CERTITUDO (SUBJECTIVE/OBJECTIVE) PHILOSOPHICAL LEXICONS: GOCLENIUS, LEXICON PHILOSOPHICUM (1613): CERTITUDO (P.

361) MICRAELIUS - LEXICON PHILOSOPHICUM (1653): CERTITUDO (P. 216) CHAUVIN, LEXICON PHILOSOPHICUM (1713): CERTITUDO (P. 98) WALCH, PHILOSOPHISCHES LEXICON (1775): GEWIHEIT (BD. I, PP. 1761-2) Jene bestehet darinnen, da eine Object vor sich betrachtet mit hinreichendem Grunde vorhanden ist, ich mag solchen wissen und einsehen oder nicht. [] Die subjectivische Gewiheit aber erheischet ein Subject, welches sich eine Sache als gewi wahr oder nach dem vlligen Grunde gedenket.

ZEDLER, GROSSES SUBJECTIVE und

VOLLSTNDIGES

UNIVERSAL-LEXICON ALLER WISSENSCHAFFTEN

UND

KNSTE (1732-54; 64VOLS):

OBJECTIVE,

sind zwey einander entgegen gesete Kunst-Worter in der alten

SUBJECTIVE,

Philosophie. Jenes, nehmlich

heisset so viel, als per modum, quo quid inest in

subject, das ist, die Sache, von der geredet und gesaget wird, da sie subjective genommen werde, werde als das Subject angesehen, in welchem das anzutreffen, was von ihr gesaget wird; dieses aber,
OBJECTIVE

nehmlich, ist so viel als per modum objecti, das ist, die Sache, von welcher die

Rede und gesaget wird, da ist, die Sache, von welcher die Rede und gesaget wird, da sie objective genommen werde, werde als das Object angesehen, womit eine andere Sache beschffuget sey. (SUBJECTIVE und OBJECTIVE, bd. 40, pp. 1548-9) CHAMBERS, CYCLOPAEDIA: OBJECTIVE, Objectivus, is used in the Schools in speaking of a thing which exists no otherwise than as an Object known. The Esse, or Existence of such a thing is said to be Objective. Others call it Ratio Objectiva. See O B J E C T . The Word is also used for the Power or Faculty by which any thing becomes intelligible; and for the Act itself, whereby any thing is presented to the Mind, and known. Hence a thing is said to exist O B J E C T I V E L Y , Objectiv, when it exists no otherwise than being known; or in being an Object of the Mind. See E X I STE N C E . This, some will have to be a real Esse; others deny it. See E S S E . (p. 649) 1

SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1768)

LOGICAL WORKS

RUST, DISCOURSE

ON

TRUTH

IN

TWO

CHOICE AND USEFUL TREATISES

(1682) (FINNS

ELEKTRONSIK VIA UU)

Thus have we spoken concerning the truth of things, or Truth in the Object. It follows that we speak / Concerning Truth in the power, or faculty, which we called Truth in the Subject; [] Truth in the power, or faculty is nothing else but a conformity of its conceptions or Ideas unto the natures and relations of things, which in God we may call an actual, steady, immovable, eternal Omniformity[] (sect. XVIII, p. 193) NORRIS, AN ACCOUNT OF REASON AND FAITH: IN RELATION TO THE MYSTERIES OF CHRISTIANITY (1697/1724) I consider therefore that the most general distribution of Reason into that of the Object and that of the Subject; or, to word it more Intelligibly, though perhaps not altogether so Scholastically, into that of the Thing, and that of the Understanding. (19-20) Reason objective, or of the Thing, is again very various: Sometimes it is taken for Truth, and that both for Truth of the Thing, namely the Essential relations that are between Ideas, and for Truth of the Proposition which is its conformity to those Ideal Relations. [] Sometimes again it is taken for the Medium, Argument, or Principle whereby a Truth is proved; as when we say, Do you prove this by Reason or by Authority? [] Come we not to the Consideration of Reason, as tis taken subjectively, the other general part of its distinction, in which also there is some variety of Acceptation. For it is sometimes taken for the Act, sometimes for the Habit, and sometimes for the Natural Power or Faculty of Reasoning. For the Act; as when we say of a Man asleep, that he is deprived of his Reason. For the Habit; as when we say of Man, that he has lost his Reason, when his Intellectuals are mightily disorderd and impaird by a Disease. For the Natural Power or Faculty of Reasoning; as when we say, That Man is a Creature indued with Reason. (20) [http://books.google.se/books?id=f0EVAAAAQAAJ&printsec=frontcover&hl=sv]

WATTS, LOGICK: OR, THE RIGHT USE OF REASON IN THE ENQUIRY AFTER TRUTH (1725/1729) Certainty according to the Schools is distinguished into Objective and Subjective. Objective Certainty is when the Proposition is certainly true in itself; and Subjective, when we are certain of the Truth of it. The one is in Things, the other is in our Minds. (Part II, chap. II, sect. VIII, p. 176) 2

[http://books.google.se/books?id=B0lOAAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover&hl=sv]

OLDFIELD, AN ESSAY TOWARDS THE IMPROVEMENT OF REASON (1707) Finally, wheresoever this or that Attribute is truly affirmed or denyd, the Matter is so long Necessarily, and therefore also certainly so or so, with (what they call) Objective certainty, or that of the thing, as really it is in it self; and there is also a Subjective certainty of it in the in infinite Mind, which beholds all things immediately in themselves, and exactly as they are by intuitive Knowledge; when yet those things may appear to us only Possible and Doubtful, or Probable, or Certain, whether in themselves or by Means of some assuring Evidence and Proof. / Therefore what our Reason has next to consider, is the Condition of things in respect of their Certainty as to us; and first, of what is to us sufficiently Evident. (part II, chap. 19, 23) [http://books.google.se/books?id=PKlVAAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover&hl=sv]