Dumayas vs.

COMELEC Facts:

warranto action. 9. Petitioner Dumayas asked the Supreme Court to set aside the COMELEC en banc

1. Petitioner Dumayas and respondent Bernal were rival candidates for the position in Mayor of Carles, Iloilo in the May 1998 synchronized elections.

resolution. ISSUE: WON COMELEC was correct in including in the canvass the election returns of the

2.During the canvassing on 13 May 1998, election returns for precincts nos. 61A, 62A, and 63A/64A all of Barangay Pantalan were protested for inclusion in the canvass before the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC for brevity) by petitioner-appellant Dumayas Jr.

contested precincts?

HELD: Yes, they are correct. - The grounds relied upon for their exclusion are all the same- that is, violation of Secs. 234, 235, 236 of the Omnibus Election Code and other election laws; acts of terrorism, intimidation, coercion, and similar acts prohibited by law. 3. The MBC denied petitioners objections and proceeded with the canvass which sh owed respondent Bernal garnering more votes than the petitioner. 4.Petitioner appealed to the COMELEC Second Division which excluded election returns from 3 precincts and directed the MBC to reconvene and finish the canvass of the remaining or uncontested returns and then, to proclaim the winning mayoralty candidate. 5. Private respondent Bernal moved for reconsideration of the decision of the Second Division with the COMELEC en banc. 6.The MBC proclaim petitioner winner of the election. Private respondent Bernal filed an urgent motion to declare void petitioners proclamation. 7.The duly proclaimed Vice-Mayor Betita, and private respondent Bernal filed n action for quo warranto against petitioner before the RTC of Iloilo. 8. Dumayasfiled with COMELEC en banc a motion to cancel Bernals motion for reconsideration and motion declare void petitioners proclamation on the ground that respondent Bernal should be deemed to have abandoned said motion when he filed quo Sande vs. Comelec Facts: In the January 30, 1980 election, there were three candidates, Saturnino Tiamson of the Nacionalista Party, Cesar Villones of the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan and Edgardo Samson of the National Union for Liberation. After the canvassing of the election returns, it was shown that private respondent Tiamson had more than 117 votes over the candidate Villones. On February 29, 1980, he was proclaimed as Mayor by the Municipal Board of Canvassers and on March 3, 1980 assumed such position. On March 10, 1980, as mentioned, Villones filed a quo warranto based on Article XII, C, Section 10 of the Constitution which reads No elective public officer may change his 'political party 3. The election irregularities cited by the petitioner would require the presentation of evidence which cannot be done in a pre-proclamation controversy which is summary in nature. 1. The only evidence presented by the petitioner to prove the alleged irregularities were the self-serving contracts of his watchers and inspectors. 2. Returns cannot be excluded on mere allegations that the returns are manufactured or fictitious when the returns on their face appear to be regular and without any physical signs of tampering.

affiliation during his term of office, and no candidate for any elective public office may change his political party affiliation within six months immediately preceding or following an election. Respondent Commission on Elections denied the petition and the motion for reconsideration with respect to disqualifying private respondent Tiamson. A petition for certiorari was filed only later on May 30, 1980. Issue:Whether or not election protest or quo warranto proceeding is proper remedy? Held: Yes. The holding of the January 30, 1980 election, and a proclamation thereafter made, a petition to disqualify a candidate based on a change of political party affiliation filed with this Court after January 30, 1980, arising from a pre-proclamation controversy, should be dismissed without prejudice to such ground being passed upon in a proper election protest or quo warranto proceeding. This means that the filing of pre-proclamation case once the candidate has been proclaimed be dismissed. However, a petition for election protest or quo warranto may be filed. In the end however, the case was still dismissed because of lack of merits. Luna v Comelec Facts: - On January 15 2004, Hans Roger withdrew his certificate of candidacy. On the same date, Joy Chrisma Luna filed her certificate of Candidacy as a substitute candidate forHans Roger for the 2004 elections as vice mayor of Lagayan Abra. - Tomas Layao, together with several others filed a disqualification petition against her since she was not a registered voter Lagayan Abra, but of Bangued. - It is also contested that there can be no valid substitution since Hans Roger, the candidate sought to be substituted, is only 20 years old on the day of the election. - COMELEC ruled in favor of the disqualification case. Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that there was no valid substitution by Luna for Hans Roger. PARDO, J.: In her petition for certiorari, petitioner seeks to nullify the resolution of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc declaring her disqualified to run for the office of governor of Leyte and mayor of Baybay, Leyte, because she filed certificates of candidacy REP. MA. CATALINA L. GO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, FELIPE V. MONTEJO and ARVIN V. ANTONI, respondents. Since Hans Roger withdrew his certificate of candidacy and the COMELEC found that Luna complied with all the procedural requirements for a valid substitution, Luna can validly substitute for Hans Roger. * The Election Code allows a person who has filed a certificate of candidacy to withdraw the same prior to the election by submitting a written declaration under oath. There is no provision of law which prevents a candidate from withdrawing his certificate of candidacy before the election. * Section 77 of the Election Code prescribes the rules on substitution of an official candidate of a registered political party who dies, withdraws, or is disqualified for any cause after the last day for the filing of certificate of candidacy. Held: The COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in declaring that Hans Roger, being under age, could not be considered to have filed a valid certificate of candidacy and, thus, could not be validly substituted by Luna. The substitution of Luna for Hans Roger was valid . The COMELEC may not, by itself, without the proper proceedings, deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy filed in due form. Since Hans Roger withdrew his certificate of candidacy and the COMELEC found that Luna complied with all the procedural requirements for a valid substitution, Luna can validly substitute for Hans Roger. The Court ruled that the question of eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate for non-age is beyond the usual and proper cognizance of the COMELEC.

for both positions and the withdrawal of her certificate of candidacy for mayor was filed late by twenty eight minutes from the deadline. Forthwith, we issued an order to maintain the status quo ante, in effect allowing petitioners certificate of candidacy for governor in the meantime. In its Comment, the COMELEC justified its resolution on the ground that petitioners affidavit of withdrawal of her certificate of candidacy for mayor of Baybay, Leyte was ineffectual because it was submitted twenty eight (28) minutes late at the office of the municipal election officer at Baybay. The facsimile copy thereof was filed with said office at 12:28 a.m., 1 March 2001, and the original copy thereof was actually received by the office of the municipal election officer of Baybay at 1:15 p.m., the same day. The provincial election supervisor of Leyte, with office at Tacloban City, to whom petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy for governor at 11:47 p.m., 28 February 2001, refused to accept the affidavit of withdrawal tendered simultaneously therewith because, as he claimed, the affidavit must be filed with the office of the municipal election officer of Baybay, Leyte where petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy for mayor. Facts Petitioner is the incumbent representative of the Fifth District, province of Leyte, whose term of office will expire at noon on 30 June 2001. On 27 February 2001, petitioner filed with the municipal election officer of the municipality of Baybay, Leyte, a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Baybay, Leyte. On 28 February 2001, at 11:47 p.m., petitioner filed with the provincial election supervisor of Leyte, with office at Tacloban City, another certificate of candidacy for governor of the province of Leyte. Simultaneously therewith, she attempted to file with the provincial election supervisor an affidavit of withdrawal of her candidacy for mayor of the municipality of Baybay, Leyte. However, the provincial election supervisor of Leyte refused to accept the affidavit of withdrawal and suggested that, pursuant to a COMELEC resolution, she should file it with the municipal election officer of Baybay, Leyte where she filed her certificate of candidacy for mayor. II. Must the affidavit of withdrawal be filed with the election officer of the place where the certificate of candidacy was filed? I. Is petitioner disqualified to be candidate for governor of Leyte and mayor of Baybay, Leyte because she filed certificates of candidacy for both positions? Issues: In the meantime, the Law Department, COMELEC, under Director Jose P. Balbuena, made a study of the cases without affording petitioner an opportunity to be heard or to submit responsive pleadings. On 05 April 2001, they submitted a report and recommendation to the COMELEC en banc. On 06 March 2001, Atty. Manuel L. Villegas, the provincial election supervisor of Leyte, by 1st indorsement, referred the cases to the Commission on Election, Manila, Law Department, on the ground that he was inhibiting himself due to his prior action of refusing to receive the petitioners affidavit of withdrawal tendered simultaneously with the filing of the certificate of candidacy for governor on 28 February 2001. On 05 March 2001, respondent Montejo filed with the provincial election supervisor of Leyte, at Tacloban City a petition to deny due course and/or to cancel the certificates of candidacy of petitioner. Respondent Antoni filed a similar petition to disqualify petitioner. The petitions were based on the ground that petitioner filed certificates of candidacy for two positions, namely, that for mayor of Baybay, Leyte, and that for governor of Leyte, thus, making her ineligible for both. At that late hour, with only minutes left to midnight, the deadline for filing certificates of candidacy or withdrawal thereof, and considering that the travel time from Tacloban to Baybay was two (2) hours, petitioner decided to send her affidavit of withdrawal by fax to her father at Baybay, Leyte and the latter submitted the same to the office of the lection officer of Baybay, Leyte at 12:28 a.m., 01 March 2001.On the same day, at 1:15 p.m., the election officer of Baybay, Leyte, received the original of the affidavit of withdrawal.

There is nothing in this Section which mandates that the affidavit of withdrawal must be III. Was there denial to petitioner of procedural due process of law? Held: I. No. We grant the petition. We annul the COMELEC resolution declaring petitioner disqualified for both positions of governor of Leyte and mayor of the municipality of Baybay, Leyte. The filing of the affidavit of withdrawal with the election officer of Baybay, Leyte, at 12:28 a.m., 1 March 2001 was a substantial compliance with the requirement of the law. We hold that petitioner's withdrawal of her certificate of candidacy for mayor of Baybay, Leyte was effective for all legal purposes, and left in full force her certificate of candidacy for governor. II. No COMELEC thus acted with grave abuse of discretion when it declared petitioner ineligible Section 73, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, provides that: III. Yes. The Law Department, COMELEC conducted an ex-parte study of the cases. It did "SEC. 73. Certificate of candidacy.- No person shall be eligible for any elective public office unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein. "A person who has filed a certificate of candidacy may, prior to the election, withdraw the same by submitting to the office concerned a written declaration under oath. "No person shall be eligible for more than one office to be filled in the same election, and if he files his certificate of candidacy for more than one office, he shall not be eligible for any of them. However, before the expiration of the period for the filing of certificates of candidacy, the person who has filed more than one certificate of candidacy may declare under oath the office for which he desires to be eligible and cancel the certificate of candidacy for the other office or offices." WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition. The Court ANNULS COMELEC Resolution No. 3982, adopted on 23 April 2001, and DECLARES valid petitioner's certificate of candidacy for Governor of Leyte. The Chairman, Commision on Elections, Manila, and the provincial election supervisor of Leyte shall immediately order the inclusion of petitioner's name in the certified list of candidates for Governor, province of Leyte, to be posted in each polling place/voting booth in every precinct throughout the province of Leyte, in the not give petitioner an opportunity to be heard. Petitioner was not required to submit a comment or opposition to the petitions for cancellation of her certificates of candidacy and/or for disqualification. It did not set the cases for hearing. It was not even aware of the proceedings before Director Ibanez in Tacloban. After an ex-parte study of the cases, on 05 April 2001, the Law Department submitted its report and recommendation, approved by Director Balbuena, to the COMELEC en banc. for both positions for which she filed certificates of candidacy. While it may be true that Section 12 of COMELEC Resolution No. 3253-A, adopted on 20 November 2000, requires that the withdrawal be filed before the election officer of the place where the certificate of candidacy was filed, such requirement is merely directory, and is intended for convenience. It is not mandatory or jurisdictional. An administrative resolution can not contradict, much less amend or repeal a law, or supply a deficiency in the law. Hence, the filing of petitioner's affidavit of withdrawal of candidacy for mayor of Baybay with the provincial election supervisor of Leyte sufficed to effectively withdraw such candidacy. The filed with the same office where the certificate of candidacy to be withdrawn was filed. Thus, it can be filed directly with the main office of the COMELEC, the office of the regional election director concerned, the office of the provincial election supervisor of the province to which the municipality involved belongs, or the office of the municipal election officer of the said municipality.

voters information sheet to be given to each registered voter therein, in the election returns, statement of votes by precincts, and certificate of canvass, and all other election papers. The status quo ante order heretofore issued is made permanent. EN BANC G.R. Nos. 186007 & 186016 SALVADOR DIVINAGRACIA, JR., Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ALEX A. CENTENA, Respondents. DECISION CARPIO MORALES, J.: FACTS: 1) Salvador Divinagracia, Jr. and Alex Centena vied for the vice-mayoralty race in Calinog, Iloilo during the May 14, 2007 Elections wherein Divinagracia garnered 8,141 votes or 13 votes more than the 8,128 votes received by Centena. 2) After the proclamation of Divinagracia as the duly elected vice-mayor on May 16, 2007, Centena filed with the RTC of Iloilo City an election protest claiming that irregularities attended the appreciation of marked ballots in seven precints. 3) By Decision of December 5, 2007, Branch 24 of the RTC dismissed Centenas protest. It ruled that Centena failed to overcome the disputable presumption of regularity in the conduct of elections since no challenge of votes or objection to the appreciation of ballots was raised before the Board of Elections Inspectors or the Municipal Board of Canvassers. 4) Centena and Divinagracia filed their respective notices of appeal before the trial court, upon payment of the P1,000 appeal fee under Section 9, Rule 14 of the "Rules of Procedure in Election Contests before the Courts involving Elective Municipal and Barangay Officials" (A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC) which took effect on May 15, 2007. The COMELEC ordered its consolidation. 5) Meanwhile, the duly elected mayor of Calinog, Teodoro Lao, died on March 18, 2008. On even date, Divinagracia assumed office as mayor. July 27, 2009

6) On July 17, 2008, the COMELEC Second Division issued its FIRST assailed resolution declaring Centena as the duly elected vice mayor. 7) Divinagracia filed a Verified Motion for Reconsideration, alleging that both parties failed to pay the appeal fee/s in the amount of P3,200 under Section 3, Rule 40 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, and following Section 9, Rule 22 of the same Rules, an appeal may be dismissed motu proprio or upon motion on the ground of failure of the appellant to pay the correct appeal fee. 8) On January 26, 2009, the COMELEC En Banc issued its SECOND assailed Resolution affirming the pronouncements of the Second Division. It held that petitioner was barred under the doctrine of estoppel by laches when he failed to raise the question of jurisdiction when he filed his Appellants and Appellees Briefs. Hence, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition. ISSUES: 1) Whether or not filing fee/appeal fee is mandatory and jurisdictional, hence, can be raised at any stage of the proceedings pending with the same court/COMELEC? 2) Whether or not Divinagracia is barred by estoppel because his participation in the proceedings was directed by COMELEC? HELD: 1) NO. (Petition is lack of merit.) On May 15, 2007, the Court, by A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC, introduced the "Rules of Procedure in Election Contests before the Courts involving Elective Municipal and Barangay Officials," which superseded Rules 35 and 36 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure governing elections protests and quo warranto cases before the trial courts.18 Not only was the amount of the filing fee increased from P300 to P3,000 for each interest; 19 the amount of filing fee was determined by the Court, not by the Comelec, which was, to recall, the cause of confusion in Loyola, Miranda and Soller. Another major change introduced by A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC is the imposition of an appeal fee under Section 9 of Rule 14 thereof, separate and distinct from, but payable within the same period as, the appeal fee imposed by the Comelec under Sections 3 and 4, Rule 40

of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, as amended by Comelec Resolution No. 02-0130. Contrary to respondents contention, the Comelec -prescribed appeal fee was not superseded by A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC. The requirement of these two appeal fees by two different jurisdictions had caused confusion in the implementation by the Comelec of its procedural rules on payment of appeal fees for the perfection of appeals, prompting the Comelec to issue Resolution No. 8486 (July 15, 2008) clarifying as follows: 1. That if the appellant had already paid the amount of P1,000.00 before the Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court or lower courts within the five-day period, pursuant to Section 9, Rule 14 of the Rules of Procedure in Election Contests Before the Courts Involving Elective Municipal and Barangay Officials (Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 07-4-15) and his Appeal was given due course by the Court, said appellant is required to pay the Comelec appeal fee of P3,200.00 at the Commission's Cash Division through the Electoral Contests Adjudication Department (ECAD) or by postal money order payable to the Commission on Elections through ECAD, within a period of fifteen days (15) from the time of the filing of the Notice of Appeal with the lower court. If no payment is made within the prescribed period, the appeal shall be dismissed pursuant to Section 9(a) of Rule 22 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which provides: Sec. 9. Grounds for Dismissal of Appeal. The appeal may be dismissed upon motion of either party or at the instance of the Commission on any of the following grounds: (a) Failure of the appellant to pay the correct appeal fee; x x x 2. That if the appellant failed to pay the P1,000.00-appeal fee with the lower court within the five (5) day period as prescribed by the Supreme Court New Rules of Procedure but the case was nonetheless elevated to the Commission, the appeal shall be dismissed outright by the Commission, in accordance with the aforestated Section 9(a) of Rule 22 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure. (Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied) That Comelec Resolution No. 8486 took effect on July 24, 200820 or after a party had filed

a notice of appeal, as in the case of petitioner, does not exempt it from paying the Comelec-prescribed appeal fees. The Comelec merely clarified the existing rules on the payment of such appeal fees, and allowed the payment thereof within 15 days from filing the notice of appeal. 2) YES. On the Comelecs application of the doctrine of estoppel by laches, records show that petitioner raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction for his and private respondents non-payment of the appeal fee only after the Comelec appreciated the contested ballots and ruled in favor of respondent, an issue which could have been raised with reasonable diligence at the earliest opportunity. The Court finds the Comelec resolution well-taken. That petitioners filing of the appellees brief was an invocation of the Comelecs jurisdiction and an indication of his active participation cannot be refuted on the mere asseveration that he was only complying with the Comelecs directive to file the same. The submission of briefs was ordered precisely because the Comelec could not anticipate the claims and defenses that would be raised by the parties. Moreover, in his Verified Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner once again pleaded to the Comelec to exercise its jurisdiction by dismissing private respondents appeal on the merits. SANTOS VS. COMELEC Ynares-Santiago| 2003 FACTS: 1.) Edgar Santos and Pedro Panulaya were both candidates for Mayor of the Mun. of Balingoan, Misamis Oriental in the May 2001 elections. Mun. Board of Canvassers later on proclaimed Panulaya as the duly elected Mayor. 2.) Santos filed an election protest before the RTC. The court found out that Santos had 2, 181 votes while Panulaya had 2, 105 votes. In its April 2, 2002 decision it proclaimed Santos as the duly elected Mayor of Balingoan, Misamis Oriental. Petitioner thereafter filed a motion for execution pending appeal.

3.) However, pursuant to the petitions/appeal filed by Panulaya, COMELEC issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction which effectively enjoined the trial court from acting on petitioners motion for execution pending appeal. 4.) The Writ of Preliminary Injunction was later on lifted and the Court, on Aug. 20, 2002, thus issued an Order upholding and approving petitioners Motion for Execution Pending Appeal. Santos then took his oath of office and assumed the duties and functions of his office. 5.) On Oct. 14, 2002, COMELEC issued a Resolution SETTING ASIDE the Resolution of the respondent judge granting the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal as well as his Order directing the issuance of the Writ of Execution. (NB. COMELEC set aside the Order stating that shortness of term alone is not a good reason for execution of a judgment pending appeal.) ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in setting aside the trial court s order granting execution pending appeal. HELD: YES, COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion. The granting of the court of the execution pending appeal was proper. A valid exercise of the discretion to allow execution pending appeal requires that it should be based upon good reasons to be stated in a special order. The following constitute good reasons and a combination of 2 or more of them will suffice to grant execution pending appeal: (1) public interest involved or will of the electorate; (2) shortness of the remaining portion of the term of the contested office; and (3) length of time the election contest has been pending. Xxx the rationale why such execution is allowed in election cases is to give as much recognition to the worth of a trial judges decision as that which is initially ascribed by the law to the proclamation by the board of canvassers. Xxx to deprive the courts of their discretion to grant execution pending appeal would, bring back the ghost of the grab-the-proclamation-prolong-the-protest techniques so often resorted to by the devious politicians in the past n their efforts to perpetuate their hold to an elective office. EN BANC [G.R. No. 157957. September 18, 2003] CHARITO NAVAROSA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HONORABLE DEAN R.

TELAN, as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Kalibo, Aklan and ROGER M. ESTO, respondents. DECISION CARPIO, J.: The Facts: Petitioner Charito Navarosa and respondent Roger M. Esto were candidates for mayor of Libacao, Aklan in the 14 May 2001 elections. On 17 May 2001, the COMELEC Municipal Board of Canvassers of Libacao proclaimed petitioner Navarosa as the duly elected mayor, with a winning margin of three (3) votes over respondent Esto. Claiming that irregularities marred the canvassing of ballots in several precincts, respondent Esto filed an election protest in the RTC, Branch 9, Kalibo, Aklan. Petitioner Navarosa, who also claimed that canvassing irregularities prejudiced her, filed a counter-protest in the same case. On 4 March 2002, after revision of the contested ballots, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of respondent Esto. The trial court found that respondent Esto obtained 4,595 votes over petitioner Navarosas 4,553 votes. Thus, the trial court declared respondent Esto the elected mayor of Libacao by a margin of 42 votes and annulled the earlier proclamation of petitioner Navarosa. The trial court also ordered petitioner Navarosa to pay respondent Esto actual damages and attorneys fees. Petitioner Navarosa appealed the trial courts ruling to the COMELEC Respondent Esto, on the other hand, filed with the trial court a motion for execution of the judgment pending petitioner Navarosas appeal. Petitioner Navarosa opposed respondent Estos motion. In the alternative, petitioner Navarosa offered to file a supersedeas bond to stay execution pending appeal, should the trial court grant respondent Estos motion.

In its Order of 22 March 2002, the trial court granted respondent Estos motion subject to the filing of a P300,000 bond. However, the trial court also granted petitioner Navarosas prayer to stay the execution pending appeal, upon filing a P600,000 supersedeas bond. There is, therefore, no question now that execution pending appeal may be granted. Both petitioner Navarosa and respondent Esto sought reconsideration of the Order but the trial court denied their motions on 5 April 2002. Respondent Esto filed a petition for certiorari with the COMELEC against the Order.

elective municipal officials decided by the trial courts of general jurisdiction elevated on appeal, and not the trial court, that may order the stay or restrain the immediate execution of the decision pending appeal granted by the trial court of general jurisdiction in an election contest. Except when the trial court reversed itself in a motion for reconsideration of its order granting immediate execution, it cannot later on stay or restrain the execution thereof in the guise of allowing the losing party to file a supersedeas bond. The issue before the trial court where a motion for execution pending appeal is filed is to determine whether or not there are good reasons to justify the immediate execution pending appeal. The issue is not whether there are good reasons to stay the immediate execution of the

In her memorandum to the petition, petitioner Navarosa raised for the first time the issue of the trial courts failure to acquire jurisdiction over the election protest because of respondent Estos failure to pay the COMELEC filing fee. The Ruling of the COMELEC: In its Resolution dated 28 November 2002, the COMELEC Second Division affirmed the RTC's granting execution pending appeal and nullified the stay of the execution. It also found that respondent Esto duly paid the COMELEC filing fee. The Resolution reads: Going now to the main issue at hand, did respondent judge gravely abuse his discretion and/or exceed his jurisdiction when he stayed the immediate execution of his decision on a finding of good reasons he made in his questioned Order of March 22, 2002 b y allowing in the same Order the filing of a supersedeas bond double the amount posted by petitioner?

decision pending appeal. The trial court, by granting the immediate execution of the March 4, 2002 decision, recognized that the good reasons cited in the questioned Order constitute superior circumstances demanding urgency that will outweigh the injuries or damages to the adverse party if the decision is reversed. By declaring that petitioner Esto is the duly elected Mayor of Libacao, Aklan, the trial court gave substance and meaning to the peoples mandate as expressed in the ballot, especially since it has established petitioner Estos right to the office. The trial court cannot indirectly reverse its substantial finding of good reasons by a ru le of procedure which does not strictly apply in election protest cases when it allowed the filing of a supersedeas bond under Section 3, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. To allow the application of the said procedural relief would defeat the right of the winning candidate in an election protest to hold the public office by virtue of the peoples mandate expressed through the ballot and to perform the functions of the said public office. Note that respondent raised for the first time in his memorandum the issue of lack of

The answer is yes. It is for the Comelec in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction over all contests involving

jurisdiction of the trial court over the instant election protest for the alleged failure of petitioner Esto to pay the filing fee of P300.00 required under Section 9, Rule 35 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

Petitioner Navarosa sought reconsideration of this ruling but the COMELEC En Banc denied her motion on 15 April 2003. Hence, this petition. The Issues: Petitioner Navarosa claims that although the receipts issued by the trial court show that Petitioner Navarosa raises the following issues: 1. WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC EN BANC ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE 28 NOVEMBER 2002 RESOLUTION OF THE COMELEC SECOND DIVISION FOR FAILURE TO RULE ON THE BASIC ISSUE OF LACK OF JURISDICTION OF THE COURT A QUO OVER RESPONDENT ESTOS ELECTION PROTEST FOR NON-PAYMENT OF THE MANDATORY COMELEC FILING FEE OF P300.00. Contrary to petitioner Navarosas claim, the COMELEC Second Division did rule on the 2. WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC EN BANC ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE 28 NOVEMBER 2002 RESOLUTION OF THE COMELEC SECOND DIVISION DESPITE THE FACT THAT THERE WERE NO GOOD REASONS TO EXECUTE THE 4 MARCH 2002 DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT. 3. WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC EN BANC ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE 28 NOVEMBER 2002 RESOLUTION OF THE COMELEC SECOND DIVISION WHEN THE LATTER RULED THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD NO POWER TO ORDER THE STAY OF EXECUTION OF ITS 4 MARCH 2002 DECISION PENDING APPEAL IN AN ELECTION CONTEST, BECAUSE SECTION 3, RULE 39 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT DOES NOT APPLY TO ELECTION CASES.[7] Nevertheless, our rulings in Miranda and Loyola where the issue of lack or incomplete The Ruling of the Court: The petition has no merit. payment of the COMELEC filing fee was timely raised in a motion to dismiss, are inapplicable to the present case. In Miranda v. Castillo, the Court, reiterating Loyola v. Commission on Elections, held that it would no longer tolerate any mistake in the payment of the full amount of filing fees for election cases filed after the promulgation of the Loyola decision on March 25, 1997. However, based on the trial courts Election Fees Form for Election Case No. 129, of the total amount of P515 respondent Esto paid, only P100 was indeed credited to the General Fund. Consequently, respondent Esto only paid P100 of the required P300 COMELEC filing fee. issue of respondent Estos non-payment of the full amount of the COMELEC filing fee. The Second Division held that the P515 fees respondent Esto paid already covered the P300 COMELEC filing fee. Petitioner Navarosa also claimed that the Second Division did not rule on this issue. respondent Esto paid P515 as filing and other fees, only P100 was credited to the General Fund. The rest of what respondent Esto paid accrued to the Judiciary Development Fund (P400), the Legal Research Fund (P10) and the Victims Compensation Fund (P5). Consequently, respondent Esto paid only P100 of the P300 COMELEC filing fee, for which reason the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the election protest. 1. The Trial Court Acquired Jurisdiction Over the Election Case. Petitioner Navarosa contends that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the election protest because of respondent Estos failure to pay the COMELEC filing fee.

Petitioner Navarosa raised the issue of incomplete payment of the COMELEC filing fee only in her memorandum to respondent Estos petition before the COMELEC Second Division. Petitioner Navarosas conduct estops her from claiming, at such late stage, that the trial court did not after all acquire jurisdiction over the election protest. At this stage, the remedy for respondent Estos incomplete payment is for him to pay the P200 deficiency in the COMELEC filing fee. Election contests involve public interest, and technicalities and procedural barriers should not be allowed to stand if they constitute an obstacle to the determination of the true will of the electorate in the choice of their elective officials. 2. Good Reasons Exist to Grant Execution Pending Appeal in this Case To grant execution pending appeal in election protest cases, the following requisites must concur: (1) there must be a motion by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party; (2) there must be good reasons for the execution pending appeal; and (3) the order granting execution pending appeal must state the good reasons. Petitioner Navarosa concedes respondent Estos compliance with the first and third requisites. What she contests is the trial courts finding that there are good reasons to order discretionary execution of its decision. In Ramas v Comelec, the Court held that the following constitute good reasons, and a combination of two or more of them will suffice to grant execution pending appeal: (1) the public interest involved or the will of the electorate; (2) the shortness of the remaining portion of the term of the contested office; and (3) the length of time that the election contest has been pending. The trial court invoked two good reasons to justify its order allowing execution pe nding appeal.

First, the order will give substance and meaning to the peoples mandate. Second, more than 10 months or nearly 1/3 of the 3 -year term of the office in question had already lapsed. The COMELEC found these good reasons sufficient an d found no grave abuse of discretion in the ruling of the trial court or of the COMELEC. 3. Section 3 of Rule 39 Not Applicable To Election Protest Cases Unlike the Election Code of 1971, which expressly provided for execution pending appeal of trial courts rulings in election protests, the present election laws are silent on such remedy. Nevertheless, Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (now 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) applies in suppletory character to election cases, thus allowing execution pending appeal in the discretion of the court. The failure of the extant election laws to reproduce Section 218 of the Election Code of 1971 does not mean that execution of judgment pending appeal is no longer available in election cases. In election contests involving elective municipal officials, which are cognizable by courts of general jurisdiction; and those involving elective barangay officials, which are cognizable by courts of limited jurisdiction, execution of judgment pending appeal under Section 2 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court are permissible pursuant to Rule 143 of the Rules of Court, which is now Section 4, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. This Section 4 provides: SEC 4. In what cases not applicable.- These Rules shall not apply to election cases, land registration, cadastral, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient. As to election cases involving regional, provincial, and city officials, which fall within the

exclusive original jurisdiction of the COMELEC, Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution vests the COMELEC with the authority to promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. Additionally, Section 52(c), Article VII of the Omnibus Election Code empowers the COMELEC to promulgate rules and regulations implementing the provisions of the Code or other laws which it is required to enforce and administer.

A supersedeas bond secures the performance of the judgment or order appealed from in case of its affirmation in ordinary civil actions where the interest of the prevailing party is capable of pecuniary estimation, and consequently, of protection, through the filing of a bond. Consequently, it finds no application in election protest cases where judgments invariably include orders which are not capable of pecuniary estimation such as the right to hold office and perform its functions. As applied to the present case, the supersedeas bond petitioner Navarosa filed can only

Accordingly, the COMELEC promulgated the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Section 1 of Rule 41 thereof expressly provides that in the absence of any applicable provision in said Rules, the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court in the Philippines shall be applicable by analogy or in a suppletory character and effect. Thus, a primordial public interest to obviate a hollow victory for the duly elected candidate as determined by the trial court lies behind the present rule giving suppletory application to Section 2. Only a more compelling contrary policy consideration can prevent the suppletory application of Section 2. In insisting that the simple expedient of posting a supersedeas bond can stay execution pending appeal, petitioner Navarosa neither claims nor offers a more compelling contrary policy consideration.

answer for that portion of the trial courts ruling ordering her to pay to respondent Esto actual damages, attorneys fees and the cost of the suit. It cannot secure execution of that portion proclaiming respondent Esto duly elected mayor of Libacao, Aklan by popular will of the electorate and authorizing him to assume the office. This anomalous situation defeats the very purpose for the filing of the supersedeas bond in the first place. In sum, the Court holds that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in ordering execution pending appeal of the trial courts decision. Grave abuse of discretion implies capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction, or arbitrary and despotic exercise of power because of passion or personal hostility. The grave abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. This does not obtain in the present case. Petition dismissed.

Furthermore, a supersedeas bond under Section 3 cannot fully protect the interests of the prevailing party in election protest cases. Section 3 provides: Social Justice Society vs Dangerous Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency Stay of discretionary execution. Discretionary execution issued under the preceding section may be stayed upon approval by the proper court of a sufficient bond, filed by the party against whom it is directed, conditioned upon the performance of the judgment or order allowed to be executed in case it shall be finally sustained in whole or in part. The bond thus given may be proceeded against on motion with notice to the surety. In 2002, RA 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 was implemented. Sec 36 thereof requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of FACTS:This is consolidated with Laserna vs DDB and PDEA ( G.R. No. 158633 ) and Pimentel vs COMELEC ( G.R. No. 161658 ) Respondent Roger M. Esto shall pay immediately the P200 deficiency in the COMELEC filing fee.

secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutors office with certain offenses. On 23 Dec 2003, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the rules and regulations on the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office in connection with the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local elections. Pimentel, Jr., a senator and a candidate for re-election in the May elections, filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated December 23, 2003 for being unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for candidates for senators in addition to those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 6486. According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5) qualifications for one to be a candidate for, elected to, and be a member of the Senate. He says that both the Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug test, create an additional qualification that all candidates for senator must first be certified as drug free. He adds that there is no provision in the Constitution authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements of candidates for senator. ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 36 of RA 9165 is an amendment to the Constitution on the qualifications of Senators. HELD: Pimentels contention is valid. Accordingly, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution. In the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed. The provision *n+o person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test. Is not tenable as it enlarges the qualifications. COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36, validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, the

COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution.