m ml Military Review

Professional Journal of the US Army

lNferiCaff Advisors Overseas IoodNeighbors in Uniform . . . . . . . . . Edward c. Stewart USA, Ref 3 10 19 23 31. 40 45 52 61 . . . If Col Harry F. Walferhouse,

Petroleum and Communist Cl!ina . . . . . . . . . . Jan s. Pryby/a RtdChiifas Military OoCtrirlL!. . Q. . . . . . . Ake Langley Hsleh

North Vietnam and the Sirro-Soviet Oispute

. . . . . . . King Chen

~Dtc~fftrO[DOCtrifZe.

. .

. .

. Maj John K. Stoner, Jr., USA

Philosophy of the Attack . . . . . . Maj Clinton E. Granger, Jr., USA IIOIifltMhfSUrgMICY in Bleeding Kansas . . . . . . . David c. Skaggs . . . . Leo Heimarr

Organized Looting . . . . . . . . . . . .
A MilitaryReview Special Reprint:

letter From Nankirrg

. . . . . .

Capt Ray Hrrang, Chinese Army

69 78 87 97 107

Nmihle Response . . ~ Gen af fhe Army Charles Ailleret, French Army Attractionsand Pitfalls of Military History . . . . . . . 6ricm Band Military Notes Militar yBook . . . . . . . . . . . . s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

[ TheM!lltary Reviewa publication of the UNITEDSTATES ARMY, provides aforumfor theexpressi0n ~ Of mihtary thoughtwithemphasison doctrineconcerning the dwisionand higherlevels of command. The, VIEWS expressedin this magazineARETHEAUTHORS and not necessarilythose of the ~S Army or the Command and GeneralStaff College.

Editor in Chief
Cot Domdd J. Delaneu

Assistant Editor
Lt Col Albert N. Garland

Features Editor Mffj Robert L. Burke Layout Editor

Ist Li Robert K. Lindgren

Acting SpanishAmerican Editor

Luis A. Monwrrate

Brazilian Editor
Lt Col J050 H. Faeci

Associate Editor
Lt Col Algin J. Hugkes Armg War College

Production Officer JSaj Norman C. Mur:afr Staff Artist

Chade8

A. Moore

MILITARY REVIEWPubhshed monthly by U. S. Arnw Command and General staff Colle&mFort Le.g. enworth, R...s,s, in Erwlbb, Spanish, .nd PortuaIew. Use of funds f m Drintmz of this p.bhc.tion h= beem .mmoved by Efe.dcwarters Dw.rtme.t of the Army, 8 JlY 1962. Sec.. d-c1.S. Dostwe Daid .t Fort Le., er.w.rtb, K..s-& S.bwipti.. ret,,: $350 i US mrsew) 8 , Year in the United states. United States m!kt .!3$ post offices. and th.., mm, t ries whi.b are m@nb@~.0 the P.n.Amermm Postal Union ( mcl.dins Spain): 34.50 . ye.. i .1! .tber cmmtries. Address s.b,c,~ t:.n m.il to tbe B..k Department, A IIIIY C.mmmd .d G,..,,I saff COII,=., FO,t Lm.mwofih. K.nsas 66n27. .

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AMERICANADVISORS OVERSEAS t
Edward C. Stewart
The tieaw expressed in this article are the aathors and are not necessarily those of the Department Department of of the Army, Defense, or t}w U. S. Army COmmand and General Staff Co[lege. Editor.

VER since the end of World War 11, American military officers have gone overseas in large numbers to give advice and training tothe militarY personnel of developing countries. The demands of these missions, in many ways subtle or Intangible, are quite exceptional. The khrdarf igtis

advisor, or trainer, is called upon to set aside his usual operational procedures as staff officer, or commander, and to work in a strange setting outside the miIitary organization to which he is accustomed. Not only is the military situation strange, but the human milieuthe psychological and social context in which he worksis also foreign and makes unexpected demands on the knowledge, patience, and practical wisdom of the advisor. His counterpart and coworkers speak a different language and have different customs and preferences-external differences 3

ADVISDRS which can be easily observed and described. Thair very obviousness, however, often obscuree more subtle differences in patterns of thought and modes of action, and in concepts about the world and experience, which affect the interaction of the advisor and his counterpart. These cultural factors, which make up the distinctive nonmaterial heritage of a national or ethnic groupthe cultural patternpresent obstacles to the procees of communication and cooperation overseas. The difficulty in communication and cross-cultural cooperation for US advisors overseas Iiee primarily in the disparity and conflict between the advieors own cultural pattern and that of hie foreign counterpart, and only secondarily in the strangeness of the foreign ways. It certainly appears that the cross-cultural performance of the US advisor would be enhanced if his area training included instruction on the US cultural pattern as well as on the foreign pattern. Cultural Awareness The need for the US advisor to understand his own cultural pattern, as weI[ as that of the hoet country, does not mean that his insight must be explicit and articulate. His cultural understanding may often be implicit, as when an advisor gears his actions to existing cultural differences, even though he is not necessarily able to describe the relevant aspects of either
Edward C. Stewart, a Researc~ Scientist with the Human Resources Research Ofice, George Washington University, holds a Ph. D. degree from the University of Texas. He served with the 84th Infantry Division in Europe during World War II. From 1956 to 1959 he waa Assistant Professor at Lehigh University.

his own or the foreign culture. In this circumstance, the advisOr perceives the cultural disparities at some intuitive level and acts accordingly, Direct Participation In other instances, although lacking cultural understanding, the advisor is successful through serendipity. A fortunate and accidental combination of cultural factors on one hand, and personality and behavior of the advisor on the other, may produce a result that would usually be expected only on the basis of cultural insight The average Americans facility in establishing social relationships frequently creates favorabIe circumstances for giving advice, especially when it is followed by the Americans willingness to work .yith those at the loweik levels of an organization or group. Thus, in non-Western countries, US officers are often more effective in working with the enlisted men than with the officers. Part of the reaaun for the success of the Americans rests with their greater willing nessin comparison to nOn-Western officers-to work with all ranks, even the loweet. Success through serendipity may take strange forms; the experienced advisor learns not to count on it, for unwitting failure is probably far more frequent than uuplanned sucee.w An exampie of this type of success was given by an Ecuadoran admini$ trator who supervised several Peace Corps volunteers in social welfare work. Because the volunteer did noi speak Spanish fluentIy on arrival, thej were forced to demonstrate rathel than to give lectures, working directl} with the Indians instead of super vising them. The actions of the volunteers influ enced their Ecuadoran counterparts t( Military RWiOr

ADVISORS workalong the same line. Although the Ecuadoran administrator recognized that demonstrate ion and direct participation are typical American methodsof instructing and influencing others, he pointed out that many Americans overeeas become like their Iesalcounterparts, giving lectures and remaining aloof. In this instance, he felt that the Peace Corps volunteers Lack of fluency in Spanish contributed, inpart, to their success. Cross.Cultural Incongruity Many problems of US advisors overseaecan be traced to the incongruities between American and foreign culmrsl patterns. When the US advisor ie confronted with unusual cultural patterns, his lack of familiarity with them may lead to misunderstanding andfriction. Americans, like members of any other culture, have their own cultural patterns which provide them with a comprehensive system of perceivingand understanding the world, andwith preferred modes of action. Whenever the individual finds the strangeness of life in a foreign country leading to uncertainty, be adopts hypotheses derived from his owncultural pattern to fit the new situation. Since these interpretations based on his own cultural pattern dominate, he is not likely to suspend judgment and action until he can fully understand the strange ways. Because his nwn ways seem to him normal and natural, he is likely to regard those of another culture as undesirable,,unnatural, or immoral. Consequently, the individuals own Pattern comes into conflict with that of the foreign cu]tre. Any contingency he may meet, no matter how strange, is ]ikely to lead to an interpretationaccording to his own pattern. since the cultural pattern itself ia not precisely articulated, the tentative hypotheses are likely to be imprecise. The individual will, accordingly, epawn a crude interpretation and thereby reduce the ambiguity pf cross-cultural differences. Examples of Incongruity The waye in which people act toward each other reveal many instances of cross-cultural incongruity, since each culture has pre. ferred standards which govern social interactions. ., American men, for instance, have well-marked norms of displacement in space in regard to other people. When sitting in an audience, an American man does not ordinarily lean against or touch persons sitting next to him, because the act carrie.+ emotional or sexual meaning. In conversation, he stands at least an arms length from the other person. If he comes closer, the distance is charged with significance. Thus, the intensity of a cocktail party, the intimacy of a small, crowded restaurant, and the camaraderie of people jamming a parade route, are all partly a result of the necessary proximity of the persons involved. The inexperienced American overseas may become very uncomfortable when he talke to an Arab or a Latin American whoee face is only a short distance from his own. Their proximity merely expresees a more persOnidized manner of interacting with other people; it is a custom, bowever, that is incompatible with American habits. Another practice that may chock the American when he first observes it is tbe custom in many parts of the worldin Vietnam, for instancefor men to hold hands as an expression of friendship. While the American knows that the practice bas no 5

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ADVISORS sexual significance for the Vietnamese, he cannot regard it with equanimity because his own cultural pattern gives him an interpretation of holding hands contrary to the Vietnamese meaning of the act. Both the Americans and the Vietnamese may well understand these different ways, yet each is likely to feel that his own way is the normal one. An aspect of interpersonal relations found in US culture, which contrasts with non-Western ways, is the depersonalized manner of dealing with and predictable ways of interactkg with other people, he is unprepared for the personal mode of social inter. action in other parts of the world. ID the Middle East, in southeast Asia, and in other areas of the world, the business dealings that take place over a purchase are seen as a person. alized way of doing business. The price of an article is not standardized, hut is subject to bargaining between the seller and the buyer. In non-Western countries, bargain. ing is a transaction between persons

m -. Am! Advisory duty makes unexpected demands on the knowledge, patience, and practicaj wisdom of the advisor other people. The American places a high value on equality, informality, and depersonalized business relations. He takes an objective approach to bis job, trying to remove his feelings from his work. Preferring standard 6 who, because they have about the same control over the situation, may be considered equals. Gift giving, especially a gift of money, is a pelsonalized way of conducting affairs in which reciprocity is incomplete Or Military Re?ieti

ADVISORS nonexistent. The person who received money may reciprOeate with his usual wvices, or he may not be expected 10 make any return at all. Personalization in unequal situationsbetween superiors and subordmstes-may be regarded as graft, or corruption, influence peddling, nepotismby the American. He tends :0react with moral indignation forgetting similar instances in his own romtry. His sense of outrage preventa hls recognizing that personalized superior-subordinate relationships are expected in many nor?-Western cul:wav.His anticipation that US money and material overseas will yield goods, wvices, or at least will not ge into wmeonespockets is not necessarily sharedby his counterpart. US mqney mgoods, or even the adyisors themselves, may mean to the counterparts a personalized gesture of good will fromthe US Government which does notr$quire an accounting. !reaof Application Various aspects of interpersonal rela.t]ons in US culture provide precedents for understanding graft in otherparts of the world. The tip, in someinstances, has functions similar tograft. The main difference between ihetwo is in the area of application. \$hereas for Americans the tip is wally confined to personal services green by nonprofessional persons, peoplein other parts of the world extend tbe same kind of personal masideration to most activities. This parallel between graft and the tip is not suggested to induce the Amer]can to regard graft as inevitable,but only to avoid reactions that wll subvert his own purposes. For Instance, he will anger many nOnWesterners if he reacts to graft with moral indignation, because they accept what Americans call graft as part of social existence. They feel it is something not to abolish but only to curb. When an American,reacts indignantly, as if graft can and should be eradicated, the non-Westerners may become angry, for they consider the American unrealistic and hypocritical. Finding the Right Concept The task of the US advisor is much easier if he can find a concept that is meaningful to him and that can be effectively translated into the language of his counterpart without causing confusion. Transferring concepts from one culture to another is more than the translation of words. Culture differences exist even when members of both cultures speak tbe same language, as in the case of Americans and the British, and require the same tact and understanding that is needed between the Americans and, say, the Chinese or Iranians. The conflict between different cul~,,ral patterns can be so subtle that may lead to misunderstandings :/ cult to ~rave, Because the > ritish and American cultures are very similar in most respects, no great difficulty arises in reducing the amount of discnrd between the two when translating the cultural items of one culture into the patterns of the other. When two cultures are very different, however, additional complications are introduced. The patterns of the twro differing cultures may not be parallel and hence may lack analogous focal points. Fortunately for the US military advisor, he is working in areas of activity for which his own culture offers clear parallels. In most military matters, the advisors activities can be considered as efforts to impose certain Weetern patterns of Organi-

ADVISORS zation and action upon a different culture environment. Quite often it may be possible for the advisor to translate US concepts into familiar terms dealing with generalized ideas or acts and thereby produce the desired results. Some time ago in Laos, a US military advisor attempted to motivate Lao soldiers by describing the squad, platoon, and company in terms of the family. This officer apparently recognized that the Lao might not have a national identification, that he could not readily identify himself with the army, and that he might not be motivated by a spirit of competition. The officer took advantage of the Lao soldiers attachments to their own large and extended families to supply the motivation which, with the American, is usually derived from competition, personal rewards, and satisfactions. Basic Differences In each cu Itu rsl pattern, experiences are organized by means of certain concepts. Western European and US cultures, for instance, employ a subject-predicate relationship, clearly separating the agent both from his actions and the context in which they occur. These cultural focal points allow for the development of separate abstractions such as the individual, his feelings, and various kinds of activities in which he may engage. Practically speaking, in ~he case of the military profession, the American can readily separate tactical and logistical problems and consider each problem by itself. An even more fundamental distinction can be made between military and political or social problems in a war like that being fought in Vietnam. The Chinese, however, do not have 8 clear parallels for such abstractions. They do not recognize the subject. predicate relationship, and do not clearly distinguish between the indi. vidual and his thoughte and feelings, the individual and h]s actions, and the context in which these occur. The Chinese mind is concrete and he is situation-centered to a degree unb~. lievable to the Westerner. He does not derive laws and principles that presumably govern events in the way that the Westerner does. In the writings of Mao Tse-tung we read that the laws of war are different according to the character of the war, its time, ita place, and the nation. Misunderstandings Perhaps it is the Chinese trait of concrete thinking that induced one American writer to state that Maos: . . . theory has universal applic~ bility only in its repeated warnings
that everg situat{on must be consid. ered in the frame of its historic development and geographic setting.

Even though a word may be found to translate a concept from one cultural pattern to another, there is no assurance that an accurate and viable concept has been chosen in the second pattern that is equivalent to the original one. When two cultures are not parallel in their focal points, misunderstandings can occur and inaccuracies can be perpetrated by the application of familiar concepts in a foreign environment. Americans and other Westerners have taken political and social concepts such as nationalism, militarism, and the demo. cratic svstem of elections, which are native t; Western countries, and have attempted to apply them to the underdeveloped countries where they have different meanings. The procees of translating these wiitsry rwiw

ADVISORS deas from one language to another s likely to fail of the desired intent. h an example, the Lao do not constitute a pOlitical entity in the sense hat the Americans or Frenchmen do. rheLao villager, who Identifies solely sith his family and village, does not mvethe sense of being a national of is country in the same way as the Americanor the Englishman. In regard to militarism, an ot%cer 10a Middle Eastern country is likely :0 represent the conservative feudal demeritof the society with an outlook md manner of life typical of his class. Elsewhere, as in Brazil, the nditary officer often represents the liberalintellectual whose a&itude and position in his own society resemble that of militarists in other countries onlyin the uniform that others wear. Finally, an election in manY non\\~esterncultures is more like a festival and celebration than a political campaign. hriou~Obstacles Cross-cultural incongruities present serious obstacles to the US advisor, becausehe may not have the principles and concepts readily available that ui]lhelp him understand his situation. tIe may become puzzled and confused ]f he does not recognize the cultural disparities; more likely, since his own cakural pattern provides him with possibleinterpretation?, he will derive erroneousconclusions about the mean. mg of the situation. Advisors in Laos, when faced with tbetactics of their Lao eommanders whichthey call a game of tagsusPectedthe Lao officers of cowardice and, in some cases, of co]lusion with tbePa[//et .&so. They apparently were notaware that one pattern of warfare in that part of the world is, in the American view, a matter of bluster, evasion, and tleception, and hence such tactics do not necessarily represent cowardice or collusion. Although the misunderstandings that can occur are many and varied, the instructor in area training who prepares advisory personnel for overseas work does not face an impossible task in giving advice and training. Interviews with advisors who have been overseas serving in various countries show certain similarities in the problems and difficulties that they regularly meet. The US cultural pattern, shared by all US advisors, provides one constant factor among all the competition and friction that develop between the American and the foreign ways. And although the widely separated countries to which Americans are sent each possess unique characteristics, they often differ from the American or Western culture in the same directions. The primary objectives of the area trainer should not be limited to coping with information about the many dilferent countries to which military personnel may be assigned. Rather, he should concentrate upon the development of concepts and principles that will help the student first to understand his own cultural pattern and then be able to translate it satisfactorily into the patterns of any country to which he may be assigned. Sometimes the necessary interpretations can be carried out at a superficial level, but when the differences between the cultures are profound, the tactics of finding a common ground may be beyond the scope of commonsense concepts. It may require psychological or social analysis to discover the means for transforming the understanding of one cultural pattern into effective performance in another.

Lieutenant Colonel Harry F. Waterhouse,

United States

Army, Refired

UCH of the euphoria which surrounded the inaugural of the Alliance for Progress in the summer of 1961 has dissipated. Although the first three years of the 10-yerw economic blueprint for Latin America has achieved a measure of progress, 10

ite successes have been only relative. Neither the United States, architect of the program, nor her beneficiaries are satisfied with the accomplishments to date. All concerned are beginning to appreciate that revolut ionsocial, economic, or militaryrepresents no

ReVi! Military

GOOD NEIGHBORS lore than an accelerated facet of evo]otion. In fact, revoluti~n of itself Oftenis regressive. In terms of a homely analogy, the Alliancefor Progress may be likened IO a cart in danger of becoming stuck mthe mud. Tbe carts horses representan unworkable tandem of status quo and revolutionary zeal. The sticky amd is a Mend of compounds, some oldand some new. There is, for instance, the stultifying heritage of Spanishcolonialism; there is the more contemporary clamor of impoverished mdlions who seek a more equitable share in the patrimony of the 20th century. fiood Neighborliness A number of willing volunteers are pushing the cart ahead elowly. They represent both forces of internal reformand external assistance, not the least of which among the latter are thepersonnel of the US Armed Forces assisting in civic action operations. In essence, the Alliance for Progressrepresents a cont~mporary manifestation of what often has been characterized as the Good Neighbor Policy.Generally, this concept of hemispheric good neighborliness is identified with former President Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Certainly, he ras nne of its most ardent exponents, and during his administration, as a
Lieutenant Colonel Harry F. Waterhouse, United States Army, Retired, obtained an M. A. degree from the bniuersity of South Carolina subsequent to his retirement and is now tcith the cocoa Beach, FlO~ida, High School. He served in Japan as a mili. [!Z?Y government oficer du~ing Worfd Ivar II, has held intelligence assigrarnents in the Far East Command and in Korea, and was Director of the Civil Affairs Combat Development &rencg at Fort Gordon.

notable US uolicy. the Good Neighbor Policy took shape and marked ~ new departure in our foreign relations. But neither the thought nor the terminology was original with President Franklin Roosevelt. Buena Vewas a cindad (good neighborliness) common political cliche in the 19th century diplomatic correspondence of the Republics. Elihu Root possibly was the first North American to use the phras+he chose the words in 1907 to describe the attitude of the United States toward Santo Domingo. The late President Herbert Hoover during his goodwill tour in 1928 advocated the sentiment and employed the good neighbor expression in a number of his addresses. US Interest The United States has maintained a friendly interest in the Latin-American Republics from the inception of their independence. True enough, there have been times when relationships have been strained over such matters as manifest destiny and dollar diplomacy. Neighborliness in spirit never is easy among disparate peoples. Originally, mutual benefit gave rise to good neighborliness. The same mutual benefit motivated the Alliance for Progress:. Reciprocal interest continues to inspire cooperation and coordination among countries whose cultural and political heritages tend to separate. From its colonial beginnings the stamp of a predominantly Anglo-Saxon origin has shaped the North American way of life in spite of an amalgam of differing races and cultures. It was not strange that the political and economic intercourse of the United States found stronger gravitational pulls toward Europe than to the South where other new 11

Mmary 1965

MOD NEIGHBORS nations with different roots were achievjrrg independence. In a per[od when the politically stable United States was creating a cohesive and viable economic community, Latin America fragmented into a score of republics whose leaders engaged in chronic conflict for position. Governments fell with alarming frequency and usually without benefit of franchise. Democratic constitutions were ignored or were rewritten. Political or trade agreements made with Latin-American administrations frequent~y were abrogated in the chaotic transition of authority. Rich natural resources were developed slowly, usuaIly with foreign capital and foreign enterprise. Since foreign investors portunists alike took strong exception to the dichotomy between raw abun. dance, exploited by foreign cspita] and the domestic elite, and the desti. tution of the majority. They argued that natural wealth belonged to the nation and the betterment of all its people. Their arguments and their expropriations ran counter to equally logical rebuttai from risktakers. The capital and technical skills of the latter were invited to develop projects which countries either were unable or unwilling to undertake themselves, Entrepreneurs pa!d taxes and reh. tively good wages. They expected legal protection. Expropriation and pdit. ical instability y provoked intervention. In 1903 the United States secured canal rights in Panama after inter-

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Military civic action air ambulance operated by the Guatemala emphasized the procurement of produce and raw materials which were complementary to their domestic economies and which promised a return upon investments, industrialization throughout Latin America lagged. Dedicated patriots and political op12

vening to prevent Colombia from put. ting down a Panamanian revolution. In 1906 US troops made the first of a series of Platt Amendment incursions into Cuba. In 1909 Mmines landed in Nicaragua to restore order: they returned in 1912, remained for Military Review

GOOO NEIGHBORS H years, and departed only to come I]ck again in 13 months. Between I$10 and 1930 Marines occupied Honiwas On a number of occasions. In 1914 the United States seized hracruz, and two years later, in 1916, General John J. Pershing took a mili[aryforce hundreds of kilometers into !lexiw in search of Pancho Villa. In concentric waves of anger and fear throughout South America. Thirty years after the last occupation troops had departed from Latin America the waves have subsided. The evidence of their erosion, however, is still plainly apparent. In the early 1900s, US troops represented the element of force in inter-

US A{,

l?.,,.

The beginning of the Santa Rosa Canal civic action project in Ecuador 1915 the Marines went into Haiti, and In1916 they moved into the Domini!anRepublic. The Iast of the US occupational units left Latin-American ,nilwhen the Marines quit Haiti in 1934. Proximity probably was the major [actor behind the record of intercessionin the Caribbean countries. Yeverthe]e~s,US activities in the Carlhbean,arguments and counterargunents over justification aside, set off khuary 1965 ventionism. Today, though, in one of those intriguing quirks of history, members of tbe US Armed Forces on Latin-American territory epitomize good neighborliness and constitute one of the strongest links in hemispheric solidarity. The neighborly in. vasion has come about gradnally. Around the turn of the century the Latin-American armed forces began to professionalize, at first drawing almost exclusively upon Europe for ad13

600D NEIGHBORS visors to assist in revamping their organizations. World War I opened Latin Americas doors to a sizable number of US military representatives. Some of those repreeentatives, particularly navaI persmmel, stayed on after the war. Since the end of World War H, US military personnel have enjoyed a virtual monopoly in advisory functions. Today, US military advisory groups or missions, including 15 from the Army, operate in 17 of the 20 republics. In two of the three exceptions, Cuba and Haiti, their absence patently is poIiticaI. The US military advieory organization in Latin America is numerically modest. From the first, advisors were utilized in conventional training capacities concerned with tactics, techniques, and uee of equipment, much of which is of US manufacture. Those functions still characterize advisory operations. Now, however, the emphasis is shifting etrongly toward considerations of economic uplift and social reform. Concurrently with tbe inauguration of the Alliance for Progress, the US Department of Defense began a comprehensive military civic action program in Latin America. Initially, the two assistance schemes were, perhaps, coincidental, but the fact that they had common objective quickly became obvioue. Civic Action In point of fact, the first civic action projectso designatedactually predated the Alliance for Progress by a few months. The initial US Army civic action team went to Guatemala in November 1960, at a time when the concept of civic action generally was meeting somewhat grudging acceptance within the US Armed Forcee. Although earlier civic action operations in southeast Asia had met 14 with some success, a joint Department of Defense-State-InternationaI CoOp. eration Administration query in 1960 elicited only, two requests for civic action teams from Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAGs ) or missions. One of these had come from Guatemala. Experienced Leaders Credit far the atlirmative response from Guatemala can be linked clearly with the personalities and past expe. riences of two menthe Guatemala President and the American Ambmsador. The then President, Miguel Ydigorae Fuentes, had been an army general. He also at one time bad been the Director General of Roads. over. all, his administration was marked by controversy beyond the scope of this article. It can be said, though, that he was depoeed in a bloodless coup in March 1963 and ~hat he was reform minded. The US Ambassador at the time was John J. Muccio. He earlier had been the firet American representative to the Korean Government, a position he held at the time of the North Korean invasion. In Korea Mr. Muccio had been able to observe the good work of the Armed Forces Assistance in Korea program in assisting that war-ravaged country. Too, he had had an excellent opportunity to observe that troops could rebuild what they earlier had destroyed. The able Ambassador was not likely to overlook any preventive meaeures aimed at a POSS ible Communist takeover in Guatemala, where in 1954 a Communist-controlled dictatorship had been overthrown. Civic action caught on magically in Guatemala. A staff planning organi. zation wae set up on the national defense level. Troops built roads Military Ravim

6(IODNEIGHBORS bridges, and public buildings; they developed water syetems, undertook public health projecte, and operated adult education centers. Plane for the second year of operation envisaged an ambitioue development program for a virgin jungle area, a scheme vhich included exploiting timber and chicle resourcee and planting nut and citrus groves and cereal grain Bcreage for commercial production. Furthermore, Guatemala officere be-

. . . the task of our armies is ex, tremely dij$icult. They have a greater political responsibility which YOU no longer can ig-nore, because there are conditions in some communities of our countries which, if they are not im. proved, will bring em to disaster. . . . If we wish to attack these miserable condition in the same wag we would attack a combat objective, we can make uee of the practical weapon of civic action to atta{n bread, literacg,

Pm Anwr,can L7n<on

Harvesting rice inEl Salvador csme ardent missionaries for the principlee and precepts of civic action a.mongtheir Latin-American military peers. At the third conference of the Armies of America in July 1962, Maj~r F. Abundio Maldonado, a Guatemalan representative, told the conferees:
Mwaiy 1965 and housing. We, gentlemen, possess the means to retain our sacred freedom because the bases of our strength come from precepte of reason and law and not merely polit{cal part~ props. ganda. We must devote ourselves to the acute problems of OUT villagee with goodwill, with faith in God, and -above allwith courage, using the

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6000 NEIGHBORS t fair and cow~ansfntw

.,. itary civic action. weapon of mil-

Burst of Inter?st Guatemalas program stimulated a burst of interest among other LatinAmerican Republics, especially in Central America. In 1962 the Central American countries formed their own civic action association. A year later, at a meeting of tbe association in El Salvador, representatives adopted a civic action seal which bore, besides Civic Action, the words Security and Progress and facsimile flags of member states. At about the same time, military civic action became an important adjunct of US foreign policy in Latin America. The late President John F, Kennedy told Latin-American diplomatic representatives at a March 1961 meeting in the White House: The new generation of military leaders have shown an increasing awareness that armies cannot only defend their countriesthey can help build them. Four months later his Army Chief of Staff, General George H. Decker, linked civic action directly with the Alliance for Progress in an address before the Inter-American Army Conference in Panama. General Decker noted the proud record of nationbnilding activities in which each army represented at the meeting had en. gaged. The same type of operations, he pointed otit, would contribute to national progress and serve to confound Communiet propaganda. Tbe role the US Army was expected to take in motivating and underwriting national civic action programs was spelled out clearly at the annual meeting of the Aseociatirm of the US Army in October 1962. Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara, Secre16

tary of the Army Cyrus R. Vance, Chief of Staff General Earle G. Whee~ er, and most of the major Command. ers who attended the meeting indi. cated strongly that civic action could make a substantial contribution to. ward progrese in underdeveloped countries. Lieutenant General AndreIy P. OMeara, Cemmander in Chief, Ca~ibbean, tild strike a cautious note at the meeting with respect to ~on. gressional skepticism over the man. ner in which Latin-American ~rmie~ often become embroiled in politics. Nevertheless, he maintained that these same armies had the capab6ities to make the A1liance for Progress an effective program. Joint Programing It was in a Latin-American courltry, incidentally, where Department of Defense Military Assistance Pro. gram (MAP ) money and Agency fir International Development (AID) funds were used for the first time in support of common programs. ID January 1962 a US Army civic action team went to Ecuador. The five officers making up the team developed a comprehensive plan which the Ecus. doran Defense Minister liked but which he held his country could not afford. Secretary McNamara took personal action to see the plan implemented and authorized the expenditure of 1.5 million dollars in MAP funds. He also secured an additional half-million-dollar allocation from AID. The authority for joint programing of this nature had been incorporated in a National Security Memorandum promulgated by President Kennedy at the end of 1961. US civic action operations in Latin America at first were mounted by teams recruited from the Army Civil Affairs School, the 95th Civil Affairs

Military Itwim

GOOD NEIGNBORS Group, and technical ~er~ce specialists generalIY. When six Reservg civil affairs units came on active duty in the summer Of 1961 as part of the Berlin crisis buildup, a rich new source Of personnel temporarily becameavailabIe. On a more sustaining basis, the 3d Civil Affairs Detachment, Army Forces Southern Command,was organized in April 1963 as partof the Armys counterinsurgency force. Projects In the first year of its operations, the 3d engaged in civic action projectsin 11 of tbe Repnblica. Engineers, medical, and veterinary officers, agrooomiata, educators, economists, and expertsin various other socioeconomic spheresmade up the organization, fmd assignments generally consisted of team operations with team-member trength and skills and length of employment varying with the scope of the miksion. Following the preeedent set in Ec,!ador,plans drawn up by the teams recenredfinancial support botb from AID and Department of Defense IMP funds. Furthermore, civic action specialists today augment a number of IIAAGs and missions to coordinate nith national army CounterParts in carrying out programed projects and to r$commend new ones. Latin America is in a state of social and economic. ferment. Even though most of the military forces beganto avoid political meddling early ,n the century, they have not been able to stand entirely clear of the ttrf)ulece ae~ociated ~,ith the indu~rialand social revolution taking place m their countries. Urbanization, inkatrialization, soaring populations, mdthe emergence of a politically VOIMe labor and middleclass group have contrived to disturb the security of the traditional elite. Powerful new forces seek progress and change, but neither the old nor the new orders appear always to recognize the essen. tiality of political stability for programs of national advancement. To a degree, Latin Americas military forces have always engaged in nationbuilding activities. In many respeets, their efforte have heen somewhat similar to activities undertaken by the US Army in pioneering the West. Now, new and challenging operational opportunities lie ahead for these military forces. There are virgin jungles to colonize and rich natnral resources to develop. There are communication and transportation networks to build. Most important of all, there are people to educatein baeic literacy, in tbe skills of modern technology, and in the attitudes of change. Special Assets These tasks by no means represent the primary military responsibility. 13ut military forces can complement civilian efforts with some undeniable special aesets. They possess leadership, techniques of management, disciplined manpower, and technical skills. They can operate in primitive environments, and they can impose order where unrest threatens. Unquestionably, military operations in constructive fields can be broadened and facilitated. US advisory personnel have assisted considerably in recent years; these advisors could make an even greater contribution. More than good neighborliness, important as that may be, suggests they should. The United States and the rest of the Free World retain a vested interest in a politically stable Latin America. Frustration, hardships, and uncertainties spawned by 17

6000 tiElGH60Rs poverty and disorder provide a milieu which benefits only the Communists. The imposition of a Communist re. gime in any of the Latin-American States poses distinct poiitical and security hazards for the United States as well as the other Republics. Intervention at best would create an unpopular image of Yangrd imperialism; at worst it could Iead to escalating Communist pressures elsewhere. On the other hand, Communist basee in Latin America, such as in Cuba, ex. port hate and subversion. Their continued existence threatens neighbors, the security of the Panama Canal, a~ sources of strategic materials vita] tO the United States. Prevention offers the surest means of solving this prob. lem, and one of the better preventives is military civic action as a contribu. tion to nationbuilding. Good neighbors in uniform can go a long way toward contributing to some of the as yet unfilled objectives of the Alliance for Progress. They may well shove the cart out of the slough which restrains its progress,

There is no quick, easy, cheap way to success. The road is long and our task will require courage, steady nerves, and sacrifice by all the peoples of the hemisphere.
Assistant

Secretary of State Thomas C. Mann (Inter-A mericarr Affairs)

18

; Petroleum -. .} nist
Prybyla

{no: f,/
( , ..,

,
ETROLEUM and its products are today not only the foundation ~ modern industry and, hence, of a regressive economy, but also of the nilitm-ymight of nations. The Comnmist countries interest ip economic rowth is matched only by their preoccupationwith military strength. In ecent years, they have put mnch tress on the rapid expansion of indignous petroleum production, domestic .Mning,and the rapid transportation ,fcrude oil hy underground pipelines Yomthe producing to the deficiency Ireas and to strategic ports within he Communist world. Communist China, who arrived Iate m the scene of Communist economic construction, was quick to recognize [he tremendous importance of the Petroleum industry and of the ~Pparently limitless possibilities ofMuary1965

fered by her vast, untapped petroleum potential.* As early as 1953 probable crude oil reserves within. the boundaries of Mainland China were put at approximately 20 billion barrels, while ultimate reserves were considered to have been virtually unlimited. Although in the absence of thorough geological surveye these estimates were no more than rough guesses, they did indicate the order nf magnitude of the vast Chinese petroleum potential. Chinas seven main sedimentary basins favorable for oil have an area of over 2.3 million square kilometers. The largest of thew+--the Tarim and Dzungarian Basins in the SinkiangUighur Autonomous Regionare located far from the populous coastal
The kvm Chh. 3, used th mwhout the remainder of this article to refer to Communist chum-the Peoples Republic of Chins.

19

PETROLEUM . areas, near the Soviet and Outer Mongolian borders. Lands in these basins lack water, suffer from periodic and are even today sandstorms, accessible only with great difficulty, considering the backward state of Chinas roads and rail communications. The unfavorable natural and capital factors, rather than any lack of drive or ambition, have so far been responsible for tbe relatively slow pace of development in these and other remote petroleum-bearing rsgions and for Chinas continued heavy reliance on coal as the source of primary energy. Production and Exploration Even so, the Chinese record in petroleum production and exploration since 1950 has been far from negligible. In 1950 there were only 17 exploratory parties in the field; seven years later 246 parties were reported. In the course of the First Five-Year PIan (1953-57), the Chinese claimed to have explored about 290,000 square kilometers of territory and to have located 11 crude oil deposits. After 1957 statistics on exploration and footage drilled became ecarce and increasingly unreliable, and it would appear that the pace and scope of exploration were stepped up during the Second Five-Year Plan and the Great Leap Forward (1958-62). It was during this latter period that the moqt important discovery in Chinas petroleum history was made Jan S. Prybyla is Associate Pvafessor of Economics at the Pennsylvania State University. He has carried out extensive research on Communist bloc oil resources and has published numerous studies on the economics of communism. For I?ve years, Dr. Pr#byla was associated with the Free Europe University in Exile in France. 20 in Szechwan in a 480-Kilometer radius around the city of Nanchung. Wkh Soviet help, modern electric and radio. active well-logging methods were introduced on a fairly large scale in the midfifties. BY the early sixties, the Chinese claimed a total of 32 crude oil depositsmost of which had been located after 1957. This exploratory activity has resulted in an increase in total crude oil production and a rise in the propor. tion of natural crude oil in the totai, From 200,000 metric tons in 1950, output climbed to about 5.3 million tons in 1961, and was expected to reach nearly 12 million tons in 1965, The proportion of synthetic oil in the total, which was about 55 percent in 1952, declined to less than 35 percent in 1958, and this trend has almost certainly continued since. Thermal refining of oil shale and, to a much lesser extent, coal are the two sources of Chinas synthetic crude oil. This activity centers on Manchuria, especially at the Fushun plant and at a newer installation in the Kwantung Province of southern China. Increase in Oemand One of the immediately trouble. some effects of Chinas Great Leap Forward was the sharp increase in the demand for petroleum. On the eve of the leap, in 1957, annual petro. Ieum consumption was just over tbre? million metric tons; it rose to about eight million tons in 1960. Sine! domestic output in 1960 was only fiv~ million tonsin spite, and, in part because of the installation of score: of small, inefficient, backyard syn thetic petroleum plantsthe thre( million tons annual deficit had to b( met from imports at tbe tires thal relations with the main supplier, th~ Militsry, Reci!~

iPETROLEUM Soviet Union, were at an unprecedented IOW. Moreover, Chinas refining capacitymost of it installed with Soviet material and technical ai# was capable of handling only the domestic output, leaving a net import requirement for producte+specially gasolin~f approximately three million tons annually. steel production Given Chinas levels and, as yet, still modest technological know-how, this import dependence was likely to increase in the foreseeable future on the assumption that the amhftioue Chinese industrial and military buildup plane were realistic. If, in their dispute with the Chinese, the Soviets could have prevented their adversary from securing new sources of refined petroleum through diplomatic overtures and trade offers they would have had in their hands a political card more convmemg and infinitely more reliable thamthe shaky Khrushchevian version of tbe doctrine according to Marx. The Chinese leadership was not slow in perceiving this danger, aid much of the history of Chinese diplomacy since 1960 is witness to Pekings determination to outmaneuver the strnngest of Soviet movesthe everpresent threat of petroleum blackmail. Although the facts of the case are not quite clear, tbe Soviets did reportedly suspend deliveries of gasoline and jet fuel to China during the Sine-Indian border conflict. UnrelatedEvents Fortunately for the Chinese, the impact of the rapid decline in Soviet sales of gasoline and other products to China after 1960 and the effects of the brusque withdrawal of Soviet technical advisors from China in mid1960were cushioned by two unrelated events: the loosening of discipline kbmary1965 within the Soviet bloc and the discord in the Western alliance. Rebel Albania, while willing to come to the aid of her Chinese protector, was not of much help because of the relatively low grade of her petroleum and a limited refining capacity which was short of Soviet-made desperately spare parts. Tbe Albanians did, however, send quantities of dense, asphaltbased crude and some residual fuel oil, but the transactions were mainly political and symbolic in nature and exerted a strain on Chinas modest oceangoing tanker fleet. Romanias Role The role of Romania was and continues to he much more curious. For some years the Romanians have been chafing under the constraints imposed upon them by the Soviet-sponsored .. Council of Mutual Economic Aid ( COMECON ) and have eyed with suspicion and resentment Soviet incursions, via the friendship pipeline, into Rbmanias petroleum markets in Eastern Europe. At the ti:ne that Sine-Soviet trade pIummeted to virtually rockbottom, the Romanians were signing trade and payments protocols with China that envisaged (for 1963) increases in trade of up to 10 percent over tbe previous year. In November 196S the Romanians sent a trade delegation to Peking as a followup on the agreement eigned earlier in the year. The delegation included a number of oil. experts whoee task apparently wae to supervise those sections of tbe agreement relating to Romanian sales of petroleum products and refinery equipment. The Hungarians, too, have not been idle. In March 1964 they concluded a trade agreement with Peking which, among other things, envisaged Hungarian exporte to China of steel tubes, 21

PETROLEUM diesel locomotives, and machinery accessoriesall. important items for Chinas badly pressed refining and petroleum transportation industries. In the meantime, Sine-Soviet trade talks for 1964 were, according to all indications, hopeIesely bogged down. Chinae main hope of eecaping the Soviet petroleum grip lice, however, in another direction. Shortly after Premier Chou En-laia African safari, a delegation of Chinese oil experte visited the AIgerian capital. Their purpose was allegedly to secure four million tons of Saharan oil annually a plan made realiatic by Algerias cordial relations with Peking, the establishment of diplomatic representation in France (which could facilitate triangular payments arrangements ), and, over the long run, the withdrawal of French companies from their Saharan concessions. A Chinese petroleum and natural gas production and treatment delegation spent four weeks in France early in 1964 negotiating bids for the construction of ~ three-million-tons-per-year refinery in China by a consortium of French companies led by the Compagnie
Frar@se dEtudes tiorz. The delegation et de Constrwc.

subsequently vis-

ited England. It is clear that, over tbe long stretch, production and refining equip. ment and know-how, rather than oil imports, are the answer to Chinas petroleum problem. Imports of oil refinery process pumps of various types from England, piping for oil and natural gas pipelines and anto. mation equipment from France, and contracts for the constriction of a five. million-dollar refinery in Manchuria by an Italian enterprise all point to the fact that the Chinese leadership has fully understood this trend. They also indicate that the leaders look beyond the present products shortage problem to the time when China may interest Japan and other oil deJficit countries with offers of surplus products.

22

Military Ilevien

RED CHINAS MILITARY DOCTRINE

Alice Langley Hsieh

HE image of a reckless, bellicose Communist China which emerged during the Sine-Soviet dispute contrasts neatly in Soviet propaganda with the portrait of a Soviet Union dedicated to peace. Chinas military policies, however, have been very cautious and reflect a realistic assessment of the military situation and a careful calculation of risks. Since 1953 Chinese doctrine has been influenced by Soviet doctrine on modern warfare and by difficulties fthmary 1965 23

MILITARY DOCTRiNE engendered by the dispute between Peking and Meacow. The doctrine has also been influenced by military thinking in the United States, and it has been stimulated by the deployment of US forces in the western Pacific and hy the military balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. It reflects Pekings military weakness and the economic underdevelopment of the mainland. Evidence that the Chinese recognize the key military implications of nuclear weapons is provided in the 29 issues of the secret Krmg-tso Tunghsurr (Bulletin of Activities) of the General Political Department of the Peoples Liberation Army. These BrrUetirrs were recently released by the US Government and cover the months January into August 1961. The material in these issues produces UOsensational or dramatic revelations about Chineee military doctrine or strategy which were not
This article was digested from the original, publckhed in THE CHINA QUARTERLY (Great Britain) April-June 1964, under the title, Chinas Secret Military Papers: Military Doctrine and Strategy. The autkor is a staff member of the Social Science Depai_tment of the RAND Corporation, s?Jecializing in Chinas external political and military yroticies. Red China and Her article, in the Nuclear War, appeared February 1961 issue of the fvflL-

previously available to the careful reader of Chinese military literature. It does, however, offer a few new insights into the thinking of Chinas military leaders. It also establishes a nseful yardstick for future developments in doctrine, particularly as China progressively moves toward the acquisition of a nuclear delivery capa. bility. Chinese military doctrine, as revealed in the 1961 issues of the Bulletin, takes into account several types of war: surprise strategic air attack with nuclear weapons against the Chinese mainland; invasion of the mainland by ground forces armed with conventional weapons; chemical or bacteriological warfare, both strategic and tactical; and lower level conflicts such as local wars in contig. uous areas. Outbreak of War A[though the Chinese do not sesm to regard war as very likely, they apparently believe that, if war should occur, it might well take the form of a surprise nuclear attack against the mainland. Chinese officers, like most military men, place a high valne on the element of surprise and expect an enemy to do the same. Chinas military leaders appear to be particularly aware of the danger of surprise attack. They propose to meet this danger by the improvement of their air defenses and by tbe dispersal, hardening, and camouflage of military installations and military industrial sites. They expect a surprise attack to take the form of a bolt from the blue. There are no references to strategic warning or to the possibility of a surprise attack developing from a crisis situation. There is a suggestion, however, that they recognize tbe POs Military Rwim

; t 1

( 11 Y

o a m ar

1 11

ITARYREVIEW.
Sketch of Marshal Yeh Chierr-

ping is from the authors book, Communist Chinas Strategy in the Nuclear Era. @ 1962. Reywoduced by permission of PrenticeHall, Inc., Engfewood Jersey. Cliffs, New

MILITARY DOCTRINE sibility that limited politico-military activities or a 10caI conflict may escaMe into a larger war, particularly if the United States chose to intervene. TIM Image of Future Wars In a speech to a Military Affairs Committee conference on training in lateJanuary 1961, Marshal Yeh Chien. ying, the leading military spokesman of the party, admitted, in effect, that a strategic air attack could be enormously destructive to urban, military, and economic targets. The significance of the initial phase of the war was likewise recognized by Yang Cheng-wuwhen, in discussing vulnerabilities in command control, he pointed out that the effectiveness of our defense against a surprise enemy attack is the key to how effective we mll be in the next phase. Yet Chinese mi~itary doctrine also presupposes the possibility of a protracted war on Chinas soil, requiring large+ conventional ground forces. It insists that nuclear weapons cannot be the means of achieving victory against a country with a large territory and population. Victory is said to require an army, regular weapons, andoccupation. It is further asserted that the United States must rely on nuclear weapons rather than manpower to win a victory over China and the Soviet Union. But, because nuclear weapons alone cannot defeat China, the United States must contemplate the use ofbiological warfare. In brief, the Chinese envisage a protracted war, in which the enemys position is weakened by time and space, but tacitly recognize that this strategy is vulnerable to chemical and bacteriological weapons. It is likely that Chinese concern shout the possibility of chemical and bacteriological war stems from their belief that Chinaa advantages in and manpower territory impose important obstacles to any invaaion attempt based on the use of nuclear or conventional weapons. That this fear is real is evidenced by training programs which mention the use of chemical and bacterial weapons, but emphasize training in defense against these weapons. Chinese Capabilities & to the position of the Chinese in the event of war, Marshal Yeh readily admitted that: In accordance with our situation, if
there is a war within three to jive years, we will have to rel~ on hand weapons. . . . The enem~ is stronger than we are in a distant war, bnt short distance fighting, and especially jace to face fighting, is where our strength lies. We have to avoid the strengths and take advantage of the weaknesses of our enemy. In face to face fighfing fhere can only be used hand grenades, bayonets, or jlarnethrowers. We havq to use close fighting, nigh f fighting, or trench warfare todefeaf fhe enemy. . . . In the eventof war wifhin fhe next few ~ears zce can defeat the enemy we by using close combat although have no special xeapons.

Although Yeh insisted that China needed to walk on two legs, his statement may well have reflected a rough estimate of the time within which the Chinese expected to detonate a nuclear device and, perhaps, acquire a few nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, the Chinese had little alternative but to emphasize the role of their conventional forces, particularly their ground forcee, in frustrating an enemy invaeion ar in defeating the enemy in limited war. Yeh also admitted Chinas lack of
25

Mmary 1965

MILITARY DOCTRINE nuclear weapons and the superiority of the United States in advanced weapons and in distant war, In April 1961 he emphasized the need to understand our own situation as well as our enemys and insisted on the need to take measures to survive nuclear attack. This underlined the continuing weakness of Chinas armed forces, the caution that dominated her military policies, and her intention to avoid a direct confrontation with US forces. Such statements do not suggest that the Chinese are likely to become reck. less or lack caution as they progressively move toward the acquisition of a nuclear delivery capability. Selfpreservation is likely to remain an important element in Chinas calculations. The Chinese have no illusions training against nuclear, chemical, and bacterial weapons was to be uni. versally given and was stated to be the key task for units below battalion level. Units above the regimental level were being instructed not only in defense, but also in the use of nuclear and chemical weapons, and even in methods of exploiting the results of Chinese-initiated surprise attacks with nuclear and chemical weapons. Consequently, it must be assumed that the Chinese are already consid. ering the battlefield use of nuclear weapons. The Chinese may view the equipping of their ground forces with tactical nuclear weapons as one way of deterring US intervention in local conflicts or of keeping US intervention at a nonnuclear level, thus compelling the United Statss to fight at the conventional level to Pekings advantage, co

G
po

Ml

es no th of T] of SC ty ha th re po eq

Marshal Yeh Chien-ying about the mere acquisition of nuclear weapons ipso facto providing them with a military status equal to that of the United States or, for that matter, the Soviet Uniom The Brdletslw make no reference to high-yield nuclear weapons although they do refer to tactical nuclear weapons. Training directives emphasize the use of advanced weapons and defense against such weapons. Defense 26

\vl gt Lack of Soviet Support m By 1961 Chines@ military doctrine th reflected the deterioration in Sinom Soviet relations and the Soviet Unions al refusal to use her nuclear deterrent T) in support of Chinas objectives in m Asia. w The general tenor of the Brdletim ar strongly suggests Chinas acceptance to of a policy of self-reliance or of going it alone. By early 1961 it appears nt that the Chinese did not expect much In Soviet assistance in modernizing ti Chinas armed forces or Soviet mili- at tary backing for Chinas foreign e) policy. P: In any event, Chinas military cau- 9( tion has been and remains partly a in function of her military dependence 01 on the Soviet Union. So long as , ir Chinas military power falls short of tl that Of the United States, China will remain dependent on Moscow in any Oj military acVIonwhere US interests are ml involved. Hence, for a &ng time to f(

Military Reiiew II

MILITARY DOCTRINE come,Soviet heh or lack thereof, will remain an essential component in Chinese doctrine and risk calculation. Modern Technolow In the lruUati?w, too, the Chinese pointed out that they had adequately estimated the ability of modern technology to influence battles and war, that they had aeeessed the influence of nuclear bombs and guided missiles. They admitted that the development of modern techniques of military science and the appearance of new types of weapons would undoubtedly have great effects on warfare. But they concluded that war is finally resolved by human beings and their political system, not by techniques or equipment. This reiteration of the man-overweapons theme, however, cannot disguise Chinese recognition of the Importance of nuclear weapons. Until the Chinese can effectively deliver nucle+r weapons, they have little alternative but to repeat this formula. Thereiteration of the theme bolsters internal morale, eerves to reinforce party leadership over the military, and rationalizes the emphasis given to ground operations. The Chinese acknowledge the vulnerability of their military targets, industrial complexes, and communicationscenters to destruction by nuclear attack. Like the Soviets, they do not expect a purely counterforce campaign. They are, therefore, making someattempt to locate military and industrial sites at some distance from other vulnerable targets and are tak, mg measures to harden and camouflagethese facilities. Chinese recognition of the danger of sudden nuclear attack is also reflectedin their concern over air de. fense vulnerabilities. Specific vulnerabilities include delays in the construction of airfields deeper in the interior, shortages of equipment and fuel, poor aircraft maintenance, numerous accidents, radar shortcomings, weaknesses in defense against lowaltitude attack, and lack of intelligence about the enemy. Training directives of the air force in 1961 emphasized the need to correct these deficiencies and, in particular, to strengthen defenses against lowaltitude attack. Training was to be intensified. Radar units were require~ to improve their low-level scanning. Antiaircraft units were instructed to improve their low-altitude firing to force enemy aircraft up to a medium altitude. Similar concern was reflected in the continual criticism of communication units. Tbe point was made time and again that, under tbe conditions exi@ing in 1961, the communications system was unlikely to survive a surprise enemy attack and that, once communications were paralyzed, commands would be paralyzed. The Role of the Air Force Chinese military doctrine assigns to the air force the chief role in resisting tbe enemy and in protecting essential targets. As in the Soviet Union, air force training directives emphasize mobility to cope with any surprise attack. However, it is surprising that training in this area commenced as late as 1960. Certain nonoperational units of the air force were subjected to a 50-percent selective reduction in 1958, while a 10 to 20-percent reduction in some staffs and units was to take place in 1961. The 1958 reduction, limited largely to staff and administrative functions, may simply have been an attempt to reduce unneces27

Mary 1965

MILITARY DOCTRINE

sary o,verhearb+ The 1961 retrenchCW:nas military leaders clearly con. sider the capability for ground combat ment, which may have included both as a deterrent to invasion, but they operational and nonoperational units, recognize important limits to the of. can be explained by the cutoff in Soviet deliveries of aircraft in 1959; by , fensive nse of ground forces. They probably do not see these forces ss the attrition of operational aircraft enabling them to engage in prolonged in the Communist Chinese Air Force; high-level actions that would requir? by the deteriorating economic situaextensive logistic support. They can tion, including setbacks in national no longer count on the type of logietic defense production; and by tbe need support which the Soviet Union msde to economize wherever possible. available to them during the Korean Developments in the air force War. Indeed, cutbacks in industrial shouId be viewed in the Iigbt of Nikita production, including that for national Khrushchevs remark to W. Averell defense, curtailment of deliveries of Harriman on 23 June 1959 that the equipment from the Soviet Union, and USSR had sh]pped numerous rockets shortages in fuel oil had by mid-1961 to China. Other reports that Moscow seriously handicapped the development has supplied Peking with short-range of Chinas ground forces. missiles and that the Chinese are testing missiles over ranges of 800 to Limitations 1,100 kilometers should ak,o be conWhile it may be assumed that the sidered. situation has improved somewhat The evidence suggests that at some since June 1961, there probably still point in 1958-59 the Chinese may have remain, in addition to the lack of ef. decided to give priority to tbe develfective tactical air support, important opment of a missile capability and to materiel restraints on the use of downgrade the development of an adChinas ground capability for any provanced aircraft delivery capability. longed and large-scale operations, Chinas ground strength ia probably The Role of Ground Forces viewed as a dual politico-military inThe Chineee recognized that their strument which enables the Chinese, armed forces lacked advanced weapwithin limits, to pursue a go-it-alone ons and were technologically inferior policy and to make certain gains withto US forces; hence, they emphaout Soviet support. More specifically, sized their considerable experience in in view of Chinas long-range objecground combat, a form of warfare in tives in Asia, her ground capability which they felt they excelled and in may be viewed as permitting the Chiwhich they possessed an advantage nese to seek gains by way of political, over the enemy. Chinas ally, the Socovert, and low-level military activiviet Union. had been rehwtantto pro. ties in contiguous areas. vide the Chinese with the type and amount of military assistance and While more a question of foreign policy than of military strategy, the support the Chinese felt they needed. Chinese regard Mao Tse-tungs miliIn advanced weapons, in so-called tary thinking and their experience in distant war, the United States adclose combat and night fighting as a mittedly possessed superiority, go the model for national liberation moveChinese prepared to do the best with ments in Asia, Africa, and Latin what they had. 28 Military Review

MILITARY DOCTRINE

merica. According to Yeh Chien,ng, the Chinese were compiling reg. Iations and Ordinanees based on their istorical experience not only for lemselves, but also for the benefit of ther nations still fighting for national bsration. There is implicit in Chinese mili$ry statements contained in the Bul,ttrz-contrary to what Peking has iid publiclya recognition and conernthat local conflicts or more limited wms of politico-military activity light escalate to a higher level of viomce, even to the nuclear level, if the hited States chose to intervene. consequently, an important consideration in Chinese military thinking uwt be the question of how to pre,ent escalation, especially in viqw of he Soviet Unione reluctance to use Ier nuclear deterrent to back Chinas

intervention by the United States. The Chinese may beIieve that, even when they have a number of nuclear weapons, it may be best to limit conflict to the conventional level in order to inhibit use of nuclear weapons by the United States. While it is possible that the Chinese intend to equip their ground forces with tactical nuclear weapons for operations in contiguous areas, the over-all tone of the 1961 Bulletins gives the impression that conventional weapons will remain an integral part of the equipment of Chinas armed forces for a long time to come. The Chinese may calculate that, when Chinese forces possess tactical nuclear weapons, the United States will be less likely to intervene in local crisis situations or to raise intervention to a nuclear level. Peking may

~bineseCmrrmunist leaders have said they wiIl rely on close combat during the next few years forsign policy. AS long as they lack sufficient nuclear weapons, the Chioese can only hope to avoid the strengths of the enemy, to limit conflictto low levels of violence, and thereby to reduce the likelihood of large-scale conventional or nuclear Mruary 1965 believe that in thie way the United States may be compelled to accept the level of violence chosen by China. In brief, the Chinese may hope that the acquisition of tactical nuclear weapone will enhance their advantage in tlie area of conventional ground 29

MILITARY DOCTRINE

forces and, at the same time, reduce the risk of, e$crdation to the nuclear level. This strategy, however, would confront the Chinese with the very problems of maintaining a conventional-nuclear force that are currently plaguing other conntries. Pragmatic rather than theoretical considerations dominate Chinas military thinking. Chinese military doctrine, aa reflected in the Brdletins, is based on four impressively realistic assessments: Chinas military capabilities and vulnerabilities. US military capabilities and strengths. . The extent of the assistance and support that China can expect from the Soviet Union. The opportunities for exploiting Chinas limited military powe,r. The evaluation of the military situation that emerges underlines the captiousness with which Chinas military Ieadere calculate the risks of various military operations and emphasizes the responsiveness of Chineee doctrine to both internal and external conditions.

The Chinese evaluation of their limitations and opportunities in 1961 aPPears tO have been formulated for a reasonably long period that would extend to a time when China begins to poesess a nuclear capability of her own. From the Chinese doctrinal emphasis on self-preservation and the care. ful calculation of risk, it can be inferred that, even when she has nuclear weapons of her own, China is likely to be cantious in their use, or to attempt to manipulate the situation so as to inhibit the nse or effective counternse of such weapona by the United States. Indications that the Chinese may be planning to equip their ground forces with tactical nuclear weapons for operations in contiguous ai-eas suggest that Peking may expect the United States to re. frain from intervention against China or to keep her intervention at a non. nuclear level. Chinaa leaders are apparently aware that opportunities exist where. by China may be able to make gains throngh a cautioua but astute uae of her evolving military power.

30

NORTH VIETNAM AND THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE

King Chen

IKITA Khrushchev, the target of much virulent, personal criticism from Communist China, has been removed from power in the Soviet Union. Whether the new leaders in the Kremlin will now be able to with achieve a genuine rapprochement Peking, which has already detonated its first nuclear device, remains to be seen. For the leaders of North Vietnam, this is a crucial question. They have for several years been caught in the middle of the conflict between Peking and Moscow, and, although they have sided with Communist Chha, the evidence indicates that North Vietnam strongly desires to remain on good terms with both. In the development of the dispute from 1956 to 1961, North Vietnam maintained a neutral position. She issued no statement on de-Stalinthuafy 1965 31

THE DISPUTE ization, welcomed Khrushchevs peace policy toward. the West in 1959-60, supported the 1960 Moscow Declaration, secured economic aid for her First Five-Year Plan (1961-65) from both Peking and Moscow in 1961, and kept silent on the Albanian issue at the 22d Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). The dispute did not grow into an open rift until after the Soviet 22d Congress, and North Vietnam did not become seriously involved until early 1962. ~ After the close of the congress in Moscow, Ho Chi-minh returned to Hanoi via Peking. In the Chinese capital, he held a cordial talk with Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-chi, Chou En-lai, and Teng Hsiao-ping. There can be little doubt that the dispute was the central topic of conversation since all top Chinese leaders participated. Apparently, Ho sought to probe Pekings position on all issues as a preparation for his planned mediation.
Meeting Proposed

attacking one another in the press and over the radio. Hanois efforts won snpport from several of these parties. In March the Vietnam Dang Lao Dong Party snd four other parties organized them. selves as a neutral group which proposed to hold an international Camnmnist meeting to settle the differences. The Chinese Communists accepted this proposal and sent a letter to the Central Committee of the CPSU suggesting the convention of all corn. munist Parties to eliminate the differ. ences and strengthen Socialist unity. The situation over the spring and summer, as the Vietnam Dang Lao Dong Party said, was somewhat improved. It was merely a hdI, however. When Sine-Indian horder fightins flared up in September and the CUban crisis broke out in October, new arguments between Moscow and Peking destroyed the weak foundation for a Sine-Soviet reconciliation that HO Chi-minh and others had endesv. ored to build.
Skro-lrrdian Border Corrf6ct

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1

In January 1962 the party sent letters to a number of Communist Parties proposing that a meeting be held between representatives of Communist and Workers Parties t~ settle the discord together, and that, pending such meeting, the parties cease
Th{s article was digested from the original, published in ASIAN SURVEY, September 196.4, under the t{tle, North Vietnam in the Sine-Soviet Dispute, 1962-64. ASIAN SURVEYis published monthly brj the Institute of International Studies, flniversit~ of California. The author is Associate Professor of Political Science at the State University C0U0r7e, Oswego, New York.

The fighting on the Sine-Indian border in October-November 1962 greatly complicated Communist bloc relations. Nehru asked arms from the United States and Great Britain, and announced his hope of securing So. viet jet fighter planes. The Soviet Union initially pressed India to accept Chinese proposals for negotiations, but, when Nehru rejected these, the Soviets retreated to the neutrality which they had previously maintained. Meanwhile, Hanoi shifted from a friendly to a critical attitude toward India. Nhan Dan (The People), organ of the Dang Lao Dong FartY, condemned tbe Indian expansionist gronp for openly colluding with British and American imperial@ts against Military Revi!w

32

THE DISPUTE

Chinese border guards. It avoided, however, any mention of the Soviet Union. When the Chinese suddenly announced a unilateral cease-fire and proposedconciliation on 21 November, the Hanoi regime immediately issued a statement strongly supporting the Chinese proposal and urging India to make a positive response. To reinforce his government% etatement, Ho Chi-minh sent personal letters to both the Chinese and Indian leaders on 24 November urging a peaceful settlement of the border issue. He reaffirmed his stand when Preeident Antonin Novotny of Czechoslovakia mited Hanoi in January 1963 and President Liu Shao-chi of China came m May. Bitter arguments over the b~rder Issue between Peking and Moscow didnot begin until after August 1963 when Peking openly accused tbe So!iet~ion of collaboration with the United States and India against China, and charged that this constituted a betrayal of proletarian internationalism. Moscow retorted that Chinasattack on India without hav]ngconsulted the Soviet Union was a violation of a SinO-SOviet treaty prOmion calling for consultation on important international matters affectingeach sides interests. Furthermore, China had barred accord with India byher chauvinistic behavior, : 1 J i Avoiding involvement Hanoi tried its best to avoid becominginvolved in these mutual accuWions but continued to support China against India. The implications of Hanois positionseem clear. Ihe North Trietnam&se disapproved of Soviet military aid 10India, but hey could not afford to !riticize the SO iet Union. Indias mil-

itary buildup for the border conflict with the help of the United States and others was inexctjsable-an entirely different matter than the Indian military action against the Portuguese imperialists over Goa which Hanoi had applauded. Chinas measures in November 1962 for a settlement were reasonable although the North Vietnamese never praised the Chinese military advance. While supporting China, Ho Chiminh continued to communicate with Nehru, making every effort to urge a peacefui settlement. When personal friendship clashed with Communist alIiance, however, Hos Marxism tri-

t t

When the United Statas acted to keep Soviet ships from delivering offensive wearmns to Cuba, North Vietqarn strongly supported Cubas posltmn umphed easily. And when his two Communist allies came in conflict over this issue, Ho sought to maintain his fraternal ties with both but edged closer to China because of North Vietnams own national interests. North Vietnam strongly supported Castros regime prior to the rise of the Cuban crisis in October 1962. After the United States ordered a blockade of Cuba, China made the Cuban issue a paramount one, striking out against the American paper tiger and urging full support for the Castro government. 33

V hbruary 1965 \

THE DISPUTE .

North Vi@nam, in a different fashion, also gave ardent support to Cuba and, in addition, warmly endorsed the Soviet 23 October statement that accused the United States of committing piratical and provocative acts which might lead to thermonuclear war. The Soviet position was described as a correct and firm stand against American imperialism. On 28 October Khrushchev agreed to the withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba, and China immediately turned against the Soviets. The Chinese ridiculed the Soviet thesis that world peace has been saved and criticized the Soviet Union for having bowed to the United States when the latter was actually stepping up her military preparations for a Cuban invasion. Although publicly endorsing Soviet policies, Hanois warning of American imperialist schemes and its insistence upon the importance of being firm indicated that North Vietnam did not entirely approve of Khrushchevs Cuban poIicy. In truth, the decisive factor affecting Hanois attitude was neither the Soviet Union nor China, but Cuba and particularly the United States. Havana and Hanoi were struggling against a common enemy. Hanoi not only wanted Havana to stand firm, but it was vital that Havana win a victory over Washington.
Urgs for Ideological Meetings

changed. Ho Chi-minh pledged that his party would make active coatri. butions to the cause of Socialist SOL clarity on the basis of the two Moscow statements. 1ss February 1963 he proposed that the Communist Parties cease their public attacks on each other and that the Soviets and Chinese arrange a meeting of all Corn. munist Parties to settle differences In response to this proposal, the Chinese invited Khrushchev to visit Peking for talks. After thr?e weeks of deliberation, the Soviets euggested, instead, that Mao Tse-tung visit Moscow for a meeting on 15 May. FIw weeks later (on 9 May) the Chinese agreed to the Soviet proposal in principle, asking for a postponement until mid-June. Teng Hsiao-ping was cho. sen to iead the Chinese delegation.
Socialist Unity

At this point, the struggle between .Moscow and Peking for the support of North Vietnam sharpened. In addition to the economic aid offered by the two disputants, military, party, and political delegations from both sides proceeded to Hanoi. On the Vietnamese side, the interest in Socialist unity remained un34 .

Ho stressed the importance of SO. cialist unity when Liu Shao-chi visited Hanoi in mid-May. He said that the unity of the Communist Parties of the Soviet Union and China was the pillar of the unity of the Social. ist camp. He also said that it was necessary to call a meeting, fOllO~. ing the mid-June conference in Mos. cow, of the Communist and Work. ers Pariies of the whole world in order to eliminate the differences and strengthen unity through inte~ national consultations. Ho was appar. ently anxious to convene a meeting of world Communist Parties at which he might expect to play an active role as mediator. Although the Sine-Soviet confer. ence finally took place in MOSCOW on 4 July, mutual accusations continued unabated during the meetings, The talks ended on 20 July with a corn munique giving no information about the outcome, but indicating only that

THE DISPUTE

t complete deadlock had ensued. Thue, Hanoishopes for Socialist unity were shattered.
$upport for China

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3ino-Soviet polemice entered a new stage in August 1963 when the partial test ban treaty was eigued in Moscow.Peking not only disapproved of this treaty, but published a geriee of criticisms of tbe Soviet poeition. Hanois position also took a new turn at this same moment. It refused tosupport the treaty, condemned Tugoslav revisionism in terms identical to the Chinese line, and adopted offensivetactics and strategy for the revolution in South Vietnam. Communist China long wanted to developber own nuclear weapons. In a 1957 agreement with the Soviet Union,she was guaranteed Soviet aid. But the Soviet Union, according to Peking, attempted to control Chinese usage of nnclear power. When the Chinese refused to accept such control, the Soviets scrapped the agreementand withdrew their aid. North Vietnam has neither the capacity nor the ambition to develop nuclear weapons. The Hanoi regime hadlong supported complete and total disarmament both for propagandistic md economic reasons. When the partialtest ban treaty was signed, Peking suddhrly advocated the complete prohibition and deetruct.ion of nuclear weapons. obviously, this was devised tobolster itg stand against the treaty. On 31 .July the Chinese Government rewed a formal statement opposing the treaty, denouncing tbe Soviet capitulation to US lrnperialism, and proposing a worldfor the ~omp]ete and thorough prohibition and destruction ofnuclear weapons. lwo days later, ChouEn-lai gent ]etters to all gov-

ernments of the world askhg that such a conference be convened.. It did not take Hanoi long to decide its position. The People quickly published editorials indicating Hanois support of Peking in opposing the treaty and in advocating complete and total nuclear disarmament. On 19 August Pham van Dong, Premier of North Vietnam, announced that the Hanoi Government fully approved tbe Chinese proposal. One month later, North Vietnamese spokeemen not only supported China but criticized the Soviet Union openly ,for the firet time. Hanoi was not merely opposing the partial test ban treaty. It had begun to defend China against Khrushcheve accusation of being warlike. Why did Hanoi shift its position ? Although one may argue that Hanoi had long supported total disarmament and that the partial test ban agreement did not meet its disarmament policy, one can scarcely deny that the treaty represented a beginning in the direction of total disarmament. Hanois all-ornothing stand showed. that it had adopted the Cbineae hard line.
Yugoslav Revisionism

Yugoslavia bas increasingly been a factor in the Sine-Soviet dispnte. As the conflict has become more grave, the Soviet-Yugoelav relationship has gradually improved, and the Chinese attack upon Yugoslavia has become more bitter. Rapproeh ement between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia wae well underway when Khrushchev defended Yugoslavia as a Socialist country in December 1962. At that time, he told the Supreme Soviet that:
For a long time there have been no landowners or capitalists in Yugoslavia, no private capita!, no Vivate enterprises, landed estates, or private banks. . . . The Yugoskzv Communist

35

THE DISPUTE and their leaders are . . . developing the dconomy of socialiem. Therefore, if one proceede from objective la W.V, from the teaching of Marxism-Leniniem, itis impossible to deny that Yugoslavia ie a socialist country. This view was upheld in the open

letter of the CPSU on 14 July 1963. In late August of the same year, moreover, former Premier Khrushchev visited Yugoslavia and repeatedly lauded the Tito regime. Chinese attacke on Yugoslavia have elways been bitter; Vietnamese comparatively mild. In its criticism of the Tito regime prior to last fall,

fall, however, Hanoi began to shifl its position. Thus, a ehower of criticism OJ Yugoslavia was launched. Tito wa~ denounced as a tool of tbe US im. perialiste-a term used by Albania in 1961. -The Yugoslav path to social. ism, wh]ch Khrushchev lauded in 1962, was severely criticized. Yugo. slavia was further accused of slander. ing China as a warseeker and aggres. sor, and denouncsd for having praised the partial nuclear test ban treaty, The most significant Hanoi criti. cism however, was a November 196s Hoc Tap (Study) editorial. It not

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unttedN.tw.n President Tito of Yugoslavia, scmsed of revisionism by botb Peking and Hanoi Hanoi had frequently streseed the necessity of the struggIe on two fronts against revisionism and dogmatism. When MarshaI Tito visited Latin America and the United Nations last 36 only followed precieely the Peking viewpoint published one month ear. Iier, but defended, for the first time, dogmatism. The editorial also hinted broadly that the Soviets were w MtitaryWiw

THE DISPUTE

visionists. Indeed, Hanoi almost aPpeared to be Redder than Peking. Policyfor the South The aim of Hanois policy toward South Vietnam is liberation and reunification; the meane is a twofold struggle-military and political. The priority given to economic development in the North made it impossible for Hanoi tO eupport a massive military operatiOn in the South. Prior to the summer of 1963, therefore, political struggle for a neutral South Vietnam in order to bring about her liberation wae regarded as important as the armed revolution. After tbe outbreak of the Buddhist crisis in 1963, China adopted a more aggressive Policy toward South Viet. nam. On 29 August Mao Tse-tung issued a statement firmly supporting the just struggle of the South Vietnamese. In October Peking convened an Aeian Buddhist conference attended by more than 100 Buddhist monks from 11 Asian countries which resolved to support Vietnamese Buddhists action and to condemn Diems atrocities against them. After tbe Diem regime was overthrown, Peking sped up its military assistance to the Viet Cong. As Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara reported in early March 1964, a growing number of improved and heavier Chinese weapons were supplied to the Viet Cong through H&roi in the previous aix months. Hanoi then began to intensify its struggle in the South on both the political and military fronts. The South Vietnam National Liberation Front issued a statement urging the establishment of a coalition government and the adoption of a policy of neutrality for South Vietnam. hhmary1965

Hanoi fitly refused any proposal to neutralize North Vietnam but welcomed the plan for a neutral South Vietnam. Obviously, a neutral South Vietnam, aftbr tbe withdrawal of US military forces, would inevitably fall under the control of the National Liberation Front and its military arm the Viet Cong. In that case, the South could quickly be reunified with the North under Hanois control. Significant Decision On the military front, a significant decision was made at a party meeting in December 1963 with the adoption of an offensive strategy to intensify its military struggle in the South. The party first denied that strategic offensives against tbe West were adventurist policies leading the world into a major war as Khrushchev had warned. It aiso denounced the defensive strategy of compromise with the imperialists as the abandonment of revolution. Finally, the party gave wholehearted approval to the Viet Cong insurgents in the South. This thesis ciearly opposed Soviet poiicies on war and defensive strategy and supported the Chinese strategy of all-out revolution. Furthermore, The People warned that, if the United States attacked North Vietnam, she would have to fight not only with North Vietnam but also with China, or eventually with the Sociaiist camp as a whole. Ho Chi-minh also said that North Vietnam would have powerful friends ready to heip if the United States carried the war to the North. It appeared that there was a Hanoi-Peking miIitary unde&anding or agreement under which China would protect North Vietnam. The North Vietnamese must have considered that the waves of revolution in the South were running high. 37

THE DISPUTE

While not desiring to break with Moscow, the Vie@mese leaders were now committed to the militant Chinese strategy. Consequently, the armed struggle intensified: more Chinese arms were imported, more battles fought, larger campaigns undertaken, and more terrorist attacks launched against American personnel.
The Shift

Hanois pro-Chinese sentiments are strong today, but the pro-Soviet group is still influential. Apart from some pro-Soviet leadera in Hanoi, Ho Chiminh himself is a middle man- standing aloof from factionaI rivalries and maintaining a balance between them. His training in Moscow, his close association with Peking, and his need for Sine-Soviet economic assistance restrain bim from leaning entirely to one side. If he could have a choice without any serious effects, he would certainly remain neutral. All etTorts made by North Vietnam for Socialist unity have failed. The Sine-Soviet dispute has brought the world Communist movement to the brink of an open split. Since last fall, Hanoi has sided ever closer to Peking. Even Le Duan, a pro-Soviet leader, appeared in December 1963 to regard Chinese revolutionary tactics as the model for many Communists in Asia, Africa, and Latin America today. Pham Hnng, member of tbe party Politburo, went a step further in June 1964 by accusing the Soviet Union of ne~lecting the defense of the Communist camp and implied that Moscow should supply more military aid to Hanoi. In mid-June 1964 the Dang Lao Dong Party voiced strong opposition to the Soviet proposal for a world Communist conference in De. cember 1964 to settle the dispute. 38

There are two fundamental reasons for the shift to China. First, gee. graphical contiguity is a vital force, The position of North Vietnam makes China too near to be ignored, while the Soviet Union is too far away to serve as an effective baIance. History indicates that Vietnam has always been allied with or controlled by her northern neighbor when that neigh. bor was strong. This geopolitical factor affects not only North Vietnams stand inthe dispute but her position in Indochina, As Premier Souvanna Phouma of Laos has remarked, Hanoi supports China, and China, in turn, bas ac. knowled~ed that all of Indochina is to be considered North Vietnams sphere of influence. It is certainly conceivable that Hanoi-Vientiane and Hanoi-Phnom Penh relations will develop in a fashion similar to the present Peking-Hanoi. alliance.
Revolutionary Strate~

The second basic factor determining Hanois present position is revolutionary strategy. The liberation of South Vietnam and ber reunification with the North are not only political objectives but also economic necessities for tbe Hanoi regime. Histori. tally, the North has depended heavily upon the South for rice supplies. The partition of the country in 1954 has caused continuous food shortages in the North. Hanoi clearly understands that only the reunification of the conntry can provide a eolution to the food problem. To consummate tbe southern revolution with victory, Hanoi has decided that the Chinese revolutionary strategy is more suitable than that of the Soviet Union. This decision is abetted by the similarity between tbe Chinese and Vietnamese races, cultural backMilitary Review

THE DISPUTS

round, and social conditions. It also terns from a situation whereby both lhina and Vietnam are struggling gainst the United States while Mosmv attempted a reconciliation with Washington. As Hanois alignment progresses, ne question becomes crucial. How far !ill Hanoi go with Peking? It is ikely that the more serious the Sinojoviet dispute becomes, the stronger Ianoi will support Communist China ~lthough HO Chi-minh will never ease his efforts for mediation.

Some limits to Hanois alignment exist, however. North Vietnam has no intention of becoming a second Albania. Sbe certainly hopes to mairatain some form of normal relationship with the Soviet Union. She doss not desire to become a Yugoslavia. She cannot and will not openly offend Communist China. In sum, Hanoi seeks to be realistic and practical in its retations with the two big Communist brothers as it threads its way through an increasingly troubled era.

COMMENTS INVITED
The Military Review welcomes your comments on any mateAn opposite viewpoint or a new line of thought rial published. of your ideas. If you will assist us and may lead to publication are an authority on a certain subject, why not write an article for our consideration ? If you have only an idea, query us; ,haps we can assist you in developing an acceptable article. per-

[ehruary 1965

39

RIOT CONTROL DOCTRINE

Major John K. Stoner, Jr.,
United States Armg

N RECENT years, the frequency of civil disturbances in which mili. tary forces have been committed has been on the increase. The surge of civil rights activity within the United Statee has brought about several instances when US Army personnel have been called upon to take action to protect life and property.

Overseas, eince 1958, unruly crowds have not only demonstrated against both the President and the Vice President of the United States, they have also played major roles in effecting

ml

Revie Military

several changes of government. In many of those countries, indigenous forcestrained and equipped according to US doctrine-have been employed to quell the disturbances. The rise in riot control activity brings to the fore the question as to whether m. not the current US Army riot control doctrine ia adequate in todays turbulent world. Is there a better system that we might employ? Are there changes we should make to ensnre that our doctrine will be more effective? Before the turn of the century, US inilitary authore characterized riots
hhruary 1965

as the sporadic issue of local disturbances. Riots were spontaneous and practically leaderless. They were not the offspring of sobering thought or calculating mind, but were the sudden outbursts of passion. The leadere of these mobs were characterized as the most angry and the least discreet members of the mob. During the latter part of the 19th century, though, a change in the nature of the mob took place, related directly to the tremendous influx of immigrants into the United States. A military author of this period observed that professional agitators were part and parcel of this influx. These professional agitators were generally men who bad been educated in tbe military profession, but had soiled its code in one way or another and had been dismissed from the service of their countries. Having been turned out, their interests were taken up by the maeses of people who were trying
41

RIOT CONTROL >

to find a new way of life in a new society.

Doctrinal Changes

The appearance of these professional agitators brought about two noticeable changes ~in US Army doctrine for dealing with mobs: Troops were enjoined to refrain from any physical contact with the rioters. Previously, the mere appearance of trained troops and a few wellplaced musket butts or bayonet pricks had been force enough. The professional agitator changed this, because he added the tools of professional anarchyweapons and explosives. Thus, mixing with the mob caused the troops to lose the power advantage their musket offered. One military author of the day observed that the rioter had changed from the hurler of brickbats to the thrower of dynamite bombs. To be effective against this opposition, troops bad to meet tbe anarchist with his own weapon firepower. Greater use of firepower led to a second change in doctrine. Less and less reliance was placed on local militia units to quell disturbances and more and more was. placed on the use of Federal troops. The reason wae simpl~local militia were not as preMajor John K. Stoner, Jr., is with the O@ce of the Deputy Chief of Stall for Personnel in Washington, D. C. A graduate of the Advanc~d @our.?e at the United States Army Chemical School and of the 196$64 Regular Course of the United States Army Command and General Staff College, he was, fo~ three years, the Depmty Chemical Ofier, US ArvaY Southern Command, in the Canal Zone. His article, Probtems of the Panama Canal, appeared in the September 1964 issue of the MILITARYREVIEW.

pared psychologically ta fire on neigh. hors and friends. By 1900, then, US Army riot control doctrine envisian$d tbe use of Federal troops and a reliance on unit firepower to quell civil disturbances. The change from more peaceful and local means had been caused by a change in the characteristics of the mob-more professional leadership and an increased ability to affect life and property through the use of explosives and weapons. Next Step World War I ushered in the next evolutionary step. Although there were uo major changes in the nature of riots in this country after 1900, the frequency of disturbances did take a leap forward, The use of military force increased commensurately. In seeking ways to increase the effectiveness of the riot control force, efforts were made to incorporate combat developments which came out of World War L Two of those develop. ments, in particular, were notedthe machinegtm and chemical agents. In effect, the machinegun did nothing more than to increase the existing base of fire available to the commander, and this development was viewed accordingly. With chemical agents, however, a new dimension was added. Doctrinal sources of the period reflect that gas was the newest, most humane, and moat effective weapon available for quelling domestic disturbances. And these same sonrces went so far as to eay that this new weapon system should be relied npon before resorting to the more deadly rifle or machinegun fire. Certain major chang~s in riot control doctrine resulted from the incorporation of the new weapon systems. With the use of chemicals, there came witary Review

42

RIOT CONTROL

the concept of priority of force-use gas first; if that doesnt work, then me firepower. Prior to this, the failure to respond to an order to disperse was met with fire. Now, the troop commander had some discretion in his choiceof means. The introduction of these new weapons also helped to foster a greater reliance on variable troop formations in confronting rioters. A 1934 article onthis eubject noted that: should be . . . troop formations such that force cute be applied in ever-increaeing amounts, and that only that nmount of force should be used which b absolutely necessary to quell the
disturbance and disperse the mob.

to determine such action if, in his judgment, it is necessary to the accomplishment of his mission. How does this doctrine fit the contemporary world ? In general, there are two types of situations into which US forcee may be introduced or US doctrine employed-civil unrest within the continental United States and disturbances with political overtones in countries allied with the United States. mob motivatiwr generates from deep-seated moral convictions which have been brougbt to tbe surface in response to apParent violations of certain rights. Although political issues may be associated with these situations, the fundamental issue is not one of overthrow of government. The principal type situation which fite this mold is the civil rights disturbance. In contrast is the politically motivated display of outright hostility to government which has been generated so many timee by subversive elements in other nations. The issue at band is stability of government. From the point of view of the indigenous military force committed to quell tbe disturbances, it can be said without too much exaggeration that they are fighting for their very existence. The role of the Communist Party in many of these events has been clearly establishedthe program of the 1928 Comintern World Congress called for organization of mass action utilizing strikes and demonstrations and, finally, the general strike coupled with armed insurrection. In the case of domestic disturbances, there appears to be no need to change our current riot control doctrine. If the violence of a domestic 43
Civil Itights In the first circumstance,

,, Priority of Force Current doctrine ie based on the fundamental principle that only that amount of force should be employed which ie necessary to accomplish the givenmission. In the implementation of this principle, the concept of priority of force has been expanded until it now includee eix elements: e A show of force. c The uee of troops in varying riot control formation to drive a mob and to split it into small manageable groups, Employment of high-pressure water to disperse the mob. Employment of riot control agents to disperse the mob. . Fire by selected marksmen to render the mobs leadership ineff ective. . The use of full unit firepower when a]] else has failedC The above priority is nurmally followed.In a rapidly developing or extremely violent eituation, however, we or more of the elements of force may have to be bypaesed. The comIoanderat the scene has the authority

RIOT CONTROL .

riot should ,become so great as to override the less severe elements of force, the commander hae at his disposal the selective use of firepower upon which he can rely, and he can tailor his reaction to the situation at hand. This type of flexible response is perfectly suited to the requirements of a military force in reacting to domestic civil disturbances. The development of the new riot control agent CS lends further credence to this policy. The incisive effectiveness of this agent, coupled with its rate of action, has added a new dimension to the effective uee of riot control agents in quelling civil disturbances. In effect, an increased element of force has been incorporated in the arsenal without echeloning upward the use of firepower. Current doctrine, then, appears adequate to deal with domestic disturbance. The development of a new weapon system fits easily into the existing doctrine, while at the same time it gives tbe current doctrine increased effectiveness. The same generally holds true in foreign countries where considerable US effort ie expended in training indigenous forces in riot control. Certainly, the mob leadership fits the professional moldhighly motivated, well trained, politically controlled. Even if not politically controlled in the initial instance, the domestic disturbances are fertile fields for agitation and subversion by Communistinspired groups. It is this particular characteristic of civil disturbances in foreign courrtries which suggests that military reaction must be swift and immediately effective. The 1960 Tokyo riots provide a vivid example. For months tfre cry of the agitated citizenry was 44

down with the Mutual Defense Treaty. After the mobs had been whipped into a bloody assault on the Diet, the treaty had dropped to third place on the poll, and the trained left. ist agitators bad shifted mob empha. sis to down with Kishi and dis. solve the Diet. Military intervention, therefore, must prevent the trained agitator from turning tbe mob toward his own political goals. The US doctrine df priority of force ie applicable under these con. ditione. Certainly, each occurrence will vary in some detail. In one, the mob may consist of armed men;. in another, the mob may include a front rank of women and children, as in Buenos Aires in 1959. The reaction to each of these circumstances must be different, and flexible response is inherent in onr current doctrine. It is not necessary that the six elements be followed in any predetermined order. Rather, it is the job of the force commander to make an accurate estimate of the situation to determine the appropriate amount of force with which to initiate his actions. It ie precisely this inherent flexibility which makes our current doctrine equally effective in all extremes of civil disturbances. There is no need for changing our current riot control doctrine. Snme will undoubtedly ask Has the doctrine been effective each time it has been applied ? The answer is not so much a f unct ion of tbe doctrine itself as it is the state of training of the force employing the doctrine. The conclusion I reach makes one assumptionthat troops employed under this doctrine will be thoroughly trained in its application. The validity of this assumption can only be determined with the passage of time.
Military Itavicw

,!HI1OSOPHY OF THE ATTACK

I

A Q

S A RESULT of the intense feeling generated by the French defeat in the France-Prussian War, and prior to the changes wrought of necessity from the experience of World War I, the French Army ignored all forms of war except one-the attack. Through an entire military generation, the advantages of offensive combat, the decisiveness of the frontal attack with cold steel, and the honor and glory of an attack with 61an were

Major Clinton E. Granger, Jr., United States Armtt

National Archive,

hkuary

1965

45

THE ATTACK .

emphasized to the near exclusion of 1 all else. Yet, by the end of World War I the cream of the youth of France was dead. The country was victorious, but with a hollow victory bought at an awful price in lives. The victory cost the French dearly in another respect ae wellmilitary thinking, turning away from the saber-drawing heroics of the spirit of the attack that had opened World War I, now leaned to the opposite extreme, seeking to draw doctrine from the dreadful experiences of trench warfare. The valuee of the defense were emphasized and reemphasized until French ability to conduct offensive warfare was lost in faith in the Maginot Line, and in the dark thought that the defender possesses the utmost advantage in any war of attrition. of current military opinion appears to be swinging more and more toward tbe advantages of tbe defense. This defense is based on a greatly advanced military technology, where to mass for an attack draws criticism from the advocates of tactical nuclear weapons; where to attack is occasionally pictured as a headlong race to destruction against the superior firepower of both conventional and nuclear weapons; , and where the defense no longer is required to mass to the same extent
Majov frequent Clinton E. Gvangev, Jr., is a contributor to the MILITARY kztest article, Global appeared in the OctoDeplogmentsp ber 1964 iseus. Presently assigned as a student at the Armed Forcee Stafl College, he has served with the 9th Corps Headquarters on Okinawa, and is a graduate of the 1961-62 Regufar Course of the United States Army Command and General Sta# college. 4a Pendulum Swings Once again the pendulum

aa before, since maes can be accom. plished through tirepower alone. The attack is also disclaimed by some advocates of unconventional warfare. Those who have fought guer. riI1as or insurgents since the days of Napoleon in Spain are quick to relate how futile a gesture a coordinated attack against terrain latelybut not currently-occupied by an enemy can be. Admittedly, if the objective of a war or particular campaign. is not destruction of the enemy forces: then offensive action may not be required. Such a situation could well occur in cold war situations where one side or the other is reluctant to admit that a state of war actually exiets, regardless of the appearance of the state of affairs to tbe people on the ground. In that case, it might be expacted that desired national gOals would be achieved by the use of diplomatic, economic, or other alternate means. But if the solution is to be a military victory, offensive action will be required.
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fie th w{ m th St

REVIEW. His

The basic nature of this offensive action may well be another affair. The offense or the attack has most frequently referred to the effort by one ground-gaining element to seize and occupy a specific terrain feature, or I to close with and destroy a particular mwosing force. It will cuntinue to till At these roles in the future, but sbmdd not be limited by any preconceived u) ideas concerning tbe actual tactics em- u ployedthe only limiting factor here m co is the imagination of the commander. Generally, attacks are conducted toward the enemy. Unless surrounde dm and cut off, attacks in another direc- vi t re tion are not considered normal. BU will not the greatly increased mobilitY tu hfilitery tleview f!

.
THE &TTACK

Fered an anemy through the largeale use of helicopters and armored :rsonnel carriers negate this, at least part ? Attacks ~re conducted as coordited actions, with support or conrted action by all elements of the ,mmand. Should the nuclear battle:Id become a reality, though, then [e greatly increased dispersion that ould be required to ensure survival ight make coordinated attacks (in le sense now taught in our service !hoole) a practical impossibility.

the effect of massed fires can be obtained through the use of a single nuclear weapmr, however, the change may not be as radical as first indications would lead one to believe. There will still be many uses for convent ional high-explosive fire support, including massed fires where the risk of residual radiation may preclnde the use of nuclear weapons. Still, the fractional kiloton to multimegaton weapons can well replace the effects of massed artillery or saturation bombing under other circum-

htacksare conducted as coordinated actions, with support or concerted action by all elements of the command
Units, perhaps as small as battalions, md in some cases even companies, maywell be required to operate in a Completely independent role. Massed fires, as known in World WarII and the Korean War, may be trtuaIIY impossible within the currentrange limitations of conventional tubeartillery. Because a good deal of

stances, unless their use is denied by political ramifications or strategic implications. A commander will choose to assume the offensive to achieve specific goals to destroy enemy forces, to deprive the enemy ~f required resources, to seize enemy territory or terrain, to develop enemy dispositions, or to di47

fdfwf 1965

TiE ATTACK

vert the enemys attentiori from other areas. The goal of the destruction of the opposing force is, of course, most obvions. It must be the prime consideration in the mind of any commander. If the forces of the opponent are destroyed, all the other goals and ob-

nents societv. -. the effort has hwn rewardedbut history is full of ex. amples to the contrary. There will be, of course, many gee. graphic areas that may logically be considered objectives for offensive action because of their function in ~ logistic or economic sense. The value

: 1 ! ; !

jectivee can be achieved without organized opposition. There have been examples of commanders in almost every great conflict who, for political or other reasons, selected geographic areas not related to the ground battle as their objectives, and failed to destroy the OPPOSing forces in the course of their operations to seize the area concerned. Occasionally, where the area has been the seat of government or filled a critical role in the fabric of an oppo48

of the geographic objective should be in terms of the impact that the seizure will have on the opposing military establishment, both in the immediate future and over a long period of tinm. On a lesser scale, but frequently cited as a reason for offeneive action, is tbe requirement to develop enemy dispositions. This type of activity is frequently confused with tactical techniques of smaller scale operations, such as a reconnaissance by fire or a recotinaissance in force. While these

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tmo techniques may be considered part of the business of developing enemydispositions, they are, in themselves, far too restrictive to enable a commander to use his forces to their fullest capabilities. Even though developing enemy dispositions implies aggressive ground combatto secure more detailed intelligence of the disposition~ of all the enemyforces on the ground, the conceptmust be extended beyond the idea of a limited intelligence-gathering function to that of forcing the enemy to reveal not only his current dispositions, but his plans for subsequent movements and activities as well. In this sense the use of offensive operations to develop enemy dispositions can serve in a number of ways to secure additional intelligenc~; to causethe enemy to undertake actions prematurely; or, perhaps, just to upset a carefully prepared maneuver. It is a form of the offensive directed against the opponents military forces, aad~as few strategic and probably no political implications for the average aperation. Attrect Attsntion There is little difficulty in interpreting the offeneive form of action !Jhenused to attract tbe attention of the opponent, to divert him from other areas. The real problem is, of , course, not to let the diversionary forces become so deeply engaged as 10preclude their disengagement and lVithdrawal when their missimr has beenaccomplished. Worse yet, if too ieeply engaged, the diversionary forcesmay require reinforcement at the expense of the main effort. Diversionary attacks occasionally havea habit of developing along unuwa]paths, and the commander must guardagainst a plan which is so rigid 1 d. Mrwry lg65

THEATTACK as to preclude exploitation in the event of unexpected success. At the same time, he must beware of unexpected enemy strengths or dispositions, the temperament of the opposing commander, and the numerous other var. iahles which might lead to deeper commitments and the use of mare resources than were planned for the diversion. Resources It is apparent that a commander should allot his resources in a manner that will ensure success at what he believes to be the decisive point in time and space. But tbe threat, if not the actual use, of nuclear weapons on tbe modern battlefield muet make any commander think carefully about the amount of force he will mass to achieve a decisive action. Every additional man and piece of equipment beyond the minimum requirements will increase the possibility of detection. Every increase will make the target appear that much more lucrative to enemy target analysts. It will be a real matter of judgment to determine juet how much is enough, and how much might be too much. A large measure of the success in this judgment will rest with the intelligence availahk when tbe decision is made. The fog of war will remain with us to a certain extent, and there is certainly little possibility of war being reduced to a chesslike confrontation played with mathematical precieion. Ground combat, and especially the attack, will remain a matter of moral and physical courage, of individual drive and initiative, of surprise and determinationand of careful planning and intelligent implementation. In the attack, perhaps more than in the defense, the factor of training 49

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THE ATTACK .

will continue to be a major determinant in the scales of success versus defeat. It is. easy to speak in theoretical terms concerning forms of maneuver, mass, and similar concepts, hut in order to be meaningful, these terme muet be executed on the battlefield and execution is possible only by trained men. The more complex the requirement, the higher the degree of training required. This is one of the variables which the commander must weigh in determining not only what he wishes to do, but what his forces are capable of doing, if so ordered. There ie no substitut~ for training, and training is costly in terms of the one item that is always in short supply after the beginning of bostilitieetime. There are two leesone to be gained from this pointtraining should be initiated as early as poesible to permit men and units to achieve the highest state prior to the shock of combat; and the degree of training already accomplished determines, to a large extent, the capabilities of the command. Courage hae a place on the battlefield, but it does not replace adequate training. The commander cannot gamble on heroics to win; he must depend on solid dependable men performing solid dependable work under the most. difficult mmditione. This can only be accomplished through thorough and complete training of botb individuals and of unite, Legistic Support Assuming that the commander has the trained personnel to perform offensive missions, he must then examine the logistic picture to ascertain his resourcee, what he requires, and to balance out the two. This is occasionally referred to ae inserting commonsense into the situation.
50

Here, the commander must exert bis personality. The planners snd operation people of bis staff must recognize the general logistical linritatione of the situation and his Iogis. ticians muet eeek ways to support the optimum operations plan. The ordy thing that actually matters in the long run is the retention of the initiative, maintaining the command in a condition fit to fight, and the accomplishment of the mission.
Main Points

What points, then, should be considered in developing a philosophy of the attac$? The following ones would seem to be the most important: In spite of advanced weaponsYstems, surveillance devices, and the advantages of greatly increased firepower, a favorable decision can only be reached by a commander who rises from his backside& fixes his bayonet, and attacks. The attack, to have any meaning witbin the over-all purpose of a war, must serve either the political objet. tives which required the use of force, or must contribute to the defeat of the enemy w,ar establishment. . The concept of attacking in a linear formation wae fine in World War II, but increased firepower and mobility demand more of the small unit commander and has given warning that pact tactical formation may be as dated as the weapons of tbe past. The attacker must have a plan, but that planand the commander must be sufficiently flexible to permit deviation, exploitation of a eituation, or a rapid shift to a new approach if tbe first effort is not successful. The attacker should allocate sufficient resources to ensure the accom plishment of the mission assigned @ Military Rwl~*

THEATTACK ach subordinate unit, but-especially ,n the nuclear battlefield-should ex,rcisegreat care to prevent providing OO many, lest his combat power be oncentrated in a target complex for he enemy, and his rear left exposed o the unexpected. o The key to any move more com]Iexthan sitting in one place is in he training given the unit prior to :ombat. Perhaps no unit will ever be :ompletelytrained to the degree which he commander might desire, but :hereare acceptable and nonacceptable tates of training. The commander ,vho must fight a unit mnst do so with :omplete knowledge of the capahilitiesof the command. o Logistics must be an integral part of the commanders plan, but he must make it work for him, rather than to have logistical support constantly presented only as a limiting factor beyond which he may not go. There must be the will to win. A commander muet poseess it, and he must have the moral courage and physical stamina to enforce his will on his entire command. The will to win must, of couree, be tempered with a practical realism that will recognize the impossibility of some courses of action, the impracticality of others, and the potential pitfalls in all. Wars may be won by &mr, but this vital spirit must be applied in a rational and practical way.

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khmrf 1965

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BLEEDING KANSAS

UR modern United States Army, contemplating years of guerrilla warfare, seemingly finds itself frustrated by an apparent lack of victory, bypolitical direction of military oper- . atimw, and by the problem of locating the real enemy. The very existence of that state Of mind denies that our Army of years ago ever faced the same frustrations. This is not true, of course. Throughout ita history, the Army has had to copewith problems remarkably similar to the ones it must cope with today. And it seems well to recall tbe words of Colonel Robert N. Ginsburgb who, after reviewing the history of our Philippine operations in the early 1900s,wrote:
It is fair to conclude that US stu-

publicized primary issue, but also several economic and social issues which

probably were equal[y large determining factors. After the creation of the new territory in 1854, Missourians by their very proximity-quickly gained economic control through the preemption of timber and coal regions and tbe acquisition of the two most likely townsitesAtchison and Leav- ~ enworth. They also secured political control after the first Territorial election, and seemed well on their way toward ensuring the preservation of the slave code when the entirely unexpected Topeka Free State movement emerged in the fall of 1855. Immense Problem An immense problem now confronted both tbe National and Territorial Administrations. The KansasNebraska Act had created the customary Territorial government with a legislature elected by tbe local populace and executive and judicial branches appointed by the Preeident. The new Free State faction refused to participate in the Territorial government and set up an imperium in imperio with state elections, governor, legislature, constitution, and militia. They called the duly constituted Territorial Legislature bogus and swore noncompliance to its bogus laws and bogns officials; they raised and armed their state militia in opposition to the bogus Territorial force. By late 1855 a physical clash ., between the two camps seemed imminent. Decisions and indecision at both the National and Territorird levels only compounded the situation. The initial clash occurred near the Free State town of Lawrence when a Territorial sheriff had an accused man taken from his custody by snpposed Free t%aters. When Governor 53

dents of courrterinsurgenc~ wilt find it equally as rewarding to studg our wm past experiences as well as the
more recent tions. experiences of other na-

Thb manner in which the Army conducted itself during our own Kansas struggle of the 1850s-a struggle whichhad political, economic, psychO. logical,and sociological as well as miltary fouhdationsmerits the study of both historians and planners of modern military strategy. Tbe complexity of the Kansas Territorial troubles cannot be overemphasized. Like our pr@ent global struggle, it involved not only the much
Colonel Robert N. Ginsburah. .Dmnn tbe In. ~Toctos!,.. Md>umu Retezu, January 19a4, DD

David C. Skaggs, a first lieutenant in the Army Reserve, is assigned to the 20iOth Army Reserve School Unit, Fort Myer, Virginia. He is a graduate fellers and doctoral candidate in histoy at Georgetozon University, and attended the University of Kansas where he received his Masters degree.

Wmsry1965

BIEEDING KANSAS

Wilson Shanpon ordered the militia to aid the sheriff, Lawrence citizens prepared to defend their village. To avert combat the Governor requested Colonel Edwin V. Sumner, commanding the Ist Cavalry Regiment and the Army post at Fort Leavenworth, to send troops. Sumner refused to help and Shannon wired Washington for autborizat ion to use Federal forceg. Four days later, on 4 December 1855, Shannon received President Franklin Pierces cryptic reply promising that all the power vested in the executive would be ueed to preserve order and enforce the laws. The telegram continued, saying that the preliminary measures necessary to be taken before calling out the troops would be promptly executed and that Shannon would be fully advised when this was done. Since hi had received no authorization to use the cavalry, Colonel Sumner refused to leave his post.
Proclamation Finally solving the dilemma at Law-

retary of State William L. Marcy and Secretary of War Jefferson Dsvis. The result was a Presidential procla. mation issued in February 1856 which placed the combined might of the Territorial militia and the US Army be. hind all laws, Federal and Territorial,
Moral Force

Secretary Davis wrote Colonel Sum. ner and Lieutenant Colonel Philip Saint George Cooke, who commanded Fort Riley, that they might be called upon hy the Governor for aid if the Governor found: . . . the ordinarv course of judicial
proceedings afid powers vested in the Un{ted States marshals inadequate for the suppression of insurrectionary combinations or armed resistance to the execution of the law.

rence by compromise, Governor Shannon again appealed to the White House for assistance. He knew that the Free State concept of a bogus Territorial government made it necessary to use the instruments of the National Governmentwhich both the Free State and proslavery forces respectedto restore and preserve order. This brought before the Pierce administration one of the most important aspects of the Kansas crisis. Should special tactics be used in a situation where a large percentage of the population did not recognize the constituted civil government, or ehould that government be continued in its current form? To help him decide, President Pierce called in his trusted aides, Sec. 54

Davis hoped the soldiers would be used as a moral force rather than a physical one, and felt they would soon return to the more grateful and prouder service of the soldier, that of common defense. Secretary Marcy, writing to Shannon for the President, said tbe Governor could call on the Army if it became indispensably necessary to do so in order to execute the laws and preserve the peace. It would appear from this letter that Shannon was given considerable discretionary latitude whereas Davis letter to Sumner and Cooke was certairdy more limiting. The proclamation, two different sets of instructions, and three contrasting personalities eventually resulted in different interpretations than Washington intended. Conflict between Governor Shannon and Colonels Sumner and Cooke as to the correct interpretation was bound to arise. In May 1856 violence again erupted. Military Review

BLEEDING NANSAS Proslavery @lements, u?ing the pretest of militia duty, raided Lawrence, md John BrOwn led a brutal murder offive proslavery men on POttawatOrnie Creek. At Fort Leavenworth more authority to combat what he considered a etate of banditry. On 4 June Shannon issued a proclamation calling upon all unauthorized armed bands to disperse; it had little

Free State militia battery in Topeka ColonelSumner readily complied with Governor Shannons requests for troopsto escort marshals, escort prisoners,and to break up armed hands. Perhaps he acceded too readily, but hefelt he was withjn his orders. As the months went by, Sumner grsw bolder, even moving without Federal marshals accompanying his patrols. Because he, often used only Territorial law enforcement officials toassist him, Sumner drew the wrath ofthe Free State camp and ita vocal supporters in New England, New York, and Washington. Instead of slowingdown, however, he requested hhtit~ 1965 effect on the situation. A few days later, after having been in the field fora month, the 1st Cavalry returned to Fort Leavenworth for rest, reinforcements, and resuppIy. Feeling that he needed a force of troops at hie immediate disposal, Shannon called Colonel Cookee 2d Dragoone to Lecompton, the Territorial capital. Cooke disliked what he found. He felt the eituation could be settled by the Territorial officiale if they would proeecute the prisoners already in custody. Cooke failed to see the Fkee State position of disregarding the Territorial otficiak, and 55

BLEEDlN13 KANSAS wanted

the Army to stay ont of petty embroilments of armed constabulary duty. Relating his views to Governor Sffannon, he marched his 134 men, 124 horses, and one six-pound cannon back to Fort Riley. The turmoil aroused in Washington

to move his Department of the West Headquarters from Saint Louis to Fort Leavenworth. This move would eliminate Sumner as the senior officer in Kansas and wordd enable General Smith to uti. lize Cooke more extensively. Davis

Free State prisonera at Lecompton heId by the Federal Government over Colonel Sumners using Federal troops to enforce the bogus laws raised havoc with the administration in an election year. Kansas became an albatrose around the neck of tbe Democratic Party. My knowledge of tbe facts is incomplete, Pierce admitted, as be contemplated what action he might take. Indecision was so rampant that on one day two sets of conflicting instructions went from the White House to the Territorial GOV. ernor. Hoping to remove the partys albatross, Secretary Davis decided to install Colonel Cooke as field commander instead of Colonel Sumner, in the belief that Cooke would be more discreet in his use of soldiers than Sumner. To do this, Davis ordered tbe ailing Brigadier General Persifor F. Smith 56 instructions to General Smith were quite specific-his men were to accompany civil officers who held processes, to aid such officers in making arrests, and to escort prisoners. There was no mention of dispersing armed bands which had committed no known crime and which contained no individuals for whom warrants were held. Before this change could be effected, however, new developments occurred in Kansas. Governor Shannon resigned and left the territory before a replacement arrived, thereby putting his rabid proslavery secretary, Daniel Woodson, in office as Acting Governor. Colonel Sumner brought his refreshed and reinforced command to Lecompton and awaited further instructions. He did not have a long wait. Military Review

BLEEDIN6 KANSAS

Before he left, Shannon had urged ,umner to disperse the Free State ~gislature if it should try to meet s scheduled on Independence Day. h the 80th anniversary of the Decmation of Independence, Acting Govrnor Woodsm issued a proclamation ailing for the illegal assembly to dlsland.Even after a Territorial marshal ead the proclamation before the citiens of Topeka, the Iegfilature coninued to deliberate. Sumner faced a supreme challenge. ;hould he obey the request of the territorial Governor or should he lbeyhis conscience, which favored the Free State cause ? After some soul learching, Sumner, who had assem-

whole life he must force the insurrectionary conclave to d}sband. Sumners action had immediate and considerable political repercussions. To the Northern press it appeared that a peaceful assembly of citizens had been deprived of its constitutional right. Deeply shocked at the colonels rash action, Secretary of War Davis severely rebuked Sumner for acting prior to eneuring that the Territorial government had exhausted all the legal resources which Davis felt were unused at the time of the incident. Sumner tried in vain to explain that as the local commander, in close touch with the situation, he had determined that dispersal of the Free State Legis-

K.....

Au Zbt.x court-u of State Hi#tond .%c,ety. ToPek., Kez,.as

Colonel Edwin ~. Sumner disperses the Free State Le.qiskiture, bledfive troops of cavalry and two artillery pieces at the outskirts of Topeka,moved in. He marched to the ineeting hall and told both houses of theFree State Legislature that while it was the most painful duty of my Mmary 1965

4 July 1856

lature was necessary to keep the peace. What Sumner failed to realize was that military operations, especially counterinsurgency operations, must be conducted in light of the existing political eituation. 57

.
BLEEDIN6 ivtmAs General Smith arrived at Fort Leavenworth on 7 July 1856, and a week later Sumner took leave, returning to his home state of New York. Now, Colonel Cooke would have his turn. In putting Cooke in command in the field, Davis installed a levelheaded officer who had spent most of his distinguished career on the Missouri-Kansas border. What Cooke needed, however, was a governor who would work in tandem with him. Darriel Woodson was not such a man. As his first action, Cooke refnsed Woodsons ridiculous request that he invest Topeka, level its f ortitications, and confine the Free State leaders there. After this irmident, Cooke forced the Territorial militia, which had been on almost continuous duty since the previous winter, to release some Free State prisoners it held. But in not prosecuting the Acting Governors obviously biased requests, Cooke did not resolve the situation which had grown critical during the two months following the Fourth of July incident.
Course of Action

Kansas Territory, someone in author. ity recognized that the real issue be. hind the violence was neither elavery nor greed, but conflicting land claims. If this iseue could be settled, Geary felt, the basis for popular support of either faction would disappear. To settle the immediate problem of two sets of armed bands roaming tbe countryside, he disbanded the Territorial militia which Shannon had un. wieely activated. This eliminated tbe raison ddtre for the Free State militia. With no legitimate or neceesary reason for their existence, marauders became criminals, not partisans. Geary subsequently placed any militia he activated in Federal service and, therefore, subject to the Articles of War and Federal officers. Harmonious Relations The Northern-born Governor, assuming dictatorial powers over the territory, worked in close harmony with the Southern-born colonel to bring order from chaos. General Smith reinforced Cooke with 200 men from the 6th Infantry Regiment, thereby relieving the more mobile cavalry and Dragoone from garrison duty at Lecompton and Topeka. The quickly delivered maneuvers of Geary and Cooke left both sides ao stunned that in less than a month relative peace reigned. Lieutenant Colonel Joseph E. Johnston took a cavalry patrol to the Nebraska border to stop a rumored invasion by the Free State radical, James Lane. Cooke poised the Dragoons to intercept an assault against Lawrence by a proslavery force from Missouri. On 6 October 1856 the infantrymen guarded. the polls during a Territorial election, Although tbe Free Staters still refused to vote in this election, the way was paved for Free. State participation a year later.
Militarykaiew

It was during this so-called August War, when armed bande openly engaged in combat, that Cooke resojved a course of action he felt would properly utilize his force. The new field commander evolved a three-part program: He let the political factions wage their own battlesin print. He moved in concert with Federal marshals holding duly constituted warrants. He stopped obvious reinforcements of arms to either side. The arrival of a new Governor, John W. Geary, in September 1856 helped soothe the situation. For the first time in the short history of the 58

BLEEDING KANSAS Bymid-October peace eeemed aesured mall except the isolated and roughly Wooded southeastern section of Kansas where pafiies under the control of John Brown and James Montgomery continued their rapine tactics. Having pacified the territory with the use Of force, the next item on Governor Gearys agenda wae to institute economic stability and political dernocraw. In the wring of 1857 the Territorial land office received applications for and granted clear title to vast tracts of land which had just recentlybeen surveyed. As secure land patents became possible in most of Karmas,contests between rival claimants were settled in the courtroom, noton the battlefield. During the year, conservative, elements within the Free State Party gainedcontrol, and they directed participation in the Territorial election. Victury gave them dominance over thelegislature whose earlier laws they calledbogus, and ended the necessity for the state government f acade. As far as the Army was concerned, its subsequent activities consisted of guarding the polls during elections and of sending company-sized units to localized trouble spots. Impatience Most military personnel regarded their duties as boring. After Governor Gearys pacitjcation campaign, theybecame more and more impatient at the inactivity and expressed a desire to end their supposedly meaningless duty, They diaJiked being kept way from the pleasures of garrison fife and the thrills of the Indian campaigns. One young officer wrote he wouldrather fight Indians than stay in the territory all summer subject tn the orders of the Governor.
rhruary 1965

Captain Nathaniel Lyon sent the Governor overly optimistic reporta of contltions in the southeastern section so that he and his troops might be returned earlier to Fort Leavenworth. Major Thomas W. Sherman complained bitterly to the Governor that his troops did nothing and should he returned to garrison. These men never seemed to realize that their boredom indicated their succese. As long as the threat of Federal retaliation existed, the lust of the plunderer disappeared. When the Army left the isolated areas in the southeast, depredations began.
Historical Value

For modern military strategists, faced again with the problems of insurgency, there is much to be gleaned from this struggle of 11 decades past. For example, one can draw the obvious conclusion that there is more to fighting guerriUas than destroying elusive and, more often, illusive partisans. There must be a coordinated civilianmilitary effort against the economic and social bases of conflict. In an insurgency situation, there cannot be military or political victory without attention being paid to the underlying evils around which the contest began. Certainly, the military activities Of Colonel Cooke would not have been successful if they had not been combined with Governor Gearys astute attention to solving the immediate problem of the Territorial militia and the deeper problem of land titles. The struggle in Kansas also focused on tbe problems caused by a division of authority. No matter how rapid communications are between tbe field and central headquarters, situations develop eo fast that centralized decision making cannot cope with them 59

BLEEDING KANSAS

in time to alleviate the problem in the field. Throughout the Kansas struggle, it became evident that field commanders, both civilian and military, had to be empowered to make rapid decisionsdecisions made, of course, within broad outlines of policy directed from Washington. This solution rests almost entirely upon the premise that the men directing the operation are coolheaded, intelligent, and forceful. The indecision and inaction of the Pierce administration was countered in the field by the excessive activity of Colonel Sumner who failed to fit his only solution-overt actionto existing political limitations.

And, finally, impartiality is another attribute which the Army must have in such a situation. Favoritism only intensities problems and in no way aids in their solution. The study of previous insurgency situations cannot solve all aspects of contemporary ones, nor does it pretend to do so. Modern guerrilla operations invite unique problems and unique solutions. Nevertheless, as Colonel Ginsburgh has noted, todays Commu. nist subversive tactics serve .to rein. force conclusions reached from past experiences in the necessity of CO~. bining political, military, economic, and psychological efforts in order to combat insurgency successfully.

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60

Military Reviel I

ORGANIZED LOOTING
The Basis of Partisan Warfare
Leo Heiman

EARLY all books published in recent years on the subject of guerrilla warfare have one serious shortcoming in common. They speak of partisan operations and tactics, motivation, and psychology, but fail to underline tbe problems of supply and transportation. Most authors dismiss the subject of partisan logistics with such stereotype phrases as guerrillas live off the land, and partisans have no transportation problems because they move on foot and carry whatever supplies they need on their backs. These are dangerous misconceptions, despite the grains of truth. they contain. The fact is that adequate supply and transportation are the basis of potent guerrilla warfare. A few small bands can exist witbout logistics, but no organized insurgency or centrally directed partisan movement is possible without tackling the thorny problem of logistics at its grassroots level. There is a good reason why the

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LOOTING

problem of guerrilla logistics is not appreciated by most students of insurgences and partisan operations. Few authors of books devoted to the subjeet of guerrilla warfare have been guerrillas themselves. And a study of books written by former partisan commanders sheds little light on this vital area. Since nearly all partisan commanders must solve the problem of logistics by organized looting, extortion, and pillage, they are naturally ashamed to admit it in their books and memoirs. They may speak at length shout blowing up trains, ambushing enemy troops, recruiting enthusiastic volunteers, or operating cloak-and-dagger undergrounds next door to enemy police headquarters. But they are not proud of having denrived some impoverished Deasant of his last loaf of bread, having robbed a poor widow and her children of their last goat, or suffered heavy casualties just for a few sacks of potatoes. Yet, this, too, is partisan reality. Few will admit it, but logistics cause mm-e partisan casualties than any type of enemy action. The large-scale looting of a civilian population, which forms the cornerstone of partisan logistics and the very basis of guerrilla operations, is nothing to be proud of. No Commnnist
Leo Heiman is a frequent contributor to the MILITARYREVIEW. A foreign press correspondent, he was born in Poland, studied in the Soviet Union, and fought with Soviet par+isan forces against the German Army for two years. He attended Munich University, and went to Israel in 1948 where he served in the army and navy for seven years. His latest article, Assistance. by S m a 11 Military appeared in the March Nations: 1964 issue.

authority on the subject, from Mao Tse-tung to Ch6 Guevara, wilI ad. mit having looted the peasants. h their books the population is eagerly assisting the partisans, out of its own desire to speed up the process of liberation. This is not true. Former Soviet, Polish, and Greek partisan commanders either do not mention the subject at all or claim to have subsisted on supplies captured from the enemy. This, too, is not true, The truth is that no large-scale guerrilla movement can exist and operate without organized looting of the civil. ian population. Since, at the same time, tile movement requires tbe POPU. Iations sympathy and support, the problems of supply and transportstio~ are often the worst dilemma a guer. rills chief must face. Misused Oogma When 1 served with the Reconnais. sance Detachment of the Rokossovsky Brigade of Soviet Partisan Forces in the forests of Belorussia in World War II, more than one carefully con. ceived and planned guerrilla operstior failed because of inadequate transpor tation and supply. The misused dogrm that guerrillas live off the land mrc move on foot applies only to renal units. When my unit was less thar 50 strong in the summer of 1942, il had no logistic broblems to speak of Food was available in any village am on every farm, shelter was provide[ by the overhanging branches of oh gnarled trees, and we could march O] foot undisturbed up to 40 kilometer: a day in any direction we chose. But our impact as guerrillas WS: insignificant. We killed Nazi police men, cut telephone and telegrapl wires, hanged German-appointed vil lage headmen and pro-Nazi collabo raters, burned a few wooden treatl Military flwi~

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LOOTIN6

ridges, and ambushed a few police >hlcleson the roads. These local pinricks gave us a good feeling, boosted u prestige with the local populace, Id made the Germane angry. But

and a small landing strip in the forest. During the crucial battle of KurskOrel in July 1943, our brigade was ordered to paralyze German railway communication near the Ivatsevitehi

Mom. than one carefully conceived and planned guerrilla operation failed because of
inadequate transportation and
supply

they did not influence the outcome of decisiveEastern Front campaigns, did not harm the Nazi war machine, and did not contribu~e to the ultimate German defeat in the Soviet Union. Onlyan organized, centrally directed partisan campaign could do that. In the summer ~f 1943 our outfit grew to a full-fledged partisan brigade, about 1,200 strong. We maintained a regular channel of communication with the Central Headquarters ofthe Partisan Movement in MOSCOW andhad a powerful radio transmitter hhw.ry1965,

cau~eway in the Polesski Marshee. The main Warsaw-Moscow Railroad passed over this causeway, and up to 200 German trains thundered along its double tracks every day with ammunition, fuel, reinforcements, and supplies. Our sabotage detachments bad mined tbe railroad despite German security precautions. Blowing up two or three trains a day only slowed down the German volume of traffic, however, but did not halt it entirely. A plan was worked out by representatives of the Central Partisan 83

,LOOTING Headquarters who had parachuted intd our camp, in consultation with local guerrilla chiefs, to attack the fortified stations on both sides of the causeway with units in brigade strength, pin down the enemy, and blow up the tracks to prevent reinforcements being rushed by armored train from the nearest city. While one partisan brigade attacked a whistlestop station 24 kilometers west of the causeway, and another assaulted the Byten junction east of Ivatsevitshi, the Rokossovsky Brigade was assigned the task of blowing up the causeway.
Advantages and Disadvantages

To make the attack possible, Soviet transport aircraft dropped containers with PTR antitank rifles, ammuni. tion, delayed-action bombs, a few thousand soan cakes of TNT. fuzes. and detonators. The P7R antitank rifle was a relatively new Soviet weapon at that time, and, while it was soon obsolete against the new German Tiger tanks, it was the ideal weapon for partisans. Its accuracy was amazing, and a trained PTR crew could hit the boiler of a railway locomotive at 800 meters. This enabled us to ambush German trains in daylight, shooting them up from a safe distance. The PTRs only disadvantage, as far as we guerrillas were concerned, was its size and weight. It required two men to carry it, and a third to haul the boxes of ammunition. Since we had to cross some 30 kilometers of marshy ground to get within ehooting distance of the Ivatsevitshi causeway, we needed peasant carts and horses for the PTRs, heavy machineguns, explosives, bombs, and ammunition. In theory, we could start one or 64

two days earlier and move On fool across the swamps. In Practice, thk was impossible. No trees grew in thf marshes, and the low clumps of vege tation and prickly bushes did not pro vide adequate cover. German recon naissance aircraft made daily flight along the main railroad line, and w would be caught out in the open i we tried to bivouac in the swamp in daytime. Moreover, an attack o) the causeway, across minefield an! barbed wire and under heavy enern, fire, was not going to be a pushove] The assault units had to be fresh m rested, not worn out after a force 30-kilo~eter march across swamp carrying the heavy PTRs and ammu nition boxes on their backs. Our commander decided, therefor( that we would round up some 30 peasant carts and horses, load the er tire brigade upon them, and move m at dusk, taking a detour via hart packed village dirt tracks. This WOU1 bring us to the Ivatsevitshi statio at midnight. The horse carts WOUI also enable us to evacuate our woundf and be back in the forest by dawn, We also had to consider the posa bility of a strong German antipartiss offensive. This would force us to r treat to another forest, abandonir our supply dumps of potatoes, cal bage, smoked meat, and flour. TI men had to be fed, and we were o dered to seize pigs, cows, sheep, ilou potatoes, and other staple foods wh! we picked up the carts and horses. said than dor The villages in our own partias controlled zone had been impoverish{ by constant raids and SUPPlYoPer tions. Not a single horse was left most of them. Many had been raz, by the Germans during punitive ex~ Military Rwi
Villages Stripped This was easier

LOOTING ditions and antipartisan offensives. Crops had been destroyed, cattle slaughtered, and the peaeante wiped out or driven into the forest. This meant that we had to get our supplies from villages Outside the partisancontrolled zone. Most such villagee had strong polite or home guard garrisons, though, \vhich greeted us with machinegun andrifle fire. Looting pigs and horses and robbing the peasants of their bread and potatoes was a very prosaic mission without any heroice and and horsesless than one-third the number required. No matter how hard we tried, we could do no better. Accordingly, our brigade commander ordered all PTRs, heavy machineguns, TNT, and ammunition loaded upon the available carts and rushed to the causeway as planned. Our monnted Reconnaissance Detachment and the Brigade Sabotage Company ~provided eecort for the PTR squads. The rifle companies and special assault detachmentsarmed with eubmachineguns and grenades only a J

Blowing up two M. three trains a day only skmved dm.m the German volume of traffic,
but did not bait it entirely

glory. But it was more difficult than blowing Up a train or ambushing an enemy convoy on the road. It was more dangerous, too. we were not the only partisan brigade operating in ihe district. Other units also needed horses and had to collectfoodstuffs. The result wae that after one week of hectic activity and
9uffering numerous casualties, only 92 peasant could provide we

carts

moved out on foot across the marshes. What happened was the most disastrous defeat our brigade had ever suffered. Our Reconnaissance Detachment and the horse cart convoy arrived on time and deployed as planned. But the bulk of our brigade had bogged down in the swamps. By the time they arrived, tired, wet, and worn out, the battle had already raged for more than three hours on both sidee

Ithru,ny 1965

I
I

65

LOOTING

of the causeway, and the Germans were ready *for us. Our first two attacks were repulsed with heavy casualties, and when we regrouped for the third assault, dawn broke over the eastern skyline and the brigade commander ordered a general retreat. Having lost more than 100 dead and wounded without any tangible results, he refused to expose the brigade to inevitable German Luftwaffe bombing and strafing after sunrise. We failed to achieve our main ob. jective-the destruction of the vital causeway. German trains kept moving to the Kursk-Orel battlefront. We failed to accomplish our mission be. cause of insufficient transportation,
Food Problems

Transportation is only one of the numerous logistic problems which confront a guerrilla leader. It is easy to say that partisans live off the land, but what if viIlages have been razed, the farmers deported or massacred, crops destroyed, and cattle slaughtered ? Partisans are free of supply worries only in the orthodox military sense. They can live without regular rations, blankets, underwear, shoelaces, and toothpaste. But they must eat. Even where the local populace is friendly, sympathizes with the guerrillas, and is genuinely willing to help which is frequently not the case providing the necessary amounts of staple foodstuffs remains guerrilla problem number one. Any former partisan leader who mentions the problems of feeding his men must admit that most of the food, clothes, horses, and tools had to be looted from the peasants. Looting was comparatively easy in Russia, the Ukraine, Lithuania, and Belorussia during the first year of 66

World War IL The farmers still had their cows, sheep, goats, chickens, and horses, and even the kolkhoz collec. tives, taken over intact by the Ger. mans, could provide flour, potatoeg, and meat for partisan raiding per. ties. But in the summer of 1942, during the first Battle of Stalingrad, tbe Ger. mans made a major effort to wips out the partisans operating in their rear areas. Regular infantry divisions on their way to the battlefront were dis. embarked from trains a few hundred kilometers behind the front] ines, and marched on foot across the guerrillainfested-zonee, combing out the forests en route. This delayed the arrival of German reinforcements at the battlefront and proved to be ineffective. Guerrilla units scattered ahead of the German steamroller, moved to another location, and reassembled after the German tomb-out waves had disappeared.
Soorched-Earth Policy

The Germans did one thing, however, which made later partisan oper. ations difficult. They burned villages, razed farms, and seized all cattls and horses. The peasants who did not flee were either killed or deported to slave labor camps. The scorched-earth policy forced the partisans to get their food and horses in villages within the German-controlled zoneswithin shooting range of police forts, railroad stations, fortified stronghold, military barracks, and cities with etrong garrisons. To solve the thorny problems of logistics, the Central Headquartera of the Soviet Partisan Movement devised a 10-point program, good in theory, but unworkable in actual practic~. Stealing was strictly forbidden, and partisane found guilty of theft were Militaty fleview

LOOTING

executed by firing squad, without being granted the right to appeal the death sentence. A guerrilla became guilty Of theft if he took anything \vithout first infOrming the propertys owner Of the seizures purpose and identifying himself as a member of the Soviet partisan forces. Initially, the Central Headquarters instructions commanded the partisans to issue receipts for anything seized from tbe farmers. The receipts had to be signed by partisan commanders or commissary. But the signed receipt system was misused by bandit gangs and criminal elements posing ae partieans who robbed the peasants, is. sued fancy receipts, and promised to redeem everything after the Soviet Army returned to the occupied re. gions.
+ieceipt System Ends

wholesale cesses.

pillaging,

and

other

ex-

Notorious Order

New instruction eventually put an end to tbe signed receipt system. Onlybrigade or detachment commanders were authorized to order seizures of food, clothing, or animals, and to conduct expropriation operations. Looting of money, jewelry, toilet articles, personal effects, and, in fact, anything but basic foods, horses, and working tools, was forbidden. Infractions against this rule were punishableby death. Stud groups of partisans detached from their units on sabotage reconnaissance and other missions entailing an absence of more than 24 hours from camp were authorized to enter farms and vi]lages and ask for food. They could aIso seize horses to facilitate their movement or to evacuate their wounded. As a rule, these instructions were obeyedby most guerrilla formations. But there were many loopholes and exceptions which led to rape, murder,
Fekuary 1965

The most notorious loophole was Order 1OO-JAT which authorized the execution of enemies of the people, their immediate relatives, and the confiscation of their property. Up to the spring of 1943, only real traitors and pro-Nazi collaboratorsGermanappointed village headmen and police chiefswere so classified and were shot or hanged. Order 1OO-JAT, flashed by radio to all partiean units in May 1943, changed this. Now, all persons employed by the German administration who willingly facilitated the enemys war effort or helped the occupation regime were to be classified as enemies of the people. A railroad stationmaster, for example, who went on working for the Germans thus became an enemy of the people, and was placed on the liquidation lists urdees he agreed to cooperate with the partisans, leak vital information to their agents, and plant time bombs supplied by guerrilla saboteurs. The order opened new vietas for partisan looting. Since everything had to be confiscated or destroyed, everything could be looted. Before that, most seasoned partisans preferred two combat missions to one supply operation which was dangerous and tedious. But now there was no lack of volunteers for operations within the framework of Order 1OO-JAT and most enemies of the people, real and imaginary, took refuge in Germanheld cities. With sources dwindling, partisan commanders had to think fast to keep their men dressed and fed. The result was the Double Quota order. German occupation authorities had imposed agricultural delivery quotas

LOOTING

upon every farm and village. Peasants who fell behind in handing over eggs, butter, milk, meat, and wool for the occupation authorities were flogged the first time, seriously beaten for the second offense, and banged in the marketplace the third time. The Double Quota order opened with a lofty preamble that supplying agricultural deliveries to the enemy was tantamount to treason, since it helped the German war effort in the Soviet Union. A village which honored its supply commitments to the Germans would be severally punished (burned ) by provisional Soviet authorities (partisans), unless it supplied twice as much to the defenders of the people (partisans). The result wae that most villages were looted and burned either by the partisans, for failing to comply with the Double Quota order, or by the Germans, for, having halted agricultural deliveries to the occupation au-

thorities. All this generate additional hatreds and bitterness whch served our over-all political-psycbol, gical PU. pose, but which complicated our sup. ply problems a hundredfold. In my opinion, the problems of par. tisan logistics are,, common to guerrilla and insurgency operations in all parts of tbe world! Asian partisaus may be capable of matching 48 kilometers a day on a cupful of rice, but they need that rice to begin with, They may not need horses, but they need canal boats or junks for the movement of supplies and support weapons, evacuation of wounded, aud rapid transportation of assault units under tbe cover of darkness, They may pick up hundreds of weapons from ambushee, raids, and battlefields, but they still need a sufficient quantity of ammunition for any prolonged fighting. They live off the land to some extent, but their logistics are difficult, complicated, and vulnerable.

The time appears at hand to extend our thinking to embrace a triplepurpose concept for ground combat operations in which counterinsurgency operations snd other types of US military participation overseas in time of nominal peace are a normal third principaI mission of the Army going band in hand with nuclear warfare and conventional warfare. General Harold K. Johnson

66

kwitary Ileviu

Aml:

special Reprint

LETTER

FROM NANKING

Captain Hay Huang, Chinese Armu

This is another in a series of selected reprints from past issues of the MILITARY REVIEW. All of the reprints which will be Wblished in this series will have been drawn from issues published at least 15 years ago. This particular article first appeared in our December 1948 issue. Letter From Nanking is reprinted for its historical value and because of the position Communist China holds in the world today. It is particularly important because it points out the total nature of the war thut was fought on the China mainland between 1946 and 1948, the mental and physical toughness of the Communist soldier, the ruthlessness of his leadefs, and some actions that might have been taken to combat move e~ectively the Communist takeover. The author graduated from the V. S. Army Command and General Stuff College in July 19.$7. Previously, he had served as a platoon comaid in 1946 8aw action mander in Burma, was wounded in Myitkyina, in Manchuria aaainet the Chinese Communists in the first Battle of .%enina-kai. Ch~nochun. His letter is dated at Nanking. 20 June 1948. Cap;ain Huang & now retired and living in the United-States.Editor.

I WU81Y 1985

LETTER FROM NANKIN6

Y CAPfAI~S pay has been raised to Chinese 13 million dollara per month, which sounds ample. But as a matter of fact, it is precisely the opposite. My monthly income, inches thick in Central Bank Notes, does not even suffice to buy a pair of decent shoes. I am a bachelor and have no family burden, yet, I find it extremely hard to keep my head above water. How can the married fellows make it? No doubt they have a truly miserable life. The other day I called at the home of a lieutenant colonel. This officer, educated in Hongkong and the United States, is an out. standing soldier. He speaks and writes two or three foreign Ian. guages, and during the late war against the Japanese commanded a regiment of guerrillas in the Yangtze Delta with brilliance. Meeting him the first time, I was deeply impressed with his amiable disposition and organizing ability. Later, official duties caused me to report, to him occasionally and my admiration for him increased, He is an outstanding leader, and very talented. I had been informed that his home was very humble. But that afternoon, to my surprise, I found myself in front of a not-too-bad brick house. As there was no bell, I knocked on the door. My senior officer appeared, opened the door, and ushered me in. What a house! That western style building, built to accommodate three or four persone, was actually occupied by five families. My colonel has four children and his entire family lives in one room 16 by 20 feet. Their room was dark, dingy, and badly ventilated. He let me sit on one of his two chairs while he perched on the bed as we talked. In a minute or two his wife stepped in. She was quite an attractive lady, but, like her husband, miscast for life in such rough surroundings. I stood up and the colonel introduced me. The lady did not stay long, but apologized as she hastily flapped back the bed cover on which her husband was sitting, picked up a can of grease from under the bed, and quickly made her way out. Her excuse-the cooking must be hurrie,d before other housewives in the same building should monopolize the kitchen. It is disgraceful that the brains of our armed forces muet live under such miserable conditions. This is what is referred to as the tranquil life in the peaceful rear areas, but the prospects of the combat zone, of course, are even more distressing.

Casualty Lists In the days when we were fighting the Japanese, it was always a shock when we heard that a certain division commander was killed in action. And we would consider it an overwhelming loss when an entire regiment was routed by the enemy. But now, with the Communists as our opponents, our casualty lists carry even the names of corps and army commanders, and many a seasoned brigade has been reported wiped out after a Red attack.
70 MijitaryReview

LETTER FROM NANKING News of this type appears in the papers every day and is so corn. monas to cause little comment. But we who are more or less involved in the scene just cannot dismiss the significance of the long casualty lists. After hearing of this or that brother officer killed or taken prisoner, ourselves constantly oppressed by the ever-heavier burden of the cost of living, we begin to ask. ourselves: Can we win out? I am afraid that many of our foreign friends believe the anewer is in the negative. Last year I read an article released by an American syndicate in which the author aseerted that the situation in China was incurable. Many columnists and feature writers predicted that we might lose the North in a few months and the rest of China soon after. Their predictions were not entirely groundless. They pointed out that two years ago we seemed to have every advantage over the Communists, yet we did not win the war. Now, at a stage when the odds are reversed, how can we win? Their deductions are quite plausible but, perhaps, arrived at a little too hastily. It is true that early in 1946 the situation was more advantageous to us. Our planes commanded the air, as they still do. The fertile provinces south of the Yangtze were untouched by the Communists. We enjoyed the superiority of numbers, our crack divisions were making progress in Manchu&ia, and the equipment of our troops, although inadequate, at that time was still much better than that of the Reds. Two years ago a great many people, including some of our general officers, overestimating the advantage of these favorable conditions, came up with the conclusion that victory would be easy for us and that the war against the Communists could be ended in a fiw short months. Blunder

The big blunder in this estimate of the situation was that too mnch stress had been laid on the value of material superiority, while many other important factors were entirely disregarded. Those optimists did not realize that the Communist is a professional agitator and a skillful organizer, and, therefore, a very dangerous enemy. They did not visualize the gains the Reds had grasped while peace negotiations were in process, and our observers failed to foresee the possibility that international relations might turn to our disadvantage. In the spring of 1947 we were still hopeful of driving the enemy northward. It was only in the summlx that we discovered that this strategy would not work. The Communists refused to maintain contact with our forces but, instead, let the fighting sProut uP here and there like mushrooms. There were, and still are, sound reasons for our enemies methods. Their armies are built Up on the farms. Without bothering themselves about laws, they have been able to develop a system of drafting as many conscripts as they require. They feed their troops in private kitchene. They are prepared to take any town at little cost and are ready to evacuate it at any convenient time if it becomes fmlafy1965
71

LEUER

FROM NANKING

apparent. that to hold it they must pay off. They are quite carefree and their strategy is destructive. They do not worry if the national economy is paralyzed. While our Supreme Headquarters finds it a terrific task to maintain a payroll of millions of soldiers, the Red military strength is no burden to them at all. The sky is the limit. Psychological Factors Even more acute are the psychological factors involved. Remember that this civil war crowded on the heels of eight years of desperate fighting with the Japanese, in which we suffered much death and destruction. Consequently, many people just cannot stand gunfire and air bombing any longer. After the disillusionment of VJ-day and the peace negotiations, our people are very much depressed and their negative attitude toward our present exertion is not surprising. And the Communist is a well-trained propagandk,t, knowing how to work on the public mind, especially the mind of a frustrated people who are demanding a change, who ~re ready to accept any black hope, and who are inclined to turn against what they fancy

r 4\.. -.. L
151 NG. HAI;

S,x -.

CHINA SEA /

to be the cause of their Protracted agonies. SO far, the Communist has- been very successful in stirring ~p the general war-weary feelings of our-good citizens whose loyalty and support are of vital importance to us. In the long eight years we were engaged with the Japanese, the counsel of our beloved ones was: $Do your duty and take care of yourself. What a change it is today, and how much our morale is sapped, when these same voices say: Why must you be such fools! Is it a cause worth fighting for ? It is far easier for people to VIS72 Mlitary llelien I

LETTER FROM NANKIN6

ualize the danger of a foreign invadere bayonets than the einister danger of the Communists sugar-coated propaganda. Furthermore, 80 percent of our population are illiterate, while a majority of our people are all but starving. To simple, uneducated, hungry people, food is of far more concern than any political conceptions. It is, indeed, difficult to teach them the difference between communism and democracy when their stomachs are empty. Now the Communists lead them to an open revolt, luring them with the myth of land reform. Their propaganda is: The corn cake is almost on the tip of your tongue; dont let Chiangs troops take it . away ! It is as effective as it is astute. Meanwhile, there are only abstract nouns to counter this psychological warfare. It is much easier for me to cobble my shoes four times before they go to pieces, and for my colonel to keep his family in a hovel, than for Private Chang Teh-sheng to understand why we must battle Mao Tze-tung while his family is left behind with scarcely enough to eat, year after year. New Phase Today, the Communists are rampant, and we suffer. But the war situation has entered a new phase in that there are always slight turns, minor changes, and gradual developments which eventually are certain to affect the course of our campaign. First of all, our people are beginning to comprehend that the suppression of communism is a hard, tough job and will take time. Nobody any longer clings to the vain hope of an early victory. Our generals are deploying their troops more warily, realizing at last that combating the Reds is not necessarily easier than opposing the Japanese, that in many respects it is much tougher. Tbe suicidal doctrine of defending every position at any cost bas been absndoned. More freedom in operations now enables our field commanders to gain the initiative. Certain field armies have been performing impressively since the adoption of the new tactics. Two years ago only a few of our people understood that in addition to successful military operations, political, economical, and psycboiogical warfare are also necessary to guarantee victory. Now, although much time has been lost, and I cannot say we are making much headway in these fields, at least I am safe in stating that the existence and importance of psychological and economic warfare is clearly recognized. Not long ago such subjects as land redistribution and liquidation of the official capital were only discussed by extremists; today, these topics have become very popular and are even debated in government-owned newspapers. And that is a big change. In the early stages of our war against the Communists, our government was negligent in not seeking the support of the masses of the population. The Communists did not neglect this opportunity, khuary1965
73

LETTER FROM NANKING

and, con~equently, many Pacification Corps troops and militia (civilian components) were absorbed into the Red camp. However, our Supreme Headquarters has now gone into action in this matter, and a very large Peoples Safe Defense Program has been inaugurated. In recent battles this has proved to be of great value to us, for the fabulous mobility of Communist armies is built upon their practice of conscripting replacements on the march, using all farm villages as their supply points and every country hearth as their field kitchen. We believe that before long these methods will not be available to the Reds and then they will lose their mobility and recuperative ability in the field. We have always believed that time was on the side of the Communists; but now we find that this is only half true. A reckless gambler, making use of bis neighbors money as if it were his own, might win a fortune at a single toss, but if he sticks to the gaming table too long, he is certain to ruin his neighbors. That is exactly the case of the Communists who, in the hide and seek operations in Shantung and Honan Provinces, constantly moving their divisions back and forth, have eventually exhausted an immense area. A barren, denuded battlefield may bring this nation another step closer to economic collapse, but it also denies the boundless supply of personnel and food for the Communist Army. Under such circumstances, the Communists, unable longer to effect shock tactics, are bound to lose the campaign. This fact explains why recently they are so anxious to cross the Yangtze or march west to Szechwan they now want to leave the land made barren by their own tactics. Many Problems Thus, we should understand that while our situation is serious, that of our adversaries, the Communists, is by no means easier. Their problems may be of a different nature than ours, but they are by no means less oppressive. Except in Manchuria, the Reds do not have a single railway in operational condition. Their signal, medical, and ordnance supply situation has never been satisfactory. Their nomadic life is not attractive to skilled specialists, whom they need so badly. Their prestige reached its zenith when their campaign symbolized some hope for tbe people. I doubt whether they can maintain their prestige much longer, considering that after years have elapsed the people are still suffering and kinsfolk are being killed and dwellings burned. To be sure, the Red Political Commissary are as tough and crafty as ever, and the morale of the Communist Army can be promoted by well-arranged easy victories and cheered by the land reform propaganda. But their casualty rates increase, and when the Red soldier begins to realize be is enmeshed in an endless career of blood and ashes, dynamited bridges, and detracked railways, but nothjng else, and he finally tires of it, even the most eloquent and talented morale builders will find the damage beyond repair.
74 .

Military Rwil

LETTER FROM NANKIN6 Naturally, all these tendencies must not be exaggerated. There are now SWIMof a change, but these signs are not yet the change itself. We are in no position to underestimate the enemy; we did that two years ago and are still suffering for it. Any further indiscretion, such as failure to watch every line of action our opponents might take, would result in even greater catastrophe for us. Toni ht, as I write, our Manchuria forces are crowded into three ? 1 the rest of that part of the world still being under Red cities, a control. Should those last ramparts fallwell, it would mean at least half a million fresh troops tbe enemy would immediately be able to march down into North China; after a few more weeks, it might be another million. We are aware of this, just as we understand that our economic position is not promising. A major flood again might wash out all our hopes. Opportunity for Victory

But wby not think positively? Today, our weakness is revealed rather than covered up; our mistakes are openly criticized rather than unchecked. Psychologically, we are sounder, saner, and more fit to challenge the realities of life. Although our isolated cities are pressed by the hostile encirc~ement, if we can but hold them, they are ideal airheads, deep in enemy territory, for the seizing of which we should have required a dozen well-trained airborne divisions. There is plenty of opportunity for victory ahead for uswe should be both craven and foolish to give up at this point. ~oreign observers visiting China often comment upon the fact that we lack efficient leadership. This does not mean, however, that we are starved for capable generals. Another point is that on many occasions the problems of our armed forces are such that they are beyond the capabilities of a brilliant soldier to solve. Along with fighting the Communists, our commanding officers are also required to combat traditions, intrigues, and many other factors. Experience has proved to us that purely military problems are the least disconcerting of all the harassing headaches which confront a Chinese commander. What bazookas our infantry possess are ancient relics. Our water-cooled machineguns are antiquated. Yet, we must rememb@r that in many aspects the social system and living conditions. of this country are still in the age of muzzle-loading rifles. That is why we must always compromise with the outeide world, suffer our policies and procedures to be hampered, and hardly ever achieve anything foursquare and efficient. In short, thingg in China cannot be gaged by Western industrial standards. AS an ex.engineering student, I often feel thwarted when, against my better judgment, I must write something impracticable in my staff work, while logical recommendations based on analysis andcomputations are thrown into tbe wastepaper basket. Too many factors existing in this agricultural society limit the full use of scientific methods.
hhrlmy 1965 75

LETTER FROM NANKING Things are bad, but it is not the end of our hopes. Despite all the deficiencies, we can still forge ahead to victory. Many of our officers now believe that we should develop a large air force. Since regaining initiative on the battlefield is of the keenest interest to us, the value of airpower becomes apparent to all. Air squadrons, whkh ate least subject to interference by our present chaotic conditions, offer the best hope for early and economical victory. Fighters and dive bombers are the best weapons to cope with the Communist troops; cargo planes will satisfy all our strategic require. ments. As for the reorganization and retraining of our ground units, many observers suggest Taiwan as the ideal location. A sizable retraining program could be conducted on the island with our schools and training fieIds quite secluded and safe from outside influence or interference. A certain amount of shipping would be needed to implement such a plan, but, on the other hand, maritime transportation would ensure safer and swifter troop movements than are now possible over our disorganized rail afid highway net. The advantages of such a reliable means of transportation should not be ignored. Reform Programs

We now are receiving some war supplies from the United States. Suppose we unload them at Tsingtao, or any other port, meanwhile also landing our retrained divisions there. Sufficient rehabilitation material could also be imported, and workable social and economic reform programs initiated under trained political organizers. Then a firm offensive and steady push inland could be undertaken. Such a program and movement would be more effective and fruitful than trying elsewhere and having our strength scattered. To ensure its success, this bridgehead reform would have to be planned, organized, and coordinated as completely and thoroughly as an invasion of any hostile shore. We do not consider that this would be an easy job. It is only feasible on the condition that we can slow down inflation and hold the Yangtze and certain other major fronts. But I do not want to go too far into the details here. I do not mean to make a five-star decision at this point, but I do want to set it straight that there are still numerous ways for us to improve the eficiency of our war effort. It would be absurd as well as unfair to interpret any mistakes we have made heretofore as evidence that our position ie now hopeless. Next fall I ehall have been in the Chineee Army for 10 yeare. In these years we have experienced success and adversity. Now, we see many friends who narrowly eecaped Japanese artillery and air bombardments fall before Communiet machineguns, our country once again on the brink of an abyss more dangerous than ever before. This, truly, is a national tragedy.
76

Miiifary Revil

LETTER FROM NANKING

In the meantime, with marriages delayed, chances for further education gone, the gay spirit and enthusiasm of youth passed, and fond dreams and extravagant ideas vanished into the vapor of those long hard years, we now find ourselves engaged in a struggle to which our young brothers and sisters refer as that dirty business, Although it may be a dirty job, national repairs and rehabilitation must be effected. Civil war is always a bitter, cruel struggle, but wken You remember that the Chinese Communists consider that the privileges of their international gangsters should supersede our own national interests, we can hardly consider them still as our fellow countrymen. We have 450 million people in this country who must be fed, while every effort must be made to keep them free. In this 20th century, freedom of thinking is as essential as freedom from want. In other words, the four freedoms minus one do not make up freedom at all. When I came into the service in 1938 I did not dream that I would stay so long in uniform. Now, bowever, I realize that our work can never be complete so long as one of our primary surviving rights is still threatened, whether by Japanese militarists or by Chinese totalitarians. Can we win final victor;? That depends on how fast we think, how fast we can organize, and how fast we can perform. As my colonel and I concluded the other day, while talking in his dark, dingy house, it is up to us. But we want our friends overseas to understand our problems, and we badly need your sympathy and cdntinued friendship and support.

# .,

hbruary 1965

17

,,

THE FLEXIBLE

RESPONSE

A French View
General of the Army Charles A1lleret French Armu

General Ailknwt, of the French Armed Forces, gave the following lecture before the annual assem~lg of former NATO Staff College students on 26 June 1964. The lecture, presented here in condensed form, was subsequetitlg published in the August-September 196.4 issue of the Revue de IIXense Ifationale {France) ureder the title, Opinion Sur la Th40rie Stratigique de la Flexible Response. -EditoT. HE doctrine of flexible response consists basically in the rejection of the idea that massive retaliation can solve all defense problems and that strategic nuclear bombing alone can meet all situations. The idea is perfectly justified so long as one accepts: defense of sec The nonnuclear
T

ondary interests or positions against limited attacks. In the event of general war, the possession of conventional forces needed to complete in the field the results obtained by massive destructive action. In this very general form, which means that nuclear weapons are not necessarily used to solve secondsry or minor problemsthose which are not directly vital to the possessors of nuclear weaponsFrench strategy does not dispute the theory of the flexible response. But it must immediately be seen that response by conventional means to limited conventional aggression is not applicable in all cases. For the response to be employed with any chance of success, the enemys conventional forces in the theater in question must not be too much MlitsryRsview

78

THE FLEXIBLE RESPONSE

larger than thoee which can be en. inrelation to gaged and ~e.intained the distance of the area of operations, the available infrastructure, and the ewsting transportation means. TheOistance Factor If the enemy is on the spot with allhis means close at hand, and if he can be opposed only with expeditionary forces Operating at a great distance from their bases, there is every reason to believe that success is unattainable. fhe conventional limited response to aggression is then practically excluded. This, for example, would be the case for the Soviet Union if limited apwations were to take place in Cuba. The leaders of the USSR do not, in general, seem to favor the use of the flexible response for their own purposes,for no reference whatsoever to kmited warfare can be found in the booksupervised by Marshal V. D. Sokolotsky setting forth the Soviet doctrine. It even seems to be considered an established fact that a modern \var, in a nuclear environment, can only be a total war. Sup~ose, however, that the USSR decides to apply the flexible response in certain cases and that, moreover, the United Statesa totally unrealistic assumption, of course, but then all hypotheses are always permissible in a theoretical argumentattacks Cuba in a conventional operation. It is obvious that there is such a disproportion in Cuba and the Caribbean between the IJS conventional forces and those which the USSR could transport and engage there that the undertaking would be unthinkable for the USSR as a practical proposition. The conventional response to a conventional aggre~~ion is, therefore, po~sible only when local operational conFebruary 1965.

diticrns are such that a certain equality can be established between the opposing forces. If the imbalance is too great, there is no possible recourse action. to conventional Either the USSR should not oppose the hypothetical US conventional intervention in Cuba, or she could do so only by launching an operation somewhere else in the world where the imbalance would work in her favor in Berlin, for example. Here, certain success would cause tbe United Statee to abandon her action in Cuba. A final alternative might be for the Soviets to fire intercontinental missiles at US territory.
Tactical Nuclear Weapsns Would it be the same if the opera-

tions were not solely conventional but supplemented by so-called tactical nuclear weapons used selectively on the military objectives of tbe battlefield or the areas immediately to the rear of it ? Althongh it is difficult to imagine what a battle with a limited use of nuclear weapons would be like, the end result would probably be the same. It would hardly be thinkable in an outlying theater to place limited forces, even forces backed up by nuclear weapons, against more powerf u] forces with more extensive support in co-called tactical nuclear weapons. The flexible response is thus possible under certain conditions only: states of balance achieved only in certain parts of the world, taking into consideration distance and transportation ae well as political factors. But if Cuba is not the place for the ultimate application of the flexible response by the USSR, it rapidly becomes evident that Western Europe if it is agreed that we wish to defend it against pnssible aggression 79

THE FLEXIBLE RESPONSE from the Eastis not a favorabIe area for the application of tbe flexible

response West.

either,

this .
Attack

time

for the

The, Commtional

Leaving aside the possibility of an attack on the Free Wprld being deliberately nuclear and of the conquest of Europe being undertaken solely by subversive operationstwo cases in which the flexible response has no justification-let us examine the methods whereby it would be possible to defend Europe against aggression of a conventional nature. These methods can be reduced to two: Defense by conventional methods if the enemy employs conventional means only. o Defense in place with tactical nuclear weapons if the enemy attacks and itself employs nuclear weapons on the battlefield, or if the previously envisaged purely conventional methods are not sufficient to halt the enemy forces deep penetration. Let us first examine what can be expected from a conventional defense, on the understanding that in this case it is a matter of protecting Europe against conventional Soviet forces clearly outnumbering those which the West possesses on that continent. If the aggression were to occur without any warningwitbout sig. nificant enemy buildup-the ratio of forces would be roughly 3 to 2 in favor of the Soviets for larger ground units, and the imbalance would be even greater for support and fighter aircraft. Moreover, the element of surprise would operate to the full since tbe Soviet attacking force would find itself facing nothing more than a defensive force in the process of getting into position. If the operations were launched
80

following a period of tension during which the forces of the East would be concentrating and mobilizing, the element of surprise would no longer exist, but the ratio between forces would become even more unfavorable to the West despite possible reinforce. ments from the other side of the At. lantic. In addition, if the Soviets were in. tent on attacking Europe by conven. tiimal means, they would have the advantage of their central position and the possibility of choosing their axis of main effort in order to apply there the means needed for increasing fur. ther the local imbalance of forces, The Western defensive apparatus is, on the contrary, distributed between such different, distant, and varied theaters as Turkey, Greece, northern Itaiy, central Europe, and Norway, and there is no usable reserve of strategic weapons available, except for the nuclear forces whose use we are assuming is ruled out. Both the theory and practice of modern conventional warfare show that even with equal forces and without any surprise it is impossible to prevent an aggressor, who benefits from the initiative of the operations by concentrating his tirepower on a smaU part of the defense forces, from breaking through the defenss. The coneequencea of this are, at worst, the destruction of these. forces and, at best, their rapid withdrawal to a new position much farther back causing the enemy to pause in order to bring up his logistic means before resuming the offensive.
Oefense in Oepth

It is impossible, even with equal forces, to stop a conventional attack completely except in depth by exploiting the progressive wearing down of
Military ReYiew

THE FLEXIBLE RESPONSE

:heassailant and his increasing dis;tnce from his bases and infra~tructure. Within the conventional framework, here is reason to avoid the Maginot ~omplexand the static defense con:ept at all costs, even if the latter is active. This complex goes back to 1916when the superiority of the defendersfire over that of the attacker corresponded to a stage in the history ofweaponry which is over by now, at least if one keeps to the area of conditional weapons. The purely conventional defense of Europe against a m?issive attack timed at reaching either the Atlantic or an intermediary limited objective couldnot stop the invasion without ceding important ground and totally destroying the logistics and communications infrastructure in the regions tbandoned to the enemy. Even then, ,

ized that this is not feasible at the Iron Curtain itself. If the Soviets had to be stopped, the Rhine would already be a good solution. The Somme, the Aisne, the Vosges, the Jura, and the Alps would be more probable ones. This method, which would culminate in allowing the aggressof to seize a part of Europe which might not be recaptured for a long period of time, or even recaptured at all if conventional methods were held to, does not seem satisfactory to us, Europeans that we are, as a method for defending Europe. In our opinion, it should be ruled out. It is true that, if things went badly and if the enemy penetration became dangerous, tacticaI nuclear weapons could always be called upon to check it in due time. Defense in place with nuclear weapons poses the problem under alto-

Z?erkenmirzg lNctherkmd.$ )

A Fiehbed

fighter, Dart of the hwge Soviet tacticaI air arm

such a defense could succeed only if the forces were deployed in advance deepenough so that sufficient reserves couldbe engaged in ,offensive actions to stop and destroy the enemy penetrations cm successive battlefields. Woulda purely conventional defense OfEurope halt the Soviets and their $ateHites in a conventional attack? This is not impossible, but, as optiIniaticas we may be, it must be realMruary 1965

gether different conditions. Since nuclear weapons are more effective on exposed people than on people under cover, and more effective against visible troops than camouflaged ones, the result must be the relative superiority of defensive weapons over the weapons supporting the movement. However, while nuclear weapons used on maneuvering troops would certainly be very powerf u], their effec81

THE FLEXIBLE RESPONSE

tiveness might be exaggerated if the attacking units advanced in a sufficiently dispersed manner. They would probably operate through a kind of general infiltration by elements scattered widely both in breadth and depth, seeking to advance rapidly, preferably through gaps, to close with the defender who wOuld no longer be able to use his nuclear weap. ons to destroy the assailant, The aasault forces would be relatively difdcult to detect and costly to destroy,
6reater Effectiveness

The effectiveness of nuclear bombardment of logistic support and infrastructuresmore compact by nature, and indispensable for ensuring the continuance of the advancewould certainly be greater. The surest method of stopping the aggressora forcesheading toward the West like an octopuswould be to puncture the body and to reach the source of the nervous impulses going out to its members which would, once they were no longer fed, stop by themselves. Therefore, given the depth of present logistic infrastructure, it must be expected that there would have to be an exchange of weapons to a depth of about 900 miles on both sides of the point of contact in order for those weapons to have the desired etTect of a reciprocal and lasting containment. This depth of 900 miles is not at all surprising for a modern battlefield. It merely reflects the growth in the power and range of the weapons and facilities for supporting the front. The use of nuclear weapons on the battlefield and in the rear can, therefore, check an invasion quite rapidly. But the cost for the battlefield itself that is to say, Europ=would be immense. The need to reach, in addition to the troops, their nuclear de82

livery means and their logistic support I would mean exploding many kilotons (either in the form of numerous small weapons or a smaller number of large. yield weapons) practicably all over the battlefield where there are generally more civilians than military personnel per square mile. It is clear that even a tactic~[ nuclear exchange #ould completely crush Europe for 1,800 miles from the Atlantic to the Soviet border. Therefore, we do not think that Europeans can consider this solution satisfactory; while it prevente their countries from being invaded, it does not protect the people from destruction. No Alterriative Thus, this, too, is only a method to be used if there ia no other way that is, if the United States, who is still the only Western possessor of nuclear stockpiles capable of conducting large-scale nuclear war, decided to use it to the exclusion of any other. In view of thie hypothesis, the Western Powers must be prepared to risk it both intellectually and materially, but they would not be in a position to recommend it and could do no more than resign themselves to it, Moreover, if this method were to be employed in due timeonly when serious setbacks to our conventional forces made it necessaryit is obvious that this good time must occur as aeon as possible after the Iron Curtain is crossed. If it does not take place until the Soviets have invadsd half of Europe, Europes destruction would be added. If the methode of replacing conventional defense and nuclear defensive 1Prea.mi.s that cm the batt]erleld me division vmuld OCCUPY a mm roughly 26 mfla by 26 mil~ that is, 626 m..re mile. it can be seen th.t this m.mspo.ds to a. a..mge d.nsw of l-, than 26 men Per m.... mile, while the eve-e P. P.l.ti.n density in Germany i. 4s6, in Seh!,am 685, and %. Fran.. 190.

Militarf Re!ieW

THE FLEXIBLE RESPONSE

battleare not satisfactory for Europe, it is obvious that it is necessary, from ths Europeanstandpoint, to return to the method of immediate strategic action which, in the event of aggression, cOnsists of: Destroying, by strategic nuclear attack, the roots Of the aggression and its chances of building UP. o Terminating the action by a battleaimed simply at absorbing the momentum of the aggressionwhich may have already broken through andat destroying it or forcing it back behind its bases of departure. New Possibilities This strategy takes advantage of the new possibilities offered by longrange nuclear weapons for establishing a strategic defensive without thoughtof withdrawal and with good chancesfor success. This could never be accomplished in the conventional era, except during the brief period from1915 to 1918 when the superiority of the defensive weapons of the timemade it possible. Nuclear weapons alone seem able to permit a defensive without surrendering territory, something which neither conventional forcee, nor even forcesengaging in the limited uae of tactical nuclear weapons against tbe Wressive fOrces alone, could presume to accomplish. What is more, they alone, through this possible generalized use against the aggressors war potential, can havea serious deterrent effect on it Whichweapons limited to a simple external battlefield could not have. If W4 believe that, in the event of inajoraggression in Europe, the only strategy which can defend it effectively against invaeion wOuld be by Usingtbe most powerful means, it is Ml necessary to define this major hbrswy 1965.

In Western Europe, can aggression. there be cases of aggression limited in ecope which would not justify a strategy as drastic and as full of risks of intercontinental exchanges ? I feel that there can be no such cases. Although objectives affecting only small geographical areas can, in fact, be considered as limited individually, they cannot be limited in absolute terms for they are likely to be repeated. A succession of limited objectives rapidly becomee, by a simple process of addition, a major and vital objective. We experienced this in the paat with Hitler. The resumption of compulsory military service in Germany, the reoccupation of the left bank of the Rhine, the Anscldems, the Sudetenland, Czechoslovakia-each of theze objectives in itself the Allies considered too limited to justify war. But when tbe total, with the addition of Poland, seemed to make war imperative, it was too late for war to put a rapid end to the Hitlerian disturbances; five years and enormous Iozsee in property and human lives were needed to achieve that. Types of Aggression Furthermore, even general aggression necessarily starts out by being limited in its extent. Before rcach@g the Atlantic, the Soviet invasion forces would first have to penetrate beyond the Iron Curtain. It can thus be asked at what point west of the Iron Curtain the aggression would start to become general. For, slight as a penetration might be, reaction to the aggression would be too late to have maximum effectiveness. Therefofe, we believe that we must not distinguish between major and limited aggression, but between 83

THE FLEXIBLE RESPONSE

characterized aggress ionpenetration using fofce and aimed at seizing all or part of Europes territoryand aPParent aggression, which must be dealt with in another way. All sorts of possible border incidents come under the heading of apparent aggression: unintentional in-

ous regions or arctic wastes;

it

c~n.

not exceed a few miIes in popu[ated

mapped-out regions such as central Europe. The strength of penetration and the determination exerted, manifest&f by the use of combat means large enough to be employed only by a high

without orders; exchanges of fire between border detachments who have lost their nerve; and pursuit of refugecsa by overzealous police units. Tbe definition of aggression agreed upon would thus eliminate all these cases of apparent aggression, Two criteria appear essential: The depth of the penetration. Possible unintentional penetration varies according to the region. It can be several dozen miles in mountain84

cursions; incursions actihg subordinates

by irresponsible

enough ranking officer to ensure that the government and the people pledge their responsibility for the orders, and on whose account these means are being put into effect. Characterized aggression may thus be defined as a penetration, using I force against the defense elements encountered, reaching a depth into the territory defined in relation to the nature of the region involved, and putting enough forces in the field for itnot to be considered as anything other,. than an action concordant with Military Flwiw

THE FLESIBLE RESPONSE

lb?will of the country to which these forcesbelong to conquer part of Westtrn Europe.
tavering Positions

That is why we suggest a defensive positiondesigned not to check powerfulattacks, but to gauge the minimum ievel of enemy attack that would constitute aggression which, in turn, would set the defensive nuclear strategyin motion. Under cover of these positions and ofthe nuclear array of the countries ofthe alliance, Europe, on the understandingthat the breaking of the line wouldaut.~matically bring about nuclearretahation, would no longer fear menf the chief dangers which threatens it and at which the flexible responseis directly aimeddirect inusion by air and ground forces. This formula would also have the advanjage of requiringin central Europe-only a limited number of dwisions to hold the advanced protectiveline. Instead of being pushed for\varddangerously, and with debatableeffectiveness-as close as possible to the Iron Curtain to stop a So~iet aggression by conventional !rarfare, the other divisions cou]d then be placed in reserve at a depth whichwould permit them to counterattack and wipe out a deep enemy penetrating. This possibility,. which justifies maintaining the frontier as far forwardas p~ssib]e with fewer Conven. honal forces and offers the great advantageof permitting greater positioning in depth of the forces availablefnr tbe defense of Europe, would alsomake it possible to face other formsof futnre war. Jt is not in the least certain that afuture war will take the classic fOrm ofinvasion by conventional forces or . Wary 1965

forces supported by nuclear arms. It could occur i~ many other unexpected forms. The only way to meet the unforeseen circumstance which would certainly arise ie to use reeerves positioned in depth.
The Soviet Hypothesis

We may wonder whether tbe hypothesis of Soviet aggression against Western Europe by conventional forces is realistic. Marehal Sokolovekye book does not, for example, envisage any war limited either in ite geographic extent or weapons. This ie because the Soviets do not coneider military operation like those in Korea or Vietnam as wars but as domestic revolutionary enterprises of national liberation. In the framework of the study of a possible large armed EastWest conflict, the Soviets consider only the case of so-called Capitalist and imperialist aggression against the Soviet Union. It ie not apparent to what degree they seriously believe in this threat, but it ie evident that this is the only war hypothesis which they can publicly admit. In this hypothesis, as unfounded ae it may appear to us, the USSR does not seem to be considering any strategy Other than total nuclear war in the event of imperialist aggreseion which, in view of the imbalance in the distribution of the forces of the two blocs, could not be conventional. But if the USSR one day decided to act offensively in Europe, she could very well apply a maneuver concept baeed on the massive and dynamic use of her conventional forces. She could uee the delay afforded by the flexible responee and the first phases of the escalation to seize all or part of Europe before suffering, on her , wa,~,r D,me]] JSCOIJS, , %!+dovsl+, st..*,SY,S, Mtlitarw Reiew, July 1963. D 9. 85

THE FLEXIBLE RESPONSE

own territory,

the consequences of aggression. Soviet forces are based on nuclear

power and the most modern weapons today, the entire range of ballistic deviceq; tomorrow, probably the space range. Even tbe USSR with her potential however, could not in the long runwithout ruining her economy and her developmentgo ahead simultaneously with the creation of considerable strategic ballistic forces, undertake vast space projects, and maintain large mechanized forces. It is more probable that their conventional forces, to which the Soviets still attach great importance but which are expensive, will gradually diminish in number. The same reduction will probably also occur in the countries of the West which will not be able to maintain a considerable proprmtion of their citizens in arms when they feel that the Weste nuclear weapons assure them genuine effective protection against outside aggression. Because the Wests conventional forces must be dispersed among numerous, noncontiguous countries, and because many of the countries of the West are maritime nations, a large part of the Wests resources is devoted to naval forces. The USSR and her satellites, monolithically continental make their chief effort in land forces. Thus, even with a general reduction in conventional forces, the USSR would maintain a fairly distinct local conventional superiority in Europe. An assumption of conventional Soviet aggression, initially, is not absurd, and it would be less absurd if the USSR could hope to deal only with a flexible response whose deterrent power would be something of an illusion. 86

But if it is agreed that this as sumption is acceptable, we canno treat that aggreaaion any different}! than we would treat a total aggresaiol conducted with all possible means. / reliance on conventional arms, eve] when backed by tactical nuclear weal ens, makes it impossible to condw a defensive without thought of with drawal. If a strategic response is de layed, it will probably be too late t act and will create, under the wors conditions, the situation ,that w wished to avoid at the outset. Actually, full-scale war involvin) invasion of Europe from the outsid no longer haa any political significance in our era. This is what the Soviet seem to be aware of and why the proclaim their adherence to the thesi Of peaceful coexistence, which in n way implies the termination of th struggle between the Socialist worl and the Capitalist world, but the r( jection of outside war aa an effectiv and worthwhile instrument of thi struggle. But if war must no longer be worthwhile political instrument, thi is precisely because the uae of nucled weapons on the territories of th countries at war, aa well as on th battlefield, makes it practically in possible for aggression to succeed. Mutual deterrence between tb Western and Soviet blocs thus reauli from the immediate strategic nuclea action which could follow an aggrel sion. It is this action which remair the best gauge of the elimination f outeide war as a political instrumen It is in accordance both with rea.so and with what we believe we kno of Soviet doctrine. That is why, M der the present circumstance, we a] deeply committed to it. Military Mil

f
(

SOME ATTRACTIONS AND PITFALLS OF MILITARY HISTORY

Brian Bend

N IRISH lady recently told a British general that although he was very interested in history, hehad to confess that she invariably !kippedthe battles. The general reorted that it was rather like saying IOU are interested iw food but never ?atmeat. I have much sympathy for )oth partiee. I can think of many !oundreasons why the lady skips the oattles (dont we all experience that temptation?). Yet, at the same time, 1think the general was right, that Mmfy1965

our historical

diet will be gravely deficient if we exclude the military element or even regard it as of marginal importance. Unfortunately, the Irish lady is not alone. Many people are deterred from a study of the subject-despite the fact that war is one of the most powerful stimulants of the imaginationbecause of various defects or pitfalls of military history written or unwritten, For example, there is the easy as87

MILITARY HISTORY that to evince an interest in military history is the same thing as actually being a militarist-one who approves of, and even glories in, war. Although this association of ideas now strikes most people as plain silly, the myth is not without historical foundations. In the writings of men as different as Heinrich von Treitschke, John Ruskin, Rudyard Kipling, Alfred Tennyson, and even the early Winston Churchill, one can find sentiments and exhortations that today we can only regard as nauseating. On this concept of militarism one might comment that few but lunatics have voiced such sentiments since 1918; that they were roundly denopneed even before 1914; and that, in general, soldiers and students of war are less militaristic in this sense than civilians. Indeed, it would seem to be axiomatic that soldiers who have experienced the dreadful realities at the front never extol the virtues of war. It is notoriously those on the sidelines who bay for blood. AR the students of war, nowadays, whether soldiers or civilians, would endorse the recommendation of B. H. Liddell Hart and take it as their motto that if you want peace understand war. sumption Gap in History

ably fostered hy the layout of many school textbooks, but a little reflection will show that it is a profound errorone that Clausewitz exploded over 100 years ago when he insisted that war is only a continuation of policy by other means. indeed, it is, precisely when his dictum is forgot. ten and war becomes an end in itself, conducted by the generals, that the greatest mischief resultsas was, I think, the case in World War I. Transformation Again, anyone whb, ignoringClause. witz, tries to und~rst~nd the trans. formation of British society after 1945 will be complet~ly baffled nntil he takes into account the social and psychological effects of the war years on both the armed forces and the civd population. In the deepest sense, politics did not cease for the British people on the outbreak of war in 1939. It cannot be overstrassed that military history is not, or at any rate ought not to be, a distinct and very sperial branch of historical study, but an integral part of the whole along with political, economic, and religious history; and, conversely, military specialists must also be general historians. Then there is the opposi!ng but also widespread belief that military studies consist of nothing but wars. If this were true, the accusation of militarism would be much harder to refute. In fact, wars in modern military studies resemble the fraction of the iceberg that appears above the wavas; beneath lie a great complex of problems ranging from conscription, training, and the history of military thought to current strategy and the limitation or prevention of fnture war. It is quite legitimate to cloak such studies under innocuous titles Military Review

popu~ar Another misconception about military history is that wars constitute a gap in real history a holocaust of destruction and waste from which the sane man can only avert his gaze. This attitude is prohBrian Bond, lecturer in Modern History at Liverpool University, England, served with the Royal Artillery during 1954-56, read htstory at Worcester College, Oxford, for three years, and is the author of numerous articles on rnititary history. 88

MILITARY HISTORY

like Citif-Military Rehetions pi-o. vialed the historian remembers always to relate his theories to the hard experienee of past wars. One ean have no feelings other than respect or sympathy for the many

are not so self-evident or established that we can thankfully banish them as we do nightmares. Hence, much of the astonished comment one hears nowadays about the revival of interest in World War I is foolish or mis-

Sir

Douglas Haig with Marshal Joseph Joffre and Marshal Ferdinand Foch leave the commander in chiefs chateau, Beauquesne, 12 August 1916, after luncheon with King George

nonhistorians whose antipathy to military history derives directly or indirectly from the ghastly events of World War 1, from which, in particular, popular consciousness has fastenedand not without reason+n the utterly intolerable conditions and fruitless sacrifice of the campaigns of the Somme and Passchendaele in 1916 and 1917. Nevertheless, historians owe it to th~r trade not to be carried away by their emotions and to continue the search for truth even in the environment of the Flanders mud. The causes of these terrible events february 1965

guided. It is precisely now that young authors of a new generation, includlng John Terraine, Barrie Pitt, Alistair Home, Correlli Barnett, and many more, are able to put these four wasted and horrific years in perspective. Were the generals really so much to blame? Was a compromise peace never possible ? These are some of the questions that merit the iarefuI objective attention they are now receiving from historians. One small aspect of the an~iwar fever that swept Britain between the wars is worth mentioning since it bas 69

MILITARY HISTORY adversely affected the climate of mi]itary studies. I mean the late cartoonist David LOWS caricature of, the army officer as Colonel Blimp. What a disproportionate effect that cartoon has had ! George Orwell perceived as early as 1941 that: Ten years of systematic Blimp-baiting affected sven the Blimps themselves and made it harder than it had been before to get intelligent young men to enter the armed forces.

Of course, there were Blimps and even, perhaps, ap army-type classifiable as such. But the caricature was far too effective-to the extent of sowing deep in the popular mind the notion that all army officers are foolish and tbe higher the rank the older they are and, therefore, the more foolish. This, to say the least, is an exaggeration. Judging by photographs and accumulated anecdotes, Field Marshal Sir William Robertson, in World War I, might appear the embodiment of a top brass Blimp. His manners certainIy were rough and his speech stumbling and incoherent. Yet, he had worked his way up from private with no aesets but his craftsmanship and perseverance. He had taught himself about six languages besides mastering all the techniques of his profession.
there have heen and will be stupid or incompetent officers at all levels, but it is a great mistake to be taken in by the Blimp caricature. If the generals always and consistently behaved stupidly, it would save us historians a lot of trouble in our study of wars. On the contrary, the really great captains in the three services have been, for the most part, widely read and deep thinkers who 90 . Great Captains Admittedly,

could, and sometimes did, play extremely important roles in civil llfe. I have in mind in modern times such men as Napoleon, Robert E. Lee, Wiliiam T. Sherman, the elder Hd. muth von Moltke, and, in a minor theater, T. E. Lawrence. The Germans produced many brilliant candidates in World War IIErich von Manstein, Heinz Guderian, and F. M. von Senger und Etterlinbut their strategy was shackled by Hitler, and few, perhaps, had the necessary breadth of mind to rank in the highest class. Dullness I have left the strongest objection until las~it is simply that even if military history is interesting, most books about military history are dull. Again, this, is a view with which I can sympathize. It seems to me that for various reasons some periods of history just are ,comparatively uninteresting. For example, I have never yet been able to work up enthusiasm for any of the Duke of Marlboroughs campaigns except for his march to the Danube in 1704 and the Battle of Ramillies. Then there are the heroes of the nations series which seem to raise a barrier between the reader and the real manthey portray cardboard fiwures in spIendid uniforms but with all the warts omitted. Similarly uninspiring are many of the books written by soldiers to boost the morale of the serrice or even their own reputations. Finallyand thes i are the kind that often daunt the a akening interest of hietory studen 1 sthere are tbe books written by soldiers for the instruction of other soldiers. They are by nn means devoid of usefulness, bnt they are certainly disastrous fare for the beginner.
Military Review

MILITARY HISTORY

Having examined, and, perhaps, put o perspective, some of the objections nd doubts about military history, it s time to say something positive bout what it should try to do. A great advantage which military iistory possesses over certain other mpects of history is that when the hips are down, in battle, it is usually Ihundantly clear which side has won,

sanguinary dramas, military historians must develop their intuitive understanding to a high degree if they are

in any way to scale the highest points in their craftto understand and portray how men react under the terrible etress of what is termed the friction of war. Some of the greatest students of warKarl von Clausewitz, a German;

Mr. Lloyd George, M. Thomas, and Lord Reading near Fricourt, September 1916

any rate which has lost, which Mnot quite the same point. As Marshal Joseph Joffre said of the Battle of the Marne in September 1914, it may not he clear who won it, but he knew very well who would have heen blamed for losing it. By the very nature of the subject, Jhen, certain moments are highlighted, and as tbe beaten army scuttles away, problems of cause and effect are more starkly owed than in most other branches of history. To chronicle and interpret these
or at

Ardant du Picq, a Frenchman; and G. F. R. Henderson, an Englishman have excelled in grasping and explaining why one army fought better than another; wby one recovered after a defeat (say the Confederates after Gettysburg), while another disintegrated (the Army of the Potomac after Fredericksburg) ; why one part of an army kept its high morale in foul conditions, while another was decimated in the same place witbin a few days by illness and desertion. The answers to such questions can only 91

bhwary 1965

MILITARY HISTORY be formulated after years of study, and few studente have possessed all the qualities necessary for their elucidation. Then, within a battle, there is the fascinating drama of the comma@er wrestling with imperfect and usually contradictory intelligence and finally making the momentous decision: Eisenhower judging rightly to go ahead during the night of 5 June 1944; Lee wrongly deciding to press the attack at Gettysburg on 3 JuIy 1863.
Unraveling Evidence

The military historian has a particularly difficult problem in, on one hand, unraveling a tangled mass of evidence about notoriously confused past events to impose a pattern by selection and emphasis, yet, on the other hand, to convey a vivid impression of what it was really like with all the confusion and muddle that contribute to the fog of war. He must note and explain the effects of the weather, of armies being misdirected or not directed at all, of the enemy capturing the plans (as happened before Antietam in 1862), the disagreements of the commanders, the occasional cowardice, and the panic flight. The best military hooks are those which somehow succeed in riveting together order and chaos. An encouraging sign in the best military writing in recent years is that this objective is being pursued more frequently than those of myth making and self-justification. It is an unfortunate defect in Field Marshal Bernard Montgomerys lucid and vigorous campaign histories that he allows the factor of muddle so little scope, except, perhaps, in explaining the misfortunes of his American Allies. I count it as an attraction that writers have succeeded in capturing
92

the essential nature of war in a vari. ety of ways. There are the orthodox military histories which leave the reader with the feeling that through a combination of scholarship and lucid presentation almoat the last word hss been said. In this category are books like C. P. E. Staceys on Quebec, Michael Howards on the Frahco-Prussian War, and Alistair Homes on Verdun. Then there are works of military philosophy which try to set military thought in the context of general speculation about human be. havior. In this category I would place Sun-tzu, Clausewitz, much of Du Picq, and, perhaps, Mao Tse-tung in bis theory OTguerrilla warfare.
Thought Stimulants Another select brilliant military class consists of thinkers who illu.

minate more than the campaigns they describe by saying, in effect, what they would have done had they been in tbe generals place. Carefully documented as they are, G. F. R. Hendersons Stonewall Jackson and J. F. C. Fullers G~a?zt and Lee may not rate highly as academic studies of the American Civil War, but they will continue to be read as admirable stimulant to thought about war in a broad historical context. Under the slightly unsatisfactory label of military prophecy, there are a few profound studies like Liddell Harts S/wmw?I which are thoroughly grounded on historical research, yet, at the ssme time, use their subject to indicate future trends in warfare. Nor are autobiographies to be shunned as vehicles of the truth, whether literary and philosophical like T. R Lawrences The Seven Pillars of Wisdom or devastating in their dry understatement like the books of Robert Graves, Edmund Ftlunden, Artbnr
Military Rell!w

MILITARY HISTORY Behrend, and many others. Again, every historian must sometimes feel that the novelist has said more in a few pages than many volumes of official or academic history. Perhaps the most poignant imaginative description of the American Civil War was written by a manz,who was not even born when it took place The Red Badge of Courage by Stephen Crane. Of several moving novels on World War I from the viewpoint of the British enlistsd man, let me single out a now neglected classic flict within the German military tradition between duty and consciencewhich historically culminated in the plot of 20 July 1944as movingly as does Hans Hellmut Kirst in hk+ novel The Oficer Factorv. Poets, above all, have captured the essence of war, its pathos, its grandeur, and its littleness, whether it be Walt Whitman or Allen Tate on the American Civil War, Sassoon or Rosenberg on World War I, or Keith Douglas and William Plomer on World War II. There are two other pitfalls of mili-

AI1 sshofo,.owtew of immmai war lw,<,e,tm Lo+,don. E,wlm,d Lord Iiitchenc.r, accompanied by General Birdwood, through tbe trenches to at Anzac, tbe beach 13 November 1915, return

Her Privates we by Frederic Manning, a retiring wfiter whose literary integrity shines through in his letters to his friend and admirer, T. E. Lawrence. It is doubtful if historians will ever convey the moral grandeur of the con-

tary history which I would like to discuss more fully. One concerns personal experience. War, it is argued, is so unlike most mens ordinary life particularly the life of the leisured class who write historythat study as they may, they will lack the feel

MILITARY HISTORY of how it really was. I think we must concede that, there is much truth in this. Admittedly, most historians have never worked at the coal face or in a factory either, but I still think war is a special case. Where one can see this deficiency most clearly is the long ViCtOrian peace that also saw the es. tablishment of history as a respectable academic study. Did some of our most famous historians, like Lord Acton, for example, ever bear a shot fired in anger ? It is certain that he never slept in a ditch or had to forage fm. his next meal.
significant What Details did these ultrarespectable

dons, what did William Stubbs and Frederick Maitland know about the small but significant details of medieval history such as the introduction of the stirrup, tbe use of maps, and the capability of the war horse? They knew little and did not care very much. In fact, to tbe Victorians in general, military affairs, present as well as past, were in every eense peripheral, and significantly it was an American sailor, Captain Alfred T. Mahan, who at last pointed out in the 1890s that even the pacific British Empire rested upon force. Today, we are all more conscious that war has been, a perpetual force in history and, in addition, that historians are less insulated from everyday life. So I would go no further than to say that experience of peacetime service is valuable for an understanding of how real soldiering is done-wars being notoriously regarded by the army(as only regrettable interruptions to aft orderly life-and for seeing how even the simplest orders can be hopelessly bungled. I sometimes wonder whether someone who

has never been under fire can honestly and fairly describe and evaluate the reactions of those who have. A more difficult question than the nse of ones imagination is for the civilian to know what was practically impossible in certain conditions. For example, no quartermaster general woutd frave been duped for a minute, as were civilian historians for years, by the huge alleged size of classical armiestboee armies simply could not have lived or moved with the rs. sources available, Conversely, soldierIristorians are likely to get the political context wrong by, for example, ascribing to a Cromwellian general ideas he could not poseibly have held before tbe age of Marx and Freud.
Lack of Experience

The most dangerous aspect today of the lack of practical experienceor at any rate of recent and relevant experience-seeme to lie in the realm of strategic studiee. Here, concepts such ae games theor y are drawn from experience of the past with a view to predicting optione and possibilities for the future. In the writings of some of the American theorists, terms like mega deathsmillions of deathsappear to be as calmly manipulated ae a child playing wjth bricks. The practical influence such men have had on official doctrine is, we may hope, limited, but there is obviously a need to have the counterbalance of actual war experience present to remind tbe theorists that under such and such conditions men would probably not fight at all, and that all their calculations are, therefore, barren. The sheer lapse nf time since the last war may thus be an indirect danger to peace. The last topic is one that concerns
all historians, but particularly mili-

MOitary Review

MILITARY HISTORY

t
tary historiansnamely, the question

of whether any lessons can be learned from history. In the strictest sense, the answer must be negative because every event is unique. History does not repeat itself, as the adage puts it, historians repeat one another. But this is to be too pedantic. Indeed, we must all learn from history because there is nothing else. Otto von Bismarck expressed this beautifully when he said, Most people try to profit from experience; I profit from other peoples experience ! Practice Not Possible It is not widely realized just how crucial Bismarcks dictum is to the military profession. Their duty is, perhaps, the most exacting and perilous that falls on any citizen and yet, unlike other professional men, they cannot practicemaneuvers or sham fights fall ludicrously shin-t of real warfare. Imagine a lawyer who had to rely solely on textbooks for 20 years for his single brief, and that a matter of life and death; or the surgeon who had to practice on dummies for 20 years, and then perform a single great OperatiOn.* This is only one great problem. Another lies in the tendency of human nature to resist change and become immersed in day-to-day administratiuri. The proneness to seize on the most striking but often misleading lesson of the last war is another tendency that bas frequently brought disaster upon armies and, by association, has cast a shadow of doubt on strategic planning, itself. Accepting, then, that soldiers must learn from the past, what type of lessons can they discover ? Napoleon, . ~ichae, Howard, ,.The Use and Abuseof History,$) the Joutnal of flu. R.W1 U,ttted Mibte.ry Februam Ser.m ltmtttm.n I Great Britain).
1962. ReD.i. ted by the Mtlit.r# 1962 p 8. ?f..tew, December

in one respect, is the model zmilitary student in that for all his youthful voracious retading he never allowed his mind to be cluttered up with irrelevant details. He read the campaigns of all ages for the light they could throw upon the perennial problems of generalship and the performance of men in war. In short, the past could yield helpful insights into strategy but seldom into tactics. Because Napoleon kept his eye on the broad questions, the maxims he evolved were deceptively simple, so that the reader is apt to exclaim, What ? Concentrate your forces at the decisive point and distract tbe enemy ? Why, I could have thought of that. But this is to underrate the word learn. A general commanding thousands of men must not merely know objectively that something is correct. He must be able to apply the right principle instinctively in the heat of battle when, perhaps, his men are reeling back in confusion and even his subordinates are losing heart.
Need for Theorist

Few modern generals have been as well read as Napoleon, but aIready in his day the need for a theoriet or a brain of the army was appreciated by Pruesia in the appointment of highly educated staff officers like August von Gneisenau and Clausewitz to work hand in glove with the fighting generals like Gebhard von Bliicher. As a rule, however, the most influential military lessone have been discovered not by high-ranking officers but by unorthodox juniors and even civilians. Captain Liddell Hart and J. F. C. Fuller (eventually a major general) successfully predicted, from historical studies ranging from Scipio Africanus to Genghis Khan and the Amer95 .

february1965

MIIJTARY HISTORY

ican Civil War, the decisive importance of mobility and arfiored warfare long before the opening of World War IL T. E. Lawrence, virtually a civilian, based his desert warfare against the Turks on principles gleaned frnm a knowledge of hiatnry almost exceeding credibility. His ideas have influenced another great contemporary theorist of war, Mao Tsetung. It may justly be objected that these were only a few brilliant individuals, that there were other forgotten prophets who proved quite mistaken, such as those who were insisting before 1914 that the horsed cavalry had even greater days of glory to come, and that the British Army has been unprepared in certain respects at the outset of all its major wars. This is, however, only to make the point ,that the right lessons are exceedingly bard to learn and that since the right course is often perceived by men not in high office, it tends to be halfheartedly adopted, ignored, or even taken up by less blinkered opponents. Soldiers will inevitably continue to search for lessons but are unlikely to benefit in practical ways unless they study in width, over long historical periods; in depth, from varied sources and angles until they begin to understand tbe real experience; and, most important, in context, as conflicts of whole societies and not just of armies in the field. The latter is a task which, incidentally, Correlli Barnett has recently attempted with a great deal of success in The Swordbearers. Supreme Command in the First World

War.

But what about the historian? It seems clear that he must not set out to describe a period of the past with any particular lessons in mind or even a strong desire to deduce them. Otherwise, be will find it difficult to resist reading them into his evidence. Ideally, he should follow the example set by Michael Howard, in The France-Prussian War, of explaining as clearly as possible exactly what happened and why, and leave tbe reader to spell out the relevance of the war ta bis own experience or to contemporary events. Occasionally, too, the military historian may bring such freshness to his subject that the reader is charmed into forge~ting that he knows tbe sequel, and momentarily imagines himself to be sitting in the generals place. Whether or not the reader has been convinced that military history is an essential yet neglected part of general history, it is an inescapable fact that wars and battles are enormously popular with the general public. Unfortunately, a common failing in many of these battle studies is that they either ignore the historical context or more usually get it wrong. Yet, they escape constructive criticism precisely because so few readers, even among those with a good historical education, have any real understanding of the significance of military history. A rapid increase in the number of military specialists is hardly called for, but here at least is one small lvaY in which the student of history can exert a healthy influence on military studies.

96

MMary Review

UNITED STATES Shillelagh Tests The Armys Shillelagh antitank missile, which recently underwent four months of rugged environmental testiug, has been successfully test problems connected with high rotor speeds can be solved hy proper design, and that ultra-high-speed machines can compete with commercial motors, both in performance and cost. The five-horsepower motor, complete with a liquid cooling jacket, weighs aPPrOxlmate]y five pounds. This averages one pound per horsepower, a goal in rotating electrical machinery long sought by both industry and Government.US Army release.
Special Warfare Training

. .

. .

us Amy

fired at White Sands Missile Range, Ne\v Mexico. The missile system (MR. Apr 1964, p 100) is a direct-tire guided missile capable of firing either rocket or con. ventional ammunition and is in an advanced stage of development.Army News Features.
High.Speed Motors

The Department of Nonresident Instruction of the US Army Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, conducts an extension pro. gram in which over 10,000 military personnel now participate. The program covers military and paramilitary activities related to unconventional warfare, counterinsurgency, and psychological operations. Eligibility requirements for enrollment are prescribed in Department of the Army Pamphlet 350-60, from all services and all components are eligible to enroll.News item,
Th. MILITARY REVIEW md the
Army Command ?ny (kmral Staff COU,IX, as. .cc.rr.cy of inf.r. *.IIW no

Successful Army tests of a fivehorsepower, ultra-high-speed induction motor indicate that use of high speeds and high frequencies results m small, lightweight electric motors mitable for many applications. Evaluation of the test model motor designed and tested in a feasibility, study also shows that mechanical
Mruary 1965

Announcement of Personnel Courses.

Army

Extension

u.. s.

nmtien .mmt.in.d m the MILITARY NOTES sectionof, this p.b]ic.tie.. Items . .. printed as . ser,ce t. the readers.N,I officialen. dorsemem.t of ihe views.opinion.. or factual statements is intended.The Editor.

reswn.lb!lltY for

97

MtllTfiRY NOTES
,. Weather Information

US Air F.,,,

Some B-47 bombers are being modified and redesignated WB-47S

The Air Force will soon be gathering overwater weather information more rapidly, more frequently, and ever a wider area than previously po&ible as a result of new equipment developed by the Air Force Systems Command. Specially equipped B-47 bombers have been redesignated WE-47S and outfitted with the capability to gather, store, and transmit information concerning barometric pressure, temperature, and humidity over the northern regions of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. These data-gathering aircraft will be operated by specially trained crews of tbe Air Weather Service. The airborne weather data system, designated the AN/AMQ-f9, is designed to provide the Air Weather Service with current information on atmospheric conditions at all altitudes, particularly over large water areas. 98

Flying at a height of 40,000 feet, the WB-47 drops a radiosonde by parachute every hour. The radiosonde, a metal tube weighing from four to five pounds and approximately 18 inches in length, contains telemetry equipment which gathers weather information. Installed in the tail of the WB-47 is a nine-shot dispensing unit which ejects the radiosondes on command. As the equipment descends, it transmits weather data back from different altitudes. This. information is recorded in digital form and stored on magnetic tape for later transmission to ground stations. Prior to the WB-.4~, overwater weather inf ormat ion was gathered by weather observers aboard aircraft which had to land hefore the information could be effectively disseminated. However, when the WB-47 comes within 1!000 miles of any of the nine
Military fieticw

MILITARY NOTES ground stations, the digital data is instantly transmitted to the ground, converted to teletype, and retransmitted to the Air Weather Service. The nine sites which will receive data from the flying weather stations are located at Andrews Air Force Base (AFB), Maryland; McClellan AFB, California; Elmendorf AFB, Hickam Field, Hawaii; Alaska; Anderson AFB, Guam; Fuchu Air Station, Japan; Lajes Field, Azores; England; and RAF, Croughton, Wheelus Air Base, Libya.US Air
Force releaae. laboratory Nit To AidSpecial Forces Airscrew Swamp Vehicle

The Army has developed a lightweight medical laboratory combat equipment and supply set that, will enable Special Forces medical personnel to perform under extreme climatic conditions. The small portable eet is packed in a lig~tweight nylon fabric case containing a lightweight microscope, centrifuge, drugs, and reagents necessary for performing basic laboratory procedures. Development of the set was based onthe fact that much valuable time is lostbecause medical personnel engaged in civic action programs are not able to identify local health probleme and initiate prompt corrective action. The new kit may be carried on a mans back with the aid of a lightweight rucksack frame. A parachutist may place. it in the parachute equipment bag and exit from an airplane at altitudes of 12,200 meters without
damage to the cent&ts. Should the laboratory kit fall in water, it will

prototype Airscr-ew have been completed at the US Army Engineer Research and Development Laboratories, Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Designed to further the Armys mobility in swamp areas, the vehicle skims water surfaces having heavy ewamp vegetation. Although similar to the sports vehicles used in the Florida Everglade, it will be the largest boat ever built especially for swamp work. It can carry 2,000 pounds of cargo or 12 soldiers. The vehicle will have a 400-horsepower aircraft engine with a specially designed four-blade propeller mounted on a 20-foot hull. Ite speed in open water is in excess of 20 knots. prior utilization of airboats has been confined to limited teets of commercially available boats. The airboat under development will be designed as a troop carrier and to move heavy loads through marshy areas.US Army release.
.Swamp Vehicle High-Power Facility

Tests

of

float and remain waterproof. It is estimated that the eet will be

ready for delivery to Army Special

Forces in June

1965.Newe item.

A high-power facility, now operational at the Rome Air Development Center, Griffiss Air Force Base, New York, is designed to evaluate highpower transmitting tubes and radio frequency components that will be developed during the next five to eight years. It will be used to eupport research in plaema physics and gerrerate high power for lasers and other equipment in the areas of physics and engineering where brute force, in terms of direct current and f)ulse radio frequency, is required. Experimental studies already are scheduled for the next three years for the US Air Force, other governmental agencies, and private industry.US Air Force release.
e9

hbrwry 1965

MILITARY NOTES

Airborne Control Center An airboind battlefield command joint task force commander and his and control center, designed to enable air and ground component command. a military commander to conduct ers a continuous live picture of the combat operations in a see-for-himenemy. self situation, is under evaluation by A. battery of tape recorders is the Tactical Air Command. designed to store information for The new airborne war room, known playback when desired. A semiauto. as the ABCCC, was delivered in a matic system will display visually to C-I 30E aircraft to Eglin Air Force the commander and his staff vitsl Base, Florida. data such as order of battle, weather It is designed to function as a conditions, and preplanned missions joint operations center, tactical air awaiting execution. control center, Army operations cenThrough tbe communications net, ter, direct air support center, or tbe commander has contact with all emergency airstrike control center. echelons such as tacticaI air control Air Force officials said they hnped centers a-rid Army command posts on tests will prove that direct reconnaisthe ground, ships at sea if they are sance transmissions could give the part of the unified force, tactical

Interior view shows two operations-intelligence consoles with microfilm data storage files in between 100 MiiitatyReviar

MILITARY NOTES

fighters, assault transports carrying soldiers, reconnaissance airborne planes, and helicopters. Present plans call for the ABCCC to be closely integrated with the See Fast reconnaissance gathering concept, now under development at the

.,.

Under the ABCCC concept, the commander, assisted by his staff, would be able to make instant decisions in such broad areas as control of tactical air efforts, planning of air-ground operations, aUocaticm of close air support, reconnaissance, interdiction, counterair, assault airlift, and airlines of communications support, III addition, coordination would be possible on weather, intelligence, special weapons, air rescue, air traffic control, and other combat aspects. News release.
Micromap Camera

~z---<

A 70-millimeter micromap camera the basis of a system designed to eliminate logistical problems in printing, storing, and displaying military mapsis being developed by the US Army Engineer Geodesy, Intelligence and Mapping Research and Development Agency, Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Designed for transport and use in standard Army mobile map reproducTenw. Acmw.t.m Photos tion vans, the extremely rigid and ABCCC being loaded aboard C-130 precise camera produces 70-millimeter Tactical Air Reconnaissance Center, micromaps from standard military ShawAir Force Base, South Carolina. maps. TheSee Fast concept makes use of Two thousand of these micromaps RB-66 reconnaissance aircraft flying can be stored in the target map lodirectly over the enemy zone to coIlect catorthe systems second major comIntelligence data through use of teleponentand projected at will for invision, infrared photo, and sidedividual viewing. Iookingairborne radar. . Those maps required in quantity Reconnaissance itiformation picked can then be reproduced from microupby the multisensor-equipped RB-66 map color separations by an electroaircraft, in addition to being put on static printer. In this way, maps can filmfor further analysis, also would be printed, stored, and displayed at betransmitted live to ground read the point of demand, thus eliminating our) vans as we]l as to the ABCCC. the reproduction and storage of large commanders on the ground and in the quantities of maps made in advance ABCCC would see exactly what the in anticipation of a requirement. lB-66, flying over the forward zones, seesand at nearly the same moment. US Army release.

101

MILITARY NOTES MOM-42A Roadrunner

. .

Ninth Amen...

Amati,m, In,,

The Roadrunner target missile

The Armys newest target missile, the ~oadrunner, was intercepted by the Hawk air defense missile in development tests several months ago at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico. The US Army Missile Command called the test a noteworthy success for both the target missile and the Hawk missile system, The Roadrunner is the Armys subsonic-supersonic addition to its series of target missiles used for training of missile crews and development of air defense miesile capabilities. A multifunction target, it can simulate the flight pattern and speeds of a wide variety of high per102

aircraft as well as missiles. In one role it can fly as slow as 1,100 kilometers per hour and only 90 meters off the ground. At this speed and altitude it simulates grotmdhugging aircraft and missiles. In missions calling for high altitudes and supersonic speeds, it is designed to attain Mach 2 speeds of about 2,100 kilometers per hour at an altitude of 18,300 meters. The Roadrunner flew at a supersonic speed on the deck in the test at the missile range. The Army said no other target missile had ever flown so low and fast in a controlled mission. News item.
formance

MiitaryReYieW

v .,

MILITARY NOTES

Theodolites flexible to promote multiple bidding ,Military theodolites are being marmand, thus, to reduce unit costs. This ~ctured in quantity in the United work, conducted in close cooperation tates for the first time, giving this m-ith industry, has also encouraged mntry a production base for these US firms to produce other items of igh-order surveying instruments hich possess features not found in supply formerly obtained abroad. Ie ordinary transit. There are 480 While difficulties were encountered in the first quantity production of an eing produced under contract with {e US Army Materiel Command. instrument as delicate as a theodolite, these were overcome with the assistRevision and upgradirig of specifiante of the industry. The units will )tions used in quantity procurement he tested this winter under fieId conf engineer equipment is aimed at !aking the specifications sufficiently ditions.US Army release. A span flow boom duster has been eveloped for the Navy for use on ?veral types of utility helicopter. he system has been designated
Insecticide Disnersal f;et, and is attached to the aircrafts electrical system. Valves, agitators, and fluidizing pumps are electrically operated and controlled through the [[DAD (Helicopter Insecticide ~isuse of a portable, conventional pistolgrip control by a flight crew member. and will be er.val Apparatus Dust) The HZDAD system is capable of sed by the Navy for application of

rY-tYPematerials for use in disease ontrol. Thedueter incorporates a fluidizing ,rinciple which changes the properties f dry chemicals, making it possible 4%

dispensing from 30 to 500 pounds of the fluidized dry material per minute, and this can be increased to 1,200 pounds per minute by using larger booms. The system can also be used

Engmeermg

A9vicu1 curalAwatt..

COWIZUWLU

A ground test of the duster

o pump these materials through a loom system and dispense them hrough nozzles. The self-contained mitweighs approximately 200 pounds, vith a hopper capacity of 20 cubic Mtuary 1965

to dispense biological and chemical materials as well as dry inert materials to replace present corrosive smoke-producing liquids as smokescreening agente.News release. 103 ,

MILITARY NOTES.

. .

Reconnaissance Missile

Dubbed Ping Pong for its bounceback capability, this feasibility model of a potential photoreconnaissance missile is being readied for launch. Tbe model, seen poised in its launch tube, recently underwent a successful flight test. The missile returned to the area of the launch tube following a flight that included a midair stop and bounce back. Seen on the model are sliding fins that provide stability. Operation of a future Ping Pong camera-carrying missile is depicted in the drawing. The missile is aimed at the area of interest ( 1 ). After photographs are taken, the missile reverses direction (2), returns toward launch area (3), and is recovered (4). The missile is reusable. Feasibility studies have been sponsored by the US Army Electronics Command.News release.
L.mkheed.Crzlifmma COmDG

104

Mimirs Review

MILITARY NOTES

VIETNAM
Australian Aid

Australian military assistance is being given to both the Federation of Malaysia and South Vietnam (MR,

the training team sent to Vietnam at the request of the Vietnamese Governntent.-News item. NORWAY F-5 Fighter Bomber Sixty-four F-5 fighter bombers will
be delivered to.Norway in 1966 under the terme of agreements recently concluded in Washington.

The Norwegian

Air Force will also

e
Northrop COVPWaliOII

Sep 1964, p 107). In the picture above, Konthi Suphamongkhon, Secretary General of the Southeast Aeia Treaty Organization, is shown during a visit to the Australian Jungle Warfare Training Camp in Queensland where troops are trained to carry out Australias military commitments in southeast Asia. Below, two Australian warrant officers are shown giving rifle instruc--$

receive the ground equipment needed to bring the squadrons up to combat status .News item.

POLAND
The Oflicer Corps

OfhidA..t..lmn Phot..
tion at the Dong Da Training Center in the northern mountain region of South Vietnam. Both are members of

A European news source reports that the pro-Soviet Chief of the Education Department in the Defense Ministry has initiated a new cleaning action within the Polish officer corps. Victims are primarily wartime officers who still have not joined the Communist Party. According to confidential guidelines, all officers who are not members of the party will be discharged by 1970. To be releaeed this year are mainly officers whose rank is due to actions or deeds performed in World War II and not to ideological merits achieved within the framework of their party alignment. Moreover, all officers who, despite the strict regulations, have refueed to remove the traditional symbols of the old Polieh Army will be retired prematurely. News item.
105

MILITARY NOTES

,.
Military Balance

GREAT BRITAIN

The Inatituie for Straterric Studies in London has published its 1963-6 estimates of the comparative strategic strength of the Western alliances an the Communist bloc. This is the fifth of the Institutes annual estimates of the nature and the siz of military forces of the principal powers involved in the cold war. The following chart shows the early 1964 figures: Category Intercontinental ballistic missiles (over 4,000-kilometer range) Intermediate and midrange ballistic missiles (960 to 3,400-kilometer range) Fleet ballistic missiles Long-range bombers (over 8,000-kilometer range) Medium-range bombers (over 3,200kilometer range, including cakrierbased aircraft ) Carriers Nuclear submarines Conventional submarines Cruisers Escorts Active forces (in millions of men)
Shin. in reserve am shownm brackets. I

Western AIIiances 475

Comdmnist Bloc 100+

192 630

800 100 200

1,380 38 [37] 33 219 [42] 33 [25] 742 [358] 8.56

1,400

23 446 [56] 19 [2] 124 [248] 7.47

JAPAN
Radar On Mount FuJi

FRANCE
Miniature Helicopter

A meteorological radar station recently constructed at tbe top of 3,700-meter Mount Fuji is able to scan an area within an 800-k]lometer radius. It is expected to play an important role in tracking typhoons and predicting their course. Tbe system is operated by remote control from a meteorological station in Tokyo.News item. 106

A report published in a Swiss military journal states that France plans to equip her ground forces with an unmanned miniature helicopter designed for battlefield surveillance. The new system was designated 0rph4e and is credited with an observation range of 60 kilometers. A three-cable system holds the helicopter captive.News item. >. Military Reviw

MILITARY BOOKS
INTERNATIONALCONFLICT AND BEHAVIORAL sCIENCE.The Craigville Papers. Edited by
Roger Fisher. 290 Pages. Basic Books, inc., New York, 1964.$6.50. BY LT COL FRANK B. CASE, TC CIVIL AFFAIRS: Soldiers Become Governors. United States Army in World War N. By Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg. 932 Pages. Superintendent of Documentsr US Government Printing Office, Washington, o. c. $1.15. BY LT COL ALBERT N. GARLAND,Inf

International conflict is between people and one of the fields in which we are most ignorant is human moti. uation. Tbe most difficult problems today are not those concerned with the dispositions of weaponry but those of human conduct. Behavioral scientists should have something worthwhile to say in connection ~with these problems. This is a collection of papers prepared by a cross section of behavioral scientists at the invitation of the Amefican Academy of Arts and Sciences. It is a primer on the application of psychology, sociology, anthropology, and some related disciphnes to the problems of international relations. As a point of departure, tbe authors concern themselves with alternatives to the use of force as a means of settling international problems. Their particular object was the prevention of nuclear war. The book offers unfamiliar ideas and outlines direc~ions of investigation instead of dictating solutions. Some of the authors appear more qualified in their own disciplines than in international aff,airs and to the military reader some of their shots may seem wide of the mark. Nearly all of the papers, however, stir the readers imagination and force his thinking into rewarding channe]s. hhmary19S5

Drawing largely on documentary source material and depending but little on narrative, this volume, the 57th to be publisbed in the UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR 11 series, concerns itself with US Army and Anglo-American civil affairs planning for and operations in Italy, France, and northwest Europe prior to the occupation of Germany. No part of the civil affairs story in the Pacific is included, since the important part of that story would have to concern itself with tbe occupation of Japan. This volume represents a departure from the usual manner in which tbe series has been presented. Tbe authors decided on the documentary approach because they felt the documents presented here will be of permanent primary interest for historical research in economic, social, and political fields as records of the initial World War 11 effort in Allied military government. Perhaps of the greatest importance to todays military man are those documents which relate to the question of why, despite every initial prospect to the contrary, soldiers rather than civilians became and remained governors. A worthwhile addition to an Outstanding military hktory series. 107

MILITARY BOOKS MASS PERSUASION IN COMMUNIST CHINA. By Fretlerick T. C. Yu. 186 Pages. Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., New York, 1964. $5.00.

BY DAVIDRODNICK The political strength of the Chinese Communists lies in their ability to make known to the more than 700 million inhabitants of China their wishes, points of view, and goals. The Communist leadership is helped in its control by the dozens of functionaries, party members, and militia in each vjllage. By adapting the system of communication built UP within the Soviet Union to the more traditionalist and peasant aspects of Chinese life, the Communists have been able to control the thoughts and behavior of the Chinese population far more thoroughly than have any dynasties of the past. One can say that for the tirst time in history, China is unified as she has never been before, under a more totalitarian regime, and with less opportunities for any parts of the population to escape the ruthless and far-reaching arms of the partys propaganda apparatus. Although the population is effectively controlled by the party and its government, the danger to the Communists is not an uprising (which would have little chance of succeeding~ecause it would require time for organizationand in this respect the tentacles of the party in the smallest hamlets permit it to crush any revolts with overwhelming force), btit the apathy resulting from the boredom of hearing the partys slogans repeated endlessly. As in the Soviet Union, the overorganized propaganda machine tends, to defeat itself by lecturing to an apathetic audience which has
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learned to escape into private fantasy worlds of its own. Even in the Soviet Union, the saturation of the airwaves with party propaganda tends to breed an indifference to politics of all kinds, including both communism and anticommunism. Professor Yu, a Director of Research at the Columbia Graduate School of Journalism, has done an effective job in pointing up the intricate commu nicat ion network which exists between the party headquarters in Peking and the emallest and most isolated hamlet. But as Professor YU points out: One m~y seek some comfort in the
fact that after decades of persuasion and rig{d ieolation, the propagandists in Moscow have yet to capture the minds and hearts of the young in the Soviet Union. The mind of man hw a strange Loav of resisting oppression, and it is not likely that this characteristic will cease to exist altogether. THE STRATE6Y OF VICTORY 1914-1918. The life and Times of the Master Strategist of World War 1: Field.Marshal Sir William Rob. ertson. Bv Victor Bonham-Carter. 417 Pages. HoIt, Rin_ehart & Winston, Inc., New %k, 1963.$6.00.

The subject of this biography known as WUUY to his compatriots has been the only Britieh soldier ever to rise from the rank of private to field marshal. He served 10 and a half years as an enlisted man, then earned a commission. He was known for his hard work and dogged determination, two factors which played important roles throughout his $sreer. A sympathetic treatment of Sir Williams role in shaping the British ArmY and its strategy during World War I. Military R?YieW

MILITARY BOOKS
VIEW FROM THE SEVENTH FLOOR. By W. W. fwstow. 178 PageS. Harper K Row, Inc., New York, 19S4. $4.00. BY LT Co~ TOM REID, Inf

As chairman of the State Departments Policy Planning Council, Dr. Rostowhas developed a wide-ranging analysisof the events which have led to our present internatiwal situation, and in doing so has offered some cogent projections for the future. Establishing as he does at tbe outset that his is a partisan view, the wthor, nevertheless, makes a strong case for continuing the practices and policies that have characterized the operation of the international political scene during the 1961-63 period. Taking ite title from the specific location of the Policy Planning Council in tbe State Department, this volume examines our global strategy, the problems peculiar to the Atlantic Community, the economics of undeveloped nations, and the urgent problems of the cold war. Of particular interest is the authors comparison of the role played by the Army Corps of Engineers in the building and developing of our country with a corresponding need for newly emerging nations to engage m a similar operation. This he terms civic action at work. military Supporting a national posture consisting of a suitable mix of nuclear weapons, a full array of conventional forcis, and counterguerrilla elements, the volume contains a timely insight into the two major problems Dr. Rostow haa
isolated, munist objective the of containment and the world peace of the longer and Comrun offensive

University, he has honorary degrees from both Oxford and Cambridge. He also has extensive service as Profeseor of Economic History at Massachusetts Institute of Technology and in Government service at the policymakhg level. He has written extensively on politico-economic subjects and is the author of several books in this sphere. THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF EERMANY. A Concise History. By Alfred Grosser. Translated by Nelson Aldrich. 150 Pages.
Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., New York, 1964. $4.50. BY 2D LT FRANZ L. HELBIG,QMC

order.

Dr. Rostow is exceptionally well qualified to analyze the view he depicts. In addition to his doctorate from Yale fehmary 1965

In the discussion of United States and European relations, the past and future of Germany occupy a prominent place. As a factual background to euch discussions, this concise history fulfills a gap which has long been evident on the American bookshelf. With unusual brevity and succinctness, the author informs the reader of the many aspects of development in postwar Germany. While many important events are covered in as little as the new nation is a paragraph, examined and analyzed in a scholarly manner. Governmental institutions, society, the rapid growth of the free market economy, and German cultural life are discussed and historically evaluated. Professor Grosser, eminent French student of Germany, closes with the alternatives which are open to Germany in her efforts to effect the reunification of her people. For the casual and the professional student of European problems, this book presents not only a factual and precise text, but also an unusually comprehend ive bibliography for further study and research.
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MILITKRY BOOKS INTERNAL WAR. Problems and Approaches. Edited by Harry Eckstein. 339 Pages. The
Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., New York, 1964. $6.50. BY MAJ BOBBIE J. PINKERTON, Inf

A Professor of Political Science at Princeton University and a research associate of the Center of International Studies at Princeton, Dr. Eckstein has compiled a series of essays by 12 prominent social scientists. The contributors were to study the application of contemporary social theories to internal wars to include functional, action, communications, group dynamics, and attitude formation theories. Professor Eckstein admits in the introduction that the essays fall short of the mark in that the authors either fai[ed to confront the problem at hand or did not follow an acceptable scientific approach. Internal War is best described as an advanced textbook, more suited for classroom discussion in an institution of higher learning than for the individual reader. THE AGE OF DETERRENCE. By George E.
Lowe. 324 Pages. Little, Brown & Co., Boston, Mass., 1964.$6.75.

current Secretary of the Navy Paul H. Nitze. Mr. Lowe seee the Utopian Traditionalist debate as a continuing etrug. gle and warne againet the possibility that frustration with the state of affairs in Vietnam, like frustration over Korea 12 years ago, may add new strength to the Utopian camp.
RETURN TO CASSINO. A Memoir of the Fight far Rome. By Harold L. Bond. 207 Pages. Ooubleday & Co., Inc., Garden City, N. Y., 1964.$3.95. BY LT COL CHARLESR. SNIFFIN, In/

An interesting account of the personal ex~eriences of the author while serving as an infantry officer in cOmbat in Italy during World War II. As such, the text concentrates on the authors experiences as a member of the 36th Infantry Division during some of the most rugged fighting of the Italian Campaign. His style makes for fast-moving and interesting reading. ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF THE FIRST WOR1O
WAR. By A. J. P. Taylor. 224 Pages. G. P. Putnams Sons, New York, 1664.$6.95. BY CAPT FREnEmcK F. WOERNER, JR., lnf

A Foreign Service officer sets out to describe the great debate over defense strategy. He doea so in terms of an oversimplification which pits Utopians, who would put all our eggs in the nuclear and pre-emptive warfare basket, against Traditionalists, who place their faith in balanced conventional and nuclear forcee. The author aligne himself quite openly with the Traditionalists among whom he includes such personalities as Generals Tay}or, Ridgway, Gavin, and Medarie as well as former Seeretary of State Dean Acheson and the
110

In his most entertaining, succinct, and critical style, Mr. Taylor has produced a concise history of World War I. Supporting the text are 14 maps and 220 photographs, chosen with obvious discretion and poignantly cap tioned. The author discusses the military campaigns in terms of the ineptitude of the generals on both sides and concentrates on the strategy of the major campaigns, rather than the tactics of individual battles. It concludes with a brief discussion of the peace settlement and the League of Nations. Military RCViW

MILITARY BOOKS
THE 6E06RAPHY OF MOOERN AFRICA. BY WilfiaOIA. Ifance. 653 Pages,cokrnlfria Uni. versityPress, New York, 1964.$12.00. WAR: Studies From Psychology, Sociology, Anthropology. Edited by Leon Bramson and Georga Goethals. 407 Pages. Basic Books, brc., New York, 1904.$7.50.

BYCAPT FREDERICKJ. BURBACH, Art# The author, a Professor of Economic Geography at Columbia University, emphasizes both the present state of economic development and the potential for future development. The first five chapters summarize the physical, economic, demographic, and political features of the continent, and their effect on development. The remainder of the book examines Africs by regions. Included are more than 100 maps, 50 tables and charts, and several hundred pictures. The military reader will find the book helpful in understanding same of the underlying causes of c&flict in the emerging nations of Africa, and in recognizing the indicators of future problems.
lE610N OF STRANGERS. The Vivid History of a Unique Mifitary Tradition-The French Foreign Legion. By Charles Mercer. 342 Pages.Holt, Rinehart &Winston, Inc., New

BY MAJ FRANCIS H. HELLER, ZLSAR While historians and students of international relationa have produced small libraries dealing with the subject of war, the other social sciences have largely slighted the topic. Thus, an examination of introductory sociology texte published in the decade after World War 11 showed less than two percent of tbe total pages devoted to some aspects of the causes or effects of war. Psychologists have similarly ignored this particular subject until Stauffer published his volumes on tbe American soldier and T. W. Adorno and bis associates studied the authoritarian personality. The present collection of writings on war by a wide range of social scientists thus fills a void, and more importantly, offers tangible evidence of the awakening interest in the phenomenon of war on the part of students of human behavior. Represented among the authors are De Tocqueville and WiRiam Graham Sumner as well as the modern scholars Allport, Janowitz, and Margaret Mead. As is true of any collection of writings, another editor might have produced a different selection. Assuming that the book is aimed primarily at academicians, might there not have been merit in the inclusion of some material from military authors? The military reader, however, who presumably knows his own literature, will find his outlook uaefnlly enlarged by the different perspectives offered in this volume.
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Rrk, 1964.$5.95. A faat-moving, dramatic account of the French Foreign Legion, from its inception on 9 March 1831with an initial strength of about 3,500to the summer of 1963, when the Legions rolls showed some 13,000 effective scattered about a few small garrisons. In weI1-written chapters, the authorfor many years associated with the Associated Press and the producer of three novejsreviews again the Legions exploits in Africa, Asia, Europe, and at the small village of Csmerone in Mexico. He explains the Legions mystique: and concludes with an estimate of the Legions future. fdruary19e5

MILITARY BOOKS
CONGRESS: The Sapless Branch. By Senator Joseph S. Clark; United States Senator From Pennsylvania. 268 Pages. Jfarpar & Row, Inc., New York, 19B4. 34.95.

BY COL HAROLDA. DYE, Arty A liberal account of the operations of the legislative branch of the Government with emphasis oss the slow, tradition-bound functioning of Congress. The author, senior Senator from Pennsylvania, makes severaI recommendations for tbe speedup of the legislative process in Congress. The most notable ie the elimination of the filibuster in the Senate, and the crippling power of the Rules Committee in the House. The author implies that since in nearly all areae Congress polices and controls itself, corrective measures are obtainable within the congressional family. It is, perhaps, because Congrees has not eeen fit to make the suggested changes that Senator Clark calls Congrees the Sapless Branch. The book is well worth reading for a closeup view of the operation of the Congress.
lRAfJ UNDER GENERAL NURI: My Recollec. tions of Nuri al-Said, 1954.1956. By Waldemar J. Gallman. 241 Pages. The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, Md., 1964.$5.95.

monarchy. With the death of Nuri in the coup of 1958, the author mourns the end of a stable, viable Iraq in the Arab community, the lose of a world statesman, and tbe passing of an old and respected friend of the Weet. Mr. GaRman feels that the United States failed in her policy regarding Iraq an~ kie apologies for the State Department in Washington are thirdy veiled. Students of Middle Eastern affairs, particularly those interested in the historical claeh between Arabs and Zionism, will wish to share his recollections.
MILITARY SYSTEM OF THE SIKHS. Owing the Period 17994849. By Fauja SingJr Bajwa. 3B2 Pages. Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, India, 1964.$4.20.

BY MAJ LARRY S. MICKEL, Inf

Dr. Fauja Singh Bajwa hss drawn on English, Persi,an, and Punja!J language sources to catalog tbe sig

nificant military evente underlying Sikh domination of the Indian Punjat during the period 1799 to 1849.
Militarg S@em of the Sikhs par.

BY LT COL JOHN A. HUGHES,JR., CE During his tesmre as US Ambassador to Iraq, Mr. Gallman developed a personal friendship with Nuri, the Prime Minister and strong man of Iraq, His narrative covere that critical period in the Middle East which saw the establishment of the Baghdad Pact, the Suez incident, the US intervention in Lehanosr, and the Iraqi coup of 1958 which overthrew tbe
112

trays Maharaja Ranjit Singh as chiei architect. of a military organization which blended ancieut indigenou: fighting technique with tbe lW century European concept of maneu ver supported by fire. Although thi! system enabled the Sikhs to rise fron a purely religious %ect to a dOmina~ political group, divesting contrOl O! the Punjab from the Afghans, i proved no match for the army of th English East India Company. The military reader with a tbirs for detail will find it in preponder ante in this historical account. For the tactician, two chapters partially augmented witti sketch maps are devoted to Afghan battles and th, Anglo-Sikh Wars. MMtary Ile!iel