CASE DIGEST SEPARATION OF POWER Is SOP absolute?; Planas v. Gil, 67 Phil.

62 On 17 Nov 1978, Carmen Planas (then a municipal board member of Manila) statement criticizing the acts of certain government officials including Pres. Quezon was published in la vanguardia. The following morning, she received a letter from Vargas (Secretary to the President) by order of the president containing the following: In the above statement, you appear to make the following charges: (1) That the President of the Philippines has violated the Constitution in that he has taken part in politics, expressing his preference for the candidates of the Nacionalista Party; (2) That the whole government machinery has been put in action to prevent the election to the National Assembly of the candidates of the people; (3) That the candidates of the NP and of the administration have won the election through frauds and violations of the civil service rules; (4) That the administration does not permit the people to freely elect the candidates of their choice. Planas was then ordered to appear before the CSC for inves tigation and to prove her allegations against the administration. She appeared before the CSC but she questioned the jurisdiction of the CSC over the matter. She said that as an elective official, is accountable for her political acts to her constituency alone, unless such acts constitute offenses punishable under our penal laws, and not to executive officials belonging to a party opposed to that to which petitioner is affiliated. Further, her statement of November 17th made by her as a private citizen and in the exercise of her right to discuss freely political questions cannot properly be the subject of an administrative investigation had with a view to her suspension or removal, and is only cognizable by our courts of justice in case the contents of said statement infringe any provision of our Penal Code and that her removal due to the same would be an arbitrary act by the CSC. The CSC however took cognizance of the case hence the appeal to the SC. The Solicitor General replied for the CSC arguing that under the separation of powers marked by the Constitution, the court has no jurisdictions to review the orders of the Chief Executive which are of purely administrative character. ISSUE: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction to review orders issued by the President. HELD: The acts of the Chief Executive performed within the limits of his jurisdiction are his official acts and courts will neither direct nor restrain executive action in such cases. The rule is non-interference. But from this legal premise, it does not necessarily follow that the SC is precluded from making an inquiry into the validity or constitutionality of his acts when these are properly challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding. The classical separation of governmental powers viewed in the light of political philosophy is a relative theory of government. There is more truism and actuality in interdependence than in independence and separation of powers. In the present case, the President is not a party to the proceeding. He is neither compelled nor restrained to act in a particular way. The CSC is the party respondent and the theory is advanced by the Sol-Gen that because an investigation undertaken by him is directed by authority of the President of the Philippines, the SC has no jurisdiction over the present proceedings instituted by Planas. The argument is farfetched. A mere plea that a subordinate officer of the government is acting under orders from the Chief Executive may be an important averment, but is neither decisive nor conclusive upon this court. Like the dignity of his high office, the relative immunity of the Chief Executive from judicial interference is not in the nature of a sovereign passport for all the subordinate official and employees of the executive Department to the extent that at the mere invocation of the authority that it purports the jurisdiction of this court to inquire into the validity or legality of an executive order is necessarily abated or suspended. Nevertheless, SC ruled that CSC can take cognizance of the case. Planas was not denied the right to voice out her opinion but since she made allegations against the administration it is but right for her to prove those allegations. The CSC has the right to elicit the truth. SOP; Enforcement Bondoc v. Pineda, GR# 97710, September 26, 1991 Facts: In the elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano Pineda of the LDP and Emigdio Bondoc of the NP were candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a protest in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which is composed of 9 members, 3 of whom are Justices of the SC and the remaining 6 are members of the House of Representatives (5 members belong to the LDP and 1 member is from the NP). Thereafter, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda. Congressman Camasura of the LDP voted with the SC Justices and Congressman Cerilles of the NP to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest. On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Camasura received a letter informing him that he was already expelled from the LDP for allegedly helping to organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo Cojuangco and for allegedly inviting LDP members in Davao Del Sur to join said political party. On the day of the promulgation of the decision, the Chairman of HRET received a letter informing the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the House of Representatives decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura to the HRET. Issue: Whether or not the House of Representatives, at the request of the dominant political party therein, may change that partys representation in the HRET to thwart the promulgation of a decision freely reached by the tribunal in an election contest pending therein Held: The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to provide an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of partisan consideration. As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete detachment, impartiality and independence even independence from the political party to which they belong. Hence, disloyalty to party and breach of party discipline are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a conscience vote in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void. Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that it violates Congressman Ca masuras right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET, as sole judge of congressional election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the Judiciary enjoy security of tenure under the Constitution. Therefore, membership in the HRET may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the members congressional term of office, his death, permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party or removal for other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for party disloyalty, short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another.

Political Question; Tanada v. Cuenco, L-1052, February 28, 1957 FACTS: Senate chose respondents Senators Mariano J. Cuenco and Francisco A. Delgado as members of the same Electoral Tribunal. Respondents allege that: (a) this Court is without power, authority of jurisdiction to direct or control the action of the Senate in choosing the members of the Electoral Tribunal; and (b) that the petition states no cause of action, because "petitioner Taada has exhausted his right to nominate after he nominated himself and refused to nominate two (2) more Senators." RULING: We cannot agree with the conclusion drawn by respondents from the foregoing facts. To begin with, unlike the cases of Alejandrino vs. Quezon (46 Phil., 83) and Vera vs. Avelino (77 Phil., 192)-relied upon by the respondents this is not an action against the Senate, and it does not seek to compel the latter, either directly or indirectly, to allow the petitioners to perform their duties as members of said House. Although the Constitution provides that the Senate shall choose six (6) Senators to be members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the latter is part neither of Congress nor of the Senate. Secondly, although the Senate has, under the Constitution, the exclusive power to choose the Senators who shall form part of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the fundamental law has prescribed the manner in which the authority shall be exercised. As the author of a very enlightening study on judicial self-limitation has aptly put it: "The courts are called upon to say, on the one hand, by whom certain powers shall be exercised, and on the other hand, to determine whether the powers possessed have been validly exercised. In performing the latter function, they do not encroach upon the powers of a coordinate branch of the, government, since the determination of the validity of an act is not the same, thing as the performance of the act. In the one case we are seeking to ascertain upon whom devolves the duty of the particular service. In the other case we are merely seeking to determine whether the Constitution has been violated by anything done or attented by either an executive official or the legislative." Again, under the Constitution, "the legislative power" is vested exclusively in the Congress of the Philippines. Yet, this does not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress. And, since judicial power includes the authority to inquire into the legality of statutes enacted by the two Houses of Congress, and approved by the Executive, there can be no reason why the validity of an act of one of said Houses, like that of any other branch of the Government, may not be determined in the proper actions. In fact, whenever the conflicting claims of the parties to a litigation cannot properly be settled without inquiring into the validity of an act of Congress or of either House thereof, the courts have, not only jurisdiction to pass upon said issue, but, also, the duty to do so, which cannot be evaded without violating the fundamental law and paving the way to its eventual destruction. As already adverted to, the objection to our jurisdiction hinges on the question whether the issue before us is political or not. In short, the term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum (supra), it refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure. Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the present case. Here, we are called upon to decide whether the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by Senator Primicias-a member and spokesman of the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate-on behalf of its Committee on Rules, contravenes the constitutional mandate that said members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be chosen "upon nomination .. of the party having the second largest number of votes" in the Senate, and hence, is null and void. This is not a political question. The Senate is not clothed with "full discretionary authority" in the choice of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of its power thereon is subject to constitutional limitations which are claimed to be mandatory in nature. It is clearly within the legitimate prove of the judicial department to pass upon the validity the proceedings in connection therewith. Whether an election of public officers has been in accordance with law is for the judiciary. Moreover, where the legislative department has by statute prescribed election procedure in a given situation, the judiciary may determine whether a particular election has been in conformity with such statute, and, particularly, whether such statute has been applied in a way to deny or transgress on the constitutional or statutory rights .." (16 C.J.S., 439; emphasis supplied.). It is, therefore, our opinion that we have, not only jurisdiction, but, also, the duty, to consider and determine the principal issue raised by the parties herein. Is the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as members of the Electoral Tribunal, valid and lawful? Section 11 of Article VI of the 1935 Constitution, reads: "The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen by each House, three upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three of the party having the second largest number of votes therein. The Senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman." Petitioners maintain that said nomination and election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado-who belong to the Nacionalista Party-as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, are null and void and have been made without power or color of authority, for, after the nomination by said party, and the election by the Senate, of Senators Laurel, Lopez and Primicias, as members of said Tribunal, the other Senators, who shall be members thereof, must necessarily be nominated by the party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate, and such party is, admittedly, the Citizens Party, to which Senator Taada belongs and which he represents. Respondents allege, however, that the constitutional mandate to the effect that "each Electoral Tribunal shall be compose of nine (9) members," six (6) of whom "shall be members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the case may be", is mandatory; that when-after the nomination of three (3) Senators by the majority party, and their election by the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal-Senator Taada nominated himself only, on behalf of the minority party, he thereby "waived his right to no two more Senators;" that, when Senator Primicias nominated Senators Cuenco and Delgado, and these respondents were chosen by the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, Said Senator Primicias and the Senate merely complied with the aforementioned provision of the fundamental law, relative to the number of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal; and, that, accordingly, Senators Cuenco and Delgado are de jure members of said body, and the appointment of their co-respondents, Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes is valid and lawful. What has been said above, relative to the conditions antecedent to, and concomitant with, the adoption of section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution, reveals clearly that its framers intended to prevent the majority party from controlling the Electoral Tribunals, and that the structure thereof is founded

upon the equilibrium between the majority and the minority parties therein, with the Justices of the Supreme Court, who are members of said Tribunals, holding the resulting balance of power. The procedure prescribed in said provision for the selection of members of the Electoral Tribunals is vital to the role they are called upon to play. it constitutes the essence of said Tribunals. Hence, compliance with said procedure is mandatory, and acts performed in violation thereof are null and void. It is true that the application of the foregoing criterion would limit the membership of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, in the case at bar, to seven (7), instead of nine (9), members; but, it is conceded that the present composition of the Senate was not foreseen by the framers of our Constitution. Furthermore, the spirit of the law prevails over its letter, and the solution herein adopted maintains the spirit of the Constitution, for partisan considerations can not be decisive in a tribunal consisting of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court, three (3) members nominated by the majority party and either one (1) or two (2) members nominated by the party having the second largest number of votes in the House concerned. Upon the other hand, what would be the result of respondents' contention if upheld? Owing to the fact that the Citizens Party has only one member in the Upper House, Senator Taada felt he should nominate, for the Senate Electoral Tribunal, only said member of the Citizens Party. The same is, thus, numerically handicapped, vis-a-vis the majority party, in said Tribunal. Obviously, Senator Taada did not nominate other two Senators, because, otherwise, he would worsen the already disadvantageous position, therein, of the Citizens Party. Indeed, by the aforementioned nomination and election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, if the same were sanctioned, the Nacionalista Party would have five (5) members in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, as against one (1) member of the Citizens Party and three members of the Supreme Court. With the absolute majority thereby attained by the majority party in said Tribunal, the philosophy underlying the same would be entirely upset. The equilibrium between the political parties therein would be destroyed. What is worst, the decisive moderating role of the Justices of the Supreme Court would be wiped out, and, in lieu thereof, the door would be thrown wide open for the predominance of political considerations in the determination of election protests pending before said Tribunal, which is precisely what the fathers of our Constitution earnestly strove to forestall. In view of the foregoing, we hold that the Senate may not elect, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, those Senators who have not been nominated by the political parties specified in the Constitution; that the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate may nominate not more than three (3) members thereof to said Electoral Tribunal; that the party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate has the exclusive right to nominate the other three (3) Senators who shall sit as members in the Electoral Tribunal; that neither these three (3) Senators, nor any of them, may be nominated by a person or party other than the one having the second largest number of votes in the Senate or its representative therein; that the Committee on Rules for the Senate has no standing to validly make such nomination and that the nomination of Senators Cuenco and Delgado by Senator Primicias, and the election of said respondents by the Senate, as members of said Tribunal, are null and void ab initio. As regards respondents Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, we are not prepared to hold, however, that their appointments were null and void. Although recommended by Senators Cuenco and Delgado, who are not lawful members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, they were appointed by its Chairman, presumably, with the consent of the majority of the de jure members of said body 14 or, pursuant to the Rules thereof. At any rate, as held in Suanes vs. Chief Accountant (supra), the election of its personnel is an internal matter falling within the jurisdiction and control of said body, and there is every reason to believe that it will, hereafter take appropriate measures, in relation to the four (4) respondents abovementioned, conformably with the spirit of the Constitution and of, the decision in the case at bar. Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that, respondents Senators Mariano Jesus Cuenco and Francisco A. Delgado have not been duly elected as Members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, that they are not entitled to act as such and that they should be, as they are hereby, enjoined from exercising the powers and duties of Members of said Electoral Tribunal and from acting in such capacity in connection with Senate Electoral Case No. 4 thereof. With the qualification stated above, the petition is dismissed, as regards respondents Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes. Political Question Santos v. Manglapus, GR # 94070, April 10, 1992 Santos was an ambassadress sent to Geneva for a mission. On her trip, she bought a discounted ticket which provided that she could bring someone with her so she brought with her her adopted daughter. Some of her co-workers complained because they thought that Santos used government fund to finance her daughters fare. It was later found out that the cost of the said ticket is actually 50% less than the amount tha t was given to Santos to be used for her expenses for the trip. Nevertheless, because of her refusal to appear before the disciplinary board, she was found guilty of misconduct. Upon her appeal to the Office of the President and after review, Cory issued AO 122 which declared Santos guilty of dishonesty. She was then removed from her post and was replaced. ISSUE: Whether or not Santos was rightfully removed from her post. HELD: Evidence showed that Santos is not guilty of misconduct or dishonesty. In fact what she did was beneficial to the government for she helped save and lessen the expenses. However, the SC does not have the power to reverse the recall done to Santos. She cannot be reinstated by the SC to her position for the removal power of the president is solely her prerogative. Further, the position held by Santos is primarily confidential. Her position lasts upon the pleasure of the president. When the pleasure turns into displeasure she is not actually removed from her position or office but rather her term merely expires. Also, her position involves foreign relations which is vested solely in the executive. The SC cannot inquire upon the wisdom or unwisdom of the exercise of such prerogative. Thus, the assignment to and recall from posts of ambassadors are prerogatives of the President, for her to exercise as the exigencies of the foreign service and the interests of the nation may from time to time dictate. Political Question: Phil. Judges Association v. Prado GR # 105371, November 11, 1993.pdf Facts; Republic Act 7354 was passed into law stirring commotions from the Judiciary. Under its Sec 35 as implemented by Philippine Postal Corporation through its Circular No.92-28. The franking privelege of the Supreme Court, COA, RTCs, MTC, MTCC, and other government offices were withdrawn from them. In addition, the petitioners raised the issue of constitutionality and the methods adopted prior it becoming a law. Issues; WON RA 7354 is unconstitutional. - Violative of Art VI Sec 26(1) which says '"Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof." - Violative of Art VI Sec 26(2) which says 'No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed,

and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal. Violative of the Equal protection clause Ruling: The Supreme Court sustained as to the violation of Art VI Sec 26(1) ruling further that it's adoption is within the terms prescribed by law saying that the title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. However, Sec 35 was ruled out to be in violation of the equal protection clause. The distinction made by the law is superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between the Judiciary and the grantees of the franking privilege. Therefore, RA 7354 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Extent of Power of the courts in reviewing acts of executive officers or the Legislature; Marcos v. Manglapus, GR # 88211, September 15, 1989.pdf Facts: This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order the respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue a travel documents to former Pres. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to return in the Philippines is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically Sections 1 and 6. They contended that Pres. Aquino is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so. They further assert that under international law, their right to return to the Philippines is guaranteed particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which has been ratified by the Philippines. Issue: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the President (Aquino) may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. Held: "It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right involved in this case at bar is the right to return to one's country, a distinct right under international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave the country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. What the Declaration speaks of is the "right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state". On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence and the right to be free to leave any country, including his own. Such rights may only be restricted by laws protecting the national security, public order, public health or morals or the separate rights of others. However, right to enter one's country cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to ones country in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel. The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is a well considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of International Law and under our Constitution as part of the law of the land.The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare. President Aquino has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years after the Marcos regime. The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their return to the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Inquiry of courts into acts of the Electoral Tribunals; Co v. HRET, GR # 92191-92.pdf FACTS:On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held. Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar. The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent alleging that Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines and not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar. The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)declared respondent Ong is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not respondent is a natural born Filipino and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar. 2. Whether or not the HRET committed grave abuse of authority in the exercise of its powers. HELD: 1. The Court affirmed the decision of HRET that respondent is a natural born Filipino and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar. The respondent traces his natural born citizenship through his mother, not through the citizenship of his father. The citizenship of the father is relevant only to determine whether or not the respondent "chose" to be a Filipino when he came of age. At that time and up to the present, both mother and father were Filipinos. Respondent Ong could not have elected any other citizenship unless he first formally renounced Philippine citizenship in favor of a foreign nationality. Unlike other persons faced with a problem of election, there was no foreign nationality of his father which he could possibly have chosen. 2. The Court declared that HRET did not commit any grave abuse of discretion. The same issue of natural-born citizenship has already been decided by the Constitutional Convention of 1971 and by the Batasang Pambansa convened by authority of the Constitution drafted by that Convention. Emil Ong, full blood brother of the respondent, was declared and accepted as a natural born citizen by both bodies. Conduct of senate investigation viz. pending matter with the Sandiganbayan; Bengzon, Jr. vs. Senate Blue Ribbon Comm; GR # 89914, November 20, 1991.pdf

Facts: Senator Enrile asks the Senate to look into the matter of the alleged acquisition of the Lopa Group of the properties of Kokoy Romualdez which is a subject of sequestration by the PCGG. Senator Enrile citing probable violations of Republic Act No. 3019 Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Section 5. The petitioners representing Ricardo Lopa who passed away prior the decision of the court issued this petition for prohibition and an issuance a temporary restraining order and/or injuctive relief enjoin the Blue Ribbon committee of compelling them to appear before them. Issues: Coming to the specific issues raised in this case, petitioners contend that (1) the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee's inquiry has no valid legislative purpose, i.e., it is not done in aid of legislation; (2) the sale or disposition of hte Romualdez corporations is a "purely private transaction" which is beyond the power of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to inquire into; and (3) the inquiry violates their right to due process. Ruling: The Supreme court granted the petition. The committee investigation wanted by Senator Enrile is not in aid of a legislation, therefore is violative of the separation of powers between the Senate or Congress and that Judiciary. The pending civil case of the petitioners under Civil Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan is where these issues by the Senate should be discussed. Saying further that the power of the Senate and Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation is not absolute or without limitation. Arroyo vs. De Venecia G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997 Facts: A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the House of Representatives, charged that there is violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are constitutionallymandated so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution. The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral committee submitted its report to the House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyos interpellation of the spon sor of the committee report, Majority Leader Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: There being none, approved. At the same time the Chair was saying this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, What is thatMr. Speaker? The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leaders motion, the approval o f the conference committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair. On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Ramos. Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House

Held: Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members has agreed to a particular measure. But this is subject to qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects person other than members of the legislative body, the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a case where private rights are involved. In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court. The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the Court should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyos earlier motio n to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the House. Judiciary Role; Angara vs. Electoral Commission 63 Phil 139 FACTS:In the elections of Sept. 17, 1935, petitioner Jose A. Angara and the respondents Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, and Dionisio Mayor were candidates for the position of members of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas. On Oct. 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the National Assembly and on Nov. 15, 1935, he took his oath of office. On Dec. 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8, which in effect, fixed the last date to file election protests. On Dec. 8, 1935, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against Angara and praying, among other things, that Ynsua be named/declared elected Member of the National Assembly or that the election of said position be nullified. On Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution (No. 6) stating that last day for filing of protests is on Dec. 9. Angara contended that the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the Electoral Commission solely as regards the merits of contested elections to the National Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case. ISSUES:Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative, RULING:In the case at bar, here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave constitutional nature between the National Assembly on one hand, and the Electoral Commission on the other. Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with, when and while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that

it is not subject to constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between departmental powers and agencies of the government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in justiciable and appropriate cases. The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope, and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." The Electoral Commission was created to transfer in its totality all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial in the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And thus, it is as effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the Constitution. Therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission. It appears that on Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met for the first time and approved a resolution fixing said date as the last day for the filing of election protests. When, therefore, the National Assembly passed its resolution of Dec. 3, 1935, confirming the election of the petitioner to the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission had not yet met; neither does it appear that said body had actually been organized. While there might have been good reason for the legislative practice of confirmation of the election of members of the legislature at the time the power to decide election contests was still lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by the legislature cannot be construed as depriving the Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional power to be "the sole judge of all contests...", to fix the time for the filing of said election protests. The Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent, Pedro Ynsua against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the National Assembly on Dec. 3, 1935, cannot in any manner toll the time for filing protest against the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of protests within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe. The petition for a writ of prohibition against the electoral commission is hereby denied, with cost against the petitioner. Political Question; 642 Casibang v. Aquino, 92 SCRA 642.pdf FACTS: R e s p o n d e n t R e m i g i o P . Y u w a s p r o c l a i m e d o n N o v e m b e r 9 , 1 9 7 1 a s t h e e l e c t e d M a y o r o f Rosales, Pangasinan in the 1971 local elections. Herein petitioner filed on November 24, 1971 a protestagainst the election of the former with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, on the grounds of As the proceedings continued, the 1973 Constitution was ratified. Yu moved to dismiss the election protestof petitioner on the ground that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the same in view of the effectivityof the 1973 Constitution by reason of which Section 9 of Article XVII [Transitory Provisions] andSection 2 of Article XI a political question has intervened in the case. Respondent Yu contended that "...the provisions in the 1935 Constitution relative to all local governments have been superseded by the 1973Constitution. Therefore, all local government should adhere to our parliamentary form of government. Thisis clear in the New Constitution under its Article XI." He further submitted that local elective officials haveno more four-year term of office. They are only in office at the pleasure of the appointing power embodiedin the New Constitution, and under Section 9 of Article XVII. CFI ruled in favor of Yu.ISSUE:WON the protest case is a political question HELD: N o p o l i t i c a l q u e s t i o n h a s e v e r b e e n i n t e r w o v e n i n t o t h i s c a s e . N o r i s t h e r e a n y a c t o f t h e incumbent President or the Legislative Department to be indirectly reviewed or interfered with if therespondent Judge decides the election protest. The term "political question" connotes what it means inordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions which under the Constitution,are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authorityhas been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issuesdependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure" The only issue in the electoral protestcase dismissed by respondent Judge on the ground of political question is who between protestant herein petitioner and protestee herein respondent Yu was the duly elected mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan,and legally entitled to enjoy the rights, privileges and emoluments appurtenant thereto and to discharge thefunctions, duties and obligations of the position. If the protestee's election is upheld by the respondentJudge, then he continues in office; otherwise, it is the protestant, herein petitioner. That is the onlyconsequence of a resolution of the issue therein involved a purely justiciable question or controversy asit implies a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or ommission violative of said right,and a remedy, granted or sanctioned by law, for said breach of right. Any judgment to be made on thatissue will not in any way collide or interfere with the mandate of Section 9 of Article XVII. Neither doesSection 2 of Article XI stigmatize the issue in that electoral protest case with a political color. For simply,that section allocated unto the National Assembly the power to enact a local government code. Taada vs Angara _ 118295 _ May 2, 1997 _ J.pdf Facts: - April 15, 1994: Respondent Rizalino Navarro, then Sec. of the Department of Trade and Industry, representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco, the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations (Final Act). - On December 14, 1994, the Philippine Senate adopted Resolution No. 97 which Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, that the Sen ate concur, as it hereby concurs, in the ratification by the President of the Philippines (Fidel V. Ramos) of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. - The WTO Agreement ratified by the President of the Philippines is composed of the Agreement Proper and the associated legal instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that Agreement which are integral parts thereof. - The Final Act signed by Secretary Navarro embodies not only the WTO Agreement (and its integral annexes aforementioned) but also (1) the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions and (2) the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services. - Instant petition was filed: nullification of the Philippine ratification of the WTO Agreement.

Issue: Whether or not the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization and the Agreements and As sociated Legal Instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that agreement cited by petitioners directly contravene or undermine the letter, spirit and intent of Section 19, Article II and Sections 10 and 12, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Sec. 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos. Sec. 10. x x x. The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos. In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos. Sec. 12. The State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods, and adopt measures that help make them competitive. Held: The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. Once a controversy as to the application or interpretation of a constitutional provision is raised before this Cour t (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide. It is true that in the recent case of Manila Prince Hotel vs. Government Service Insurance System, et al., this Court held that Sec. 10 , second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. However, as the constitutional provision itself states, it is enforceable only in regard to the grants of rights, privileges and concessions covering national economy and patrimony and not to every aspect of trade and commerce. It is not difficult to answer this question. Constitutions are designed to meet not only the vagaries of contemporary events. They should be interpreted to cover even future and unknown circumstances. In rendering this Decision, this Court never forgets that the Senate, whose act is under review, is one of two sovereign houses of Congress and is thus entitled to great respect in its actions. It is itself a constitutional body independent and coordinate, and thus its actions are presumed regular and done in good faith. Unless convincing proof and persuasive arguments are presented to overthrow such presumptions, this Court will resolve every doubt in its favor. Using the foregoing well-accepted definition of grave abuse of discretion and the presumption of regularity in the Senates processes, this Court cannot find any cogent reason to impute grave abuse of discretion to the Senates exercise of its power of concurrence in the WTO Agreement granted it by Sec. 21 of Article VII of the Constitution. That the Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent to the WTO Agreement thereby making it a part of the law of the land is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign duty and power. What the Senate did was a valid exercise of its authority. As to whether such exercise was wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. That is a matter between the elected policy makers and the people. The petition was dismissed for lack of merit. Arnault v. Balagtas; 97 Phil. 358.pdf Issues:1. Did the Senate Special Committee believe the statement of the petitioner-appellee that the person to whom he gave the P440,000 is one by the name of Jess D. Santos and if it did not, may the court review said finding? And2. If the Senate did not believe the statement, is the continued confinement anddetention of the petitioner-appellee, as ordered in Senate Resolution of November8, 1952, valid? Held:The judgment appealed from should be, as it hereby is, reversed, and the petitionfor the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus denied. The order of the courtallowing the petitioner to give bail is declared null and void and the petitioner ishereby ordered to be recommitted to the custody of the respondent.1. NO. It is clear and evident that the Senate Committee did not believepetitioner's statement that the person to whom he delivered theabovementioned amount is one by the name of Jess D. Santos. accdg tosenate lower court believes the opinion or conclusion of the Senate Committee isnot borne to out by the evidence produced at the investigation, that theSenate abused its discretion in making its conclusion and that under thesecircumstances the only thing that could in justice be done to petitioner isto order his release and have his case endorsed to the prosecution branchof the judicial department for investigation and prosecution as thecircumstances warrant. LOWER COURT IS WRONG It assumed that courts have the right to review the findings of legislative bodies in the exercise of the prerogative of legislation, orinterfere with their proceedings or their discretion in what is knownas the legislative process THIS COURT (the judicial department of the government) has noright or power or authority to do, much in the same manner thatthe legislative department may not invade the judicial realm in theascertainment of truth and in the application and interpretation of the law, in what is known as the judicial process, because thatwould be in direct conflict with the fundamental principle of separation of powers established by the Constitution. The onlyinstances when judicial intervention may lawfully be invoke arewhen there has been a violation of a constitutional inhibition, orwhen there has been an arbitrary exercise of the legislativediscretion. All that the courts may do, in relation to the proceedings takenagainst petitioner prior to his incarceration, is to determine if theconstitutional guarantee of due process has been accorded himbefore his incarceration by legislative order, and this because of themandate of the Supreme Law of the land that no man shall bedeprived life, liberty or property without due process of law Arnault was given due process2. valid Romulo v. Yniguez Facts:1. Petitioners, representing more than one-fifth of all members of the Batasan in 1985, filed with the Batasan Resolution No. 644 and complaint calling for the impeachment of President Marcos. Said resolution and complaint were referred by the Speaker to the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government. The Committee found the complaint not sufficient in form and substance to warrant its further consideration and disapproved and dismissed all the charges contained in the complaint attached. It then submitted its report which was duly noted by the Batasan and sent to the archives. 2. On August 14, 1985, MP Ramon V. Mitra filed with the Batasan a motion praying for the recall from the archives of Resolution No. 644 and the verified complaint attached thereto. Said motion was disapproved by the Batasan. 3. Hence, this petition for prohibition to restrain respondents from enforcing Sections 4, 5, 6 and 8 of the Batasan Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings and mandamus to compel the Batasan Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government to recall from the archives and report out the resolution together with the verified complaint for the impeachment of the President of the Philippines.Petitioner contend that said provisions are unconstitutional because they amend Sec. 3 of Article XI I of the 1973 Constitution, without complying with the mandatory

amendatory process provided for under Article XVI of the Constitution, by empowering a smaller body to supplant and overrule the complaint to impeach endorsed by the requisite 1/5 of all the members of the Batasan Pambansa and that said questioned provisions derail the impeachment proceedings at various stages by vesting the Committee on Justice, etc. the power to impeach or not to impeach, when such prerogative belongs solely to Batasan Pambansa as a collegiate body. 4. Petitioners further contend that Section 8 of the Rules is unconstitutional because it imposes an unconstitutional and illegal condition precedent in order that the complaint for impeachment can proceed to trial before the Batasan. By requiring a majority vote of all the members of the Batasan for the approval of the resolution setting forth the Articles of Impeachment, the Rules impose a condition not required by the Constitution for all that Section 3, Article XIII requires is the endorsement of at least one-fifth of all The members of the Batasan for the initiation of impeachment proceedings or for the impeachment trial to proceed. 5. Respondents Speaker and the Members of the Committee on Justice of the Batasan Pambansa contend that that the petition should be dismissed because (1) it is a suit against the Batasan itself over which this Court has no jurisdiction; (2) it raises questions which are political in nature; (3) the Impeachment Rules are strictly in consonance with the Constitution and even supposing without admitting that the Rules are invalid, their invalidity would not nullify the dismissal of the complaint for impeachment for the Batasan as a body sovereign within its own sphere has the power to dismiss the impeachment complaint even without the benefit of said Rules; and (4) the Court cannot by mandamus compel the Batasan to give due course to the impeachment complaint. ISSUE: Whether or not the court can interfere with the Batasans power of impeachment NO. 1. The dismissal by the majority of the members of the Batasan of the impeachment proceedings is an act of the Batasan as a body in the exercise of powers that have been vested upon it by the Constitution beyond the power of this Court to review. This Court cannot compel the Batasan to conduct the impeachment trial prayed for by petitioners. A dismissal by the Batasan itself as a body of the resolution and complaint for impeachment makes irrelevant under what authority the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government had acted. 2. Aside from the fact that said Committee cannot recall from the Archives said resolution and complaint for impeachment without revoking or rescinding the action of the Batasan denying MP Mitra's motion for recall (which of course it had no authority to do and, therefore, said Committee is in no position to comply with any order from the Court for said recall) such an order addressed to the Committee would actually be a direct order to the Batasan itself. 3. The Court held that if it has no authority to control the Philippine Senate, then it does not have the authority to control the actions of subordinate employees acting under the direction of the Senate. The secretary, sergeant-at-arms, and disbursing officer of the Senate are mere agents of the Senate who cannot act independently of the will of that body. Should the Court do as requested, there will be the spectacle presented of the court ordering the secretary, the sergeant-at-arms, and the disbursing officer of the Philippine Senate to do one thing, and the Philippine Senate ordering them to do another thing. 4. The writ of mandamus should not be granted unless it clearly appears that the person to whom it is directed has the absolute power to execute it. Supreme Court vacillated rulings re Pol. Question & Justiciable Question Barcelon v. Baker, 5 Phil. 87.pdf In the early 1900s in Batangas, Barcelon was detained by orders of Baker. Barcelons lawyers petitioned before the court for a writ of habeas corpus demanding Barcelon and Thompson, one of his men, to explain why Barcelon was detained. They alleged that there is no legal authority behind Barcelons arrest and it was w/o due process. The Atty-Gen averred that Baker et al acted only pursuant to the Gov-Gens resolution in 1905 which suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Cavite and Batangas (Sec 5 of The Philippine Bill). Barcelon argued that there is no rebellion or invasion or insurrection during his arrest hence he should be set free. ISSUE: Whether or not Barcelon was arrested w/ due process. HELD: The SC held that the issue is a political question. Only the president can determine the existence of the grounds specified in the Constitution for the suspension o the privilege o the writ of habeas corpus. This power is discretionary and therefore not justiciable. The president has superior competence to assess the peace and order condition of the country. Hence, the determination held by the president (GG) of the Philippines of the existence of any of the grounds prescribed by the Constitution for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus should be conclusive upon the courts. The justification was that the president (GG), with all the intelligence sources available to him as commander-in-chief, was in a better position than the SC to ascertain the real state of peace and order in the country. Montenegro v. Castaneda, 91 Phil. 882.pdf In October 1950, Montenegros son was arrested by military agents. Three days after the arrest, PP 210 was proclaimed suspend ing the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Montenegro then filed before the court to have his son be set free for his arrest was w/o cause and that the said PP should not be applied retroactively to his son for it would then constitute a violation of the constitutional prohibition against bill of attainders. Montenegro then filed a petition for the writ of habeas corpus demanding the detainers to bring his sons body and explain his detention. Castaeda et al argued that the court has no judicial authority over the matter invoking the PP and the previous ruling in Barcelon vs Baker. ISSUE: Whether or not Montenegros petition should be granted. HELD: As ruled by the SC in the Barcelon case, Montenegros petition is likewise denied. The constitutional authority of the President to suspend in case of imminent danger of invasion, insurrection or rebellion under Article 7 may not correctly be placed in doubt. LANSANG VS. GARCIA [42 SCRA 448; L-33964; 11 Dec 1971] Facts: In the evening of August 21, 1971, at about 9 p.m., while the Liberal Party of the Philippines was holding a public meeting at Plaza Miranda, Manila, for the presentation of its candidates in the general elections scheduled for November 8, 1971, two hand grenades were thrown at the platform where said candidates and other persons were. Eight persons were killed and many more injured. Proclamation889 was issued by the President suspending privilege of writ of habeas corpus stating that there is a conspiracy of rebellion and insurrectionin order to forcibly seize political power. Petitions for writ of habeas corpus were filed by persons (13) who have been arrested without a warrant.

It was stated that one of the safeguards of the proclamation was that it is to be applied to persons caught in flagrante delicto. Incidentally, Proc. 889-A was issued as an amendment, inserting the word actually staging. Proc. 889-B was also issued lifting the suspension of privilege in 27 provinces, 3 sub-provinces and 26 cities. Proc. 889-C was issued restoring the suspension in 13 provinces and cities(mostly in Mindanao). Proc. 889-D further lifted the suspension in 7 provinces and 4 cities. Only 18 provinces and sub-provinces and 2 cities whose privilege was suspended. Petitioners maintained that Proclamation No. 889 did not declare the existence of actual "invasion insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof, however it became moot and academic since it was amended. Petitioners further contend that public safety did not require the issuance of proclamations stating: (a) that there is no rebellion; (b) that, prior to and at the time of the suspension of the privilege, the Government was functioning normally, as were the courts; (c) that no untoward incident, confirmatory of analleged July-August Plan, has actually taken place after August 21, 1971; (d) that the President's alleged apprehension, because of said plan, is non-existent and unjustified; and (e) that the Communist forces in the Philippines are too small and weak to jeopardize public safety to such extent as to require the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. A resolution was issued by majority of the Court having tentatively arrived at a consensus that it may inquire in order to satisfy itself of the existence of the factual bases for the proclamations. Now the Court resolves after conclusive decision reached by majority. Issues: (1) Whether or Not the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring suspension (of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus) belongs to the President and his decision is final and conclusive upon the courts and upon all other persons. (2) Whether or Not public safety require the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus decreed in Proclamation No. 889-A. Held: The President has authority however it is subject to judicial review. Two conditions must concur for the valid exercise of the authority to suspend the privilege to the writ (a) there must be "invasion, insurrection, or rebellion" or "imminent danger thereof," and (b) "public safety" must require the suspension of the privilege. President has three (3) courses of action: (a) to call out the armed forces; (b) to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and (c) to place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. He had, already, called out the armed forces, proved inadequate. Of the two other alternatives, the suspension of the privilege is the least harsh. Petitioners contention that CPP-NPA has no ability, is negatived by the killing of 5 mayors, 20 barrio captains and 3 chiefs of police; that there were fourteen (14) meaningful bombing incidents in the Greater ManilaArea in 1970. CPP has managed to infiltrate or establish and control nine major labor organizations; has exploited the (11) major student or youth organizations; about thirty (30) mass organizations actively advancing the CPP. Garcia Padilla v. Enrile 121 SCRA 472.pdf In July 1982, Sabino Padilla, together w/ 8 others who were having a conference in a house in Bayombong, NV, were arrested by members of the PC. The raid of the house was authorized by a search warrant issued by Judge Sayo. Josefina, mother of Sabino, opposed the arrest averring that no warrant of arrest was issued but rather it was just a warrant of arrest hence the arrest of her son and the others was w/o just cause. Sabino and companions together with 4 others were later transferred to a facility only the PCs know. Josefina petitioned the court for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. ISSUE: Whether or not the arrests done against Sabino et al is valid. HELD: In a complete about face, the SC decision in the Lansang Case was reversed and the ruling in the Barcelon Case & theMontenegro Case was again reinstated. The questioned power of the president to suspend the privilege of the WoHC was once again held as discretionary in the president. The SC again reiterated that the suspension of the writ was a political question to be resolved solely by the president. It was also noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must, indeed, carry with it the suspension of the right to bail, if the governments campaign to suppress the rebellion is to be enhanced and rendered effective. If the right to bail may be demanded during the continuance of the rebellion, and those arrested, captured and detained in the course thereof will be released, they would, without the least doubt, rejoin their comrades in the field thereby jeopardizing the success of government efforts to bring to an end the invasion, rebellion or insurrection. NOTE: This ruling was abrogated by Sec 18, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution which expressly constitutionalized the Lansang Doctrine. Note as well that under Art 3 (Sec 13) of the Constitution it is stated that the right to bail shall not be impaired even if the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.