Adaner Usmani TF: Kranti Saran 01/23/06 Philosophy 133: Paper #3

On the Politics of Marx and Freud1

Marx advocates human emancipation instead of political emancipation, and he does so based on a certain view of human nature. What is political emancipation and how does it differ from human emancipation? On what grounds does Marx criticize political emancipation, and how is this criticism informed by Marxs view on human nature? Consider now Freuds views as expressed in Civilization and Its Discontents. Explore whether Freuds view can be used to argue that political emancipation is the best one might hope for. How precisely could Freud argue for that view? Do you find Marxs or Freuds view more persuasive? Give reasons for your assessment, and be sure to raise and respond to an objection to your assessment. To the extent that you ascribe views to Marx or Freud, make sure to quote relevant passages in the text.

Broadly speaking, works of political philosophy typically endorse - explicitly or implicitly - particular theories of human nature. It follows that the validity of these latter positions bears upon the applicability of the corresponding political theories. Using this kind of motivation and understanding as a loose guide, we compare the works of Marx and Freud in order to pinpoint how, why, and where their political visions diverge. We argue that Marx's optimistic endorsement of human emancipation over political emancipation rests on a pervasive commitment to a sense of man as a communal being. Freud, however, rejects such an approach. For him, we argue, we require political emancipation on account of our inherently destructive tendencies. Setting these two theories in opposition, then, invites us to defend one over the other. This move takes us toward a qualified version of Marx's account. While Freud's argument enlists an arguably more scrutinized theory of instincts, it is unsatisfactory due to its failure to credit the strength of the political structure that Marx envisions. Indeed, I suggest that the success of Marx's political vision lies in its ability to incorporate crucial aspects of Freud's theory of instincts. Let us briefly sketch the structure of our argument. We begin by reconstructing Marx's argument for the insufficiency of political emancipation and the necessity of human emancipation to take its place. We then consider the extent to which this argument rests on a view of human nature. Turning to Freud, we detail how Civilization and Its Discontents argues that in contrast we must reconcile ourselves to a form of political emancipation. After considering how Freud's claim rests on a fundamentally different theory of human nature, we evaluate the grounds on which Marx's argument still remains more persuasive. In order to fully understand Marx's endorsement of human emancipation, it is most productive to consider why Marx believes that its counterpart political emancipation is wholly insufficient.2 To do so, let us first define the process of political emancipation as the
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We present the argument in this manner largely due to the fact that Marx never really provides a comprehensive account of what human emancipation ought to look like (i.e., what communism would look like). Nonetheless,

elimination of questions of religious preference, of ownership of property, of degree of education, etc. from politics (universal suffrage), and the granting of particular rights and liberties (i.e., the rights to property, security, freedom of belief, etc.) to each man and woman in society. In Marx's view, this kind of reform fails to emancipate us in the manner it claims. While the liberation of the political realm represents great progress (54, Selected Writings) from the feudal favoritism of an earlier age, he argues that the concept underlying private rights and liberties is antithetical to the lives we ought to be living. This dichotomy between the political and the personal is emblematic of the incompleteness of political emancipation: while man acts as a communal being in the political realm, Marx believes that he is withdrawn and selfish in his private life.3 Let us reconstruct his reasoning for why our lives in civil society are marked by this selfishness. We illustrate this point by means of Marx's description of the atmosphere that a particular right liberty promotes. Liberty, as Marx presents it, is the right to do and perform what does not harm others (60, SW). He argues that this conception of freedom is emphatically negative: rather than liberating us, the law limits us by bounding the realm of what is permitted. Consequently, each individual withdraws into her own sphere of protection. She no longer seeks freedom through interaction with others, but by separating herself from society. [This] right of man to freedom is not based on the union of man with man, but on the separation of man from man. It is the right to this separation, the rights of the limited individual who is limited to himself (60, SW). In response to Marx, however, one may counter that societies which ensure these kinds of rights do not necessarily prohibit the so-called union of man with man. For
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there remains much that we can infer from his criticism of political emancipation. What makes the members of the political state religious is the dualism between their individual life and their species-life, between life in civil society and political life (57, SW). Note that by 'religious', Marx refers to the analogous dualism between the heavenly and earthly that he believes religion creates. For our purposes, however, it is only relevant to note that Marx supports our assertion that the political state separates us in the manner we suggested above, where civil-society promotes 'individual', selfish life and political life promotes communal, 'species-life'.

example, although the law prohibits my taking a machete to my partner's head (thankfully), I am still allowed to find happiness and a type of freedom in my interaction with him or her. Contrary to what Marx alleges, I can realize myself through others. To contend that I withdraw into myself and define myself through the separation of man from man seems wholly incorrect. I argue, however, that this objection misses Marx's point. The crux of his critique is not that certain, 'free' courses of action that ought to be permitted are not allowed (although this may be the case under certain conditions), but rather that the spirit in which these rights are proposed and adopted stifles the possibilities for community and communal man. It is not the fact that I am no longer allowed to invade my friend's property that ought to trouble me, but rather the fact that the laws assume that I will be predisposed to do so. They presuppose my selfishness. The right of private property, for example, encodes our right to [this] selfishness (60, SW) in the structure of civil society. Furthermore, both equality (which, because it treats each individual as a selfsufficient monad, presupposes each individual's self-sufficiency) and security (the assurance of egoism) rest on the same premise (61, SW). This spirit of selfishness pervades civil society.4 And for Marx, who believes that this egoism fosters an utterly contemptible (yet avoidable) environment, it follows that political emancipation is insufficient. Let us make Marx's commitment to this last point clear. Marx believes that the spirit of selfishness that characterizes civil society is inimical to his vision of fully emancipated man man as a species-being.5 As detailed earlier, the process of political emancipation only succeeds in creating this social man in the political sphere. Moreover, Marx argues that the political state debases the communal aspect of man's life by making it the servant of his egoistical life: ...we

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...Egoistic man...is the basis, the presupposition of the political state (63, SW) This view pervades his writings, perhaps most explicitly in the Manuscripts. Alienated labour...makes the species-being of man, both nature and the intellectual faculties of his species, into a being that is alien to him, into a means for his individual existence. It alienates from man his own body, nature exterior to him, and his intellectual being, his human essence (91, SW, my emphasis).

see that citizenship, the political community, is degraded by the political emancipators to a mere means for the preservation of these so called rights of man, that the citizen is declared to be the servant of egoistic man, the sphere in which man behaves as a communal being is degraded below the sphere in which man behaves as a partial being (61, SW). So, one votes as a communal being with a communal attitude, but in a referendum on Church hours or property rights, for example. Thus, in a politically emancipated society, egoistic man reigns over essential man. Man's selfishness, as a product of the kind of environment that political emancipation engenders, triumphs over man in his ideal state. Fortunately for Marx, the solution human emancipation presents itself: we must emancipate this communal man from his fetters. The actual individual man must take the abstract citizen back into himself and, as an individual man in his empirical life, in his individual work and individual relationships become a species-being (64, SW, my emphasis)6 In short, human flourishing can only be achieved in community. Before turning to Freud's response to Marx's argument, let us elucidate our claim that Marx's argument is informed by a theory of human nature. As we intimated in the introduction, a view of human nature informs political discourse in that a political vision must consider what roles it can realistically ask humans to play. It should be clear that , in basing human emancipation on a turn towards the community, Marx makes a normative judgment about the possibility of living as a social being. Insofar as he believes that the communal individual provided the right living arrangements can ascend and thrive, he commits to a view of human nature. Freud, whose theory of human nature runs contrary to what Marx endorses, cannot accommodate this prescription for society's woes; the social being is an impossible fantasy given

It seems like Marx's account of human emancipation, as provided in the quotation, could be carried out on an individual basis. And, to some extent, this seems to be the case. Within a politically emancipated society, it seems like an individual could fully emancipate herself by taking Marx's guidelines to heart. However, regardless whether one agrees with this point, it is clear that for human emancipation to occur on a society-wide basis, Marx would contend that we would need a structural affirmation of these guidelines.

his theory of instincts. In order to develop our argument further, then, let us turn to the details of Freud's response to Marx. Let me preface my reconstruction of Freud's argument by mentioning that I will attempt to express his political vision in the terms that this paper has already developed. Though Freud never explicitly uses the terms political or human emancipation, fitting his theory to these words allows us to compare him directly to Marx. That being said, let us begin by building on the claim presented in the preceding paragraph: Freud proposes a theory of human instincts that drastically differs from what Marx endorses. As Freud writes, ...men are not gentle creatures who want to be loved, and who at the most can defend themselves if they are attacked; they are, on the contrary, creatures among whose instinctual endowments is to be reckoned a powerful share of aggressiveness (68, Civilization and Its Discontents). It follows, then, that in order for humans to live together in a sufficiently stable environment7, society has to be constructed to contain this instinctual aggressiveness. In this vein, Freud argues that civilization must offer each person a minimal degree of protection from everyone else.8 We begin to see how what Freud calls for goes hand in hand with the process of political emancipation. Because we require this protection, laws and rights are unavoidable: The first requisite of civilization, therefore is that of justice that is, the assurance that a law once made will not be broken in favor of an individual...The final outcome should be a rule of law to which all...have contributed by a sacrifice of their instincts, and which leaves no one at the mercy of brute force (49, CD, my emphasis). Before turning to a direct assessment of the respective political visions, we make some additional comments on Freud's theory that become highly relevant to our comparison.
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Freud does stress that living together in this fashion is undeniably painful for the individual. Nonetheless, it provides us necessary stability and security: Primitive man was better off in knowing no restrictions of instinct. To counterbalance this, his prospects of enjoying this happiness for any length of time were very slender. Civilized man has exchanged a portion of his possibilities of happiness for a portion of security (73, CD). Civilization has to use its utmost efforts in order to set limits to man's aggressive instincts and to hold the manifestations of them in check by psychical reaction-formations (70, CD).

To this end, let us note that Freud does partially sympathize with Marx's political philosophy. At the very least, he harbors no illusions about the kind of environment that follows from the institutions of rights and laws. Indeed, he even contends that a real change in the relations of human beings to possessions would be of more help (109, CD). Nonetheless, given his theory of instincts, this is as far as he can go. Precisely because he is committed to an antagonistic view of human nature, Freud cannot as Marx does explain society's problems exclusively in terms of a failure to transform our living arrangements.9 Rather, in Freud's political vision, the aggressive instinct is constantly at work in the background, however society has been organized.10 The consequences are understandably pessimistic. Unlike Marx, no kind of societal overhaul (i.e. revolution) can parade as the solution. We cannot strive to dismiss selfishness and greed by ridding ourselves of private property, for example, because aggressiveness was not created by property (71, CD). Having made the grounds for their disagreement clear, let us assess why Marx's political vision remains more persuasive. Let me preface my endorsement of Marx with a qualification. I argue that we must temper his theory of human nature. Roughly speaking, Freud's theory has been deemed more correct, as it is generally accepted that humans are predisposed to aggressive behavior. At the very least, it seems quite clear that Marx's optimism was partly misplaced; one must doubt his claim that human emancipation permanently releases a latent communal instinct within us. Rather, some aggressiveness seems to persist independent of our living arrangements. Crucially, however, it
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...We cannot see why the regulations made by ourselves should not, on the contrary, be a protection and a benefit for everyone of us. And yet, when we consider how unsuccessful we have been in precisely this field of prevention of suffering, a suspicion dawns on us that here, too, a piece of unconquerable nature may lie behind this time a piece of our own psychical constitution (38, CD), As Freud argues: The communists believe that they have found the path to deliverance from our evils. According to them, man is wholly good and is well-disposed to his neighbour; but the institution of private property has corrupted his nature...I have no concern with any economic criticisms of the communist system...But I am able to recognize that the psychological premisses on which the system is based are an untenable illusion....We cannot, it is true, easily forsee what new paths the development of civilization could take; but one thing we can expect, and that is that this indestructible feature of human nature [i.e. the aggressive instinct] will follow it there (71, CD, my emphasis, my addition).

need not follow from this criticism that communal behavior becomes impossible; I argue that we must retain Marx's normative espousal of the communal being and pursue a society that structurally affirms this aspect of who we can be.11 I contend that we can accommodate a degree of guaranteed instinctual aggressivenesses within Marx's prescription for political restructuring. In order to motivate this move, let us first note that Freud proposes the terms when he claims that humankind must reconcile itself to civilization (cf. footnote 6). Once we come to terms with this mandate, however, I argue that Marx offers us more. Freud, who (as noted earlier) nebulously proposes that a real change in the relations of human beings to possessions would be of more help (109, CD), never offers us anything more than a diagnosis. While one may attribute this fact to his general pessimism, his account loses much of its persuasive power as a result. He does not meaningfully address the fact that, in addition to the intermittent, destructive outbursts of certain aggressive individuals, a politically-emancipated society is plagued by the problems that Marx painstakingly details and attempts to remedy: exploitation, alienation, relative immiseration, etc.12 This point, I argue, takes us toward Marx and his analysis.13 In response to our tentative endorsement of Marx, one may counter that only Freud's rights-oriented society would offer the protection individuals in society require. In this view, the rights and liberties insured by that structure would guarantee a basic level of security, whereas Marx's society would permit the aggressive instinct to run rampant. However, I contend that this claim is unsound. Marxist principles such as the abolition of private property, collective
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At this point, one may contend that a contradiction seems to emerge in our argument: If we loosely accept that politics cannot require people to violate their internal constitution, it follows that we cannot endorse Marx's society - which seeks the ascension of the communal being - while retaining Freud's theory of instincts, which prohibits it. Thus, let us emphasize that, rather than adopting Freud's view of human nature, we are attempting to make Marx's more realistic by liberally incorporating Freud's postulated aggressiveness. We do not claim that Freud's entire theory of instincts can be reconciled to Marx's society. Indeed, that conflict is the source of the fundamental disagreement between Marx and Freud, which we detailed in the earlier section of this paper. One may argue, of course, that Marx incorrectly diagnoses these problems. Yet such a claim lies beyond the scope of this paper. The assumption we make here cannot be contested within the bounds of our argument, but will have to be granted by the reader. The points presented in this paragraph do not purport to be rigorous argument, but merely my motivating claims.

ownership of the means of production, etc. do not necessarily create a protection-less society. As crude examples, one could envision a police force, or citizen's juries. In this vein, I hold that the formal abolition of the rights that ground civil society the argument for which we detailed in the first section of this paper need not lead to their effective disappearance (with the exception of the right to hold private property, for obvious reasons). Rather, the concept of negative liberty (as in the right not to be harmed) ought to be allied to and enhanced by a positive notion of liberty that retains this element of security while extending the things to which an individual is entitled (food, clothing, shelter, health, education, etc.).14 On these grounds I contend that in fact - the kind of protection that Marx's society provides far surpasses what the political state can offer us. Where initially we were merely defended from each other, now Marx offers each member of the collectivity protection from hunger, disease, homelessness, unemployment, etc. Nonetheless, in order to develop our qualified endorsement of Marx, let us present and respond to what I take to be the strongest rebuttal of these points. A Freudian would object to our argument by countering that Marx's society would still collapse, on account of its failure to instinctually satisfy its individual members. Presumably, a successful society guarantees social cohesion because its perpetuation is in the interests of its citizens. Thus, the objector would highlight the fact that, in tempering Marx's theory of human nature, we discarded his notion that human emancipation frees a previously-suppressed communal being within us all.15 For Marx, the satisfaction of this communal instinct through communism ushers in an era of permanent cohesion: it is the solution to the riddle of history (97, SW). Once we have abandoned this optimism, the objector would contend that we cannot

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The spirit of selfishness that these rights ensured when established as part of political emancipation, vanishes in a fully emancipated society precisely because they are oriented to the community. Indeed, although we noted that we still endorse Marx's notion that this communal being is a real possibility, we did not support Marx's assertion that the structural confirmation of this social being satisfies us on a basic, instinctual level.

counter the argument that communist society becomes an extremely painful experience for each of us. Society makes demands on us that run completely contrary to our instinctual predispositions. While, in place of a communal instinct, it may seem reasonable to appeal to rational interest or a moral sense, Freud rejects both these possibilities for different reasons. Against the first he argues that the interest of work in common would not hold it together, instinctual passions are stronger than reasonable interests (69, CD). This point I concede: it seems correct that we must appeal to something more basic than rationality in order to ground social cohesion. In the case of the second possibility morality as the source of social cohesion in a communist society Freud does argue that it, to some extent, can harness aggressiveness. It has the benefit of supplanting instinct in a way that rational self-interest cannot. However, because the imposition of morality (of guilt) is an inherently painful process16, we must never rely on it too heavily. It [the cultural super-ego] does not [in its ethical demands] trouble itself enough about the facts of the mental constitution of human beings...This is a mistake...If more is demanded of a man, a revolt will be produced in him or a neurosis, or he will be made unhappy... (109, CD)17. In Freud's view, the severity of the demands a society imposes upon each of its members becomes immensely relevant to an evaluation of that society. And since Marx's political vision advocates for the most vigilant and repressive kind of cultural super-ego, the objector concludes that we must reject it. While the counter-argument correctly questions the source of social cohesion in Marx's communist society, I contend that it ultimately fails. Primarily, the weakness of the objection lies in the fact that it seems to overstate the unhappiness that follows from suppression of the aggressive instinct. At the very least, the claim that protection against the aggressive instinct can
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The price we pay for our advance in civilization is a loss of happiness through the heightening of the sense of guilt (97, CD). It continues: What a potent obstacle to civilization aggressiveness must be, if the defence against it can cause as much unhappiness as aggressiveness itself! (109, CD).

cause as much unhappiness as it prevents (cf. footnote 13), seems unreasonable.18 In the fact that Marx's society limits the collectivity's suffering far beyond what the political state purports to offer its citizens, the seeds of social cohesion under the process of human emancipation do emerge. As emphasized earlier, once we have come to terms with the necessity of living in community, our task is to make sure that the expected periodic outbursts of aggression do not interfere with a structural set-up that reaffirms our commitment to the ideals espoused by Marx's political philosophy. While we incorporate an element of Freud's theory of instincts in the process (namely, that some background aggression persists), we have admittedly discarded much of the groundwork for his theory. Yet if the reader grants our premises, we have rejected Freud's claim that communism's unwarranted suppression of the aggressive instinct creates unparalleled unhappiness and thereby dissolves. Rather, on account of communism's superior prescription for human suffering, we endorse Marx and reject Freud's repudiation of him. In conclusion, this paper sought to critically juxtapose the political visions of Marx and Freud. We began by considering Marx's claim that mere political emancipation is insufficient, as at its heart, it promotes a selfish attitude in each of its subjects. Crucially, we argued that his position was informed by his view of how humans should and could live if uncorrupted by their societal structure. In comparing this to Freud's much more pessimistic account, we saw how Freud's belief in humankind's instinctual aggressiveness (contrary to the communal instinct that Marx believed in) led him to call for a kind of political emancipation. From his perspective, we argued that the human emancipation that Marx endorsed appeared naively optimistic. After reconstructing these two conflicting arguments, however, we concluded that Marx's account remained much more persuasive., as it resolves much of the suffering that plagues us.
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It is impractical to expect us in responding to Freud to offer our own vision of the development and imposition of this cultural super-ego. One cannot 'disprove' his theory. Nonetheless, we can evaluate it within the context of our own experience, observation, and logic. This kind of analysis, though admittedly less rigorous, is the source of the argument made above.