Aesthesis vs.

Aesthetics: Cacciari on Nietzsche

We may thoroughly appreciate now from our foregoing discussion the validity and correctness of Cacciaris judgement on the inexistence of an aesthetics in Nietzsche separable from and subordinate tophilosophical reasoning.

1. Es conocida la afirmacin de Nietzsche en El origen de la tragedia por la cual el arte aparece como la verdadera actividad metafsica del hombre. Aun en el Ensayo de una autocrtica de 1886 l recalca que aquella juvenile metafsica de artista contena ya lo esencial de su pensamiento sucesivo. Es lcito, por lo tanto, considerar en trminos sustancialmente unitarios la concepcin nietzsc eana del arte. Nietzsche no est interesado en la elaboracin de una esttica como un dominio filosfico especial; el arte es para l problema filosfico-metafsico: en la actividad artstica est en jue o una apertura al ser! una iluminacin metafsica sobre el sentido del ente. "roduccin artstica e interpretacin del producto artstico son ambos problemas filosficos. No e#iste autonoma del arte respecto a lo filosfico! as como no e#iste autonoma de lo filosfico respecto al arte. $rte % filosofa se presentan perennemente unidas en a&uella deconstruccin de la tradicin metafsica europea &ue constitu%e el objetivo de la total crtica nietzscheana. '(El $rte in N.)*
We could not agree more with Cacciaris position. As we have shown, for ietsche art has to be the true metaphysical activity of human beings because for him art is prior to philosophy, just as intuition and perception !which are based on metaphors and unthin"able without them# are prior to reflection in terms of his onto$geny of thought in which, once more, memory or re$collection or re$flection plays a crucial role in the construction of concepts out of crystallised metaphors. %nce again, however, the metaphysical status of art in iet&sches early or inchoate conception of it as the construction of metaphors by an artistically creative subject and as the genius of falsity is open to objection on the grounds that !a# meta$phors re$fer !bring bac"# invariably to a substratum beyond which they bring !meta pherein, to bring beyond#, and !b# it is impossible to separate !as iet&sche himself maintains, and here is another chorismos# meta$phors from the act of perception itself and indeed from concepts ' and therefore it cannot be accurate to describe human perception and intuition as the construction of metaphors and appearances( !%n this, cf. our discussion of )erleau$*onty in +,mmanence -e$ visited and +.he *hilosophy of the /lesh.# Cacciari sharply points out iet&sches ambiguity on the first count0 $ that if art is the genius of falsehood, then it follows that iet&sche still posits a .ruth, a /undamentum, in relation to which art is falsehood(

8 !ietzsc e afirma que el arte constituye el "#enio de la mentira". $e trata de un ejemplo evidente de "platonismo invertido", en que !ietzsc e se o%stina en separar de una manera demasiado a%stracta "razn cl&sica" y modernidad. '(acciari, )El Hacer del (anto*, fn.8.+

1uite right( ,f indeed art is the genius of falsity, this can occur if and only if there is some thing that art can properly falsify, some re$ality in relation to which art can actually lie. 2ut this is precisely the starting point of *latos vehement condemnation of art and its dissoi logoi !double tal"# and doxa !opinion, chatter# as against philosophys logico$discursive dialectic reasoning !dianoia# leading to episteme !"nowledge, science#( ,n complete contrast, what iet&sche meant by this e3pression was precisely that art is the genius of falsity in opposition to or transgression against the cemetery of intuitions constituted by that oppressive structure of concepts represented by logic and science ' by the two activities that, in opposition to art, pretend to represent the .ruth and therefore the *latonic world of supra$sensible values leading up hierarchically to the summum bonum !the 4ood#, when in fact they are distancing human beings from the greatest truth of all ' and that is that all human perception and reasoning is based on the construction of artistic or aesthetic metaphors( iet&sches e3pression about art is ironic to some e3tent5 and yet its literal inverted *latonism points once more to his early confusion with regard to a reality that art genially falsifies by creating contra$dictory appearances. And Cacciari is right also on the second count because the construction of metaphors ' that is, art ' is inseparable from the construction of concepts, which is the proper activity of philosophy. 2ut, observes Cacciari with great acumen, this affinity is revealed by a difference0 *ero esta afinidad es revelable por diferencia. 6a consideraci7n del hecho art8stico es llevada a cabo filos7ficamente, no por9ue el arte sea representaci7n o se limite a imaginar las ideas filos7ficas. El arte es problema filosfico en tanto su estructura es problema para la filosofa; su presencia, la presencia de su palabra choca con la dimensi7n conceptual del trabajo filos7fico. Arte y filosof8a se unen polarmente, por oposici7n. :e una ve& Nietzsche supera, por esta va, toda esttica decadentista de la autonoma pura del hecho artstico , as8 como todo contenido ideol7gico. Arte y filosofa estn indisolublemente conectados en tanto problema el uno con la otra. A n ms! el arte es siempre presencia amenazante"in#uietante para la pura filosofa. $El Arte en N.% 2ecause philosophy itself cannot be com$prehended !under$stood thoroughly# by its own logos and must remain therefore an artistic activity, a poiesis, and because artistic activity is prior to philosophical re$flection or contemplation in that it is in$ comprehensible to and by the philosophicallogos, it follows that artistic activity reaffirms the primacy of in$vention over re$flection ' which poses an insuperable metaphysical problem for philosophy ' again, not in the sense that art is aproblem for philosophy to consider, one among many, but rather in the sense that art is the problem ofphilosophy, a problem that is ante$cedent to, that pre$cedes philosophical reflection, and therefore also challenges its claim to theoretico$practical pre$eminence as "nowledge( As Cacciari again genially puts it, art is a philosophical problem in that its structure ;its nature as activity< is problematic for philosophy. .his cannot be said even of theology, as Werner =aeger has shown with his concept of natural theology !in The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers#, in that the

divineis not prior to the problem of metaphysics !>eidegger# but forms only one of its problems or aspects because it is just as plausible that reality is of divine origin as it is that it is entirely contingent. .his is precisely why art poses a menacing and disquieting presence for pure philosophy ' because of its precedence over philosophy as an activity, as initium. Art shows the activist reality of philosophy ' its practical initium, the fact that even conceptually its doing, its being a beginning, is prior to and cannot be com prehended !grasped and e3plained totally# by pure thought or reflection given that thought is itself an activity, namely, thin"ing about thin"ing, where the second thin"ing stands for the meta$phorical activity of art upon !hich philosophy is both a re$flection and ultimately an artistic activity in itself" %f course, artistic activity is in$conceivable without thought itself ' as iet&sche reminded us earlier, without the formation of meta$phors !2ildung der 2egriffe $ and therefore of !ords, of language, something that Cacciari points out above but forgets in his later elaboration of this thesis# inseparable from the act of intuition and perception as appearance. ?et, if it is not pre$conceptual, art is certainly pre reflective and !as Cacciari would say# pre discursive activity in that both its doing and its feeling or sense is prior to philosophic reflection and its logos. ,t is the union of these opposed moments in art ' the doing and the feeling $ that poses a greater problem for philosophy than it does for art ' because the tas" of philosophy is precisely to com$prehend all activity, including the artistic, and this it cannot do if philosophy remains an artistic activity itself, an initium that is incomprehensible by and ine3plicable to philosophy. !.his materiality or immanence of thought, its being tied ine3tricably to perception and language, is what escapes Arendt because of her formalistic$abstract, trans$scendental approach to it in The #ife of the $ind. @ee our +,mmanence -evisited and +*hilosophy of the /lesh.#

As we intimated earlier, in the course of the elaboration of his central thesis on +Al Arte en iet&sche, Cacciari this time seems to agree with iet&sches thesis that art is the genius of falsity because life and the world are perceptible and "nowable only as appear$ances, and there$fore as intrinsically contra$dictory. Al problema filos7fico del arte se centrali&a en la relaci7n arte$mentira. An el prefacio a la segunda edici7n de#a Gaya %iencia, iet&sche dice0 Nos ha fastidiado este mal gusto &'''( querer la verdad a toda costa &'''( esta fascinaci)n de adolescentes por el amor a la verdad' La artes son excogitadas como una especie de culto de lo no-verdadero. Astas indicaciones se articulan plenamente s7lo en los *ragmentos P)stumos sucesivos al +aratustra. An el conte3to de #a Gaya %iencia puede aBn parecer 9ue se trata simplemente de descubrir al juglar escondido en nuestra pasi7n por el conocimiento $ y a9uello 9ue en el arte se limite a enfati&ar la dimensi7n romCntica del ejercicio interminable de la iron8a, solamente deconstructiva, sobre el mundo$verdadero. An los *ragmentos P)stumos, sobre todo en a9uellos 9ue

pertenecen al per8odo DE$DD, es evidente, en cambio, 9ue iet&sche no estC interesado en una estFtica especial $en el caso en cuesti7n, la ir7nico$romCntica $, sino en la definici7n de las estructuras fundamentales del hecho art8stico. En el arte l aprehende una facultad &eneral, un poder"'raft #ue tiene validez universal. En el arte est en (ue&o una dimensin &eneral del ser, una total facultad falsificante. El arte es la facultad"'raft #ue nie&a la verdad " o, me(or dicho el arte es e)presin de esta facultad universal, y por lo tanto activa en cual#uier otro dominio. .his is an unnecessary forzatura of iet&sches thought caused in part by his own careless and misguided manner of articulating the problem in the early wor"s. As we can see from our 9uotation below, for iet&sche it is as senseless to say that the essence of things, and therefore contra$diction, e3ists as it is to state the contrary( ,or our antithesis of individual and cate#ories is anthropomorphic too -i.e. is of purely uman ori#in. and does not come from t e essence of thin s, alt ou# on t e ot er and /e do not dare to say t at it does not correspond to it0 for t at /ould %e a do#matic assertion and as suc just as undemonstra%le as its contrary. 'UWL, p.181+ iet&sche merely contends that the principle of non$contradiction is inapplicable as a metre of both artistic and of scientific doing precisely to the degree that they are doings, initia, and not statements, what Cacciari calls logico$discursive reason and vestimenta escritura del pensamiento,( 6ife and the world are not contradictory because they ec$sist only as appearance, $ but this term now no longer stands in opposition to a re$ality!(#, to a true world ' the true world has disappeared with the apparent one, ironises iet&sche in T!ilight of the -dols. -ather it indicates the primacy of perception and its participation !methexis# in the perceived, as well as the impossibility of truth as certainty and of truth as totality, of .ruth as =asperss all$encompassing !das .mgreifende#. .he principle of non$contradiction is applicable only to the concept of truth$as$certainty and totality, of reality as the essence of things, and not to that of appearance which challenges the objective e3istence of such being$as$presence !as >eidegger described it# as against iet&sches being$as$becoming and that therefore renders superfluous the notion of truth$as$certainty and totality together with that of contra$diction. !We have shown in our /eberbuch and will discuss again soon how Weber misconceived this essential point in his criti9ue of objectivity in science ' to wit, that as philosophers as disparate as icholas of Cusa and @chopenhauer pointed out, there is and there can be no appro3imation to the .ruth, because the concept of truth$as$certainty and totality is toto genere, toto caelo ;@chopenhauer< categorically different from that of partial truths or verities ;Arendt< ' which can ec$sist only as an ideo$ logical entity if one falsely believes in the .ruth(# ,f we understand appearances correctly !as iet&sche indicates but fails to do consistently#, then they can never be contra$dictory because as such they do not re$ fer to any under$lying ;sub$stantive< reality or essence of things or things$in$ themselves against !hich they can be judged to be false. .his is what allows iet&sche to spea" of truth and falsehood in an extra$moral sense !ausser$

moralisch#, that is to say, outside the morality, or better the suprasensible world of values, upon which this false opposition of real events is absolutely dependent( .he polarity here is between the mani$fold and multi$versality of e3perience ;appearances< which is re$presented and embodied by the human instinct to the creation of metaphors, art and myth, against the truth as certainty and uni$versality of rational science for which reality is definable in terms of ultimately self$ referential natural laws subject to the principle of non$contradiction which they themselves must infringe.

,t is precisely for these reasons that we simply cannot go along with Cacciari and persist with the terminology he adopts from iet&sche with regard to art as the genius of falsity and to the contradictoriness of the world. ,ndeed Cacciari at a certain stage seems to suggest that art as the genius of falsity is that will to power that allows us to bend the cruel reality, contradictory and without meaning, of the world, to our necessity to live0 We hold on to art so as not to perish before truth0 *ero en el arte el &enio de la mentira resurge en su pure&a $ el poder de la mentira se muestra en toda su lu& y belle&a. A9uella voluntad de poder 9ue nos permite reducir la cruel realidad, contradictoria y sin sentido del mundo a nuestra necesidad de vivir $ a9uella voluntad de poder 9ue es la gran creadora de la posibilidad de vivir $ pone sus nervios al desnudo en el arte.*enemos el arte para no perecer frente a la verdad. 2ut understood in this sense, Cacciari can no longer intend truth as truth$as$ certainty and totality5 rather, he can only intend the opposite ' that is, truth$as contingency and truth$as$becoming. ?et in this case truth and art would simply be identical0 far from being contradictory, this truth and cruel reality would simply be contingent, they would be 0a sein !>eidegger#, to which the concept of contra$diction is entirely inapplicable. ,nstead, and inconsistently, it is evident that in nearly every other conte3t Cacciari, following iet&sche, clearly understands truth as truth$as$certainty. At any rate, however tragic may be the attempt at mimesis, whether artistic or philosophico$scientific, it does not evince the contradictoriness of life and the world( Croces objection in the #ogica against the iet&schean thesis was precisely that if there is no truth understood as totality, as .ruth, then it is impossible to prove the truth of this thesis( .his is an objection of which Cacciari does not seem to be mindful because, li"e Croce, he remains captive to the primacy of .ruth and thus e9uivocates about the truth of non$ .ruth( Al arte de lo profundo es del todo solidario con lo Gerdadero de la metaf8sica. *ara ambos la apariencia es mentira, y el signo no otra cosa 9ue vestimenta$escritura del pensamiento. Aste arte miente demasiado5 en realidad, miente dos veces0 la primera haciendo propia la mentira del /undamentum metaf8sico5 la segunda reduciendo las propias configuraciones s8gnicas a seductores velos del logos. Al poeta transformado opone a este e3ceso de mentira la perfecta medida de

su arte0 e3isten mBltiples modos de abrirse al mundo $ el signo es una apertura al mundo5 Fl afirma la verdad de la apariencia, el carCcter abismal !ab gr1ndlich0 sin fundamento, continuamente desfondante# de la apariencia, la verdad de a9uello 9ue para la metaf8sica es no$verdad, por lo tanto, mentira, y por otra parte, el carCcter de velo, de ocultamiento de esta verdad de la apariencia 9ue reviste la Gerdad metaf8sica. Como :errida ha e3plicado0 la Gerdad falsificada , deviene apariencia, o, mejor dicho, asume el rol 9ue la apariencia ten8a a sus ojos, y la apariencia deviene Bnica verdad, no por9ue sustituya al antiguo /undamento, sino por9ue indica la verdad de la ausencia de +undamento , verdad de la no",erdad. $El Arte en N.%

,ndeed we certainly agree that for iet&sche and for us appearance ta"es the place of the old objective .ruth, but this does not mean at all that appearance is now the truth of non$.ruth, for the simple reason that if there is no .ruth then there cannot be any non$.ruth either5 and it is indeed absurd to refer to such a concept. .he absence of /oundation is a meaningless phrase ' unless there truly is a /oundation, unless one e3isted objectively either as presence or else as possibility, as opposed to ec$sisting ideologically( .o e3emplify further, it would be e9ually meaningless for us to tal" of the truth of the non$@ubject because, having denied the e3istence as well as the possibility of a @ubject, both the e3istence and the non$ e3istence of a non$@ubject must also be denied as meaningless statements ' because it is absurd to assert the e3istence of the opposite of something that does not and cannot e3ist( .he only way in which appearance can be described as the truth of non$.ruth is if we intend by appearance the ab$sence, the non$being or non$e3istence, of truth$as$certainty and totality, that is, of truth$as$presence. 2ut in that case it is incorrect to assign to appearance the meaning that Cacciari intends ' and that is, appearance as not only the ab$sence of truth$as$presence, as ob$jective truth, but also of appearance as life as contra$diction, as falsity( !.here is a little shadow$bo3ing or ghost$fighting here, similar to falling into the 9ui3otic trap of the old refrain about eville Chamberlain and >itler0 As , descended down the stair, , met a man who wasnt there. >e wasnt there again today. , wish, , wish hed go away( Cacciaris man who wasnt there is the notion of truth as the contra$dictoriness of reality(# !,ncidentally, the *opperian test of falsifiability of scientific truth runs against this insurmountable objection0 $ that it invalidates the very notion of scientificity because only false statements are falsifiable( ,n other words, *oppers test of scientificity mis$conceives the entire notion of scientificity and is 9uite simply an ideological attempt to rescue bourgeois science from the iet&schean criti9ue of it as the will to truth and truth$as$certainty that underlie and sustain it0 $ it is no test at all given that even, and especially, blatant lies are falsifiable by definition and that, as we shall argue below in agreement with iet&sche, the notion of

scientific truth cannot stand on contingency ' what Arendt called verities $ but rather on the physical$mathematical necessity of the laws of nature(# ;,n our ne3t piece we will attempt to draw closer to a novel approach to the social synthesis through the criti9ue of Cacciari and Gattimo.< We argued above that e3cept for the fact that philosophic reflection cannot com$ prehend artistic e3pression and is in$deed only one of its manifestations as artistic activity, philosophic reflection remains just as artistic as any other form of human e3$pression or pro$duction. Conse9uently, themimetic gap ec"sists only for philosophy and its transcendental logos; it does not exist in reality for art, -hose only reality is that of so"called .appearances/ and .meta" phors/0 !We shall argue later that the terms appearances and metaphors and even art are inappropriate and can only add confusion to our analysis of perception.# We can state therefore that there is no independent or autonomous sphere of artistic e3pression and production ' and that indeed all human action is essentially artistic. .he fact that under certain historical conditions this essential aspect of human action is overcome and repressed through the social synthesis and the mode of social reproduction that sustains it does not detract from this fundamental fact5 it is instead the reality of what is widely "nown as alienation !cf. >egel, )ar3#, and what iet&sche describes instead as internali&ation !2erinnerlichung# of morality and of all Galues ;aller /erthe< occasioned by the ontogenetic disgregation of the instincts ' which is what constitutes for him the ontogeny of thought. We will e3amine this aspect of iet&sches criti9ue shortly in connection with the social synthesis. /or the moment, we wish to turn to Cacciaris analysis of artistic production to highlight the salient features of our own analysis0

+n instante hace irrupcin! donde una voz &ue constitu%e siempre el a priori de toda idea del artesano! se abate sobre el hombre! transformndolo en su propio instrumento. $ travs de l! &ue no es! por lo tanto! el sujeto de la creacin '% cu%o ,hacer, no tiene su ori en en el no-ser*! esa voz se manifiesta visiblemente! se e#presa audiblemente! resuena! se transforma en ese canto. 'El -acer del .anto*
2ut what can it possibly mean to say an instant irrupts ;brea"s in<, whereby a voice that always constitutes the a priori of all the ideas of the artisan, stri"es the human being ' what can we possibly achieve and how is it even feasible to separate the human being or artisan from its inspiration, from the voice that constitutes the a priori of every one of the artisans ideasH And how is it even conceivable to argue that this in spiration, this voice !surely, a divine afflatus3# or de lirium, somehow transforms the artisan into its own proper instrumentH /or it is entirely evident to us instead ' as immanentists ' that the artisan and the voice or inspiration are in reality, in deed, in the act of pro$duction of the art form, one and the same entity ' because perception and creation are one and the same activity, not two separate entities as all transcendental philosophy would have us believe(

We agree with Cacciaris sharp reali&ation that ;the artisan< is not the sub4ect of creation0 but this is only because no in dividual human being can be treated as the subject or creator of the act of perception and production !which is inevitably artistic# because this belongs to the species and not to the -n dividuum ' because it is the creative activity of being human and not the individual action of a single human being( .o consider poiesis ontogenetically as a reality that pertains to in$ dividual human beings and not phylogenetically to being human is to relapse in the philosophical hypostati&ation of art as an autonomous sphere of human activity and not as the very essence of being human0 it is to relapse into the notion of art as transcendence, as divine inspiration that Cacciari himself had earlier eschewed. And it is Cacciari himself who gives the game away when he !perhaps unwittingly, but inevitably, given his entire approach to the problem# relapses into the language of the old philosophical logos he ostensibly detests0

Ese canto es mmesis! en el sentido en &ue est de acuerdo! en armona! solo con esa voz! % por lo tanto realmente con nada! %a &ue esa voz! en tanto tal! no se da nunca verdaderamente. Ese canto! en suma! no es la mmesis sino de su propio presupuesto! &uetrasciende /001 toda medida! toda utilidad % toda techne normal. Ese ,hacer, &ue constitu%e el canto es! pues! verdaderamente un delirio en relacin con el habitusde la poesa! de las technai &ue teje el arte de la realeza. !Al >acer del
Canto# Cacciaris mysticism here becomes truly mystifying( ,t is a fact that the audible and visible or perceptible manifestations, or e3$pressions, of artistic activity cannot be confused with the in$spiration of art, with its creative moment. ?et it is palpably absurd to deny that the two are in reality fused and that instead this creation, the artistic e3pression, is pro$duced seemingly out of nothing, out of sheer de$lirium. %n the contrary, this pro$duction, as Cacciari himself asseverates, distinguishes all human activity ' indeed, this id$entification !this same$ ness# of artistic inspiration with its pro$duction, this objectification of artistic inspiration, is precisely what allows that symbolic e3change between human beings that ma"es possible the social synthesis. ,t is utter nonsense, then, for Cacciari to describe artistic inspiration and pro$duction as he does above by separating onto$logically !yet another chorismos(# human inspiration !poiesis# and human production !techne# ' because the two are ine3tricably bound and fused( .here is no techne, on one side, and poiesis on the other, just as there is no @ubject and %bject in opposition to each other0 both poiesis and techne are inseparable aspects of the one metaphor$producing creative activity ' remembering that creativity, the initium, is not subject$ity. ;Artistic /orm as thought< Cacciaris mysticism is again on show0 El arte en cuanto (ue&o de confi&uraciones s&nicas es entonces el pensamiento de la verdad de la apariencia, de la verdad de la no" verdad1 pero la /orma ;artistica< no tiene nada de formal8stico0 ella es universal facultad falsificante, pone la verdad como no$verdad. 2a +orma artstica abre al

mundo, es apertura al ser, en cuanto divina tirada de dados, abismo del Azar y de sus combinaciones, teora tr&ica del eterno crear"destruir. $El Arte en N.%

ote that this play of sign ;semiotic< configurations or the artistic /orm can be understood only in relation to the reality of social formations, only in terms of the social synthesis, without which our entire speculative efforts relapse into sheer mysticism, which is what Cacciari slips into in the 9uotation above. .rue, as Cacciari himself shows in +Al >acer del Canto, the mimetic gap does remit the telos of philosophy and its logos bac" to the mystical world of divine inspiration and contingency !divina tirada de dados#, of delirium ' a thesis advanced long ago by Werner =aeger inThe Theology of the EarlyGreek Philosophers !see our +*ostcard from ,stanbul#. .he painful reali&ation of this common artistic$metaphorical matri3 is what pro$vo"ed the wrath of *latos condemnation of art and mythology because these e3pose the tragic inability of philosophy and science to bridge this mimetic gap. 3ut as -e emphasized earlier, the mimetic gap bet-een the act of perception and its .ob"(ect/ ec"sists only for philosophy and its transcendental logos; it does not e)ist in reality because li4e all human ob(ectification the only .reality/ for art is that of so"called .appearances/ and .meta"phors/, and therefore the unity of perception, thou&ht and lan&ua&e0 *he error here for 5acciari as for Nietzsche consists in see4in& to separate thou&ht from its .ob"(ect/ $a separation implicit in the notion of .meta"phor/%, thou&ht from lan&ua&e, " and then in reducin& all language and concepts to logic. *hen, havin& established this last false e#uation, they correctly deny that all 4no-led&e is lo&ico"discursive but incorrectly conclude from the e#uation of 4no-led&e -ith lo&ic that it is possible to descry .a ne- union bet-een 4no-led&e and falsity, a ne- relation that is no lon&er one of mutual e)clusion/. *or lo tanto0 la filosof8a Bltima, llegando al reconocimiento de la necesidad del arte, llega al reconocimiento de esta facultad falsificante como una formula universal del conocer, como estructura del conocer. %, viceversa, el arte en cuanto actividad metaf8sica en gran estilo torna visible una nueva uni7n entre conocimiento y mentira, una nueva relaci7n ya no mCs de rec8proca e3clusi7n. *he idea that 4no-led&e and falsity are not mutually e)clusive, that reality is .contra"dictory/, arises from the mista4en e#uation of 4no-led&e -ith lo&ico"discursive thou&ht and the latter6s doomed attempt to ob"literate all contradiction. El problema #ue a#u sale a la luz tiene relacin con un presupuesto vital de la tradicin filosfica europea. En base a tal presupuesto, el mundo se nos abrira e)clusivamente mediante pensamientos pro-ducidos lingsticamente, o sea mediante un lo&os predicativo"discursivo. El mundo nos es dado e)clusivamente a travs de las formas de la discursividad lin&7stica, de las cuales siempre es posible afirmar verdad o falsedad. Ahora para tal tradici7n no tendr8a sentido interrogarse sobre la verdad o falsedad del arte.

*or lo tanto, en el caso de un hecho art8stico, no tendremos nunca nada 9ue ver con pensamientos, con conocimiento sino con fantas8as, del todo irrelevantes para el autFntico logos $o, como mC3imo, e3presantes de los limites o de los necesarios d8as de descanso, o aBn, de los lapsus de la actividad discursiva. We "now very well, from em$pathy for instance, that "nowledge cannot be reduced to logic. .here is therefore no sense in affirming the co$e3istence of "nowledge and falsity as if "nowledge referred to truth$as$certainty and totality ' because we "now that "nowledge is not formal$logical or logico$discursive whereas falsity can only e3ist for logic. 8et 4no-led&e can ec"sist only symbolically, throu&h lan&ua&e! and -e should remember that lan&ua&e is not lo&ic 9 and that indeed lo&ic itself is not .lo&ical/0 *herefore the phrase .lo&ico"discursive/ covers only one aspect of .lan&ua&e/. :ndeed, -e demonstrated earlier that the .lo&ico"discursive/ form $philosophy% too is .artistic/0 *he metaphysical dimension of art and the artistic dimension of metaphysics entail precisely that human perception, thou&ht, and 4no-led&e cannot be reduced to .lo&ic/. 3ut can they be .divorced/ from lan&ua&e; *he ans-er -e &ave earlier $in <:mmanence =e"visited6 and <>hilosophy of the +lesh6% is that they can"not0