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Conceptual Work and the "Translation" Concept1

Sandra Halverson
University of Bergen

Abstract: The concept of "translation " is required to carry a considerable load at several levels of inquiry. It functions as a causal element in sociological theories, and as a methodological tool, when used extensionally. Most importantly, it is the concept which in some way structures the field which we take as our object of inquiry. As such, it has particular functions in serving as a basis for generalizations and as a means of determining category membership. In response to what are perceived as difficulties in some of these areas, some scholars have hinted that the concept of "translation" might be fruitfully viewed as a prototype category. In this paper, I review the philosophical and empirical arguments which support such a move, and outline some of the programmatic consequences. The focus is on the resolution of current conceptual problems, and on the theoretical and metatheoretical implications. Rsum: Le concept de "traduction" est mis en uvre diffrents niveaux de la recherche: comme lment causal en sociologie, et, par extension, comme outil mthodologique. Mais il permet surtout de structurer le champ mme de l'investigation, au point de former la base des gnralisations, et d'tre un instrument de catgorisation. Face aux problmes soulevs par ces diverses fonctions, certains chercheurs sont amens dfinir la "traduction " comme une catgorie prototypique. L'article examine les arguments philosophiques et empiriques qui tayent cette rorientation conceptuelle, puis esquisse les consquences qu 'elle entrane. L'accent est mis sur des problmes conceptuels, et sur les implications aux plans thorique et mtathorique.

1.

Introduction

In a paper which in many ways is a forerunner to the present one, I argued that major philosophical differences underlie much of the past, and some of the present theoretical dissension in the field of Translation Studies (Halverson

Target 11:1 (1999), 131. DOI 10.1075/target.11.1.02hal ISSN 09241884 / E-ISSN 15699986 John Benjamins Publishing Company

SANDRA HALVERSON

1997). I also argued that what evidence there is of a rapprochement has suggested that scholars are falling down on the side of relativity, which I believe to be the lesser of two evils, though still problematic in the long run. As has been pointed out so many times before, a complete surrender to the strongest form of relativity leaves us quite unsatisfied in our efforts to account for, or motivate, the comparability of concepts and theories and the ultimate selection of one over the other (see Lakatos and Musgrave 1970, Putnam 1981, Shapere 1981, Laudan 1990). In short, concepts whose validity is completely relative to a particular constellation either a real-world, timespace one, or a theoretical one do not provide an adequate basis for scientific generalizations; one of the major pieces of work that we need our concepts to do is not getting done. The problem of the relativity of certain basic concepts in Translation Studies has also been emphasized in earlier publications (Pym 1992, 1995a, 1995b, 1997; Koller 1995). The emphasis in several of these articles has been on the inability of current "translation" concepts to do the necessary work in providing means of categorizing instances of "translation", i.e. in delineating the object territory. This job, too, is vital to the interests of an academic discipline, as agreement on this issue is paramount to the coherence of the enterprise.2 Partly in response to the basic philosophical problem, and partly in response to a growing body of empirical research, mostly in the field of psychology, a number of scholars in what has come to be called cognitive science have converged on new means of accounting for the complex relationship of the world and the human subject through a focus on the role of experience in structuring and forming human cognition. The emphasis is not on an objective, independent, discretely structured world, but on the world as construed, or enacted,3 by the cognizing subject, and on the role of human and, consequently, shared experience in our structuring of the world. In my view, the philosophical foundations of some parts of cognitive science, and certain of the theoretical and empirical programs which build on these foundations, provide us with the means of dealing with our current situation. The aim of this paper is not to provide a detailed study of the basic tenets of modern cognitive science.4 The aim is to demonstrate how several of the most fundamental philosophical, theoretical and empirical components of current cognitive science are able to resolve the most pressing conceptual difficulties of the field of Translation Studies. More specifically, I shall argue

CONCEPTUAL WORK AND THE "TRANSLATION" CONCEPT

that the problem of "delineating" the object category, i.e. distinguishing "translation" from "non-translation", is more fruitfully addressed by restating the issue. The move entails giving up both the notion of a completely objective delineation, one "true" delineation, and that of a completely socially, or culturally, relative one. It involves looking for an experientially based (shared) cognitive structure, which, when applied to empirical "reality" will yield a pattern of prototype effects. The move will provide the means of deriving the pattern of gradience in category judgments (the pattern of more or less agreement on an exemplar's status); it will provide us with the means of explaining the gradience pattern (the source of the effects); and finally, an experientially based, cognitive approach will allow us to position the "translation" category relative to other similar and related ones (e.g. communication in general, paraphrase, or even metaphor and analogy). Thus is the argument to be presented in what follows: the thesis is that "translation" is a prototype concept.5 I shall argue that only this type of concept will do the work that we want our "translation" concept to do. In arguing this case, it may be helpful to demonstrate by means of an analogy. So, for the purposes of this paper, let us assume that a concept is like any other tool, in that it helps us do a piece of work.6 In what follows, let us assume that a concept is like a car, and that the job we want done is getting from A to B. Thus our work, guaranteeing the validity of generalizations and providing a means of categorization, is analogous to getting from A to B. And the means of doing so is in the first case a concept, and in the second, a car. I hope to have shown in my earlier paper (Halverson 1997) that current philosophical positions in the field are responsible for our concept's inadequate performance on the generalizability road test. To my mind, the arguments presented by Koller (1995) and Pym (1995, 1997) successfully demonstrate a low rating on the category delineation factor. In another paper, I have also presented arguments that point towards a similar conclusion (Halverson 1998). My concern in that paper was not as much with the delineation of the category boundaries as with the internal structuring of the category, which is a related issue involving questions such as the position of, for example, natural translation, professional, and non-professional translations as non-equal members of the "translation" category. The conclusion reached by Koller, Pym and myself is the same: in short, it seems that our car (our concept of "translation") has stalled. It is not doing the work that needs to be done; we are not getting from A to B.7

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1.1. Concepts and Categories Let us assume, then, that we are in the market for a new car. Careful shoppers are probably well advised to begin their project by gathering as much information as possible about the car market; after all, buying a car is a major investment, and merits a certain amount of research before making a commitment. So, let us first refresh our memories on what we want our car (concept) to do (its work, or functions), and then we will see what our investigations into the field can tell us. To begin, then, it has been suggested that concepts fulfill four basic functions: 1. Simple categorization: the means by which people decide whether or not something belongs to a simple class (e.g. deciding that a particular object is an instance of the concept boy). Complex categorization: the means by which people decide whether or not something belongs to a complex class (e.g. deciding that a particular object is an instance of the concept rich boy). Linguistic meaning: that part of the meaning of a term explaining relations of synonymy, antonymy, and semantic implication (e.g. that part of the meaning of "boy" that explains why it is roughly synonymous to "lad" and implies being male and young.) Components of cognitive states: the critical components of beliefs, preferences, and other cognitive states; in this role, concepts are what provide a cognitive explanation of complex thought and behavior (e.g. the roles played by the concepts rich, boys and spoiled in someone's belief that rich boys are spoiled.). (Smith and Medin 1984: 114, from Rey 1983.)

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Following Smith and Medin, we shall focus on the first of these four, simple categorization, as it has been "the major focus in the literature that explicitly concerns itself with concepts" (1984: 114). This corresponds, basically, to the delineation issue mentioned in the introductory comments; that is, it is the means by which we can determine whether an exemplar belongs to the category or not (distinguishing "translation" from "non-translation"). It will become clear that the third function is also crucial to our discussion, as it pertains to the generalizability issue; reference will be made to that function where relevant. A concept, then, for the purposes of this discussion, will be

CONCEPTUAL WORK AND THE "TRANSLATION" CONCEPT

some sort of mental construct used to structure knowledge of a class of objects.8 Structuring knowledge (a combination of functions one and three) is thus, for us, the same as getting from A to B. So, what kind of car will do that for us? What is on the market, and how do the various models compare? In fact, human categorization, and the concepts used for this purpose have been the subject of a vast amount of research over the past twenty odd years, particularly in the fields of psychology and linguistics, most notably Rosch and associates (Brown 1958, 1965; Berlin 1968; Berlin and Kay 1969; Ekman et al. 1972; Rosch 1973, 1975a, 1975b, 1977, 1978, 1981; Berlin et al. 1974). The subject has also been a topic of renewed philosophical interest since Wittgenstein's discussion of family resemblance categories (Wittgenstein f953).9 Most commonly, newer theories of categorization are contrasted with the so-called classical theory, more specifically, the theory of Aristotelian categories. Classical categories are associated with two basic ideas: first, categories are linked directly with an observer-independent, objective reality; second, the link is provided by the listing of necessary and sufficient conditions, which match directly with the essential features of the object in question. The locus of the contrast between classical theory and what has come to be called prototype theory lies in a set of issues related to certain implications of classical theory. As presented by Lakoff (1987: 7), these are:
First, if categories are defined only by properties that all members share, then no members should be better examples of the category than any other members. Second, if categories are defined only by properties inherent in the members, then categories should be independent of the peculiarities of any beings doing the categorizing; that is, they should not involve such matters as human neurophysiology, human body movement;, and specific human capacities to perceive, to form mental images, to learn and remember, to organize the things learned, and to communicate efficiently.

The first of these issues is an empirical question: it relates to category judgments made by human subjects. The second is a philosophical issue pertaining to the link between language, language users and "reality". It is concerned with the separability of the three, and the directness of the link between the world and language. The findings of Rosch and her associates, and the body of work which has followed in their tradition, are in direct conflict with classical theory. With

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reference to the first of the two issues above, the conclusion following an enormous research effort is that, "it appears that graded structure is a universal property of categories" (Barsalou 1987: 102). In other words, members are graded according to their "goodness of example" ratings; they are not equal. With respect to the second of the two issues, all of the human factors mentioned above have been found to be significant. Membership gradience in categories has been proven to be a predictor in such tasks as identification of category members, the frequency with which members are generated, ease of category learning, and decision making (Barsalou 1987: 103).10 Th evidence put forward seems to point towards one conclusion: categorization is not based on objective qualities inherent in real-world objects but is dependent on and determined by properties of the human cognizer. It is also important to note that the philosophical arguments for the indeterminacy of the link between language, or any formal symbolic system, and the world were provided at about the same time. Putnam (1981) presents a forceful argument against meaning as direct reference to real-world entities by showing that reference cannot, in any way, be fixed.11 From there, the task is to develop a theory of categorization which takes into account the relevant properties of human cognition. Such a theory has been elaborated within cognitive science on the basis of the original work by Rosch et al. (e.g. Rosch 1973, 1975a, 1975b, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1981). The most relevant work in cognitive linguistics, for our purposes, has involved the merging of prototype theory with theory of metaphor, as articulated by, among others, Lakoff (1987, 1988, 1993), Sweetser (1990), Turner (1991, 1996), Gibbs (1994). In Lakoff s (1987) version, categories are seen as the result of a subject's comparison of an exemplar with a cognitive structure which underlies and motivates his/her judgments. The pattern of intragroup variation on judgment tasks is referred to as prototype effects, and these effects must be accounted for by features of the underlying cognitive structure. It is important to note that the pattern of effects is not the same as the category structure. Accounting for conceptual structure involves describing the sources of prototype effects, which is not the same as simply deriving the pattern itself. (For Lakoff s response to the "effects = structure" and the "effects = representation" interpretations of prototype theory, see Lakoff 1987: Chapter 9.) In brief, in line with Lakoff s version of prototype theory, description of a prototype concept will involve two stages: testing for effects, and describing the cognitive model which accounts for those effects.

CONCEPTUAL WORK AND THE "TRANSLATION" CONCEPT

1.2. Market Investigations


The review presented in Section 1.1 has provided us with a little background on the development of the car market. What it apparently boils down to is that there used to be only one dealership, and they sold only one kind of car. All the cars were the same, as required by the model specifications. It seems that those specifications have been handed down over the generations (over 2000 years, in fact), and the dealers claim that their model specifications are "true", in that they have been able to determine just what the essence of car-dom is. But at a recent point in the development of the traffic scene, people started realizing that they weren't getting from A to B. The odd thing was that the actual breakdowns people were suffering happened at the same time as engineers were starting to talk about the faults they were finding in the model specifications. Some engineers even began to question whether there was such a thing as an essence of car-dom. As a result of that development, a new dealership has opened up. That dealership also offers one car, but it is based on a different set of specifications, which allows for slightly different models. As a result, each car delivered is a personalized model, which is more or less the same as each other model sold. Upon request, the dealership will provide information on which models people seem to be choosing, and their own analyses of why they seem to choose the ones they do. Apparently, the range of different models is not very broad, as people, being people, tend to choose quite similar cars. The dealers claim that the secret lies in the model specifications, which, unlike those of the original dealership, are based on how drivers drive, rather than on an assumed objective essence of car-dom. Let us stop for a moment to consider the situation. For different reasons, a number of scholars have expressed dissatisfaction with the ability of current conceptualizations of the "translation" concept to do its job. It may be claimed that that dissatisfaction is limited to an admittedly vocal minority; to my mind, however, the arguments are compelling. Current approaches, all of which utilize classical categories,12 necessitate a clear boundary between "translation" and "non-translation" and the equality of all category members (i.e. all translations are equally theoretically relevant). The two best known means of boundary drawing have suffered empirical and philosophical defeat; that is, a priori approaches (e.g. based on an equivalence criterion) do not account for much of translational "reality" and are based on a philosophy which has been

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in its death throes ever since being dealt a mortal blow by Charles Darwin.13 A posteriori, relative approaches, on the other hand, while more successful at drawing a boundary (it is done by simple extension plus control procedures) are not successful in accounting for empirical evidence of membership gradience (see Chesterman 1993b, Halverson 1997, 1998). Nor is this approach philosophically satisfying, as it does not allow for grounded generalizations. What this means is that, no matter which way you look at it, current concepts are not doing the work they are supposed to do: they are not satisfactorily allowing for or accounting for actual category judgments (concept functions one and three). Furthermore, our current concepts are also built on the basis of model specifications (theories of concepts) whose philosophical bases are arguably erroneous (essentialism) or unsatisfactory for the purpose at hand (relativism). It seems to me that it might be time to visit the new dealership and see if we can arrange for a test drive.

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Prototype Concepts

Good sales people, i.e. those who sell the most, will rarely let the buyers take a close look at the merchandise without giving them the sales pitch first. And, arguably, a bit of detailed information may be in order, again, in the interest of enlightened investment. Thus, before we can take a close look at what exactly a prototype concept of "translation" might be, it behooves us to consider exactly what "driving" a prototype concept involves.

2.1. Prototype Effects


As mentioned in the introductory remarks, the first generation of prototype research revealed a wealth of what have come to be called prototype effects. The term "effects" refers to the pattern of responses shown by any group of subjects who are asked to give category judgments on a concept. This pattern demonstrates the features mentioned in Section 1.1, i.e. membership gradience, and a lack of clear boundaries, i.e. a lack of necessary and sufficient conditions. The pattern is considered to be the result of intragroup variation in the task of comparing a given exemplar to an underlying cognitive structure of some sort (to be discussed in more detail in Section 2.2). Thus, in line with Barsalou (1987: 102), the graded pattern of responses, including the central

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member, is not assumed to serve any representational function in cognition. As Rosch (1978) pointed out, prototype effects are surface phenomena.14 The methodology employed in testing for prototype effects has developed from the earlier stages of testing for the effects themselves, i.e. asking subjects to rate various potential members or non-members of categories, to studying the role of category judgments in predicting performance on a range of related categorization tasks (see Barsalou 1987, Gibbs 1994). One of the best known of the early generation studies, and perhaps the most relevant for the discussion to follow, is the Coleman and Kay (1981) study of the 'Tie" concept. This investigation was one of the earliest empirical investigations of prototype effects in a non-physical, non-object category. In this study, subjects were asked to read through a number of stories describing situations which displayed various combinations of the following elements: falsity, intent to speak falsely, and intent to deceive. In addition, the subjects were asked to indicate how certain they were of their own judgments. The results indicated prototype effects: a lack of necessary and sufficient conditions for membership and degrees of membership. This particular design has been the subject of some criticism (see e.g. Cruse 1990: 388; Wierzbicka 1990: 351). However, the methodology has survived further testing, and though it may not be "sufficiently refined" to capture all aspects of prototypicality (Myers 1994: 274), it seems to be recognized as a viable starting point in the search for prototype effects in a category.

2.2. Sources of Prototype Effects


According to current cognitive theories of categorization, the gradience shown in membership judgments is the aggregate-level result of individual acts of comparing a given instance with a more or less shared cognitive structure (see Rosch 1978: 28). The structures posited by the various scholars are intended to capture a range of different characteristics, for example actions and participants as in frames and scripts or so-called image-schematic structure (see Johnson 1987; Lakoff 1987). The basic idea is that there must be a principled relationship between the pattern of effects and the underlying cognitive structure. In what is arguably the most well-developed theory, this underlying cognitive structure is referred to as an idealized cognitive model (ICM), whose explanatory power lies in its ability to "characterize the overall category structure, indicate what the central members are, and characterize the

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links in the internal chains" (Lakoff 1987: 114). It is my claim that a Lakoffian account of the "translate" concept provides considerable insight into the problems outlined in the introductory remarks. How it does so is addressed in somewhat more detail in Section 3.2, though readers are referred to Halverson (1999) for the full analysis. The purpose of this brief outline of prototype theory was to point out what it involves to interpret a pattern of prototype effects, and how the individual categorization event fits into the overall picture. In sum, each person's individual version of a concept is based on an idealized cognitive model, of which there are many different types. These models are what are shared, and, in the approach outlined here, the most basic among them spring from human, bodily interaction with the environment. Studying a particular concept involves looking at actual category judgment evidence, and subsequently, accounting for the patterns found through a cognitive model. Now that we know a little more about what the new dealership (theoretical approach) has to offer, a little test drive may help us to get a better feel for how the car (concept) drives, and also put us in a better position to ask intelligent questions of the sales representative. In other words, it is time to see what this new kind of car will do for us.

3.

Prototypical Translation

The aim of this section is to go for a test drive: to see what it means to say that "translation" is a prototype concept. From the preceding discussion it should be clear that there are two quite immediate tasks at hand: determining the pattern of surface effects that result from category judgments, and proposing an ICM or something similar to account for that pattern. There are, of course, numerous more far-reaching implications of opting for this kind of car. Those implications will be addressed in Section 4. In what follows, the two main stages of our test drive will be dealt with separately.

3.1. Prototype Effects


In most of the studies on prototype categories mentioned above, simple category judgments were used. Such a study must, of course, be done for the "translation" category as well. However, arriving at suitable candidates for

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such judgments is a bit more complicated when dealing with an abstract category rather than a physical object category. For the latter type of concept, there is often an available array of physical objects to choose from, which is not to say that the selection is unambiguous or given in any sense. In our case, however, the candidates are less immediately available. In order to arrive at a reasonable set of candidates it is necessary to consult various sources, the first of which will be theoretical discourse. Our survey of various theoretical issues will also serve as an indicator of how deeply rooted the category membership question actually is.

3.1.1. Theoretical Discourse and Prototype Effects


From a metatheoretical perspective, it may be argued that evidence of prototype effects in the "translation" category may be found at the crux of various disagreements in theoretical discourse. In other words, what theoreticians are showing, in their disagreement, is that at this level too membership in the "translation" category is graded, and that various candidates for boundary drawing conditions are unsatisfactory. To begin, then, one of the most recent and clearest, discussions of category membership issues, and one in which the current argument is prefigured, was Koller's 1995 article. In his article, Koller neatly demonstrates the glide from "translation" to "non-translation", i.e. the non-discrete nature of the category boundary, with respect to degrees of equivalence. In his examples, Koller shows that within an equivalence-based descriptive framework, "the transition [from translation through translation with elements of text revision] to a case of revision with translated elements ... is smooth" (1995: 210). I believe that what Koller demonstrates for the equivalence dimension is also true of any other dimension we might choose to focus on (see Section 3.2). The second aspect of the category membership issue outlined by Lakoff is internal structure (see Section 1.1). This particular question has also been at issue in Translation Studies, though less clearly so. The most obvious examples are the debate on the status of professional translations and of "natural translation". The first discussion of the incompatibility of a classical category with privileged professional translations was in Chesterman (1993b). In the article, Chesterman quite rightly points out that neither a priori (e.g. equivalence-based) nor a posteriori (extensional) definitions allows the granting of special status to professional translations, as they both make use of a classical category. Chesterman's solution to the problem is, however, not to change the

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type of category. His proposal is a sociological one, in which translational behaviors, and their products, may be described in terms of the degree to which they conform to norms of various types. What Chesterman's proposal allows us to do is to address the gradience issue. In other words, conformity to a norm, or set of norms, is gradable and, as a consequence, membership may be described in terms of degree. Chesterman's move also allows for the central position of professionals, as they are by definition those who best conform to and indeed form the norm system. The proposal being argued in this paper is the cognitive counter to that sociological maneuver. Another debate which focuses on the relationship, and/or status, of various types of translation data, is the one concerning so-called "natural translation" (see Krings 1986; Harris 1977, 1992). That debate raged (rages?) over the issue of what status these translations "done by bilinguals in everyday circumstances and without special training for it" (Harris 1977: 99) should have in the field. Harris originally claimed that natural translation was central to the category, and hence should be studied first (1977: 99), which Krings, in turn, found "utterly absurd" (Krings, in Harris 1992: 99). This is a question of membership centrality, which, as Harris points out, "is undecidable", as it "all depends on what one means by the term 'translation'" (1992: 99). Harris's relativist position should, by now, be quite familiar (see Section 1 and Halverson 1998). We should recall that, as long as there is no reasonable means of grounding various definitions of the term, then Harris is quite right. All meanings of "translation" are equally good, and my study of natural translations is just as significant and relevant as yours of third-year translator trainees, or a colleague's of professionals with ten years' experience. The problem is, of course, that we have no means of positioning these relative to each other or to our overall "translation" concept in a reasonable way, which is the situation we are trying to alleviate. As this brief exchange demonstrates, discussions of membership centrality quite immediately bring philosophical issues to the surface. And as the natural translation issue illustrates, relativism, while a sympathetic attitude, does not resolve the metatheoretical tension. The final theoretical discussion which also seems to be an indicator that prototype effects might be in existence is that surrounding the well known typology put forward by Jakobson (1959). This discussion is reflective of both membership gradience issues and category delineation ones. In what follows, the latter shall be addressed first. As we know, Jakobson put forward three

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types of translation: intersemiotic, interlingual, and intralingual. This typology has subsequently been criticized on several accounts. First of all, Toury commented on its "bias for linguistic translation" (an effect of gradience?) and lack of applicability to anything beyond texts (1986: 1113). As for the foundation for the three-way distinction (the relationship between the codes involved), it was made even more general in Toury's discussion through the introduction of a higher level distinction between inter- and intrasemiotic translation, with the latter subdivided into intra- and intersystemic, and finally inter- and intralingual translation. Even with such an elaboration, however, Toury expressed more general reservations regarding the utility of such typologies (those based on the relationships between the codes involved). In his view, the role of "the relations between various semiotic systems" (1986: 1113) in affecting actual translation activity, and thus those relationships' ability to serve as a delimiting criterion, was far from clear. In addition, Toury expressed desire for a typology of translating processes based on "the semiotic entities which serve as their initial or resultant quantities", or on the "nature of the systems and codes underlying those entities" (1986: 1113, original emphasis). Thus for Toury, the question of (sub)categorization was problematic due to the lack of foundations on which to base the requisite criteria (necessary and sufficient conditions). He posed various candidates, but, quite rightly to my mind, indicated that none of these have been proven qualified. Though not intended as a criticism of a classical category approach, Toury's criticism cuts to the quick; he illustrates the problems involved in various contenders for the role of necessary and sufficient condition. Another quite well known criticism of Jakobson's thesis was presented in Derrida's "Des Tours de Babel" (1985: 173f.), also discussed in Hermans (1997). For our purposes, the most salient aspect of Derrida's analysis is his point that, while attempting to put interlingual translation in a broader semiotic framework, Jakobson undermined his own argument through his inability to "translate" interlingual translation other than through a tautological reference to "translation proper". In Derrida's analysis, though not in his terminology, Jakobson argued for equal members, while at the same time privileging one. Thus two angles of criticism of Jakobson's translation typology reflect problems with the underlying framework of classical categories that it assumed. Toury's criticism illustrated the inadequacy of various alternative necessary and sufficient conditions in the attempt to draw a category boundary or to categorize within a superordinate category, and Derrida's

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criticism illustrated the inability to come to terms with the gradience of category membership. Thus it seems that here too is evidence of prototype effects, which must be accounted for. In our brief survey of theoretical discourse, it seems that what may be termed prototype effects are visible in many of the most fundamental debates. The debate on the status of professional, non-professional, and natural translations as data reflects different centrality judgments. The discussion of categorizations of translation types reflects an inability to draw a boundary either externally at the most general level or internally within a broader category. In sum, at the metatheoretical level prototype effects are clearly visible.

3.1.2. Testing for Prototype Effects


The next logical step would be to take a look to see how subjects do on a simple category test, similar to those mentioned in Section 2.1. The design of such a test must necessarily build on elements of theoretical discourse (the issues discussed in Section 3.1.1), as well as the more obvious extensional criterion, i.e. what do people refer to as "translation"? In what follows, I shall provide brief comments on a study I carried out to test for prototype effects.15 The test I used to elicit category judgments for the "translation" category utilizes the Coleman and Kay methodology (Coleman and Kay 1981). Accordingly, a set of seven translation pairs was submitted to the informants, who were asked to indicate whether they considered the B member to be a translation of the A member.16 At the same time, informants were asked to indicate their level of certainty in responding. The dimensions tested were derived from Toury's (1986) discussion, referred to in Section 3.1.1. Thus I was interested in considering the significance of the relationships between semiotic systems, which was teased apart into an intra- versus inter- dimension, and in the case of the intersemiotic exemplars, a dimension to capture whether the two semiotic systems were of the same basic kind (e.g. linguistic, iconic, numeric, etc.). Finally, I wished to investigate the significance of language as at least one of the systems. In sum, the test was designed to shed light on the role of system boundary crossing, the relationship between the two systems, and the role of language (see also Tirkkonen-Condit 1997: 90f. on the related question of the role of interlinguality and other dimensions). In the test, I was not interested in the relationship between the actual texts (the A/B pairs): that test is at a different level, and must be done separately.

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The results of the investigation were in some respects surprising, and in others quite what would be expected. The status of the concept as a prototype one was clearly confirmed: there was a definite pattern of graded membership and there was no necessary and sufficient condition for membership (clear boundary). Furthermore, it was hardly surprising to find that the most central member of the category was interlingual translation (English-Norwegian) and that other exemplars involving a linguistic system seemed to cluster around the center. A less obvious result involved the role of intersystematicity: it was found not to constitute a necessary and sufficient condition, though among linguistic exemplars in particular, it seemed to play a role. In other words, among the linguistic exemplars the clearer the intersystematicity, the higher the rating, even though, for linguistic pairs, intrasystemic exemplars were also included in the category. On the other hand, the non-linguistic intersystemic exemplar received the lowest rating, and indeed was the only exemplar to be excluded from the category. The salience of the dimensions tested (linguality and systematicity) is thus related, and the two dimensions seem to work together in a complex way to motivate the internal structuring of the category.

3.2. The Source of These Effects


In accordance with a cognitive theory of meaning, the next phase of our venture is to attempt to account for the effects that we have found, which, as outlined in Section 2.2, will involve positing a cognitive structure. It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide such an account in detail. In what follows, I shall present the contours of my proposal for such a structure, while readers are referred to Halverson (1999) for a complete account. Oddly enough, here too my arguments will follow, at least part of the way, in Andrew Chesterman's footsteps. In his article, 'Theory in Translation Theory", Chesterman states that:
Many of the traditional ideas about translation had to do with the question of what kind of animal translation (or translating) actually is. The answers (i.e. the tentative theories) were often proposed in the form of metaphors or similes (see e.g. Koller, 1979: 49f). (The very word translation goes back, after all, through Latin transferre to Greek metepherein "to carry over": the same root that gives us metaphor, i.e. the idea that something "is" something else which it literally "is not".) (1993a: 73)

In Chesterman's view, however, in spite of the fact that "These metaphorical theories may provide enlightenment, insight, understanding", they are ulti-

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mately not theoretically useful as they are "not empirical" (1993a: 74). Chesterman's claim is that metaphorical definitions are not empirical because they are not falsifiable. This claim rests on the assumption that meaning is fundamentally literal, and that metaphor is some form of embellishment on that basis (see e.g. Gibbs 1994: 60-63). In line with this view, literal meaning ("propositional meaning", "truth conditional meaning"), or more specifically the literal meaning of a sentence, is "the set of conditions that are both necessary and sufficient to establish the truth of that sentence" (Gibbs 1994: 61). Accordingly, only literal meanings (theories) can be falsified, as they are the only ones which refer in some way to an empirical world. It is this assumption that Chesterman and I do not share.17 As a consequence, what Chesterman considers a dead-end, i.e. the metaphorical nature of many previous attempts at defining translation (and Chesterman gives an interesting list) is to me highly significant. Furthermore, the etymology of the word "translation", also mentioned by Chesterman, is not a trivial matter. In fact, etymological evidence, in addition to patterns of polysemy, provides key evidence for the kind of meaning structure posited here. In fact, the framework I make use of, involving the metaphorical motivation of both polysemy relationships and etymological development, is one of the fundamental insights provided by cognitive linguistics (see Lakoff 1987, Sweetser 1990) and, indeed, recent research in historical semantics has also provided significant perspectives on the cognitive processes involved in meaning change. As outlined by Sweetser:
In general ... it seems clear that more abstract domains of meaning tend to derive their vocabulary from more concrete domains (rather than vice versa), and, furthermore, that in some cases there is a deep cognitive predisposition to draw from certain particular concrete domains in deriving vocabulary for a given abstract domain. (1990: 18)

In Sweetser's account it is metaphorical mappings between three basic domains, from real-world content, through epistemic premises and conclusions to speech acts, which account for both etymological development and polysemy relationships in a variety of cases. Consequently, her claim is that "historical and synchronic data point to one and the same cognitively based analysis of the relevant semantic domain" (1990: 23). Thus the step from Chesterman's discussion, on the basis of Sweetser's claim, is to take a closer look at the metaphorical relationships through historical and synchronic data and to use such data in the elaboration of the cognitive model for the "transla-

CONCEPTUAL WORK AND THE "TRANSLATION" CONCEPT

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tion" concept. In Halverson (1999), I elaborate a model for the Old and Middle English "translate" concepts in addition to the Latin derivative, translate. This model is able to account for the relationship between translate, transfer, render, paraphrase, and indeed, communication in a principled way. Furthermore, the model is able to account for the various current senses of translate in English, the most recent of which is "to result in, to be converted into, to manifest itself as" (Oxford English Dictionary 1993: 409).

4. A Cost-Benefit Analysis
As we neared the end of the test drive in Section 3, it became increasingly clear that my position as objective co-shopper is becoming more and more troublesome. In fact, at times it may have been hard to tell me from the sales representative. For that reason, in this and the final sections, I will give up that fallacy altogether. Let's just say that on my first visit I was so hooked that they now let me try to sell to my friends. The objective in this section is to take a closer look at what the cost of buying one of these new cars actually is. The analysis will be somewhat general, as the detailed arguments and analyses are beyond the scope of this more programmatic paper. However, as I hope to show in Section 4.1, the upfront cost of this new type of concept is pretty straightforward.

4.1. Costs
The costs involved in a switch to a prototype concept of our object of study may be grouped into two basic types (without implying a clearly distinct boundary between the two). The first cost category comprises the philosophical expense, while the second comprises theoretical and methodological ones. Actually, these various types of assumptions, statements and rules may not be as easily separable as this tack might suggest. In fact, it has been argued both that these types of components to scientific theories constitute holistic gestalts (see Kuhn 1970) and that they are isolable components of larger complexes (for a comparison of the two views, see Laudan 1990: Chapter 3). I do not wish to take a stand on that particular issue, which to my mind seems to be an empirical question awaiting resolution, and will consequently discuss philosophical assumptions and theoretical and methodological issues in turn in the interest of convenience.

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It should be quite obvious that a major cost of opting for a prototype concept is a philosophical shift away from any remaining vestiges of essentialist philosophies, or any extreme versions of relativism. As the weaknesses of both of these positions for the discipline have been addressed in an earlier paper (Halverson 1997) and alluded to in the introductory comments to this discussion, they shall not be dwelt on any further at this point. What should be noted, however, is that having made a commitment at this level brings with it considerable responsibility in terms of the kinds of theories, methods and statements that can be countenanced in the next instance. The type of commitment involved is perhaps best summarized by Lakoff, who describes abandoning essentialism (objectivism) as renouncing any claim to a "God's eye view" of reality. Thus as Lakoff points out, quoting Putnam (1981: 49), "... there cannot be such a thing as 'exactly one true and complete description of "the way the world is"'" (1987: 260). But, as Lakoff continues:
... that does not mean that knowledge is impossible. We can know reality from the inside, on the basis of our being part of it. It is not the absolute perfect knowledge of the God's eye variety, but that kind of knowledge is logically impossible anyway. What is possible is knowledge of another kind: knowledge from a particular point of view, knowledge which includes the awareness that it is from a particular point of view, and knowledge which grants that other points of view can be legitimate. (1987: 261)

A natural reaction to this commitment is often, however, extreme in the other direction. In other words, an acceptance that there is no one absolute "true" point of view leads to the logical consequence, and the most sympathetic belief, that all points of view are equally valid. However, epistemological relativism, as has been pointed out so many times before, is unable to account for theory selection, and ultimately, scientific progress.18 To me, this argument is convincing. The middle ground seems to be presented by a pragmatic epistemology, which has been sketched in non-technical terms as follows:
we find ourselves in a situation where our only contact with the world is mediated by our concepts. We posit certain beliefs or theories to make sense of that mediated world. If those beliefs or theories were entirely free-floating (as [the relativist] believes them to be) and reflected nothing whatever about the world itself, then it would be unthinkable that they would enable us to manipulate the world as effectively as we can .... the explanation of the success of science is going to have to be told in terms of the ways in which our interaction with nature puts strong constraints on our systems of belief. (Laudan 1990: 166)

CONCEPTUAL WORK AND THE "TRANSLATION" CONCEPT

19

A philosophy of this type is entirely necessary for the view of concepts put forward by Lakoff and other cognitive linguists. It constitutes the underpinning of the theoretical enterprise. Thus the philosophical cost of the new dealership's models should be clear. The theoretical implications are less so. As I see it, the main, and most immediate effects are at the metatheoretical level (see Sections 4.2 and 5). However, there is one important theory-level implication which must be mentioned. If a conception of our object of study is provided by current theories of categorization and metaphor, then one logical consequence would be to allow those theories more room at the level of translation theory and descriptive research as well. It is interesting to note that empirical research into translation already provides scattered examples of studies in which translational phenomena are accounted for in terms of, for instance, metaphor theory (e.g. Dobrovol'skij 1996, Paulussen 1997). Furthermore, at least one scholar has pointed out the significance of metaphoric conceptualization and processes in the translation process, i.e. Mandelblit in her 1996 article, "The Cognitive View of Metaphor and Its Implications for Translation Theory". In her conclusion, Mandelblit states:
... preliminary investigations suggest that translation of conventional everyday language is highly affected by a pervasive system of metaphors. The degree of similarity between the metaphorical mappings that structure the source and target language determines the nature of the translation process. (1996: 493)

Mandelblit's claim, in short, represents a theory-level consequence of accounting for the object of study in the manner put forward in Section 3. If the object of study is to be accounted for by a given account of philosophy and meaning, then it is only reasonable that that same account be introduced at the level of theory and empirical analysis, or vice versa. These final comments are illustrative of the difficult distinction between assumptions, theory and data. What is demonstrated is the far-reaching implications of initial commitments with respect to ontological and epistemological categories; in other words, claims regarding an object of study always presuppose commitments as to what kinds of things there are, and how we can know about them. In closing this cost analysis, then, it seems fair to point out that the philosophical costs are perhaps the greatest. Our discipline has shown considerable tolerance of theoretical diversity (see Koller 1995, Hermans 1997), including cognitive perspectives, and the incorporation of metaphor theory at

20

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the level of empirical study has not seemed to be problematic. However, a commitment to the philosophical assumptions on which cognitive theories of meaning are based, whether it is forced by the empirical findings or by metatheoretical concerns, requires a more profound cognitive shift on the part of the individual scholar. The onus lies on the seller to persuade buyers to make that shift. With this in mind, the next step in the cost-benefit analysis is to factor direct savings into the equation. 4.2. Benefits (Savings) It should be fairly clear from the discussion in Sections 2 and 3 that the major thrust of my argument (as deputy seller) lies in the savings that I believe we will accrue by investing in a prototype object concept. In this section, I shall briefly review the areas in which I believe there are savings to be had. To my mind, a prototype object concept, with all that it entails, will relieve our discipline of a great deal of unnecessary discourse and dissension on issues that can never be resolved, given the philosophical programs in which those issues are framed. In a previous paper (Halverson 1997), I discuss how these frameworks have fueled the debate on equivalence. In the introductory sections of this paper, I attempt to show how the issue of our object of study remains unresolved due to the same differences. In Section 3.1, I discuss the debates on natural translation and professional versus non-professional translation as indicative of varying perspectives on the question of "what is meant by 'translation'" (Harris 1992: 99). In another paper (Halverson 1998), I discuss how a prototype object concept may provide the theoretical grounding necessary in the design of representative corpora. Thus, even at this early stage, it seems that a number of recurrent struggles might be laid to rest. In the Introduction, we isolated two basic functions of concepts, more specifically the two functions which our "translation" concept seems unable to perform: serving as a basis for category judgments and generalizations. In Section 3, we saw that debates on the issues mentioned above demonstrate prototype effects at the metatheoretical level. In closing this section, let us pull those two threads together, and see how a prototype conception would allow for the resolution of these debates by performing the two necessary functions. The first of the two, category delineation, is the issue at stake on debates over the utility of the "translation" concept. Koller (1995: 193-196) provides a concise summary of this particular discussion and the various viewpoints

CONCEPTUAL WORK AND THE "TRANSLATION" CONCEPT presented. His conclusion, however, is that
For the subject of translation research the question of how the object is to be determined is put most succinctly by asking what preconditions must be satisfied for a text to be classified as a translation and to qualify as the object of translation studies? (1995: 195)

21

In response to that question, his comment is that


Considering the multiplicity of theoretical approaches and objectives, a single clear answer can hardly be expected, and the legitimate field of concern will be marked out in different ways depending on which factors and conditions ... are taken as the basis of abstraction. (ibid)

It seems clear that this qualifier is necessary; however, without an integrated framework by which to relate the various different demarcations, we are no further towards solving our initial problem. Toury's approach to determining category membership is diametrically opposed to that put forward by Koller above. Rather than specifying the "preconditions" that a text must satisfy, Toury outlines a set of procedures to be performed on text(s) that are, for whatever reasons, "assumed" to be translations (1995: 31ff.). Such texts are then submitted to a set of "discovery procedures", which lead to the formulation of a concept of "translation" in a given time and place. This approach seems to me to be the most reasonable alternative. As put forward by Toury, this is, indeed, a most serviceable "working hypothesis" (1995: 33). However, the relativism inherent in such a framework must be constrained (see Halverson 1997), and my proposal is an attempt at doing exactly that. A different problem arises in the one existing attempt to resolve the category judgment issue to date, i.e. Chesterman's (1993b) norm-based solution. As outlined in Section 3.1, Chesterman puts forward a proposal involving the central placement of professional translations on the basis of the professionals' status as norm masters. As I see it, however, this takes us only part of the way. After all, any sociological/behavioral theory assumes a set of cognitive structures which correspond to the "internalization" of norms of various sorts (e.g. "correctness notions" or "expectations"; see Bartsch (1987: 4, 173)). These internalized structures are posited as causal factors in, for instance, translational behavior. Thus, Chesterman states, for example, "A professional translator, in other words, seeks to design a target text in such a way that it will meet the expectancy norms pertaining to it" (1993: 10). Similarly, Hermans (1991: 166, in Chesterman 1993b: 10) maintains that:

22

SANDRA HALVERSON

the "correct" translation ... is the one that fits the correctness notions prevailing in a particular system, i.e. that adopts the solutions regarded as correct for a given communicative situation, as a result of which it is accepted as correct. In other words: when translators do what is expected of them, they will be seen to have done well.

It seems to me that the internalized "correctness notions", or "expectancy norms", actually constitute a concept of translation, which professionals (by definition) are best able to emulate. In other words, it seems that professionals acquire their status by virtue of their ability to produce texts which fit the concept of translation which is current in their time and place, at least. The same may be said of Toury's norm-based theory. Within his framework, it is claimed that translators adopt an orientation in a so-called "initial norm" (1995: 56f.). This orientation involves a position relative to two sets of potentially competing cultural norms, i.e. source and target. Thus this "logically superordinate" norm is given:
a "value" [which] may be described as consisting of two major elements: (1) being a text in a certain language, and hence occupying a position, or filling in a slot, in the appropriate culture, or in a certain section thereof; (2) constituting a representation in that language/culture of another, pre-existing text in some other language, belonging to some other culture and occupying a definite position within it. (1995: 56)

Toury continues in his discussion of this particular norm, and states that:
Its initiality derives from its superordinance over particular norms which pertain to lower, and therefore more specific levels. The kind of priority postulated here is basically logical, and need not coincide with any 'real', i.e., chronological order of application. (1995: 57)

To my mind, both the content and the particular status of this initial norm indicate that it, in fact, is the same thing as an underlying concept of "translation" adopted by the translator. In this respect, it seems to correspond to "correctness notions" and "expectancy notions" in Chesterman's and Hermans's accounts. Furthermore, Toury's need to distinguish between a "logical" and a "chronological" priority may be seen as a result of the cognitive nature of that particular norm. Perhaps the former actually corresponds to a more deep-seated long-term knowledge structure, while the latter might be a short-term, situation-specific instantiation of the concept, or a situation-specific, more conscious (re)orientation. These thoughts are mere speculation at this stage. The point is that

CONCEPTUAL WORK AND THE "TRANSLATION" CONCEPT

23

Toury's need for distinctions of this type is decisive evidence of the need for distinctions at the cognitive level. Given this interpretation, it seems obvious that a discipline which only considers the visible, behavioral outcome (normbased behavior) is assigning much of importance to the level of assumptions (internalized norms of various types). In terms of the first function, then, category delineation, a prototype concept would resolve the problem of where to draw the boundary by eliminating the question. Both philosophical argument and empirical research point in the same direction: there is no means of drawing a clear boundary. For those who feel in need of some comfort at the loss of an absolute resolution, it may be found in looking at the gains in the related issue of internal category structure, i.e. membership gradience. Prototype tests and other forms of empirical analysis will allow us to determine which members are central, and which are not. This, in turn, will allow for a coherent resolution of the natural translation issue, for example, as well as any other gradience questions which might arise. The philosophy underlying this approach also provides a grounding for the sociologically motivated step taken by Chesterman (1993b), at the same time as it opens for study of the cognitive issues and assumptions which have not, as yet, been brought to the fore in our field.19 With regard to the second function, i.e. serving as a basis for generalizations, this is much more a philosophical issue. What I hope to have shown is that neither of the philosophies currently prevailing in the field allow for a coherent resolution of that issue. I believe that an experientially based, idealized cognitive model of the type mentioned in Section 3.2 (see Halverson 1999) will provide that basis. A model of this type, based on a shared human image-schema, allows for a philosophically coherent means of linking concepts of "translation" across languages and over time. Thus, the basis for the derivation of this model, i.e. etymological evidence and polysemy patterns, allows for cross-linguistic comparison as well. Given the shared etymology and the significance granted this type of evidence in cognitive theories, generalizations will be firmly grounded. To sum up, it seems that our main up front cost is a rather major philosophical shift. The disadvantages of current positions, and some of the advantages of the new one have been outlined in this and other papers (Halverson 1997, 1998, 1999, forthcoming). In addition to this initial cost, it is important that we factor in the immediate savings that our investment will allow. As outlined above, these savings primarily take the form of conserva-

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tion of intellectual energy currently expended on unfruitful and irreconcilable differences. In what follows, however, I shall outline the additional benefits of investing in the new type of car. Thus far, I have focused on showing how it will get us from A to B. The closing comments will suggest a couple of additional gains; that car may do more than we currently need. 5. Conclusions

In discussing the savings to be had by laying to rest the issue of internal category structure (natural, professional, non-professional translation), I left untouched one of the issues dealt with in Section 3.1.1, i.e. the taxonomic/ typological categorization of various types of translation. Obviously, this discussion would also be resolved through the type of object concept that I am proposing. It is important to note, however, that the issue of taxonomic relationships, while related to internal category structure, is also linked to the question of how one category relates to others. The means used to structure systems of related categories must be related in a principled way to those used to structure a category internally. Within classical theories of categorization, necessarily equal members are assigned to categories which are structured hierarchically through the addition of further specifying features. This has been schematically illustrated for the "translation" category by Nord (1997: 15f.). However, given the evidence against classical categories, and given the evidence of prototype effects in the "translation" category, it seems that the structure which links "translation" to, for example, "transfer", "paraphrase", etc. must also be re-examined (see Section 3.2). In short, given a system of prototype categories, it is not immediately meaningful to say "translation is a communicative process", or "translation is a semiotic process". Within the classical system, statements of this nature, involving claims that "X is a kind of Y", implied that every member of Y shares (a set of) features, and that if X is a subcategory, then all of its members share all features of Y plus one more. Within a prototype system, however, statements of category membership acquire a different status. First of all, category relationships may be structured in a different way. And secondly, the type of relationship posited between members, including subcategories, must be accounted for by the underlying cognitive model.

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For the "translation" category, I posit that the same cognitive model encompasses a number of concepts (see Halverson 1999). This means that the various concepts which make use of, or are derived from, the same model are thus related in a very fundamental way, which implies that the scope of our field may be considerably broadened. At the same time, however, I believe that the status of interlingual translation within such a system of related concepts remains central. One indication of that centrality lies in the particular relationship of interlingual translation to the underlying cognitive model. Another is the pervasive use of the "translation" concept as a source domain in metaphors of understanding. Thus, a prototype approach to category delineation also provides the means by which the "translation" category may be related to numerous other conceptual categories. It provides a fruitful means by which to tackle one attempt at such a project, i.e. Even-Zohar's (1990) proposal that we consider 'translation' and 'transfer' as part of one and the same overall complex. As Even-Zohar points out, translation theory has already transcended the boundaries of what Jakobson termed "translation proper". However, as indicated by the results of my prototype test, the roles of a linguistic code and intersystematicity are not as straightforward as a system of classical categories would have it. Indeed, these results are in direct conflict with a classical taxonomic classification system. Therefore, if Even-Zohar's project is to be addressed, which I believe it should be, it will have to be done through a prototype analysis.20 In the Introduction, as well as in previous papers, I outlined what I consider to be serious problems in current attempts to deal with the concept of "translation". I suggested that our concept was not doing the work that we want it to do. In Section 2, we took a closer look at an alternative approach, and in Section 3 we tried that approach out. In Section 4 we added up the immediate costs and savings, and finally we looked at some of the potential for additional performance. For my money, the new dealership's car wins hands down. Their model did well on the test drive; we got from A to B with no trouble. Furthermore, the cost, particularly considering the savings end of it, seems quite reasonable. And if, in fact, the model turns out to be able to do even more than get us from A to B, so much the better. What remains, then, is for the rest of the shoppers to make up their minds. (Not that I am on a commission, of course.)

26 Author's address:

SANDRA HALVERSON

Sandra Halverson Department of English University of Bergen Sydnesplass 7, N-5007 BERGEN Norway e-mail: sandra.halverson@eng.uib.no

Notes
1. The following is a much revised and expanded version of a paper presented under the title "Conceptual Categories in Translation Studies: Moving from Classical to Prototype", at Transferre Necesse Est', the Second International Conference on Current Trends in Studies of Translation and Interpreting, Budapest, 5-7 September 1996. Many thanks to Professor Sonja Tirkkonen-Condit for positive comments. The paper has also been reworked to strengthen ties between it and a previous paper (Halverson 1997). On the role of agreement on this issue in a 'research program', see Lakatos (1970: 132f) on positive and negative heuristics, or as part of the 'disciplinary matrix' of a 'scientific community' (Kuhn 1977: Chapter 12). The term 'construal' is perhaps the most widely used, while 'enactment' has thus far more limited use (see Varela et al. 1991). For a concise overview of the basic historical development and alternative approaches, see Varela et al. (1991, part II). For a brief overview of the basic issues, see Lakoff (1988). For an in-depth analysis of the philosophical issues, see Lakoff (1987). The approach to be advocated here is built on newer Anglo-American philosophies, though, as pointed out by Varela et al. (1991), on the vital issues, these philosophies have much in common with the Continental philosophies of Heidegger and Gadamer in particular. To my knowledge, the first suggestion of this type was put forward by Toury as early as 1980. His proposal was that "... we think of translation as a class of phenomena, the relations between the members of which are those of family resemblance ..." (1980: 18, original emphasis). Toury continues with the recognition that "obviously, such a discussion can hardly be said to conclude by a mere declaration that the relationships between the members of the 'translation' class be regarded as those of family resemblance" (1980: 18, original emphasis). It is at this point that my discussion in Section 3 begins. A similar proposal was put forward by Tirkkonen-Condit (1997), with a rather different focus. The obviously instrumentalist appearance of this analogy is not meant to imply that concepts are 'mere' theoretical tools. As I hope to make clear in what follows, concepts are viewed as experientially grounded cognitive 'tools', which is to say that they are assumed to bear a specific relationship to 'reality'. The distinction lies in the issue of the link with reality. Epistemological instrumentalism claims that concepts are tools which help to describe reality, without having any specific link to it. The claim here is that concepts are experientially grounded, i.e. they are linked to reality through the mediation of human experience in bodily interaction with the world. As such, concepts are based on embodied construals of repeated interactive patterns. They are cognitive tools which allow humans to manipulate and control their environment.

2.

3. 4.

5.

6.

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7.

It may be argued that certain theoreticians' seeming abandonment of the categorization issue provides further evidence that current conceptualizations are not getting the job done. Thus Pym (1997: 77) reports of Vermeer's wanting to drop the terms of 'translation' and 'equivalence' altogether. As I have not had access to Vermeer's manuscript, it would be presumptuous to suggest any motivation for such a proposal. But, from this vantage point, it looks an awful lot like a stranded traveler to me. For the purposes of this argument I do not intend to take a position on the ontological status of that mental construct. There are various views on this issue. As outlined by Varela et al. (1991), these views may be roughly grouped as either cognitivist (computational/symbolic), emergent (connectionist), or enactive. To my mind, Varela et al.'s arguments for an enactive account seem to be most compelling, and these are in closest alignment with the account of categorization to follow. Also Hofstadter's (1985) arguments for an emergent (bottom-up) approach, and against a top-down (symbolic) one are most persuasive. And Bechtel (1990) presents a convincing case for the integration of a prototype approach to categorization with connectionist models of cognition. For those unfamiliar with the discussion, a family resemblance category is one in which membership is not granted by possession of a set of necessary and sufficient conditions, and for which, consequently, no fixed boundaries may be drawn. In such a category, members may be linked to each other through various chains of similarity or resemblance. In addition, certain members of such a category may be viewed as better examples, or more central members than others. Wittgenstein's example was the 'game' category, in which members may be included on the basis of the people or artifacts involved, the entertainment value, the competitive nature of the game, etc. No one feature is shared by all. Dice were given as an example of a non-central member of the 'game' category (Wittgenstein 1953: 66f.). Barsalou (1987) also provides references to specific studies. For an additional review, see Lakoff (1987: Part I). For a helpful discussion of the argument and its application to formal semantics, see Lakoff (1987: Chapter 15). This point was first made by Chesterman (1993b). I elaborated on this problem in the original presentation of this paper, and in Halverson (1998). For a discussion of objectivism/essentialism and natural kinds and the implications of Darwinism, see Lakoff (1987: Chapter 12) and Dennett (1995: Chapter One). For an overview of the research, see e.g. Lakoff (1987), Aitchison (1994: Chapter 4), Gibbs (1994). The investigation is described in a paper entitled "Prototype Effects in the 'Translation' Category" presented at the Second International EST Congress, Granada, 23-26 September 1998, forthcoming in the volume of proceedings. Actually, the survey was conducted using Norwegian informants, and as such the test was not of the 'translation' concept, but of the Norwegian concept of 'oversettelse'. This is, of course, irrelevant to the general argument, as prototype structure is claimed to hold for all languages. The relationship between the various languages' concepts is a relevant issue for the elaboration of the ICM in the next instance (see Halverson 1999).

8.

9.

10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

16.

28
17.

SANDRA HALVERSON

Actually, we do not share a philosophy of science, either. Chesterman argues for a realist (Popperian) philosophy, while to me a pragmatic approach (e.g. Laudan 1981, 1990) is more compelling. This is not the time or the place for (more of) that discussion, however. Furthermore, there is the issue of whether or not relativism is self-refuting, To my mind, in its most extreme forms, it is (see Putnam 1981: Chapter 5; Laudan 1990: Chapter 6). This is certainly not to imply that psychological factors have not been investigated. On the contrary, there is a considerable body of research into the psychological aspects of the translation process (see e.g. Kussmaul and Tirkkonen-Condit 1995; Fraser 1996 for surveys of the area). However, the focus in the study of translation processes has been very different from my own. Nevertheless, a cognitive approach to translation will address some of the same issues as current translation processes research. For example, Tirkkonen-Condit reports that professional translators demonstrate an awareness of "the overall gestalt of the emerging target text" (personal communication). Such an awareness might be targeted for further study in a cognitive perspective. The same goes, naturally, for Pym's (1992, 1995a) similar proposal regarding the relationship between translation and transfer, i.e. that they must be addressed as part of the same overall enterprise. However, we come to the same conclusion for very different reasons. Pym is most definitely not concerned with cognitive arguments; his is a much more materialist interest. Thus, while I would argue that transfer and translation are best considered as part of the same complex on the basis of their cognitive status, Pym argues on the basis of material concerns.

18. 19.

20.

References
Aitchison, Jean. 1994. Words in the Mind: An Introduction to the Mental Lexicon. Oxford: Blackwell. Barsalou, Lawrence. 1987. "The Instability of Graded Structure: Implications for the Nature of Concepts". Ulric Neisser, ed. Concepts and Conceptual Development: Ecological and Intellectual Factors in Categorization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987. 101-140. Bartsch, Renate. 1987. Norms of Language. London: Longman. Bechtel, William. 1990. "Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind: An Overview". William Lycan, ed. Mind and Cognition: A Reader. Oxford: Blackwell, 1990. 252-273. Berlin, Brent. 1968. Tzeltal Numeral Classifiers. The Hague: Mouton. Berlin, Brent and Paul Kay. 1969. Basic Color Terms: Their Universality and Evolution. Berkeley: University of California Press. Berlin, Brent, Dennis E. Breedlove and Peter H. Raven. 1974. Principles of Tzeltal Plant Classification. New York: Academic. Brown, Roger. 1958. "How Shall a Thing Be Called?" Psychological Review 65. 14-21. Brown, Roger. 1965. Social Psychology. New York: Free Press. Chesterman, Andrew. 1993a. "Theory in Translation Theory". The New Courant 1. 69-79. Chesterman, Andrew. 1993b. "From 'Is' to 'Ought': Laws, Norms and Strategies in Translation Studies". Target 5:1. 1-20.

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