***1AC***

Contention 1: The Southwest Border Non-state actors are attempting to exploit weaknesses at the border to conduct operations in the US McCaul 12 (MICHAEL T. McCAUL CHAIRMAN UNITED STATES HOUSE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, INVESTIGATIONS, AND MANAGEMENT http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/11-15-12-Line-inthe-Sand.pdf November 2012 A LINE IN THE SAND: COUNTERING CRIME, VIOLENCE AND TERROR AT THE SOUTHWEST BORDER) Terrorism remains a serious threat to the security of the United States. The Congressional Research Service reports that between September 2001 and September 2012, there have been 59 homegrown violent jihadist plots within the United States. Of growing concern and potentially a more violent threat to American citizens is the enhanced ability of Middle East terrorist organizations, aided by their relationships and growing presence in the Western Hemisphere, to exploit the Southwest border to enter the United States undetected. This second edition emphasizes Americas ever-present threat from Middle East terrorist networks, their increasing presence in Latin America, and the growing relationship with Mexican DTOs to exploit paths into the United States. In May of 2012, the Los Angeles Times reported that intelligence gleaned from the 2011 raid on Osama bin Ladens compound indicated the worlds most wanted terrorist sought to use operatives with valid Mexican passports who could illegally cross into the United States to conduct terror operations.3 The story elaborated that bin Laden recognized the importance of al Qaeda operatives blending in with American society but felt that those with U.S. citizenship who then attacked the United States would be violating Islamic law. Of equal concern is the possibility to smuggle materials, including uranium, which can be safely assembled on U.S. soil into a weapon of mass destruction. Further, the standoff with Iran over its nuclear program, and the uncertainty of whether Israel might attack Iran drawing the United States into a confrontation, only heightens concern that Iran or its agents would attempt to exploit the porous Southwest border for retaliation. Weaknesses at the US-Mexican border are a unique threat Gray 12 (Dawn L. Bartell Norwich University Masters of Diplomacy David H. Gray Campbell University http://globalsecuritystudies.com/Bartell%20Hezbollah%20and%20Al%20Shabaab%20in%20 Mexico.pdf Fall 2012 Hezbollah and Al Shabaab in Mexico and the Terrorist Threat to the United States) The inability of Mexico to secure its sovereign territories and border areas has contributed to the ability of Hezbollah and Al Shabaab to develop a footprint within Mexico, reside in Mexico, and use Mexico as a safe haven and as a transit area to smuggle weapons and terrorist operatives into the United States. The ability of Hezbollah and Al Shabaab to reside and operate within Mexico and to successfully smuggle weapons and terrorist operatives into the United States has created a growing terrorist threat to the United States by providing Hezbollah and Al Shabaab the ability to access and strike targets on American soil. Hezbollah and Al Shabaab pose a threat to the United States by residing in Mexico, therefore it is vital for the international community, the United States, and Mexico to work together in order to help create a strong Mexico. This would reduce or eliminate the ability of Hezbollah or Al Shabaab to use Mexico as a safe haven and as a platform to plan and conduct terrorist operations against Mexico, the United States, or any other state in the international community.

Attack is impending---neg evidence underestimates their capability Kanani 11 (Rahim Kanani, founder and editor-in-chief of World Affairs Commentary, Citing Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, former Director of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, U.S. Department of Energy, former Chief of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Department, Counter-terrorist Center, Central Intelligence Agency, recipient of the CIA Directors Award, graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, June 29th, New al-Qaeda Chief Zawahiri Has Strong Nuclear Intent, Forbes, http://blogs.forbes.com/rahimkanani/2011/06/29/new-al-qaeda-chief-zawahiri-has-strongnuclear-intent/) We should be especially worried about the threat of nuclear terrorism under Zawahiris leadership. In a recent report titled Islam and the Bomb: Religious Justification For and Against Nuclear Weapons, which I researched for and contributed to, lead author Rolf Mowatt Larssen, former director of intelligence and counterintelligence at the U.S. Department of Energy, argues that al-Qaedas WMD ambitions are stronger than ever. And that this intent no longer feels theoretical, but operational. I believe al-Qaeda is laying the groundwork for a large scale attack on the United States, possibly in the next year or two , continues Mowatt-Larssen in the opening of the report issued earlier this year by the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard Kennedy School. The attack may or may not involve the use of WMD, but there are signs that al-Qaeda is working on an event on a larger scale than the 9/11 attack. Most will readily dismiss such claims as implausible and unlikely, and we hope they are right, but after spending months with Mowatt-Larssen, who also served as the former head of the Central Intelligence Agencys WMD and terrorism efforts, scrutinizing and cross-referencing Zawahiris 268-page treatise published in 2008 titled Exoneration, the analytics steered us towards something far more remarkable than expected. As I read the text closely, in the broader context of al-Qaedas past, my concerns grew that Zawahiri has written this treatise to play a part in the ritualistic process of preparing for an impending attack, states Mowatt-Larssen. As Osama bin Ladens fatwa in 1998 foreshadowed the 9/11 attack, Ayman Zawahiris fatwa in 2008 may have started the clock ticking for al-Qaedas next large scale strike on America. If the pattern of al-Qaedas modus operandi holds true, we are in the middle of an attack cycle. Among several important findings, Zawahiri sophisticatedly weaves identical passages, sources and religious justifications for a nuclear terrorist attack against the United States previously penned by radical Saudi cleric Nasir al Fahd. Indeed, the language used, research cited, and arguments put forth are nothing short of detailed and deliberate. Reading as both a religious duty to kill millions of Americans and a lengthy suicide note together, this piece of literature is something we must take seriously with Zawahiri now at the helm of al-Qaeda. The time may have come for al-Qaedas new CEO to leave a legacy of his own. Concluding the authors note, Mowatt-Larssen states, Even if this theory proves to be wrong, it is better to overestimate the enemy than to under-estimate him. Conventional wisdom holds that al-Qaeda is spentthat they are incapable of carrying out another 9/11. Leaving aside whether this view is correct, for which I harbor grave doubts, we will surely miss the signs of the next attack if we continue to overestimate our own successes, and dismiss what terrorists remain capable of accomplishing when they put their minds to it. Insurgent attacks causes miscalc great power wars Ayson 10 (Robert Ayson, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via InformaWorld) Washingtons early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For

example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the countrys armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. Attack destroys the world economy and causes retaliation leading to global war Diamond 8(John Diamond fellow of the Saga Foundation,, , http://blogs.usatoday.com/oped/2008/10/a-financial-apo.html 10/9/08 A financial apocalypse isn't nearly as scary as a nuclear one,) The aftershocks As the Saga Foundation a non-profit organization focused on the threat of terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction argued in a recent white paper, the vast damage at and around a nuclear ground zero would be dwarfed in scope by the national and global economic aftershocks. These aftershocks would stem not only from the explosion itself but also from a predictable set of decisions a president would almost certainly have to make in grappling with the possibility of a follow-on attack. Assuming, as the experts believe likely, that such a weapon would have to be smuggled into the country, the president could be expected to close the nation's borders, halt all freight commerce and direct a search of virtually any moving conveyance that could transport a nuclear weapon. Most manufacturing would then cease. In a nation that lives on just-in-time inventory, these developments could empty the nation's shelves in days. The effects of post-attack decision-making go far beyond this example. If U.S. intelligence determined that one or more countries had somehow aided and abetted the attack, we would face the prospect of full-scale war. Even short of that, the nation would demand, and the president would almost certainly order, a level of retaliation at the suspected locus of the attacking group that would dwarf the post-9/11 military response. The possibility of follow-on attacks could transform our notions of civil liberties and freedom forever. And as former 9/11 Commission co-chairman Lee Hamilton has pointed out, a nuclear terrorist attack would prompt a collapse in public faith in the government's ability to protect the American people. Think your 401(k) hurts now? The presidential nominees, and the American people, should reconsider the tendency to view these two issues economic crisis and the threat of catastrophic terrorism as separate problems. A nuclear attack on a U.S. city would not only devastate the target and kill possibly hundreds of thousands, it would also create instantaneous national and global economic ripple effects with incalculable consequences. To put it in personal terms, if you think things are tough in the nation's financial sector now, imagine what your 401(k) or your paycheck might look like six months after a nuclear detonation in Lower Manhattan or downtown Washington. Saga's study merely began what must become a much larger-scale effort to understand in the fullest detail possible the consequences of an act of nuclear terrorism, not only the attack itself but also the decisions that would almost certainly follow. The idea is not to depress people but to motivate them. While some of the consequences are obvious, others are not, and it is the less understood aftershocks that could damage our world as well as transform it and not for the better. Efficient trade key to agriculture and food security CoC 12 (United States Chamber of Commerce, ENHANCING THE U.S.MEXICO

ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP <http://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/reports/1204EnhancingtheUSMexicoEconomicPartnership.pdf> 4-24-12) In both markets, consumers and producers alike benefit from access to the others agricultural output. According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture, U.S.-Mexico agricultural trade is largely complementary, meaning that the United States tends to export different commodities to Mexico than Mexico exports to the United States. Grains, oilseeds, meat, and related products make up about three-quarters of U.S. agricultural exports to Mexico, where domestic production is insufficient to meet demand. Meanwhile, roughly twothirds of U.S. agricultural imports from Mexico consist of beer, along with vegetables and fruit whose growing season largely complements that of the United States. As a result of this close relationship, each country plays an important role in the food security of the other. If that relationship can be made more efficient through regulatory cooperation, alignment of safety and testing practices, transparency, and science-based regulation, citizens of both countries will have more reliable access to safe food at better prices, quality, and reliability. Reduces the likelihood of GMO use Daily Yonder 8 [The Daily Yonder, The Daily Yonder's special reports also bring you overviews of the big issues now facing small communities -- health, employment, broadband access, education, and economic development. We're tracking how national policies are reaching (or ignoring) rural communities. The Daily Yonder has been published on the web since 2007 by the Center for Rural Strategies, a non-profit media organization based in Whitesburg, Kentucky, and Knoxville, Tennessee. The site was developed with the support of the Annie E. Casey Foundation, the Nathan Cummings Foundation, the W.K. Kellogg Foundation, and the Media Democracy Fund (a project of the Proteus Fund)., "Will Genetically Modified Crops End Food Crisis?," Daily Yonder, 4/25, http://www.dailyyonder.com/will-genetically-modified-crops-endfood-crisis] The worldwide food shortage and the rising cost of food are leading those who were reluctant to use or plant g enetically m odified crops to change their minds, according to a front page story in The New York Times. "Soaring food prices and global grain shortages are bringing pressures on governments, food companies and consumers to relax their longstanding resistance to genetically engineered crops," reports Times reporter Andrew Pollack. GMOs cause superweeds that wipe out plant species ag collapse Lean 2 [Geoffrey Lean. Environment Editor, Independent, The (London), GM crops bound to `escape', says EU, Mar 24, 2002, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4158/is_20020324/ai_n12597023] Genes will inevitably escape from genetically modified crops, contaminating organic farms, creating superweeds, and driving wild plants to extinction, an official EU study concludes. It adds that the three GM crops at present being trialled in Britain - maize, sugar beet and oilseed rape - pose the greatest risks of all the varieties it examined. The study, just published by the European Environment Agency, confirms environmentalists' worst fears and will make it very difficult for the Government to approve the commercial planting of GM crops in Britain. Ministers, who have consistently promised not to permit the crops if they are found to endanger the environment, will have to make a decision next year after the completion of three years of trials. But the trials are primarily designed to examine the use of pesticides on GM crops, not to look for escaping genes. The study concludes that "gene flow can occur over long distances", and that some varieties of GM crops interbreed with others

"at higher frequencies and at greater distances than previously thought". Pollen from the crops, it concluded, travelled far further than the official "isolation distances" laid down to separate them from ordinary crops, to prevent interbreeding, making a mockery of safety precautions. Cross-pollination by GM oilseed rape has been recorded about two and a half miles away from the crop, compared to an isolation distance of 600m. Research in Scotland has suggested that bees could carry the pollen at least six miles. The report concludes: "Under current farm practices, local contamination between crops is inevitable." Environmentalists will see it as a vindication of their view that organic and nonGM crops will not be able to coexist for long before being contaminated, denying shoppers a choice of food. The report warns that "over time even small amounts of gene flow can have important effects on evolutionary change". It expects superweeds, resistant to herbicides, to become "common" if GM crops are grown, and warns organic farmers will find it hard to sell their produce once it has been infiltrated by GM genes. And it adds that the interbreeding could lead to natural wild relatives of the crops becoming extinct. Loss of biodiversity leads to extinction Benson 95 [Robert, Loyola Prof of Law, GETTING BUSINESS OFF THE PUBLIC DOLE: August 1995 http://heed.home.igc.org/publications/dole.html] Whole ecosystems--wetlands, forests, mountains and deserts--that since ancient times have preserved a complex web of life of which humans are only one strand, are being lost forever. This is not about saving spotted owls because they are cute. We surely have an ethical duty to respect other forms of life, but this is also about saving our own skins. Moreover, it's about saving jobs by creating an economy that uses natural resources sustainably so that resources and jobs both last over the long-run rather than evaporate in one generation. "Loss of the world's biological diversity would be worse than "energy depletion, economic collapse, limited nuclear war or conquest by a totalitarian government," says Harvard's Pulitzer Prize winning scientist E. O. Wilson. "As terrible as those catastrophes would be for us, they could be repaid in a few generations. The one process ongoing . . . that will take millions of years to correct is the loss of genetic and species diversity by the destruction of natural habitats. This is the folly our descendants are least likely to forgive us. Plan solves; well isolate 10 internal links: a. Elimination of border congestion and increased efficiency at ports of entry Wilson and Lee 12 [Christopher E. Wilson1 and Erik Lee2, 7-xx-2012, Associate at the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars1, Associate Director at the North American Center for Transborder Studies (NACTS) at Arizona State University2, Whole Nations Waiting, http://www.siteselection.com/issues/2012/jul/us-mex-border.cfm] The integrated nature of the North American manufacturing sector makes eliminating border congestion an important way to enhance regional competitiveness. The global economic crisis forced manufacturers to look for ways to cut costs. After taking into consideration factors such as rising fuel costs, increasing wages in China and the ability to automate an ever greater portion of the production process, many American companies decided to nearshore factories to Mexico or reshore them to the United States, taking advantage of strong human capital and shorter supply chains. Bilateral trade dropped significantly during the recession but has since rebounded strongly, growing significantly faster than trade with China. But the growth of trade continues to add pressure on the already strained POEs and transportation corridors. Several studies have attempted to quantify the costs of border area congestion to the economies of the United States and Mexico. In what is perhaps a testimony to the

fragmented and geographically disperse nature of the border region, most of these studies have focused on particular North-South corridors of traffic and trade rather than taking a comprehensive, border-wide approach. The specific results of the studies (see table on p. 108) are quite varied. Nonetheless, one message comes through quite clearly long and unpredictable wait times at the POEs are costing the U nited S tates and Mexican economies many billions of dollars each year. Moderate investments to update infrastructure and to fully staff the ports of entry are certainly needed, as long lines and overworked staff promote neither efficiency nor security. But in a time of tight federal budgets, asking for more resources cannot be the only answer. Strategic efforts that do more with less , improving efficiency and reducing congestion, are also needed. Trusted traveler and shipper programs (i.e. the Global Entry programs, which includes programs such as SENTRI, FAST, C-TPAT) allow vetted, low-risk individuals and shipments expedited passage across the border. Common Voice Improving these programs and significantly expanding enrollment could increase throughput with minimal investments in infrastructure and staffing all while strengthening security by giving border officials more time to focus on unknown and potentially dangerous individuals and shipments. The development of the 21st Century Border initiative by the Obama and Caldern administrations has yielded some advances in this direction, but the efforts need to be redoubled. The 1990s were the decade of NAFTA and skyrocketing trade. The 2000s saw security concerns grow and recession struck. The new decade has only just begun, but the potential is there for a resurgence of competitiveness and regional integration. There are strong ideas including trusted traveler and shipper programs, preclearance, customs harmonization, and public-private partnerships that have enormous potential. The challenge is now for heterogeneous and geographically dispersed border communities to find a way to speak with a common voice, for policymakers in Washington and Mexico City to guide strategic planning for regional competitiveness, and for all stakeholders to engage vigorously in binational dialogue and cooperation. b. Time tradeoff Burnson 12 (Patrick Burnson, Executive Editor of Logistics Management http://www.logisticsmgmt.com/view/ace_enhances_security_speeds_up_the_flow_of_goods _into_u.s/airfreight 4/25/2012 ACE enhances security, speeds up the flow of goods into U.S.) ACE is the commercial trade processing system being phased in by CBP to facilitate legitimate trade and strengthen border security. ACE will completely replace the Automated Commercial System (ACS) in September and it will be the only CBP-approved EDI portal for transmitting required advance information for ocean and rail cargo to CBP. Streamlined trade and security filings under ACE will enable goods to pass more quickly through border crossings, give users better control and visibility of their assets, and allow CBP to spend less time on paperwork and more time on security initiatives. He noted that ACE was created to provide a higher visibility between participating government agencies as to what cargo was coming into the U.S. and from whom. This allows the different agencies to further collaborate with one another to make better, more efficient decisions about security, targeting cargo for exams etc. and for the release of containers to expedite the flow of cargo, added Heimbeck.[ Bryn Heimbeck, Trade Techs CEO.]

c. Prescreening Byrd 7 (Erlinda P. Byrd Department of Homeland Security http://www.domesticpreparedness.com/Updates/Government_Update/Automated_Commerci al_Environment_(ACE)_Mandate_Expanded_to_Ports_of_Entry_in_California,_Texas,_and _New_Mexico/ 1/23/2007 Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) Mandate Expanded to Ports of Entry in California, Texas, and New Mexico) ACE is the next generation of CBP technology designed to protect the United States from terrorism while ensuring the countrys economic vitality by expediting lawful trade. The electronic submission, called an e-manifest, is an electronically filed version of the paper manifest carriers are already required to submit before crossing the U.S. border. E-manifest allows CBP to begin processing the truck before it arrives at the port, said Louis Samenfink, executive director for CBPs Cargo Systems Program Office. With advance access to truck cargo information, CBP officers are able to prescreen trucks and shipments, and dedicate more time to inspecting suspicious cargo without delaying the border crossings of legitimate carriers. d. Data efficiency and elimination of corruption IDB 10 (Inter-American Development Bank, Risk Management for Cargo and Passengers: A Knowledge and Capacity Product, http://www.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/PE/2011/08876.pdf) Automated commercial cargo risk assessment capabilities provide administrations with new means to identify high-risk shipments earlier in the trade chain. New technologies that support this approach will also reduce corruption by eliminating opportunities for tampering that exist in paper processing environments. They ensure that modernizing administrations begin to focus their efforts on securitybased threats and assist in establishing a common and strategic risk management regime among security partners.87 Depending on the threat involved, pre-arrival data can be reviewed and scrutinized in advance of loading and before departure in order to identify high-risk shipments and potentially interdict threats at the appropriate stage of the supply chain. The more security and safety-oriented the threat, the more important it is to interdict the threat as early as possible in the supply chain. This prompts efforts to obtain data as early as possible within the supply chain timeline. While responses to interdict a security threat (e.g., bomb) must start as soon as possible (i.e., before loading/departure), other less physical threats (e.g., smuggled tobacco/evasion of duties and taxes) are normally interdicted after arrival, as a formal declaration is required which will prove actus rea (the act) and mens rea (intent). This point of finality is legally required by most regulatory agencies with a border or supply chain mandate outside of the security realm. e. Inter-agency coordination, scanning, and information access CBP 13 (Customs and Border Protection, Automated Commercial Environment (ACE)/ International Trade Data System (ITDS) <http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/trade/automated/modernization/whats_new/ace.ctt/a ce.pdf> 7-15-13) ACE is an enterprise-wide initiative that includes sweeping process and technology improvements across CBP. It touches nearly every CBP employee, as well as the trade community, PGAs, and the traveling public. The ACE Program also brings this enterprisewide approach to planning, defining, developing, and implementing new business processes, designed to increase national security through accurate, available data and promote seamless trade processing and collection of duties, taxes, and fees. It is dramatically streamlining CBP processing of imports with automated administrative and formerly paper-based functions. Significant screening, targeting, and border security capabilities have been implemented through the ACE Program. Leveraging the Automated

Targeting System, the Intranet-based enforcement and decision support tool that is the cornerstone for all of CBPs targeting efforts, ACE delivers innovative and emergent screening and targeting capability to identify high-risk cargo and crew based on advance information and strategic intelligence, allowing CBP, DHS, and other law enforcement officials to prescreen and evaluate entities early on, generally at the port of departure. With the ACE platform, CBP has the ability to initiate activities, foster collaboration among security analysts, and access past activity logs for additional intelligence. ACE has the potential to be integrated with DHS information systems and border security technology, bringing together critical security, public health, public safety, and environmental protection information through a common platform, enabling agencies to efficiently obtain trade and enforcement data across the Government.

1AC - Plan Thus the plan, the United States Federal Government should fully fund and implement the Automated Commercial Environment land port modernization program along the United States-Mxico border. 'Economic engagement towards Mexico includes infrastructure investments. U.S. Chamber of Commerce, no date, The U.S.-Mexico Leadership Initiative Vision 2020: Enhancing the U.S.-Mexico Economic Partnership, http://www.uschamber.com/international/americas/us-mexico-leadership-initiative-vision2020-enhancing-us-mexico-economic-par In this moment, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce is launching a CEO-level Leadership Initiative to execute a strategy for enhanced economic engagement between the U nited S tates and Mexico. The Leadership Initiative will provide the strategic energy behind Vision 2020, a five-point plan for enhancing the U.S.-Mexico economic partnership, with a view toward making the relationship a global model for bilateral best practices by the year 2020. Key Elements: Annual high-level trade and investment mission to Mexico City and reciprocal visit to Washington, DC Annual high-level U.S.-Mexico commercial dialogue to be hosted by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in conjunction with the Mexican private sector Working-level policy group structure in support of Vision 2020 Annual report to U.S. and Mexican governments on the state of the bilateral economic relationship Policy Program of Work The U.S. Chamber of Commerce is building a program of work that will move true economic partnership between the U nited S tates and Mexico from policy aspiration to reality. Our goal is to make our border work; make both countries more competitive in global markets; promote the continent's energy independence while respecting our shared environment; raise living standards for our citizens; and enhance intergovernmental cooperation; all within a framework that fully respects and supports national sovereignty and interests. Leadership Initiative members will: Advance a Partnership for Competitiveness Our bilateral economic framework must build on the foundation of NAFTA to advance 21st Century standards for our increasingly integrated markets. Through the work of its Global Regulatory Cooperation Project and Coalition for the Rule of Law in Global Markets, the U.S. Chamber has positioned itself as a thought leader and prime mover in this area. This working group will advance best practices that will grant citizens on both sides of the border the benefits of markets where openness, competition, and transparency prevail. Build A Partnership of Mutual Respect With the end of the Security and Prosperity Partnership, the United States and Mexico lack a robust institutional framework for cooperation for one of the most complex bilateral relationships in the world. This working group will press for pragmatic ways for the private sector to support regular government-togovernment cooperation. Our objective is to foster closer bilateral working ties at all levels of government, especially in those areas that most closely affect the flow of trade and investment. Create a World Class Border U.S. and Mexican officials must pursue a common, consistent, and comprehensive approach to border management to address our shared security and competitiveness challenges. This working group will engage the U.S. Chamber and AmCham Mexico as they produce a report on the Mexico-U.S. border to underscore that the use of proven risk-management techniques, investments in infrastructure , and a renewed focus on trade and travel facilitation can advance both countries' security and economic interests. Lead Collaboration on Energy and the Environment Mexico is second only to Canada as a source of U.S. petroleum imports, and we must recognize that our economic competitiveness depends on our ability to secure sustainable and reliable sources of energy while acting as wise environmental stewards. This working group will work to

leverage the advantages inherent in each country to boost our mutual competitiveness through optimal and sustainable use of resources. Raise Living Standards by Enhancing Competitiveness Recognizing the challenges facing workers in the United States and Mexico, this working group will promote common approaches to workforce issues wherever possible. We must build on the competitive advantages inherent to workers in each market if we are to raise living standards for all our workers.

Contention 2: Supply Chains Aerospace growth and competitiveness declining now stronger supply chains key Bernardini and Fitzpatrick 13 (Eric Bernardini and David Fitzpatrick, managing directors for AlixPartners, Pockets of Turbulence <http://www.alixpartners.com/en/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=wi4rab_uA84%3d&tabid=2085> June 2013) The airline sector reflects the current good-news/bad-news state of the A&D industry. Steady traffic growth5.3% in 2012is leading to improved revenue, and the airlines have become much more disciplined on capacity than they were in the past. (Capacity grew 3.9% last year.) Still, airlines have struggled to translate these improvements to the bottom line, and strong profits remain elusive. Current projections call for operating margins of just 3.3% in 2013. [] As the profit pool gets larger, commercial aircraft OEMs will fight to increase their share, by developing new aircraft designs and ramping up production for both narrowbody and wide-body aircraft. Supply chain: Challenges on the horizon The coming increase in sales volume is a positive sign, but it will create significant challenge s for A&D supply chains . As noted earlier, we project a 45% ramp-up in workload by 2017, with new programs like the A320neo, Boeing 737 MAX, and Bombardier C series that will tax engineering and industrial service functions. These new programs also involve more-technologically-complex designs aimed at increasing aircraft operating efficiency by 15 to 20%. such advances include composite materials, fuel-efficient engines, and new systems, including avionics, fuel, braking, and electric systems. The current industry supply chain is not entirely ready for this dual challenge of delivering a greater volume of more-sophisticated aircraft. in fact, there is a real and growing risk of 1supply chain disruptions. Certain suppliers have only limited expertise and modest engineering capabilities for implementing and sustaining several programs, especially in the detailed-parts and aerostructures segments. some suppliers and OEMs have taken early steps to handle those limitationsfor example, by more directly involving and closely monitoring tier 1 aerostructure suppliers in new programsbut those measures represent a new risk-sharing model for which neither side is yet mature enough to implement and monitor. US aerospace competitiveness key to air power Watkins 6 (Todd, PhD-Harvard and director-Lehigh Universitys Institute for Entrepreneurship, Creativity and Innovation, with ALAN SCHRIESHEIM and STEPHEN MERRILL, Glide Path to Irrelevance: Federal Funding for Aeronautics, http://www.issues.org/23.1/watkins.html) World leadership in air transportation and aircraft manufacturing is widely viewed as a cornerstone of U.S. economic welfare and national security. Department of Transportation statistics are revealing. U.S. residents already have the highest per capita level of air travel in the world, and use is rising steadily. Domestic commercial flights, the backbone of the U.S. travel industry, carried 660 million passengers in 2005. The Federal Aviation Administration predicts one billion passengers by 2015. General aviation already flies 150 million more passengers than do commercial flights. Air cargo has grown 7% annually since 1980, by far the fastest-growing mode of freight transportation during the past two decades. It now accounts for more than onequarter of the overall value of U.S. international merchandise trade, steadily gaining ground on the maritime sector, which has a two-fifths share. JFK International Airport alone handled $125 billion worth of international air cargo in 2004; this total ranks ahead of the value of cargo through the Port of Los Angeles, the nations leading maritime port. Aviations national economic impact does not stop with the air transport system. Aerospace exports in 2005 made

up nearly 30% of all U.S. exports in the category that the Department of Commerce labels advanced technology products. Census Bureau trade figures indicate that aerospace, mainly airplanes and parts, delivered a surplus to the United States of nearly $37 billion in 2005, which significantly defrayed an $82 billion deficit in all other advanced technology categories. Indeed, for years aerospace has regularly logged the widest positive trade margin among U.S. manufacturing industries. As for aeronautics military significance, the Department of Defenses (DODs) guiding doctrine relies significantly on air superiority and aircraft rapid strike and force-deployment capabilities. Moreover, a variety of aeronautics technologies, such as stealth and unpiloted remote-sensing aircraft and airborne command and control systems, have transformed military operations not only in the air but on the ground and at sea. The centrality is reflected in procurement strategy: A 2005 RAND analysis found that the DOD spends on the order of a third of its procurement budget on aerospace, including about $40 billion every year to buy aircraft and other air systems. Nonetheless, recent signs that the nations preeminence in aviation may be imperiled have occasioned deep concern. At least 12 studies of U.S. activity in aeronautics published during the past half decade by the National Academies and various industry and government bodies have called attention to the vulnerability of the United States traditional leading position. In its final report, the Commission on the Future of the United States Aerospace Industry, widely known as the Walker Commission, stated that the critical underpinnings of this nations aerospace industry are showing signs of faltering and warned bluntly, We stand dangerously close to squandering the advantage bequeathed to us by prior generations of aerospace leaders. In 2005, the National Aerospace Institute, in a report commissioned by Congress, declared the center of technical and market leadership to be shifting outside the United States to Europe, with a loss of highpaying jobs and intellectual capital to the detriment of the United States economic well-being. The clear message is that the United States must overcome a series of major challengesto the capacity, safety, and security of the nations air transportation system, to the nations ability to compete in international markets, and to the need to reduce noise and emissionsif the nations viability in this sector, let alone international leadership, is to be ensured. Air power key to US-Asia alliances and effective Asia pivot Lowther 11 Dr. Adam B. Lowther is a member of the faculty at the U.S Air Force's Air University. November 22nd, 2011, "Why U.S. Needs Airpower Diplomacy," thediplomat.com/2011/11/22/why-u-s-needs-airpower-diplomacy/?all=true What makes affording a shift to the region particularly difficult is the fact that the Asia-Pacifics distances make operating in the region much more expensive than operating in the West. By contrast, Europe is a rather compact continent where the distance between Washington, DC, and Berlin is closer to half that of Los Angeles to Beijing. To make matters more challenging, existing U.S. bases in Japan and Korea, for example, are among the United States most expensiveeven with significant financial support from the host nation. And to make matters even more difficult, in some cases, local populations no longer support a permanent American presence. These challenges impose a difficult set of requirements on a new U.S. strategy for the Asia-Pacific. Such a strategy should demonstrate that it relies on U.S. assets best able to overcome the challenges of distance; it must prove cost effective; and it is sensitive to the domestic and strategic position of partner nations. One approach is particularly well suited to overcoming these challenges. Airpower diplomacy, also known as building partnerships by the U.S. Air Force, offers some distinct advantages over any alternatives. Best thought of as the nonkinetic application of air, space, and cyber power, airpower diplomacy is a form of soft power thats useful in strengthening existing relationships and developing new oneswhile protecting American interests. The U.S. Air Force has successfully employed airpower diplomacy in one iteration or another for more than six decades. Its strengths are in three distinct areas. First, airpower, broadly speaking, is able to overcome the distances that make the Asia-Pacific such a challenging region. As the single largest feature on the earths

surface, the Pacific Ocean makes it difficult for the United States to respond quickly with men and material to unexpected events in the region. With airpower, theres no place on earth that the United States cant reach in less than 24 hours. However, aircraft must land, which is why building partnershipsof mutual interestswith countries in the region is a critical component of airpower diplomacy. For many nations in the Asia-Pacific, walking a careful line between China and the United States is the unenviable position in which they find themselves. As the most advanced air, space, and cyber force in the world, the U.S. Air Force is a desirable partner for many countries. This provides a natural advantage for the United States. However, ensuring that the U.S. doesnt overplay its hand is important if airpower diplomacy is to succeed . Second, airpower diplomacy is a cost-effective alternative to the use of force. Since its a concept that focuses on the application of soft power, airpower diplomacy is far more than just American aircraft sitting on the ramps of foreign airfields. It builds partnerships through economic ties, training and support of local forces, humanitarian relief, joint operations, and much more. For example, Fifth Air Force, based at Yokota Air Force Base in Japan, has provided assistance to victims of floods, typhoons, volcanoes, and earthquakes on numerous occasions in recent years. The Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami (2004), Burma cyclone (2008), Indonesian earthquake (2009), and the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami (2011) are some examples of where airpower diplomacy played a leading role in the United States response to natural disasters. In the case of the Indian Ocean and Tohoku earthquakes and tsunamis, a strong American response led to improved relations between the United States and Indonesia in the first case and the United States and Japan in the second. This was airpower diplomacy at work. An often overlooked example of airpower diplomacy is the U.S. Air Forces Inter-American Air Forces Academy (IAAFA) at Lackland Air Force Base in San Antonio, Texas. There, students from across Latin America attend courses ranging from aircraft maintenance to professional leadership. The schools broader objective is to build a community of airmen with the skills to lead capable air forces in their home countriesmaking cooperation with the United States more likely. In these and many other instances, airpower diplomacy acts as a costeffective way for the United States to build partnerships with nations that share common interests. And, by strengthening relationships, the United States is less likely to find itself in a costly conflict with what could have been a partner. Third, airpower and airpower diplomacy dont require permanent large footprint bases that are both expensive for the United States and a political irritant for many governments in the region. With the U.S. pivoting toward the Asia-Pacific, a growth in the number of American main-operating bases in the region would be expected. Airpower diplomacy, however, focuses on the use of joint operations, shortterm deployments, and other temporary measures, enabling the United States to maintain a regional presencedemonstrating commitmentwhile eliminating concerns of an American occupation. Flexible operations and arrangements also have the added benefit of proving to be less of a stressor in the host nations relationship with China, which is becoming increasingly important for every nation in the region. The United States attempt to conduct what Secretary of State Clinton calls forward deployed diplomacy, a strategy in which American airmen operate with their host nation counterparts at bases owned and operated by the host nation, may prove a far superior option to one resembling Cold War NATO where up to several hundred thousand Americans were stationed in Western Europe. With its focus on a wide range of soft power tools, airpower diplomacy is well suited to serve a central role in American foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific. Simply put, no other U.S. military capability provides the speed and flexibility of airpower. As defense and foreign policy officials in the Obama administration refine the presidents regional strategy, they may want to give airpower diplomacy and its mix of diplomatic tools significant consideration. After all, no other approach is as cost effective, culturally sensitive, and responsive to the requirements of a complex and changing region.

Effective Asia pivot solves multiple scenarios for nuclear war Colby 11 Elbridge Colby, research analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses, served as policy advisor to the Secretary of Defenses Representative to the New START talks, expert advisor to the Congressional Strategic Posture Commission, August 10, 2011, Why the U.S. Needs its Liberal Empire, The Diplomat, online: http://the-diplomat.com/2011/08/10/why-us-needsits-liberal-empire/2/?print=yes But the pendulum shouldnt be allowed to swing too far toward an incautious retrenchment. For our problem hasnt been overseas commitments and interventions as such, but the kinds of interventions. The US alliance and partnership structure, what the late William Odom called the United States liberal empire that includes a substantial military presence and a willingness to use it in the defence of US and allied interests, remains a vital component of US security and global stability and prosperity. This system of voluntary and consensual cooperation under US leadership, particularly in the security realm, constitutes a formidable bloc defending the liberal international order. But, in part due to poor decision-making in Washington, this system is under strain, particularly in East Asia, where the security situation has become tenser even as the region continues to become the centre of the global economy. A nuclear North Koreas violent behaviour threatens South Korea and Japan, as well as US forces on the peninsula; Pyongyangs development of a road mobile Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, moreover, brings into sight the day when North Korea could threaten the United States itself with nuclear attack, a prospect that will further imperil stability in the region. More broadly, the rise of China and especially its rapid and opaque military build-up combined with its increasing assertiveness in regional disputes is troubling to the United States and its allies and partners across the region. Particularly relevant to the US military presence in the western Pacific is the development of Beijings anti-access and area denial capabilities, including the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile, more capable anti-ship cruise missiles, attack submarines, attack aircraft, smart mines, torpedoes, and other assets. While Beijing remains a constructive contributor on a range of matters, these capabilities will give China the growing power to deny the United States the ability to operate effectively in the western Pacific, and thus the potential to undermine the US-guaranteed security substructure that has defined littoral East Asia since World War II. Even if China says today it wont exploit this growing capability, who can tell what tomorrow or the next day will bring? Naturally, US efforts to build up forces in the western Pacific in response to future Chinese force improvements must be coupled with efforts to engage Beijing as a responsible stakeholder; indeed, a strengthened but appropriately restrained military posture will enable rather than detract from such engagement. In short, the United States must increase its involvement in East Asia rather than decrease it. Simply maintaining the military balance in the western Pacific will, however, involve substantial investments to improve US capabilities. It will also require augmented contributions to the common defence by US allies that have long enjoyed low defence budgets under the US security umbrella. This wont be cheap, for these requirements cant be met simply by incremental additions to the existing posture, but will have to include advances in air, naval, space, cyber, and other expensive high-tech capabilities. Yet such efforts are vital, for East Asia represents the economic future, and its strategic developments will determine which country or countries set the international rules that shape that economic future. Conversely, US interventions in the Middle East and, to a lesser degree, in south-eastern Europe have been driven by far more ambitious and aspirational conceptions of the national interest, encompassing the proposition that failing or illiberally governed peripheral states can contribute to an instability that nurtures terrorism and impedes economic growth. Regardless of whether this proposition is true, the effort is rightly seen by the new political tide not to be worth the benefits gained. Moreover, the United States can scale (and has scaled) back nation-building plans in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Balkans without undermining its vital interests in

ensuring the free flow of oil and in preventing terrorism. The lesson to be drawn from recent years is not, then, that the United States should scale back or shun overseas commitments as such, but rather that we must be more discriminating in making and acting upon them. A total US unwillingness to intervene would pull the rug out from under the US-led structure, leaving the international system prey to disorder at the least, and at worst to chaos or dominance by others who could not be counted on to look out for US interests. We need to focus on making the right interventions, not forswearing them completely. In practice, this means a more substantial focus on East Asia and the serious security challenges there, and less emphasis on the Middle East. This isnt to say that the United States should be unwilling to intervene in the Middle East. Rather, it is to say that our interventions there should be more tightly connected to concrete objectives such as protecting the free flow of oil from the region, preventing terrorist attacks against the United States and its allies, and forestalling or, if necessary, containing nuclear prolif eration as opposed to the more idealistic aspirations to transform the regions societies. These more concrete objectives can be better met by the more judicious and economical use of our military power. More broadly, however, it means a shift in US emphasis away from the greater Middle East toward the Asia-Pacific region, which dwarfs the former in economic and military potential and in the dynamism of its societies. The Asia-Pacific region, with its hard-charging economies and growing presence on the global stage, is where the future of the international security and economic system will be set, and it is there that Washington needs to focus its attention, especially in light of rising regional security challenges. In light of US budgetary pressures, including the hundreds of billions in security related money to be cut as part of the debt ceiling deal, its doubly important that US security dollars be allocated to the most pressing tasks shoring up the US position in the most important region of the world, the Asia-Pacific. It will also require restraint in expenditure on those challenges and regions that dont touch so directly on the future of US security and prosperity. As Americans debate the proper US global role in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis and Iraq and Afghanistan, they would do well to direct their ire not at overseas commitments and intervention as such, but rather at those not tied to core US interests and the sustainment and adaptation of the liberal empire that we have constructed and maintained since World War II. Defenders of our important overseas links and activities should clearly distinguish their cause from the hyperactive and barely restrained approach represented by those who, unsatisfied with seeing the United States tied down in three Middle Eastern countries, seek intervention in yet more, such as Syria. Indeed, those who refuse to scale back US interventions in the Middle East or call for still more are directly contributing to the weakening of US commitments in East Asia, given strategic developments in the region and a sharply constrained budgetary environment in Washington. We can no longer afford, either strategically or financially, to squander our power in unnecessary and ill-advised interventions and nation-building efforts. The ability and will to intervene is too important to be so wasted. The Asia pivot protects straits of Malacca---key to Asian trade Kaplan 11 Robert D. Kaplan 11 is senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, national correspondent for the Atlantic, and a member of the U.S. Defense Department's Defense Policy Board, September/October 2011, The South China Sea Is the Future of Conflict, online: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/08/15/the_south_china_sea_is_the_future_of_c onflict?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full The South China Sea joins the Southeast Asian states with the Western Pacific, functioning as the throat of global sea routes. Here is the center of maritime Eurasia, punctuated by the straits of Malacca, Sunda, Lombok, and Makassar. More than half the world's annual

merchant fleet tonnage passes through these choke points, and a third of all maritime traffic. The oil transported through the Strait of Malacca from the Indian Ocean, en route to East Asia through the South China Sea, is more than six times the amount that passes through the Suez Canal and 17 times the amount that transits the Panama Canal. Roughly two-thirds of South Korea's energy supplies, nearly 60 percent of Japan's and Taiwan's energy supplies, and about 80 percent of China's crude-oil imports come through the South China Sea. What's more, the South China Sea has proven oil reserves of 7 billion barrels and an estimated 900 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, a potentially huge bounty. It is not only location and energy reserves that promise to give the South China Sea critical geostrategic importance , but also the coldblooded territorial disputes that have long surrounded these waters. Several disputes concern the Spratly Islands, a mini-archipelago in the South China Sea's southeastern part. Vietnam, Taiwan, and China each claim all or most of the South China Sea, as well as all of the Spratly and Paracel island groups. In particular, Beijing asserts a historical line: It lays claim to the heart of the South China Sea in a grand loop (widely known as the "cow's tongue") from China's Hainan Island at the South China Sea's northern end all the way south 1,200 miles to near Singapore and Malaysia. The result is that all nine states that touch the South China Sea are more or less arrayed against China and therefore dependent on the U nited S tates for diplomatic and military support . These conflicting claims are likely to become even more acute as Asia's spiraling energy demands -- energy consumption is expected to double by 2030, with China accounting for half that growth -make the South China Sea the ever more central guarantor of the region's economic strength. Already, the South China Sea has increasingly become an armed camp, as the claimants build up and modernize their navies, even as the scramble for islands and reefs in recent decades is mostly over. China has so far confiscated 12 geographical features, Taiwan one, Vietnam 25, the Philippines eight, and Malaysia five. Collapse of Asian trade causes US draw-in and nuclear war Auslin 9 Michael Auslin 9, resident scholar at AEI, Averting Disaster, The Daily Standard, 2/6, http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all,pubID.29339/pub_detail.asp As they deal with a collapsing world economy, policymakers in Washington and around the globe must not forget that when a depression strikes, war can follow. Nowhere is this truer than in Asia, the most heavily armed region on earth and riven with ancient hatreds and territorial rivalries. Collapsing trade flows can lead to political tension, nationalist outbursts, growing distrust, and ultimately, military miscalculation. The result would be disaster on top of an already dire situation. Asia's political infrastructure may not be strong enough to resist the slide towards confrontation and conflict. No one should think that Asia is on the verge of conflict. But it is also important to remember what has helped keep the peace in this region for so long. Phenomenal growth rates in Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, China and elsewhere since the 1960s have naturally turned national attention inward, to development and stability. This has gradually led to increased political confidence, diplomatic initiatives, and in many nations the move toward more democratic systems. America has directly benefited as well, and not merely from years of lower consumer prices, but also from the general conditions of peace in Asia. Yet policymakers need to remember that even during these decades of growth, moments of economic shock, such as the 1973 Oil Crisis, led to instability and bursts of terrorist activity in Japan, while the uneven pace of growth in China has led to tens of thousands of armed clashes in the poor interior of the country. Now imagine such instability multiplied region-wide. The economic collapse Japan is facing, and China's potential slowdown, dwarfs any previous economic troubles, including the 1998 Asian Currency Crisis. Newly urbanized workers rioting for jobs or living wages, conflict over natural resources, further saber-rattling from North Korea, all can take on lives of their own. This is the nightmare of governments in the region, and particularly of democracies from newer ones like Thailand

and Mongolia to established states like Japan and South Korea. How will overburdened political leaders react to internal unrest? What happens if Chinese shopkeepers in Indonesia are attacked, or a Japanese naval ship collides with a Korean fishing vessel? Quite simply, Asia's political infrastructure may not be strong enough to resist the slide towards confrontation and conflict. This would be a political and humanitarian disaster turning the clock back decades in Asia. It would almost certainly drag America in at some point, as well. First of all, we have alliance responsibilities to Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines should any of them come under armed attack. Failure on our part to live up to those responsibilities could mean the end of America's credibility in Asia. Secondly, peace in Asia has been kept in good measure by the continued U.S. military presence since World War II. There have been terrible localized conflicts, of course, but nothing approaching a systemic conflagration like the 1940s. Today, such a conflict would be far more bloody, and it is unclear if the American military, already stretched too thin by wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, could contain the crisis. Nor is it clear that the American people, worn out from war and economic distress, would be willing to shed even more blood and treasure for lands across the ocean. The result could be a historic changing of the geopolitical map in the world's most populous region. Perhaps China would emerge as the undisputed hegemon. Possibly democracies like Japan and South Korea would link up to oppose any aggressor. India might decide it could move into the vacuum. All of this is guess-work, of course, but it has happened repeatedly throughout history. There is no reason to believe we are immune from the same types of miscalculation and greed that have destroyed international systems in the past. Plan key to aerospace sector CoC 11 (United States Chamber of Commerce, Steps to a 21st Century: U.S.-Mexico Border <http://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/reports/2011_us_mexico_report.pdf> 11-3011) Much discussion takes place today about the ability of U.S. companies to increase their exports. President Obama made this a national goal in the United States, calling for doubling the nations exports over the next ve years. The Chamber supports this goal, and through its advocacy for open markets is working to ensure that it is achieved. However, policymakers should recognize, too, that exports sometimes rely on imports. For example, year after year, the Boeing Corporation is the largest U.S. exporter by value. The company designs, manufactures, and sells commercial jetliners, satellites, military aircraft, and other products in a worldwide marketplace. The completion of its newest commercial aircraft, the 787 Dreamliner, is truly a marvel to behold and a point of pride for the company and the entire country. While the Dreamliner is constructed in the United States, many of its parts come from all over the world. Consequently, while Boeing is the countrys leading exporter, it is also a top importer. Companies invest billions annually to ensure the security, safety, and speed of the products coming into the United States. The faster those products are brought to their manufacturing facilities, the faster Boeing exports its planes. In a just-in-time delivery environment, Boeing relies on an efcient supply chain from countries around the globe, including Mexico. In this high-value, mass-scale production environment, inventory is not an option. Trade facilitation is the only solution . Trade efficiency especially key to UAS AIA 13 [Aerospace Industries Association, The Aerospace Industries Association represents the nation's leading manufacturers and suppliers of civil, military, and business aircraft, helicopters, unmanned aircraft systems, space systems, aircraft engines, missiles, materiel and related components, equipment, services and information technology., "Unmanned Aircraft Systems:

Perceptions & Potential,"] As U. S. defense budgets decline, maintaining a strong U. S. aerospace industry will increasingly depend on an effective export strategy for technologies where the United States is a global leader. There is no better example than UAS. According to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, approximately 556 models of unmanned systems are produced worldwide by 195 companies.21 UAVs key to ISRsolves crisis management Trefz 3 John L, Jr., LCDR, US Navy, From Persistent ISR to Precision Strikes: The Expanding Role of UAVs, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a420264.pdf Operational intelligence is directed at collection, analysis, and evaluation of information dealing with all aspects of the situation in a given theater of operation plus adjacent areas of interest.21 The ability to gather timely, relevant intelligence is critical to the success of any major operation or campaign. The capability to provide adequate coverage of the operational commanders Area of Responsibility (AOR) or Area of Interest (AOI) depends on the integration of both manned and unmanned assets. The level of effort will vary with the size (factor space) of the AOR/AOI and the time available (factor time) for intelligence collection. During the pre-hostility stage of a conflict, UAVs can assist manned assets in the Intelligence Preparation of the Theater (IPT). Easily transportable and rapidly deployable, both the Global Hawk and Predator systems can quickly respond to an emerging crisis . Their smaller footprint in a given theater allows the operational commander to gather intelligence with less diplomatic and political interference. The deployment of manned platforms such as the JSTARS or Rivet Joint aircraft to monitor a given crisis results in a very large support package to sustain operations. Once these aircraft are in theater, Operational Security (OPSEC) becomes more challenging and Military Deception (MILDEC) may be lost. During the monitoring of adversary activity, the presence of easily identifiable, radar significant intelligence platforms makes easier the enemys job of hiding his activities. UAVs smaller size, combined with long endurance and unlimited sustainability, makes them the optimal platform during the pre-hostility phase of operations. Once hostilities commence, the UAV remains the premier intelligence-gathering platform. The reduced risk to coalition aircraft and personnel in high-threat environments makes UAV employment ideal. Although systems such as the Global Hawk at $10 million per unit are not considered expendable, the cost of losing one of these assets is insignificant when compared to the loss of a manned asset and its aircrew. The ability of UAVs to provide real-time BDA to the operational commander will allow more efficient allocation of follow-on strike assets to maximize their effects on the enemys ability to continue to resist. Command and Control Warfare (C2W) Information Warfare (IW) is the actions aimed at achieving information superiority by denying, exploiting, corrupting, or destroying the enemys information and information functions while protecting ones own from enemy attack.23 C2W uses OPSEC, MILDEC, PSYOPS, Electronic Warfare (EW) and Physical Destruction to defeat the enemys Command and Control (C2) functions while protecting ones own.24 The UAV has the ability to accomplish all of these functions effectively. As mentioned before, the employment of UAVs for monitoring and IPT missions improves both OPSEC and MILDEC activities. Additionally, the psychological impact to the enemy of constant monitoring and surveillance cannot be overlooked. The ability of the UAV to maintain 24/7 coverage of selected portions of the AOR will make it virtually impossible for the enemy to determine if or when he is being watched . The CNN Factor of constant coverage will make him think that all his movements are under scrutiny. When you add a limited strike capability to the UAV, such as armed Predators, the adversary commander would have to assume that all UAVs are armed. Another

subset of C2W is Electronic Warfare (EW). This is an area where the UAV can tackle the dull and the dangerous missions presently performed by manned aircraft. The three parts of EW are Electronic Attack (EA), Electronic Protect (EP), and Electronic Support (ES).25 EA serves to deny the enemys operational commander the use of the electromagnetic spectrum while EP serves to safeguard the use of the same spectrum for our operational commander. ES involves those activities which serve to identify our enemys activities and help locate the threats (SIGINT is a by-product). ES also helps to provide Indications and Warnings (I&W) to our forces of immediate threats or potential future threats enhancing overall Force Protection. The Global Hawk UAV is ideally suited for the mission of monitoring enemy electronic emissions and providing timely threat warnings to the operational commander. As UAV technology advances, they will prepare the battlefield by leading the way into high threat envelopes and neutraliz ing enemy air defense systems . As mentioned before, they are not expendable, but their loss would be more acceptable than that of a manned aircraft. That prevents nuke war over Taiwan Lieber 7 - Keir A. Lieber, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame, and Daryl G. Press, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania, Winter 2007, U.S. Nuclear Primacy and the Future of the Chinese Deterrent, China Security, Issue No. 5, online: http://www.wsichina.org/cs5_5.pdf He notes that if China were to alert its strategic nuclear forces during a war with the United States over Taiwan, the United States would likely act to beat China to the punch. He continues, Given constant U.S. surveillance of Chinese nuclear launch sites, any major Chinese preparations to fire preemptorily would be detected and countered by a rapid U.S. preemptive strike against the sites by U.S. conventional or nuclear forces The United States could easily detect and react inside of the lengthy launch cycle time of Chinese forces.24 Blairs words mirror our argument and suggest the two ways that nuclear primacy may benefit the United States. First, if the Chinese were to threaten nuclear escalation in the context of a Taiwan war, the U.S. could strike first and likely destroy the Chinese force on the ground beat China to the punch, as Blair puts it. Second, Chinas knowledge of its vulnerability to nuclear preemption might prevent China from alerting its nuclear force or even attacking Taiwan in the first place. Transition wars for econ reform Kothari, 82 [Professor of political science at University of Delhi, Towards a Just Social Order, p. 571] Attempts at global economic reform could also lead to a world racked by increasing turbulence, a greater sense of insecurity among the major centres of power -- and hence to a further tightening of the structures of domination and domestic repression producing in their wake an intensification of the old arms race and militarization of regimes, encouraging regional conflagrations and setting the stage for eventual global holocaust. War over Taiwan inevitable - U.S. superiority causing China escalation now Zhang 8 - Baohui Zhang, Associate Professor of Political Science, Lingnan University, Hong Kong, March 2008, The Taiwan Strait and the Future of China's No-First-Use Nuclear Policy, Comparative Strategy, Vol. 27, No. 2, p. 164-182 In fact, the Chinese military was awed by the American dominance in conventional warfare. As observed by General Wang Baocun, a prominent strategist at the PLA Academy of Military Sciences, the U.S. revolution in military affairs has resulted in a new kind of gap with other countries. Previously, the gap was merely generational. This time, there is a time

gap in that the U.S. military and others are fighting as if they were from different historical periods. According to Wang, The time gap in military technologies allows the superior side to possess an absolute advantage while leaving the other side in a position of absolute disadvantage. The time gap makes it impossible for developing countries to overcome their military disadvantage in confrontations with the United States. Wang thus reaches a gloomy conclusion: The military time gap results in serious threats to the national and military security of developing countries. In fact, they are almost in a defenseless situation.17 Major General Xu Hezhen, who is the Commandant of PLA Army Command Academy in Shijiazhuang, suggests that the RMA allows the U.S. to conduct no-contact combat against other militaries through beyond visual range sensor technologies and precision-strike weapons. This revolution in combat creates a battlefield situation where 'I can see you and hit you but you can't see me and hit back. The situation leaves the weaker side in a position of perpetual disadvantage until it loses the will of resistance.18 The RMA thus presents a serious problem for China's military planners: how to defeat a technologically far superior enemy such as the United States. In fact, China is no longer confident it can defeat such an enemy due to the vast gap with the United States in conventional military technologies. As Lewis and Xue observe, As senior PLA planners dissected the American strategy from the Gulf War of 1991 to the lightening war against Iraq in 2003, it was to become painfully evident that no war with the United States could be won or even brought to a reasonable draw.19 This bleak assessment by Chinese officers of the U.S. conventional dominance in the Taiwan Strait is echoed by American analysis. In a research project for the U.S. Department of Defense, the Rand Corporation analyzed how China may choose to conduct a war against the American military. According to Rand, in the coming decades the U.S. will possess even greater military advantages over Chinese forces than it currently enjoys.20 Therefore, if the China intends to fight the U.S. through conventional military modernization, this option, taken alone, potentially condemns the PLA to evolving relative obsolescence.21 How to prevent a disastrous defeat in the Taiwan Strait led some in China to question the separation of conventional and nuclear doctrines in Chinese military thinking. While the no-first-use policy can prevent a nuclear attack against China, it cannot deter a largescale conventional war by a technologically superior enemy. Some believe that the policy can no longer protect China's core national interests, such as preventing de jure independence of Taiwan. According to Alastair Iain Johnston, who was the first Western analyst to notice this trend in the 1990s, some Chinese strategists began to argue that China should develop a nuclear doctrine suitable for economically and technologically weak states.22 Taiwan escalates and goes nuclear - no defense Lowther 13 [William Lowther, Taipei Times, citing a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 3/16/13, Taiwan could spark nuclear war: report, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/03/16/2003557211] Taiwan is the most likely potential crisis that could trigger a nuclear war between China and the US, a new academic report concludes. Taiwan remains the single most plausible and dangerous source of tension and conflict between the US and China, says the 42-page report by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Prepared by the CSIS Project on Nuclear Issues and resulting from a year-long study, the report emphasizes that Beijing continues to be set on a policy to prevent Taiwans independence, while at the same time the US maintains the capability to come to Taiwans defense. Although tensions across the Taiwan Strait have subsided since both Taipei and Beijing embraced a policy of engagement in 2008, the situation remains combustible , complicated by rapidly diverging cross-strait military capabilities and persistent political disagreements, the report says. In a footnote, it quotes senior fellow at the US Council on Foreign Relations Richard Betts describing Taiwan as the main potential flashpoint for the US in East Asia. The report

also quotes Betts as saying that neither Beijing nor Washington can fully control developments that might ignite a Taiwan crisis. This is a classic recipe for surprise, miscalc ulation and uncontrolled escalation , Betts wrote in a separate study of his own. The CSIS study says: For the foreseeable future Taiwan is the contingency in which nuclear weapons would most likely become a major factor, because the fate of the island is intertwined both with the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party and the reliability of US defense commitments in the Asia-Pacific region. Titled Nuclear Weapons and US-China Relations, the study says disputes in the East and South China seas appear unlikely to lead to major conflict between China and the US, but they do provide kindling for potential conflict between the two nations because the disputes implicate a number of important regional interests, including the interests of treaty allies of the US. The danger posed by flashpoints such as Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula and maritime demarcation disputes is magnified by the potential for mistakes, the study says. Although Beijing and Washington have agreed to a range of crisis management mechanisms, such as the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement and the establishment of a direct hotline between the Pentagon and the Ministry of Defense, the bases for miscommunication and misunderstanding remain and draw on deep historical reservoirs of suspicion , the report says. For example, it says, it is unclear whether either side understands what kinds of actions would result in a military or even nuclear response by the other party. To make things worse, neither side seems to believe the others declared policies and intentions, suggesting that escalation management, already a very uncertain endeavor, could be especially difficult in any conflict, it says. Although conflict mercifully seems unlikely at this point, the report concludes that it cannot be ruled out and may become increasingly likely if we are unwise or unlucky. The report says: With both sides possessing and looking set to retain formidable nuclear weapons arsenals , such a conflict would be tremendously dangerous and quite possibly devastating. UAS will monitor agriculture and energy infrastructure against attacks an attack would collapse the entire industry Darnall 11 [Bart Darnall, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: A Logical Choice for Homeland Security Support, Naval Postgraduate School thesis, Dec. 2011, http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA556271] Agriculture and food infrastructure comprises of production, processing, and delivery systems. A disaster caused by an attack on this infrastructure could disrupt the food supply and pose a serious threat to public health, safety, welfare, or to the national economy.129 According to DHS, food and agriculture infrastructure is almost entirely under private ownership and is composed of an estimated 2.1 million farms, approximately 880,500 firms and over one million facilities.130 It accounts for approximately one-fifth of the nation's economic activity. The capabilities provided by UAS can facilitate the monitoring of farm and agriculture related features, such as the spread of crop destroying pests, status of crop production, identification of crop varieties, and loss of timber in areas threatened by timber theft. Using UAS for crop spraying and dusting greatly reduces the exposure of people to hazards associated with chemical contamination. Leads to resource wars and extinction Lugar 4 (Richard G., U.S. Senator Indiana and Former Chair Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Plant Power, Our Planet, 14(3), http://www.unep.org/ourplanet/imgversn/143/lugar.html)

In a world confronted by global terrorism, turmoil in the Middle East, burgeoning nuclear threats and other crises, it is easy to lose sight of the long-range challenges. But we do so at our peril. One of the most daunting of them is meeting the worlds need for food and energy in this century. At stake is not only preventing starvation and saving the environment, but also world peace and security. History tells us that states may go to war over access to resources, and that poverty and famine have often bred fanaticism and terrorism. Working to feed the world will minimize factors that contribute to global instability and the proliferation of w eapons of m ass d estruction. With the world population expected to grow from 6 billion people today to 9 billion by mid-century, the demand for affordable food will increase well beyond current international production levels. People in rapidly developing nations will have the means greatly to improve their standard of living and caloric intake. Inevitably, that means eating more meat. This will raise demand for feed grain at the same time that the growing world population will need vastly more basic food to eat. Complicating a solution to this problem is a dynamic that must be better understood in the West: developing countries often use limited arable land to expand cities to house their growing populations. As good land disappears, people destroy timber resources and even rainforests as they try to create more arable land to feed themselves. The long-term environmental consequences could be disastrous for the entire globe.

Contention 3: Solvency ACE underfunded - plan speeds up the project no disads CoC 11 (Steps to a 21st Century: U.S.-Mexico Border, A U.S. Chamber of Commerce Border Report, http://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/reports/2011_us_mexico_report.pdf) Another area of concern is the lack of progress related to, and budget cuts affecting, Automated Commercial Environment (ACE). The FY 2011 budget for ACE is $153 milliona reduction of $75 million from the FY 2010 budget. This includes some $40 million to fund the Automated Commercial System (ACS), a 26-year-old program on life support. At its budget peak, ACE was funded at the $300 million level. Funding has been steadily reduced, slowing the progress of the project. The current budget allocation only prolongs the use of two systems, which is inefcient and costly for both industry and government. We are encouraged by recent efforts by leadership at CBP to achieve our shared goal, but funding is needed now to signal to the private sector that the government is serious about this system. Our goal in the next three years should be the retirement of the U.S. Automated Commercial System and the full use of ACE by the entire trade community. We should also strive to ensure the development and implementation of the International Trade Data System (ITDS). Unfortunately, there has been little progress made due to the lack of coordination between government agencies to harmonize data submission into the system. To date, companies are required to enter repetitive data to each government agency involved. Simplifying the entry process for trade decreases costs for businesses and provides governments with more accurate and accessible information.