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Themilitarizationandweaponizationofspace: towar dsaEur opeanspacedeter r ent

* 3AFStrategyandInternationalAffairsCommission Writers'Group

Defensive in its fir st decades, the use of space for militar y pur poses has now become offensive. The conceptofmilitar izedouter spacehas beenr eplacedbythatofweaponizedouter space.Inter national law in space only str ictly pr ohibits putting weapons of mass destr uction into or bit. The thr eat of conventionalar msdevelopment,mainlytar getingthedestr uctionofoper ationalmilitar ysatellites,isone which may not be pr evented simply by diplomatic activity, an appr oach to which Fr ance has been wholehear tedly committed. In this context, a Eur opean space deter r ent, based on the expr ession of a str ongEur opeanfor eignpolicyandonthedevelopmentofindependentmeansfor or bitalsur veillanceof ballistic andspace launches, andindeedr etaliationif attacked, including ar apidr esponsecapacity and small dedicated launcher s, seems in itself to secur e a space which, used for the social and economic developmentofFr anceandEur ope,willbecomemor eandmor eimpor tantinthenextfewdecades.Such anassetwouldplaceEur opeon anequal footingindialogues withtheUnitedStates inthe contextof a NATOequippedwithinter oper ablespaceassets.

Space:forpeacefulpurposesorafuturetheatreofconflict? Theconquestofspace,startedattheendofthefifties,coincidedwiththebeginningoftheColdWar.Itwasan integralpartoftheEastWestconfrontation.Withtheirpoliticalandtechnologicalrivalry,theUnitesStatesand theUSSRgaveamilitaryaspecttospacewiththecommissioningofballisticmissilesandthelaunchingofthe firstartificialsatellites.TheothermembersoftheUNSecurityCouncilhavefollowedsuit.Andstillothershave gone downthis path, wishing to exert regional influence.ThePeoples Republic ofChinaand Indiaare clear examples. Simultaneously, civil applications have emerged. They show that States are convinced of their importance in future social and economic development. The countries operating a liberal economy have also encouragedprivateoperators. The passive militarization of space results in putting into orbit of satellites for reconnaissance, secure telecommunications,spacesurveillanceandeavedropping.Theseinformationgatheringtechnologiescontribute tothestrategyofStateswhichpossessthemandprovidelogisticsupporttotheirtroopsdeployedinoperational theatres.Theydonthoweverformpartofarmamentssystemswiththepurposeofneutralizingordestroyingthe enemyanditscapacities.Theyhave,initially,contributedtothestabilizationofinternationalrelationsthrough theirroleofoverseeingtheimplementationoftreatiesonscalingdownthearmsrace. From the eighties onwards, space systems have started to enter the arsenal of nuclear and space powers. The networksofnavigationsatellites,GPSintheUnitedStatesandGLONASSinRussia,withtheinformationthey contributetocruisemissilesguidanceandconstituteafirststeptowardtheuseofspaceasamilitaryresourcefor destroyingenemyforces.

LedbyPhilippeHenry (Snecma):DidierCompard(ECTI),BernardDeloffre(SatelConseilInternational),Bertrandde Montluc(MinistryforForeignAffairs AnalysisandpredictionCenter),JeanJamet(3AF),MichelLaffaiteur(3AF),Louis Laidet(3AF,PresidentoftheCommissionforStrategyandInternationalAffairs)

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Thisdevelopmenthasbeenamplifiedduringtheninetiesuptothepointwhere,intheUnitedStates,spaceisan amplifierofforcesandasymboloftherevolutioninmilitaryaffairs.FromtheendoftheClintonadministration thePearlHarboursyndrome has heldsway, openingthe waytoapolicy ofcontrollingspaceand more and moreovertstrategyofspacedefence. Inthiscontext,theUnitedNationshavedevelopedinternationallawspecificallyforspace.Itconsistsofseveral treaties,butnonehaveasyetbeenunanimouslyratifiedbyitsmembers.The1967Treaty,onthepeacefuluseof extraatmosphericspace,wasdrawnupbytheUnitedStatesandtheUSSR.Thegeneralprinciplesonwhichitis foundedhaveanethicalandmoralcharacter.Itistheresult ofacompromisewhichhadtoensureneitherside couldgaintheadvantagefromtheiractivitiesinouterspace.Thesetwosuperpowershadtomaintainabalance either by prohibition or by the limitation of certain uses. In particular, putting weapons of mass destruction, particularlynuclear,intoorbitwasprohibited.However,anambiguityremainedinarticleIV.Itstipulates"not placingsucharms,inanyway,inextraatmosphericspace".Theuseofmissilesinouterspaceisthereforenot excluded. However, the same article says that all States, party to the Treaty, will use the Moon and other celestial bodies for exclusively peaceful purposes". So this formula leaves the possibility of using extra atmosphericspaceformilitarypurposes. If the principle of a peaceful use of outer space has clearly been stated, it is in fact just a form of words. Its systematicrepetitioninalmostalltheresolutionsanddeclarationswouldgivetheimpressionthatitislaiddown asthemandatorymoralruleofinternationallaw.Butitdoesntensurethedemilitarizationofspace:iftheMoon and the other celestial bodies constitute a demilitarized zone, earth orbit, from which weapons of mass destruction are excluded, does not have to be free of military activities judged to be nonaggressive like, for example,spying,telecommunicationsorpositioning.

TheWeaponizationofspace The militaryuse ofspace is not howeverlimitedtothesedefensiveapplications.Theconcept of militarized outerspace has beenreplacedbythat ofweaponized outerspace.The expressionweaponizationofspace defines theprocess whichresultsinthedeployment ofweapons inspace which maythenbecomeatheatreof conflict,abattlefield,bytheuseofweaponsaimedatdestroyingtargetseitherinorbitorontheEarthssurface. Thearmingofspaceconstitutesadestabilizingfactorforinternationalrelations. ThemediacoverageoftheinterceptiontestsuccessfullycarriedoutbyChinaon11January2007ononeofits satellites(FengYun1C,windandclouds)byarocketderivedfromasolidpropulsionballisticmissile,finally drewthewholeworld'sattentiontothetechnologicalcapacitiesofsomeStateswhichhavethisastheiraim.This interception is the conclusion of a phase of technological demonstration which included three other attempts since2004,whichitis difficulttosaywerefailuresormerelypreliminaryverifications.Indeed,theAmericans hadthemselvesdevelopedsuchsystemsbutdecidedagainsttheirdeployment.AndtheSovietUnionhaditsown projects.DotheRussiansstillpossesssuchsystems?Novisibleactivityhasbeenobservedonsincetheendof thecommunistregime.SotheChinesetestsurprisedandshockedusassomethingofananachronism,especially asitwasasuccess.Thissuddenreappearanceofantisatelliteweaponsmakesthemnownolongeramonopoly oftheAmericanstrategistsbutcommonpropertyofthewholeinternationalcommunity. It is howevertobefearedthat these events only giveapartialview oftheprogrammesofthe mostadvanced space powers intending to equip themselves with attack capacities which can be described as weapons in space. It is quite possible in fact that the weapons race may in the future take place in other directions than 1 nuclear, space systems being part of one of the elements (C4ISR , reactive infrastructure) of the new triad" 2 definedinthe NuclearPostureReview2002,constitutinganimportantlayerinantimissiledefence. SincethewithdrawaloftheAmericansfromtheABMtreaty,thelegalvacuumconcerningtheaggressiveuseof space seems clearer and clearer. Moreover, the nonexistence of a multilateral forum for discussion and the consideration of questions of peaceful uses for space constitutes a serious handicap while resumption of the ConferenceonDisarmamenttalksdoesntappeartobeveryrealistic.

1 2

C4ISR:Command,control,communications,computers,intelligence,surveillance,reconnaissance. See thetestimonybeforeCongress(HR)forthepresentationofthe2008budgetoftheBMDofLtGlH.A.Obering,directorofthe MissileDefenceAgency(27March2007) :IbelievetheperformanceoftheBMDsystemcouldbegreatlyenhancedbyanintegrated spacebaselayer.

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ThedevelopmentofconceptsfortheuseofSpacefordiplomaticpurposes Attacks onmilitaryordualpurposesatellitesbelongingtootherStates maycoverseveraldifferent methods of action: intrusion in vital satellite systems and the ground segment which control them, electronic jamming, ionizing and electromagnetic effects produced by high altitude nuclear explosion, destruction by means of kineticordirectedenergyantisatelliteweapons(powerfulmicrowaves,laserweapons)fromthegroundorfrom space.Theputtingintoorbit,onstandby,ofmilitarypayloads whichmaythensubsequentlybedesorbitedand directedattargetsonthegroundhasalsobeenstudied.Althoughtheiraccuracyisdebatable,theirfeasibilityis beyonddoubt.Theycouldbethoughtofasconventionalweaponsofmassdestruction. TheG.W.Bushgovernment'snewAmericanspacepolicy(NationalSpacePolicy)ofOctober2006assertsthe principle of freedom of action in space. It rejects any limitation on the right, which is considered to be fundamental, to use space, including its weaponization when the vital interests of the United States are threatened. TheChineseantisatelliteweapontesthasrelaunchedthedebateontheriskswhichwillberunifarmsareused inspace,risks which may effectivelybecomethreatstootherStates.Therelative moderationofthe American comments whichfollowedandtheindifference displayedbytheChinesein theface ofthe disapproval ofthe mostvocalcountriesillustratesonceagain theasymmetricalstrategyofthiscountryandwhileithasthecapacity toanticipatesuchaneventAmericahasntattemptedtodissuadeit. Indeed,thedestructionofoneofitssatellitesdoesntconstituteanaggressiveactonthepartoftheChinese.It appearsasanaturalconsequenceofthearrangementsfortheuseoforbitalspace.Thesituationwouldhavebeen completely different if the destroyed satellite had belonged to another country. However, with respect to the arrangementsrecentlyapprovedbytheCommitteeforthepeacefuluseofouterspace(COPUOS),theChinese test is wholly condemnable interms oftheadditional pollution ofspace which it has generated.In effect, the presenceinorbit ofalargeamount ofdebrisarisingfromthecollisioncontributestoagrowingriskfactorfor satellitesandforthesafetyofthecrewsofmannedspacecraft.Itisbecomingextremelyworrying. Safetyinspace,whichtheUnitedStates,asalsoChina,eachintheirownwayclaimtowishtomaintain,also correspondstothepositionofFranceandEurope.China,likeIndiaandJapan,hasbeenspeakingforalongtime infavourofdisarmamentinspace.ApossiblereadingofthetechnologicaldemonstrationoflastJanuaryisthatit isattemptingtoconvincetheWesternpowersbyashowofstrengthapparentlycontrarytoitsprofessedaims. The United States, whose economy and global defence network depends more than any other country on its space systems, seems clearly to be moving towards a reopening of discussions on security in space so as to reunite around it those wishing to codify and control space security, resulting in something like what already exists for air traffic. The recent attempts by the Chinese, including that denounced by the Americans, to illuminate one of their satellites with a laser beam, proves that most space powers which possess satellites or mannedspacecraftinorbitareinterestedinprovidingspacewitharealframeworkforcontrolwhichguarantees itssecurity. Very many analyses and recommendations have been made in past years by States, in the appropriate multilateral bodies, and beyond this arena by "think tanks" and academic research groups with a view to suggestingwaysandmeanstomakeouterspacesafe,tomakeupforthelegalshortcomingsofthetreaties,orin facttoamendorcompletethem,oreventoproposenewinstitutionsandmeasureswhichaimatincreasingtrust amongpartners. ButtherecenteventsdemonstratetheunilateralcharacteroftheforeignpolicyoftheUnitedStatesandChinain theiruseofspacetoincreasetheirpower.Chinasdemonstrationofdestructionmaybeinterpretedasaresponse to the American doctrine of the military use of space. As an asymmetric strategy, it finds in the inherent vulnerabilityofspacesystemswhichareincreasinginnumberandhaveakeyroleintheconductofmilitary operationsanAchillesheelwhichcanclearlybeseentobefragile. The negotiations called Paros3 (prevention of an arms race in space) have been moribund for several years, particularlyduetotheblockingbytheUnitedStates,inoppositiontoChinaandRussia,inparticular,whoare favorabletothesettingupofanewstricterlegalframework.
3

PAROS: PreventionofanArmsraceinOuterSpace(theme exploredbytheConferenceonDisarmamentwhichhas66participating States)

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As for France, it is committed to the nonarming of space which it regards as an essential element for internationalsecurity.Itisagainstanydeployment ofoffensiveweaponryandrejectsanyinitiativewhichmay restartanarmsraceinspace.Butsecurityinspaceisnotlimitedtothesingleissueofarmaments:itconcerns freedomofaccessandsafetyinandofspace.

WhatistheFrenchposition? Whereas the United States and the Russian Federation possess all the operational capacities necessary for detecting, qualifying and making credible such events, France does not have a global concept for the use of space,evenifithasdecided,fromthebeginningofthenineties,toacquireobservationsatellites(Helios1&2, thenEssaim)andsecuredtelecommunications(Syracuse3)whoseprotectionagainstelectromagneticradiation has been strengthened. Lets remember that these programmes would not have seen the light of day if they hadntbeenprecededintheseventiesandeightiesbyothers,lessambitious,withadualusealthoughessential civil:SPOTandTelecom1&2. Italsohasacapacityfordetectingobjectsinloworbit:thebistaticradarGraves.Evenifthishasbeenableto,a posteriori,identifyandanalyzetheconsequencesoftheChineseaction,itsperformanceislimited,inparticular intermsofthesizeoftargets.Consequently,FrancedependstotallyontheAmericancapacitiesforidentifying anddatingmonitoredevents.Inpractice,theburdenofproofforaState,inthecaseofanattack,meansithasto beabletounambiguouslydistinguishaneventfromanyotherwhichcouldresultfromanaturalphenomenonor fromthefailureofoneoftheseorbitingsatellites.AsystemwhichisindependentfromtheAmericanoneisonly feasibleattheEuropeanlevel:ontheonehand,becauseitwouldnaturallyhavetobeseenintermsoftheglobal objectiveofthesecurityofthemembersoftheEuropeanUnionand,ontheother,becausethemultiplicationof observation centers would lead to a cost of installation and maintenance which only the Union could finance withoutaheavyimpactonthebudgetsofthethreearmedforces. Incidentally,Franceis developing alowcostsurveillanceandballistic deliverysystem warning demonstrator, two Spirale minisatellites. The objective is to test the technologies which may be implemented in future operationalsystems. Proposals haverecentlybeenformulatedas part ofa nationalstrategicstudy foradefenceandsecurityspace policy(reportoftheStrategicOrientationGroupforSpacePolicy,"GOSPS").Inessence,theapproachaimsto ensure the protection of national capacities (protection of satellites), continue the work already undertaken on space surveillance demonstrators then moving on to a more operational system and gradually making it more European,stoppingshortofencouragingstudiesonoffensivesystemsinthenameoflegitimatedefence. Inlegalterms,noproposalatthenationallevelhasbeenenvisagedasfarasweknow.ThedraftFrenchlawon space,beingpreparedintheCouncilofState,deals essentiallywithquestions oftheStatesresponsibilityasa launchingState,incoonformitywiththeprovisions ofthe1967Treaty.Moreover,ittakesuptheloopholes in 4 internationallawandproposesanimplementationofthenationalregistrationofspaceobjects.

WhatdoctrineshouldFranceadopt? Thisquestionisofgreatconcerntousforareasonwhichbecameclearwiththepublicationofthedeclassified GOSPSreportentitledLetsgivemorespacetoourdefence,OrientationsforaspacedefencepolicyforFrance andEurope. Thisstrategydocument,approvedbytheMinistryofDefence,effectivelyrecommendsthatFranceincreasesits use of space systems. It is for a more advanced sharing of European capacities in this area. A realistic view would include cooperative military operations involving the sharing of some resources at a level where space 5 systems would necessarily be included (C4ISR) . From now on it appears clear that we have to convince our partnersofthefullyoperationalcapacitiesoftheseresourcesforundertakingmissionsofdefenceandsecurity.

4 5

Draftlaw,pages73to75.
The2020visionofAED/EDAshowstheimportanceofC3andC4ISR.

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Inthesecircumstances,thequestionoftheirvulnerabilityanddependabilitycannotbeevaded.Theirprotection 6 has a cost. Having a reactive capacity available (responsiveness as the Americans call it) also has considerable financial consequences. If it happens that there is a trend toward antisatellite weapons, possibly justifyingareactionfromusandinvestmentsintechnologicalresearch,newfinancewillhavetobefoundfora Research & Development Common Budget envelope which is already very limited. In other words, the consequencesforFranceofanactivemilitarizationofspacewillnotbefeltsimplyatthediplomaticlevel,but couldhaveanimpacton theorientationsofspacedoctrineandtheplanningofinvestments. Inreality,ifweconsidermakingofouterspaceanewarenawherethepowersmayconfronteachotherbeyond or in the continuum of atmospheric space, or to speak of a necessary securing of transactions in space and recognisetheincreasingmilitarizationofthisenvironment,wemustaskourselvesabasicquestion,articulatedas threepoints: 1. Dowenow,duringpeacetime,havetomanagespace,whoseuseisbecomingcommonplaceasanasset, aterritory,ameans ofcommunication,sothat itsusers may enjoyaminimum ofpredictableandsafe rulesofconduct? 2. Canwestillhopetodemilitarizethisenvironment,inwaystobedefined? 3. Dowehavetofaceuptothearmingofthisterritoryasunavoidable? Iftheactivemilitarization,offensiveoraggressive(whichtheAmericanscallcounterspace,spacedenial) of space is avoidable, how can we influence the players so that they reject this? In fact, despite having accumulatedthetechnological elementsnecessary,theUnitedStates hasnot,sincethedemonstrationof1985, engagedinactivitiesgeneratingdebrisnordeployedevensimpleweapons.SomeAmericanresearchersremain 7 convincedthattheoperationalimplementationofnumerousfuturistsystemswouldberandomandcostly. Itis 8 not impossiblethat the excesses oftheRumsfeld doctrine oftherevolution in militaryaffairs andthefully technologyorientedpolicywillbetempered,atleastmomentarily.Ifstoppingthearmingofspaceistherefore stillarealisticobjective,wecanargueforaEuropeanapproach whichisstilltobeorganizedaroundtheshared viewsofFrance,GermanyandItalyquiteclosetotheCanadianposition.Itwouldmeananincreasedsecuring oftheouterspaceenvironmentforspaceobjects,whethercivilormilitary,bymeansofrulesofconductsimilar tothoserecommendedforthepreventionofspacedebris,and/orpoliticaldeclarations drawingattentiontothe 9 mostsignificanteffortsfromtheresponsiblenations.
10 If arming is inevitable , the approach will have to be different, orientated on our own capacities to slow it down and, at the same time, to protect ourselves in legitimate defence : analysis of threats, 11 countermeasuresoractiveandpassiveprotectionofsatellites ,spacesurveillanceandearywarning, demonstrators, if necessary the working out of a policy of space reactivity with or without the deploymentofantisatellite equipment.The issue isclearlythatFrance andEuropeshould notinthe futurebeblind,paralysed,dominatedanddependentwithoutsomedegreeofautonomy.

WhatstepsshouldEuropetakeforitsdefenceandsecurity?
Confrontedwiththephenomenonofthegradualarmingofspace,FranceandsomeofitspartnersinEuropemay, ifthe hypothesis ofathreat was totakeform inspeeches and deeds,enlargetherange ofalternatives opento them : diplomatic action and control of armaments, technological and industrial measures aimed at the 12 development of European capacities possibly within the NATO framework of space surveillance and warning systems, and an increase in our national technical capacities which are defensive and, if necessary, active.

6 Th.Hitchens,CDI,WashingtonDC. AndM. Krepon, Stimsoncenter atIFRI4April2007. 7 RMA: revolutionofmilitaryaffairs. 8 Thebehavioristapproach,viatheobligationsonalaunchStateresultingfromresponsibleconductisrecommendedbyM.Krepon. 9 NewspacepolicyoftheWhiteHousepublishedinSeptember2006,doctrineoftheChinesestrategies. 10 UpstreamR&TandresearchofDGA,ONERA,DAM. 11 See recommendationsoftheAssemblyoftheUEO:ReportsDeploymentsofarmamentsinspaceFirstpart:DocC/193216May

2006 Secondpart:DocC/19662May2007.

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Ineffect,theChinesetesthasshowntheincapacityofEuropetodetect,characterizeandappreciatethepotential menace which it constitutes. Only an intergovernmental collaboration within Europe appears appropriate for preparingtodealwithsuchasituation.It wouldavoidmassiveinvestment infullyautonomousresources.The firstexamplewehaveisthetripartiteagreementbetweenFrance,GermanyandItalyfortheexchangeofhigh resolution images from the reconnaissance satellites, respectively, Pliades, SARLupe and Cosmo Skymed, whenthesethreesystemsareoperational. However, France must continue with what it has already embarked on, on the one hand the operational programmesHelios,EssaimandSyracuseand,ontheotherhand,thetechnologicaldemonstrationprogrammes SPIRALE and ELISA, to ensure the continuation of the former and, for the latter, to arrive at operational capacitiesfittoputatthedisposalofthearmedforces. Europe does not havetoimitatethe UnitedStates.It is not exposedtothesamerisks and has no intentionof beingarivalasadominatingworldpower.Ontheeconomiclevel,Europedoubtsithasthefinancialresources tobeabletocatchupwiththeUnitedStatesintermsofthequantityofoperationaldevices,eventhoughitisthe secondeconomicpowerintheworld.Buthavingsystemswhichareautonomousandcomplementarytothoseof its partners appears to be more and more of a priority, in the light of the recent advances observed in other countries.Chinahasjustremindedusofthis.GermanyhastheFGANTIRAradarandtheUnitedKingdomthe PIMSopticalinstruments.Theyprovideacapacityfordetection,orbitography,themanagement ofacatalogue oforbitingobjectsandtheiridentification.However,thesesystems,withGraves,arenotinteroperableanddont satisfytheglobalneedfordetection,warningandresponsewhichfuturethreatswillrequire. The relaunch of the defence effort in terms of space, which we are advocating, must on one hand include reinforcement of the protection of orbiting systems, naturally those which are exclusively military, but also Europeancommercialsatellites whichhavearoleinprovidingservicestothearmedforces,and,ontheother, make Europe able to anticipate possible attacks from rogue States or isolated terrorist groups and able to counterthesethreatsbyappropriatemeans. Thegeneralisationinthewordoftheuseofspaceformilitarypurposeswith,ultimately,theaccessofregional andlocalpowerstoarmamentsystemswhichmaybeusedinspace,inthefirstinstanceinterregionalandinter continentalballisticmissiles,leadsustoproposethestrengtheningofourcapacitiesformonitoringandresponse. Soinourviewtheprioritymustbe: TheestablishmentofaEuropeandoctrineofstrategicspacedeterrence, The development by Europe of an autonomous operational system of space surveillance including systemsfordetectingandanalysingobjectsinorbitandalsoterrestialandspacesystemsfordetectingand warningofballisticandouterspacelaunches, TheidentificationofcriticaltechnologieswhichFranceanditsEuropeanpartnerswillneedtopossessin order to equip themselves with a credible operational capacity and so reduce their dependence on the UnitedStates,allowingthemthustoenterintobalanceddialogue thisistobeundertakenwithoutdelay, Theundertakingofan exploratorystudy,asaEuropeancollaboration,ofantisatellite devices which do not generate space debris, are groundbased and use directed energy, laser in particular. This may be consideredwithintheframeworkofthepreviouslydiscusseddoctrine, Thedevelopmentofrapidresponselaunchers,indispensabletotheurgentreplacementofvitalsatellites, sothatalimitedreserveoflaunchersmaybeoperationallyavailable. ***

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