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Revilla v CA (G.R. No.

95329)
Facts: Don Cayetano Revilla, a bachelor, owned 2 pieces of land with buildings in Manila and 6 parcels of land in his hometown in Bulacan. These properties are worth P30M. In 1978, he executed a 13-page last will and testament, bequeathing all his properties to his 9 nephews and nieces including petitioner, Heracio Revilla. To each, he gave 1/10 of his estate reserving the last tenth for masses to be said after his death and for the care of religious images he kept in a chapel in Bulacan. During his lifetime, Don Cayetano sought the probate of his will to which the CFI Manila admitted. However, the City Hall of Manila was burned by fire where the records were also burned. A petition for reconstitution of the records was filed and it was granted. After Don Cayetano died, Heracio Revilla filed another petition of a will wherein he instituted Heracio as sole heir of his uncles estate and executor of the will allegedly executed in 1982. The probate was opposed by Heracios 8 brothers and sisters on the grounds that: Since 1978 up to Cayetanos death, he never informed that he revoked the will executed in 1978 The 1982 will was not executed in accordance with law and the signature of Cayetano was different from his usual and customary signature Cayetano was of unsound mind when he executed the will That the alleged will was executed with undue pressure and influence That the 1978 will is void for the reason that it was executed under duress or the influence of fear or threats Cayetano acted by mistake and the signatures in the alleged will were procured by fraud and he did not intend that the instrument be his will at the time of fixing his signature The trial court disallowed the second will. On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court. Issue: Whether or not the court erred in disallowing the second will. Held: When Don Cayetano testified in the reconstitution proceedings, he was unaware of the second will which he supposedly made. He identified his first will and declared that it was his true and only will. He could not have executed a second will because he was sick in the hospital during that time (he stayed there for 2 months) and he could not sign any papers while he was confined in the hospital. During the reconstitution proceedings, the will was produced. It was placed in a browned envelope stating Buksan ito pagkalibing ko to which Cayetano agreed to open. He recognized the original will and acknowledged that he signed it. In the court records, Cayetano declared that he did not execute another last will and testament after the original will had been probated. Significantly, although the petitioner opposed the reconstitution of Don Cayetano's first will, he did not reveal the second will which Don Cayetano supposedly made only 2months before he testified in the reconstitution proceeding. If the second will already existed on November 27, 1982, it would have been Heracio's strongest argument against the reconstitution of the probate of the first will. Since the execution of the second will could not have occurred on the alleged date (September 13, 1982) appearing therein (for Don Cayetano was admittedly sick in the hospital then) it must have been procured at the time when the testator was a virtual prisoner, held incommunicado, in his house. Judge Eduardo Bengson had to issue an order commanding the petitioner to allow his 8 brothers and sisters to visit Don Cayetano. Only then were they able to penetrate the iron curtain that Heracio had placed around their uncle. A videotape, taken during their visit and shown in court, belied Heracio's allegation that Don Cayetano was displeased with his said nephews and nieces, that was why he left them out of his second will. Despite Judge Bengzon's order, Heracio did not cease his efforts to monopolize Don Cayetano and his estate. To isolate Don Cayetano and make him inacessible to the private respondents, Heracio transferred him from his own house in Manila to Heracio's house in Quezon City. The execution of the second will in an environment of secrecy and seclusion and the disinheritance of his 8 other nephews and nieces, justified the trial court's and the Court of Appeals' belief that undue influence

was exercised by Horacio over Don Cayetano to make him sign the second will (which Don Cayetano did not know to be such) in order to deprive his brothers and sisters of their rightful share in their uncle's estate. There was fraud because Don Cayetano was not apprised that the document he was signing with Co, Barredo and Lim ( as witnesses) was a second will revoking the dispositions of property that he made in his first will. Had he been aware that it was a second will, and if it were prepared at his own behest, he would not have denied that he made it. He would probably have caused it to be probated while he was still alive, as he did with his first will. But apparently, the instrument was foisted on him without his being aware of its true nature which the petitioner assiduously concealed, not only from the court and the private respondents, but from Don Cayetano himself. That the dispositions in the second will were not made by Don Cayetano is proven by the omission of Don Cayetano's reservation of one-tenth of his properties and the income thereof to pay for holy masses and to be spent for the maintenance of his family chapel. That provision in his first will, for his personal benefit, would not have been deleted by Don Cayetano if his only purpose in making a second will was to disinherit his nephews and nieces. But Heracio overdid himself. He wanted everything. *Assuming for the sake of arguments that the second will was executed, the testimonies of the notary public, as well as those of the three (3) instrumental witnesses were not given credit because of major contradictions in testimonies.

Nuguid vs Nuguid, No. L-23445, June 23, 1966; 17 SCRA 449, digested
(Special Proceedings Difference between Preterition and Disinheritance) Facts: Rosario died without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate parents Felix and Paz, and 6 brothers and sisters. Remedios, one of the sister filed in court a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario instituting the former as the sole, universal heir of all her properties. She prayed that said will be admitted to probate and that letter of administration be issued to her. Felix and Paz opposed to the probate of the will on the ground that by the institution of Remedios as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors who are compulsory heirs in the direct ascending line were illegally preterited and that in consequence, the institution is void. Article 854 provides that preterition of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir. Petitioners contention is that the present is a case of ineffective disinheritance rather than one of preterition drawing the conclusion that Article 854 does not apply in the case at bar. Issue: WON the institution of one of the sister of the deceased as the sole, universal heir preterited the compulsory heirs. Held: Yes. Where the deceased left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate, but she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line her parents, and her holographic will does not explicitly disinherit them but simply omits their names altogether, the case is one of preterition of the parents, not a case of ineffective disinheritance. Preterition consists in the omission in the testators will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, through mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Disinheritance, in turn, is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law. Where the one sentence will institutes the petitioner as the sole, universal heir and preterits the parents of the testatrix, and it contains no specific legacies or bequests, such universal institution of petitioner, by itself, is void. And intestate succession ensues

Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals


Facts: 1. Martin Hugo died on 1974 and he left a will wherein he instituted Sofia Nepomuceno as the sole and only executor. It was also provided therein that he was married to Rufina Gomez with whom he had 3 children. 2. Petitioner (Sofia) filed for the probate of the will but the legal wife and her children opposed alleging that the will was procured through improper and undue influence and that there was an admission of concubinage with the petitioner. 3. The lower court denied the probate on the ground of the testator's admission of cohabitation, hence making the will invalid on its face. The Court of Appeals reversed and held that the will is valid except the devise in favor of the petitioner which is null and void in violation of Art. 739 and 1028. Issue: Whether or not the court can pass on the intrinsic validity of a will RULING: Yes, as an exception. But the general rule is that the court's area of inquiry is limited to the an examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the will. This general rule is however not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and may pass upon certain provisions of the will. The will itself admitted on its face the relationship between the testator and the petitioner. The will was validly executed in accordance with law but the court didn't find it to serve a practical purpose to remand the nullified provision in a separate action for that purpose only since in the probate of a will, the court does not ordinarily look into the intrinsic validity of its provisions. The devisee is invalid by virtue of Art. 739 which voids a donation made between persons guilty of adultery/concubinage at the time of the donations. Under Art, 1028 it is also prohibited

Icasiano vs. Icasiano G.R. No. L-18979 June 30, 1964


Facts: 1. Celso Icasiano, filed a petition for the probate of the will of Josefa Villacorte and for his appointment as executor thereof. It appears from the evidence that the testatrix died on September 12, 1958. She executed a will in Tagalog, and through the help of her lawyer, it was prepared in duplicates, an original and a carbon copy. 2. On the day that it was subscribed and attested, the lawyer only brought the original copy of the will while the carbon duplicate (unsigned) was left in Bulacan. One of the witnesses failed to sign one of the pages in the original copy but admitted he may have lifted 2 pages simultaneously instead when he signed the will. Nevertheless, he affirmed that the will was signed by the testator and other witnesses in his presence. Issue: Whether or not the failure of one of the subscribing witnesses to affix his signature to a page is sufficient to deny probate of the will RULING: No, the failure to sign was entirely through pure oversight or mere inadvertence. Since the duplicated bore the required signatures, this proves that the omission was not intentional. Even if the original is in existence, a duplicate may still be admitted to probate since the original is deemed to be defective, then in law, there is no other will bu the duly signed carbon duplicate and the same can be probated. The law should not be strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on account of the inadvertence of a single witness over whose conduct she has no control of. Where the purpose of the law is to guarantee the identity of the testament and its component pages, and there is no intentional or deliberate deviation existed. Note that this ruling should not be taken as a departure from the rules that the will should be signed by the witnesses on every page. The carbon copy duplicate was regular in all respects.