The Constitutional Commissions 1. THELMA P. GAMINDE, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT and/or Hon. CELSO D. GANGAN, Hon. RAULC.

FLORES and EMMANUEL M. DALMAN, respondents. FACTS: On June 11, 1993, the President of the Philippines appointed petitioner Thelma P. Gaminde, ad interim, Commissioner, Civil Service Commission. She assumed office on June 22, 1993, after taking an oath of office. On September 07, 1993, the Commission on Appointment, Congress o f t h e P h i l i p p i n e s c o n f i r m e d t h e appointment. However, on February 24, 1998, petitioner sought clarification from the Office of the President as to the expiry date of her term of office. In reply to her request, the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, in a letter dated April 07, 1998 opined that petitioners term of office would expire on February 02, 2000, not on February 02, 1999.Relying on said advisory opinion, petitioner remained in Leon, wrote office after February 02, 1999. On February 04,1 9 9 9 , C h a i r m a n C o r a z o n A l m a G . d e t h e C o m m i s s i o n o n A u d i t r e q u e s t i n g o p i n i o n o n w h e t h e r o r n o t Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde and her co-terminus staff may be paid their salaries notwithstanding the expiration of their appointments on February 02, 1999. On February 18, 1999, the General Counsel, Commission on Audit, issued an opinion that the term of Commissioner Gaminde has expired on February 02, 1999 as stated in her appointment conformably with the constitutional intent. Consequently, on March 24, 1999, CSC Resident Auditor Flovitas U. Felipe issued notice of disallowance No. 99-002-101 (99), disallowing in audit the salaries and emoluments pertaining to petitioner and her co-terminus staff, effective February 02, 1999. On April 5, 1999, petitioner appealed the disallowance to the Commission on Audit en banc. On June 15, 1999, the Commission on Audit issued Decision dismissing petitioners appeal. The Commission on Audit affirmed the propriety of the disallowance, holding that the issue of petitioners term of office may be properly addressed by mere reference to her appointment paper which set the expiration date on February 02,1999, and that the Commission is bereft of power to recognize an extension of her term, not even with the implied acquiescence of the Office of the President. In time, petitioner moved for reconsideration; however, on August 17, 1999, the Commission on Audit denied the motion. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: The basic issue raised is whether the term of office of Atty. Thelma P. Gaminde, as Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, to which she was appointed on June 11, 1993, expired on February 02, 1999, as stated in the appointment paper, or on February 02, 2000, as claimed by her. HELD: The term of office of Ms. Thelma P. Gaminde asCommissioner, Civil Service Commission, under an appointment extended to her by President Fidel V. Ramos on June 11, 1993, expired on February 02, 1999. However, she served as de facto officer in good faith until February 02, 2000, and thus entitled to receive her salary and other emoluments for actual service rendered.

Consequently, the Commission on Audit erred in disallowing in audit such salary and other emoluments, including that of her co-terminus staff. RATIO: Consequently, the terms of the first Chairmen and Commissioners of the Constitutional Commissions under the 1 9 8 7 C o n s t i t u t i o n m u s t s t a r t on a common date, irrespective of the variations in the d a t e s o f appointments and qualifications of the appointees, in order that the expiration of the first terms of seven, five and three years should lead to the regular recurrence of the two-year interval between the expiration of the terms. Applying the foregoing conditions to the case at bar, we rule that the appropriate starting point of the terms of office of the first appointees to the Constitutional Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must be on February 02, 1987, the date of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution. In case of a belated appointment or qualification, the interval between the start of the term and the actual qualification of the appointee must be counted against the latter. In the law of public officers, there is a settled distinction between term and tenure. [T]he term of an office must be distinguished from the tenure of the incumbent. The term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds the office. The term of office is not affected by the hold-over. The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent. Clearly, the transitory provisions mean that the incumbent members of the Constitutional Commissions shall continue in office for one year after the ratification of this Constitution under their existing appointments at the discretion of the appointing power, who may cut short their tenure by: (1) their removal from office for cause; (2) their becoming incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office, or (3) their appointment to a new term there under, all of which events may occur before the end of the one year period after the effectively of the Constitution. However, the transitory provisions do not affect the term of office fixed in Article IX, providing for a seven-five-three year rotational interval for the first appointees under this Constitution. 2. BRILLANTES vs. YORAC 192 SCRA 358, 1990 Facts: The President designated Associate Commissioner Yorac as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections, in place of Chairman Hilario B. Davide, who had been named chairman of the fact-finding commission to investigate the December 1989 coup d etat attempt. Brillantes challenged the act of the President as contrary to the constitutional provision that ensures the independence the Commission on Elections as an independent constitutional body and the specific provision that (I)n no case shall any Member (of the Commission on Elections) be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. Brillantes contends that the choice of the Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections is an internal matter that

should be resolved by the members themselves and that the intrusion of the President of the Philippines violates their independence. The Solicitor General the designation made by the President of the Philippines should therefore be sustained for reasons of administrative expediency, to prevent disruption of the functions of the COMELEC. Issue: Whether or not the President may designate the Acting Chairman of the COMELEC in the absence of the regular Chairman. Held: NO. The Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional Commissions as independent. They are not under the control of the President of the Philippines in the discharge of their respective functions. Each of these Commissions conducts its own proceedings under the applicable laws and its own rules and in the exercise of its own discretion. Its decisions, orders and rulings are subject only to review on certiorari by this Court as provided by the Constitution. The choice of a temporary chairman in the absence of the regular chairman comes under that discretion. That discretion cannot be exercised for it, even with its consent, by the President of the Philippines. The lack of a statutory rule covering the situation at bar is no justification for the President of the Philippines to fill the void by extending the temporary designation in favor of the respondent. The situation could have been handled by the members of the Commission on Elections themselves without the participation of the President, however well-meaning. In the choice of the Acting Chairman, the members of the Commission on Elections would most likely have been guided by the seniority rule as they themselves would have appreciated it. In any event, that choice and the basis thereof were for them and not the President to make. 3. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT 482 SCRA 233 (2005), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.) FACTS: The total funds appropriated by General Appropriations Act of 2002 (GAA) for Civil Service Commission (CSC) was P285,660,790.44. CSC complains that the total funds released by Department of Budget and Management (DBM) was only P279,853,398.14, thereby leaving an unreleased balance of P5,807,392.30. CSC contends that the funds were intentionally withheld by DBM on the ground of their no report, no release policy. Hence, CSC filed a petition for mandamus seeking to compel the DBM to release the balance of its budget for fiscal year 2002. At the same time, it seeks a determination by this Court of the extent of the constitutional concept of fiscal autonomy. ISSUE: Whether or not DBMs policy, no report, no release is constitutional HELD: DBMs act of withholding the subject funds from CSC due to revenue shortfall is hereby declared unconstitutional.

The no report, no release policy may not be validly enforced against offices vested with fiscal autonomy is not disputed. Indeed, such policy cannot be enforced against offices possessing fiscal autonomy without violating Article IX (A), Section 5 of the Constitution, which provides that the Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy and that their approved appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released. The Court held in the case of, Batangas v. Romulo, automatic release in Section 6, Article X of the Constitution is defined as an automatic manner; without thought or conscious intention. Being automatic, thus, connotes something mechanical, spontaneous and perfunctory. As such the LGUs are not required to perform any act to receive the just share accruing to them from the national coffers. By parity of construction, automatic release of approved annual appropriations to petitioner, a constitutional commission which is vested with fiscal autonomy, should thus be construed to mean that no condition to fund releases to it may be imposed. This conclusion is consistent with the Resolution of this Court which effectively prohibited the enforcement of a no report, no release policy against the Judiciary which has also been granted fiscal autonomy by the Constitution. Furthermore, the Constitution grants the enjoyment of fiscal autonomy only to the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, of which petitioner is one, and the Ombudsman. To hold that the CSC may be subjected to withholding or reduction of funds in the event of a revenue shortfall would, to that extent, place CSC and the other entities vested with fiscal autonomy on equal footing with all others which are not granted the same autonomy, thereby reducing to naught the distinction established by the Constitution. 4. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (CHREA) vs. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS G.R. No. 155336. November 25, 2004. FACTS: On 14 February 1998, Congress passed Republic Act No. 8522, otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act of 1998. It provided for Special Provisions Applicable to All Constitutional Offices Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy. On the strength of these special provisions, the CHR promulgated Resolution No. A98-047 adopting an upgrading and reclassification scheme among selected positions in the Commission. To support the implementation of such scheme, the CHR, in the same resolution, authorized the augmentation of a commensurate amount generated from savings under Personnel Services. By virtue of Resolution No. A98-062 the CHR collapsed the vacant positions in the body to provide additional source of funding for said staffing modification. Among the positions collapsed were: one Attorney III, four Attorney IV, one Chemist III, three Special Investigator I, one Clerk III, and one Accounting Clerk II. The CHR forwarded said staffing modification and upgrading scheme to the DBM with a request for its approval, but the then DBM secretary Benjamin Diokno denied the request. In light of the DBMs disapproval of the proposed personnel modification scheme, the CSC-National Capital Region Office, through a memorandum recommended to the CSC-Central Office that the subject appointments be rejected owing to the DBMs disapproval of the plantilla

reclassification. Meanwhile, the officers of petitioner CHREA, in representation of the rank and file employees of the CHR, requested the CSC-Central Office to affirm the recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office. CHREA stood its ground in saying that the DBM is the only agency with appropriate authority mandated by law to evaluate and approve matters of reclassification and upgrading, as well as creation of positions. The CSC-Central Office denied CHREAs request in a Resolution and reversed the recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office that the upgrading scheme be censured. ISSUE: Whether or not the Commission on Human Rights validly implement an upgrading, reclassification, creation, and collapsing of plantilla positions in the Commission without the prior approval of the Department of Budget and Management? HELD: CHREA grouses that the Court of Appeals and the CSC-Central Office both erred in sanctioning the CHRs alleged blanket authority to upgrade, reclassify, and create positions inasmuch as the approval of the DBM relative to such scheme is still indispensable. Petitioner bewails that the CSC and the Court of Appeals erroneously assumed that CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy insofar as financial matters are concerned, particularly with regard to the upgrading and reclassification of positions therein. The CHR, although admittedly a constitutional creation is, nonetheless, not included in the genus of offices accorded fiscal autonomy by constitutional or legislative fiat.as the laws designated body to implement and administer a unified compensation system, is beyond cavil. The interpretation of an administrative government agency, which is tasked to implement a statute is accorded great respect and ordinarily controls the construction of the courts. In Energy Regulatory Board v. Court of Appeals,we echoed the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies. 5. Sarmiento vs Comelec Facts: COMELEC resolved a number of cases en banc regarding the appeals for inclusion and exclusion of certain election returns and certificates of canvass, as well as the composition of a Municipal Board of Canvassers. Petitioners aver that the resolutions w e r e i s s u e d w i t h g r a v e a b u s e o f discretion because the COMELEC took cognizance of and decided the appeals without first referring them to any of its Divisions. Issue: W/N the COMELEC should have heard the appeals en banc Ruling: N O . E l e c t i o n c a s e s i n c l u d e p r e - proclamation controversies, and all such cases must first be heard by and d e c i d e d b y a D i v i s i o n o f t h e C o m m i s s i o n . T h e C o m m i s s i o n , sitting en banc, d o e s n o t h a v e t h e authority to hear and decide the same at first instance. In the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, pre-proclamation cases are classified as Special Cases a n d , i n c o m p l i a n c e w i t h t h e Constitution, the 2 Divisions of the

C o m m i s s i o n a r e v e s t e d w i t h t h e authority to hear and decide these Special Cases. Indisputably, then, the COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, when it resolved the appeals of petitioners in the Special Cases without first referring them to any of its Divisions. Said resolutions are, therefore, null a n d v o i d a n d m u s t b e s e t a s i d e . H o w e v e r , S e c t i o n 1 6 o f R A 7 1 6 6 provides that all pre-proclamation c a s e s p e n d i n g b e f o r e i t s h a l l b e deemed terminated at the beginning of the term of the office involved. Since the terms of office involved in t h e S p e c i a l C a s e s s u b j e c t o f t h e petitions have already commenced, these cases have been rendered moot and academic, and must be dismissed w i t h o u t p r e j u d i c e t o t h e f i l i n g o f p e t i t i o n e r s o f r e g u l a r e l e c t i o n protests. Doctrine: Section 3, Subdivision C, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution:The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two Divisions, and s h a l l p r o m u l g a t e i t s r u l e s o f procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, i n c l u d i n g p r e - p r o c l a m a t i o n controversies. All such election cases s h a l l b e h e a r d a n d d e c i d e d i n division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.

6. Ambil v. COMELEC G.R. No. 143398 (October 25, 2000)

FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent were candidates for the position of Governor, Eastern Samar during the May 11, 1998 elections. The Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed petitioner as the duly elected Governor. Private respondent filed an election protest with the COMELEC, which was assigned to the First Division. Commissioner X prepared and signed a proposed resolution in the case. Commissioner Y dissented, while Commissioner Z wanted to see both positions first before giving her decision. On 2/15/00, Commissioner X retired and was replaced. On 2/24/00, petitioner and respondent received a purported resolution in favor of private respondent promulgated on 2/14/00 and signed by Commissioners X, Y, and Z. The First Division later declared that the parties should ignore the resolution since it was not yet promulgated. The Division later set a date for promulgation of a resolution of the case, and said that the aggrieved party could then challenge it through a Motion for Reconsideration before the Commission en banc or through a certiorari case before the SC. The petitioner filed this case to annul the order for the promulgation of the resolution and to direct the First Division to deliberate anew on the case.

ISSUE: Whether Comelec, First Division, in scheduling the promulgation of the resolution in the case (EPC Case No. 98-29) acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. HELD: The SC dismissed the case for prematurity. It ruled that it has no power to review via certiorari, an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a Division of the Commission on Elections. The instant case does not fall under any of the recognized exceptions to the rule in certiorari cases dispensing with a motion for reconsideration prior to the filing of a petition. In truth, the exceptions do not apply to election cases where a motion for reconsideration is mandatory by Constitutional fiat to elevate the case to the Comelec en banc, whose final decision is what is reviewable via certiorari before the Supreme Court. The SC declared the resolution signed by Commissioner X as void for various reasons. First, one who is no longer a member of the Commission at the time the final decision or resolution is promulgated cannot validly take part in that resolution or decision. Second, the Clerk of the 1st Division denied the release or promulgation of the resolution on 2/14/00 resolution. Third, the 1st Division even later said that the parties should ignore the resolution since it was not yet promulgated. Lastly, Commissioner Z could not have affixed her signature on the resolution, since on the same date an order was issued where she said that she still wanted to see both positions before making her decision.

The Civil Service Commission

1. Baltazar Camporedondo vs National Labor Relations Commission 312 SCRA 47 Business Organization Corporation Law Government Owned and Controlled Corporation vs Private Corporation Facts : Baltazar Camporedondo was the administrator of the Surigao del Norte chapter of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC). In 1995, a PNRC auditor found out that Baltazar had unremitted collections amounting to P109,000.00. Baltazar, unable to restitute said missing amount, then filed for early retirement. He later filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against PNRC. He filed the case with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). He averred that he was forced to retire because of the erroneous audit. The Labor Arbiter, affirmed by the NLRC,

ruled that it has no jurisdiction over the case because PNRC is a government owned and controlled corporation (GOCC). Baltazar however argues that PNRC impliedly became a private corporation when its charter was amended to give it authority to secure loans, etc. ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine National Red Cross is a private corporation. HELD: No. The simple test is to find out whether or not a corporation is public or private is to determine if it has its own charter for the exercise of a public function or was it incorporated under the general corporation law. PNRC has its own charter (R.A. 95). Its subsequent amendment did not convert it into a private corporation. As a GOCC, it is subject to its own charter and its employees are under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission, and are compulsory members of the Government Service Insurance System.

2. SSS Employees Association v Court of Appeals G.R. No. 85279 July 28, 1989 Facts: On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that on June 9, 1987, the officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and baricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking employees from reporting for work and SSS members from transacting business with the SSS; that the strike was reported to the Public Sector Labor Management Council, which ordered the strikers to return to work; that the strikers refused to return to work; and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike. The complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be ordered to return to work; that the defendants (petitioners herein) be ordered to pay damages; and that the strike be declared illegal. It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's demands, which included: implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of union dues; payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay; conversion of temporary or contractual employees with six (6) months or more of service into regular and permanent employees and their entitlement to the same salaries, allowances and benefits given to other regular employees of the SSS; and payment of the children's allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries of the employees and allegedly committed acts of discrimination and unfair labor practices. Issue: Whether or not employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the right

to strike. Held: The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, provides that the State "shall guarantee the rights of all workers to selforganization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law" [Art. XIII, Sec. 31]. Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes helpful in understanding the meaning of these provisions. A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution would show that in recognizing the right of government employees to organize, the commissioners intended to limit the right to the formation of unions or associations only, without including the right to strike. Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "the civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters" [Art. IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where the employees in the civil service are denominated as "government employees"] and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service [NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870 & 70295, November 24,1988] and are covered by the Civil Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the case, the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal. 3. Francisca Baluyot vs. Paul Holganza Facts: During a spot audit in 1977, the auditors from the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) headquarters discovered a case shortage in the funds of its Bohol chapter. The chapter administrator, petitioner Baluyot, was held accountable and thereafter, respondent Holganza as member of the board Bohol chapter, filed a complaint with the Ofc. of the Ombudsman for malversation. Upon recommendation of respondent Militante, an administratiave docket of dishonesty was also opened against Baluyot. Baluyot raised the defense that the Ombudsman had no jurisdiction as he had authority only over government owned or controlled corporations which the PNRC was not. She gives as evidence of its private character 1) it does not receive budgetary support from the government and all money given to it by the latter and its instrumentalities become private funds of the organization. 2) funds for the payment of personnels salaries and other emoluments come from yearly fund campaigns, private contributions and rentals from its properties. 3) it is not audited by COA. PNRC, petitioner claims falls under the International Federation of Red Cross, Swiss-based organization. Issue: Whether or not PNRC is a government owned or controlled corporation or a private corporation.

Held: The Court cited the case of Camporedondo vs. NLRC. Resolving the issue set outwe rule that the PNRC is a government owned and controlled corporation, with an original charter under RA No. 95, as amended, The test to determine whether a corporation is government owned or controlled or private in nature is simple. Is it created by its own charter for the exercise of a public function, or by incorporation under the general corporation law? Those with special charters are government corporations subject to its provisions, and its employees are under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission, and are compulsory members of the GSIS. The PNRC was not impliedly converted to a private corporation simply because its charter was amended to vest in it the authority to secure loans, be exempted from payment of all duties, taxes, fees and other charges of all kinds on all importations and purchases for its exclusive use, on donations for its disaster relief work and other services and in its benefits and fund raising drives Clearly then, public respondent has jurisdiction over the matter.

4. DE LEON vs. CA Hon. Alma G. De Leon Chairman, Hon. Thelma P. Gaminde Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, and Secretary Rafael M. Alunan III, Department of Interior and Local Government, petitioners, vs. Hon. Court of Appeals and Jacob F. Montesa, respondent. FACTS: In the decision sought to be reconsidered, the court ruled that private respondents appointment on August 28, 1986, as Ministry Legal Counsel CESO IV of the Ministry of Local Government was temporary. Applying the case of Achacoso v. Macaraig, it was held that since the private respondent was not a Career Executive Service eligible, his appointment did not attain permanency because he did not possess the required CES eligibility for the CES position to which he was appointed to, thus he can be transferred or resigned without violating his right to security of tenure. March 19, 1992 Court issued a Minute Resolution holding that Achacoso v. Macaraig is not applicable to the case of private respondent because there was no Career Executive Service Board during the Freedom Constitution or at the time of appointment of petitioner. Therefore, having met all the requirements for the position to which he was appointed, he cannot be removed in violation of the constitutional guarantee on security of tenure and due process. Private respondent contends that the nature of his appointment can no longer be passed upon and controverted in the present case considering that said issue had already been settled in the foregoing Minute Resolution of the Court, as stated in Rule 39, Sec. 47, parC of the Rules of Court. Rule 39, Sec. 47, parC of the Rules of Court once an issue has been adjudicated in a valid judgment of a competent court, it can no longer be controverted anew and should be finally laid to rest.

ISSUE: WON the Court possess any rights to re-examine the case despite what was stated in the Rules of Court? YES RULING/HELD: The Court is not precluded from re-examining its own ruling and rectifying errors of judgment if blind and stubborn adherence to res judicata would involve the sacrifice of justice to technicality. It must be stressed that this is not the first time that the principle of res judicata has been set aside in favor of substantial justice, which is afterall the avowed purpose of all law and jurisprudence. With regards to the issue of the private respondents designation : A CES eligibility is not a requirement in the case of private respondent, the mobility and flexibility concepts in the assignment of personnel in CES, which allow transfer or reassignment of CES personnel to other CES position without violating his right to security of tenure. WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant motion for reconsideration is DENIED with FINALITY.

5. ABELLA V. CSC (2004) The Facts: Petitioner Francisco A. Abella, Jr., a lawyer, retired from the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA), now the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA), on July 1, 1996 as Department Manager of the Legal Services Department. He held a civil service eligibility for the position of Department Manager, having completed the training program for Executive Leadership and Management in 1982 under the Civil Service Academy, pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 850 dated April 16, 1979, which was then the required eligibility for said position. Two years after his retirement, petitioner was hired by the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) on a contractual basis. On January 1, 1999, petitioner was issued by SBMA a permanent employment as Department Manager III, Labor and Employment Center. However, when said appointment was submitted to respondent Civil Service Commission Regional Office No. III, it was disapproved on the ground that petitioners eligibility was not appropriate. Petitioner was advised by SBMA of the disapproval of his appointment. In view thereof, petitioner was issued a temporary appointment as Department Manager III, Labor and Employment Center, SBMA on July 9, 1999. Issue: Who may file reconsideration or appeal Ruling: Approval Required for Permanent Appointment A permanent appointment in the career service is issued to a person who has met the requirements of the position to which the appointment is made in accordance with the provisions of law, the rules and the standards promulgated pursuant thereto. It implies the civil service eligibility of the appointee. Thus, while the

appointing authority has the discretion to choose whom to appoint, the choice is subject to the caveat that the appointee possesses the required qualifications. To make it fully effective, an appointment to a civil service position must comply with all legal requirements. Thus, the law requires the appointment to be submitted to the CSC which will ascertain, in the main, whether the proposed appointee is qualified to hold the position and whether the rules pertinent to the process of appointment were observed. The applicable provision of the Civil Service Law reads: SECTION 9. Powers and Functions of the Commission. The Commission shall administer the Civil Service and shall have the following powers and functions: (h) Approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in the civil service, except those of presidential appointees, members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, police forces, firemen, and jail guards, and disapprove those where the appointees do not possess the appropriate eligibility or required qualifications. An appointment shall take effect immediately upon issue by the appointing authority if the appointee assumes his duties immediately and shall remain effective until it is disapproved by the Commission, if this should take place, without prejudice to the liability of the appointing authority for appointments issued in violation of existing laws or rules: Provided, finally, That the Commission shall keep a record of appointments of all officers and employees in the civil service. All appointments requiring the approval of the Commission as herein provided, shall be submitted to it by the appointing authority within thirty days from issuance, otherwise, the appointment becomes ineffective thirty days thereafter.

6. CSC v. Darangina Facts: Engr. Ali P. Darangina was a development management officer V in the Office of M u s l i m A f f a i r s . O n S e p t e m b e r 2 5 , 2 0 0 0 , h e w a s e x t e n d e d a t e m p o r a r y p r o m o t i o n a l appointment as director III, Plans and Policy Services, in the same office. On October 11,2000, the Civil Service Commission approved this temporary appointment effective for 1year from the date of its issuance unless sooner terminated. On October 31, 2000, newly appointed OMA Executive Director Acmad Tomawis terminated Daranginas temporary appointment on the ground that he is not a career executive service eligible. Tomawis then appointed Alongan Sani as director III. But he is not also a career executive service eligible. Thus, the CSC disapproved his appointment, stating that respondent could only b e r e p l a c e d b y a n eligible. On appeal, the CSC 2001 sustained the termination o f Daranginas temporary appointment but ordering the payment of his salaries from the time he was appointed on September 25, 2000 until his separation on October 31, 2000.Darangina filed a motion for reconsideration. CSC granted the same with modification in the sense that Darangina should be paid his back wages from the time his employment was terminated on October 11, 2000 until September 24, 2001, the expiration of his one year temporary appointment. O n A p r i l 3 , 2 0 0 2 , D a r a n g i n a f i l e d a m o t i o n f o r p a r t i a l

reconsideration, praying for his reinstatement as director III and p a y m e n t o f back wages up to the time he shall be reinstated but the CSC denied the same for being a second motion for reconsideration which is prohibited. Darangina then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals but it was dismissed for his failure to implead the OMA Executive Director and the incumbent of the disputed position. Darangina filed a motion for reconsideration. CA reconsidered its previous ruling and ordered his reinstatement as well as payment of back wages. CSCs MR was denied. Issue: Whether Darangina should be reinstated HELD: CA REVERSED. Petition GRANTED. No reinstatement & back wages, only salary from appointment until termination. With the expiration of his term upon his replacement, there is no longer any remaining term to be served. Administrative Code of 1987 Book V Title I Subtitle A Chapter 5Section 27. Employment Status. Appointment in the career service shall be permanent or temporary.(1)Permanent Status. A permanent appointment shall be issued to a person who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed, including appropriate eligibility prescribed, in accordance with the provisions of law, rules and standards promulgated in pursuancethereof. (2)Temporary Appointmen. In the absence of eligible persons and itbecomes necess ary in the public interest to fill a vacancy, a tempappointment shall be issued to a person who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed except the appropriate civil service eligibility: Provided, that such temporary appointment shall not exceed 12 mos., but the appointee may be replaced sooner if a qualified civil service eligible becomes available. 7. G.R. NO. 135805, APRIL 29, 1999 CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, PETITIONER, VS. PEDRO O. DACOYCOY, RESPONDENT. [PARDO] Facts: On November 29, 1995, George P. Suan, a Citizens Crime Watch VicePresident, Allen Chapter, Northern Samar, filed with the Civil Service Commission(CSC), Quezon City, a complaint against Pedro O. Dacoycoy, for habitual drunkenness, misconduct and nepotism. After the fact-finding investigation, the Civil Service Regional Office No. 8, Tacloban City, found a prima facie case against respondent, and, on March 5, 1996, issued the corresponding formal charge against him. After a conduct of a formal investigation, the CSC promulgated its resolution on January 28, 1997 finding no substantial evidence to support the charge of habitual drunkenness and misconduct. However, the CSC found respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy guilty of nepotism on two counts as a result of the appointment of his two sons, Rito and Ped Dacoycoy, as driver and utility worker, respectively, and their assignment under his immediate supervision and control as the Vocational School Administrator Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades, and imposed on him the penalty of dismissal from the service. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the CSCs resolution was reversed ruling that the respondent did not appoint his two sons, hence, respondent was not guilty of nepotism.

Issue/s: Whether the appointment of the two sons of respondent is within the scope of the ban on nepotism. Ruling: The law defines nepotism as all appointments to the national, provincial, city and municipal governments or in any branch or instrumentality thereof, including government owned or controlled corporations, made in favor of a relative of the appointing or recommending authority, or of the chief of the bureau or office, or of the persons exercising immediate supervision over him. The word "relative" and members of the family referred to are those related within the third degree either of consanguinity or of affinity. The court ruled that it is true that the respondent did not appoint or recommend his two sons to the positions of driver and utility worker in the Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades. In fact, it was Mr. Jaime Daclag, Head of the Vocational Department of the BCAT, who recommended to DECS Region VIII the appointment of Rito Dacoycoy as driver and appointed Ped Dacoycoy as casual utility worker. However, it was the respondent who recommended Mr. Daclags authority to appoint first level positions. It was also the respondent who certified that funds are available for the proposed appointment of Rito. Further, Ped, listed him in his job description as his next higher supervisor. Unquestionably, Mr. Daclag was a subordinate of respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy, who was the school administrator. Mr. Daclag recommended the appointment of respondent's two sons and placed them under respondent's immediate supervision serving as driver and utility worker of the school. Both positions are career positions. Clearly he is guilty of nepotism. Nepotism is one pernicious evil impeding the civil service and the efficiency of its personnel. The court stressed in the Debulgado case that the basic purpose or objective of the prohibition against nepotism also strongly indicates that the prohibition was intended to be a comprehensive one. If not within the exceptions, it is a form of corruption that must be nipped in the bud or bated whenever or wherever it raises its ugly head. What is needed is not only to punish the wrongdoers or reward the `outstanding' civil servants, but also to plug the hidden gaps and potholes of corruption as well as to insist on strict compliance with existing legal procedures in order to abate any occasion for graft or circumvention of the law. The Court REVIVES and AFFIRMS the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission dated January 28, 1998 and September 30, 1998, dismissing respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy from the service.

8. BANGALISAN v. CA, 276 SCRA 619 FACTS: Petitioners were among the 800 public school teachers who staged mass actions on September 17 to 19, 1990 to dramatize their grievances against the alleged failure of the government to implement measures intended for their

material benefit. The Education Secretary issued a Return-to-Work Order but the petitioners failed to comply. Hence they were charged by the Secretary with several administrative cases leading to their dismissal from service. ISSUE: WON government employees can engage in a strike HELD: No. As a general rule, even in the absence of express statutory prohibition like Memo Circ. No.6 public employees are denied the right to strike or engage in work stoppage against a public employer. The right of the sovereign to prohibit strikes or work stoppages public employees was clearly recognized at common law. To grant employees of the public sector the right to strike there must be a clear and direct legislative authority therefore. In the absence of any express legislation allowing government employees to strike, recognizing their right to do so, or regulating the exercise of the right, employees in the public service may not engage in strike, walk-outs and temporary work stoppage like workers in the private sector. 9. UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES and ALFREDO DETORRES VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION FACTS: Dr. Alfredo B. De Torres is a Professor of the UPLB who went on a vacation leave of absence without pay from September1, 1986 to August 30, 1989. During this period, he served as the Philippine Government official representative to the Centre on Integrated Rural Development for Asia and [the] Pacific(CIRDAP).When the term of his leave of absence was about to expire, CIRDAP requested the UPLB for an extension of said leave, but was denied. He was advised to report for duty and that if he failed to report within 30 days he would be dropped from the rolls of personnel. Dr. De Torres did not report to work. After almost five years of absence without leave, Dr. De Torres wrote the Chancellor of UPLB that he was reporting back to duty. However De Torres was informed that in the absence of any approved application for leave of absence, he was considered to be on AWOL. Thus, he was advised to re-apply with UPLB. Dr. De Torres then sought for reconsideration with regard to said decision. Chancellor Villareal reversed his earlier stand and notified De Torres that since records at UPLB did not show that he had been officially dropped from the rolls he may report for duty. Members of Academic Personnel Committee, ACCI-UPLB, requested the Civil Service Commission regarding the employment status of Dr. De Torres. The Commission issued CSC Resolution No. 953045 stating that De Torres was already on AWOL beginning September 1, 1989since his request for extension of leave of absence for one year was denied. De Torres' absence from work was not duly authorized by UPLB. Despite the advice of Chancellor De Guzman to him that he should report for duty on or before September 5, 1989, De Torres failed to do so. Thus, his failure to assume duty as ordered caused his automatic separation from the service. The CA upheld the decision of the CSC. ISSUE: WON the automatic separation of Dr. Alfredo de Torres from the civil service due to his prolonged absence without official leave is valid HELD: The CSC predicated its ruling on Section 33, Rule XVI of the Revised Civil Service Rules, which was in effect at the time. The provision states:

"Under no circumstances shall leave without pay be granted for more than one year. If an employee who is on leave without pay for any reason fails to return to duty at the expiration of one year from the effective date of such leave, he shall be considered automatically separated from the service; Provided, that he shall, within a reasonable time before the expiration of his one year leave of absence without pay, be notified in writing of the expiration thereof with a warning that if he fails to report for duty on said date, he will be dropped from the service." UPLB Chancellor had advised petitioner of the possibility of being dropped from the service, if he failed to return and report for duty. This action constituted sufficient notice. The pivotal issue herein, however, is whether petitioner was indeed dropped from the service by the University. In the case at bar, however, Petitioner De Torres was never actually dropped from the service by UP. He remained in the UPLB's roll of academic personnel, even after he had been warned of the possibility of being dropped from the service if he failed to return to work within a stated period. UPLB records show that no notice or order of dropping Dr. de Torres from the rolls was ever issued by the UPLB Chancellor. On the contrary, UPLB records show Private petitioner was not only retained in the roll of personnel; his salary was even increased three times. Moreover, he was promoted in rank with the explicit approval of the Board of Regents, the highest governing body of UP. All these circumstances indubitably demonstrate that the University has chosen not to exercise its prerogative of dismissing petitioner from its employment.

10. CSC v. Dela Cruz G.R. No. 158737 August 31, 2004 Facts: Saturnino de la Cruz is an employee of the Air Transportation Office, DOTC, presently holding the position of Chief Aviation Safety Regulation Officer of the Aviation Safety Division. He was promotionally appointed to the said position on November 28, 1994, duly attested by the Civil Service Commission. But prior thereto, he was a Check Pilot II in the Air Transportation Office (ATO). In a letter dated February 9, 1995, Annabella A. Calamba of the Aviation Security Division of the ATO formally filed with the DOTC her protest against the promotional appointment of respondent as Chief Aviation Safety Regulation Officer, claiming among others that respondent did not meet the four-year supervisory requirement for said position. On July 20, 1995, then DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia rendered a decision finding the protest without merit. Calamba appealed the decision of the DOTC Secretary to the CSC-NCR. On November 18, 1997, the CSC-NCR rendered its decision upholding the protest of Calamba and recalling the approval of respondents appointment as Chief Aviation Safety Regulation Officer. On January 5, 1998, CSC-NCR Director Acebedo ruled that there is no cogent reason to disturb earlier rulings on the matter. He also denied ATO Director Gilos request, for lack of merit. Strangely, in a letter dated January 13, 1998, CSC-NCR

Director Acebedo granted Director Gilos request and affirmed the approval of respondents appointment as Chief Aviation Safety Regulation Officer. In a letter dated January 26, 1998, Calamba requested the CSC to implement the January 5, 1998 ruling of the CSC-NCR.When asked by the CSC to clarify the conflicting rulings, CSC-NCR Director Acebedo explained that the January 5, 1998 ruling is unofficial and inexistent.The CSC treated Calambas request as an appeal. On November 13, 1998, the CSC rendered its Resolution granting Calambas appeal recalling Dela Cruzs appointment. Acting on the request for reconsideration filed by Dela Cruz, the CSC denied it. Dela Cruz filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals assailing the CSC Resolution. CA granted the petition by setting aside CSC Resolution Nos. 98-2970 and 99-1451 and approving respondents appointment as Chief of the Aviation Safety Regulation Office. CSC MR was denied. Issue: Whether the CA erred in approving respondents appointment as Chief Aviation Safety Regulation Officer despite his failure to meet the minimum four-year managerial and supervisory qualification for the position Held: No. Dela Cruz has sufficiently complied with the required experience standards. Respondent would indeed lack the required years of work experience to qualify for the contested position if the managerial standards in the first clause above were to be strictly followed. At the time of his permanent appointment on November 28, 1994 as Chief Aviation Safety Regulation Officer, respondent had a little over one year of managerial experience from his designation as Acting Chief of the Aviation Safety Division during the latter part of 1993. However, the work already rendered by respondent in the ATO at the time of his appointment was well within the supervisory standard in the second clause. Planning, organizing, directing, coordinating and supervising the enforcement of air safety laws, rules and regulations pertaining to licensing, rating and checking of all airmen and mechanics and regulation of the activities of flying schools were part of the work performed by respondent for more than 13 years prior to his ap It is elementary in the law of public officers that the power to appoint is in essence discretionary on the part of the proper authority. In Salles vs. Francisco, et al., we had occasion to rule that, in the appointment or promotion of employees, the appointing authority considers not only their civil service eligibilities but also their performance, education, work experience, trainings and seminars attended, agency examinations and seniority. Consequently, the appointing authority has the right of choice which he may exercise freely according to his best judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified among those who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities. The final choice of the appointing authority should be respected and left undisturbed. Judges should not substitute their judgment for that of the appointing authority. In the appointment of division chiefs, as in this case, the power to appoint rests on the head of the department. Sufficient if not plenary discretion should be granted to those entrusted with the responsibility of administering the offices concerned. They are in a position to determine who can best fulfill the functions of the office vacated. Not only is the appointing authority the office primarily responsible for the administration of the office, he is also in the best position to determine who among the prospective appointees can efficiently discharge the functions of the position. Dela Cruz, was the uncontested choice of the appointing authority. Then DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia dismissed the protest against respondents appointment.

ATO Executive Director Gilo also noted respondents full compliance with the qualifications for the position. CSC-NCR Director Acebedo, who previously recalled respondents appointment, later affirmed it after a re-evaluation of the case and declared his previous ruling unofficial and inexistent. There is no reason to disapprove the appointment of respondent as Chief of the Aviation Safety Regulation Office considering that he is fully qualified and evidently the choice of the appointing authority. Between the Commission and the appointing authority, we sustain the latter. Every particular job in an office calls for both formal and informal qualifications. Formal qualifications such as age, number of academic units in a certain course, seminars attended, etc., may be valuable but so are such intangibles as resourcefulness, team spirit, courtesy, initiative, loyalty, ambition, prospects for the future and best interest of the service. Given the demands of a certain job, who can do it best should be left to the head of the office concerned provided the legal requirements for the office are satisfied. The reckoning point in determining the qualifications of an appointee is the date of issuance of the appointment and not the date of its approval by the CSC or the date of resolution of the protest against it. We need not rule on petitioners assertion that respondents subsequent compliance with the experience standards during the pendency of the case should not be counted in his favor since respondent was anyway qualified for the position at the time of his appointment.

Commission on Elections

1. Cayetano V. Monsod

201 SCRA 210 (1991)

FACTS: Monsod was nominated by President Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC on April 25, 1991. Cayetano opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been

engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsods nomination, petitioner filed a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void because Monsod did not meet the requirement of having practiced law for the last ten years. ISSUE: Whether or not Monsod satisfies the requirement of the position of Chairman of the COMELEC. HELD: The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he: . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86.55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. Atty. Monsods past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyerlegislator of both the rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

2. Bautista vs. COMELEC [G.R. Nos. 154796-97 October 23, 2003] FACTS: On June 10, 2002, Bautista filed his certificate of candidacy for Punong Barangay in Lumbangan for the July 15, 2002 barangay elections. Election Officer Jareo refused to accept Bautista's certificate of candidacy because he was not a registered voter in Lumbangan. On June 11, 2002, Bautista filed an action for mandamus against Election O f f i c e r J a r e o with the Regional Trial Court of Batangas. The trial court o r d e r e d Election Officer Jareo to accept Bautista's certificate of candidacy and to include his name in the certified list of candidates for Punong Barangay. In compliance with the t r i a l c o u r t ' s o r d e r , E l e c t i o n O f f i c e r J a r e o i n c l u d e d B a u t i s t a i n t h e c e r t i f i e d l i s t o f candidates for Punong Barangay. At the same time, Election Officer Jareo referred the matter of Bautista's inclusion in the certified list of candidates with the COMELEC L a w D e p a r t m e n t o n 5 J u l y 2 0 0 2 . T h e r e a f t e r ,

t h e C O M E L E C L a w D e p a r t m e n t recommended the cancellation of Bautista's certificate of candidacy since he was not r e g i s t e r e d a s a voter in Lumbangan. The COMELEC en banc failed to act on t h e COMELEC Law Department's recommendation before the barangay elections on 15July 2002.During the 15 July 2002 barangay elections, Bautista and private respondent Alcoreza, ere candidates for the position of Punong Barangay in Lumbangan. Bautista obtained the highest number of votes (719) while Alcoreza came in second with 522 votes, or a margin of 197 votes. Thus, the Lumbangan Board of Canvassers proclaimed Bautista as the elected Punong Barangay. Meanwhile, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 5404o n 2 3 J u l y 2 0 0 2 a n d R e s o l u t i o n N o . 5 5 8 4 o n 1 0 A u g u s t 2 0 0 2 ( " C O M E L E C Resolutions"). In Resolution No. 5 4 0 4 , t h e C O M E L E C e n b a n c r e s o l v e d t o c a n c e l Bautista's certificate of candidacy. On the other hand, Resolution No. 5584 expressed COMELEC's policy regarding proclaimed candidates found to be ineligible for not being registered voters in the place of their election. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it issued Resolution Nos. 5404and 5584; 2. Whether or not the COMELEC deprived Bautista of due p r o c e s s w h e n t h e COMELEC en banc issued Resolution Nos. 5404 and 5584 3. Whether Bautista was a registered voter of Barangay L u m b a n g a n w h e n h e filed his certificate of candidacy; and 4. Whether or not it was proper to proclaim Alcoreza as P u n o n g B a r a n g a y i n view of the alleged disqualification of the winning candidate Bautista. HELD: 1. A division of the COMELEC should have first heard this case. The COMELEC en banc can only act on the case if there is a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the COMELEC division. Hence, the COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction when it ordered the cancellation of Bautista's certificate of candidacy without first referring the case to a division for summary hearing. The proceeding on the cancellation of a certificate of c a n d i d a c y d o e s n o t m e r e l y pertain to the administrative f u n c t i o n s o f t h e C O M E L E C . C a n c e l l a t i o n p r o c e e d i n g s involve the COMELEC's quasi-judicial functions. 2. T h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o b e h e a r d d o e s n o t o n l y r e f e r t o t h e r i g h t t o p r e s e n t v e r b a l arguments in court during a formal hearing. There is due process when a party is able t o p r e s e n t e v i d e n c e i n t h e form of pleadings. However, the COMELEC did not give B a u t i s t a s u c h opportunity to explain his side. The COMELEC en banc i s s u e d Resolution Nos. 5404 and 5584 without prior notice and hearing .A summary proceeding does not mean that the COMELEC could do a w a y w i t h t h e requirements of notice and hearing. The COMELEC should

have at least given notice t o B a u t i s t a t o g i v e h i m t h e c h a n c e t o a d d u c e e v i d e n c e t o e x p l a i n h i s s i d e i n t h e cancellation proceeding. The COMELEC en banc deprived Bautista of procedural due process of law when it approved the report and r e c o m m e n d a t i o n o f t h e L a w Department without notice and hearing. 3. B a u t i s t a w a s a w a r e w h e n h e f i l e d h i s c e r t i f i c a t e o f c a n d i d a c y f o r t h e o f f i c e o f Punong Barangay that he lacked one of the qualifications - that of being a registered voter in the barangay where he ran for office. He therefore made a misrepresentation of a material fact when he made a false statement in his certificate of candidacy that he was a registered voter in Barangay Lumbangan. An elective office is a public trust. He who aspires for elective office should not make a mockery of the electoral process by falsely representing himself. The importance of a valid certificate of candidacy rests at the very core of the electoral process. Under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, false representation of a material fact in the certificate of candidacy is a ground for the denial or cancellation of the certificate of candidacy. The material misrepresentation c o n t e m p l a t e d b y S e c t i o n 7 8 r e f e r s t o q u a l i f i c a t i o n s f o r e l e c t i v e o f f i c e . A c a n d i d a t e guilty of misrepresentation may be (1) prevented from running, or (2) if elected, from serving, or (3) prosecuted for violation of the election laws. 4. I t i s a w e l l - s e t t l e d d o c t r i n e t h a t t h e C O M E L E C c a n n o t proclaim as winner the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes in case the winning candidate is ineligible or disqualified. The exception to this well-settled r u l e w a s mentioned in Labo, Jr. v. Commission on Elections which h e l d t h a t t h e e x c e p t i o n i s predicated on the concurrence of two assumptions, namely: (1) the one who obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified; and (2) the electorate is fully aware in factand in law of a candidate's disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety but would nonetheless cast their votes in favor o f t h e i n e l i g i b l e candidate. F o l l o w i n g S e c . 4 4 o f t h e L o c a l Government Code provides for the rule regarding permanent vacancy in the Office of the Punong Barangay, the highest r a n k i n g sangguniang barangay member, or in the case of his permanent disability, the second highest ranking sangguniang member, shall become the Punong Barangay. Thus, the proclamation of the second placer Divina Alcoreza as winner in lieu of Bautista is void. 3. Zarate vs COMELEC FACTS: Julian Lallave, Jr. won the 1996 SK Elections of Brgy Ican, Malasiqui, Pangasinan, garnering a total of 46 votes over Marivic Zarate who garnered 45 votes. Unsatisfied with the proclamation by the Barangay Board of Canvassers, Zarate filed an election protest before the Municipal Trial Court stating that three or more votes that read JL should not have been credited in favor of Lallave. Zarate further

stated that the votes bearing JL were stray votes and that there was no candidate with the name or nickname of JL. The Municipal Trial Court rendered it decision in favor of petitioner Zarate, declaring 8 of the original 46 votes invalid. Lallave appealed to the Commission on Elections theorizing that the votes reading JL should be credited in his favour considering that such initials sufficiently identify him as the candidate and that the votes bearing Julian, Jr de Real, Notno Lallave, and Nono de Real should have been credited as well being his nickname and middlename, respectively. The appeal by Lallave was not referred to a division of the Commission but was, instead, submitted to the Commission en banc.The COMELEC en banc annulled the decision of the Municipal Trial Court and declared Lallave as the elected SK chairman. Issue: Whether or not the Commission on Elections committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction? Held: Yes. The COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction without first referring the case to any of its division. The petition for annulling the COMELECs decision was granted and was set aside. The Commission was ordered to assign the case to a division. Ratio: The recourse of respondent Lallave transgressed Section 3 Article IX of the Constitution which provides that ...election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.

4. Baytan vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 153945 February 4, 2003 FACTS: Petitioners, Reynato Baytan, Reynaldo Baytan and Adrian Baytan were on their way to register for the May 1998 elections when they met the newly elected Barangay Captain, Roberto Ignacio, in Barangay 18, Zone II of Cavite City, who led them to register in Precinct No. 83-A of Barangay 18.U p o n r e a l i z i n g t h a t t h e i r r e s i d e n c e i s s i t u a t e d w i t h i n t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n o f Barangay 28 not Barangay 18, petitioners proceeded to Precinct 129-A of Barangay 28 and registered a new. S u b s e q u e n t l y , p e t i t i o n e r s s e n t a l e t t e r t o f o r m e r C O M E L E C A s s i s t a n t Executive Director Jose Pio O. Joson requesting for advice on how to cancel their previous registration. Petitioners Voters Registration Records were forwarded to the Provincial Election Supervisor, Atty. Juanito V. Ravanzo, for e v a l u a t i o n , w h o , subsequently, recommended filing an information for double registration against petitioners. The COMELEC affirmed Ravanzos resolution. Petitioners moved for reconsideration, which, was denied by COMELEC en banc. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it recommended the prosecution of petitioners for double registration despite lack of intent and substantial compliance with the requirement of cancellation of previous registration. HELD: No. There is no question that petitioners registered twice on different days and in different precincts without canceling their previous registration. Since "double registration" is malum prohibitum, petitioners claim of lack of intent to violate the law is inconsequential. Neither is the letter to Joson an application to cancel their previous registration. This letter was sent after their second registration was accomplished and after the election officer of Cavite City had already reported their act of double registration to a higher official. Moreover, petitioners claims of honest mistake, good faith and substantial compliance with the Election Codes requirement of cancellation of previous registration are matters of defense best ventilated in the trial proper rather t h a n a t t h e p r e l i m i n a r y i n v e s t i g a t i o n . T h e e s t a b l i s h e d r u l e i s t h a t a preliminary investigation is not the o c c a s i o n f o r t h e f u l l a n d e x h a u s t i v e display of the parties evidence. It is for the presentation of such evidence o n l y a s m a y e n g e n d e r a w e l l - g r o u n d e d b e l i e f t h a t a n o f f e n s e h a s b e e n committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof.

5. FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS 211 SCRA 315 Facts: On May 5, 1992, this Court issued a Resolution in GR No. 104704, disqualifying Melchor Chavez, private respondent therein, from running for the Office of Senator in the May 11, 1992 elections. Petitioner filed an urgent motion with the Comelec praying that it (1) disseminate through the fastest available means this Courts Resolution dated May 5, 1992 to all regional election directors, provincial election supervisors, city and municipal election registrars, boards of election inspectors, the six (6) accredited political parties and the general public; and (2) order said election officials to delete the name of Melchor Chavez as printed in the certified list of candidates tally sheets, election returns and to count all votes cast for the disqualified Melchor, Chavez in favor of Francisco I. Chavez. On May 8, 1992, the Comelec issued Res. No. 92-1322 which resolved to delete the name of Melchor Chavez from the list of qualified candidates. However, it failed to order the crediting of all Chavez votes in favor of petitioner as well as the cancellation of Melchor Chavez name in the list of qualified candidates.

Issue: Whether or not the law allows pre-proclamation controversy involving the election of the members of the Senate. Held: A simple reading of the petition would readily show that petitioner has no cause of action, the controversy presented being one in the nature of a preproclamation. While the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over pre-proclamation controversies involving local elective officials (Sec. 242, Omnibus Election Code), nevertheless, pre-proclamation cases are not allowed in elections for President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House of Representatives. Sec. 15 of Republic Act 7166 provides: For purposes of the elections for President, VicePresident, Senator and Member of the House of Representatives, no preproclamation cases shall be allowed on matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns or the certificate of canvass, as the case may be. However, this does not preclude the authority of the appropriate canvassing body motu propio or upon written complaint of an interested person to correct manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns before it.

6. G.R. No. 163193

June 15, 2004

SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., petitioner, JOSE CONCEPCION, JR., JOSE DE VENECIA, EDGARDO J. ANGARA, DR. JAIME Z. GALVEZ-TAN, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, FRISCO SAN JUAN, NORBERTO M. GONZALES, HONESTO M. GUTIERREZ, ISLETA, AND JOSE A. BERNAS, Petitioners-in-Intervention, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. Facts: Comelec issued resolutions adopting an Automated Elections System including the assailed resolution, Resolution 6712, which provides for the electronic transmission of advanced result of unofficial count. Petitioners claimed that the resolution would allow the preemption and usurpation of the exclusive power of Congress to canvass the votes for President and Vice-President and would likewise encroach upon the authority of NAMFREL, as the citizens accredited arm, to conduct the "unofficial" quick count as provided under pertinent election laws. Comelec contended that the resolution was promulgated in the exercise of its executive and administrative power "to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections Comelec added that the issue is beyond judicial determination. Issue: Whether or not Comelec's promulgation of Resolution 6712 was justified.

Ruling: The Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing Resolution 6712. The issue squarely fell within the ambit of the expanded jurisdiction of the court.

Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution, further bolstered by RA 8436, vest upon Congress the sole and exclusive authority to officially canvass the votes for the elections of President and Vice-President. Section 27 of Rep. Act No. 7166, as amended by Rep. Act No. 8173, and reiterated in Section 18 of Rep. Act No. 8436, solely authorize NAMFREL, the duly-accredited citizens arm to conduct the unofficial counting of votes for the national or local elections. The quick count under the guise of an unofficial tabulation would not only be preemptive of the authority of congress and NAMFREL, but would also be lacking constitutional and/or statutory basis. Moreover, the assailed COMELEC resolution likewise contravened the constitutional provision that "no money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." It being unofficial, any disbursement of public fund would be contrary to the provisions of the Constitution and Rep. Act No. 9206, which is the 2003 General Appropriations Act. The Omnibus Election Code in providing the powers and functions of the Commission subjects the same to certain conditions with respect to the adoption of the latest technological and electronic devices, to wit: (1)consideration of the area and available funds (2) notification to all political parties and candidates. The aforementioned conditions were found to have not been substantially met. Resolution 6712 was null and void.

7. DE JESUS vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES 120 SCRA 760, 1983 Facts: After the local elections of January 18, 1980, Ananias Hibo, defeated candidate of the Nacionalista Party for the office of mayor of the Municipality of Casiguran, Sorsogon filed with the COMELEC a complaint charging petitioner Rogelio de Jesus, then COMELEC registrar of Casiguran, with violation of the 1978 Election Code. Asst. Fiscals Manuel Genova and Delfin Tarog, in their capacity as deputized Tanodbayan prosecutors, conducted an investigation. A prima facie case against petitioner for violation of section 89 and sub-sections [x] and [mm] of Section 178 of the Election Code of 1978 was found to exist. The following information, was filed before the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner filed a motion to quash the information, contending that neither the Tanodbayan nor the Sandiganbayan has the authority to investigate, prosecute and try the offense. In its opposition, the prosecution maintained the Tanodbayans exclusive authority to investigate and prosecute offenses committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, and consequently, the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction to try and decide the charges against petitioner. Issue: Whether or not the Tanodbayan and the Sandiganbayan have the power to investigate, prosecute, and try election offenses committed by a public officer in relation to his office.

Held: The evident constitutional intendment in bestowing the power to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of election and the concomitant authority to investigate and prosecute election offenses to the COMELEC is to insure the free, orderly and honest conduct of elections, failure of which would result in the frustration of the true will of the people and make a mere idle ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every qualified citizen to vote. To divest the COMELEC of the authority to investigate and prosecute offenses committed by public officials in relation to their office would thus seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving this clear constitutional mandate. From a careful scrutiny of the constitutional provisions relied upon by the Sandiganbayan, We perceive neither explicit nor implicit grant to it and its prosecuting arm, the Tanodbayan, of the authority to investigate, prosecute and hear election offenses committed by public officers in relation to their office, as contradistinguished from the clear and categorical bestowal of said authority and jurisdiction upon the COMELEC and the courts of first instance under Sections 182 and 184, respectively, of the Election Code of 1978. 8. TUPAY T. LOONG vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ABDUSAKUR TAN G.R. No. 133676 April 14, 1999 FACTS: Automated elections systems was used for the May 11, 1998 regular elections held in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) which includes the Province of Sulu. Atty. Jose Tolentino, Jr. headed the COMELEC Task Force to have administrative oversight of the elections in Sulu. On May 12, 1998, some election inspectors and watchers informed Atty. Tolentino, Jr. of discrepancies between the election returns and the votes cast for the mayoralty candidates in the municipality of Pata. To avoid a situation where proceeding with automation will result in an erroneous count, he suspended the automated counting of ballots in Pata and immediately communicated the problem to the technical experts of COMELEC and the suppliers of the automated machine. After the consultations, the experts told him that the problem was caused by misalignment of the ovals opposite the names of candidates in the local ballots. They found nothing wrong with the automated machines. The error was in the printing of the local ballots, as a consequence of which, the automated machines failed to read them correctly. Atty. Tolentino, Jr. called for an emergency meeting of the local candidates and the military-police officials overseeing the Sulu elections. Among those who attended were petitioner Tupay Loong and private respondent Abdusakar Tan and intervenor Yusop Jikiri (candidates for governor.) The meeting discussed how the ballots in Pata should be counted in light of the misaligned ovals. There was lack of agreement. Some recommended a shift to manual count (Tan et al) while the others insisted on automated counting (Loong AND Jikiri). Reports that the automated counting of ballots in other municipalities in Sulu was not working well were received by the COMELEC Task Force. Local ballots in five (5)

municipalities were rejected by the automated machines. These municipalities were Talipao, Siasi, Tudanan, Tapul and Jolo. The ballots were rejected because they had the wrong sequence code. Before midnight of May 12, 1998, Atty. Tolentino, Jr. was able to send to the COMELEC en banc his report and recommendation, urging the use of the manual count in the entire Province of Sulu. 6 On the same day, COMELEC issued Minute Resolution No. 98-1747 ordering a manual count but only in the municipality of Pata.. The next day, May 13, 1998, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 98-1750 approving, Atty. Tolentino, Jr.'s recommendation and the manner of its implementation. On May 15, 1998, the COMELEC en banc issued Minute Resolution No. 98-1796 laying down the rules for the manual count. Minute Resolution 98-1798 laid down the procedure for the counting of votes for Sulu at the PICC. COMELEC started the manual count on May 18, 1998. ISSUE: whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in ordering a manual count. (The main issue in the case at bar) HELD: the petition of Tupay Loong and the petition in intervention of Yusop Jikiri are dismissed, there being no showing that public respondent gravely abused its discretion in issuing Minute Resolution Nos. 98-1748, 98-1750, 98-1796 and 981798. Our status quo order of June 23, 1998 is lifted. A resolution of the issue will involve an interpretation of R.A. No. 8436 on automated election in relation to the broad power of the COMELEC under Section 2(1), Article IX(C) of the Constitution "to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election , plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall." Undoubtedly, the text and intent of this provision is to give COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. The order for a manual count cannot be characterized as arbitrary, capricious or whimsical. It is well established that the automated machines failed to read correctly the ballots in the municipality of Pata The technical experts of COMELEC and the supplier of the automated machines found nothing wrong the automated machines. They traced the problem to the printing of local ballots by the National Printing Office. It is plain that to continue with the automated count would result in a grossly erroneous count. An automated count of the local votes in Sulu would have resulted in a wrong count, a travesty of the sovereignty of the electorate In enacting R.A. No. 8436, Congress obviously failed to provide a remedy where the error in counting is not machine-related for human foresight is not all-seeing. We hold, however, that the vacuum in the law cannot prevent the COMELEC from

levitating above the problem. . We cannot kick away the will of the people by giving a literal interpretation to R.A. 8436. R.A. 8436 did not prohibit manual counting when machine count does not work. Counting is part and parcel of the conduct of an election which is under the control and supervision of the COMELEC. It ought to be self-evident that the Constitution did not envision a COMELEC that cannot count the result of an election.

Commission on Audit

1. Sambeli v Province of Isabela 210 SCRA 80

FACTS: An agreement was entered into by and between the City of Isabela and ECS Enterprise for the purchase of 300 units of wheelbarrows, 837 pieces of shovels, and 1 set of radio communication equipment. Based on the finding of the Price Evaluation Division COA Technical Services Office, the Provincial Auditor advised the P r o v i n c i a l T r e a s u r e r t h a t a n o v e r p r i c e d i n t h e t o t a l a m o u n t o f P 6 1 9 , 0 4 2 . 2 0 e x i s t s o u t o f t h e t o t a l p r i c e o f P761,077.20 offered by ECS Enterprises or an overpayment of P195,893.10. It recommended that the future claim of ECS Enterprises be withheld. Provincial Auditor formally forwarded the matter with the Regional Director who formally endorsed the stand. ECS appealed the decision but was denied for lack of merit. Hence, this instant petition. Petitioner assails the ruling of the COA as not valid. It contends that the contract of sale has not only been perfected between the Province of Isabela and petitioner but delivery has been made by it with the corresponding partial payment by the Province of Isabela. Thus, it is allegedly incumbent upon COA to authorize the payment of the balance because to act otherwise will constitute an impairment of contract. ISSUE: Whether the ruling of COA is invalid so far as it will constitute impairment of contracts? HELD: In the exercises of the regulatory power vested upon it by the Constitution, the Commission on Audit adheres to the policy that government funds and property should be fully protected and conserved and that irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant expenditures or uses of such funds and property should be prevented. On the proposition that improper or wasteful spending of public funds or immoral use of government property, for being highly irregular or unnecessary, or scandalously excessive or extravagant, offends the sovereign people's will, it behooves the Commission on Audit to put a stop thereto.. . . No less than the Constitution has ordained that the COA shall have exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods required therefore, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures or use of government funds and properties. (Art. IX D, Sec. 2 (2) 1987 Constitution of the Philippines)

2. Bustamante v COA

216 SCRA 134

FACTS: Petitioner is the Regional Legal Counsel of National Power Corporation (NPC). As such he was issued a government vehicle with plate number SCC 387. Pursuant to NPC policy as reflected in the Board Resolution No. 81-95 authorizing the monthly disbursement of transportation allowance, the petitioner, in addition to the use of government vehicle, claimed his transportation allowance for the month of January 1989. On May 31,1 9 9 0 , t h e p e t i t i o n e r r e c e i v e d an Auditor's Notice to Person Liable dated April 17, 1990 from respondent Regional Auditor Martha Roxana Caburian disallowing

P1,250.00 representing aforesaid transportation allowance. The petitioner moved for reconsideration of the disallowance of the c l a i m f o r t r a n s p o r t a t i o n allowance which was denied. Petitioner appealed this denial to the Commission on Audit which denied do due course. Hence this petition. The petitioner takes exception from the coverage of said circular contending that such circular did not mention the NPC as one of the corporations/offices covered by it ( COA Circular No. 75-6) ISSUE: Whether such denial to give due course to the appeal of herein petitioner constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction? Whether NPC takes an exception from such coverage of the said circular contending that such circular did not mention NPC as one of the corporations/offices covered by it. HELD: NO. Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or in other words where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. NO. It is very patent that the circular is addressed, among others, to managing heads of Government-owned or Controlled Corporations, the NPC being held under such category of corporations. We likewise c a n n o t sustain petitioner's contention that the Commission, in the exercise of its power granted by the Constitution, usurped the statutory functions of the NPC Board of Directors for its leads to t h e a b s u r d conclusion that a mere Board of Directors of a governmentowned and controlled corporation, by issuing are solution, can put to naught a constitutional provision which has been ratified by the majority of the Filipino people. If We will not sustain the Commission's power and duty to examine, audit and settle accounts pertaining to this particular expenditures or use of funds and property, owned or held in trust by this government-owned and controlled corporation, the NPC, We will be rendering inutile this Constitutional Body which has been tasked to be vigilant and conscientious in safeguarding the proper use of the government's, and ultimately, the people's property.