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NRE Lecture 9 Refs: J. M. Conrad & C. W. Clark: Ch.2 Nick Hanley, Jason F. Shogren & Ben White: Ch.

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Static Models of Fishery

Constant Rate of Harvesting: The harvest rate, Y (t), changes the population stock x: Therefore,

X = F (X) Y (t)

Where F (x) may be defined by the logistic growth function and function Y (t) may be by some fishery production function. In deriving the sustainable yield function we defined

X = F (X) Y (t) = r X (1 - X/K) qEK = 0

Suppose, the rate of harvesting is constant Y (t) = h, and the growth rate is logistic. This leads to the two equilibrium points, X 1 and X2. The equilibrium now depends on the initial stock. It is obvious that X 2 is the stable equilibrium. The constant rate of harvesting policy has no economic meaning. Moreover, there is the inherent danger of the extinction of the specie if for any h, the initial stock is less than X1 and where the h > Ymsy.

Figure 1

Figure 2

h In case of critical depensation there are two equilibrium stock levels associated with each catch level effort: a stable equilibrium and an unstable equilibrium. If effort rises to a critical level, the population may be reduced below some viable minimum level.

The above picture depicts the equilibrium level of catches at different effort levels. The catch increases as efforts increase from E1 to Emsy. If effort exceeds Emsy, say E2, this reduces both the equilibrium catch and the equilibrium stock. Harvesting as an economic problem: The static economic model of fishery is due to Gordon (1954). Assume a constant price, p, for harvested fish and a constant cost, c, per unit of fishing effort. Then, we can define the sum of the profits across all firms as: = p Y (E) c E

Where Y (E) is the yield curve; now, p Y (E) is the total revenue and c E is the total cost. If the fishery is open access, firms enter the industry until the economic rent is zero, that is, where total revenue equals total cost.

The equilibrium in open access fisheries represents economic over fishing. The fishery may show biological overfishing where the harvest is below the maximum sustainable yield. In extreme cases this may lead to fish population being reduced to such low levels that its exploitation is no longer viable. If instead the fishery was owned by a single firm, the firm would equate marginal cost to marginal revenue to maximize profit. Gordon (1954) argues that whereas the optimum point (E*) is at (MR=MC), the common property fishery will instead reach equilibrium where TR= TC (E^), which Gordon defines as bionomic equilibrium of the common property fishery. Gordon further argues that optimum effort (E*) is less than the effort necessary for MSY. But this conclusion requires zero discounting. Nevertheless, it is always true that for discount rate, > 0, optimal effort level is less than E^, which in fact corresponds to + . Dynamic Model of Fishing: Renewable resource is treated as capital good and the objective is to manage the resource in such a way to maximize its value to society. Assume that the utility a society derives from the use of a resource can be expressed as

U (t) = U (Y (t), (X (t))

(1)

U (t) is the flow of net social benefit at instant t. The resource stock may appear as an argument in the utility function for the following reasons: 1. a large stock may lower the cost of a given level of harvest; 2. The stock may reflect preservation values. If is the discount rate then society maximizes
T

U (Y (t ), X (t )) e- t dt
0

We can specify the net benefit function U (t) in two special cases. 1. Constant cost: Let p be the unit price for the resource after harvest and c the cost per unit of effort, E (t). We can then write net revenue as net benefit to society implying

U(Y (t),X (t)) = pY (t) c E (t)

(3)

Now, Y (t) is the fishing production function which can be defined as Y(t) = H (X(t), E(t)) Let us assume Y (t) = q E (t) X (t), q is some constant. Then, U (Y (t), X (t)) = p Y (t) c E (t) = P Y (t) c Y (t)/q X (t) Or, U (Y (t), X (t)) = Y (t) [p c/q X (t)] (4)

Thus, we can write our general maximization problem can be written as:

Maximize
T

U (Y (t ), X (t )) e- t dt
0

S. t X = F (X (t)) Y (t) X (0) is given. The constant value Hamiltonian for this problem is H(X, Y; ) = U(X, Y) + [F (X) Y] (6) (5)

And the necessary and sufficient conditions of the maximum principle are:

a. Y (t) maximizes H for all t; b. = - Hx = - Ux - Fx

(7) (8)

Thus, translating this into our special constant case the maximization problem becomes

H (X, Y; ) = Y [p c/q X] + [F(X) Y] Or, H(X, Y, ) = [p c/q X - ] Y + F(X) Now, consider (10): Y 0 must be chosen to maximize H(X, Y, ). This implies, 0 Y (t) Ymax if (t) > p c/q X (t) X (t) < X* if (t) < p c/q X (t)

(9)

(10)

X (t) > X* Note that (10) does not say anything about what if P c/q X- = 0 That is, the slope of H in Y is zero. Assume that (11) holds for t in some interval. Differentiating (11) w. r. t. time we get = c/q X2 X = c/q X2 [F (X) Y] From (8), adjoint equation = - Ux - Fx = - c/q X2 Y - Fx = - c/q X2 Y + ( - Fx) = - c/q X2 Y + (p c/qX) ( - Fx) Equating the right side of (12) and (13), we get c/q X2 F (X) = (p c/qX)( - Fx) Or, ( - Fx) = c/(q X2). F (X).qX/(pqX c) (13) (12) (11)

= Fx + c F (X)/X(pqX c)

(14)

This is an implicit equation for the unknown X; any X which satisfies equation (14) is called a singular solution of the original control problem. Having determined the optimal equilibrium solution X*, what do we conclude about the complete solution to our dynamic problem? Unless

it is by luck that X0 = X*, some initial stock adjustment will be necessary. This is described by 0 Y (t) Ymax if (t) > p c/q X (t) X (t) < X* if (t) < p c/q X (t) X (t) > X* Such a policy is the most rapid approach path (MRAP) to the long term equilibrium at X*. Of course we also have Y (t) = F (X*) whenever X (t) = X*. Dynamic Version of the Common Property Model: X = F (X) Y Y = qEX Therefore, U (X, E) = pY cE = (pqX c)E (17) (15) (16)

Bionomic equilibrium occurs when net returns U (X, E) are zero. This implies from (17), X = X^ = c/qX (18)

Thus, X^ is the stock level at which net returns from fishing become zero. The corresponding bionomic yield and effort levels are given by (15) and (16): Y^ = F (X^) E^ = Y^/qX^ = F (X^)/qX^ Could common property exploitation ever drive renewable resource stock to extinction? According to (18), we have X^ > 0; if also F (X^) > 0, then bionomic equilibrium is indeed also a biological equilibrium at X = X^. But in the case that F (X^) < 0 (that is, X^ < X min = minimum viable population), extinction will result, although exploitation will cease when X (t) falls below X^. The fact that X^ is positive is also a result of the model assumption, namely, the form of production function Y = qEX, which implies that catch per unit effort Y/E 0 as X 0 The model in fact assumes that the cost of driving the resource to extinction is infinite.

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