MILITARY REVIEW

ideas of the general staff but of the will

the commander. These recommendations of
appear a bit exaggerated, how
It might be that those who take this
have yielded to the intense fear that
staff officers would become con
as a result of their daily contact with
chief and finally come to consider them
the command, thus losing sight of the
situation."
"I believe," Castex continues, "that it is
'indispensable that the chief have about him
.. critical moments officers who are not only
t'&iv.\" ....,.,... to draw up an order and fill out a march
but who are distinguished counselors.
cannot subscribe -to the opinion occasionally
that the chief has no need of. of
ficers at his side who are conscious of the
enormous importance of their charge. On the
contrary, everyone in the military profession
should be aware of the importance of his
mission, which is not the mission of one, but'
of all. Only by paying this price can great
results be attained. And this concept assumes
the existence of 'a soul in everyone, a ca-'
pacity for thinking-that is to say, a per
sonality." .
This personality within the impersonal or
ganization represented by the general staff
has nothing to do with the idea of responsi
bility which, as far as it has reference to
decisions and the conduct of operations, is
, wholly and absolutely a prerogative of com
mand.
German Tactics of Combating Guerrillas
Digested at the Command and General Staff School from the Soviet Handbook of
the Guerrilla, 3d edition, 1942.
GUERRILLAS' activities force the Germans to
constantly on the alert. Therefore, in the
temporarily occupied by them, the
(X,erlnan command is compelled to ;resort to a
Special guard system and to punitive meas
ures.
: The Germans divide the occupied areas into
sectors, each of which is assigned to a divi
Every division has special reserves for
t action against the guerrillas. Division-
sectors and the methods each division
emlul()vs in fighting the guerrillas should be
Disposition and strength of special
should also -be known and always
kept in mind.
The Germans pay particular attention to
security of their lines of communications,
highways and railroads. In frontal
regions, each 100-kilometer section of road is
',guarded by a battalion. This, of course, varies
upon the size and importance of the
'J'Oad and upon terrain. Every kilometer of
Each company is assigned its own sector.
The companies send out field patrols of from
ten to twelve men. Battalion and company
commanders are usually with the reserve con
tingents, which are located in the center of :,
their respective sectors. .
The field patrols and reserves set up
strongpoints surrounded by barbed wire.
These are usually located in places with a.
good field of fire. Reserves are moved by
motor, by railroad motor cars, and by. special
trains.
Posts are established to guard individual'
objectives. Their strength depends upon the
size and importance of the objectives. As a
rule, they are doubled at night. Sentinels are
stationed not only under bridges, but on
trestles as well. Posts with poor fields of fire j
have more men.
- German patrols ride back and forth con-'
tinuously, often on motorcycles. In daytime,
they cover a strip several kilometers wide on .
may be guarded by two men detailed
both sides of the road. When troops are avail-)
the battalion for constant guard duty.
remainder' of the battalion is assigned
able, this strip may be as wide as
kilometers, All populated places within it arei work and serves as a reserve.
..
that guerrillas should
short attack is
-
on
FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS

places
night.
lated
force.
ger.
unit
vidual
'rial
toons.
investigated. At night, however, only the road
:itself is patrolled.
In order to get a better field of fire and to
deprive the guerrillas of concealment, the
Germans often burn hamlets located near
railroads.
For fighting the guerrillas in a given area,
the Germans employ special troops which are
garrisoned in populated localities. In most
localities the garrisons are either companies
or larger units.
To learn the disposition of guerrillas, the
Germans usually use spies. Sometimes, the
latter are German soldiers dressed in civilian
clcthes. Then the Germans designate certain
for ambushes and occupy them at
In the morning, .the main forces of
,punitive troops march up to the line of am
bushes. On their way up, they examine popu
points, individual back yards, and
houses.
Undertaking punitive expeditions, the Ger
mans, as a rule, do not resort to troop recon
naissance and never to reconnaissance in
In their opinion, reconnaissance will
only warn the guerrillas of impending dan
while on a punitive march,
the Germans send out only advance guards.
The Germans always try to surround guer
rilla units and to attack them, preferably late
at night or at dawn. If, for some reason, a
is stationed in a populated point, the
Germans will suddenly open fire either with
incendiary or signal ammunition, attempting
to set fire to straw roofs. As a rule, this is
followed by mortar fire. Then comes the con
centric attack of German storm detachments.
Some troops are always left in reserve. Indi
enemy detachments maintain cpm
. munication with each other by means of sig
rockets and telephone. Sometimes the
Germans use motorized and cavalry units for
attacks on populated places; In such cases,
the motorized unit breaks through the popu
lated place, while the cavalry units surround
it. The cavalrymen usually make a check of ,
all inhabitants.
Units most commonly used by the Germans
in fighting guerrillas are companies and pla
They are armed with heavy machine
guns and grenade rifles. Fpr
they use bicycles, motorcycles, and truCKS.
When guerrillas are found on islands
difficult approaches, the Germans use grlElnlldEV'j
rifles' on a large scale. Small
take dogs with them.
Operating against 'our guerrillas the
mans recognize only one kind of Dattle--tJ'le"W
offensive battle. Defensive battles are
sidered extremely undesirable. If their
fails, they prefer to quit fighting and ,
draw. This means
ways energetically force their initiative
the enemy. If, however, a
at once successful, they should quickly'
engage from the enemy and withdraw, if
sible.
The Germans also undertake large
ditions to clear whole districts of
groups. For such operations the
assign at least a battalion to operate
a zone of up to twenty kilometers
side of a railroad. Such a unit covers ablclUi;"c:il!
not
are sellrchej
get information concerning the
at rest or
mobile detachments return to the villages
ready examined in order to get the reaction
the guerrillas and of the local population
the
impossible. The
Opera
guerrilla units, the Germans
aviation. Their planes fly over villages at
speed and altitude. They examine them
on roads,
Guerrillas should thoroughly conceal
fifteen kilometers a day. To avoid warni
guerrillas, reconnaissance is
All along the way populated places
amined and individual houses
When time is available, the Fascists
two or three-day halt in every large
it by, cruelty, intimidation, or bribery;
the main enemy forces are
the measures taken by. Fascists.
Even when the Germans send out
expeditions, they consider
large forested areas
would be very large.
forests are dangerous. The Fascists are
of large forest tracts.
To find
oughly, paying attention to traffic
fires, smokes, etc.
movements, making use of
,
MILITARY REVIEW
vegetation, and darkness. Open and
i :SJtnoKiIllg bonfires should not be allowed. Spe
<!ial dugouts should be prepared for this pur
,pose. To mislead the Germans, open bonfires'
be started some distance away from
the location of the unit. '
Every guerrilla should know the rules of
camouflage against aviation and be skilful in
fighting and hitting Fascist aircraft with
rifle and machine-gun fire.
The Use of Tanks as Heavy Cavalry in Italy
An article by M. J. Massey in The Sphere (Great Britain) 29 January 1944.
WHEN IT comes to dislodging an enemy
hilly country, such as frames prac
the whole of our present line in Italy,
c,'a'nlI1frlhf'!r of conventional solutions have to be
It is usually not possible to group
weight of artillery necessary to bring a
knock-out barrage on the target, and
eriemy normally has plenty of "dead
\g,rUUHU" in which he can shelter his troops
the moment when he has to produce
to meet attacking infantry.
really mountainous country the ground
i.oonf4ers no favors on either side, and the old
that defense is the stronger part of
is never truer. In pre-mechanized days,
advance on Rome would have been looked
essentially as a job for cavalry, with good
try backing them up. It is interesting
note that for one of the few times on record
this war, the tanks on both sides are now
near bottlenecks in the line of our advance.
If they can catch an advance party of our
infantry working its way forward without
much in the way of support, they will swoop
down and exploit the situation. As soon as
the element of surprise is lost they will be
off to' try their luck elsewhere. Some of
our forward field engineering companies
seem to have been particularly harassed by
these roving panzer groups, probably com
posed of the faster medium-armor types.
Parties of our troops endeavoring to pre
pare bridgeheads for oui" forces have been
singled out for attack, frequently before
they have had time to establish their posi
tion securely. There is little doubt that the .
Germans make a practice, when their infan
try are forced to leave a position, of
a fair force of tanks to investigate the
chances of making at least a temporary
playing the scouting, thrustitlg, and
f"Jl1a:ralssing roles they were originally intended
in their role of mechanized cavalry.
We have seen them used as mobile artil
as stationary strongpoints, and as a
of armored infantry going in under the
of heavy artillery barrages, but not
indulging in neat, quick, cut-or-thrust
such as those it was, always held
fight. But at last, in the actions
Ortona, Tommasso, and most re
at Cassino, the fighting has tempo
taken on a cavalry character. The ene
has very sensibly chosen to use his tanks,
in stolid frontal attacks which give op
artillery ample time to do their worst,
in enterprising sorties calculated to in
the greatest inconvenience on us at the
, cost to them. Thus, German tanks lurk
counterattack before we have settled in.
country where the advance is continuously
under the protection of heavy artillery suchg
tactics would not pay, but in the labyrinthine
folds of the Apennines it has been quite prof
itable. Two other factors have also helped
the Nazis here, our "tank-buster" air squad
rons have frequently been grounded on their
temporary waterlogged airfields, and our'
forward troops have often been operating on
the far side of swollen rivers and dama;ged
bridges over which it has been difficult to
bring our own armor.
The Allied tanks; on the other hand, have
found their principal occupation in the heavy
street-fighting which has been such a feature
of the whole front. The cracking of strong- '
points in house cellars, or pillboxes concealed
>'1
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