In This ISWP

What Is the Threat?

~ CafiadianUnification ~ VietnamGroundWar ----------22.S A&M UN!VERs~

ryx4,Jl!41ENTS

April

67

UNITED STATES ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLE6E, FORT LEAVENWORTH,KANSAS

COMMANDANT Major General Michael S. Davison

ASSISTANT COMMANDANT Brigadier

General

Robert

C. Taber

The MilitaryReview is published by the United States ArmyCommandand Gemi Staff College in close association with the United States ArmyWarCollege. It provikrl forum for the expression of military thought on national and military strategy, rvItivJ security affairs,and on doctrinewith emphasis at the division and higher Ievals of com~

. Military
Professional Journal

Review\
of the US Army.

Canadian The

Unification and

Wg

Cdr

J. Gellrrer,

Royal

Canadian

Air

Force,

Ret

Command?r

CivilWitery

Relations

LTC

Irvin C.

M. E.

Kent, S.

USA Dudley

The

Cotfp

DEtat

14 21 28

6mtran Inchon

Reserves The 6enerats

and

Replacements Decision . . .

. .

. .CPT

. H.

. Pat

Eric

Waldman USA, Ret

Tomlinson,

Hos

Mistake and the

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. .

. .

. .

. .

MAJ .

Dave . .

R. ,

Palmer, Fritz

USA

35

Mossow

Chinese

Missile

Ermarth

40 47

What Indias

Is

the

Threat? .

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. .

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COL .

Irving Brig

Heymont, R. D. Law, Anthony

USA, Indian

Ret Army

Alternatives

5B 80

Ilrmrnd ~wfdsh Operation

Warfare Armys Moldau

in Role .

Vietnam in

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. . . :

. . .

. . .

. . .

. COL .

Harrigan

Nationbrrildirrg . . . . . .

Clifton . . .

C. Fox, Anonymous

USA

88 75 80

A New Waapons

Look for

at

the Internal

Mintiemen Oefens&

. .

. .

. .

MAI COL

John Alvin

R. Galvin, C. Isaacs,

USA USA

1970.80

87

Webility

Without

Wheels,

Wings,

or

Blades

COL

Charles

M.

Tyson,

USA

92 .

~iy 4+ ry F

Notes

87 108

Books

: The VIEWS expressed ~krny or the Oommsnd

in this ma ezirre ARE THE AUTHORS and and Genera f Steff College. ,

not

neoeseerily

those

of

the

Edftorin Chief COLDonaldJ. Delaney Associate Editor COLJohn B. McKinney ArmyWar College AaafstantEditor LTCA, LeroyCovey Faatsrras ,Editor LTCCharles A. Gatzka ProductionEditor Helen M. Hsll Spanislr-Amarisan Edftw MAJJuan Horta-Merly BrazilianEditors LTCPaulo A, F. Wana LTCWalter J, Fauathri Publication Oflicer MAJNormanC. Murray Art and Design CharfesA. Moore OonaldL. Thomas

MILITARY RPW3V-Publlshed monthly by the U. S. Arm Command #ndGemorsl Stsfl Sollege Fort& rmwerth, Kansasin EnIlsh,Spanish, andPortuUWO.$SI of fund!ror Inllngof this publlcEtiOO h+I as% bermspprowdby H qvarters, D@artmerrt o0 the Army, 28 May1X!& svbscrkwonwree,S4.00 IUScur~e~ e SSOOIId.SiaSS pestagc rdat Fort hawmwrth, Kansas, hag the United States,f%tedStatesmill rSIYIOtiOfnM*, mdthesamimfrle$fiich sreme~d n.krrerken PostalUnkrrr (lncludlna Spain,$S.OR * yearIn 011 ottwrcovntriwlsinglecopy* S0 aanfa.kidress WdtSOriptiOO mailto the Oook Department, IA.S. Army Commend end rlermrel StOt College,fort Leavenworth, Senses SS027.

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, 7

VIETNAM

(Estracted from a speech by PresidentLyndonB. lohnwn,Washington, D.C.,10January 19S7)

We are in Vietnam because the United States of America and our allies are committed by the SEATO Treaty to act to meet the common danger of aggression in Southeast Asia. We are in Vietnam because an international agreement signed by the United States, North Vietnam and others in 1962 is being systematically violated by the Communists. > That violation threatens the independenceof all the small nations in Southeast Asia and threatens the peace of the entire region and, perhaps,the world. We are there because the people of South Vietnam have as much right to remain non-Communist,if that is what they choose,as North Vietnam has to rererainCommunist. We are there because the Congress has pledged by solemn vote to take all necessary measures to prevent further aggression.No better words could describe our present course than those once spoken by the great Thomas Jefferson. It is the melancholy law of human societies to be compelled sometimes to choose a great evil in order to ward off a greater avil. We have chosen to fight a limited war in Vietnam in an attempt to prevent a larger war-s war thats almost certain to follow, I believe, if the Communists succeeded in overrunning and taking over South Vietnam by aggressionand by force. I believe,and I am supported by some authority, that if they are not checked now the world can expect to pay a greater price to check them later.

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SERVICE UNIFICATION IN CANADA

Wing CommanderJohn Gellner, ReMalCamre%m Air Force, Retired

ILL C-243, the Canadian Forces Reorganization Act, is now bafore Parliament. It will still have come rough going both in committae and onthe floor of the Houee, but, barring such drastic developments as the fall of the present government, it eeems assured of final paseage, perhaps by nest summer. Its basic provision, in stilon 2 of the act, then will become law: The Canadian Forcee are the anneal forces of Her Majesty raieed by Canada and coneist of one Service called the Canad]an Armed Forces. Thie ia a revolutionary departure. Air forcee ara treated es weapons branchee of a eingle service in some countriesfor example, Switzerland -but nowhere is this the case with the naviw. Furthermore, nowhere elee bee the fundamental reason for one service--the indivisibility of modern Wer-been established and then made the basis for a complete reorganization of the defense establishment. Canadas ie, of course, an experiment. It could turn out badly in its Practical application. If thie happens, Ml 1337 k..

the Canadian armed forces will have been eeriouely harmed for ycare to come. If it turns out well, and there is no reaeon why it should not, then Canada will have set a precedent of the utmost importance, aapacially to the worlds middle and smell pewers. These countriw are being forced, just as Canada is, by the growing axpensivenesa of military power into the greatest possible rationalization of their defenee organizations. The unification of the servicee ia surely the ultimate in such rationalization. It must not be thought that Canada embarked on large-scale experimentation with her armed forces juet for the sake of testing a new model organization, even if it was one which eooner or later had to be tested somawhere. Caneda went into it bacause ahe had to and because she could afford to try. This dual motivetion neceeeity and opportunity-is moat important for understanding, the Canadian unification scheme. The political climate in Canada page the defense budget at 1.5 IAlli;ii dol3

w E. ~ Ulsflcmom )are at the approximate dollar value of 1662. TMs WS8 the year the present Liberal Government came to power. There ie a modest yearly increment of about two pement to tie care of inflation, so that successive Defense Eetimatee have been for approximately 1.626, 1.560, and 1.672 billion doUara. However, it is still only 1.5 biSUon in real 1962 dollars, and, perhe~ not even quite that. Of tide cum, 18ss than 1.4 billion actually go to the three servicee. The balance ie for eundry extraneous expenditure such ae mutual aid or peneione. Volusltw Fwses Canada bee all-volunteer forces. No other method of recruitment ie pelitieally Peseible in tbie country in time of peaca. Gmeequently, the per cnpite coet of the services is high. Taking ee a meaeure only the more or less tied expenditures shown in the Operations and Maintenance Stilon of the Defense Estiitee-wldch covers neY. . . . allowances. maintenance of buildings and materiel, and eoete of current operation-it amounte to more than 10,000 dollare a year per man. The result is that operation and maintemuwe hea been taking an overgrowing, pmpetilonately much too high ehare of the total money availabla to the three services. CorreapendWing Commander John Ge41w, Rou04 Canadian Air Force, Retired, was born in T&te and educnted in AuEh+a, France, and CcecheeZueakia. He practiced tiW in (?zecho8kw0.kiO until 1989 when b came to the United Stite8. He ealiet8d {n the RCAF upon tb outbreak of World War II, and emved until hi8 retirement in 19S8. Commander GeUner is Editor Of Cemmentatir, a political nq7mne, centributea to other publioatimw, and hue Ieetwwd in tit-e United Statee. 4 ingly, the account for modarnicetioa -construction and aequieition of w jor equipment-bee been pmsively decreasing in actual dollare esd ee a proportion of the entire budgtt In the 1966-66 Defenee EetimeX &@ lest before the present reerganimtkm showed any effects, the tlguree wen 1.119 billion and 268 milUon dolleq rea@lvely, and the ratio betwm tixed coete and funds for moderniw tion wee more than four to one. HEW Espsaditurss A projection made in 1961 indicated that, if the dafenae budget remained dxed, expenditure for operations end maintenance would be equal to the tot,al allotment for defense by Fiscal Year 196S-69 with notMng laft for new equipment. Even with the pm vieion of the already mentioned two percent increment for infletioq * rainy day could not be peetpened for more then one or two years, and this only if some new fixed expenditera would not epeed ite coming. A pay increase which was effectht 1 October 1966 did so, and adde to the budget an extra 62.6 miUion dol. lara yearly. Ae the VbM Chief of tt+ Defense Staff, Ak Marshal F. R. Sharp, acid in a speech in Lendou Ontario: TIrdeae eometMng wee dom we would price ourselves out of exisb ence. The question wee what could la done about it. Tha Canadian Geverw ment dld not want to fail on ita coo!+ mitmente to North Ameriean defen% to the North Atlantic Treaty Orgaeisation, to the United Nations, and to amrdler but atiil important domeetic tasks. The only eolution wee to fuldll all cmnmitmente with fewer inct.elb tiorw and men. Hencq the radk.al * tioneliaation came into being wbiCb eervice unification makes pmeible. Militwy Rwiw .s2

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UNIFICATION ;:

The other motivation for service unification was opportunity, or freedom to experiment. It must be remembered that Canada hoe for the last 96 years been in the extraordinary position of not bating to worry about her passive security. She was in no serioue danger of having her territory, coastal waters, or air space invaded. In the Treaty of Washington in 1871, Caneda acquired a permanently undefended border to the south. From then until 1945, her ocean tkmkewere secured mainly by British mapower.And the belt of arctic wasteland to the north wae practically impenetrable in the then stete of military technology. Inviolata Area From 1945 onward, with the center of gravity of international relatione atdftcd to the United States-Soviet competition for world leedershlp, Canada has, militarily, been the strategic forefieId of the United States. She thus is an aree wh]ch the worlds mightiest power hae to keep inviolate in its own interest even if it were not treatybound to do so. The Canadian military establishment has al. WSYSeerved, and stiil serves, only tbe countrys active security which ie to help further Canadian political policies. This has been done traditionally by SCtii se second to a principal-Great Britain until the end of the Second World War, and the United Ststee since 1945. ca~dian defense planning was, therefore, a relatively simple matter. With one eye on available reSOUrees and the other on what the principal wae doing, Canada produced Zddhions to the latters military drengtb, and organized, trained, and equipped to fit. in with her military W@izetion. m laal

Before Hiroebhna, tMe did not pre- sent particular problems, It wee WY ; to keep in stip with the Brit~h con- \ cept of conventional warfare, and then J to produce a number of battalion, : 4 squadrons, and flotiltze on tbe British 3 PSttSrII. This was done in a smell way ~

UNIFICATION Canada tried to do so until 1963, In fact, unable to finance the frequent changea the United States decided, or was forced, tomekq she always hobbled more or lese far behind. In the spring of 1963, Paul T. HelIyer came in with the new Liberal Administration as Minister of National Defense, He was convinced that the simple, second-principal relationship no longer secure as long as the United States is strong. The work now hdng done should result, if all goes well, in greet)y enhanced Canadian active SS. curity which should benefit this coun. try and ite friends and allies. Nsw PrimaryMlsalona In determining what Canadas prin. cipal military mission should be, both the general politico-military situation in the world and the role Canada is playing in it had to be considered, The feet that Canada needs to he seriously concerned only with her SC. tive security was the obvious etsrthg point of all considerations. The prob lem wae to determine what kind of militiry pelicy would do Canada the greatest goed politically in terms of helping her to achieve her natural aims of peace, prosperity, and development in freedom; of maintaining her alliances; and of buying influence where this is needed. Clearly, this would not be achieved by concentrating on the deterrence of, and the creation of a capability to engage in, unlikely conflicts, General nuclear war, limited nuclear warthese two anywhere in the world-or major conventional war in Europe are all possibilities but, fortunately; w mote ones. Canada is committed to contribute militarily to warding OR these remote threats, and does so hy participating in the North American Air Defense Command and NATO. ObvioirsIy, a much more usefo~ pract.icel, and politically more rewarding task can be performed by Canadr keeping flexible and mobile forcfs ready for the deterrence, and if nerd be the fighting, of lower mule armrd eonflicta. Such confllcta could include ineurgent ware, civil wars extended by foreign intervention, and llmitd conventional wars jn the old etyla Mllltwy RariR

C.z.udi.. Farm .%nt<nel PIwo. Generrd Jean V. Allsrd, Chief ef the Defense Staff, Canadian armed forces served, that it wee wasteful for Canada, and was of limited usefulness tv the United States. Consequently, he formed a Canadian defense pelicy which was based on Canadian military thinking and attuned to Canadian capabilities and requirements, including, of course, that of cooperating militarily with the United Staten and the we&em coalition Ied by the United States. He thue became the architect of the thorough reerganiaation Of the Canadian military establishment based on a new definition of missions, on service integration, and, ultimately, service unitlcntion. This complete overhaul has been possible becmine Canada is pawively

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All count?iee in the Second World War probably suffered diflicultiee becauee the cldefe of the three services bad different backgrounds, and thus different outlooks. Fortunately, the same difficulties were experienced in countries on either eide of the figh~ ing lines. The moral would seam to be that coordination is fine, but it is even better if there is no need to coordinate. Tradition Why, then, has unification of the services never been attempted in prectice except now in Canada? The principal reason is, undoubtedly, the reluctance to tamper with an existiig organization wh]ch has eerved, albeit not perfectly, for a long time. Tradition also stands in the way. This is partkxdarly true in the navies where sea warfare wae of neceseity often conducted in isolation from land operations. In Canada, too, navy men are the strongeet opponents of service unification. One rezzon for oppeeition is typically Canadian. It steme from the type of inferiority complex which Canadians have in military affairs. They do not-doubt the fighting prowess of their men, but they are dubious about the qualifications of their leaders ae military thinkers. This attitude ie, no doubt, a throwback from the yeare during which Canadian strategy was made in I.andon and later in Waehingten. It is shown in the questione that are being asked: why do we have to he the ftret to try? Are we really capable of behg the first? Service unification was set as the ultimate goal in the WMte Paper on Defenee of March 1964i mere are no readings on the effeete of uni5cation hacauee the servicee are not yet unified-they cannot be until Parlia7

UNiFICATION With no specific interests, Canada would, ss a rule, act as restorer or keeperof peece in such confScta where diplomacy has failed. Logically, then, it ie thie mission which has bean made the principal one for the Canadian armed foreee. It must not be understood ae encompzseing only the type of UN police MIOUSin which Canada has engaged in the pest, and is engaged now in the Sinai Peninsula (United Nations Emergency Force) and in Cyproe (United Nations Forces in Cyprus). It is not, ss Mr. Hellyer put it, merely a matter of blue berets and billysticke: but of having a fighting force capable of intervening in a great variety of situations. One War,Ona Service Limited conventional confllcts are fought with all the means for fighting them applied together toward a single aim: victory within the politico. miIitary limitations resulting in a favorable peace. The question is whether the eingle purpose of the indivisible war can be achieved better by eeveral armed services acting in esordination, or by one eervice with cotomon doctrine, personnel and materiel planning, training, and epirit. There can be litfle doubt that, theereticelly, one service is beet. It is also the obvious eohrtioh because the historical reasons that did exist for a division have either dieappeared, as in the ease of the separation of sea end land warfare, or have never been valid, as ie the czee of the reparation of air from sea and land warfare. Rwe traditional divieions in the pact beve resulted in intereervice competition and wrangling which were detrimental to the over-all cause in time of peace, and in inefficiency and mistakes in war. M 1ss7

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.ffNIFICAlfON rnent approves. The preliminary work of integration, of combhing paraSeI functions while rnaintrdning the triaervice structure, is, however, far advanced. Actually, it ie virtually completed. BN C-90, which became law on 1 Auguet 1964, mtablished a single Chief of the Defense Staff to replace the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee and the Chiefs of Staff of the three servicca. This wae followed by the formation of a single Canadian Forceq Headquarters, and six functional commands-mobile, maritime, training, materiel, air transport, and air defens%ncompaesing the activities of all three eervicee which had totaled 11 commands. In 1966 the service skzlls were integrated. There were formerly 346 in the three services. Now, there are 98, of which 28 are unique to one service, and 70, from cook to aircraft engine mechanic, common to two, or to all three. In these common skills, membere of the thrco services are interchangeable and are, in fact, already being interchanged as the need arises. Bill C-243, when it becomce law, will introduce the outer signs of unity: a common rank structur+the ranke will be the present ones of the army with some slight meditbzationa-and a common off-duty uniform. Service integration is still too new to have produced any great number of resulti measurable in dollars and cents eavcd, and even less of the more ditlicult to measure rcaulbr in greater general ettlciency and combat readinem. This will take tjme. There are, however, already some encouraging indication. Each of W cervices looked after ite own strategk communications, Iandlines, teletype f~ cilitiee, and relay and filter centers This required S,S07 personnel. TbI three orgardnations were Integratd into a eingle Canadian Forcee Commu. nioations System nearly two years ago It is run by 2,9S0 personnel with t payroll saving of close to one and ~ half million dollars a year. A simiim amount is being saved by the eIimiru tion of formerly duplicated and trip licntcd faciIitiea, both owned cat leased, and of some plants that bav{ become redundant. The ma] benefits from having { single communications system arc however, yet to come. Plans are un derway te automatize it f(rllj. Tbi would not have been economical witl three smaller organizations, but wil be with a single large one. This wil lead to a reduction by 600 in man power alone, or altogether by 22 psr cent compared with the original ea tablishmenti. The system is also m pccted to be vastly more et?lcient. In a recent speech in Montreal, Que bee, General Joan V. Allard, Chief o the Defense Staff, said that all in d there has been a saving of over 14 million dollars since integration br garr. This is welcome because i mearm that a substantial aum has kea freed for the procurement of rim equipment. Material efdciency is o!d one tent of the revolutionary Canadix plan. Operational efficiency is tb other, and the more important, 1 Canada paem both, she will undoubl edly have many followtwa in the worl who will want to go the same way.

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Lieutenant Colonel Irvin M. KenG Umted Stote8 Armu

The views eworeesed in thie artislo are the aw thore and are no; nsceeearily those of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the J7S Army Command atzd General Staff College. Editor. N 1914 a hard-pressed French Army moved several thousand men from one flank to another, counterattacked, and restored a desperate situation. There was nothing particularly unueual in the maneuver except that the movsment wae made by means of the civilian taxicab fleat of the city of Paris. In 1940 another hard-preeeed French Army was unable to control the flow of civilian refugees along its main eupply and reinforcement routes and found itself defeated without even a chaneo to commit a large portion of its reserves to action.. In the eummer of 1944, as US armies ewept across France, a eerioue ehortage of fiv+gallon gasoline cans threatened to wreak havoc with the logistic ayatcm of our forces. Thousande of these cans had been jeWleoncd by our troope in their haete to pueh on with the pursuit of the fleeing German armies. These cane were scattered alqng the tielde and roade of France. A large-scale and highly eucceeeful paychologicel campaign was directed toward the echool children and other young people of France to find, collect, end turn the cane in to the rtsereet US unit or installation. WhSe many cans ware never recovered, the responec of the children of France wae extremely helpful, and the worst aspccte of the ebortage were thus overcome. 9

ml 1967

CML-MS.ITARY SEI.ATIONS In 1945 commanders of US military forces found themselves exercising full executive, legislative, and judicial authority over millions of conquered peoples on both sideti of the globe. In the 1960a the eronmanders of several major US Army unita found themselves and their unita committed, within the continental United States, to enforce the orders of the civilian courts. For the past several years, the commanders of Bolivian Army units and their US advisors have found themselves fully committed to the movement of people from the Altiplano to more fertSe lowland areas. Thie action caused them to use the medical, engineering, and transportation facilities of their unite to improve the lot of segments of the civilian populace. Today, commanders of posts, camps, and stations both at home and abroad find -themselves engaged in attempting to influence surrounding communities to provide housing, education, and recreational facilities for their personnel and their dependenta withLientenmt Colonel Irvin M. Kent is unth the Awge Advocate Section, l%WbJmWt8r8, US Army Air D8fS7WS Gomnwnd, Ent Air Fercs Bass, Colerao% SFngs, Colorado. He /sol& a B.A. degree from S@wuse University in New York and an LL.B. from Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Ma.%%% cha+retts. Hie assignments inclti dutg with tks Oflice of the Staff Judge Advocate, US Artwg Commdcations Zone, Europe, and with the US Army Combat Devehrpnwnte Command, Civil Araire Agetwg, Fort Gorckm, Georgia. A frequent contributor to tlw MnrrAIw REVIEW,his meet recent artidv, Hard SkU/a and Drepowte/ appeared in the Dscember 1966 ieeuc. 10 a.. out discrimination because of race 01 color. In the Republic of Vietnam, td South Vietnamese ArmY units and U units are frequently engaged in at tions designed to protect the berm! and safe storage of the rice crop frw the ravages of the Viet Cong and tbei taxation: MajorActivities .* Each of these vignettes of miii, history illustrates one or more of. seven major activities which tog make up a military commander% terest in his civil-military relati or civil affairs as they are eelle& the US Army. These are: ~ Provision of civilian suppwt and prevention of civilian intc ence with tactkal and logistic o 1 tions. s Providing or supporting functions of government for a ci 4 population. Community relations of the , itary forces. Military civic action se pati internal deve~opment operations. ! BfSitsry patilcipation in a ulace and resources control pro as part of internal defense operati Military support of civil defe !! , Consolidation psychological ow ations. Each of these seven acti&.ies coal{ be illustrated by additional example However, the examples given are mfb cient to identify civil affairs for whs they are-the commanders relatiou chips with Ida civilian environmsd This scope is so broad that. no one sub ordinate organization or eingle std section could hope to encompass aUa the operations that deal with or affa civil-military reiationehips. Obviously, procurement offices mw continue to purchsee or requisitb Mmly .

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civilians, assist in the preparation of Plans and orders to implement that @cy, and provide staff supervision b oversee that implementation. The field of logietics is almost qually diverse in its manifestations, butno commander would think of PUt@3 himself in a position where he kid to @nvaaa all of Me general and ~wial stiff seetions and major sub-

geon, provoat marshal, and logistics officer, as well as from ids major subordinate unita. This is a difficult and time-consuming procedure. In some respeate, civil affairs is akin to intelligence. The acquisition of information about the enemy ie the business of many elemente of the Army. The denial to the enemy of information about our forces is the busi.

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CNIL-MlltTARY RELATIONS ness of every member of the Army. Intelligence and counterintelligence operations are planned and supervised by specialists, but only a small percentage of the total effort ia performed by specialist personnel. Nevertheless, the intelligence element of the coordinating staff can provide immediate and detailed information to the commander on the whole intelligence and counterintelligence situation. The civil affaire problem should be handled in a similar manner. Experience hae taught us that, when we deny to a commander the professional toole he needs for an essential tack, we have not relieved hlm of any responsibility-we have eimply made all of hie tasks more difficult, To make matters worse, most commanders have had little training in civil affairs. Too often, we eaddle commanders with the necessity of doing their own G5 worknot merely the making of policy, which cannot be delegated in any case, but aleo of doing the detail work. Many commanders are forced to parcel out the civil affairs job to many etaff elements, with the risk of gaps and duplication. Central ContaotPoint The civilian-official or private citir.en-who hae businese with a military command must hunt on his own for the right man to see. Frequently, he winds up at the wrong place or finale himself talking to someone who hae only a peripheral interest in the matter. The (25, on the other hand, provides a central point that can serve as an initial contact for the civilian. Command policy can be explained and proper arrangements made to do business with the appropriate staff section or euhordinate command. This at least encourages good will, even when the request cannot be fully satiefied. 12 To actileve civil affairs objectives, the military commander engages io one or more of the seven civil affairs activities wideh affect the relation. shlpe between hle forces and the civil authorities and people in any area in which those forces are present. Priority Activity The priority of command civil af. fairs effort goee to that major $ivil affairs activity moat directly related to the mieeion of the military command. Normally, consolidation psychw logical. operations will be in support of the other eix activities and will also be geared to provide maximum sup port to the priority activity. Thus, in 1944 the priority civil affairs activity was obviouely the provision of civilian eupport for our tactical and logistic operations, and the consolidation pwchological operation directed toward the children of France was mounted in eupport of that priority effort. The priorities of command effort in this field of interest will be affected both by the command miesion and by the level of command concerned. For example, in the course of a etability operation, such as that in Lebanon or in the Dominican Republic, the com mander of the US forcee was primarily concerned with the provision of support to the civil government. Nevertheless, the commanders of subordinate units, while supporting the over-all effort, might have differeot civil affairs priorities. The commander of the logistical command committed in such an opention would he primarily concerned, ii sofar as hie interest in civil affabr activitke wae involved, in the provk sion of civilian eupport for and W prevention of civil interference Witi hia Iogiatic activities. In eupport 0~ the over-~11 command mission, the IQ 4

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CIVIL-MILITARY RE~TlONS gietic commander might also participatein population and resources controland civic action activities, but this pwticipation would not change his priority for civil affairs activities. Priorities of command effort can ideobe affected by a change in theIsvelof conflict. Thus, a post, camp, or station commander in the United States normally accords priority of his civil affairs effort to community relations.The outbreak of general war, however, would mean an instantaneouschange in that priority to military support of civil defense which could wsii become the major activity of his entire command. 8imilarly, the chief of a US MilitaryAssistance Advisory Group (MAAG) in a country faced with a phase i insurgency wouid be primariiy concsraedin the fieid of civil affairs with sms kmg host nation forcee in pianningand conducting miiitzry civic action. If the situation degenerated to @ase H, his emphasis shouid probabiy and properly shift to military @Icipation in populace and resoureeacontrol. If mattera became etill worse and his host country were invoived in a PhaseIII insurgency, his civil affairs priority would undoubtedly shift to theprevention of civilian interference Withtactical counterguerrilia operations. In each ease, the MAAG civil Mr+ire priority of effort would match thepriority of effort of the host countryforces. Tbe allocation of resources to civii affairs activities muet also vary ac(wdfng to command mission and the tharecteristics of the area, rather than the size of the over-ali Qiiftery force. Thus, Field Marshal &raard L. Montgomery, wbiie commanding an entire army at the Battle of Ei Alamein, needed only a emall civil affaire staff to pian for civii affairs operations when he reached population centers in Libya. On the other Lieutenant Generai Bruce hand, Palmer, Jr., with a force of 1SSSthan two divisions in the Dominican Rc.public, needed and, used the entire civil affairs staff capability of the 18th Airborne Corps and a fuil civil affairs company to handle his. civii raffairs probieme in part of one city. Civil affairs activities of any given command may either be in support of other command functions or may themselves be the supported function. Generally, the higher the ievel of conflict, the more likely civil affairs wili be in the support role. In certain cases, a commands mission may require that primary attention be given to the civil affaire function. There are four sets of circumstances where this condition will prevail: Internal defeneedeveiopment assistance operations. Stabiiity or other cold war operation necessitating military support of the civil power outside of the continental United States. Military support for the civil power in the continental United States as a result of domestic disturbances, disaster, or hostile attack. Military government of occupied territory after tbe conclusion of boa. tilities. Taidng all of the published doe. trine together, civil affairs adds UP to being that branch of the military art aimed at the intelligent handling of our relations with civilians to best easist the commander in the accomplishment of his mission.

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13

From The Armu Quarterl# (Great

Britain]

C. E. S. Dudley

N RECENT years, the coup detat hag come into its own as a meane of seizing power from the legitimate government of the state. It can no longer be regarded as the prerogative of Ruritanian revolutionaries. Since World War 11, governments have fallen in Czechotdovakia, Egypt, Syria, Irsq, Turkey, Korea, and South Vietnamto name but a few-as the result of successful coupe. The Commonwealth bee not been immune to this form of political activity either. Within the pact few years, the government of four newly independent African territories have had to face the threat ofs coup detat launched from within. The failure of all but one of these attempta (Zenzibar) wea due not only to prompt intervention by British troopc, but also to the sheer ineptitude of the Ieadera who, in each case, fMed to observe the most elementary principles of nuch an operation. The COUPdstat, like rebellion and 14

insurrection, is a method of power by illegal and violent meant Unlike the other two, however, it dom not require a large degree of pepuiu eupport; on the contrary, it ie esem tially an operation for small, picked elite. This does not mean that it wlU not be used m part of the over.d plan for bringing a mass uprieing & a succeeaful conclusion. In fact, * Communis~ have utilized it in thb manner eince the October Revolutkm of 1917 although they have attemptd to dieguiae the fact. The writinge of km Troteky me& the point clear that the coup and U@ mace uprising must be regarded aI two separate undertaking althouti they may be employed in conjunctia wjth one another. The dividing lb between the two is semetimea a dM one. Trotsky wae underetrmdably m Iuctarrt to comment in preciue ~ on the retationabip between the * apirecy and the Wmrrwtion. Aft8 all, he could hardly afford to MOW Ullftxy* d

TSE COLIP DETAT miciona that the October Revolua ro had atite root what he use term putschism or revolulnary a ven riem. Be that as it may, as a rule of n e aseumed that, in an ~mb, it am t n, t e massee are mobilised > e physical support of an atnef npt to seize power, whereas their Ie in the COUP or pure conspiracy if they are allotted one at allis seive or for propaganda purposes ly.

vision of reepensibRity ie essential. The first and most impertent of the two will be concerned with over-efl strategy and with providing the tlexible orientation in changing conditions stressed by Trotsky. Dedicationto Causa One particular characteristic appeare to be almost the hallmark of successful conspirators: complete dedication to their cause, if neeeeeary to the exclusion of all elee. Hit~eri who wae something of an expert at thie type of infighting, never tired of prezchlng the virtuee of fanaticiemy and history eeeme to indicate that it ie, indeed, the fanatice who make the most competent conspirators. Men like Colonel Claue von Stauffenberg and General Ludwig Beck, courageous though they were, never etoed a chance once they had failed to kill Hitler, if only because their accomplices were all too human. One other point is to be noted: the l~dere of a successful coup will usually be members of the military or pelitieel hlerareby. It would be mieleeding to overemphasize thle, hut the fact remains that the COUSI detat is primarily a weapon for the use of thoee close to the santa of power. When or.ganiead outeide theee circles, it is likely, at beet, to degenerate into civil war and, at worst, to take the form of a purely hxal attack on the government. Sometimes, however, the dynamic will come from a foreign power which, whether the coup succeeds or not, may then intervene to establish a puppet regime. Tids technique was suicesefully employed by the Cemmuniste in eastern Europe and more recently, but less effectively, by Preeident Gamel Abdel Nasser in Yemen. In such eases, the over-all pelitice15

A Factors General Franz Halder, in attemptE to account for the failure of e German ArmY conspiracy against Iolf Hitler, declared that three main ndltions are required for a succeseI COUP: a clear and reeolute leederip, the readiness of the masses to Ilowthe idee of the revolution, and e right choice of time. Although one ight quibble about General Haldere e of the word revolution (the COUP but one of the weepone in the revkionarys armory, it does not in itIf make a revolution), he appeare to we pinpointed three vital factnre hich muet he carefully considered sing the planning stage of any coup. The need for sound leadership is obOUS,There are, however, two dismt kinds of leadership required: the vr-sll politico-military leaderehi Id the purely tactical leadership. 1 ,nfueion is to be avoided, a clear d Thie article waa digested from the original, pwbli.shed in THE ARMY@IABTEStLY ANO DEFENCE JOUBNAL (Great Britain) October 1968. Ccq@ghted @ 1966 bg THE $,,NSmmetLY AND DEPENCE The a;ther ie presently serving in the Saltan8 armed fercee, Mleeat.

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THECOUPOETAT military Ieaderehip is likely to be provided by the power concerned although local leadere and the rank and file mnst be found from within. General Haldere eecond condition the willingness of the massee to follow the idea of the revolutionis more complex. Under certain conditions, it ie poesible, if the conspirators are ruthless enough, to force a new government on a predominantly hostile population. Nevertheless, there is a minimum degree of support without which no government can survive. Once thie eupport has been achieved, the reactione of the remainder of the population are of far Iese importance. Generals Revolt On the other hand, the sympathy, or at least the neutrality, of the armed forces is essential. But in a world of almost universal conscription, it ie often difficult to draw a line betweey the soldier and the civilian. The dangere of a false appreciation of this factor were clearly demonstrated by the 1961 Generale Revolt in Algeria. Its leaders, knowing that they could rely on certain elite paratroop and Foreign Mgion units, hoped te carry the rest of the army in Algeria with them. When they failed to do so, the revolt collapsed. General Haldere last condition timing-muet be considered with regard to the international, domeetic, and @&lcal eituatione. It is unlikely that, at any given time, all condition at home and abroad will favor the conspirators. They will have to balance a number of constantly changing conditions, one against the other, before deciding on tbe moment to strike. On the international plane, they muet gauge the reaction of foreign powers. In the domestic epbere, the conepiratore must consider the economic and 16 8 Dolitical situation, the state of publii ~pinion, and the likely reactions of friendly and rival political groups, The tactical situation-the least im. portant of the thre+need be consid. ered only ineofar as it will have a direct bearing on the immediate outcome of the coup. Like any other operation demanding rapid and violent action, the coup

us Am! General Franz Halder outlined three COB ditions for a rmccemful COUP:smm leadership, eupport of the masses, m timing detut can logically be divided inti three phaees: planning and prepars tion, execution, and consolidation. During the preparation phaee, ti conspirators muet build up their ox ganicstion so that they are ready t strike when prevailing conditions ar favorable. In the modern etnte, it is diftlctdt for all but the most ecrupu

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THECOUPtlETAT ]ous and proficient conspirators to swid detaetion. Their work is made more dangerous by the fact that peychologicatiythey must be on the offehsive, collecting information, recruiting new members, and makhg contacts. At the same time, funde must be raised, eezrecy preserved, and discipline maintained. Ixistim Conditions The-size and scope of the organizationwill depend on exieting conditions nedon the political outlook of its leadwe. It mw operate only within the fmmework of the armed forces or jome existent political party; it may be a maes movement with its own hadow administration existing paralIsl to the states; it may employ the Sfth-column technique used by Hitler, attempting to penetrate the ranks of the services, police, administration, szd trade unions; or it may be a combination of the three. Whatever form it takes, the conspirators will not necessarily be concerned solely with technical preparations for seizing power should the opportunity arise. If they adopt this psssive approach: the movement will probably become moribund. They should, therefore, seek to create the opportunity. To do eo, they must developa plan designed to tnm existing @itical, ezonomic, and psychological conditions to their own advantage. Strizt]y speaking, however, their activities in thie field would not constitute part of the preparation for the wup, but would fall within the scope of other departments of revolution. W Politice. One of the most important problems Whichthe Conspiratire will have to &e is that of recruiting the force tith which to carry out the execution Phase. If unite of the armed forcee &l 1s7 can be won over, they will have a readymade and disciplined instrument at hand, but it will require careful and cautioue planning to subvert officers and men, weed out tmreliablee, and yet maintak absolute eaerezy. Even when thie has been done, it must be remembered that officers who dabble in higls treason can never be absolutely certain that their orders will be obeyed by their subordinates u til 7 they put them to the test, On the other hand, the security risk involved in recruiting, training, and equipping an independent forze such as the Red Guard or the SA (Stwmabtsihm~) is considerable. Whichever method is adopted, some form of protracted eubvereive campaign is neceseary. Execution Phase The execution pbaee of the coup will have two main objective: to paralyze the existing government and to take over the apparatus of central administration. If the conepiratore have overwhelming numerical superiority, and if their organization is geared to it, they may be able to carry out both stages simultaneously. More generally, the operation will he divided into two distinct parts. In considering thie phaee, it must be apprwiated that, in a totalitarian state, the government is only a small part of a political party which has a life and an ideology of ite own. Thue, even if Colonel von Stauffenbergs bomb had killed Hitler outright, he would still have had the Nazi Party, the SS (Schstmtaffel), and the @+ stapo with which to contend. Under such conditions, a civil war may be the inevitable outcome of the coup, a factor which must he taken into account during the planning and preparation phaee, but which should 17

THECOUPOETAT not be allowed to distract attention during the execution phaze. It ia most important to neutralize the government and seize the machinery of state; the prosecution of the civil war will form a separate undertaking thereafter. If the aim of the coup detat is to ?<$j~~~~]:>~~~-<<~,~~<, ~::.. .. . .;,..,..,)-. . . The trappinga of pnwer should not be mistaken for power itself. Poww is an abetraet thing. It may lie %Mr one man-en absolute monarch or dictator-end hie subordinates; with a political party; or with the lwders of the mass organizations. But at any given moment, it lice in the hands of .. . ...... -,. *.~y$$: .,

seize power, it follows that its leaders must first decide exactly who holds it. In the past, many COUPS have come to grief because the conspirator erroneously believed that, by erecting barricades and seizing ministry offices, they had gained control of the government. All they were really doing was causing the general public a certain amount of inconvenience. 18 k,- ...... ...

a lirrdted number of individuals, for at root power is the ability of a man, or group of men, to bend others to their will. Having decided who theee men are, the conepiratore must either arrestor kill them. With limited forces at their disposal, the conspirator will be unable to deal with all the smaller frh so, in compiling their lists, they will MllifeIY Rrvi@ ...=..&

,
have to decide who are the most important. The essence ,of the coup is surprise, and the arrests must, therefore, be carried out quicldy, quietly, end, as far as possible, simultaneously. VitslPoints The central offices of administration-and, therefore, those individuals who hold powerare usually located in the capital, so it is in the capital that a COUP is most likely to be launched. The conspirators must decide in advance if there are any key buildings or installations (vital points) which they need to occupy. Economy of effort ie eesential. If armed opposition is expected, it may be necessary to disperse some of their troops tactically, but no useful purNse is served by occupying the ministry of war, for example, with an infantry battalion if a single sentry at the gate will achieve the same result. The vital points are those places from which warning may be given (certain communications centers) and those of immediate importance for prestige or propaganda purposes, such os television and radio statione and certain public buildings. Generally speaking, other key installations need simply be isolated, The imposition of a strict curfew, enforced by mobile patrols, will serve the same purpose as numerous scattered detachments of . troops and will release men for the more important task of carrying out arrests. A strong reserve can be kept to deal with any unforeseen emergencies. Once the government has been neutralized, the conspirators can proceed to the second etage and take over the Machkiery of central administration. Initially, they would be well advised b trust nobody and to retakr all power ~ Jrdl1*7

THECOUPDETAT in their own hands, enforcing their authority through the medium of the forces they have deployed for the coup. The cldef actions required are the proclamation of martial law and; an announcement of the change in government which may be accompanied by a tilef declaration of their aims and policy. This declaration may simply be designed to win popular support, and the new regime may have no intention of subsequently honoring its promises. If the population is enthusiastic about the coup, the curfew can be lifted, a public holiday declared, and the day given up to celebrations. On the other hand, if people are hostile or indifferent, they are best kept out of mischief by staying at work although for propagrmda purposes popular demonstrations of approval can be stage managed. Aggressive Policy The new government cannot afford to rest on its laurels after the coup, but should adopt a vigorous and aggressive policy during the consolidation phase. It is at this tim+immediately after tbe coup, hut before it is firmly established-that it will be most vulnerable to attack The new government must extend its authority to all parts of tbe country as quickly as possible. To do this, it will have to insure that orders are carried out promptly and effectively and that any lapses by civil servants or heal authorities are dealt with immediately and rigorously. Perhaps, the most effective method of doing this is by attaching political officers or commissioners, armed with sweeping powers, to as many administrative centers-at all leveb+aa practicable. While strengthening its grip on the 19

THECOUPOEtAT administration, the new regime will have two other major tasks: to eliminate any remaining opposition and to gain international recognition. The second task is a matter for a few specialists in the foreign affairs department, BO the main effort can be directed toward crushing any likely resistance. Once again, it is primarily a question of detecting and arrenting the right menthose with the ability and inclination to rally the opposition. The problem of mesa insubordination strikes, civil disobedience, and demonatrationtiannot be dealt with at any length here. But in the light of past experience, it would seem that, if the regime is ellicient and ruthless, it may well be able to forse the public to cooperate against Ha will, In the international field, the new government will regularize ita poeition by gaining the recognition of other governments es quickly se possible. If there is a danger of foreign intervention, an appwd for help to one of the major powers may result in military or diplomatic support, or at least cauee the intervening stetc to hesitate until the moment for so tion has papsed. When the country ha6 returned to normal, the consphwtme will be able to turn their full attention to the bud. nees of government. But in one eem the consolidation phase will last fa es long os there is the pomibility tbd the new regime may itself be attacked from withh. For today, when cm ventional warfare has become too costly in term of humnn life to h worth while, the coup has many ad vantages, It is economical in terms 01 men and material; it preeente th country and the world with a fait w cowcpli; and, when suitably dreese $ up by propagandists, it can even be cm. ered with a cloak of respectability. It is to be expected that the coII; detuf, ae a means of overthrowkq the legitimate government of the state will be used even more frequently il the future than it hss been h the FWX

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GERMAN RESERVES ANDREPLACEMENT k

.

v
Eric Waldman

I
NY meaningful evaluation of the German military contribution to the Weetern defenee alliance must include an evaluation of the military reserve and replacement system. In the Federal Republic of Germany, most combat units are qnderetrength. Therefore, ae aeon se an emergency situation ariaee, or even a period of intensified tensions, trained reservists are needed in fairly large numbsre to bring the unita assigned to tbe North Atlantic Treaty Organiza. tion and those under the command of the territorial defense to their authorized watilme strength. Reservists are also needed to fill up mkf aztiVStethe many mobilization unite and to provide the personnel for the replacement centers. Ml 1987

The favorable reputation of the German military system of the pest both in terroe of efficiency and effectiveneee-was, in pa~ beeed on its ability to buildup large fighting forces within a relatively short period of time and to maintain Germanys military strength, in spite of heevy losses, through an eilicient replacement system. However, the political and social climates of the past, marked by strong authoritarian atiltudee among the military and shared by large segmente of the civilian population, are no longer cbzraeteristic of contemporary Germany. The democratic environment of the Federal Republic of Germany provides for an entirely dHerent background. In faz~ there wee 21

REsEms ml

MPUCEMENTS miiitary reserve nyetem thus had ti take into eorudderatlon not only h needs of the military for trained m serviate, but abia the changed over4 circumetancee, the attitude of the m serviste, and the persistent atthat of many Germane who eee in tb Ihmde8welw, at beat, a necofumry @ Systems ltlfhr It also ehould be noted that the@ man military reeerve eyatem i6 * niderebly ditXerent from the resect system ae practiced in the Unitq Statee; therefore, a mare compartqq of the two sys~me is of minimaI val~ First of all, the Germans utilkm ~ individual reserviata. Reserve units u the Armed Forces or National GuasI unite, forming tbe basis for the U Rrmerw system, me unknown to tk Gcrnwm. The only exceptions to the Gernw practice are the reserve units of tk territorial defenne etnrted in Apd 196d and reorgnnizad into the hors defense troups in April 1966. But eve those units, when brought to the II tended strength of 60,000 men h 1968, will affect 5 relntivo]y mad group of German rwerviste. At the end of 1966, there were w proximately 900,000 Ihm&ewehr ri fierviem. By 1970 their number Ml hava lncrexsed to around 1.8 millia and then wIII remain nbout the mm provided that no drastic changes I the=air,e of the Rctive Bunrkumhr N cur, Tbe new rrscewhta becomla available aftar 1970 will replnce olde rmervlsfa daatgnstad for desctivatioc A carefully worked out regi$tratio rind aaeignment eyatem kavpe track u all available reeervhk In additioi the Gerrncmc are certainly aware tbc In order to kesp up the mllltary pri tlclency of tha mcerviste for their ma krnpkct mflltxy uoe. proper trai~ ilunwy *

strong oppeaitton by a large percentage of the German population toward rearmament and toward the creation of the Bsmdeswehr, the armed forcen of the Federal Republic. Mtltttdc Ch~o Within the laet few yenm, a definite change in the attitude of the Gertnrm civllhme haa been observed, This change wae probably caused primtwily by the recognition that n Qwnmn contribution toward Wentern mcurity wae not only necemary, but also aesisted in irnprcwing the international positjon of the Federal Republic. Nevertheless, the Brmdeewehr ia etill ehort of profeeeional soldiers and eohfiern serving Ionrer poriodn of time thrm the 18 months required of the drafteen. The better financial opportunities within n booming economy, the Ions of pre~tige suffered by the military, and the long m-id articulate oppcmition to rearmament ntill inttu. ence tho youngor generation. After completion of the compuhiory mi}itiry #ewice, meet of tho draftees-much like their American countarparta tack intereet in u continuation of their mllitmry career in the remrve orgarrisation and congider any required reserve obligation an err rmnoying inter. fwcutcc with their privrite Iivee. The planners of the new Gerrrmn . . . .. ..&ic Wahfman ie Profrmor of POtiMeaJ Science at tkc Univereitu of Ca@ary, Cdgarg, Alberta (lmodc. Born iu Austria. he rreerl os aetivm duty with the US Armv from 19M fa z$b$, and bi& the nmk of major in the Rwn-w. He atbdatths Uni?wr$iw of Vienna, ond enbqwnttlp received hix Ph, D. ie PofWaal Srieae~ jrom GROPLM Wmh{wpfmr tfriiwreity, Wmhin@m, ~. ~, iiix 8rtiC/Q, *@rsIux$ Home Lbfmc Troape, ap. /r#red in tha S@ 1S68 uetw of the hftS.STAEYit&V5KW.

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RESERVES ANDREPtAiEMENIS jag facilities must be provided. These feciiitiee, however, are available only tea very small numbeq of reservists. EvsrY German male &izen between the agea of 18 and 60 ie, under the present law, subject to military conscritilon. Buamuefir reeervistet whO are the backbone of the German reserve system, qre only those men who Reservist of the lower enlisted ranks can be called back to active duty until they have completed their 45th year. In wartime, this period is extended until the end of their 60th year. The reserve obligations of noncommissioned officers and officers lasts until the completion of their 60th year. RWIrcd professional eoldiere, irre-

sctually saw eervice in tbe Btmdeswehr either aa draftees, volunteers, or se professional soldiers. However, those German men who hsve eerved in the former German miiitary forces, in the Federal Border Pelice, or in the unite of the Alert Poiice organized by the individual states are considered members of the military reserve. Their eligibility and usability have to be verified by the County hfilitary Replacement Olllce with jurisdiction over their place of residence. w 19S7

spcctive of rank, can become reactivated until the end of their 65th year. kfembers of the German rsserve are subdivided on the basis of their length of military training and ages into three groups: Reserve I is comprieed of former draftees, volunteers, and professional soldiers with at bmet nine monthe of active eervice. Reserve II is made up of former draftees who had lees than nine monthe of atilve service. Reserve 111 contains reservists 23

RESERVES hND REpMcEMEtiTs who formerly belonged to Reserves I and 11 after they have reached age 36. A different way of dividing the C&man reservists is based. on their respective utilization after they are ceiied back to active duty: Callup Group I includes all reservieta who are assigned to 8ctive Brwzdesreekr units or tm Mobilization units. . Callup Group II is for all reservists who, after calkrp, are to report to Personnel Collecting Offices. Callup Group III includes all remaining reservista who are not assigned to either of the two other groups. Since not all eligible young men are utilized by the draft, the German military .reaerve aleo has a standby reserve comprised of those draft-eligibles who were not called into the military eervice. The etandby reeerve is divided into three groups. The firet two are based on physical fitness categories while the third is for all members of the first two groups after they reach age 35. Ueiservri *stem In addition to 461,000 military personnel, the Bwde.weiw aieo includes 165,000 civil servantz. The objective is to relieve military personnel during peacetime from practically all administrate, financial, and logietic functions. The adrnhietrative aspects of the draf~lnckrding examinations and callups, the supervision of the everincreasing number of reeervieta, and the military replacement eystem-fall under the jurisdiction of tbe civilian Bundeswehr Administration. Department V of the 06ice of Military Administration, krmivsr as the Burrdeswelw Replacement Ofdce, works with the replacement oftica of the six military d&ricte and 116 County ?24 Military Replacement Ofiicee covering the 5S0 political regione of the Fed. eral Repubiic. The Office of Military Administra. tion ie, in administrative matters, tbe policymaking body whfle the County Military Replacement Offices admin. ister the policy and remain in dkwt contact with the reservist. They keep the personnel records and aeeign raserviets on the baeis of mobilization requirements. Reservists are required to keep the county office informed of changes in residence. Mobilization pkmning, allocation of reserve manpower, and policies concerning training and welfare of w. servists are the responsibility of the military staff of the Ministry of De. fense. The organization to carry out the policies is headed by the Superintendent for Reserviete. His organization extende throughout the Federal Republic and is part of the structure of the territorial defense with subor. dinate headquarters at military dis. trict, region, and county levels. Organizational Cztagoriss The present 900,000 reservists are grouped into six categories according to the type of organization in which they wili be employed: . Existing unite under NATO Commands. Highest priority reeerviste will be ueed to fill existilng vacencies and bring the units to wartime strength. Mobilization units. Theee may bs part of NATO integrated forces or of the territorial defense. Organizational equipment for these units is etored end maintained in peacetime by caretaker personnel. Field replacement battalions. These organizations provide for m. placement of unit losses of all eerviced and the territorial defense. MI1611s Revier

IL

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RESERVES ANDREPf.ACEMENTS
Personnel Collectinx Offices. kt&t 160 such offices pr~vide fillers iv the replacement battalion as va@ciss occur. Logistic beae organizz~lon. In weetime, the military logietica orpnicztion ia small, but it expands apidly in mobSization with the addiion of over 100,000 reserviete. Home defense troops. These are witewhlch will be called UP in emerFIWY to perform a va~iety of tesks in herear areas and in civil defense.

welw does not have the facilities to accommodate larger formation. Mandatory exercises for reservists unite are theoretically-held every thr~ yeare and alert exercisee at ehorter intervals. Actual practice chows great diecrepanciee. While some reservists are called up every year, either upon their own request or aeked for by name by the units to which they are aseigned, others are not called up at all. Individual reservists may also be called up for mandatory miSitary training. As a rule, these periode of duty last four weeks with the army, four to eix weeks with the air force, and eix to eight weeke with the navy. Self-Development Since the mandatory training of reservists affecta only a relatively emall part of the total number of reservists, the voluntary part of the reservista training program is of great eignificancel On an individual and voluntary basis, the reeervist has a number of opportunities to improve his militery proficiency. He may: o Attend a Bundeswehr school. . Apply for active duty training with a Bunde8wehr unit. . Avail himself of the military training provided in the group of reservists which are set up either by the Superintendent for Reservists or hy the Association of the Brmde8wehr Reservists, (Verband). The groupa organized by the Superintendent for Reservists participate in baaic individual training. In addition, there are emaller work groups which provide more advanced training for reserve officers and noncommissioned oilicers. The groupe organized by the Verband have precisely the same purpoee 25

[timing Reservists The effectiveness of the German ditary reserve syetemie greatly afkctcdby the quality of the individual vservist. His miiitary Dreparedneee sthe product of hie military trainny. The Bundeswehr, therefore, is itally interested in providhg milimytraining, as well ae training failities for the ever-growing number jfreservists. However, the organization of the hperintendent for Reservists is a mall establishment, and it is beyond is capability to meet the objective of @ding training facilities. In fact, wly thoee reservist who voluntarily ptilcipate in furthering their milibry competence can be assisted in heir endeavors. Only five to six persnt of the reservists avail themselves f this opportunity of improving their mihtsryproficiency. In addition to voluntary participationof the reservist in the military ksining program, there are official dlups which require the reservists totake part in mobSization exercisee, WU811y lasting 13 days and in aedlcd alert exercises, with a duration Ofup to three daye. So far, only @er units, such ae battalion and tides, have been able to carry out b axemiees beeauee the Btuuies-

RESERVES ANDREPLACEMENTS and are, therefore, of tremendous. aesistanee to the military reserve training program because of the limitations of the small organization of the Superintendent for Reeerviste. The Verba?zd was founded by a few individuals in January 1960 as a private organisation with the intention of creating and maintaining contact between the Bwzdeswekr and its growing number of r~erviste. When the Federal Defense Ministry serve organization of the Territorti Defense Command of practically su its odministrative functions to petit the active military personnel to dev~ their time to training functions, About two-thirds of the reeervbik who volunteer for training do so wkb the Verband. These training meetings of the local groups of the Vee%tmd have the same official status as the meetings of the groups organized by the Superintendent for Reservists.

recognized the weaknesses of its own training program for reservists, it decided to utilize the pdential services of the Ver$ewzd. OSicial funds have been made available to this organisation in order to enable it to improve ita organisational structure and to increase ita etTiciency in handling the training of ita reservists. The objeetive is to build up the Verba?ed to euch an extent that it will W capable of relieving the re2s

Therefore, the participants are considered for the durntion of the mssting in a legal sense es soIdlers. The German military reserve aye. tern may appear to he perplexing and confueing because of ita curious mixture of military, civilian, and even private aspecta. There are at least three major factors which contributed to the emergence of thie arrangement: . The prevalent notion is to keep civilian personnel in charge of adMliituY WeW

.-

ftESERVES ANDREPLACEMENT ministrative matters of the military Mablisbment because of the erroneous interpretation. of the democratic conmpt of civilian control. This concept wee and still ie not generally understood to mean political and parlia entary control, but is accepted to imply the control of the military by civilims. There is a ehortage of qualified ilitary personnel for administrative tasks connected with the implementation of an effective reserve program. Even an increaee in the draft quota, unlikely for many reesone, would not eliminate this epeeitlc personnel shortege of experienced officere and nontonneieeioned officere. There has been an absence of long-range plannin& for reserve matters caused, in part, by aesigning the buildup of the NATO-integrated forces consistently the higheet priority. This encouraged improvisation end the willingness to look for outaiie solutions. The arrangement with the Vefband is a case in point. The key question is: Can this organisational structure achieve the ohjetlivee of a military reserve system and accomplish ita miesion during peacWlme, during periods of increased tensions, and under wartjme conditions ? The answer might take the character of qualified optimism. This relative omlmistic evaluation is based on observations made during m~ny personal visits; by numerous interviews with key personnel of the Bwndeswehr, both military and civilian, and with officiale of the Vet-band; and, finally, upon the realization of the duty eoneciouanees nf the average German citizen who, as soon as be receives an official order, reports for duty. But the efficiency of the organizational structure, the intensiveness of the training program, and the over-all effectivanees will depend upon the priority the reserve and replacement program receives from h]ghest authorities, And this ie primarily a political and not a military decision.

COMMENTS INVITED
The Military Review welcomes your comments on any material published. An opposite viewpoint or a new line of thought will aesist ue and may lead to publication of your ideas. If you are an authority on a certain subject, why not write an article If you have only an idea, query us; perfor our consideration? haps we can aseist you in developing an acceptable article.

m 1267

21

IHCHOH: THE6ElIlERA1S DECISI

Captain H. Pat Tomlinson, United States Armff, Refird N 15 September 1950, as the gray shoreline adjn. cent to the South Korean port city of Inchon be. came visible in the morning haze, the stillness was shah tered by eamplitting sounds and sheets of flame tbst belched forth from the cruisers and dwjtroyers. A major amphibious assault against the invadhg North Koreao Peoples Arnry (NKPA) was beginning. So deep bebind the lines was the attack that only a few had confidence in the feasiiAlity of the daring scheme. This opsratio~ was the brainchild solely of one of the most controversial military leaders of modern times, General of the Arroy Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief, Far Esst (CINCFE). General ItfacArthurs plan WSBbased ]arge]y on ter. rain. An evaluation of terrain would be necesssry be cause Korcais eseentiaI1y apcnineula of mounmins. Tbe east coaet coneiste of ranges running ita length with spur rangec deviating waatward acroes the peninsuh These ranges are characterised by their ruggedness and 26 . hllllbryR@ .&

I SW ridiy; however, they are not notably high. They definitely curtail mecherria4d forces. mobiIity for Therefore, motor movement was restricted to a few primitive roads, arsirdyin the lowlands along the weet side of the peninsula. The same restrictions applied to railroads. Thus, Koreasprimary communications were centered in the weet with the main roods and rails converging on Seoul fromthe south and following the western lowlands te the north. Amphibious lending The general planned an amphlbioue Ieadiug at Indon, a sescoaet town 25 miles west of Seoul, to be followed by s lightning advance on the capital city to cut the NKPAs main communication routes. Simultaneously, the flth US Army in the south would mount a counterattack northward, presenting%he NKPA with a two-front war. Inchon, the second largest port in Korea, would he in United Nations hands. Finally, the recapture of Seoul would ba a psychological and political blow of great significance. Gensral MecArthur envisioned winning the war with thie one bold stroke. Any doubts that might have crept inte hh mind were quick2y subdued by hls overwhelming self-confidence. Considering the tides that limited an Inchon landing to one of four dates 15 September, 11 October, or 2 or 3 Novemberhe chose 15 September Captain H. Pat TomUnson, US APMy, Retired, h with the Department of Hi8toW, Louieiaras Pol@echnic Ingtitute, at Rwtork. He aeq.vsd with the US Navy during World War 11,and wth the US ArmsI in Korea. Heholds degvees from Louieiaua Stite University, Baton Rouge, aml the ~rsivwmty of Arkaneas, FayetteviUe. ipil Ieel ti>..>

IHCHON

becauee it would more quictdy re2ieve the preeeure on his outnumbered troops on the Puean perimeter and epare them a bitter winter campaign. A longer wait would permit the enemy additional time to improve hie defensee, An early liberation would give the South Koreans an opportu. nity te harvest their Octobsr rice. A frontal aseault from the perimeter was dismiseed because, even if successful, the heavy casualties would outweigh any advantages iq simplicity. In July the CINCFE transmitted hie plan to the Pentagon, es12ing for a twedvision amphibious landing at Inchon. Optimismversus Pessimism There was evidence of skepticism among his own staff in Tokyo. They thought that two dlvisione were insufficient and were worried over what might happen in Japan with the occupation forces removed. They agreed with the Navy that the poor landing conditions at Inchon made the plan too rieky. Further, reinforcements could not be provided from Puean. So enthusiastic was General MscArthur, however, that, early in July, planning for Operation B2uehew-t8 to put the let Cavalry Divieion aehore at Inchon ae eorly as 20 July was initiated. Thie endeavor wa% scuttled when the cavalry had to be committed to Korea at an earlier date. At a meeting in Tokyo on 10 July, Lieutenant General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., Commander, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, told General MscArthur that the 1st Marine Division with neceseary air eupport could he ready for a landing by 15 September. This was a b]g order. The only poseihle method of bringing the division to full etrength was to call in tbe Re-

SIMON
serves. Sean many eiviIi6ne, who just five years before had aaid never again, were receiving clothing issue at Camp Pendleton, California. Opposition to General MecArtimrs plan wee not confined to ids own staff. The Navy Department praeantad a sound case. l+ydrographicaily, Irwhon was one of the bet desirable ports, As the bad co~ditione in tie 4trmrwl precluded night aeeembly of tlur ft~ the main ]amting force would have to hit the beacime in the aftemoen day. light, alIowing ozdy about two houta in which to eacure the city.

ilpmtlorr iXtrmrrSe
By earIy Augusk Generai MeeAr. thur had his unite-the lat Marim Division cormnmxkd by Major Geeeral Oliver P. SmMk apd the 7th Ie. fantry Division under !Major Generel David G. Barr. The 6th Marine WK. iment wouid be withdrawn from tbe Pusan perimeter, bringing the Mcrinea to division strength. The two divisions and support wouId form ~ IOth Corps, to be commarrded by M& jor General Edward M, Almond. Sear Admiral James H. Doyle was Navy ampidbzous commander, and Vice Ad. miral Arthur D. Struble was over-ail commander of the invru?ion arnrsd& Admiral StrubIe answered to Vim Admiral C. Turner Joy, Commmdcr Navrd Forcee, Far Eeet. The opera. tion was assigned the code name Chro. mite. The itnal debate on Operation Lh* mite was heId 28 August. The rne& ing was attended by General J. ,Lcrr. ton Coltins, Chief of SW?, US Am Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, Chid of Naval Operations; General ShSP herd; and Lieutenant Generai ]dwd H. Edwards, US Air Forve; as well se other Pentagon representatives and General MacArthurs own staff. GorP eral Cdiins later said: We went oat to discuae it with Genernl MacArthur. We eugfreeted certain alternate pemibiijtiea and phcca. . . f The Navy had a group of eight em phibioue experts repreaentlng everl swialty. lkh wee allowed elSht mfrr utac to praaent hir cane. They spb of navfgatfonat, hydrvgraphic, w tmitq MrleJ . .. ,. ..!. .. .. .... ..-..d~

Flgnre 1. Tide varied from 26 to 99 feet. The approach to the objective wes restricted by a narrow channel with s fivc+lmot current studded with natural obstacles snd easily mined, The wet only offered limited facilities for handling esrge. Further, the Marines would land in the middle of a city with an added obstacle of 12foot eeawalie to ecde. The ameil ielarrda of Wolmi and Sewolmi were lccated in commanding positione and were Kqired to Inchon by causBwaYs. Jo h.. ..

.. ..

,., ... . . . ... .. .........%..=

paphic, and other obstacles that made the doubtful plan sbsm impossible. Then General Collins voiced MS doubts. He did not like removing the Marine regiment from Pusan, and wonderedif the loth Corps might be piiued down ashore. He suggested lbmsan as tbe place to land, and Admiral Sherman agreed. General MacArthur conceded that

ae to tti itnpraeticabilities involved wU4 tom-1~to ineure for me the element of eurpriee. For the enemy rwmmander wi~ rsaetm that no tme would be eo braeh as to muke such an attempt. He recalled Wolfee impossible victory at Quebec and assured the Joint Chiefs that Inchon would ha another. He argued that the combined effort ., . . . . ... . .r.

US AWW

Extreme tides at Inchrm limited the dates appropriate for a landing Kmsan would ha safer, but, at beat, it was a Sanking attack at worst, a bloody affair that could fail. Rather thanthat, he would commit his troops to Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker for a frontal assault but he would not assume responsibility for nucb ati]on. He was confident the Navy couldovercome the ditliculties of tide md terrain. Noting the objections hem the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), hctold them the: ,.. varguments you have made r$nIml .: would put 90 percent of the NKPA between a hammer and an anvil. He ended his defense with an argument that reliccted his view of the global struggle in which the United States was engaged. If the war in Korea were lost, Europe would be jeopardised. The antiCommunist front did not lie in Europe or Washington, but along the Naktortg River in Korea. In Europe, it was a war of worde+n =Ia, it was a war with bullets. He warned that M

INCNON millions of Asians were watching the outcome of battle. I can almost hear the tickiing of the second hand of destiny . . . we must act or we will die. As his voice sank to a whisper, he ended with, We shall land at Inchon and I shall crush them. The historic conference concluded. mitted from Washington, but their ro. luctance was confirmed when thsy again queried the general on 7 Sep tember. Their concern was based on the fact that nearly all reserves would be committed. On S September they m apprOved, hut only after obteiuing an endorsement over the Presidents sig. nature. This geeture might well be in. terpreted as written insurance in cose the mission were dieaatrous. General MacArthur labeled it pessimism at its worst. However, he was well aware of the tremendous gamble, Initial Phase With clocklike precision, the hammer fell, and the initial phase of @ eration Chmmite wae executed on 16 September 1950. The Marines lande& and the 7th Divieion followed in their wake. On 29 September, General Mad Arthur, in a dramatic ceremony, turned Seoul back to South Korean President Syngman Rhee. General Walker launched the Stb Armys offensive on 16 September, Soon the hemmer and anvil met. 00 26 September the UN forces made contact. The North Koreans were beaten, disorganized, and sufferad heavy Iosees. The formidable IWP& which had all but overrun the entire peninsula, ceased to exist as an organized force below the 38th Parallel by the end of September. The old soldier had scored another spectacular success. Viewing the Inchon operation in retrospect, military studenta and schol* ars generally agree that LWromitewee a brilliant maneuvertbat it was a spectacular success cannot be doubted Even those who tried the hardei?t to convince the general that other land. ing points would be the wieer choiced readily praiaed its outcome. General Shepherd praised the operation wh~ MllltIIY RevkI

Pigure 2. He did not ask nor did he receive the approval of the Joint Chiefs present. The Navy still doubted the soundness of General MacArthurs plans. On 24 August, Admirals Sherman, Arthur IL Radford, JoY, and Doyle met with Gen&al Shepherd and decided to propese the more favorable PosungMyon area, south of Inchon, for the landing point. General Shepherd approached General MacArthur in a Iaet minute plea for reconsideration, but the general would not alter hie plan. A reluctant JCS approval was trane32

:...

-%

INCHON he said, The Inehon landing was a major amphibious operation, planned in record time and exeeuted with sk]ll andprecision. Only a man possessed of self-confidenceto a degree beyond that of moat men could have refused to alter or eempromise under such pressure. The Navyeskepticism was baeed on sound research by specialists in amphibious from the conception, he did not waver from his prediction of complete success. Luckily for General MaeArthur, the two men who had confidence in him were the two men who could have overruled hia deeision-Preeident Harry S Truman and Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, Considering that the arguments against the generals plan were sound,

US Arm

A landing force reaches the shere ef Wolmi Island in IrrchonHsrber operations. The hydrographic obstacleswere real. The Marines were right -the geographical features lent advantage to the defenders. The enemy had excellent topographical command of the landing area, and the seawall wasa difficult obstacle. Even hie own staff had sound reasons for their hesitancy. The Joint Chiefs were unable to shake General Me&Arthur with their doubte. He listened as come of the Wet reputable and high-ranking professional soldiers literally tore his @enapart for more than six weeke. He listened with interest. He considered-even doubted at times-but, m J*7 & one might easily conclude that the entire affair was just plain luck Battles have been decided by unforeseen circumstances that have been referred to as luck. However, a brief look at the nine principles of war and an analysis of their application to the Inchon operation leads to a different conclusion. Objective. The ultimate military objective of the war was General MecArthure-to destroy the enemy and his will to fight. His plan would accomplish the ultimate objective by cutting the main north-couth, line of communication, immediately securing Inehon, presenting the enemy with a two-front war, and psychologically 39

INCHON damaging the Communists by retaking the South Korean capital. Off~ue. Originally, the defense was forced by the overwhelming advance of the NKPA forces. UN-held territory had shrunk to a 140-mile perimeter around Pusan. General MacArthura conception of a two-front war and double-offensive thrueta would give bia forces the initiative. Sintpticitfh The over-all planning and execution were accomplished without violating tbia principle. This was most d]fficult due to the limited availability of resources for the operation. UnitW of Command. TMla principle wee achieved and maintained. The command structure from the ganeral down ta the smallest efamente wee sound enough to minimice confusion. Muu.c.To ati]n the maximum available combat power, he esked for the lat Marine Division. To attain a full division, the 6th Marines were taken fmm Pusan. Careful planning, fmepower, tactics, and morale contributed to the effectiveness of the principle of mass. Economy of Force. There is no evidence that exceesive numbers of men or materiel were devoted to unneceeeery secondary efforts during tpe operation. Manezawr. Operation Chrom$te was a classic example of maneuver being used to alter the relative combat power of the enemy. Envelopment, severance of communication lines, and confronting the enemy with a two-front war were planned and executed in such a manner se to place the NKPA forces at 8 costly dieadvantage. Surprise. General MacArthur based much of MISplanning on the element of surprise. Thla wee evident at the conference on 2S August when he informed ,t.lw skepthxd repreeentativee 34 of the varioua services that their er. gumente es to the impracticability 01 his plan tended to insure its succw since the enemy would reason in tht same way. Secws+tV, the last principle, is a+ aential to the application of the otim principles. So much depended on the element of surprise that a major sf. fort at securing positive intelligema for planning was initiated. Ageeb worked in the lending area, aerial pho. tograpbs were taken by the hundr~ and tidse and hydrogreph]c condMore of the narrow approach through the channel were studied. Lieutenant Eu. gene F. Clark US Navy, eetabiishaf rapport with the natives, rowed .s dinghy to Inchon Harbor to confirm tbe height of the asawall and bottom conditions of the herbor, and repeircd tbe harbor Iighthouae, turning the beacon on to guide the invasion fled through the narrow channel. Decep tion measuree, such as bombardment and decoy invasions, were planned to enhance security of the invasion tiest Strategically, the most dangeroes situation involved in the operation was the commitment of nearly alf of the available reserves, even those in the continental United Statea. The general was confident that notbint? would go wrong. NotM]ng did go wrong, The succees of the Ope+ tion was based on ids self-confid~n $ e, ability, and qualitilee of leederahlp, And on the abiiitiee and leedersh]p of the huw drede of individueie wbo were iuvolved in the over-all planning and exeention of the mansuver. Inchon has to be recorded as oos of the great battles of military history, and General MecArthura breve decision earned him a place amoru tbe great captains of the past. MIIHNY Rssk

Major Dave S. Palmer, UmtedStates Arm#

OMETIItfE during the summer of 1964, President Ho Chi-minhprobably with the advice of Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap and other top advisers in Hanoi-decided to commit North Vietnamese troops to the war in the south. The fateful results of that decision bacame evident in the fall and early winter when surprised United Statee and South Vietnamese intelligence officers dk!xovered the presence of North Vietnamese regular army units in South Vie& ncm. At first, only individuals and small uhits were detected, but soon regiments were confirmed and entire divisions were suspected. The saquel has been well reported. US combat troops were dispatched to ,. ~unteract the Communist threat on the ground while an air Offeneive was si-, mnltaneously mountad against military ta~geta in the north. A knockout blow by the Communists wss stalled by the weight of US arms. General Giaps hope to meke 196s the year of victory was frustrated. Less well racorded-in fact unknown to us-are the reasons for the Communist decision. Why dld the North Vletnamcee choose, in the late smmner of 1964, to add units of their town army to the struggle in South Vietnam? The answer ie available to but a select few in Hanoi. Pending the unlikely event of the North Vietnamcee Governments laying bare ita inner eccrets, we are obliged toconjecture. Such cemjceture reveals thrae. pleuaible raeeons. The one moat commonly accepted is that the position of the Viet Cong (VC) was so strong, while the situation of the Americana and South Vietnamese had co deteriorated, that the northern leaders wsre impelled to bslievc that the imP@IIS of fresh troops would essurs a rapid tictory. Backers of this line are augmented by the ysers of gloomy reporting coming out of Viatnam-rapnrting which appfied euch metaphors as morass, nightmare, and ~uagmire. Moreover,

Ha this argument tlte neatly into the pattarrr of the claesic three-phase insurgency war; the introduction of North Vietnamese regulars can eeeily be interpreted as the technique by which General Giap planned to enter phase III. Some thoughtful observere have offered a eeeond motivation. They euggest that the power of the Viet Cong had become eo strong that Hanoi feared an eclipse of ite own influence. According to this contention, the VC leaders, enjoying heretofore unequaled strength, were ehowing reluctance to play a wholly fmb8ervient role to the north. To counteract that trend and to reassert ita complete dominance, Hanoi intervened. However, Mriguing ae it ie, thie idea Iackn any factual foundation. It rcste on supposition, not imbetarrce. Key Assumption Theee two reatrorw bhare a key usi+umption: They preeume the Viet Gong were riding a victorious tide. The third Wi38ibie raaeon for HOS decision eprings from the hypothesla that the Communists wore being the war in 1964. If the man in the north believed they were no longer winning the fight in the nouth, the only interpretation one can give to their decision to intervene directly Is that they were willing to gamble on a quick Major Dave R. Palmer is with the Dapartrnent of Afilifmv Art and I%. Oineemng, US Militarp Aradcmv. He hdfe a Maeiers degree in Military Hietory /rem Duke Usivur&itV, Durham, North Carolina, and attended the US Armv Command and General S!af CofIqm in lLW. Ne ha irmwerf witk the Berlin Command$n (Wmanv, * for three worewith the Id Ae-. mored Riviuifm, and k 3884 woe in Wehtawr whtm ha man advkor to a Vie#nam*&e armor unit. n -. victory rather than follow their owo text by slipphrg back into a lower level of inteneity. BY thi8 logic, tta invaeion of South Vietnam bynortk ern regulars is seen ae a de8perate move to rectify a losing cauee, notw the coup de Qroce following avictorl. oue guerrilla war. Thie third reason b as plaueible-indeed, perhaps morr plausibl%than the other two.

Fourriroupktgs The eihmtion in 1964 muet be con. eidered from the perspective of Hanoi. Apart from their own po~kion, Pm+ ident Ho and General Giap had to evaluate four groupings of people: the Viet Cong, outside countriee, the go~ernment and army of South Vi8b nam, and, not least, the people of South Vietnam. The rolee of nll four nro Interrelated, but, for claritys sake, each cm be examined se$w rntel y. Although they had experienced t bounding resurgence in the wokod the coup which toppled Preeident NW dinh-Diem in the outumn of 1963, the Viet Cong were in trouble in mid. 1964. Tho most telling evidence lie! in the increaeinrr numbers of ethnic North Vietnames~ found in leadership pmitimm. After the French wor iu Indochina, thoumndeof nntivenou~ ernem traveled to the north for interisive trtdning and indoctrinrition. W tercd back into the south over W! yearn, theee men became dedicati tough foes. They pmmamed an int!mnto knowlcdjro of the country eidti Relatives-even kin not nympnthttk with ttre Cemmunints-were shm~ at hand to harbor and nupply th= lf death crone, burhd would be In* land of thdr fmccdom. Fkrnlly. * warn ttghting In an nma which, rJW vlctary, tbsy hopad to rula. Tham wmw man to be r=k~ Mllttaf nmtn .3

with, although attrition cut them down. Death, disease, and desetilon badmore than decimated their ranks by 1964. It had heen 10 yeare since they had initiated the long etruggle. Toreplace them, the Communist leadere in Hanoi were reluctantly forced to resort to native northernei~men whose speech is often poorly understood by the southern peaeant.

lhe Old and the New Compare these new leaders to the old. They are operating in a strange country. Their relatives are distant by weeks or rnonthe. Graves for thoee who fall are unmarked plote in a remote jungle hundreds of miles from their home village or town. And, should victory crown their efforte, they will probably return to the north rather than reap the spoils in the south. However motivated and dedicated they might be, they could not be as effective as their predeeeseors. By the summer of 1964, something of the magnitude of 40 to 60 percent of all cadre in the south were men born and raieed in the north. Tangible Assistance Nor was that the only indicator To make matters worse, the United which caused concern in Hanoi. TerStates was not alone. Many of the rorism, the final arbiter of the insurnon-Communist countries of Asia were gent, wae beginning tn have adverse lining up on the side of South V]e& feedback. After 10 yeare and tens of , nam. Korea, Australia, New Zealand thousands of terrorist executions, Thailand, and the Philippines were hardly a family in atl of the south among those giving tangible assisthad been left untouched by this Comance. Besides, the movement was munist tactic, spreading and other nations ahowed signs of support while the quantity The great reservoir of resentment started to well over in 1964 when the of aid tendered waa increasing. ClearViet Cong launched a policy of more ly, the commitment of third countries or less indiscriminate killings by was not an encouraging fact. bombing buees, market places, hotels, On the surface, it would seem that and bars. It was in 1964, too, that the Ho should have been pleased with the Viet Cong were compelled to raise the shaky government in Saigon. The already onerous texe~ and to imprese shock of President Diems ouster and unwilling reeruite into their ranks. death had no more than been absorbed All in ,all, Hanoi could not view with by tbe nation before General Nguyen April 1967

optimism the future of its arm in the south. With respect tu third countries: the outlook was most dismal b the rnlera in the north. True enough,, the Americans had made mistakes and bad appeared to waver in their resoluteness, but by mid-1964 they were more experienced and appeared to be even more in earnest. A new and dynamic general wae in command, a famoua war leader had been appointed as ambassador, and the major civilian agentiesUS Operations Mission and US Information Servic~bad fresh beeees. Furthermore, the advisory program was being enlarged to place US offi cers at the district level, the grassroots, and to inject even more advisors into the combat units. Although it dld not seem probable to Hanoi that the United States would commit combat troops, it wee, nonetheless, apparent that the Americans were willing to spend more money and to provide more expertise.

37

no
Khanh took the reins of power. He, in turn, wee beset by potential coupmakere, In the eummer of 1964, the outlook for stability wee not good, However, that was at the top level, At the all-important lower reachea of the governmental hierarehyprovincee, districts, viliagee, police, and civil servants-a greeter and growing meeeure of stability existed. Following the purges connected with the coup against Diem, in which all echelons of the administration had been severely ehakek the government wee restructured to insure that the men serving in subordinate positions were loyal to the Saigon Government, not to an individual. Hence, a change of personalities at the top would have minimum impact on the actual operation of government. Further, the men in Hanoi had no choice but to assume that the passage of time would strengthen rather than weaken the South Vietnamese Government. AmIyof South Vietnam when discouraging, Detlnitely gauged in Hanoi, was the constantly improving army of South Vietnam. Even though thousands of soldiers deserted yearly, the peasant youth were aleo defecting from conscripted service with the Vjet Cong. Sjgrriflcantly, South Vietnamese oSicers did not desert, but VC cadre frequently did so. More and better equipment, effective training, the experience of years of combat against the Communist insurgents, and a deepening hatred of the Viet Cong were some of the factors making the South Vietnamese Army a more potential force. Thst it would continue to improve was tbe sole prediction General Giap could mske. The leet group ti whom the Communieta could hopefully look wee the populac~the bulwark of previous m

succeesea, the sea which had alwa~ provided sustenance ta tbe guerril~ Unhappily, even the previously d~ pendable peeeant revealed disturbing indications of turning against tlw Viet Cong. Years of tmrorism, UW constant burden of taxation to sup port the guerrillrm, and an increaeint frequency of kidnappings of young men for service in insurgent unite were not likely to raise the Commu. niete popularity among the messes, Then, too, the army of South Vietnam was gradually coming to realize tbet its task wae a hopeless one without the help, or at leaet the neutrality, of the people. VC harshness, contrasted with the improving understanding of Saigon, was paying dividends for the government.

View frem North Large numbere of refugees from Communist-dominated regione begau to etream into safe area8 in 1964. Voting with their feet, these pcneante were emphatically rejecting the Viet Cong. rn that year also, a pm viouel y rare phenomenon wae occurring more and more often; the people began voluntarily supplying intelligence of VC actions and locations. This movement of the people away from the Communist cause could well have heen the bittereet pill Ho had to swallow. Ae the pendulum swinge, the Republic of South Vietnam was no longer at the bottom, Neither wae it at the top, but the movement up had begun the low point had been pemed, To those in Hanoi, the omens were clear: The Wet Cong were losing effective new, outside natiorm were rallying to the Saigon regime, the South Visb rwmeae were developing daily, and the popubkion in the beleegored south was tending to rehift from the guer. Mllltq MvlR .A

Ho
dilee. This is not to say that the war w over-far from it. But the trends wereunmistakably against the Comrneninta.Somehow, Hanoi felt, the pendulummuet be reversed. The Communist eolution was the Msion h retrieve its fading chances bywending regular troops southward. A major victory-such es capturing i province capital, destroying a large S&b Vietnamese force, or slicing thdr southern neighbor in half might create panic in Saigon, conntwnationin. Weeldnaton, and victory inthe south. Memorise of Dien Bien Phu still loomed large. A smashing success could precipitate eollapee in Saigon and bring a total victory. At the very least, it would reveree the unpromising tide of eventa. Meet ware are started because someone miscalculate. Hanoi did not expwt the commitment of US combat forces as the response to its own open aggraeeion. when US Marines waded ashore at Da Nang and US bombers took the fight north of the 17th Parallel, a new war began-e war which rages yet. The old war, the one in which Americans were only advieore, was won in 1964.

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32
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MOSCOW AND THECHINESE MISSI

Fritz Ermarth Subsequent to the wbticrztion of this article in East Europe, Cotrzmunist China exploded her fzfth nuclear device.Editor. HE announcement that Communist China had successfully tested a miesile carrying a nuclear warhead laet October must have been received in Moscow with feelings similar to those expressed in Washington apprehension as to the future of Chinese military power, plus resignation to a development which neither Washington nor Moscow is in a position to avert. Unlese China falls prey to crippling civil strife or to miiitary intervention by her enemies,. nothing can prevent her from becoming, in time, a fullfledged nuclear power. Further, nothing can prevent China from using this might to influence, for good or ill, the international environment of which she is a part. W)ll this new step in Chin~s nuclear program push Moscow closer to the West ? Not very abruptly. Chinas missile teat dose not represent the kind of quantum jump which would upeet the Soviets short-term assessment of the international aituatiou even though Moscow may have been caught unawares on the timing of tbe test. Yet one can hardly doubt that it will lend impetue to long-range S@ viet thlnk]ng on how to sdjust to Chinas growing nuclear stature. The Soviet leaders have been cmltious in their public treatment Of Chinese nuclear weapons develop menta. In fact, except for terse an.

Rreiel Mllifsry ~

THECHINESE MISSILE mnccnmnt% they have been silent sincethe C~Inese exploded their first nuclear device in October 1964. Formerly, in the period of SinoSovietideological polemics before and cf@ the test ban, treaty, Moscow accused China of jntilng light of the awesome implications of modern weaponsand even ~f advocating nuclesr war as a means for promoting revolution. Peking replied that the Sovietcbad fetishized the atom to the Nint where their will to engage in combatwith imperialism had become poralyzed. Nikita S. Khrushchevs successors probablycontinue to feel that the Chiucse are naive and irresponsible in nuclear matters although they have wrelYnoticed that, as Chinese nuclear development proceeds, one hears less and 1sss from Peking about the nu. cleerbomb being a paper tiger. ACompronrise .In June 1965 the Soviets implied thst, by working out a compromise involvingpragmatic political and economiccooperation, specifically against tbe United States in Vietnam, the USSR and China could take the first steptoward an ultimate, more broadly bssed reconciliation. But as the Chioeee nuclear program proceeded and Cbiias hoetility did not abate, the Sovietamust certainly h&ve concluded -if they had not hefor~tbat a hostile nuclear China was the probable contingency against whkh plans must be formulated. This articls waa digeeted from the ov$giccd, published in EMT EmCOPE, December 1966. CoWc$ghted @) 1966 bg Free Europe, Inc., New York. Mr. Ermarth ie an andget of fhviet aflaire for l?adw Free EW rope ;?sZfvwich, West Gevvmwqr. In workihg out their plans, Soviet intelligence experts must begin with some assessment of where the Chhese nuclear weapons program stands and where it is going. The question ie whether they are in a better position to judge thie than the United States. Soviet Intelligence . One would assume that they are in a better position to judge. Soviet radar coverage of the Chkwse missil,e range near Lop Nor should have revealed many specific detills of the Cldnese test-its range; whether a ballistic or aerodynamic projectile was used; and whether, perhaps, an air-breathkg miesile for poseible deployment on submarines may have been tested. Soviet intelligence is presumably in a position to judge the extent to which Chinas missile program is dependent upen rocket technology left over from the days of Sine-Soviet cooperation in this field. Intelligence on Chinese weapons development ie more critical for the Soviets than for the United States. The point is that the USSR must make a reasonably precise and accurate assessment of that program considerably sooner than must the United Statee. This is because China will be in a technological position to threaten Soviet territory sooner than that of the United Statee. While a nuclear threat to the USSR is certainly not the only consideration of Soviet kmdere (and probably not even the most likely), it is surely the most apocalyptic and, therefore, psychologically tbe meet preesing. By 1980, fifteen years after her *first nuclear teat, it is hardly conceivable that China will @ve progressed as far ae the Soviets did between 1950 and 1965. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamaras pro41

TSE MIINW MfWLE jection hmpliee rather vaguely that the Chinese wiIl try to foIIow, at their own pace, the weapons development vector previomdy followed by Moecow. If se, in lti years, they would be producing both medium-range and intercontinental delivery capacities, but in little more than token numbers in heth catcgoriee. Assuming, as is likely, that China threat of attack from a Soviet-TJnite states alliance or an attack hy ei% superpower independently. If so, tfiej ehouId concentrate on deveiopbtg ! mix of midrang~ intermediate magt and intercontinental haHietic mhwli (or, in the short run, subnmrim] delivery systems. Although these da Iivery eystems wotdd be sndl in nurt bcrs, they would be aesured of de

Holding books contcinlng quotatlene of Chatrmatt Mae Tee-tung, Chtneee in Pekbr celebrate the news of the guided-missile, n~clear weapon test bae not yet progre.wed so far that alternatives are foreclosed, this may not be the direction sbe takes. Other possibilities are open, and it is jmportant for the Soviete to be clear as to which course China adopts. Chinae choice depends on how she views her foreign policy intereetn over the next decade, One might sketcbe three alternative echemes: In the comhtg decade, the Chinese could regard their nuclear power princip!dly cc a deterrent against the

etroying a small number of one or both of the superpowers vital urbw center8. Thi$ stance would not support u amrrwsive foreign policy involginf mjlitary confrontation with either tb UnMsd States or the Soviet Union C& eide Chhmae territory. It would, bow ever, be consistent with Chinas @ tiow. approach, tbua far, and @ consistent with her declared f~r oft US rkt.sck. Parndoxicnlly, ouch s w ture of minimum deterrence ml~ Mlltny *

THECtSSE2EMt221LE . irddbit China because she could not risk any couree of action that might provokeone of the other powers to a preemptivestrike against her. If the Cbhese regard their major foreign pcdicy tack in the next dscade as not merely territorial defense but, rather, as the expuleion of the United States from the western PeciSc region or key pofi]ons of it, shemust choose a different and more costly nuclear poeture. To her deterrmt force directed at the United Stetea ebe would have to add suffideot medium-range nuclear power to e@ieve local superiority in at least anueareas on her esetern and southern periphery. In such a situation, China could crcdtblythreaten to introduce tactical noclear weapons into a clash over, my, Taiwan while, at the came time, k@mg to deter a US nuclear attack oe her territory. The United States @ght then be persuaded to withdraw. Obviously,the risks involved in euch ~~vmture would be enormous. Thk d@?er array might not be up to the skein of a direct Sine-American confimtation, but ita psychopolitieal influence on Chinae Asian neighbors wouldbe considerable. . Finally, if the present rulers of Chinasee their future foreign policy ss aimed primarily at gaining territoryin Soviet Asia, they must eeek 8 Meximalist posture. This would rsquireboth conventional and nuclear au riority in the border regions and v 8 sufficiently powerful weond-strike Sbetegic force tn deter a Soviet nuClser attick under dire provocation. Surveying these theoretical alterIIStiw, one can readily see tbt the ~ is a distinct and attractive pas-, eitdlity for China, that the second Ml 1s? would be extremely ditlicult to achieve in the 10 to 20-year period being considered, and that the thhd is out of the question. Only the first alter. native, the posture of minimum deterrence, is consistent with the highly defensive attitude with which China now views tbe two superpowers. Therefore, the Chinese leadere will probably strive to ach%ve a reliable minimum deterrent against both the United States and the Soviet Union, plus a marginal component of a medium-range strike capability designed mainly for psychological impact on Chinas neighbors to the south and eaet. Interim Usterrent China may, indeed, succeed in developing a primitive nuclear deterrent in the next two or three years, and this would go far toward alleviating her present intense ~nse of inseeu. rity. The several midrange ballistic missile launchers which Secretary McNamara predicts for this period would be sufficient to hold one or two major Soviet cities in Aeia hostage against a nuclear attack. They might even make limited conventional aggression by the USSR appear risky in the event, for example, that Moscow might like to take advantage of domestic etrife in China. In the ehort run, China will likely attempt to develop an interim deterrent against the United States beeed upon aerodynamic missiles, surface launched from the G class submarine she is rumored to be building. WhSe this system can be efficiently countered by existing US defenses, the prospect of even one nuclear strike on a west coast city, is probably regarded by China as a significant beginning for her deterrent posture. In the next decade or so, the Soviets
4a

THECHINESE MISSILE need expect no direct threat from China. In the more distant future, however, the Chinese may he able to develop sufficient nuclear power to support an expansionist foreign policy againet the United States in the western Pacific. Thie would raise the prospect of dangerous crieea in Asia into which the Soviete might fear being drawn. It is questionable whether the expulsion of US power from the rim of southern Asia is regarded by the Soviets es being in their long-run interest. In any caee, this ie not a development toward which current planning must be geared. Corrsequarrcm for Moscow All thie leade to tbe conclusion that Chinese nuclear development over the next decade or two will aim at building minimum deterrence and that such a posture will not drastically threaten Soviet interests. Thie does not mean, however, that Moscow ehould make no countermove. Certain adjuetmenta of force depositions will certainly be made in the next few years. First, Moscow muet guard againet the outeide peseibility that China might attempt to exploit her naecent nuclear power in come irrational feehion. The likelihood of this is probably not much greeter in the case of China than with other natione; her leadere, while unrestrained in language, have been fairly cautious in practice. But the rick is always there, At the came time, Moecow must conelder that the Chinese might seek to step up their troubkimaking on the SinO-Soviet border while sheltering behind their deterrent power. Thus, the USSR must tirst impress upon China that any irrational uee of nuclear weapons would be ivuicidal and 44 then deploy her own strategic weapm to back up this warning. And ths USSR must also deploy eutlicient gen. eral purpoee forces, conventional and nuclear, along the border to control incidents in their initial stagee. Thh deployment ie already rumored to la proceeding. InternationalEffects The growth of Chinese nuclear power, even if deployed only for deter. rent purpoeee, will have important international political effects to whisb the Sovieta must adjuet, The w tremely enthusiastic responee whist Chinese nuclear teata have elicited from North Vietnam dose not augot well for Soviet influence in Hanoi. Among Chinas other Aeian neigh hors, the eflecte will probably be ve$ oue. Some will eee their security in etronger ties with the United Sta :1 others will etrive to improve relations with China; and come+ ckding India, may louk for So guaranteea against China. One ,% predict juet how the Ieadere of nations will view China in co years. The USSRe net influence in region may well decline, but ~this not inevitable. In the immediate future, Chinew nuclear developments are likely to complicate the search for worksbk and enduring aseurancee against no. clear proliferation. Until now, tbe % vieta have acted, in part, out of $ serioue desire for a nonproliferati~ treaty, but, at the came time, d4 have sought to use tbe negotiation tO block changes in the nuclear polkv d the North Atiantic Treaty Orgerb tion. Negotiation have centered ~ most exckaeively on the desire of * United Statee to preserve a roes@ of freedom for joint nuclear soar@ ment schemes within NATO and fw

 . . ...

---y

TNECHINESE MISSILE tbeultimate oDtion of a Euronean nu. clear force when political preconditioue are achieved. The Soviet objective has been to compressttila freedom se much se poseiblewithout committing Moscow to my preciss definition of what is ac. eeptable and what is not acceptable. The psychological impact of Chinese fit) while failing to alleviate the insecurities of the nonnuclear powers. The nuclear powere will, in eho.rt, be getting something for nothing. So far, thie dissatisfaction has been expressed in the insistence that a nonproliferation treaty involve some formal dieermsment commitments on the pert of the nuclear powers. If the negotiations

based on aerodynamic mieeileej surface launched from G class enbmarines nuclear developments ,seeme to be leadingthe nonnuclear nations to incwsee their demands. These nations are increasingly resentful of the fact that the treaty -which will deprive them of the right tedevelop or possess their own nuclear wespone-ie being forged along lines which ignore their own security inbreate. They obviously fear that the ekt of the treaty will be to formalise he monopoly of the exieting nuclear mere (who will remain free to dewIoptheir own weapons as they see M 1*7 drag out much longer, other demands may be raised. It is conceivable that important candidates for the nuclear club may refuse to sign the agreement unless offered binding guarantees of their security by the nuclear powers. The proepect that these complication will multiply with the passage of time may impel the Soviet Union to an earlier and more liberal compromise on her differences with tbe United States. But even if the two major powers rush to sign a nonproliferation agree45

THECHINESE MISSILE ment before its too late, the prgblem remains how b remove the preesures on nonnuclear powere to eccure nuclear weapons. A nonproliferation treaty can only be a first step. Nothing underscores th~s fact es impressively as Chirme nuclear achievements. In other respects, Soviet policy toward the W@ is not likely to be much affected, China ie simply not strong enough. While striving to reduee the military and peliticel 8olid8rity of the Atlantic community, the Soviets have aimed at formalizing the division of Germany and preserving the solidarity of the Warsaw Pact countries. The Soviets have also struggled in recent months, with rather lees euccees, to coordinate the policies of the Warsaw Peet countries toward western Europe. WM]e Soviet tnctiee wi]] surely react to changing eituatione in the West and ebrewhere, Chinese nuclear developments are not likely to alter the breed contours of Soviet policy for a geed many years. Conceivably, these developments may induce the Soviets to shift some of their forces from eastern Europe. There are good economic reaeene for thinning out these forces, and, from a militav view, the forward dispositions of the peat are no longer so pressing. The principal obataele to this, at present, is tbe Vietnam war. MOSCOW has etiked a greet deal on maintaining solidarity with Vietmm especially for political r-em witth the international Communist mon ment. The Soviets must be careful not ti give substance to Chinese eecusatiou that they are facilitating the dissn gagement of the, Unitad States froa Europe. Despite considerable dictw eion of troep withdrawals in Europ and the United States, Soviet prop aganda has been aignitlcantly noo committal on this issue in rwed montbe. whet effect will Chinese nucleu developments have on SinO-Soviet rek tions in the near future? Mowm doee not ecem optimistic. The Sovid press noted that the Chinese miss~ teat had bean used for the furtha whipping up of anti-Soviet hysterb in China, suggesting that the W would play into the hands of tk radicals. As a symbol of China8 PO tential power, the nuclear missile w] offset the failures of Pekings rem diplomacy, In the more distant future, a w ture of nuclear deterrence may gk Chiuas leaders a sense of securltI which, in turn, could promo~ @itia moderation and pragmatism. If tb aPP@rane@of a nuclear China on tk world scene has many perilous im placations, tbie one optimistic note i certainly worth 8ounding,

48

Celonel Irving Eermon& United Stotse Armg, Itetired

MAJOR problem in long-range military studiae and cost effaetiveness analyses is a proper delinaetion of, the thraat. The problem etcms from U@ encefilntiee of the future the diversity in areas where US forms must k prepared to operate, and the divereity in @cntial enemies. Disregerd of theseproblems could lead to fomee prepared to fight the wrong kind of war at thewrong time and place, and with eerioue vulnerabllitiee. General Edward bddecke defeat by the Indiane in Pennsylvania in 1765 was, in part, a reauk ofthe fai]um of Britieh force plannera to anticipate PrOPCrlythe r~uiremen~ ofcolonial frontier warfare. Planning the composition of military forces ie based on the exiatin~ or Mential military threat to the axecution of national policy. In the psriod followingthe CNil War, US Army forces were dwignad primarily to secure the W@stern frontier end to maintiln seacoast defenses. Following the SpanishAuwricanWa;. the stramrth and comnoeition of the US military forceechanged mkeeping with the new-national w~cy beeed on a assured Western frontier andmaintenance of overeeae possessions.

M 1081

41

THREAT The major source of information on the threat is usually a threat study. This is a formulation and analysis of the expected or real situation from which to derive the combhation of enemy capabltities that can be used to counter a propesed US military capability. Other source materials include target arrays, foreign technology. and long-range forecasts. A target array is a representation of any enemy force in a specific situation that usually includes a scenario, a portrayal of dispositions, and a target analysis. A foreign technology forecast describee anticipated foreign scientific advances of military interest. Any intelligence estimat~threat studies are typee of such estimates +f future enemy activities is a set of conclusions projected into the future. The projection is based on the enemys previous behavior in comparable situations, his expected behavior baeed on indkations, and estimates of what he is physically capable of doing. These conclusions are founded on information that is either incomplete or uncertain or both. Even if the intelligence information available at a given time was complete and accurate, there is still no cerColonel Irving Hegmmzt,. US ArmzI, Retired, ie a veteran of World War II and Korea. While en active dutv, he aleo served with the North Atlantic Treatg Organicatiom Advanced Weaperw Branch, US Army, Europe, and wae amigned to the faerdtg of the US Army Command and General Staff CoUege for fear yeare. The author of Inraeli Defenee Forcee which appeared in the FebruaW 1967 izene of the MILITARYRSWSSW,Cobnrel Heyment is preeently with the Reeearoh Analgeis Corporation, McLsnp, Vir. giniu. 4s ,.

,
Wlnty that the enemy will not chse~ his mind. We have pursued the d~ velopment of major weapons and or. ganizstion systems with much fanfm only to cancel them for valid reaso~ The transition from the triangular di. vieion to the Reorganization of Cm. bat Infantry Divieion (ROCID) to ths Reorganization Objective Army Dirn. sion teok place in lees than a decmh Considering the publicity on the mu. ite of the ROCID division, it would have been difficult for enemy intelh. gence agencies to conclude that ii would be dkwarded in a few years. Tentstive Conclusions In preparing an intelligence esti. mate, the estimator creates oue 01 more hypotheses to explain the avsil. able information. The hypotheses e~ tentative conclusions on the eigsitl. cance of the information. By weigh ing the known information for per tinency and validity, and by testinj with new information, the estimatm finally selecte one hypethesie, perhz~ modified, as the beet explanation o! all the available information. Thie ~ pothesis rests on assumption tld cover many aspects including accu~ of information and validity of prevf ous judgments on enemy behavior Such assumptions are neceesary, bn they are not always the only logics ones that can be made. A change ir the basic aseumptione would probabl~ lead to different hypotheses and dit ferent conclueione. Threat source materiale are ofts misused because of failure to rccos nize that they do not coneider the im pact on the enemy of the epcc~ friendly capability that ie under etudY. Thie misuse often rezulte in dieregad of enemy countermeasures or countermoves. For example, standard tart@ arraye for a potential mechanked scMllltellnmw

THREAT my for the 1966-70 timeframe cannot smsider all possible friendly developnsats or enemy responaea during that pcried. This does not imply that standml target arraya are uselees, but, nther, that their limitations must be mderstood. One method sometimes mistakenly wed in formulating a threat study h known as inhror image. This sive use is being made of helicopters. It does not necessarily follow that a potential enemy can or will do the same. His obj~lves might be satisfied by his current capabilities or greater use of existing or improved armored personnel carriers. Tbe major variablea in the threat are time, the enemy forces, the locale of potential conflicts, the type of war-

mctlmd is based on the implied assumption that if we dan do it-so CSnour opponent. With this techniqoe,a technology forecast of friendly developments is modified slightly, @upled with come assumptions on the Ioliticel context, and presented as the CO@ny threat. Such a procedure incorwSy assumes that the United States md the enemy have the same objeetirw, resources, and economic and po~tk?alreet,~inti. For example, curMot US objectives call for greater IOobility for ground forces, and extenM 1s7 *

fare, the politieel context, and developmenta in technology. Each variable influences tbe nature of the total enemy threat and the other variables witbin the total threat. A variation in the political context may change the composition and strength of the potential enemy or only change the weapon systems available to the enemy. There is further variakdlity within the enemy factor because of the countermeaiuree or ::g:~:;:ly T]me influences the validity of all 49

threat source materials. Estimatee for the near timeframe ard usually more valid then those for later periode because, witbin certain Iimita, the enemys capability tn depart from present patteme is restricted by time. It takes time to develop systems to the peint of operational readineee, to develop new doctrine and tactice, and to retrain and reorganize forces. For the later periods, time is lees restricting and additional options become available beeauee of new technological developments. It is dficult enough to predict what our antitank weapons will be 15 years hence, much less predict with cetilnty what a eeeretive enemy will then have. It is usually impassible to prepar~with confidence threat studiee, target arrays, or enemy tachncdogical forecasts beyond about 10 years except to indicate broad trends. The threat study used must cover the same timeframe as the expected useful lifespan of the system under study. Judging the effectiveness of a new kind of division by use of a threat model based on a Korean eituation enemy and tactics of 1950-63 may lead to false conchrsione. Charrgea IIIThreat Another pitfall is to assume that the enemy threat will remain constant during the time period under study. The thrent may change because of the introduction of new enemy capabilities or cbengee in the over-all strategic concept. The useful lifespan of the 120-millimeter antiaircraft gun wee cut ehort by the introduction of jet aircraft. It is ditllcnlt to foresee all changes in the enemy threat and their timing, but the Poaelbjlity Of such cbengee, ee they affect the 8yatem under study, muot be considered. Enemy forcee may vary signithwmtly

depending on the political context ot the time period under etudy. In i given time period, one potential eo. emy may be equipped with highly& veloped air defenee mieeilee and w. teneive ground and air mobility mean In the came time period, there rru} also be other potential enamies who are equipped only with simple weepim syeteme. All significant enemy form must be considered in judging th effectiveness of alternatives unlw there are obvioue reasons to the cm. trary. Nothing ie gained by meeeur. ing the .etRctiveneee of a Proposal eystem for defense againet low-flYIoI supersonic aircraft in an environmmt where the enemy forcee do not ban modern weapons available. CommonError Consideration should not be ~ stricted to only one enemy unless h eystem is intended to be emplo@ ; againet only that type of enerny.~ ! common error, when employing ~ i one kind of enemy in an effeetiv : model, ie to generalise to other ! mice. One study on new artillery : munition, for inetance, consid ; only an enemy mechanized force. . proposed ammunition may be effective than current atilllery a~ nition against such a force, but ~ against other kinds of forces. Th$ effectiveness of a proposed capebilib against all possible aignitleently M. ferent enemy forces should be a . amined. With such information avak able, better decieione can be made 00 allocating reeourwes to counter e@ potentiet enemy or, perhaps, to invw tigate new altemativee. Examination of effectiveness is alto degraded by uee of a target arN that doee not depict all logical of the enemy. In the ammurdtb etudy, the effectiveneen eeenarlo ws! Multary M@

.1

1
THREAT IIA on a target array expected to exi~ if the enemy motorized force wcs frOmn in place four houra after an attack started. Such a test is inomckrsive. MSitary forces dispoee tlmneclves differently in the defense, offense, retrograde, and other operations. Judgment must determine the different enemy wetures that aignifitiee, but not all, ueurdly leads to false measurement of effectiveness. The enemy must be credited with some degree of abSity to react to new friendly capabilities. Guerrilla forces feeed with a new airmobile capability should not he expected to continue to employ the same taetice used against a roadbeund enemy. The introduction

TheMauler air defense eystem, even before bsbtg canceled, wae behind in its e;imeted development schedule rmtly influence the over-all effecthwnesaof the eyatem being examined. AU the perthent elements of the entire enemy force muet be included h considering enemy operations. An ersmination of enemy attack eapabUitks,should not be limited to one class of weapone such as surface-to-eurface b. Close air support, if available tothe enemy, must also be considered. Treating only some enemy eapabiliWl 1*7 of a tank main wecpon with greatly increased accuracy or lethality can be expected to result in some change in the enemys tactics. The significant feasible enemy countermeasures and countermoves must be developed for each epeeific etudy beeauee each new capability opens new possibilities for countermee$urea and countenrtovee. Tbcxe must be developed to supplement target arraye and 51

THREAT threat studies that are prepared with. out consideration of the system under study. The countermeasures and countermoves should be formulated by specialists in intelligence of the potential enemy and in friendly and foreign technology, economics, and the type of military operations involved. The formulation of countermeasures and countermoves ia a form of cost effectiveness analysis from the enemy point of view. War Games War games and simulation are often useful for gaining insight into the nature and limits of pessible enemy countermoves and countermeae.ures. Such games should be repeated with varying scenarioa by personnel knowledgeable of the potential enemys past and current developments. The scenarios should consider appropriate variations in political conte~t, Iecale, and in enemy strength and composition. The emphasis should be on the play of the friendly alternative in order to uncover vulnerabilities to feasible countermeasures or countermoves rather than on compliance with rules of the war game. The enemy should not be assumed to be beund to his current strategy and tactics, yet be ehould not be permitted unlimited freedom to react. Cogniaence must be taken of his possible technical, budgetary, leadtime, bureaucratic, and other constraints. In a long-range development pregrem, it ia possible to keep eecret the detdls of efficiency, operational capabilities, performance characteristics, and level of procurement. However, it IrJ not ueiually possible to hide the existence and purpose of the systam. This is particularly true if tbe proposed eyatem ia of large magnitude. For exsmple, the broad outlines of the Nike X program have been well publicized. The test of the air assault concept that led to the formation of an airmobjle division waa also well publicized. In peacetime, it is almret impoaaible to duplicate the security of a Project Manhattan. (lualitativaUncertainty Although the enemy must be cred. ited with some knowledge of the pro. posed capability, he cannot forem his oppositions every move. Nations do not have perfect information of their petential enemy, and they do not always either react or react appro. priately to the information they do possess. History is full of examplee of nations that faiied to take advnntage of available information becauw of inetiltutional processes, incredulity, and human failurea. Although this qualitative uncertainty cannobbe reduced to a probability figure, it should not be disregarded. It is equally as dangerous to over. estimate the enemys capabilities av it ia to underestimate them becaueo overestimates do not necessarily lead to insurance and eafety. The enemy can hardly meet all of tbe competing demands for resources. It is unreelietic to asaume that he will use a disproportionate ehare to counter one threat at the expense of neglecting other threats and ericritlcing other significant capabilities. In studying the air defense of one smcitlc lecnkt it is wrong to aeeume t~at all of the enemy air defensee will be used there The enemy cannot be certnhr of our decieione or which capability we will exerciee and to whst degree. Overw. timatlng enemy capabilities Ieada to pricing of important policy objecttvce out of the market Rnd to strategf of desperation. A cost e$fediveneas analyals ehmdd, Mltfuy 8*

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THREdT where appropriate, examine the impsst of different significant leealee on he alternative under study. The in6uenceof the am= on military operations and effectiveness of military forcesis well known. Such an examination helps in judging whether the recourcee required are applicable to roostlocalee or only to one. or more of the greateet importance or likeli. hoodof use. Ins of WarfareVariabla The advent of etrategic and tactical umlcar weapons has profoundly affectedthe utility of eystams and doctrines. For example, the Honest John is significantly more effective in nuclearthan in nonnuclear warfare. Certsin logistics policies on stoekage level andstorage policiee also vary in effectiveness depending on whether the coniiict is expected to he nonnuclear ornuclear. Although the broad effecte of nuclear weapons are known, the preeise effects are yet undetermined. The consideration of this variable ie complicated by the possibility that a nonnuclear war may develop at come undetermined point into an undeterminedlevel of use of nuclear weapone. The distinction between nuclear and nonnuclear warfare ie eo profound in its miiitery implication that it must betreated as a variable when the enemyhas nuclear weapone or allies who couldmake them available. The political context variable influencesand interacte with almoet all the other variables in the total threat. Straight Sine projection of exieting piitical aliiances and power blocs are helpful, but should not be the exclusive basis for determining the politicalcontext. The influence of the most and least favorable political contexts meet aiao be examined. The Iifeapan of political alliances is highly uncerlpil 1ss7 ~. Between 1957 and 1962 serioue rlfto uecurred both within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the Soviet bloc. Chha no longer receives military aid from the Soviet Union. The unanimity of NATO has dieeipated to the point where France now deniee baee righte to the other members of NATO. The political context directly influ+ ences logistic services and overflight rights provided or denied by ot~er natione. The availability of base righte influences force composition and even the composition of Iogietic unite. T-he availability of overtlight authority may aleo influence the deeign of army aircraft, particularly in terms of ferrying capabilities. If the availability of these rights or services is aseumed, then the study muet examine the degree of dependence on euch asenmptiona in terms of required re. eources. Indirect Influanoas Changes in the political context can also have important indirect intluence. An internal defense opera~lon can be transformed into a different conflict by a change in tbe political context. Such a change could alter the enemy capab]litiee, the locale of the operation, and even tbe kind of warfare. Tbe insurgents are usually initially weak in air defense weapone. In etudying equipment for use in counterinsurgency operations that exploit this weakness in air defense, examining only the current air defenee capabiiitiee of the ineurgente is inade. quate. The political context muet also be examined to determine if any reasonable changes could result in the ineurgente reeeiving inereesed air defense ca~abilities. The purpose ie not to predict whether the ineurgenta will or will not receive air defense weapes

THREAT ens, but, rather, to determine the possible results if they did receive them. Similarly, the study of any new capability must consider what significant changes in the peliticel context, if any, will alter the effectiveness of the we~llity under study. TechnologicalDevelopments Variability in both friendly and enemy technological developments poses great uncertainties in planning for the future. The forecasting of trends in science and technology and their influ. ence on military affairs cannot be reduced to a scientific method. Progress in science ie not like the growth of population or the development of backward economies where trende are well recognized and reliable predictions are possible. Progress in scientific knowledge cannot be foretold since a breakthrough may or may not occur at any moment. When a breakthrough does occur, it usually opens new fiekie both in further scientific ideas and in technological application. Nevertheless, it is possible to analyze scientific developments and to evaluate their possible military implications if one is aware of the limitations imposed on such considerations. The uncertainties regarding enemy technological deveiopmente can be readily appreciated by comparing them with the uncertainties of our own future technological development where full information is available. For example, the Skvboit missile had been under development for many years before it was abandoned because of technical difficulties and changed operational needs. Furthermore, estimates on the operational availability of new systems have been more in the nature of gueaEee. The lfaulw air defense system, even before bahg canceled, 54 was well teehind the estimated devel. opment schedule. Enemy technological developments, despite the uncertainties involved, are an integral part of the threat. The UO. certainties about which development he ia pursuing, operational availsbil. ity, dnd the probability of his msk. ing unanticipated technological bresk. throughs cannot be dismissed because there is a lack of firm information, Treating these uncertainties is dti. cult, but failure to do so can lead b poor decisions. During World War I, the Allied failure to anticipate the German development of peison gas and the German failure to anticipate the development of the tank led to near disasters. Sorrrse Materials The first step in handling the threat factor in a study is to secure thrcst source materials that cover tbe same time period as the subject under study and tbe anticipated service life of the development proposed. However, it usuelly is not possible to obtain threat source materials that cover the time period of concern and specifically coneider the implications of the proposed capabilities under study. The next step is to modify and am. plify the threat source materials b meet the neede of the particular sub ject being examined. This is best accomplished by personnel qualified in intelligence, friendly and foreign technology, economics, international relations, and the type of military opers. tions involved. Uncertainties in regard to any one variable that eignitleently influences the alternatives are best reduced to quantitative considerations. This can be accomplished by studying the ef. fectivenees and cost of the alterrw tives under a range of different but Mllltsry IleItw

THRWT ! reasonablerangee in the v~riable. Differences in cost and effectiveness resulting from such examinations muet bs,presented. In etfect, th]e requiree doingthe study more than once. The extent to which this can be done depends on the available time and resmrcee. Where time and resources are limited, the variability ehould be treated qualitatively by pointing out tkedependence of the conclusions, recomraendatilone, and other areas of the studyon changes in the variable. It ie often feasible to reduce the volume of these combined uncertainties tn a manageable number and range by carrying three threat estimatesthrough the etudy: optimistic estimatee that and pessimistic bracketthe range of uncertainty, and a best estimate that has the hlgheet confidence of likelihood of occurring. Tkeaeterme are not rigoroue, and subjective judgment is required. Using these three estimates aeeists in determining the sensitivity of the effeetiveneas of any indNidual alternative to the assumptions about the threat variables. In dealing with the pessimistic eetimate, it should not be assumed that the enemy will always react to cauee ue the most harm. What is worst for us is not necessarily the best for the enemy. For example, the enemys maesing of his air defenaee ip one area may be the worst action from our viewpoint. However, it ia not neeeeearily the best for the enemy because of the vulnerability that ensuee in other vital areas. The enemy use of low airburst nuclear weapons in certah terrain may bring both hie and our forces to a standstill. Failure to consider properly the threat factor leads to faulty preparations. Victories of tomorrow can only come from todays proper vieion.

Sendinyour CHANGEOF ADDRESS

To assure uninterrupted delivery of your Military Review, be sure to submit promptly both your old and new address, including Zip cod+four weske in advance, if Pesgible. Addrese to hfilitarg Review Subscription Service, Book Department, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027.

~e~lkv~

From The Owl (India)

E~NATi~E ~ 7 . . ..2
Brigadier R. D. Law, Indian Armu

UCLEAR detonations by Communist China and the proepeci of mainland China becoming a nucIear power have posed a number of ~ problems for India. Theee problems have a direct bearing on her domeetic and foreign policy. Most important is the queetion of whether India should attempt to develop and produce nuclear weapene. When eutllciently developed, Chinas I 5 nuclear capability will Wee a serious 3 threat to Indias eecurity, and, unlem 1 tbe Indian armed forcoe are provided 1 nuclear eupport, their morsle will suffer a serioue eetback. To expect the 9 armed forces to resiet Chinese attacke which are supperted by nuclear weay one would be a useleee sacrifice. t If India is to defend hereelf againet D Chineee aggraeeirm, or if ehe ia to have any hope of recovering Ioat tar. ritoriea, her forcee muet have nuclfwr

---INDIA ;

1 support, be

it with her own weapons or those obtaine~ elsewhere. In modern war, the morale of the armed forces is essentially a part of national morale. If cities and industrial complexee are subject to Chinese nuclear attacks, maintenance of national morale will be an impossible task unless India has the meane to retaliate, thus providing a deterrent to the use of these weapons by an aggreesor.

meDeterrent
India ie at a considerable disadvantage compared to China. From Tibetan bases, China can etrike at msny of Indiaa major cities and muchof her industrial potential without employing highly eopbisticated delivery. means, On the other hand, Indiacannot retaliate against Chinese cities or industry without highly sophisticated delivery syeteme. The only military targets within easy reach are those in Tibet and Sinkiang, and Chinawould not be unduly concerned eheut attacks on these targeta. Therefore, if India develops nuclear weapons, the cost will be high. The annual cost for an effective nuclear deterrent is of a magnitude clearly beyond Indias means unless she stops development and increasee tasation. This would certainly lead to a collapse of her economy and cause widespread discontent-e eituation vddchwould be to China)a liking. India has pledged herself to peaceful uses of nuclear energy and has

been one of the most enthusiastic supporter of disarmament. This stand ie widely appreciated by the civilized world and, along with her policy of nonalignment, has helped to ease world teneione. As a result, India has attained a position in international affairs out of all proportion to her material strength. A reversal of these policies is bound to tarnish Indias image in the civilized world. She would cease to be a stabilizing influence in internationa~ diaputee. Thh would be a disservice to the cause of peace. However, theee considerations are secondary when the conntrys sovereignty is at stake. Proiiferstion of Weaperrs If India attempts ti develop nuclear weapone, other nations may consider themselves threatenad by India and follow euit. Thie may well start a chain reaction and reeult in some irresponsible nations possessing nuclear weapons which would considerably increase the chancee of the outbreak of nuclear wars either accidentally or intentionally. The development of nuclear weapons by India will, therefore, have far-reaching effects. Indias efforts to promote world peace and her sacrifices for thie cause have been appraeiated in most quartere. Consequently, she reseives substantial aid from practically all the developed countries of the world, irrespective of their ideologies. India will continue to require euch aid for many years. If India were to take the step which would lead to nuclear proliferation, she would loee the sympathy she enjoys. In fact, in order to discourage India from producing nucksar weapons, external aid may well be refueed or etopped altogether by many nations. The attainment of a nuclear capa57

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This article wae digeeted from the mfgirml, published in THE Owh (Indin) Volume XXI, 196566, under the title, Emergence ef China as a Nuclear Power. Co-p@ghted @ 1965-66 by THE OWL.

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b bility will certakrly bolster Indias preetige among Afro-Asian countries and produce a corresponding setback to Chinaa stature. It will retard the sprekd of Chinese influence and would be a major contribution toward the cotrtainmant of Communist China. Since ignoring the Chinese nuclear

Requesting a nuclear shield un. der the auspices of the United Ns. tions. Entering into collaboration with a country or countries, similarly threatened, to share the cost of devel. opment and production. Intensification of nuclear re search in India so the V!me gap lx-

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01 S*

A UN nuclear shield is not a mtlicfent guarmtee for India berarreeII Security Coundl member rmuldexerciee his veto at s critfcsl time since d&elopment and production of nuclear weapons and their aaeociated delivery meant would severely tax Indias economy, four alternatives sre oporr: An underetarrding with one or more friendly nuclear powers to previde nuckrar protection to India in the event of a Chhtwe nuclear attack. tween a decision to produce nucleu weapone and actual production cm k reduced b the minimum. The United Stste6 hee made a geo eral etatement that her aasietance @ be available to any country threnteod by a nuclenr attack, India could od possibly rely on 8 general dtclaratiti of this nature, for thie is not a 6@

INDIA
eient gaarantee that nucleer protection will be provided at the critical time. A more concrete arrangement is neeezsary. possibly in the form of n treaty. Countries which could provide this protection are the United Stetea or the Soviet Union. India could enter into an agreement witheither one, both of them individealIy, or with the two collectively. Suchan agreement would not be contrary to Indias policy of nonalignment but it will not be entirely free from drawbacks. First, the ability of a country to be ableto provide the required support will depend upon the international @nation prevailing at the time. For uu.tance, if India had an agreement with the United States, ehe may not te ablete offer assistance if, as a consequence, she is threatened with retaliation by the Soviet Union. It is ertramely unlikely that India would ~w any control of nuckmr weapons Iied by another nation. , riderthe UN Charter, any member taned by aggression can ask the Nations for aseietonce. If .: tened with a Chinese nuclear atIndia could follow tbia course; I ever, there are serious disadvan. All decisions of the United Naare eubjeet to a majority vote. P @has been Indias experience that thevoting in the United Nations is tot always on the basis of a cases omits. Not to be ruled out is the pos!ibtity that a member might exercise hisveto in the Security Council at a witksl time. The only country likely to be threat@by China and which ie sufficiently Ukvmcedto collaborate with India in tke development and production of 00c1ear weapons is Japan. The strong feelingin that country against nuc]ear weapone ie well known. Therefore, it is unlikely if any Japanese Government would be in a poeition to collaborate on such a project in the face of such strong public opinion. Further, the .Japaneee Government has declared that it would accept the positioning of US nuclear weapons if Japan is threatened. Under thsse circumstances, it is doubtful if Japan would be prepared to divert resources for the development of nnclesr weapens. In addition to any other arrangement that India may make, it would be a logical course to @.ep up nuclear reeearch so that, if the need arises, India coul& start production of nuclear weapons with minimum delay. This would be a useful standby arrangement in the event other arrangemeute fail to materialize. In a few years, the Chineee nuclear capability will pose a very live threat to India, and she has to devise ways and means of countering it. Development of nuclear weapons is clearly beyond Indias reeourcee, and euch a step would have serious repercueeions on her economy. Nuclear protection under the auspices of the United Natione will not be sufficiently reliable, for one cannot afford to stake a countrys security on the whims and fancies of voters or those who have the power of veto. An agreement with the United Stetee, or the Soviet Union, or both for nuclear protection would have dieadvantages, but it is the beet under the circumstances. In addition, efforts should be made to step up nuclear reeearch to an extent that the timelag between the decision to produce nuclear ,weepons and actual production ie reduced to the minimum, This would be a useful standby.

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6ROUN0WARFARE

LTHOUGH the United States is in South V]etnam to aseist that country in maintaining its independence, the southeast Asian conflict also is serving ae a laboratory in wldch a new type of war is being tested. Tbe details of the test have profound significance to free societies confronted with the menace of an illusive, guerrittaenemy backed up by regular unite iadltrating across a border. NowTools of War Wllitary commentators have made much of the new tools of war which engineers have produced to aid United States and Republic of Vietnam forces in dealing with the Viet Gong and ~North Vietnamese regular units. The $rnostimportant of these toole is the elicopter. In the course of the Vietstruggle, the helicopter has unrgone a remarkable evolution from i, unarmed aerial transport for a uad of soldiers to a true combat air +. de mounting an elaborate array , . weapons, including rockets, guided I siles, grenades, and automatic cann. [Somewhat overlooked in the public d professional attention devoted to ~e new weaponry is the revolution in ttlefield tactics. Important as are e new machines and weapons, the ~ YS in which foot soldiers are em-

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LIMO mmmtesyAnmu New.y Fat.,...

Anthony Harc%gan is A880C&7te Editor of The News and Courier, Charleston, South Carolina, and a member of th8 Institwte for Strategic &udie8 {London). He is US corncmt fov the Canadian MNitary JOUrnel and the auther of the recently publtihed book, A Guide to the War in Vietnam. Hia article, Armies and kmcr Leadec8hip~ was the MILITAXY 7@licw Awavd Article for the Janc%l 1967 iseue.

ployed have even greater eigniticance. In the final analyeie, troops on the ground decide whether a country ie won or lost. The US soldier on the ground in Vletnsm can count on extraordinary support. Maesive firepower is available to back up deep penetrations of enemy territory. Excellent communications make possible complicated, precieely timed operations. In critical situations, troops on the ground can summon aerial and artillery eupport. Availability of fixed-wing and rotary craft have made instant logistics almost a reality. Most important of all, there ie the unprecedented mobility of ground unite and their weapons. It is routine for a divieion commander to have a battalion picked up by helicopter and carried to a clearing deep in a jungle. It aleo is routine to fly artillery over rice paddies and ,_jungle into positions miles from any road or atop high ridges. ImportantAdvances The heli-lifting of atilllery, even at night, represents one of the most important advances in ground warfare in centuries, Major General Moshe Dayan, former Israeli Chief of Staff who observed the ground confllct in Vietnam, has deecribed this heli-lifting as the American anewer to the problem of movement in the jnngle: mobility that is not dependent on roads, ground vehicles or airtielde. Neither mobility nor massive firepower, however, offer a complete answer to the problem of the elusive guerrilla unit. The Vlet Gong and the North Vietnamese are superbly adapted to the environment in which they are fighting. AS through the emnmer of 1966, for example, the North Vietnamese regulars infiltrated into wilderness areas of South Viet-

61

6ROUHD WARFARE nam. Using tunnels and jungle tracks, they built up supply and ammunition depots ineide the demilitarized zone. The battles US ground troops fought in the mud and among the rocks in the summer and early fall teetilled to the legpower of the enemy. These qualitiee on the pert of the Communist units have led to frustration for US ground forcee on many occaeions. Nothing is more depressing than a sweep that nets nothing. The Vlet Cong and the North Vietnamese are ekllled at utilizing the hours of darkneee, the early morning monsoon raine, and the fog to withdraw from the US attackers. Thle, after all, is their basic etrategy. For them, victory often simply means avoiding being destroyed, tlid&and.Srmk Ground warfare, in these circumstances, frequently is a game of hideand-eeek. Reaction time is no longer a major problem for US forces now that helicopters are available in great numbers. But locating the enemy pinpointing his formationz-ie a different etory. Helicopters loudly announce themselves as they approach a landing zone. Often, they are the eignal for the enemy to brak up into small units and move into tbe jungle by different routes se they strike out for a new rendezvous. It is thie eituation that has rreceeeitated sopbieticated tactica for etealtby entry onto the battlefield, In time, leee noisy helicopter may be produced which will allow a greater meeeure of surprise in heliberne aesmdts. For the present, US combat forcee have to rely on unconventional taetice. This ia not to say that eideIooking radar and infrared devicee in reconnaineznce aircraft are not useful. They are able to detect river croeeinge at night and lrxate the cites of recent enemy campllree. The meet valuable date, however, cornea from the soldier who epets tk enemy with his own eyes. Thus, in. creasing uee ie M]ng made of long. range reconnaiaeance patrols. Thw elemente have been introduced at th battalion ae well as the brigade level, Cuetomary procedure is for thm patrols to be heli-lifted into enemy areas for reconnaissance miesione ot eeveral daya duration. Their mieaion ie not to engage the enemy, but to locate him. As in all patroI activitiw results are mixed, Sometimes no u@ ful information is turned up. On othw oeeasione, the patrols are epotted by etrong enemy forces, and it is neeea. sary for the reconnaissance group to disengage. Finally, there are the aW ceseful operations when the enemy $ pinpointed and a powerful US re+tion force arrives on time to aeeatl plieh its miesion. FollowupProcedure A followup procedure is an o& growth of the long-range patrol S+W tern. Under thkr procedure, a tion force of company size ie locati fairly close to the reconnaissance w trol. Once the reconnaissance petrol hae acquired a target, the accompezy ing reaction force begine the engage ment. Meanwhile, the main battaliozstrength reaction force is lifted into the area se fast ae poeeible. US troops aleo have been msldea increased use of night operation. Mt. taIion airmobile aesaulte have b@ made under cover of darkness, fd lowing reronnaiesance by the ba@ ion reconnaizesnce unit. These bm been accomplished without prelid. nary aerial or artillery fire, Continually being refined in VW nam ie the mode of entry onto W Mlltary M .a

6ROUND WARFARE battlefield.The basic style of the heliImne aaaault involves preliminary aerial reconnaissance; closer inspection of a landing zone by air and ground commander; preparation of thelending zone by bombing, ati]llery &e, ehd helicopter gunehlps; and, fiOZIIY, the landing of the aseault force. This basic etyle ia not always satthe main zone without preparatory fire. This is not to say one approach or another is better under all circumsteneez. The ti]x of the Vietmzrn war changes all the time. Fighting guerrilla and fighthig North Vletnameee regulara are very different propositions. Fighting in the Mekong

., AWW Nw* Feat.rea Increasing use ie being mede of Ions-range patrOk

iafectory, however, as the preparatoryphases of the operation frequently $erauadethe enemy to depart. A modiikation of the claeeic heliborne asN.ldt involvee moving elements of a battalion into landing zones near the lozin landing aone that baa been sebcted. Moving by night, a small reOmaaissanze force takes up poaitfonz h the main landing aone. The other dementa.of the battalion then land in !@ 1967 ... . Delta and along the demilitarized zone involves different problems. In the former, the uze of air and afi]llery has to be restrained because of the danger of harming friendly people. In the dense tropieel foreata along the Laotian border, where there are few people, it is possible to drench the. ridges and valleys with afi]llery and rocket fire. Heavy preparatory fire also is nec6s

GROUND WARFARE essary in contested landing zones or in areae which it is necessary to seize, over fierce opposition, because of major campaign objectives. In euch an operation, 105-millimeter howitzers might be heli-lifted into an uncontested landing zone a mile or two from the main landing zone. These howitzers would be put to work to soften up the perimeter of the main landing zone during a firing schedule of, perhaps, 30 minutes. Fighter bombers might then drop 500-pound bombs on the jungle bordering the main landing cone. Then, the troope would make their aesauit. Ringside Seat In euch an operation, the aseardt commander would be in a helicopter command post where he has a sweep. ing vision of the battle area. Indeed, even a tank battalion commander is likely to be airborne during action. This way he ia able to keep in con. stint touch and know where all bis tanks are deployed, Insofar ae an assault commander is concerned, he can detect from a helicopter a gap in the bomb and artillery barrage eoftening up a landing zone. If the enemy ie scattering, he can direct the gunships to follow as the enemy withdraws. The commander can take note of all the elemente on the battleground+verything from unexploded bombe that endanger his own men to unwise bunching of troops. what the helicopter means to tbe aseault commander is unprecedented opportunity to direct a battle from a ringzide eeat. In World War 11 a division commander might not know what wae going on until reporta came in from the battlefield. In Vietnam, however, commander can be in visual contact with tbe developing combat situation. InV deed, it is possible for a divieion coro- ; mander or aasistint d]vision corn. mander to oversee several battalion. ; sise operation in a eingle day, fh isolation of beadquartera frbm front- : line troopsalways a danger in for. mer warsno longer exists in the Vietnam conflict. Another interesting aspect of the new warfare in South Vietnam is the tempo of divisional action. Brigadier General Willard Pearson, Commanding General, 1st Brigade, 10lst Airborne Division, gave this account of division operations in Arrnu Digest: During a dx-dau period at TUY Hoa, we conducted four battalion w eaulti and 11 artillery batteW did. plaeemente bv helicopter. At Tou Mo. rorzg, we moved nearly 1.5,000 troW and accomplished 9S 8eparate unit airmobile operation, plus 8eveu artilk?y battery dieplacemente jn an 18day period.

ModernArtilleryRaid One of the techniques used by the artillery in Vietnam is an updated vereion of the artillery raid. A typical raid consists of picking a location central to several enemy targets, landing a battery (four gmre and a minimum of personnel) with 70 rounds for ench gun and preeomputed firing data. According to one 1st Cavalry Division source, The idea is to get in, get the rounds off, and get out of the aree. This type of raid is typical of the nggreseive uee of artillery in Vietnam. Current infantry tactice indicate there is little danger of the war assuming a static quality. Indicative of this is the following statement by M8jor General WiIljam E. DePuy: We dont IJend troops elogoi!w through the jungiea arqirrtovo just bJokirtg for uornethffir. We fat the Afi ! 8quade move out oa reconnafaaam& Mlllfmy AelK
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GROUND WARFARE~ s%en thev find eomething, we quickly tend in a battalion, nuwbe two. Awl we prouide the firepower eapport. For the foot soldiers, the moment of grC8teSt dangerand also the pariod of maximum eaeualties-is the initial contact with the enemy. After the troops have been offloaded from and to search the path for evidence of mines. Ne#ertheleee, ambush often cannot be avoided within a few hundred yards of a landing zone. The Viet Cong are skillful at camouflage and at preparing firing positions. In all likelihood, the Vkt Gong unit commander will allow the first

helicopters, they move out from the landing zone. Because of the nature of the terrain in South Vietnam, it often ie necassary for a platoon to advance in single file down a narrow sath. This type of formation means that tbe unit has only a minimum of firepower forward. In euch a situation, SCOUte will proceed with great cautiod, etopping to listen for the enemy Ml 1s67

US squads or platoona to pass along the path, and then direct all available fire at the other platoons strung out along the path. In such an incident, casualties are likely to be heavy on the US side. The US counterattack% when it comes, most probably ie conducted with aerial and artMery atrikea, not manpower. Repeated storming by ground forces is not standard prece. 6s

dure in the Vietnam war. In8tead, firepower {a directed to accomplish the job. l?omba, rockets, and shells, ttfter sII, are not vulnerable to ambuehee, nor are they impeded by jun. gle growth, To draw out the enemy ta where he can be rwbjceted to man. e.ive firewwer in the US aim in the now warfare, Cam cad Tuned 6@ams Of course, shaking out the Viot Gong and the North Vietnamese can be extremely ditltcult. In the region of razorback ridges in the highlanda, the North Vietnamese dug an @lab. orate awe and tunnel ayatmo that ran deep into the mount.@na. DeniB Warner, the Austrrdlrirr military writer, k reported that %ome of thcne manmrtde caven were 00 feet long and 40 f~t wide, with I?-foot ceilings. On the nurfrmc in the demilitarized zone, the North Vktnamme in the rmmmer of 1966 dug milen of crrmmu. nlcationn trmrchrw and ~n emplKemerrta. Deallng with the Cgmmuni@t cave nnd tunnel ynbmn 1S B prob)cm throughout Vlctnam, although the URC of xmoke and tcnr gm in helpful. The extent of the tunnellng pdntn up the fallucy of rotmrdhrg COrrrmu. rrint imurgent wnrfare in V&Rnam an strictly prlmitlve. The notion of guerriltan nwimmlng In s protective ma ~f r==nti in trroaely lnndequsts. Rewlutlorrary warfnre in the V ktrmmew country@ido hac bermno quiie mphi~ticatod, with the enemy mquirhrg con@cd baecn In forecte and swemp. tnnde. Some of the cnvee and tunrw)n conatttute targe ernmunitiori rind nuppiy dumpm. Indeed, ~ W&bed boxpital w foond hr cum csve network in tlw fd of Itkld. M was doci@wt b nervs ?%3rthVhtnameae troops Wdc to undoratmrdhru t.h conflict in $%trrxm i- the meiirattmt that S9

sevfmd different typec of war me h procecs at tbe same time In dlffermt parts of the country and in dlffemet terrnin, While Vietnam h not an cr. mor war, for inetance, tank units bavc played an incraeaingly important rcA in the Central Highlands. Wherever the North Vietrramrcr have iwtabliahad vDlag~ fortitled with concrete burrkere and trench systenq a tank is e ueef d weapon. Tanks elm hava been uerrful in fighting off North Vi&name80 bnttalion.sim mttacke. In one arch at@ck on a Korcnn unit ID August 19S6, tanka employed in sup port of the 2i5th Divieion killed 44 pement of the attackhrg force. The French had a dlseatrou@ em riencc with armor in Vietnam, but they lecked advarrtagen poaaeased ~ US forcec. Helicopter mobility rnek porwible the ewift diepatch of repair crown to disabled tanks. Thwe crew can repn}r in a matter of hou~ ~ tank thnt hae bean put out of nctioa by mince or rocoillwn rifles. Reut@ 6ecwtty Tanks deo hro proving vdu~blo for route security. They cen keep rod oorm and prowt trut.t convoye, In m Kmbuth, W-& immcdi tttdy got out of the kill rare nnd chrmga thrn cm. bumhcrrt. one of the mwrt etT@im tank vwipone in the cmrlater roued This corrt.hin~2,700 mrall &toolpollsb whkb have a shotgun amect on a hlI1. nlde. Operating on nmd petrol, thr tank am-a cu an e4rty wrirning #ye. tcm for an mea, The Pecmt of 8 mm. c~ful tank patrol, tmwmor, in novu to do the srmw thing twica, Mm+ mmrte hnvo M be vwied co thtit Ckcm munia! tmope do noi discern n pWem The Prt@@ E#p r@mmim W@ iic4@it.krO and 15M!II-$ s.@J#?!@ of the -e problem, Now rtericm #t@ hqse nt marked sdv&rrtw@ MOng i~ -n

-.

.--deserters. It is possible, on tbe beeie of a computerized reading of th~e datd, to obtain a complete intelligence report on an area in which a divieion plans an ofiration. In the pact, the info~ation was available to a considerable degree, but collating it wee an almost impossible task in a short time. No accurate report on the war in Vietnam can properly conclude. however, with the impression that thk is an entirely new kind of war. The war in Vietnam contains the claesic elements of battlefield combat, only in different combinations. Furthermore, the real heart of victory is not exotic weaponry or tactical gimmicks on the battlefield. The -sentfals are the ageold qualitiee of well-trained and worthy ground forces, familiarity with personal weepone, pbyeical conditioning for combat, lecderebip at all levele, and the will-to-win that ie born of the proud tradition of a greet army mindful of the concepte of duty, honor, and country.

GROUND WARFARE lines, however. lhe chemical personnel detector, carried by the lead man On8 patrol, promises to be effective in revesting an 8mbushers location before an engagement begins. Perhaps the most significant application of US technical know-how is the use of computers to pkccess intelIiice data. An enormous mass of intelligence date ie available through human and technical channels. Heretofore, the problem has been organizing it in timely fashion for the use of field commanders. WMc the installationof the fcrst computere in Saigon, however,the commander of US forces in Vietnam can pull the necessary intelligence data together in a matter of a few hours, Fed into the automatic data proceedingequipment are the locations of roads, waterways, and landing sites; information on peat ambush sites, knowntunnel systemz, caves and antiaircraft gun sites; material gathered byelectronic and infrared means; and knowledge gained from informers and

The Armys over-all training mission is to provide units which can cleze with and defeet the enemy in snztnfned land cembet... . Esch man must know bis job thoroughly end have complete con5dence in his ab]~ty end the determination to accomplish that job under eny corrditiona. The men in eombet units mmt be trained from %cretcbheceuee there is no counterpart in civlfian life for a rifleman, a howitzer crewman, or e tank gunner. Gcnerol Harold K. Johmsom

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Turhish Armys Role in Nationbuilding

TURKISH ARM Anoyofficers OCCUPY a special niche ~ Turkish scc.iety, not only because they are generally well educated, but also because they, more than any other group, understand tbe divisive factors width separate rural from urban societies. On one hand, they are undisputed members of tbe nations intellectual elite, and, on the other hand, they largely come from peasant stock. Because of ita talents and its unique position in society, the Turkish ArmY has been able to assume a leading role as a nationbuilding institution. Poliiiosand Government Turkey has never bad an overabundance of administrative competence and could iii afford to ignore the talents of. her well-educated miiitary officers. Since the establishment of the Republic, the government has never hesitated to tap this source of administrative talent, but only after the persons concerned had divested themselves of their miiitary identity. Retired officers and officere who have resigned from the army have been active in the government of Turkey throughout the hietory of the Republic. During the period from 1920 Coionel Clifton C. Fox is serving with the .!ld Infantrg Division i% Germany. Hie other eervioe includee dutg in Japan with Genera?, He@uartar8, ,ParEewt flmmund; with the let CavOIW Divieion in Icorcd; in Washing. ti mth the Career Management Dihi-eien and the O~e of ths Chief of &eca~ch and Development; and two @ one-half yeatw in Twrke~ aa an $+visor to Turkish militeny echoole. ?~e received an M.S. it? International ?Affaivefrom George Washington UniA!@t~, U@hingtw, D. C., and iS a j@dtmte of the US Army Commaad l%ed General Staff College a?td the US htv War (!oilege. WI 1907

to 1967, former miiitery pereonnel had the highest Grand National Assembly election rate of any vocational group except professional civil servants. Three of Turkeys Presidents also have had military backgrounds. In general, the active army has maintained a position of pcditical neutrality and has exhibited a reluctance to associate itself with any particular political party. The younger officere especially tend to be suspicious of politician and bureaucratic funtilone. Conversely, the army has evidenced an awarenesa of political ieaues and has demonstrated that it values peiitical democracy. It did not baeitate in 1960 to wrest control of tbe govern. ment from an administration which it thought had become wo authoritarian and which threatened to de@roy political freedom in Turkey.

EducationalEndeavora The Turk]sb Army hea heen referred to as tbe school of the nation. Indeed, the armye most valuable contribution to Tnrkkih mwiety has heen in the field of education. Aside from ite basic literacy training program and its various programs for trairihg technical speciaiiets, the army also hae taken a more direct step to aseist public education. Prior to 1960, all high school level graduatee were required to enter the army and spend two yeara on active miiitary duty as rwerve oSicers. A new law allows them to undergo oSicers training for aix months and epend the remaining 1S monthe as teachers in village elementary echcole. The program bee resulted in several tboueand young men being dispatched to viilages all over Turkey and has been an important factor in ailcwia& ing the existing teacher shortage. The army is aleo a major eource of

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TURKISH ASMY pereonnel with linguistic ability. To meet its requirement for interpreters and translators and to qualify officers and noncommissioned officers for attendance at technical schools in the United States and Germany, the army conducts courses in the English language using language lahoratary faAdmhtedly, the armys activity io 1 the field of basic edueetion is moti. vated largely by self-interest and m. \ cessity; The advent of US miSitaty J assistance pointed up the need for cr. panding the countrys reservoir O! ! personnel with sufficient education to enable them succeesfuUy to compl~ the technical training that would Is associated with the supply, operatioq j and maintenance of modern miSitary ~ weapons and. equipment. Since the ci. + vilian edueation syetem was not geared : to cope with the problem, the army i had to do what was possible within its own capabilities. Basic LiteraayCourses The basic literacy training program was an ambitious undertaking. Con. 3 sidering the ages and circumstanw ! of the personnel involved, it was a 1 program which only the army could : carry out with any degree of C5 ; ciency. Since the program wee esscs- ; tially one of adult education, some ; form of regimentation was neees~ : to bring together the iSSitsrate person. : nel who were to receive special trait- 1 ing. Even if adequate facilities and { teachers had been available in the vii. lages, other practical problems .wouIi have precluded wide subscription tn concentrated coursee in basic literacy, : Regardless of the motivating fso tora, however, both the army and d. vilian society benefit from the armyi educational endeavors. In a countrF where less than half of the Villa&a had elementary schools in 1960, tbe return to society of approximate 100,000 literate discharged soldiers * nually repreaenta a eigniftcant impact Both directly and indirectly, W Turkish Army serves as a major irt strument to promote general economk development and social change. In em ploring this area of nationbuilding e@ Military R* I

cilities provided under the MSitsry Aseietance Program. Additionally, many officers and noncommissioned o5cars acquire a language proficiency on their own initiative by off-duty study. These personnel, in turn, frequently conduct classes in local schools or evening classes for other civilian groups, including dependents of military personae] who are inteewated in learning the English language.

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motion of agrarian cooperatives. His tivity, atintion must be turned again habita of dress and etandards of perto the individual soldier. sonal hygiene will have a profound During the two years that he spends effect on the msmbere of his immediin the army, the young coneeript deate family and conceivably on a large velops a new personality and a new segment of the community. Certabdy, oeaeeof valuee. He leame to read and to write-if he were unable to do so he ie a potential exponent of community cleanup eampaigne or other projbefore entering the army-and he scects designed to improve the sanitaquires some degree of tacbnieal skill tion aepccta of community living. in areas which previously had been There has been a long-existing tendforeign to him. His horizons are broadency in Turkey for the wealthiest, ened to include an appreciation of a most talented, and most ambitious citworldthat is much larger and more izens to concentrate in the cities of complex than the eimple village soIstanbul, Ankzra, and Inmir, thus ciety, and he begins to identify himleaving the villagee and towne devoid self with the larger body. Gradually of such quality personnel. To counter and unconeeioualy, he acquirca a new level of expectations which tbe old sothie trend, the government began in ciety is unable to eatisfy. tbe 1960s to distribute industrial facilities more widely and thereby to Independent Attitude force more professional people into Upon returning to the village folthe remote regions. The army aleo inilowing the completion of his compultiated companion measures designed sory tour of military service, the exto encourage social mobility and to soklfer is likely to resist falling back support the over-all government obinto the traditional social pattern and jective. the primitive way of doing things. With hia newly acquired confidence in his own ability, he may exhibit a more independent attitude that may etrain femily tics. The ex-soldier may even be inspired to abandon village life and move to the city where greater opportunities exiet for his advancement and for application of the skills which he learned in the army. If he remains in the vilIsgc, however, he is likely to become thedriving force behind the introductionof technological and social change. He may be the first to purchase a truck or a farm tractor or to establish a repair facility for radios or Vcldclee. The ex.soldiers appreciation of the value of organization and teamwork mayprompt him to take tbe lead in dkge youth tilvitiae or in the prof#il 1*7 . Assignment Policies Assignment policiee were devieed to require draftees from urban areas to perform their compulsory military service in remote regione while those draftees from rural areas were to serve in or near the cities. Rotation of officere iz aleo accomtdiehed in a similar faehion. Even though the SYS- . tern results in a greater expenditure of travel funde, tbe country profite from the increased fueion of population groupe, and the army avoide a potential morale problem that could result from maldhtribution of ite personnel. The army also serves se an instrument for general cultural development in the areas that eurround the major military installations. A good example ie the remote eaetern tmvn of Ersurum 71

TIMKISH ARMY where a large army headquarters is Ioeated. A new university was established in Erzurum primarily because of the presence of a great number of college-age children from military families. Tbe stimulating influence of a major educational institution in new] y developing eastern Turkey is expected to be significant. bsdtrstrlal Dewloprnerrt The contributions of the Turkish Army toward industrial development have been largely of an indirect nature and not particularly dramatic, The Turkish Armys value to industry principally derivee from the education and release of vast numbers of mechanice and tcchniciane who are capable of accepting employment in industry with little additional training. In asrreesing the individual eoldiers potential value to the industrird manpewer pool, the change in outlook experienced by the eoldier during his tour in the army ie, perhaps, more eigniticant than acquired skille. Because of his introduction to urbanized society and his reorientation toward an appreciation of mechanicetion, the ex-soldier is more likely to seek em. ployment in industry than if he had never eerved in the army. The role of the ex-soldier in the economic and hrdustrial development of Turkey is an importnnt one indeed. Thi6 was recognized by Ambaeead& Fletcher Wmrmr wberr he stated in 1956: AU over Turkev technico.1 &-ills learned in the arrqi are being put to work in oconornic activiiim. The importance of the amw w a school canrsot be oucremphastied. A program which has served to intcgr@s national e.earity int4meats with economic rrooh hr Turkey is that of rend nnd highway drrveloprnent.For many Yesre, Turkey wes rnluctnnt to Y2 develop good roads, especially in her eastern sector, because of the fear that the Soviet Union might use them for invaeion routes. With the introdu&lori of US military assistance came the realization that the lack of an ade quate road net, which had been a ibn. iting factor in industrial developmee~ wouid aiso hamper the operations of a mechanized army. Roadlridldlng Corurequentiy, a roadbuilding pro. gram wae initiated as a part of the Miiitary Assistance Program. An agreement was reached between the Turkish Generai Staff and the Mirrkr. try of Public Works whereby a nuar. ber of army personnei would be trained to operate road construction machinery. They eubeequently wem ueed in construction work untii the program wae taken over evmrtualiy by civiiian concerne. Aside from the network of eecond. ary roade constructed throughout tbe Turkish countryside, the roadbuildbrg effort aleo remited in an increase o! primary roade from 16,000 miles io 1950 to neariy 27,000 milee in 196t Although priority was given initiailj to building roads of Mrategic impor. tarrce, the road network wae deliber. ately planned to facilitate the mow ment of agricultural, mineral, aar other products to domedic markeb and te Turkieh ports. The made in Turkey are fnr fren adeemate. but a hmre oercentnue 01 rur~l fsrniliea hsve be& uneh~ckkd from the villages. Not only can th~ move their pr-ducte to market with greater epeed and etTtciency, but thSJ nlso can broaden their nocinl horhoro by occnnlorralvieks to tbe hqer towm and cen trnneport thuir ehildrm @ schoeln outslds the V\hI&& Another useful dmrolopmrmtprokxt Mlotuly Svdw

TURKISH ARMY undertaken by tbe Turkish Army, which holds considerable promise of long-range benefit to Turkey. is that of reforestation. The roots of presenfiday Turkish nationalism extend from the founding of the First Turkish Republic when Kemal Atattirk was able to inspire his come to aesociate intenee nationalism with instrdility. Turkey, on the other hand, is a case in which nationalism has been reasonably well controlled and guided into a channel of productive patriotism. This hae been poseible because of the moderating influence of the army whefe, in epite of its in-

US ATI)W
Turkish Army accomplishments in Kerea have made a great centrihutien to nationel pride and morale of a nation-state within defined boundarise. However, the intensification of nationalist feelinge and development of responsible national citizenship hae been a gradual process and one in which the army has had an important function. Beeeuse of widespread upheavals within the newly emerging areas of the world in recent years, we have April 1967 ture and responsible type. Although the army haa been a consistent champion of modernization, it has managed even during periods of domestic atrife to maintain a sensible balance between realism and pressures for innovation. Consciousness ,of being a pert of the whole nation is greatly strengthened by compulsory military service. The conscript soldier develops a sense of 13

WtKISllARMY
citizenship and a fierce pride in being a Turk. Upon visiting a Turkish rnik itary unit, a perzon becomes acutely aware of th>s spirit. The twmy enjoys enormous prestige throughout the general public. Pr&ably no single factir haa contributed more to Turkish national pride and morale than the accomplishments of the Turkish ArmY in Korea. The armys d~rect usefulness in controlling domestic disturbmma was dwdy demonstrated during the Kurdish uprisings in 1925 and 1990, the anti-Greek riots in 1955, and the student riots jn 1960. Ita greatest value cc a stabilizing force, however, probably lies in its ability to deter political violence. Although occasions have arisen when it hae had to act M an umpire between competing politicsl factions, the armys refuetd to serve ac n tool of any particular party forces poIitical Ieadera to promote a more moderate atmosphere h seeking 8olutions to their problems. Turkey is fortunate in that her top military leaders have repeatedly demonstrated their willingness to place the national well-being above persomd ambkione. The success of the Turkish Army as s nationbui}ding inatjtution Eug. geata that military predominance with. in developing countries is not new. sarily 8 condition to be feared and avoided. In aseeeeing the prrmpscta of other nations, Americans should net be blinded by their own trnditio prejudices against military invol ment in governmental affaira. T should realize that in some countrf the military forcim represent the source of patriotic, honest, and cient national leaders and public ministrators. Furthermore, the Tur%b exam suggeate that, in providing eesieta to developing nations, Ameri i should encourage the complemental? WWtS of military and nonmilitq programg while bejng careful to avoid actions which will lead tn a stifling of development in either sector. Americans must be constantly aware of the necessity to maintain a proper bolance between military assistance and programs dezigned to promote pelitiwd, social, and economic progrem. Ignoring any one of them areas could jeopardize the over-sll aesi8tnnce ob jective. _

SUBSCRIBERS
Avoid the inconvenience of renewing your subscription each year, Write to The Book Department, U. S. ArmY Comm*nd and General s~m Cdew, Fort Lmvanworth, Knnsm 66027, requesting converdm to tho Automstlc Renewsl Plan. .

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MiilmfCm&

~~From

Wehrkmde (We,t G,,Rwy)

OPERATION MOLDAU,
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HE largest military maneuver in the n-year hktory of the Warsaw Pact was conducted in September 1966 in Czechoslovakia. East European sources, claimed that the maneuver, under the code name Vttmw (Mokfmt), surpassed any conducted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in terms of the number of personnel involved and the eize of the manenver area. Participating in tbe maneuver were forces froin the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Eaet Germany. Although no figure was released on the combined etrengtb of the forces, Western sources estimated 150,000 men were involved. This included three Soviet, three Eaet German, two Hungarian, and at least five CzeehoslovaThis amwwrnem article was translated and digested from the ari9i@ published in WEIIE. K?JNDE (Federal Republic of Germany) November 1966, under the title, Moldau-Die Gr688ten Mani?ver dss f)stblocke. ~

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OPERATION MOLOAU ~ ..

A multinational Frog-i surface-to-surface rocket battafion was formed during tbe ~ maneuver with one battery each. from Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, and j -j the Soviet Union J lpril1967

OPESATION MOI.OAU

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kisn divisions. The maneuver was commanded by General Bohumir Immsky, the Czechoslovakian Defense Minister. The exercise marked the first appearance of Hungarinn forces in a Warsaw Pact fall maneuver. The absenca of Polieh forces was presumed to have been due to financial considerations. However, Polish forces had pati]cipated in smaller exercises during 1966 and in the 1965 fall maneuver. ManeuverConcept The concept of the maneuver was based on a defense against NATOs forward strategy with NATO forces stationed in Weat Germany as the assumed adversary. Presumably, the Warehw Pact command element reasoned that the location of neutral Switzerland and Austria and the block formed by Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania would adequately cover NATOs southern and southeastern flanks. This permitted the use of Hungarian troops in Cneehoslovakia to reinforce the striking force. The Warsaw Pact forces were designated the Green force and the aggreasor the Pink force. Almost one-third of the paratroopers who participated in the maneuver were reservists. CsechuelovaMa, in particular, had called up a large number of reservista for the maneuvers duration. The maneuver started when Phk forces made a penetration in the south of the Province of Slovakia and air landed troops in Bohemia. It was assumed that nuclear weapone, when ueed, would be restricted to tactical operations. During the firet day, the Pink force advanced, and the Pink and Green air forces sought to gain air superiority. During the night, the Green force received a substantial number of rephwe. menta, most of whom were Soviet troops stationed in central Germany and Belorussia. At dawn on the second day, the Pink force conducted an air-landing operation using Caechoslovaklan and Soviet 3%3 Hook and 3fi-4 Hewui helicopters to carry the combat troeps. Mi-1 Hare helicopters were used for liaison while Fitter tighter bombers and MiGZ9 l@wwr-E all-weather fightere covered the landings. Compared with earlier Warsaw Pact exercises, there was a significant increase in the use of air-land]ng operations. The. Czechoslovakian Deputy De. fense Minister pointed out that the term air landing includes more than just lsnding personnel by helicopter and parachute. During the exercise, medium and heavy equipment was frequently air lifted with ATZ-12Cub and 12-14 transports. CounterattackLaunchad On the eecond day, the Green forces gained air superiority and SUC. ceeded in launchlng a counterattack According to plan, on the third and Iaet day of the maneuver, the Green forces mounted an offensive using nuclear weepone. Croesing of the Moldau River, which had been started during the hours of darkness, continued under the cover of strong air support. An Eeet German journalist de. scribed the activity at one of the crossing sites. While fighter aircraft covered the cite and artMery pounded Phrk forces on the opposite bank, S* viet fighter bombers approached the area, went into a steep climb, and re leased nuclear weapons, he said. 1bis was followed by a-helicopter landing operation on the opposita bank while T55 tanks provided direct fire support MllibiyReview

OPERATION MOLllAU fraas the near bank. Other troops siosead the Moldau at points where the rivers width is about 800 yards. The maneuver wee baaed on a gradusl eewdation of the use of taetiesl nuclearweapons. The thinking in the Eset bloc ia tW a nuclear strike et a wersoutset which would affaet all of ceetml Europa ia improbable. Supplying tbe maneuver elcmentz wee reportedly conducted without problem. There was evidence that the taebniesl equipment of the Conmmnist forces bzz bean improved. The maneuver control center bad a largascale television net at itz disposal. Cooperation between the stztTs of the Warsaw Pact forces appeared to be good. Even though there were language barriers, all tbe staffs have a similar structure which facilitates combined operations.

LESSONS LEARNED
The MILITARYREVIEW is particularly interested in receiving manuscripts covering lessons learned by US unite in Vietnam. problems of organization, command and control, equipment, tactics, and fsre support merit informed discussion. After complying with appropriate bxal regulations, authors may submit manuecripta direct to the MILITARYR% VIEW. We will obtain the necessary security review on those accepted.

A New Look at the Minutemen

Major John R. Calvin, United Statea Armu

HE mere meation of 1775 re calls at once Paul Revere riding hard for the Mystic Road to avoid a galloping patrol of Britjah regulars; angry farroere witk mueketa in their field-hardened fieto hurrying _ dark furrows; a ragged Jine of proud mim facing the tide oionmrdng mdand-wl$te ranb at hinwon green; breve Captain Iaaae Dqvii; marked for deaw striding .dilwil e CM@ way to the North Br$&@I AY % onw~ and btubborn, cm@mrbW old ~ Whittimom &tagwor@K. under th weight of Mu nwdtetj. piatole, -d 8A! ber to plant lIiKL9W Wotty in W path of Iard ~Jluxh; P.WU k~

MillblyRr?l!a b->.. ,

--q

MINUTEMEN growth of the minuteman concept-is worth knowing in full, not only for thefurther understanding of the great effort these men made, but also because the problems they faced are, in many ways, analogous to our own. The 19th of April certainly was the greatest day in the history of tbe minutemen,but it was not their debut hy any means. They had been called outearlier on a number of minor alerts caused by British General Thomas Gagespractice marches and hia raids on Charleston and Salem. They were well organized and, in some waye, as well prepared ,as the regulars in Boston. Still more important, not only the minutemen themselves, but the entire eonntryside understood tbe minuteman concept which was not new to them. Concept Develops Since the earlieet colonial military companies under Daniel Patrick, John Underhill, and Mylee Standish, the organizational and tactical concept alarm riders, alerts, intertown coop. eration, and rapid aseembly of special units detached from the militiahad begun to develop. On 12 August 1645 the Massachusetts Council ordered the commander of every militia company b appoint 30 percent of the soldiers whoehall be ready at half an hours warning upon any service they shall h put by their chief military officers. The preparations and campaigns of the half dozen wars before 1763 illusMajor John R. Galvin is with Headquarters, Ist Air Cavalry Division, in Vietwam. Hs reeeivsd his Maater8 degree from Columbia University, New York, and was gradeazted from the US Army Command and General Staff college in 1966. His book, The ComPset History of the Minutemen, is achedmledfor .pmblication in April. *U 13s7 ~:: .trate a steady refinement of this concept wldch continued to the end of the Revolution. Any attempt to tell the story ,of the Battle of Concord is handicapped by the inordinate number of legends and anecdotes that over the years have become associated with the events of the daya fighting. Tbid historical embroidery grew because the battle has never received the analytical atfention given to most of the other actions fought by this countrys soldiers. It has been dismissed as an accident that only occurred once and, happily, with good results, or explained away ae the spontaneous combustion of a smoldering rabble, or, worst of all, given as proof that not much training ie necessary to build an army. KnowParticipants The difficulties in analyzing the battle of 19 April arise not in following the actions that occurred, but in understanding the participants. Who were the minutemen ? How were they organized, trained, equipped, and led ? How did they manage to march from distant towns in time to strike the fast-moving British column before it could get back to Boston? what relationship existed between the minutemen and the militia ? How did the minuteman and militia soldier compare to their opponent, the Britieh regular in General Gages army at Boston ? It is a distotilon of the facts to say that the battle of 19 April was a spontaneous uprising of loosely organised embattled farmers-it was more than that. The battle can better be seen ae the final clash of arms of the old Massachusetts militia in which 47 regiments, containing over 14,000 men, marched against the British regulars. Over 4,000 men from 14 of the 81

MINUTEMEN regiments actually struck the column, employing conuepts of organisation and methods of command and control that had been forged during a century and a half of nearly conetant warfare. In the progressive transition of thie fighting force from a crude miniature replica of Elizabethan militias to a state of near completion as a powerful army, some factors can be isolated as control aJso departed from English tradition and continually evidenced e realistic evaluation of the possib]litiw and limits in areas such aa weaponry, tactics, eupply systems, and training, Third, the individual towne of the province, from the earliest daye, prk tided a degree of discipline and m environment of cooperation which would have been impossible except in

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ROTCM

14s.!0

not only contributory to an important degree, but also as quite unique. First, the militia organisationalthough etrongly based on the English Mueter Law of 1572 and later regulations-was continually revamped by requirements euch as the levy eystem for the provisional expeditionary forcee and the concept of alert and rapid response by designated potiions of the regimente. These and other requirement produced several precursors of the minuteman-militia structure of 1774, including the enowsboe men of 1702-4S and the picket guards of 1765. Second, the system of command and 02

the political, social, and spiritual at. mosphere under which these communities chose to live. The close mutual association of these towns and the in. fluence of the town meetings, the clergy, and later the newspapers cm ated a matrix in which the coopersiive spirit of the province was nurtured. Thus, when the committees of correspondence were created in 1772 they had a profound effect, galvanizing the province into the collective action that created tbe minutemen. As the conflict that was to open the Revolution drew near, the provinoieb knew that widespread militia regk menta would be difiicult to control cod Miiitery R*

...

wouldbe too slow in forming to meet an attack by the reirulare. At the came time,the cradion of a Standing Army in the province would precipitate a Britieh move againet thie force. Untii some of the other colonies were ready to throw. their strength behind Meeaechueetts, a small, untrained provincial force would present the khd of target General Gage was reedy to attack. PiesIs Proposed A few of the other colonies were considering plans to oppoee Great Britain, hut no one was ready at thie time. In Massachuaetta, some type of miiitery force had to be created to meet the neede of the moment-to opposethe British until a stronger army could be built. This force would have to be composed of well-trained, lightly armed infantry capable of rapid assembly and movement to any point in the province. The interim unit wae, of course, the minutemen. In the 1st Provincial Congress, in the fall of 1774, a plan for the organization of the minutemen and militia wae proposed. The plan touched off a hammer-and-tongs debate that lasted from 21 to 26 October. During this time, it was read and eraended eix times and, finalIy, accepted. The firet resolve created the committee of eafety, consisting of three delegates from Bostun and six from the rest of the province, empowered tO abmrn, muster, and cause to be Sesemb]ed as much of the provincial militia as needed at any time. All officers and soldiers of the miiitia were eerneatly recommended to carry out the orders of this committee. The second rewolve established a committee of supplies to provide logistic suppart for any mueter of the militia. Other J@ 1#7 resolves covered the appointment and pay of the officere and men of the new army. The final point approved by the congreee was the organisation of the army itself. The new army was created from the old militia. All militia companies were to elect new officers. These officers were to aseemble and elect battalion and regimental commanders and

MiNiJ~MEN

General Thomas Gage staffs. Once the regimente were formed, the commanders were to enlist one quarter of the men into new companiea of 50 privates: . . . who .dtall equip and hold themselves in readine8s, ore the sharteet notice from the eaid committee of eaf et~, to march to the place of rendezvous; and that each and eveW company so formed chooee a captain and two lientanante to command them oa any such emergent and neceeeary ear-vice m they rnw be edted to. The men were to form into battalions of nine companiea eecb. Al] men were directed to eupply themselves with weapuns and to become prottcient in military ekille. Selectmen of all the towne were told to insure an adeqnate supply of ammunition for their own militia. 03

MINUTEMEN Extracts of the resolves were sent to every town in the province, and the reaction, in most cases, wae immediate and hearty. New elections took place, and there seems to have been very little trouble in filling the ranks of the expanding provincial army. Poeitions of command responsibilitypreviously filled by men whoee younger men to move UP, adding new vigor to both the militia and the minutemen. The response to the call for minute. men wae remarkable. This was a touchy point since it meant that the regimental commanders would actually be giving away not only one quarter of their etrength, but also many of their best young fightere. In view of this, the active support which reg. imentzl commanders gave to the re. organization is one of the best indi. cations of the strength of the minute man concept. CongressionalRecommendations The Provincial Congress, after pub licizing the resolvea which formed the minutemen, cent a steady succeeaion of notee to tbe towns encouraging the rapid organization and training of the units. In December 1774 the congress announced: We now think that partieukzv care should ix? taken by the towns and dktricts in this colong, that each of the minutemen, not already pm vialed therewith, $hotdd be immedi. ately equipped with an effective firearm, bagonet, pouch, lcmzpeaek, thirtv rounds of cartm.dge8 aced balk, and that theu be disciplined three times a week, and oftener, as opportunity mag offer. To encourage these, ow worthy countrymen, to obtatn the skill of complete 801dieV8, we recommend it tbthe towns and dietrtcts forthwith to @ZZI their owu minuteman a reasow able consideration for their service8: and in caae of a general muster, their fuvther services mcwt be recompensed by the provbwe. An attention to die. cipline the militia in general is, how ever, by no means to be neglected. A few of the more independent towns were not easily convinced that the minuteman concept was the best MllteryRwlse .-d

The Minutemsn prime distinction was a firm loyalty to the Crown-now were open to soldiers who were popular enough with their townsmen to be elected to the job. Knowing they would probably be serving in combat under the new lead. ere, the soldiers chose, in almost all eases, wise and hardened veterans of earlier Indian fighting. The splitting off of minuteman regiments doubled the number of leadership positions available and allowed many of the 84
G& .-.

..=.MINUTEMEN solution, and they were not anxious to tmnsfer control of their men to the committee of safety. These towns did not follow to the letter the recommendations of the Provincial Congress, but adapted them to suit themselves. Some did not allow election of new officers, but, rather, appointed officere and let the officers select the men, a reverse procedure from that intended. Other towns allowed elections of the officersby the rank and file, but took other meeaures of control. In general, however,the revival of the minuteman concept caught the imagination of the entire province. In a short time, the minutemen were the pride of their towns, and the cost-conscious townsmen did not overlook the fact that here was an ideal army to fit the situation in the provinc%an army that had to be supported only when it was actually fighting. Reinforcements At Boston, General Gage was ordering additional reinforcement to join him. During the month of October, the 10th and 52d Regiments arrived from Quebec, together with the 18th cud 47th Regiments from New York, andthe two detached companies of the 66th from Newfoundland, bringing that regiment up to etrength. General ,Gagehad said that four segimenta in phusetts would be quite suffiment to intimidate the province, Now, with nearly triple that number, he wae aware that his control did not extend kyond the port of Bostonthe General Court had melted away, the militia, stripped of reliable loyeliet offikwe, was now turned against him, and the Provincial Congress governed the tolony. ~ The inevitable succession of events lied General Gage to order a force of Iabmrt800 men out to Concord on 18 April 1775, and the result is well known. General Gages troops were completely surprised by the incredible number of the people of the conntry in arms. He wrote that the whole country was aesembled in arms with surprising expedition. One of the junior officers of the expedition later wrote in hie diary: I believe the fact ie,, that Gcnsral Gage waa net cmlg much &ceiveft with respect to the gemntitrr of military stores said to be collected in Concord, f@+@.Tso conception the vebets would have opposed tlw Kinge troope in the manner theg did. A Plot The officer who commanded the colnmn, Lieutenant Colonel Francis Smith of the 10th Regiment of Foot, felt that the whole affair was some kind of plot: They bega~ to fiTe on uc from behind the walls, ditches, treee, etc., which, a-s we marched, incveased to a verg great degree, and continued without the intermieeicn of jive minutes altogether, for, I believe, upwarde of eighteen miles; eo tkut I cant think but it mvwt have been a preconcerted scheme in them, to attack the Kings troops the first faverable opportunity that o~ered, otherwise, I think thev could not, in 80 ehcrt a time uc from our marching out, hnve raised such a nurmerene body, and for eo great a space of ground. As the British marched for Concord, they were astounded to find that they were not the only soldiers heading for that town. They had only the vaguest idea of the organization of the provincial forces, even after the several contecte they had experienced in the past year. Abnoet to a man, they simply refnsed to believe that an army had been created under their 85

MINUTEMEN noses, and now, unwittingly, they were marching directly into the center of six regiments of that army. A five-mile circle drawn around their marching column would have encompassed 76 companiee of minute. men and militia, most of them mustering more men than a regular Britieh company. At thie time, nearly every one of those companies was either in the procees of aee.embling or on the march to meet the British column at Concord. Concord woe the ehire town and the leader of all activities in Middleeex County. The town was the geographical center around whkh the country regiments were Iecated, all of them containing at leaet one company raiaed in Concord or in a town bordering on Concord. These regiments alone totaled 6,000 men. Not a man in General Gages army understood how well these regiments were organizednot even General Gage. There were 28 complete regiments of 10 or more companies, and 19 etjll in the formation stage, alerted, hav. ing received messages from Dr. Joseph Warren informing them that the Brit. ieh planned come type of move imms. diately with Concord ae the likely goal. It is in terms of this regimental organisation and with a recognition of theminuteman concept that the battle, of 19 April has to be etudied. Additionally, the evente of the seven or eight monthe of marches and coun. termarches that preceded the battle muet be given a proper place in the analysie of that tight.

Mlltblyke?le9 .-d

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WEAPONS FOR INTERNAL DEFENSE 1970=80 G

Colonel Alvin C. Iasacs, UmYed Stotes Army The views ezpreeeed in this article are the authtie and are not neceeaarilg those of the Depatiment of the Army, Department of Defense, or the US Army Command and General Sta# CoUege.EdC?or. ATERIAL developed to meet broad military requirements often fails during speeific employment beceuee it ie not optimized to meet tbe more probsble conditions of use. Certahdy, todaye conventional military-hardware is not optimized .@ msst the conditions peculiar to lower levele of insurgency. W4 W7 87

: INTERNAL DEFENSE Todays equipment ie designed to inflict maximum destruction on an enemy who is expected to fight, but rarely does eo, in the manner for which the United Statee is prepared. Conventional forces are required, of course, to seize and bold territory and defeat the larger organized subversive formation. To supplement but not replace these conventional forces, we need a epecial purpose force capable of detecting insurgents and temporarily neutralizing them until they can be subdued, caPtured, and turned over to a special organization for indoctrination. Thie should be the primary mode of operation of the force, although it would still require a capability to inflict casualties as a protection against hardcore subversives. Proposed Arsenal The force would require weapons and devices tailored for anti8uerri11a operations in tropical areae. Whether they are feasible to develop is unknown, but these or similar devices using the came concepts are urgently needed. The ideas may seem to be taken from science fiction, but their development may await nothing more than a decision to explore a bit deeper the state-of-the-art. Colonel Alvin C. 18eacs ie Chief, Plum and Opmatiorre Divi8ion, G4 Section, Headquarter, US A~u, Vietnam. ffie aanignmente include dutu in North A friar and It.alu during-World War Ii: with ath US-ATW Headquarter& Korea; and with tho Reamrch and Development Division, O@u of the Chief of Ordnance, Department of the Arrntt. He received hia Afwter of Bunbrtxw Admhdetmtion degree from the Vnivereitu of Chicago, and torM graduated from the US Army Command and G.rneral Stnfl Collcpe mrd the US Armv War ColhWc. S@ L.

Generally, equipment should be deeigned apecitically for tbe purpose in. tended. Superfluous requirementsI operation at temperature extremeq extended and probably uselese ranges, and potential application to the Euro. pean battlefield-complicate develop ment, increase complexity and maink nance, and should be eliminated. Datactor Oevicas Included in the group most urgently needed are: A man-detector (surface). Thie is a device that will sense the presence of a man in the jungle or other under. growth up to a dietance of 55 yards and in cleared land up to 110 yard.t The device would gather the eound energy of heartbeat or breathing, translate this inpnt into electrical eti ergy, amplify it, and provide an au. dible signal in a set of enrphonee, It would have an integral discriminator to eliminate the sounds of animal life and wave lengths other than those w culiar to humans. The trrmsducing equipment should be microminiaturized, employ solid. state components, and be easily portable by one man. It would be connected to a small horn-type sensing deviw with highly directional characteristh to eliminate pickup from the rear and sidee. It initially would be designed for dismounted use, although it would move to its general area of use by vehicle or man-portage. Helicopter nnd vehicular mounts could be delayed until the man-carried equipment is pep feeted, and then be developed as s product improvement. A mandetedor (underground). Thin device would be almilnr in prio. ciple to the rmrface device. It ehould be a separate development however, because the serrnitivity and diucrim~natlon problem~ dii?er from thone of Mllltssy MM@

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INTERNAL DEFENSE the wfaee device and ~re probably awier to solve. A requirement to eombffe the two would delay availability of both capeb]lities. On the other hand, it is entirely posqible that progress in one of the devices would enhmce the progress of the other, and

The mzn.sniffer tiff detect the presence of en enemy from hts body odor tbe final equipment would have a number of interchangeable parte. Operationally, the device would be used to detect the presence of human life in a tunnel or other excavation. : The range of the device should be up to 110 yarda of open tunnel apace, with a 220-yard maximum desired, if possible. This range capability probably can be more easily attainable than that desired for the surface device since there is less sound absorptive ~terial in a tunnel even though deftmdation would be caused by turns oin the tunnel. @ii 1987

A tunnel-detector. A device to detect holes and tunnels large enough to hide two or more men would use a sonar principle or electromagnetic radiation to detect grose dMcontinuities in the earth, and would be directional so that the discontinuity could be pinpointed. A sensor would transmit the detecting radlatfon, receive the returning signal, and send the returned signal through an amplifier to earphones. A distinctive signal would indicate the presence of an excavation, and the sound intensity, comtilned with an interrupted lock-on eignal of different pitch, would indicate that the directional censor had been pointed full into the target. The device would permit the operator to follow the path of the tunnel from a fixed point on the earths surface so that its course could be determined without following it on the surface. The change in intensity in the earphones would indicate when the sensor had been pointed toward the entrance, The search range of the eet ehould be 55 yards, and the range capability, once a tunnel had been detected, would allow its course to be followed for 220 yards. The sensor would be carried by one man, with another required to use the earphonee, plot the tunnels, and carry the amplifying equipment. Microminiaturization of components would insure easy manportability. A tunnel-clearing device. This would be a rocket propelled snake-. like device to be ineerted into an occupied tunnel that had been detected by the previous devices. The, device would be man portable for short dkztancea and be carried to the area of use by vehicle. It would be inserted headfirst into the tunnel and ignited

INTERNAL DEFENSE mechanically or by built-in electrical ignition. Propulsion would be furnished by a elow burning rocket that would move the device at a rate of 10 to 20 feet per second. A sensor in the noee would guide the missile through the open space of the tunnel by keeping the head centered with respect to the eides. It could contain a small inertial and follow one, other than that of entry. The device would be amed with a. selectable number of small, eelfignitable grenadee filled either with high explosive or a pacification gse at the users choice. Theee grenadrc would be dropped off and ignited suo cessively at preset intervale. A pacifier. This would be a gun magazine or drum fedthat would

The pacifier places an enemy in a highly pacified state for many houre, greatly facilitkiug his capture guidance unit that would preclude its return to the point of original entry into the tunnel in caee the miesile raeched an underground room from which the entering tunnel wae tbe only egrese. The guidance eystem would recognize its preeence in a room wider than a tie-foot-wide tunnel, eeek out tunnel exite from the room, 90 k... fire bursts of emall needles, each aerodynamically designed to fly at extreme velocity without tumbling after entering a human body. The tips of the needlee would be impregnated with a chemical that would induce an ertreme desire to move into the open in a pacified etate, Thie condition would laet for eeveral hours. The viz.

RDVW Mlllfaty -si41

INTERNAL liEFENSE tim could then be captured without resistance, evacuated to an ares where he could be interrogated, and later evacuated for indoctrination. As an alternative to the needles, or as a product improvement, tbe gun could be designed to fire droplets at extremely high velocity so they would penetrate t e skin of the victim much esent pneumatic inoculatIiie the ion gun. The needles, or droplets, wouldfly { a veloeitiee sufficient to penetrate foliage to a distance of 10 feet, roughly equivalent to the distance required for cover and observation hy a guerrilla. The material used ae a pacification agent would have to be such that friendly forces could be inneculated to guard against its effect on our own troops. An interrogation device. Thla piece of equipment would be eimilar in operation to the currently available polygraph. The latter device, however, with its electrodes and general formidable appearance, can be expected to alarm a suspect who ie to be interrogated. The proposed device also would nse seneors that detect changes in heartbeat, blood preeeure, perspiration level, or some combination of these. It would do so by exterior sensors that could be installed easily and inconspicuously in sofa cueldons, the top of a wooden bench, chair seat, or a similar place so that any bodily contact,even through a thickness of clothing, would actjvate the sensor. The sensor then would send a signal when it detected body changes that indicate faIsehood or evasiveneee. The signal would travel by radio wave to a small Snrplitierand earpiece concealed in tbe ear canal of the interrogator. It is not contemplated that unconventional warfare iteme euch ae those described would be the exclueive arma. ment of a counterinsuruenc~ force. A requirement etill woul~ r&ain for conventional weapons to, deal with aituationa obviously beyond the capqbUity of these unconventional weepene. One group of weapons would complement the other in a counterinsurgency force. The proposed weapons would be appropriate for use by combat and combat support elements of a division, group, or airnilar force. The two man-detector-urface and undergroundthe tunnel-detector, and the pacifier would he appropriate for use by infantry-type companiea. In general, men and equipment should be provided so that any element which might be expected to en. counter revolutionaries in a mission would have the support of these teame. In any encounter, first priority after detection of an enemy should be given to hia paciibmtion, If thie e~ould fail, and the livee of combat personnel are unduly threatened, it might then become necessary to reeort to lethal weapons. Consequently, the lethal weapons should be available, and no force should be armed exclusively with pacification-type weapons. The tunnel-clearing device would be appropriate equipment for an engineer support unit. A clearing team would move to the required site by surface vehicle or helicopter at the radio request of the f rontline commander who had located an occupied tunnel with his equipment. The interrogation device would be suited beet for use by trained intelligence personnel. It basically would be an adjunct to skilled interrogation techniques. It is contemplated that it would be utilized by intelligence teams attached at battetion level, or by a team accompanying a company-eiae unit on an independent mieeion.

Colonel Charles M. Tyson, UmtedStates Armu

AN has spent thraequarters of a century and untold billions of dollars devising ways ti propel himself higher and faster. He is now getting close tQ tbe moon and exceeding the speed of a bullet. Thus far, the main effort has been dirsctcd toward seating man inside a machme dceigaed to provide him with supermobility. But removed from such a machine, he is virtually immobilised. As a soldier, he drags across the esrth at two and one-half to five miles par hour, much like his Neanderthal forebaars, except that he is now laden with many pounds of equipment that may hinder more then it helps Kim. It would seem that technology has forgotten the soldierstill the most dscisive military asset, now and in tbe future. In an era of the lightest and strongeet fabrics, tbe US soldier is weighted with heavy stiff webbing, iron buckles, and bulky containers. In an era of incredible strides in firepewsr lethality, he still carries a yoke of ammunition not much im proved since invention of the cartridge in the previous century. After four major wars, be is still carrying a pistol made 66 years ago. On the field of battle, he is more vulnerable than the Knights of tbe Round Table-susceptible to bullets, f ragtnente, ftrq

MllimIy R*

MOBI knives, traps, holes, bamboo spikes, and the mosquito. And in the field of mobility, the miracles of science have made hi no more fleet of foot than the primitive invisible guerrilla he is expected to defeat. Indmidual Mobility Unquestionably, we have given him the greatest degree of mobility in moving from one co~tinent to another and in jumping from one battle area to anotherth]e by an impressive array of ground and air vehiclee. But once we have disembarked hlm within the tactical confines of the battlefield and within small arms range of the en. emY, we Ieave him no more mob]le than his foe. In fact, when considering the individual and organisational gear we have heaped upon him, he ie almost at a mobility disadvantage. We have done well in long-range planning for strategic mobility, and we have come a long way in saturating the battle area with tactical mability, but we have done almost nothing to develop individual mobility. Ia a breakthrough in individual mobSity feasible in the 1970-80 period? Ie it desirable? There are few long-range projecCobnsel Charles M. Tgaon ie with the US Armg Element, O@ee of the Jot-nt Chiefs of Staff; Washington, D. C. He aevved in the Paci@ during World War II; waa Senior US Advieor with the Sd Ro@ Thai Army; was O.wigmed to the Ofie of the Dcpnty Chief of Stuff for Militaw Operatiorw, Department of the Army; and .wwved de Chief, Special Weapoaa Division, Allied Land Forces Southern Europe. ffe hoide an M.S. degvee in Im?arnatkmal Affaire from George Washingtea Univeraitv, Washington, D. C. arsd is a g.radr@e of the US Armg War College, Carliele Barm&a, Pemw@ventiz.

tions of the world environment a the nature of future warfare th suggest the dfminiehing importan of the combat soldler. The contra aPPeare to be so. It is obvious that there is an i creasing probability of carefully c cumscribed conflicts ah~d of us bo in remote primitive areas and in p litically volatile and heavily populat urban areae. Such conflicts promi to produce future combat akuation where small-unit tactical ingenuit and individual mobility will be impe ative. There appear to be two technolo ikd steps which, if vigorously unde taken now, could increase individu mobility and eoldier effeetivenees du ing the next decade. The firet of these steps involves t need for a completely freeh approa toward outfitting the combat soldi of the future with clothhg, equi ment, and weaponry of the futur Every item now worn and carried the 1967 soldier repreeente only marginal product improvement ov that borne by his father in 1944.

Siscard Gaar Starting from the skin out, t preeent eoldiers combat garb an~ ge . should be discarded. Whatever placed back on him should be ha the weight and should afford twi the comfort and twice the protectio from the elements and the enemy. There appear to be no technologic obstacles to devising a basic comb uniform that would be made from featherweight fabric that ie plaati thin and impamoue to we&h~, y which will breathe and prdvide pe spiration absorption. While come i tensive ret%arch may be required, also seems feasible withh the ne decade tQ design a lightweight out

MOBILllY

Ministurlmd 6PSCC-SW version of oetond.jrenerstlon Jet Ilelt

proteetivo gnrmont capable of renisthrg small arm f% and frairmmb without impairing ~he weurern freet+om of movement. Anothar aoume of Irritntlon should be scratched. Zlppera, mwm, or abrn-

sive faetmmrs should replace antiqu~ laces, buttons, buckles, and other bu~ metal items, Strapa, where neeaewq, should be wide-band thin nylon nod should emphaeice expendability rather than durability. The canteen, sleeping bag, pouchq and other containers should be madd of Iixhtweixht and collam!ible fabric offering no- additional c&mr whee empty. Boot and helmet deeign should be started anew with modem mate. rials. The future vereion of both ha should provide protection without weight, comfort without bulk, and ventilation without vulnerability, Since thin, resilient, fairly impcrm trable plastics and other materiab are now within reasonable teehnolog. ical grasp, them is no valid obstacle to putting drastically improved fcotwear and headgaar on tom6rrow8 eoldier. Food Packages Similarly, it ie within existing acientitlc capabilities to provide the future combat 8oldier with ~ compare. tively small package of nourishing concentrated field mtions capable of mmtahing him for several daye in combat. While it is visualized that aerinl resupply will be the future rub rather than the exception, such an emergency food pockage should br available to him without burden, No great scientific challenge nhould be involved in developing a vnriety of pnlatable three-day emergency rationt with a packaged henting I!ourcr+-atl within a packege no Irwger than s porket-eized book. Dramatic improvement in indivbl. ual weaponry for the naxt decade MCY be more difficult, However, a major rammrcb and dmdopmtmt (R&13) cf. fort, coupled with the willingntO thmncs the hrdlvidurd noldlmn ft~ Mllltwy MctR ,=

.,

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MOBIUTY! ; ,; thrust apparatus was a rather bulky ~ arm as a si@cant weapon system, affair weighing 115 pounds. ceuld, within the n=t 10 years, reThe Advanced Research Projects ~ lieve him Of the poundage of steal, Agency has funded for the develop- J bmas, wood, and lead under which he ment of a eecond-generation Jet Belt. : now labors. Virtually at hand is the ThM new flying belt promises vastly Mchette principle. This promises conimproved flight performamw with no : siderable weight reduction in ammuincrease in weight and bulk. It thus nition and the tirearm itself. Also possible is the use of a liquid propellant appears that individual mobility is not .a-futuristic dream, but, rather, an source encased in a light rifle stock. In essence, the breakthrough needed excltmg new capability that is practically at our technological doorstep. to modernize the soldiers accouterWith concentrated funding support ments is not so much teehnical ae it is fiscal, but it is hard to conceive and R&D effort, there seems to be no of any effort more importcnt than furreason why a miniaturized space-age zieldng the beet to the man who daily version cannot be developed within comesto grips with the enemy. , the next five to 10 years or earlier. But tbe question remains: Would 6iie Him a lift euch a device be merely an interestOnce we have lightened the load ing, nice-to-have accessory, or is it carried,by the soldier, we can, then, an eseential combat requirement? turn to the second major step toward achieving indi~dual mobilitythat of Tactical Advantages lightening the soldier. Perhaps the best way to approach an answer to this query would be to For at least 10 years, the Army liet some of the tactical advantages has stated a requirement for a simits use would suggest: ple lift device to enable a combat sol The Belt, Aerial Thrust (BAT) dier to fly short distancee without would provide a margin of protection benefit of an aircraft. The device for the soldier by enabling hlm to would encompass a small thrust syeavoid guerrilla-placed mantraps, minetem attached to a belt, with a light, field, and other latent casnalty-proback-mounted power package that ducing ruses. It would minimize his couldbe rapidly refueled or recharged, vulnerability by affording only fleetplus a one-hand control mechanism. ing dispersed targets for enemy small Idsrdly,it would be a 15-pound system arms fire. It would give the soldler a O@ would permit nap-of-th~arth capability to escape from ambuehes 6ight for dietances up to one mile. and enable hlm to vacate vulnerable Where do we stand on such a mohelicopter landing sites with speed. bility project ? Although such a de The EAT obviously would be a vice has never been regarded as a priority operational requirement, one means by which to vault barriers. It commercial company has conducted would provide an instantaneous capaseveral promising feaeibllity teeta durbility to cross rivers, ecale cliffs, traverse impassable terrain, an)d overtly iag the past few yeara. As far back se 1963, this company demonstrated all types of man-made obstacles and a 22.second, 65.mile-per-hour fllght structures. over a distance of 1,000 feet at alti. Its potential for reconnaissance tudes under 100 feet. The prototype work would be significant. The BAT Jplil19a7

would yield an improved capability for swift patrol and observation missions by stealth, botb day and night, with less vulnerability. . The BAT could be used for local resupply choree. Small-load packages could be retrieved readily from drop zones and be man flown to otherwise inaccessible combat locations. The BAT most certainly would revolutionize the techniques of maneuver. It would afford unlimited opportunities to achieve cross-country mebility and perfect demoralizing tzctize. Defensive situations could be turned rapidly inte offensive opportunities by permitting swift dispersal and regrouping. It would make pormible the launching of sodden and confusing 360-degree attacks against suspected enemy locations, thus requiring the enemy to diffuse hia fire both horizontally and vertically. Unanticipated avenues of escape could be observed and cut off promptly. Tremendous advantages also would be pemrible in city ftghting, riot control, and other disordere that might typify future warfare. It also ie apparent that such a sYstem would not be without problems. Exteneive training would be required to acclimate the soldier to individual flight. Mwbanical operation of the one-band control lever, perhapz, would not be too difficult, but the development of flight proficiency to cope with feet-moving tactical siturstions and emergencies would take time. The syetem would force tactical leaders to develop the ability te conduct the type of split-second mcmeuver concepts needed to exploit tbe full potential of euch a mobility system.

No new and worthwhile military cape. bility, however, hse ever been achieved without some degree of experiment tion and training. Another problem cordd stem from the BATs short endurance. Certainly, the relatively short-range characteri~ tice of the belt as it is thus far vis. ualized would entail frequent refuel. ing or recharging. However, the de vice is not yet envisaged as a meeos by which to soar perpetually around the battlefield. However, until greater sustxdrred flight capabilities can hs achieved, a single refueling station mounted on a ground vehicle in the combat ares would eerve the interim purp9se adequately. Safety is another consideration. Without doubt, a zudden inflight real. function of the BAT would find the soldier with poor intrinsic flight chnracteristice. On the other hand, nap-of-the-earth maneuvering would not neceeearily in. volve the same degree of hazard es a free fall from great altitudes. And the protection from enemy tire afforded by the BAT8 mobility would more than offset the risk of injury through pessible malfunction, There can be no doubt that an unstinting effort to lighten the load of the eoldier, coupled with priority development of a propulsion syetem to permit individual flight, will produce a truly medern, mobile, and vital weapon syetem. While such an event may not yet mean the end of the walking infantryman, it will at Irxwt cOnvey the idee that technology has not moved into epace leaving him with the baeic load and the bueic problem still on hi8 back.

MllltxyR*-

,.

r-

, ---

.-==

UNITED STATES Minefield Ihmolition Skids Remote-control blasting of enemy traile an armed explosive charge series that, in turn, exploded mince minefiebfe by rockets trailing strhga planted in ite path. The reckats traof exploeivee and which are launched jectory ie halted by an arresting wire from arnpldbious demolition skide attached to the sl@d.News item. STRATCOM Hoadquartsrs Moving Headquarter of the US Army Strategic Communications Command (STRATCOM) will be moved from the Washington, D. C., area to Fort Huachuca, Arizona. The move of STRATCOM is being made to provide a permanent station for the headquarters and to consolidate, in one location, all elements of the headquarter now ecattcred at several sites in the Washingten area. The location of STRATCOM Headquarters to existing facilities at Fort Huachuca, a communications-electronice post since 1958, provides an en.viromnent that will enhance the capability of STRATCOM Heedquartere to carry out ite mieeion of directing the Armye portion of the worldwide Defense Communications Syetem. The announced move will be phased over a period of several months, and should be completed by mid-1967. Army Newe Features.

Amw Eeaenvch and Dmelmmwnt Nenmmam@w

technique developed at 3icationy Arsenal, Dover, New Jersey. The fully loaded, rowboat-liie ekkle, dmignated the M1798, can be towed over land or water and fired by any vshiole containing a 24-volt direct current power eupply. Constructed of waterproof fiberglass, the skids are 12 feet long and ilve feet wide. When loaded with Isuncher, rocket, and exploaivee string, a skid weighs 8,000 pounds. Plastic exploeivee are coiled in the center section of the skid and attached to an lf%5 jato rocketi When projected across a minefield, the rocket
is a new

@rll1SS7

sl

MaverickAb-to.surface Missile Two aircraft manufacturers have been seleeted by the Air Force to proceed with the contract definition phase of the Maverick (AGM-66A ) air-toeurface missile program. The purpose is to verify the preliminary design and engineering, and to provide information necessary to award a contract for development produ&lon. The Maverick ie plsnned as a nonnuclear air-to-surface miseile for uee with the F-111A, A-7D, and F-4 series. h mteeion is to increase the ntrike capability against point targets, such as armored vehicles, tanks, and ground &ucturee.-News release. w

Hdicopter Iladar System . The Joint Army-Navy Instrumenbtion Research (JANAIR) Program hae announced the development of s new helicopter radar syetem for u~ at night and in foggy weather. Flight teeta using the radar system have ehown that contrast between ob jects and differing terrain is aucb tit almost pictorial ground mapping re euita. Large or extended objeets, surl es airport runways or Nlghwaye, am unmistakab~q and pilote aided by pk tos or cbarta or with previous knewk edge of the area mm &ndily identifl clusters of trees, buildings, or ofl tanke.-Arrny News Features.

MILITARY NOIES MI Regions Research. The ArmYs Cold Regions Research sad Engineering Laboratory (USA CREEL) is engaged in a number of projectsto learn how to cope with and ntilize frozen materials for the sureivilirmoperations in cold weether refions. The laboratory has designed vehiclee to travel over ice or dig into it, studied diepersal of fogs and how to combatsprintilme soil erosion caueed by thawing, determined the effect of temperatures on vegetation growth, kerned how to etop subsurface perzrzfrost and muskeg from ruining rozds and buildlngs, studied avabmcbes and explosions on froccn materiel, and has broken up river ice jsare. Sdentists are currently analyzing a mile of vertical ice cores drilled out ofthe Greenland ice sheet. These and otherarctic cores, some whkh fell as snow10,000 years ago, have been historically dated by means of radio carbendating, in which a Geiger counter rzeaeures the carbon found in the rareeair bubbles.Army News Features. Project WEST A potential problem of gunsmoke md missile propellant fumes which mdd affect crew eiliciency in the Armye newer, more heavily armed Micopters after they reach combat wer Vietnam is being etudied by Army and Ah Force scientific teams mProject wEST, a Weapons Exhaust Study. Crews evaluating the new helicopkrs have complained of nausea and tissincss after inhaling thick concenkstione of gunpowder and miseile wepellant fumes during firing tests. Wi laa7 Widle not a critically serious problem, the Army reports that these fumes, partbmlarly heavy in recently developed and modified aircraft with a, larger number and variety of wcepons, when drawn into the helicopter could distract or otherwise reduce tbe combat effectiveness of the crew. The two services are examining the exbzuet gaees produced by va~lous types of munitione to detcrmin,e their exact chemical composition and degree of toxicity. Utilizing tbe came equipment and techniques used to evaluate recket fuels, Project WEST engineers are testing gases produced by both gunpowder and missile propellants burned under laboratory conditions. To determine their composition, the resultant gaece are analyzed by nltramodem scientific equipment. A new series of tests will be conducted under field condltione, more closely simulating actual service operations.-US Air Force release. Carrier landing Device An automatic engine throttle control is being installed by the Navy on all firsthe carrier-based jet aircraft to aeeist pilots in making eafer landinge, particularly during difficult night and all-weather operations. ,The device, called the Approach Power Corapsrwator (APC), accurately controls airspeed during landing. It hae been installed in F-8 Crw.szder and RA-5C V@wtte aircraft and will be installed in all new Navy aircraft, such as the F-11 iB and the A-7A. The Federal Aviation Agency and commercial airlines are considering use of the APC as part of proposed all-weather landing systems.DOD release. SS

MILITARY NOTES Cadet Esct!angeProgrsm The @sny has inaugurated a Cadet Exchange Program between tbe US Military Academy (USMA) and selected military academies in Latin America. The exehange follows an ,exircrimental exchange program conducted in July-August 1966 in which 28 USMA eadete vieited 14 LatinAmerican miiitary academica. In September, 28 cadets from Central and South America returned the visit. Pafilcipating Latin-American countries were Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Salvador, Hondurae, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Army Newe Features. HARP h$t$ In recent teats, the 120-footAong High-Altitude Research Project (HA 12P) gun iired rounds to an altitud~ of 103 miles, a world record for gun. fired projectiles. Two other records were eet during the firinge when a maximum velctity mark of 6,800 feet per eecond w~ recorded and when 1,225 pounds of powder were loaded into the HARP gun. The gunwhich ie used ae an m perimentel launcher for miesileo and thin, stabilized shelie-fired projeo tiles leaving a chemicai traii of Iighf visible 300 mike away (MR, NOI 1966, p 97) .Army News Featurea,

The vehicle cnn travel on improved roade at Convoy smcds of 80 miles w 1 hour and incorporate a conetant horsepower hydrauiic rear-wheel power eecirt for covering rough terrain and fording streams. It bae a cruising range of 266 miiea and a bed-carrying capacity of 31,600 pounds, the weight of three fub loaded CONEX.Newe releaee. 100 Mllltrry Mvi@
.&

MILITARVNOTES MoonVeldcle Conoepts ho lunar vehicle concepts are being teeted at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Ma@rmd, by the US Army Test and Evaluation Command [USATECOM) for the National Aeronautics and Space Agency (NASA). USATECOM is conducting gravity, endurance,and movement experiments on the four-wheel and six-wheel itfobilitg Test A*ctes, which are vehicles based on NASAs design study for a Lunar Mobile Laboratory. The four-wheel version, for examNc. is Zt feet lonfs and nearly 15 feet New ReeniistnrentProgrem The Department of the Army has announced a likmonth enlistment pregram in the US Army Reserves, with concurrent call to eetive duty for service in Vietnam. Those eiigible for the enlistment option must be former Army servicemen without current reserve status, and former active Army personnel who are curren$ly in the National Guard or US Army Reeervee.. Personnel who are accepted will serve 12 monthe in Vietnam, with the remaining time used for any needed refresher training couree, 30 days leave, travel to and from Vietnam, and processing. Accepted individuals will hold the grade they held when last separated from active duty or the current grade they hold in their National Guard or Reserve unit. Applicants must have served at least 21 months of continuous active duty during their Army career. Periods of active duty fcfr training will not be credited. Applicants not. in e current reserve statue must reenlist for the 15month program withh three years from the date they were last eeparated from atilve duty. Reserve personnel are not eligible if they have been assigned to a control group for more than three years and have not participated in any milita;y occupational specialty (MOS) training during this period. All applicants must be fully qualified in an MOS for which a requirement exiet.v in Vietnam. Those completing the 15-month duty who desire an extension must receive specific authority from the Office of Pereonnel Operations.-Army Newe Features. 101

Arm!Uesemch and
Dwebpnwnt k Neumnamzin.

own drive motor and can be steered iedhidually. Two levers constitute the driver controls, one for speed and the other for dhction. , After USATECOM teats the vebicka for hard-surfeee mobility, it will send them ta Yuma Proving Ground, Arisone, for eoft-surface testing. Date obtahed from these tests will be used by NASA to design a Lunar Wiemtific Surv.qi Mod&e (LSSM) which will look iike a scaled-down vereion of a Mobility Teet Article. The 6Malier LSSM would fit into the eehunaute Apollo rocket to the moon. -Army, News Features. lpil 1W7

men for nearly 20 years, and, during thte time, it hfta increased in Eim and *p. I@ dual mheion is to provide instruction to Lntin-American military men in fieldc rcnging frmn civic fiction planning to hesvy equipment oPerntiocw, cc well aa to tmdn soldjem to defend their countrka from internal subvcmion and extaraal enendee. Forty-!lve coumoa are taught at the eehoo), 17 of which deal with military CIVICsction, At the hlgheet level is the three-week CIVICaction training which ie declgned to prepcre LntlnIm

binee both the military and civic artion rob of Letin Americae mititarr engineem teach water puritlcstion, well drilling, and heaw equipment and comitructlon eupport equipment operation, Thcee sktlln pw para the men to work in community devcdopment progranm The bmic medical techrdclan couma includes a four-dsy medlcd sealstanm program in tbs Republic of Pcnccoc. During thO 20-w@k 8@do~ 6hIdOCCb act so numes nnd mlmintgtmtive pwnonnal for United StAt811snd PUWMllltq Rwk9
forma. US Army

..
MII.ITASY noms

osmian doctors, end wist environmental heeiti specialist with meierie surveys. Merging the military civic action role with the continuing miesion of protesting against incipient insurgenciee, the Irregular Warfare Cemadttce mh= both the military meae~ mqnired to defeat an insurgent 00 tbe battieiield, as well as the civic action functions and reeponeitrilitiee of military forces in an insurgent environment. Instruction ia presented in field probkrne and maneuvers in the lo-week wuree for sompany grade Lctin-Amerisen officers. Spanish became the official teaching Im@age in 1955, and, since then, the as@el baa graduated nearly 19,000

Pkoiw US ArfIw Stedents from Honduras enrolled in the eeven-week well-driliing course

I&in Americans. Twenty-two LetinAorerieerr officers and nine noneomOdWonad odicere from 16 conntriee s?e presently teesbing at the school as

guest instructors. These inetrrretor personnel are assigned to the eeheel for one-year periods. A bridge that finks the Arnerieae~ the school serves as a platform for the interchange of ideas among military men of aii the American countries. As su~ the School of the Americas playe a significant role. in Latin Americea battle against Comrnunistinepired subversion and vioiante in the Weetern Hemisphere.-US Army release. Mutual Understanding Program Enti;ee are currently being acseptcd for the Edward L. Berneye Foundation ~ward. The purpose of the award is to provide euggeetions and ideas that can be used by governmen~ private organiaatiom, voluntary groups, and individuals to further understanding between the peoples of the Unitsd States and tba United Eingdom. The closing date for entrke is 30 June 1967. Information on the program can be obtained from the Secretcry, Edward L. Berrtaye Fonndatfon, 7 Loweil Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138.Nsws item. Bird Collisions With Aircraft . The Air Force baa several meaeurea under consideration to reduce or eliminate bird collisions with aircraft. These coliiiione-329 were reported in 196S-coet the Air Force almost 10 miliion dollars a year, according to the OfSce of Aeroepeec Reeeersb. Means under consideration to combat the intrudeti include loud cracker shells fired from guns, draining of ponds near runways, and the cutting of weeds. The major offender is the stariirtg aithough other birds have proved troubleeome.-DOD release. 103

MILITAftY NOTES !

Awwj,t-fi.nwal

hodm

TRAP equipment aligned along the side

of a KC-135

jet

aircmft

I Ballistic missiles are being tracked and their performance recorded during the time between reentry into the atmosphere and impact by u new system which attained operational statua in November. Named TRAP (for Terminal Radiation Program), the eystem provides in. formation vital to the development of antimissile and advanced intercontinental ballistic missile systems. It was produced for the Air Force Ballistic System Division. A crew of seven physicists operatee TRAPs army of camerus, photometers, radiometer, and cinwpectrographa from e. specially modified KC-I.?5 jet tanker aircraft. On a mission, inunch information is trmwmitted from the launch site directly to the TRAP syetem in the KC-1,%5 which is on statiotl at 40,000-feet altitude about 6,000 milee down range. Tracking begins from the aircraft when the reentering miwile is ribout fiOmike above the surface and continues until the target plunges into the sw providing data for analyeis by computers.-New8 item. Alrbome Trairrlrrg for Cadats Trajnlng is open to vokin~m of A program permitting US Military the tlret and eecond cleaeee. Those dm Academy cadets to receive airborne to ~aduate in June may partJcJpM8 tratnlng during the eummer lenve pedurhrg their graduation laave.-DOD rlod Iua bean approved by the Army r?haee. Chief of Staff.
tM

MuttuyAoFt@I

-.4

MiLITARYNOTES ~ BRAZIL IT-37Trainers FortY T#7 aircraft have been ordered by the Brasiiian Government from a US manufacturer. The 10 ruiliion-doiiar contract for the trainers eiee includes maintenance equipment 8Udspare parts. The aircraft are scheduled for delivery te the Breziian Alr Force during the period JuiY 1967-October 196S. .-News item. Smcst Missiles for Vessel The Breziiiara destroyer Mariz e BafY08,the Sr8t South .Arnerican veesei to be titted with guided missiles, was recently commissioned after being armedwith British surface-to-air Seacot missiles (MR, JuI 1966, p 102). The Brazilian-built destroyer, after keing overhauled at the &asiiian Navy Arsenal in Rio de Janeiro, also received new guns. After a aeriee of tests, the Maria e Batv08 will become the flagship of the deetroyer flotiila. Three other warships-the cruisers Barroso and Tarnanokwd and the aircraft carrier MirPW Gcraia-are also scheduled to be equipped with the S8acat.-News item. CENTO IiidlinkIX J@lirzk IX, a 10-day Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) maritime exercise conducted in November, includedvessels from the navies of Iran$ Great Britain, and the United States. During the exercise, enemy submarines were tracked and attacked with dummy depth charges, and live antiaircraft and surface tiring were conducted. The force performed convey duties, practiced refueiing operatieaz at sea, and conducted a minesweeping exercise.-Newa release. ml laa7 CHILE Twin Otter Aircraft The first three of eight Twin Otter aircraft for the Chilean Air Force have been flown to Cidle. Marm@ctured in Canada, the three aircraft wilI be used for aerial survey and for supplying isolated communitiee. News item. EAST GERMANY Air Units Air force unita of the Eeet German Peoples Army, initiaiiy organized for tactical supPly missions, were formed in 1950 se a branch of the police. The air force has two fighter divisions of three regiments each. In addition, there are two transport and

ri.?rk6ni9

IUiG-15

equipped with M-l and ii4i-4 helicopters; three regiraenta of ground air ilefenae forces, each having three battalions; and two radar battalions. There are about 400 tactical aircraft in the air forc+100 iWG-15, 260 MiG-17, SO MiG-19 and MiG21, and an unknown number of 12-28 aircraft, For transport, 11-14P and An-% aircraft are used. For training and liaison, the Yak-n, Yak-1#, Yak-18, Zlin, and MiG-16 UTI, are used. The training divieion operates two schools to train pilots. In tiddition, crew training ia also conduc~d in the Soviet Union.Newa item. 165

,$

MILITARY NOIES

INDIA
Soviet Naval Aid India wtlt receive six submarines and 40 smaller veeseki from the Soviet Union. Soviet specirdiste will IIISO help construct a shipyard in India (MR, ~Ul 1966, p 104). Heretofore, the Indian Fleet had used vessels of British origin.News itim. AUSTRALIA iiMAS Iltway Australias second 1,600-ton Oberon clam submarine, the HMAS OtzoW, wee recently launched in Scotland. The new craft is one of four Oberon clam aubmarinee scheduled to be delivered to the Royal Australian Navy by 1969. The HMAS OzkW, launched in 1966, will be delivered this year. The other two will be named the Ovens and the OnuZow (MR, Oct 1966, p 104). The cost of each submarine, excluding aaeociated epare equipment and torpedoes, is 9.2 million dcdlara. Newa release. New Motorcycles In the future, the Australian Army will be equipped with lightweight British motorcycles. The 450 new motorcycles will replace World War II models now in use.Newe release, Naval Enslglr All Australian naval shipe and eetablisbmenta are flying a distinctive Australian ensjgn. The new ensign reteine the Union Jack at tbe upper esnton at the hoiet, hut the red crone of Saint George han been replaced by the eix Australian ntara In blue on a white baclwrround. The flag h called the Auutrallnn whM,e ennlgn,-Naws rehmm laa

Mlraga S1-0 Jat Trairrar The Royal Amrtralian Air Fora recently took delivery of the ilrat o! 10 Mirqre HI-D twe-eeat jet trainem The Mirage program compfirwe 160 fighters and ground attack aircraft 10 addition to the 10 trainere. The Mirage III-D, developed is France ae an Australian variant d tbe Miruge III-B two-seat aircrafi will eeeist in the conversion of jel pilots to the single-e.eat Mimge IILO 13ghter.-News releeae.

GREAT BRITAIN
Blowpipe Blowpipe, a one-man air defenue weapon currently under development which ie deehmad for use againet low

I.tdl.l

Blowpipe mockup flying aircraft, was recently displayed by itn manufacturer at n British air 8how. The nystem consi5te of the mldh a tube which is used for trauspert end M the launcher, an optical sight whirb mountn on the tube, and u small radio tmnrtmitter which the gunner uses to guide the mkiaile in flight. The weigh! of tho complde nystam Is 26 pounda.Nmm Item. Mllltwy swim

MILITARYNOTES

ITALY
691YMaiden Flight

Fiat

The first prototype of the twin-engine, lightweight reconnaissance fighter G91Y has made its maiden Sight. Equipped with two engines of a total static thruet of 8,160 pounds with afterburner, the aircraft has a maximum speed of more than Mach .96.News . release,

NORWAY
Naval Construction Program The first of five new frigates being constructed in Norwegian ehipyards hss entered eerviae with the Norwegian Navy. The new veeeela are similar in design to the US Deole~ class and have a standard displacement of approximately 1,500 tons. Powered by Swedish-built turbines snd machinery (20,000 horsepower), the vessels have a top speed of 25 koote. Armament consiste of four 76. millimeter antiaircraft guns in double gun turrets, six tubes for antisubmarine torpedoes, and a six-tube Terme rocket launcher. Each frigate will carry one helicopter. The veesele carry a crew of 150. The naval construction program also includes 15 submarines of 370 tons and 20 patrol boats of 100 tona capable of a speed of 30 knots.-News item.

d
kpril

1967

107

MILSTARY

BOOKS
DEADLY LOGIC: 7fre 7froory of Nuclear Datarrenca. Sy Philip 6raan. 361 Pages. :b&S&Mbriwrrslty Prass, Columbus,Ohio, . . BY MAJ CHM@s L. MCNEILL, USA

YU60SLAVIAS REVOLUTIONOF 1941. ~ Wag& N. Rktf~ 175 Pagea. 7ha Panasfl

varria State Urrlverslty Press, Urtivarsltf Park, Pa., W& $7.50. BY MAJ ANTHONYP. DE LUCA, USA

The author, an Assistant Professor of Government at Smith College, has launched a frontal and powerful rktaek on the authoritative credence given to what he deacribea in tMe book aa the unproved theory of nuclear deterrence. Mr. Green claime that the @tudy of nuclear deterrence policy is in no way an academic discipline, and then proceeds to diseect the various policy propoeale and the strategies which have been advanced by nuclear theorieta. What Professor Green is really attempting to refute is the mantle of ecientitlc expertise which haa been assumed by the deterrence theoriste. Champions of certain new techniques which are used in decieion making -such ea syatema anelyeia, game theory, and simulationwill find their methodology challenged and tbe validity of their canclusionn sharply questioned. For the military reader, this book will be thought provoking and may cauae him to reexamine the validity of the strategy of maaaive retaliation that wee in vogue in the 1950s. What the author baa accomrAlahod la to attack the detmrence &sorirda with thlr own ultimate wenpen+rudlto logic. 1#

Adolf Hitlers aeheme in kite 1940 for winning World War H included maintenance of the statua quo in the Balkans and the elimination of any cause for a Britieh-Soviet entry into the area. Yugoslavia was a vital element in that echeme since British forces in Greece would pose a threat to the Romanian oil flelde, and a pro. Axie Yugoslavia might have diecour. aged Greece from inviting British aid, The political courting of YugorJavi* succeeded temperaril y with Yugosh. vias acceesion to the Tripartite Pact in hfareh 1941. However, two day8 Iat.ar, pubIic indignation led to a miiitary coup and revolution which precip itated the German attack. The author, aide-de-camp to General Du&m Simovi/ who enginecrfd the coup, preaen% eyewitneee accounts of one of the most important evenb in modem Yugoslav history. Since@ full eigaiflcance of tbe event ie still a eubjwt of speculation, the reader b preaerrted with detaite on which to determine whether the coup wau m eponaible for saddling Yugodavia with a CaOmmnist regima whether it waa doaignad to atop %esiat ag~aardo% whether it wca the cnuee or ttm axcuae for the his war arrdnat YulOnlavk, and hi what waiy it contributed to Elttura uitimab defeat.

A@?h Mlittmy

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MILJTARYBOOKS AJJISTOM OFWAR AND WEAPOf% 449 to 1sS0. Enalish Warfare From the AI@W SSSOIN to-Crmnwell.BY A. V. B. Norman &d 00s Pofflngrw. S24 Pages. Thomas Y. CrswellCo., Now York, 1906. $RB5. BY LTC FommeT R. BLACKBURN, USAR Four parallel themes involving Englieh warfare and weapons from 449 to 1660 are developed in thle beok: military organisation, arms and armor, tactics and strategy, and castles sad cannons. Cbengee in the methods and equipment of warfare are traced from the tiie of the invasion of the British ISICS by the Anglo-Saxons to the estabJisbrnentof the first modern army. The author discusses the development sad use of weepone from the crossbow to the pistil and musket, the pike to the bayonet, the catapult to the esnnon, and describthe design and construction of castles and other fortidcstione. HigWlghting tha book are 200 detaiied drawings of weapone, armor, castles, and fortifmotions. These, along with a readable text, make the book of considerable interest to the miJitery reader. 1 WORLO OF NUCLSAR POWSRS? ErSWd by AbstsJr Bucban. 176 Pages. prmrtica.tlal~ lea. Engfawood Cliffs, N. J., lBBB. $1.95 psparbourrd. BY LTC GEORGE M. RonG8RB,USA Man~ problems of nuclear proliferation are discussed in detail by outstanding scholars to give the reader a bettar understanding of the varying worldwide viewe. IUgldy recommended for the military rsader, this book should be of SPCCiSJ interest to the student of politicel affairs. w ,,, lea7 . FOLLO IM6 TNE 6UIOON. By Elissbeti! B. : Crrstar. WJth ao Introdrrotioa,by Jaoa R. ., Stew 341 Pages. Univaraity of Oklahoma ~ Press, 4 emran, Okla., 1$$S.$2.00. ~ This ia 8 new edition of Mrs. Cue- ~ tere book first puhJished in 1890. It ; relates many anecdotes of Jife with ~ the US Cavalry during the Indian ,? fighting after the Civil War. Never an ~ unbiased Kletorian where her husband ~ is concerned, Mrs. Custer ia at her ~ best in describing post life on the ~ frontier. AN ADMINISTRATIVE NISTORY OF w 1B31HBB3.By Robarl L. Roshofk381 Pages. NstJenal Aeroasutiss and Space Adminlstrs. tion, Wasbingtmr,0. C., 1W6. $4.00. BY JOXN R. CAMESON ~ ; : :

The purpose of this volume is to \ provide a detailed study of the admin: istrativa framework of the National v : Aeronautics and Space Administra- ? i tion (NASA). Thus, the book traces the Jife of the NationsI Advieory Cornmitt= for Aeronautics, born in 1916, to it-s redesimmtion in 1958 as NASA. . The bulk o; the study is devot@d to the NASA years. Drawing upon legislative and internal hietory, Dr. Rosholt covers the con4Wte in the development of the US apace agency. The impost of external events and pressures is charted to place NASA decisions in proper parsptilve. Major deeuments, legisl~ tion, and positions are emnmericed to provide the flavor of the moment. Tbe relationships of NASA to other government agencies and te its own elements are scratinieed. The character that cash adminietraitor embodied in NASA is carefully brought to Jight. The book is WCJ1 documented and authoritative and sucewds admirably in its purpose. 10s

MlLk7ARYBOOKS FJ6N7JN6 UNOER THE SEA. Oy Captain Donald Maoin(yra.174 PaE6a.W. W. Norton G Co., Inc.,Maw Yorlrj 19S5. $4.95. BY LTC MA800 J. CAEACCIA, USA Captain Donald hfaeintyre retired from the Royal Navy in 1954 after having served aa a pilot of the Fleet Air Arm. Hie experience with submarines began in World War II when he wea an Eaoort Force Commander during the Battle of the Atlantic. In Fighting Under The Sea, the author introduces hie aubjad with a chapter which aketchee the pioneer efforte of early aubmarinere-to include the activity of an American, David Buehnell, who in 1776 constructed the tlret practical submarine to be employed ee a ship of war. The following chaptera are short storiee depicting the exploits of renowned submariners during the two World Wara. The accounts are vividly and objectively presented. A CORRUA7E0 HISTORY OF THE FAR EAST. CidrIa, Kores, Japan. By MarJa Pwrkabt.76 Pages. Charlas E. Mrttla Co,, Rutland, Vt., 1900.$7.50 paporbound. , BY LTC JOHN M. JENNINGS, USA A Correlated HietoW of the Far Eaet ie a chronological listing of eignitlcant evente concerning China, Kema, and Japan from before 8000 B.C. to A.D. 1964. The eventa are well documented by W mape. This book is a valuable reference tool to the student of Far East hietory, particularly one intimated in tracing the political, religious, and cultural evolution of these three countrien. However, Ita meager treatment of recent hlatory rrrakw it of marghal value. to n milltary histerimr who is Intmeeted in ewmta of more recent thnee. no
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SCIENCE ANO SURVIVAL BY Barry CaM monar. 150 Pagaa. 7FraVlkiirg Prass, IW New yo~ lW. $4,50. BY EWaENE H, MILLER Science and Survival aurveyO the revolution in science and technology that hae brought physical changee en an unprecedented scale, changea ths.t make pesaible a better life for mzo. kind, The author, an outstanding con. aervationist, believes that we are io real trouble, however, becauay of the gap between tbe rapid developments in the phyeicrd eciencee and the rek tively slow pace of the biological eel. ences. Thue, phyaiciate split the atom aod gave ue nuclear energy before the life scientist understood the etteet.nof fallout, and engineere developed the without internal combustion engine regard to air pollution. In eucceseive chaptere the author diecuseee poseible solutions, and th role of the scientist, the citizen, and the adminiettator in making value judgments that will preserve the bir. sphere for mankinda future. FOR CONSPICUOUS 6ALJ.AN7RY.Winnersd the Madal of Honor. By Donald E. .CoakA 85 Pager. C. S. Hammond & Co.,Maplew~ N. J., 1084. $S.50. BY COL GEQROE S. PAPPAe, USA

Mr. Cooke hue sek!cted 46 winnem of the Medal of Honor aa repreeenb tive of the more than 8,000 men WLM have earned the award. The actior which resulted in eeeh award ie d~ ecribed briefly, but effectively. By adding a very nhort narmtim of the origin of the MedaI of Hone! and the etlorte to maintain th{s awari for gaILantry above nnd beyond tbl call of duty, tbe author hns IIucseedd in providing s uneful rriferenre book UII* M
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iioWTO STAY AWE IN VIETNAM. Combat 3wsisci irrtJre Warofklcny Fmnta. ify tniorral RobartB. Rim. 05 Pazaa. Tha Stack. ~ie Co.,Narriafmr&~sr.,lSf%. $1.95. By LTC JOSEPHM. COBVINO, USA Colonel Riggs formula for survival in Vietnam is a combhmtion of knowing the traite and tactics of your ensmy and of being constantly alert. In his words, the book is a profile of what to watch and watch out for in Vietnam. The words of advice are amplysupported and illustrated by acemmtsof actual actions and incidents in this strangest of wars in wh]ch a farmer with a hoe may turn out to he your enemy. liiE MiLiTARY iNTELLECTUAL.3 iN BRiTAiN 191&1939.By Robin Nigiram. 267 Pagas. Rutgers University Prass, Naw Brunswick, N.J.,1SSS.$7.50. BY MAJ NXVENJ. BAISO, USA Atilral Sir Herbert Richmond, 1. F. C. Fuller, B. H. Liddell Hart, andLord Hugh Trenchard, Marshal of the Royai Air Force. are all familiar names to those interested in the evolution of strategy. Their ideas, and the forms which influenced their thoughta, are amnmarised in this book. Of partbwlar interest are the authors impressions of ths conflict betw~n the cautioue, unimaginative thinking of the miiitary eetablishmen~ the pronouncements of the military inte$$ectuals, and the political leadership of the period which failed to provide adequate guidance or sufficient money for a satisfactory military force. Mr. Higham provides a thorough reference and concise summary of the writings of these men who played a Isrge part in the development of British strategy. lpil 1ss7

AN ARMY FOR TNE StXTiES. A study in NaticrtaiPolicy, Contract and OJliigation. By AntironyVarriar. 280 Pagaa.MartialSacker& Warbur& Ltd., London, Eng., 1SS0. $!W1. BY COL JULIAN P. FANE, BrWsh ArmI/ Tbe author draws attention te the lack of emphasis given by successive governments in the United Khgdom to the army as an element of national power. He demands a change in the mcial structure within the British Army and considers that sufficient smphesis ia not being given to profesaionaiism. Mr. Verrier arguea that the present British prdicy continues to be based on the fallacious notione of a global role. He recommends that the government face the realitiee of Britidns changed situation in the world today by tailoring the army to meet its primary defensive commitment in Europe, and its contribution to the United Nations in the maintenance of world peace. SPURS TO GLORY. Tha Story of tira Unitad Statas Cavairy. By Jamas M. Merriii. 302 Pages. Read McNaiiy & Co., Chicago, iii., 190s. $6.95. BY MAJ ROBEST R. DUNLAP, USA This volume traces the 110-year history of the horse cavalry with many excelient illustrations to help paint a colorful picture of each phase of those years. It covers the early Indian wars, the Civil War, the later Indian wars, the Spanieh-American War, and the last significant contribution by the horse cavalry-Oeneral John J. Pershings eearch for Pancho Villa. This epic of the United Stata cayelry ie told in a series of ehort stories woven about the eol~lers, oSicers, and their wives. 111