. Nor does retirement bar an administrative investigation from proceeding against the private respondent, given that, as pointed out by the petitioner, the formers retirement benefits have been placed on hold in view of the provisions of Sections 12 and 13 f the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act. People of the Philippines vs Sandiganbayan and Bienvenido Tan, Jr.

million. But in October 1987, without any word from SMC, Tan referred the case to the Legal Service Division of the BIR. Various BIR officials reviewed the case and they recommended that SMCs tax liability be reduced to P22 million (a significant reduction from the original P342 million). The reduction was justified by the BIR officials on the ground that the tax examiners had made some errors in computing SMCs tax liability. So SMC was demanded to pay P22 million but then SMC asked for a compromise of P10 million. Again, the matter was referred to various BIR officials who agreed and recommended to Tan that he should accept the compromise offer. Tan accepted the P10 million compromise offer. This resulted to a criminal case against Tan for violation of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act. Allegedly, his act of accepting the P10 million compromise offer caused undue injury to the government and it gave SMC unwarranted benefits due to the significantly reduced tax liability. The Sandiganbayan originally convicted Tan but it reversed its own decision upon motion of Tan. ISSUE: Whether or not Tan should have been convicted of the crime charged. HELD: No. It was found by the Sandiganbayan that there was an improper computation in the tax liability of SMC. The error basically imposed tax on top of another tax which if allowed would be unfair to the taxpayer. It was therefore proper to have the tax be reduced from P302 million to P22 million. But is it proper for Tan to accept the P10 million compromise by SMC?

Tan is well within his power to accept the P10 million compromise offer. This is actually abatement (not compromise as termed by SMC). Tan is Taxation Abatement Defined actually prudent to accept the P10 million offer so as to avoid a protracted and costly litigation. Abatement is the diminution or decrease in the amount In July 1987, Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) Bienvenido Tan, Jr. of tax imposed. It refers to the act of eliminating or nullifying; of lessening issued an assessment against San Miguel Corporation (SMC) demanding or moderating. To abate is to nullify or reduce in value or amount. The CIR payment of P342 million in taxes. SMC filed a request for reinvestigation. has the power to abate or cancel the whole or any unpaid portion of a tax Tan granted the request and eventually he reduced the tax liability to P302 liability, inclusive of increments, if its assessment is excessive or erroneous, Page 10 of 26

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or if the administration costs involved do not justify the collection of the amount due. No mutual concessions need be made, because an excessive or erroneous tax is not compromised; it is abated or canceled. Only correct taxes should be paid. Further, Tan cannot be said to have acted in bad faith. He acted upon concurrence and recommendation of the various BIR officials. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs CSC Case Digest To classify the position of Graft Investigation Officer II as belonging to the Career Executive Service and require an appointee thereto to acquire CES or CSE eligibility before acquiring security of tenure would be absurd as it would result either in 1) vesting the appointing power for said position in the President, in violation of the Constitution; or 2) including in the CES a position not occupied by a presidential appointee, contrary to the Administrative Code. FACTS: Melchor Carandang, Paul Elmer Clemente and Jose Tereso De Jesus, Jr., were appointed Graft Investigation Officers III of the Office of the Ombudsman. The Civil Service Commission (CSC) approved the appointments on the condition that for the appointees to acquire security of tenure, they must first obtain a Career Executive Service (CES). The Ombudsman requested to the CSC for the change of status from temporary to permanent, of the appointments of Carandang, Clemente and De Jesus, emphasizing that since the Office of the Ombudsman is not governed by the Career Executive Service Board, security of tenure can be granted despite the absence of CES eligibility. CSC changed the status of Carandangs and Clementes appointments to permanent but not with respect to De Jesus on the ground that he "has not met the eligibility requirements. Hence, this petition for ceritiorari filed by the Office of the Ombudsman seeking to nullify the CSC Resolution. ISSUE: Whether or not the general power of the Civil Service Commission to administer civil service cannot validly curtail the specific discretionary power of appointment including the grant of security of tenure by the Office of the Ombudsman

HELD: Book V, Title I, Subtitle A of the Administrative Code of 1987 provides persons occupying positions in the CES are presidential appointees. A person occupying the position of Graft Investigation Officer III is not, however, appointed by the President but by the Ombudsman as provided in Article IX of the Constitution. To classify the position of Graft Investigation Officer III as belonging to the CES and require an appointee thereto to acquire CES or CSE eligibility before acquiring security of tenure would be absurd as it would result either in 1) vesting the appointing power for said position in the President, in violation of the Constitution; or 2) including in the CES a position not occupied by a presidential appointee, contrary to the Administrative Code. It bears emphasis that that under P.D. No 807, Sec. 9(h) which authorizes the CSC to approve appointments to positions in the civil service, except those specified therein, its authority is limited "only to [determine] whether or not the appointees possess the legal qualifications and the appropriate eligibility, nothing else."11 It is not disputed that, except for his lack of CES or CSE eligibility, De Jesus possesses the basic qualifications of a Graft Investigation Officer III, as provided in the earlier quoted Qualification Standards. Such being the case, the CSC has the ministerial duty to grant the request of the Ombudsman that appointment be made permanent effective December 18, 2002. To refuse to heed the request is a clear encroachment on the discretion vested solely on the Ombudsman as appointing authority. It goes without saying that the status of the appointments of Carandang and Clemente, who were conferred CSE eligibility pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 03-0665 dated June 6, 2003, should be changed to permanent effective December 18, 2002 too. GONZALES III VS OP DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 196231, the decision of the Office of the President in OP Case No. 10-J-460 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III is orderedREINSTATED with payment of backwages corresponding to the period of suspension effective immediately) even as

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the Office of the Ombudsman is directed to proceed with the investigation in connection with the above case against petitioner. In G.R. No. 196232, We AFFIRM the continuation of OP-DC Case No. 11-1 B003 against Special Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-Sulit for alleged acts and omissions tantamount to culpable violation of the Constitution and a betrayal of public trust, in accordance with Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act of 1989. The challenge to the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act is hereby DENIED. SO ORDERED. ====================== SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST DOES THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT HAVE ADMINISTRATIVE JURISDICTION OVER THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN AND THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR? YES. THE OMBUDSMANS ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY POWER OVER A DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN AND SPECIAL PROSECUTOR IS NOT EXCLUSIVE. SECTION 8 OF RA 6770 (THE OMBUDSMAN ACT OF 1989) GRANTS THE PRESIDENT THE POWER TO REMOVE THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN AND THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR FROM OFFICE AFTER DUE PROCESS. Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6770, the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides that Section 8. Removal; Filling of Vacancy. xxxx (2) A Deputy or the Special Prosecutor, may be removed from office by the President for any of the grounds provided for the removal of the Ombudsman, and after due process. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

WAS THE DISMISSAL OF GONZALES AS DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN BY THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT CORRECT? NO. HIS REMOVAL MUST BE FOR ANY OF THE GROUNDS PROVIDED IN THE REMOVAL OF THE OMBUDSMAN. THE ALLEGED GROUND OF BETRAYAL OF PUBLIC TRUST WAS NOT PRESENT IN HIS CASE. PETITIONER GONZALES MAY NOT BE REMOVED FROM OFFICE WHERE THE QUESTIONED ACTS, FALLING SHORT OF CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS, DO NOT CONSTITUTE BETRAYAL OF PUBLIC TRUST. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX Congress laid down two restrictions on the Presidents exercise of such power of removal over a Deputy Ombudsman, namely: (1) that the removal of the Deputy Ombudsman must be for any of the grounds provided for the removal of the Ombudsman and (2) that there must be observance of due process. GEORGE UY, PETITIONER, VS. THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, THE HON. OMBUDSMAN AND THE HON. ROGER C. BERBANO, SR., SPECIAL PROSECUTION OFFICER III, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, RESPONDENTS. [ G.R. Nos. 105965-70, March 20, 2001 ] FACTS: In Uy vs Sandiganbayan [G.R. Nos. 105965-70. August 9, 1999], petitioner Uy, who was Deputy Comptroller of the Philippine navy and designated as Assistant Chief of Naval Staff for Comptrollership was charged with estafa through falsification of official documents and violation of RA 3019. The petitioner filed a motion to quash, arguing that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the offense charged and that the Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor had no authority to file the offense. The court ruled that : 1. It is the court-martial, not the Sandiganbayan, which has jurisdiction to try petitioner since he was a regular officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and fell squarely under Article 2 of the Articles of War mentioned in Section 1(b) of P.D. 1850, Providing for the trial by courts-

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martial of members of the Integrated National Police and further defining the jurisdiction of courts-martial over members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines 2. As to the violations of Republic Act No. 3019, the petitioner does not fall within the rank requirement stated in Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan Law, thus, exclusive jurisdiction over petitioner is vested in the regular courts , as amended by R.A. No. 8249, which states that In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended. In this connection, it is the prosecutor, not the Ombudsman, who has the authority to file the corresponding information/s against petitioner in the regional trial court. The Ombudsman exercises prosecutorial powers only in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. In February 20, 2000, a motion for clarification which in fact appeared to be a partial motion for reconsideration was filed by the Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor filed, which was denied. The instant case is a Motion for Further Clarification filed by Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto of the Court's ruling in its decision dated August 9, 1999 and resolution dated February 22, 2000. ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecutory power of the Ombudsman extends only to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and that the Ombudsman has no authority to prosecute cases falling within the jurisdiction of regular courts.

well. The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. It pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The law does not make a distinction between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts. It has been held that the clause "any illegal act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to embrace all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance committed by public officers and employees during their tenure of office. The exercise by the Ombudsman of his primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is not incompatible with the discharge of his duty to investigate and prosecute other offenses committed by public officers and employees. The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers and employees is one of the most important functions of the Ombudsman. In passing RA 6770, the Congress deliberately endowed the Ombudsman with such power to make him a more active and effective agent of the people in ensuring accountability in public office. Even a perusal of the law (PD 1630) originally creating the Office of theOmbudsman then (to be known as the Tanodbayan), and the amendatory laws issued subsequent thereto will show that, at its inception, the Office of the Ombudsman was already vested with the power to investigate and prosecute civil and criminal cases before the Sandiganbayan and even the regular courts. L. 13. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE V. LIWAG FACTS: Alleging that she was a former undercover agent of the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) Narcotics Group, Mary Ong filed a complaint-affidavit on before the Ombudsman against PNP General Panfilo M. Lacson, PNP Colonel Michael Ray B. Aquino, other high-ranking officials of the PNP, and several private individuals. Her complaint-affidavit gave rise to separate cases involving different offenses imputed to respondents Lacson and Aquino. The

RULING: No. The Ombudsman is clothed with authority to conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute all criminal cases involving public officers and employees, not only those within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, but those within the jurisdiction of the regular courts as Page 13 of 26

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Ombudsman found the complaint-affidavit of Mary Ong sufficient inform and substance and thus required the respondents therein to file their counter-affidavits on the charges. On February 28, 2001, said respondents submitted their counter-affidavits and prayed that the charges against them be dismissed. Subsequently, on March 9, 2001, Mary Ong and other witnesses executed sworn statements before the NBI, alleging the same facts and circumstances revealed by Mary Ong in her complaint-affidavit before the Ombudsman. NBI Director Wycoco, in a letter dated May 4, 2001 addressed to then Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez, recommended the investigation of Lacson, Aquino, other PNP officials, and private individuals for the following alleged crimes: kidnapping for ransom and murder of several individuals. On May7, 2001, a panel of prosecutors from the DOJ sent a subpoena to Lacson, et al named in the witnesses sworn statements directing them to submit their counter-affidavits and controverting evidence at the scheduled preliminary investigation on the complaint filed by the NBI. However, Lacson and Aquino manifested in a letter dated May 18, 2001 that the DOJ panel of prosecutors should dismiss the complaint filed therewith by Mary Ong since there are complaint spending before the Ombudsman alleging a similar set of facts against the same respondents, and claimed that the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction over criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, he may takeover, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases involving public officials, including police and military officials such as private respondent. DOJ, which construed the letter as a motion to dismiss, denied the motion. Lacson, et al. filed before the RTC a petition for prohibition, which the RTC granted, saying that the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the case, and directing the DOJ to desist from conducting preliminary investigation. Thus, the DOJ filed a Petition for certiorari and prohibition in the SC. ISSUE/RULING: W/N the DOJ has jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary investigation despite thependency before the

Ombudsman of a complaint involving the same accused, facts, and circumstances NO RATIO: The question is whether or not the Ombudsman has in effect taken over the investigation of the case or cases in question to the exclusion of other investigatory agencies, including the DOJ. Since the Ombudsman has taken hold of the situation of the parties in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction over the matter, respondents cannot insist on conducting a preliminary investigation on the same matter under the pretext of a shared and concurrent authority. In the final analysis, the resolution on the matter by the Ombudsman is final. In the preliminary investigation conducted by the Ombudsman itself, the other investigative agencies of the Government have no power and right to add an input into the Ombudsmans investigation. Only in matters where the other investigative agencies are expressly allowed by the Ombudsman to make preliminary investigation may such agencies conduct the investigation, subject to the final decision of the Ombudsman. The public respondents cannot find comfort in that provision of the law that the Ombudsman may takeover, at any stage, from any investigative agency of the Government, the investigation of cases involving public officials, including police and military officials such as the petitioners. That situation presupposes the conduct by other Government agencies of preliminary investigations involving public officials in cases not theretofore being taken cognizance of by the Ombudsman. If the Ombudsman, as in the case, has already taken hold of the situation of the parties, it cannot take over, at any stage of the proceedings, the investigation being conducted by another agency. It has the case before it. Rudimentary common sense and becoming respect for power and authority would thus require the respondents to desist from interfering with the case already handled by the Ombudsman. Indeed, as conceded by the respondents, they are deputized prosecutors by the Ombudsman. If that is so, and that is the truth, the exercise by the principal of the powers negates absolutely the exercise by the agents of a particular power and authority. The hierarchy of powers must be remembered. Petitioners cannot seek sanctuary in the doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction. While the doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction means

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equal jurisdiction to deal with the same subject matter, the settled rule is that the body or agency that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others. Thus, assuming there is concurrent jurisdiction between the Ombudsman and the DOJ in the conduct of preliminary investigation, this concurrence is not to be taken as an unrestrained freedom to file the same case before both bodies or be viewed as a contest between these bodies as to which will first complete the investigation. In the present case, it is the Ombudsman before whom the complaint was initially filed. Hence, it has the authority to proceed with the preliminary investigation to the exclusion of the DOJ. The subsequent assumption of jurisdiction by the DOJ in the conduct of preliminary investigation over the cases filed against the respondents would not promote an orderly administration of justice. Although a preliminary investigation is not a trial, it is not a casual affair either. A preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. To allow the same complaint to be filed successively before two or more investigative bodies would promote multiplicity of proceedings. It would also cause undue difficulties to the respondent who would have to appear and defend his position before every agency or body where the same complaint was filed. This would leave hapless litigants at a loss as to where to appear and plead their cause or defense. There is yet another undesirable consequence. There is the distinct possibility that the two bodies exercising jurisdiction at the same time would come up with conflicting resolutions regarding the guilt of the respondents 16. ESTARIJA V. RANADA EDGARDO V. ESTARIJA v. EDWARD F. RANADA and the HON. OMBUDSMAN Aniano A. Desierto (now succeeded by Hon. Simeon Marcelo), and his DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN for Mindanao, Hon. Antonio E. Valenzuela G.R. No. 159314, 26 June 2006, Quisumbing, J. (En Banc)

The powers of the Ombudsman are not merely recommendatory. His office was given teeth to render this constitutional body not merely functional but also effective. Under Republic Act No. 6770 and the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman has the constitutional power to directly remove from government service an erring public official other than a member of Congress and the Judiciary. Edgardo V. Estarija was the Harbor Master of the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA), Port of Davao, Sasa, Davao City. As such, he issued the necessary berthing permit for all ships that docked in the Davao Port. In an administrative complaint for gross misconduct against him, it was alleged that he had been demanding money for the approval and issuance of berthing permits and for monthly contributions from the Davao Pilots Association, Inc. (DPAI). The complaint also alleged that in 1998, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) caught Estarija in possession of the marked money used to entrap the latter. The Ombudsman ordered Estarijas preventive suspension and filed a criminal case against him for violation of Republic Act No. 3019, The AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act. Subsequently, the Ombudsman in the administrative case, found Estarija guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct and dismissed him from government service with forfeiture of all leave credits and retirement benefits. In his motion for reconsideration, Estarija claimed that his dismissal was unconstitutional since the Ombudsmans administrative authority is merely recommendatory and that Rep. Act No. 6770 was also unconstitutional because it gives the Office of the Ombudsman additional powers that are not provided for in the Constitution. The Ombudsman denied the motion for reconsideration, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The appellate court held that the attack on the constitutionality of Rep. Act No. 6770 was belated, having been made only in the motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Ombudsman, and that Estarija failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality in favor of Rep. Act No. 6770. In this petition for review on certiorari, Estarija contends that he cannot be liable for grave misconduct

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because he did not commit extortion as he was merely prodded by Adrian Cagata, an employee of the DPAI, to receive the money and that it makes no sense why he would extort money in consideration of the issuance of berthing permits since the signing of berthing permits is only ministerial on his part. He also maintains that Rep. Act No. 6770 is unconstitutional because the Ombudsman has only the powers enumerated under Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution, which powers do not include the power to directly remove, suspend, demote, fine, or censure a government official. According to him, the Ombudsmans power is merely to recommend the action to the officer concerned. The Solicitor General maintains otherwise, arguing that the framers of the 1987 Constitution did not intend to spell out, restrictively, each act which the Ombudsman may or may not do, since the purpose of the Constitution is to provide simply a framework within which to build the institution. ISSUES: 1.) Whether or not there is substantial evidence to hold Estarija liable for dishonesty and grave misconduct; 2.) Whether or not the power of the Ombudsman to directly remove, suspend, demote, fine, or censure erring officials is constitutional HELD: The petition is DENIED. Estarija is liable for dishonesty and grave misconduct. Estarija did not deny that he went to the DPAI office to collect, and that he actually received, the money which he demanded from the DPAI as monthly contribution. Since there was no pending transaction between the PPA and the DPAI, he had no reason to go to the latters office to collect any money. Even if he was authorized to assist in the collection of money due the agency, he should have issued an official receipt for the transaction, but he did not do so. The powers of the Ombudsman are not merely recommendatory In passing Rep. Act No. 6770, the Congress deliberately endowed the Ombudsman with the power to prosecute offenses committed by public officers and employees to

make him a more active and effective agent of the people in ensuring accountability in public office. Moreover, the legislature has vested the Ombudsman with broad powers to enable him to implement his own actions. Lastly, the Constitution gave Congress the discretion to give the Ombudsman other powers and functions. The Constitution does not restrict the powers of the Ombudsman in Sec. 13, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution, but allows the legislature to enact a law that would spell out the powers of the Ombudsman. Through the enactment of Rep. Act No. 6770, specifically Sec. 15, par. 3, the Congress gave the Ombudsman such powers to sanction erring officials and employees, except members of Congress and the Judiciary. The powers of the Ombudsman are not merely recommendatory. His office was given teeth to render this constitutional body not merely functional but also effective. Thus, under Rep. Act No. 6770 and the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman has the constitutional power to directly remove from government service an erring public official other than a member of Congress and the Judiciary. 18. MACEDA V. VASQUEZ Maceda v. Vasquez G.R. No. 102781. April 22, 1993. Facts: Petitioner Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, Presiding Judge of Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court of Antique, seeks the review of the following orders of the Office of the Ombudsman: (1) the Order dated September 18, 1991 denying the ex-parte motion to refer to the Supreme Court filed by petitioner; and (2) the Order dated November 22, 1951 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration and directing petitioner to file his counteraffidavit and other controverting evidences. In his affidavit-complaint dated April 18, 1991 filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, respondent Napoleon A. Abiera of the Public Attorneys Office alleged that petitioner had falsified his Certificate of Service 1 dated February 6, 1989, by certifying that all civil and criminal cases which have been submitted for decision or determination for a period of 90 days have been determined and decided on or before January 31, 1998, when in truth and in fact, petitioner knew that no decision had been rendered in five

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(5) civil and ten (10) criminal cases that have been submitted for decision. Respondent Abiera further alleged that petitioner similarly falsified his certificates of service for the months of February, April, May, June, July and August, all in 1989; and the months beginning January up to September 1990, or for a total of seventeen (17) months. On the other hand, petitioner contends that he had been granted by the Supreme Court an extension of ninety (90) days to decide the aforementioned cases. Issue: whether the Office of the Ombudsman could entertain a criminal complaint for the alleged falsification of a judges certification submitted to the Supreme Court, and assuming that it can, whether a referral should be made first to the Supreme Court Held: In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by the Supreme Court with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Courts power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges and court personnels compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioners certificates of service to the Supreme Court for determination of whether said certificates reflected the true status of his pending case load, as the Supreme Court has the necessary records to make such a determination. The Ombudsman cannot compel the Supreme Court, as one of the three branches of government, to submit its records, or to allow its personnel to

testify on this matter, as suggested by public respondent Abiera in his affidavit-complaint. In fine, where a criminal complaint against a Judge or other court employee arises from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to the Supreme Court for determination whether said Judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties. L.19. Caoibes Jr. VS. Ombudsman Under Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is the Supreme Court which is vested with exclusive administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel. The Ombudsman cannot determine for itself and by itself whether a criminal complaint against a judge, or court employee, involves an administrative matter. The Ombudsman is duty bound to have all cases against judges and court personnel filed before it, referred to the Supreme Court for determination as to whether and administrative aspect is involved therein. Facts: On May 23, 1997, respondent Florentino M. Alumbres, Presiding Judge of Branch 255 of the Regional Trial Court of Las Pinas City, filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, a Criminal Complaint for physical injuries, malicious mischief for the destruction of complainants eyeglasses, and assault upon a person in authority. Alumbres alleged that on May 20, 1997, at the hallway on the third floor of the Hall of Justice, Las Pinas City, he requested petitioner Judge Caoibes (Presiding Judge of RTC 253) to return the executive table he borrowed from respondent; that petitioner did not answer so respondent reiterated his request but before he could finish talking, petitioner blurted "Tarantado ito ah," and boxed him at his right eyebrow and left lower jaw so that the right lens of his eyeglasses was thrown away, rendering his eyeglasses unserviceable. He prayed that criminal charges be filed before the Sandiganbayan against the petitioner.

On June 13, 1997, Respondent Judge lodged an administrative case with the SC praying for the dismissal of petitioner from the judiciary on the ground of Page 17 of 26

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grave misconduct or conduct unbecoming a judicial officer using the same facts as above. On June 25, 1997, the Office of the Ombudsman required petitioner to file a counter-affidavit within 10 days from receipt thereof. Instead of filing a counter-affidavit, petitioner filed on an "Ex-Parte Motion for Referral to the Honorable Supreme Court," praying that the Office of the Ombudsman hold its investigation of the case, and refer the same to the SC which is already investigating the case. Petitioner contended that the SC, not the Office of the Ombudsman, has the authority to make a preliminary determination of the respective culpability of petitioner and respondent Judge who, both being members of the bench, are under its exclusive supervision and control. On August 22, 1997, the Office of the Ombudsman denied the motion for referral to the SC stating that under Section 15 (1) of Republic Act No. 6770, it is within its jurisdiction to investigate on the criminal charges. It likewise denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Issue: Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman should defer action on the case pending resolution of the administrative case Held:

Court. For, aside from the fact that the Ombudsman would not know of this matter unless he is informed of it, he should give due respect for and recognition of the administrative authority of the Court, because in determining whether an administrative matter is involved, the Court passes upon not only administrative liabilities but also other administrative concerns, as is clearly conveyed in the case of Maceda vs. Vasquez. The Ombudsman cannot dictate to, and bind the Court, to its findings that a case before it does or does not have administrative implications. To do so is to deprive the Court of the exercise of its administrative prerogatives and to arrogate unto itself a power not constitutionally sanctioned. This is a dangerous policy which impinges, as it does, on judicial independence. Maceda is emphatic that by virtue of its constitutional power of administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges and court personnels compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The Ombudsman is hereby directed to dismiss the complaint filed by respondent Judge Florentino M. Alumbres and to refer the same to this Court for appropriate action.

It appears that the present case involves two members of the judiciary who were entangled in a fight within court premises over a piece of office L. 20. LASTIMOSA V VASQUEZ furniture. Under Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is the Supreme Court which is vested with exclusive administrative supervision over all FACTS courts and its personnel. Prescinding from this premise, the Ombudsman cannot determine for itself and by itself whether a criminal complaint Petitioner is First Asst. Provincial Prosecutor or Cebu. She and the Provincial against a judge, or court employee, involves an administrative matter. The Prosecutor refused or failed to file a criminal charge of attempted rape Ombudsman is duty bound to have all cases against judges and court against Municipal Mayor Rogelio Ilustrisimo. Petitioner was filed with an personnel filed before it, referred to the Supreme Court for determination administrative complaint for grave misconduct, insubordination, gross as to whether and administrative aspect is involved therein. This rule should neglect of duty and hold true regardless of whether an administrative case based on the act subject of the complaint before the Ombudsman is already pending with the Page 18 of 26

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maliciously refraining from prosecuting crime and a charge for indirect contempt. They were also placed under 6 mos preventive suspension. Prior to this, a complaint was assigned to a graft investigation officer who found no prima facie evidence and recommended dismissal. However, the Ombudsman Vasquex disapproved the recommendation and directed that the Mayor be charged in the RTC. The Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas then referred the matter to the Provincial Prosecutor and later to petitioner. Petitioner found that only acts of lasciviousness have been committed and filed a case under such. ISSUES W/N the Ombudsman has authority to file an administrative case against the petitioners and preventively suspend them. RULINGYES.The Ombudsmans power to investigate and prosecute include the investigation and prosecution of any crime committed by a public official regardless if such were related to, or connected with, or arise from, the performance of his official duty. The Ombudsman is authorized to call on prosecutors for assistance under S31 fo RA 67701. When a prosecutor is deputized, he is subject to supervision and control of the Ombudsman. Such supervision and control would mean that they can alter, repeal or modify findings of their subordinates. The office also has the power to punish for contempt under Rule 71, S3 of the Rules of Court2. L.23. KHAN VS. OMBUDSMAN G.R. No. 125296, July 20, 2006 FACTS: Petitioners Ismael G. Khan, Jr. and Wenceslao L. Malabanan, former officers of Philippine Airlines (PAL), were charged before the Deputy Ombudsman (Visayas) with violation of RA 3019 (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) for using their positions in PAL to secure a contract for Synergy Services Corporation, a corporation engaged in hauling and janitorial services in which they were shareholders.

Petitioners filed an omnibus motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds: (1) the Ombudsman had no jurisdiction over them since PAL was a private entity and (2) they were not public officers, hence, outside the application of RA 3019. The Deputy Ombudsman denied petitioners' omnibus motion to dismiss, ruling that although PAL was originally organized as a private corporation, its controlling stock was later acquired by the government through the GSIS. Therefore, it became a government-owned or controlled corporation (GOCC) as enunciated in Quimpo v. Tanodbayan. The Deputy Ombudsman also held that petitioners were public officers within the definition of RA 3019, Section 2 (b). Under that provision, public officers included "elective, appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exempt service receiving compensation, even nominal, from the Government." Petitioners appealed the order to the Ombudsman which affirmed the decision of the Deputy Ombudsman. Petitioners, thus, filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court. Petitioners argue that: (1) the Ombudsman's jurisdiction only covers GOCCs with original charters and these do not include PAL, a private entity created under the general corporation law; (2) Quimpo does not apply to the case at bar and (3) RA 3019 only concerns "public officers," thus, they cannot be investigated or prosecuted under that law. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over GOCC without original charter 2. Whether or not the Quimpo case apply to the case at bar 3. Whether or not petitioners PAL officers are public officers HELD: 1. Jurisdiction of the ombudsman over GOCCS is confined only to those with original charters

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Article XI, Section 13(2) of the 1987 Constitution provides: Sec. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties: xxx xxx xxx (2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or employee of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as any government-owned or controlled corporation with original charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties. (italics supplied) xxx xxx xxx Based on the foregoing provision, the Office of the Ombudsman exercises jurisdiction over public officials/ employees of GOCCs with original charters. This being so, it can only investigate and prosecute acts or omissions of the officials/employees of government corporations. Therefore, although the government later on acquired the controlling interest in PAL, the fact remains that the latter did not have an "original charter" and its officers/employees could not be investigated and/or prosecuted by the Ombudsman. In Juco v. National Labor Relations Commission, we ruled that the phrase "with original charter" means "chartered by special law as distinguished from corporations organized under the Corporation Code." PAL, being originally a private corporation seeded by private capital and created under the general corporation law, does not fall within the jurisdictional powers of the Ombudsman under Article XI, Section 13(2) of the Constitution. Consequently, the latter is devoid of authority to investigate or prosecute petitioners. 2. Quimpo Not Applicable to the Case at Bar Quimpo is not applicable to the case at bar. In that case, Felicito Quimpo charged in 1984 two officers of PETROPHIL in the Tanodbayan (now

Ombudsman) for violation of RA 3019. These officers sought the dismissal of the case on the ground that the Tanodbayan had no jurisdiction over them as officers/employees of a private company. The Court declared that the Tanodbayan had jurisdiction over them because PETROPHIL ceased to be a private entity when Philippine National Oil Corporation (PNOC) acquired its shares. In hindsight, although Quimpo appears, on first impression, relevant to this case (like PETROPHIL, PAL's shares were also acquired by the government), closer scrutiny reveals that it is not actually on all fours with the facts here. In Quimpo, the government acquired PETROPHIL to "perform functions related to government programs and policies on oil." The fact that the purpose in acquiring PETROPHIL was for it to undertake governmental functions related to oil was decisive in sustaining the Tanodbayan's jurisdiction over it. This was certainly not the case with PAL. The records indicate that the government acquired the controlling interest in the airline as a result of the conversion into equity of its unpaid loans in GSIS. No governmental functions at all were involved. Furthermore, Quimpo was decided prior to the 1987 Constitution. In fact, it was the 1973 Constitution which the Court relied on in concluding that the Tanodbayan had jurisdiction over PETROPHIL's accused officers, particularly Article XIII, Section 6. The term "government-owned or controlled corporations" in the 1973 Constitution was qualified by the 1987 Constitution to refer only to those with original charters. 3. Petitioners, as then Officers of PAL, were not Public Officers Neither the 1987 Constitution nor RA 6670 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989) defines who "public officers" are. Instead, its varied definitions and concepts are found in different statutes and jurisprudence. Usually quoted in our decisions is Mechem, a recognized authority on the subject. In the 2002 case of Laurel v. Desierto,15 the Court extensively quoted his exposition on the term "public officers":

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of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer. The characteristics of a public office, according to Mechem, include the delegation of sovereign functions, its creation by law and not by contract, an oath, salary, continuance of the position, scope of duties, and the designation of the position as an office. xxx xxx xxx Mechem describes the delegation to the individual of the sovereign functions of government as "[t]he most important characteristic" in determining whether a position is a public office or not. The most important characteristic which distinguishes an office from an employment or contract is that the creation and conferring of an office involves a delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions of government to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public; that some portion of the sovereignty of the country, either legislative, executive, or judicial, attaches, for the time being, to be exercised for the public benefit. Unless the powers conferred are of this nature, the individual is not a public officer. From the foregoing, it can be reasonably inferred that "public officers" are those endowed with the exercise of sovereign executive, legislative or judicial functions. The explication of the term is also consistent with the Court's pronouncement in Quimpo that, in the case of officers/employees in GOCCs, they are deemed "public officers" if their corporations are tasked to carry out governmental functions. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Public respondents Deputy Ombudsman (Visayas) and Office of the Ombudsman are restrained from proceeding with the investigation or prosecution of the complaint against petitioners for violation of RA 3019. Accordingly, their assailed orders of July 13, 1989 and February 22, 1996, respectively, are SET ASIDE and ANNULLED. L. 24. G.R. No. 118141 September 5, 1997

GARCIA-RUEDA vs. PASCASIO FACTS: Florencio V. Rueda, husband of petitioner Leonila Garcia-Rueda, underwent surgical operation at the UST hospital for the removal of a stone blocking his ureter. He was attended by Dr. Domingo Antonio, Jr. who was the surgeon, while Dr. Erlinda Balatbat-Reyes was the anaesthesiologist. Six hours after the surgery, however, Florencio died of complications of "unknown cause," according to officials of the UST Hospital. Not satisfied with the findings of the hospital, petitioner requested the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to conduct an autopsy on her husband's body. Consequently, the NBI ruled that Florencio's death was due to lack of care by the attending physician in administering anaesthesia. Pursuant to its findings, the NBI recommended that Dr. Domingo Antonio and Dr. Erlinda Balatbat-Reyes be charged for Homicide through Reckless Imprudence before the Office of the City Prosecutor. During the preliminary investigation, what transpired was a confounding series of events which we shall try to disentangle. The case was initially assigned to Prosecutor Antonio M. Israel, who had to inhibit himself because he was related to the counsel of one of the doctors. As a result, the case was re-raffled to Prosecutor Norberto G. Leono who was, however, disqualified on motion of the petitioner since he disregarded prevailing laws and jurisprudence regarding preliminary investigation. The case was then referred to Prosecutor Ramon O. Carisma, who issued a resolution recommending that only Dr. Reyes be held criminally liable and that the complaint against Dr. Antonio be dismissed.

The case took another perplexing turn when Assistant City Prosecutor Josefina Santos Sioson, in the "interest of justice and peace of mind of the parties," recommended that the case be re-raffled on the ground that Prosecutor Carisma was partial to the petitioner. Thus, the case was transferred to Prosecutor Leoncia R. Dimagiba, where a volte face occurred again with the endorsement that the complaint against Dr. Reyes be Page 21 of 26

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dismissed and instead, a corresponding information be filed against Dr. Antonio. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, questioning the findings of Prosecutor Dimagiba. Pending the resolution of petitioner's motion for reconsideration regarding Prosecutor Dimagiba's resolution, the investigative "pingpong" continued when the case was again assigned to another prosecutor, Eudoxia T. Gualberto, who recommended that Dr. Reyes be included in the criminal information of Homicide through Reckless Imprudence. While the recommendation of Prosecutor Gualberto was pending, the case was transferred to Senior State Prosecutor Gregorio A. Arizala, who resolved to exonerate Dr. Reyes from any wrongdoing, a resolution which was approved by both City Prosecutor Porfirio G. Macaraeg and City Prosecutor Jesus F. Guerrero. Aggrieved, petitioner filed graft charges specifically for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 3 against Prosecutors Guerrero, Macaraeg, and Arizala for manifest partiality in favor of Dr. Reyes before the Office of the Ombudsman. However, on July 11, 1994, the Ombudsman issued the assailed resolution dismissing the complaint for lack of evidence. In fine, petitioner assails the exercise of the discretionary power of the Ombudsman to review the recommendations of the government prosecutors and to approve and disapprove the same. Petitioner faults the Ombudsman for, allegedly in grave abuse of discretion, refusing to find that there exists probable cause to hold public respondent City Prosecutors liable for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. ISSUE: Whether or not expert testimony is necessary to prove the negligent act of the respondent. RULING: In accepting a case, a doctor in effect represents that, having the needed training and skill possessed by physicians and surgeons practicing in the same field, he will employ such training, care and skill in the treatment of

his patients. He therefore has a duty to use at least the same level of care that any other reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a condition under the same circumstances. It is in this aspect of medical malpractice that expert testimony is essential to establish not only the standard of care of the profession but also that the physician's conduct in the treatment and care falls below such standard. Further, inasmuch as the causes of the injuries involved in malpractice actions are determinable only in the light of scientific knowledge, it has been recognized that expert testimony is usually necessary to support the conclusion as to causation. Immediately apparent from a review of the records of this case is the absence of any expert testimony on the matter of the standard of care employed by other physicians of good standing in the conduct of similar operations. The prosecution's expert witnesses in the persons of Dr. Floresto Arizala and Dr. Nieto Salvador, Jr. of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) only testified as to the possible cause of death but did not venture to illuminate the court on the matter of the standard of care that petitioner should have exercised. The better and more logical remedy under the circumstances would have been to appeal the resolution of the City Prosecutors dismissing the criminal complaint to the Secretary of Justice under the Department of Justice's Order No. 223, otherwise known as the "1993 Revised Rules on Appeals From Resolutions In Preliminary Investigations/Reinvestigations," as amended by Department Order No. 359, Section 1 of which provides: Sec. 1. What May Be Appealed. Only resolutions of the Chief State Prosecutor/Regional State Prosecutor/Provincial or City Prosecutor dismissing a criminal complaint may be the subject of an appeal to the Secretary of Justice except as otherwise provided in Section 4 hereof. What action may the Secretary of Justice take on the appeal? Section 9 of Order No. 223 states: "The Secretary of Justice may reverse, affirm or modify the appealed resolution." On the other hand, "He may motu proprio or on motion of the appellee, dismiss outright the appeal on specified grounds."

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In exercising his discretion under the circumstances, the Ombudsman acted within his power and authority in dismissing the complaint against the Prosecutors and this Court will not interfere with the same. Petition is dismissed. 25.FRIVALDO vs. COMELEC 174 SCRA 245 G.R. No. 87193 June 23, 1989 Facts: Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect and assume office in due time. The League of Municipalities filed with the COMELEC a petition for annulment of Frivaldos election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States. Frivaldo admitted the allegation but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that his naturalization was merely forced upon himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting prosecution by the Martial Law Dictators agent abroad. Issue: Whether or not Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election. Held: No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution. Even if he did lose his naturalized American citizenship, such forfeiture did not and could not have the effect of automatically restoring his citizenship in the Philippines that he had earlier renounced. Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officers entire tenure. Frivaldo declared not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore disqualified from serving as a Governor of the Province of Sorsogon.

26.MERCADO vs. MANZANO G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999 FACTS: Ernesto Mamaril filed a disqualification case against vice-mayoralty candidate Manzano on the ground that he is not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States. In its resolution, the second division of the COMELEC granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of Manzano on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code and the Makati charter, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position. The Commission found out that Manzano was born in 1955, of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother, in San Francisco, California, in the United States. Hence, he is an American citizen, following the jus soli rule, and at the same time, a Filipino citizen for being born of Filipino parents. Manzano filed a motion for reconsideration. Pending such motion, the 1998 elections was held and Manzano garnered the highest number of votes for vice-mayor in the city of Makati. His proclamation was suspended, pending resolution of the case. Petitioner Mercado, who garnered the second highest number of votes to Manzano, intervened in the disqualification case. Without resolving Manzano's motion, the COMELEC en banc reversed the ruling of the COMELEC second division and declared Manzano qualified to run for vice-mayor. Hence, Mercado filed a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court seeking to set aside the resolution of the COMELEC en banc. ISSUES/HELD: 1. Whether the petitioner has personality to bring this suit considering that he was not the original party in the disqualification case. Yes. Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 provides:

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Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong. Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after election if there has yet been no final judgment rendered. 2. Whether or not dual citizenship is a ground for disqualification. No. To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship: (1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli; (2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers country such children are citizens of that country; (3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.

Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individuals volition. In including 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase dual citizenship in R.A. No. 7160, 40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, 20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states. 3. Whether or not Manzano is disqualified to run No. By filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen. On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the Philippine, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.

There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing any act, be also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are clearly possible given the constitutional provisions on citizenship. Page 24 of 26

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NOTA BENE: Under RA 9225 (effective August 29, 2003), the mere filing of a certificate of candidacy is no longer deemed an express renunciation of foreign citizenship in order to run for public office. The candidate for public office with dual citizenship must (1) take an oath of allegiance and (2) execute a renunciation of foreign citizenship. 27.Caasi vs. Court of Appeals Facts: This case refers to the two consolidated petitions both seeking the disqualificationunder Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code of Merito Miguel, for the position of municipalmayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan, to which he was elected in the local elections of January 18,1988, on the ground that he is a green card holder hence, a permanent resident of theUnited States of America and not of Bolinao. Miguel admits that he holds a green card issuedto him by the US Immigration Service, but he denied that he is a permanent resident of theUnited States. He argued that he obtained the green card for convenience in order that hemay freely enter the United States for his periodic medical examination and to visit hischildren there and that he is a permanent resident of Bolinao, Pangasinan and that he votedin all previous elections, including the plebiscite on February 2, 1987 for the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and the congressional elections on May 18, 1987. After hearing theconsolidated petitions before it, the COMELEC dismissed the petitions. It held that thepossession of a green card by the respondent Miguel does not sufficiently establish that he has abandoned his residence in the Philippines. However, in his dissenting opinion,Commissioner Badoy, Jr. opined that a green card holder being a permanent resident of oran immigrant of a foreign country and respondent having admitted that he is a green cardholder, it is incumbent upon him, under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, to provethat he "has waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant" to be qualified to runfor elected office. This respondent has not done. Issues:Whether a green card is proof that the holder thereof is a permanent resident of theUnited States such that it would disqualify him to run for any elective local position

Held: Yes. Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S.and his possession of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is apermanent resident of the U.S. Despite his vigorous disclaimer, Miguel's immigration to theUnited States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in thePhilippines. He did not go to the United States merely to visit his children or his doctor there.He entered the US with the intention to live there permanently as evidenced by hisapplication for an immigrant's (not a visitor's or tourist's) visa. Issue:Whether Merito Miguel, by returning to the Phillippines in November 1987 andpresenting himself as a candidate for mayor of Bolinao in the January 18, 1988 localelections, waive his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States Held:No. The waiver of such immigrant status should be as indubitable as his applicationfor it. Absent clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that hesurrendered his green card to the appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor of Bolinao in the local elections on January 18, 1988, the conclusion is that he was disqualifiedto run for said public office. Hence, his election was null and void.Residence in the municipality where he intends to run for elective office for at leastone (1) year at the time of filing his certificate of candidacy is one of the qualifications that acandidate for elective public office must possess. Miguel did not possess that qualificationbecause he was a permanent resident of the United States and he resided in Bolinao for a period of only three (3) months (not one year) after his return to the Philippines in November1987 and before he ran for mayor of that municipality on January 18, 1988.In banning from elective public office Philippine citizens who are permanent residentsor immigrants of a foreign country, the Omnibus Election Code has laid down a clear policyof excluding from the right to hold elective public office those Philippine citizens who possessdual loyalties and allegiance. The law has reserved that privilege for its citizens who havecast their lot with our country "without mental reservations or purpose of evasion." Theassumption is that those who are resident aliens of a foreign country are incapable of suchentire devotion to the interest and welfare of their

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homeland for with one eye on their publicduties here, they must keep another eye on their duties under the laws of the foreigncountry of their choice in order to preserve their status as permanent residents thereof. 28.PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE vs DESIERTO, 528 SCRA 9 (G.R. No. 130140. October 25, 1999) FACTS: On 8 October 1992, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13, creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, with the Chairman of the PCGG as Chairman; the Solicitor General as Vice Chairman; and one representative each from the Office of the Executive Secretary, Department of Finance, Department of Justice, Development Bank of the Philippines, Philippine National Bank, Asset Privatization Trust, Government Corporate Counsel, and the Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation as members. In its FOURTEENTH (14TH) REPORT ON BEHEST LOANS to President Ramos, dated 15 July 1993, the COMMITTEE reported that the Philippine Seeds, Inc., (hereafter PSI) of which the respondents in OMB-0-96-0968 were the Directors, was one of the twenty-one corporations which obtained behest loans. On 2 March 1996, the COMMITTEE through Orlando O. Salvador, the PCGG consultant detailed with the COMMITTEE, filed with the OMBUDSMAN a sworn complaint against the Directors of PSI namely, Jose Z. Osias, Pacifico E. Marcos, Eduardo V. Romualdez, Fernando C. Ordoveza, and Juanito Ordoveza; and the Directors of the Development Bank of the Philippines who approved the loans for violation of paragraphs (e) and (g) of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices. ISSUE: Does the imprescriptibility of the right of the State to recover ill-gotten wealth apply to both civil and criminal cases? RULING: No. The so-called imprescriptibility as provided in Section 15 of Article XI of the Constitution applies only to civil actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth, and not to criminal cases, such as the complaint against the respondents in OMB-0-96-0968. This is clear from the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission of 1986. Since the law alleged to have been violated, i.e., paragraphs (e) and (g) of Section 3, R.A. No. 3019, as amended, is a special law, the applicable rule in the computation of the prescriptive period is Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, which provides, Prescription shall begin to run from the day of

the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. In the present case, it was well-nigh impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have known the violations of R.A. No. 3019 at the time the questioned transactions were made because, as alleged, the public officials concerned connived or conspired with the beneficiaries of the loans. Thus, the prescriptive period for the offenses with which the respondents in OMB-0-96-0968 were charged should be computed from the discovery of the commission thereof and not from the day of such commission. Art 12

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