Thai Diasporas and Livelihood Strategies in Thai Society1

Monchai Phongsiri2

Abstract

Thai Diasporas are categorized as ‘victim diaspora’ who are attached with
the territory after the boundary demarcation between Britain and Siam in
1868. This consequent made they lived in the territories which belong to
Burma nation-state boundaries. These Thai Diasporas who moved back to
Thailand have not been granted the Thai citizenship and therefore have not
obtained any citizen’s rights. This circumstance made ‘power and rights’ are
critical problems. To consider ‘political capital’ as a sixth capital asset in
Sustainable Livelihoods Approach may encourage policy makers aware on
‘power and rights’ as a critical issue of people in vulnerability context such
as Thai Diasporas.

Introduction
Thai Diasporas in Burma have lived in Myeik-Taninthayi territory for a long time, at least
since the boundary demarcation between Britain and Siam in 1868. In 1980s, there were
about 41,258 Thai Diasporas composing of 18,280 Muslim Thais and about 22,978 Buddhist
Thais. The majority of them lived in the sub-districts of Changpung, Maliwan, Bokpian and
Lungkia in Kawthoung ( or Koh Song ) district, and in Singkhon sub-district of Myeik (or
Marid) district in Thninthayi (or Tanaosri) Division. Besides these areas, Thai Diasporas
also lived in the urban areas of Myeik and Kawthoung districts as well as in Taninthayi sub-
district. Even though Thai Diasporas lived in the territories which belong to Burma nation-
state boundaries as assigned in the map of the ‘modern’ world, they held on to the belief that
they lived in the ‘original’ Thailand’s boundaries and believed that they were Thai citizens.

1
This article includes, in revised form, arguments and material contained in a paper presented at the
conference “Economic Transition and Social Changes of Countries in Asian Sub-region” Grand
Millennium Sukhumvit Hotel, Asoke, Bangkok on 28– 30 May, 2009
2
Researcher of Center for Research on Plurality in the Mekong Region, Faculty of Humanities and
Social Sciences, Khon Kaen University
 2

Since 1970s, the militarily government of Burma moved forward to control Thai
communities and forcibly moved Thai Diasporas to live together in the resettlement areas
arranged by Burmese militarily government. This has resulted in serial migrations of up to
three fourth of Thai Diasporas from Burma to Thailand in 1980s. The majority of them
settled down in Thap Sakae, Mueang, Bang Saphan, Bang Saphan Noi districts of Prachuap
Khiri Khan Province; in Tha Sae District of Chumphon Province and in Kra Buri, La-un,
Kapoe, and Mueang districts of Ranong Province. However, these Thai Diasporas who
moved into Thailand have not been granted the Thai citizenship and therefore have not
obtained any citizen’s rights. Their status has turned out to be Thai Diasporas and ‘stateless
Thais’ in Thai Society (Thirawuth, 2007).

Research on Thai Diasporas is relatively limited. Most recent studies focussed on such areas
as: limitations of nation-state knowledge in Thai society (see Thirawuth, 2007), human rights
problems face by stateless children (see Phunthip, 2003), transnationalism of migrant workers
from Burma (see Chulalongkorn University, 2003 and Bussayarat, 2008), history and culture
of Tai ethnic group (see Somphong, 2001 and Kanya, 2001) and ethnic/minority group in
Burma (see Phornpimon, 1999) etc.

This paper makes an initial attempt for more understanding on Thai Diasporas in Thai
Society and the creation of knowledge on Thai Diasporas. Furthermore, this paper aims to
present the livelihood strategies of Thai Diasporas after moving back to Thailand, where
these people have neither Thai, nor any nationality, nor citizen rights. Being Thai Diasporas
and stateless Thais, they have no access to legal rights to all types of assets and basic
livelihoods means, for example: they have no legal rights to land ownership, housing,
vehicle, etc; they are not allowed to travel beyond provincial boundaries, and therefore young
Thai Diasporas cannot study at higher level. They have no political rights at all levels.
Without Thai identity cards, they cannot be legally hired; and being illegal workers they are
low paid and many times not paid. However, these Thai Diasporas managed to survive, and
many times made their voices heard. This paper aims to conduct a documentary review and
preliminary field study on these Thai Diasporas. Special attention will be given to issues that
will generate clearer understanding on the livelihoods strategies of these Thai Diasporas; for
example how they cope and survive, with limited access to livelihoods assets and citizenship
rights, rehabilitate, negotiate, and formulate livelihoods strategies, and to assess the impact of
these strategies on their lives and communities.
 3

Who is Diaspora?
The term Diaspora (in Greek, διασπορά – ‘a scattering or sowing of seeds’) refers to the
movement of any population sharing common ethnic identity who were either forced to leave
or voluntarily left their settled territory, and became residents in areas often far removed from
the former. It is converse to the nomadic culture. Diaspora cultural development often
assumes a different course from that of the population in the original place of settlement. It
tends to vary in culture, traditions and other factors between remotely separated communities.
The last vestige of cultural affiliation in a Diaspora is often found in community resistance to
language change and in maintenance of religious practice (Wikipedia, 2008). The first
mention of a Diaspora created as a result of exile is found in Deuteronomy 28:25 ‘thou shalt
be a dispersion in all kingdoms of the earth’. Its use began to develop from this original sense
when the Hebrew Bible was translated into Greek; the word ‘Diaspora’ then was used to
refer to the population of Jews exiled from Israel in 607 BC by the Babylonians, and from
Judea in 70 CE by the Roman Empire. It subsequently came to be used to refer
interchangeably, but exclusively, to the historical movements of the dispersed ethnic
population of Israel, the cultural development of that population, or the population itself
(Wikipedia, 2008).

Diaspora was dealt with only in connection with the Jews for many generations. Thus, the
entry on ‘Diaspora’ in the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences published in 1937 was by
Simon Dubnow, the prominent scholar of Jewish history. With few exceptions, political
scientists and historians ignored it, including those who focused on nationalism and ethnicity.
The reason was simple: diaspora referred to a very specific case of the exile of the Jews from
the Holy Land and their dispersal throughout several parts of the globe. Diaspora connoted
deracination, legal disabilities, oppression, and an often painful adjustment to a hostland
whose hospitality was unreliable and ephemeral. It also connoted the existence on foreign soil
of an expatriate community that considered its presence to be transitory. Meanwhile, it
developed a set of institutions, social patterns, and ethno-national and/or religious symbols
that held it together. These included the language, religion, values, social norms, and
narratives of the homeland. Gradually, this community adjusted to the hostland environment
and became itself a center of cultural creation. All the while, however, it continued to
cultivate the idea of return to the homeland (Safran, 2005). In this context, the notion of the
 4

Jewish diaspora was distinguished as a prototype or classical diaspora paradigm. With the
emergence of globalization, the term diaspora has been used more widely than the classical
diaspora paradigm. At the same time, there was a reconceptualization of the term to
encompass phenomena of increased international population mobility unleashed by
globalization such as augmented emigration to the developed countries, the
telecommunication and transportation revolution, and the development of a cosmopolitan
global culture. Increased interest in the phenomenon of diaspora, and minorities whose
experiences met the classical diaspora paradigm only in part began to be called diasporas,
thereby blurring the lines among ethnic minorities, refugee flows, migrations, and diaspora
(Popescu, 2006). From these reasons, diaspora is too vague a concept and some scholars
prefer to focus on transnational relations. To make clear understanding of Diasporas concept
is necessary for studying Thai Diasporas too.

Diasporas are distinct trans-state social and political entities; they result from voluntary or
imposed migration to one or more host countries; the members of these entities permanently
reside in host countries; they constitute minorities in their respective host country; they
evince an explicit ethnic identity; they create and maintain relatively well-developed
communal organizations; they demonstrate solidarity with other members of the community,
and consequently, cultural and social coherence; they launch cultural, social, political and
economic activities through their communal organizations; they maintain discernible cultural,
social political and economic exchanges with the homeland, whether this is a state or a
community in a territory within what they regard as their homeland; for this as well as for
other purposes, they create trans-state networks that enable exchanges of significant
resources; and have the capacity for either conflict of cooperation with both the homeland
and host country, possibilities that are in turn connected to highly complex patterns of
divided and dual authority and loyalty within the diasporas (Sheffer, 2003).

Diaspora is a concept associated with Judaic history. It refers to the historical exile of the
Jews from Palestine and their being dispersed dramatically throughout the world. It also
refers to their permanent state of dispersion, fragmentation and exile. The word has been
employed by social scientists as a way to explain some modern experiences of migration or
mobility in a wider sense, especially the social mobility created by some wars and other
massive migrations in the modern world. Even modernity has been considered a state of exile
because often results in the non-belonging to a place, and the drastic rupture from a space and
 5

the permanent movement over the world. In this sense, modernity can be understood as an
existential moment through which everybody feels himself exiled from his homeland (Aktay,
2001). The term ‘diasporas’ in widely context refers to expatriate groups which, in contrast
to ‘migrants’, applies to expatriate populations abroad and generations born abroad to foreign
parents who are or may be citizens of their countries of residence. The overall development
potential of the people referred as diasporas can reach significant levels, involving such areas
as business creation, trade links, investments, remittances, skills circulation, exchange of
experiences and even impacts on social and cultural roles of men and women in the home
society (Ionescu, 2006).

Safran (2005) explained diaspora cohesively with Jewish diaspora and people who were
forced to leave their homeland. In this context, diaspora has had a specific meaning
historically and categorized diaspora by space and time, and conditions of displacement such
as:
- The Jews are the oldest diaspora; they lacked a ‘homeland’ for two millennia but
thought about it constantly and the idea of a return to it, at first an eschatological
conception and much later a concrete one, remained part of their collective
consciousness
- The older communities that were dispersed from their homeland many
generations ago to several host countries, where they have fulfilled economic
intermediary roles, often in permanent urban settlements, and have functioned, as
it were, as ‘ethnoclasses’
- The newer diasporas that have formed during the past half century and may add
expatriated communities that are potential or ‘incipient’ diasporas

Safran listed diaspora criteria which applied from several characteristics based on the Jewish
diaspora as a paradigmatic one or the Jewish prototype. These criteria are diasporas in the
generic sense as the following:
1. They, or their ancestors, have been dispersed from a specific original ‘center’ to
two or more peripheral, or foreign, regions.
2. They retain a collective memory, vision, or myth about their original homeland;
its physical location, history, achievements, and, often enough, sufferings.
 6

3. Their relationship with the dominant element of society in the hostland is

complicated and often uneasy. They believe that they are not, and perhaps cannot
be, fully accepted by their host society and therefore feel partly alienated and
insulated from it.
4. They regard their ancestral homeland as their true, ideal home and as the place to
which they or their descendants would (or should) eventually return, if and when
conditions are appropriate.
5. They continue to relate, personally or vicariously, to that homeland in one way or
another, and their ethno-communal consciousness and solidarity, which reach
across political boundaries, are importantly defined in terms of the existence of
such a relationship. That relationship may include a collective commitment to the
maintenance or restoration of their original homeland and to its independence,
safety, and prosperity. The absence of such a relationship makes it difficult to
speak of transnationalism.
6. They wish to survive as a distinct community, in most instances as a minority by
maintaining and transmitting a cultural and/or religious heritage derived from their
ancestral home and the symbols based on it. In so doing, they adapt to hostland
conditions and experiences to become themselves centers of cultural creation and
elaboration.
7. Their cultural, religious, economic, and/or political relationships with the
homeland are reflected in a significant way in their communal institutions.

In the opinion of some scholars, this list is still too narrow, but in the view of others, such
enlargement may have gone too far and become heuristically problematic like Popescu
(2006) said about the problem of Diasporas as a blurring and too vague concept. However,
Safran agreed that no diaspora, including the Jewish one, conforms completely to the
paradigm presented above. This has led a number of people to abandon it altogether. Now,
the term Diasporas has become so well-established by the Jewish diaspora continuing to be
used as prototype because it combines such features as ethnicity, religion, minority status, a
consciousness of peoplehood, a long history of migration, expulsion, adaptation to a variety
of hostlands whose welcome was conditional and unreliable, and a continuing orientation to a
homeland and to a narrative and ethnosymbols related to it. This explains why a number of
scholars have distinguished the ‘classic’ diaspora from the ‘generic’ diaspora.
 7

Cohen (1997) argued to Safran’s list of diaspora criteria that recognizing the expanded use of
the concept of diaspora, but the Jewish experience continued to influence Safran’s view of
the vital importance of homeland in defining one of essential characteristics of diaspora. In
this sense, Safran’s list that in some limited circumstances the term ‘diaspora’ can be used to
describe transnational bounds of co-responsibility even where historically exclusive
territorial claims are not strongly articulated. Cohen divided diasporas in five groups:
1. Victim diaspora: the same definition as classical diaspora means people who
forced to leave from their homeland, retained a collective memory of their
original homeland, they idealize their ancestral home, were committed to the
restoration of the original homeland and continued in various ways to relate to
that homeland. (Example: Jews, African, Armenians, Irish, Palestinians, others)
2. Labour diaspora: the other migration patterns, conforms to the use of the word to
describe trading and commercial network to those seeking work abroad and to
imperial or colonial settlers, diaspora who voluntarily left their homeland for
working as indentured labor. (Example: Indentured Indians, Chinese and
Japanese, Turks, Italians)
3. Trade diaspora: the famous trade diaspora is Chinese diaspora, the older
communities that were dispersed from their homeland many generations ago to
several host countries, where they have fulfilled economic intermediary roles.
Many traders as indentured labourers had begun to spill outside the Chinese
mainland to the rest of Southeast Asia. Moreover, the merchants’ long-term
influence was far greater. (Example: Venetians, Lebanese, Chinese, others:
Today’s Indians, Japanese)
4. Imperial diaspora: the settlement of people from colonial community for colonial
expansion, religious mission, trade and had intermarriage with local people. Other
synonymous expressions are settler or colonial diasporas. (Example: Ancient
Greek, British, Russian, Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, French, others)
5. Cultural diaspora: the expressions hybrid, cultural and post-colonial also is linked
to the idea of deterritorialization. (Example: Caribbean peoples, Afro-Caribbean
post-modern, others: Today’s Chinese, Indians)

Vertovec (1999) grouped the current meaning of diaspora in three meanings: diaspora as
social form, diaspora as type of consciousness, and diaspora as mode of cultural production.
 8

1. Diaspora as social form: a concept referring almost exclusively to the

experiences of Jews, invoking their traumatic exile from an historical homeland
and dispersal throughout many lands. With this experience as reference,
connotations of a ‘diaspora’ situation were usually rather negative as they were
associated with forced displacement, victimization, alienation, loss. Along with
this archetype went a dream of return
2. Diaspora as type of consciousness: relatively recent, approach to ‘diaspora’ puts
greater emphasis on describing a variety of experience, a state of mind and a
sense of identity. ‘Diaspora consciousness’ is a particular kind of awareness said
to be generated among contemporary transnational communities. Its particularity
is variously described as being marked by a dual or paradoxical nature. It is
constituted negatively by experiences of discrimination and exclusion, and
positively by identification with an historical heritage (such as ‘Indian
civilization’) or contemporary world cultural or political forces (such as ‘Islam’)
3. Diaspora as mode of cultural production: this set of meanings which various
writers have attributed to the notion of ‘diaspora’ is usually conveyed in
discussions of globalization. In this sense; usually although not exclusively the
approach of anthropologists; globalization is examined in its guise as the
worldwide flow of cultural objects, images and meanings resulting in variegated
process of creolisation, back-and-forth transferences, mutual influences, new
contestations, negotiations and constant transformations. In this way ‘diaspora’ is
described as involving the production and reproduction of transnational social and
cultural phenomena. Also with reference to questions of globalization, an interest
in ‘diaspora’ has been equated with anthropology’s now commonplace anti-
essentialist, constructivist, and processual approach to ethnicity. In this approach,
the fluidity of constructed styles and identities among diasporic people is
emphasized

Thirawuth Senakham (2004 and 2007) categorized diasporas concepts in two groups by
summarizing diaspora conceptualized which applied to expatriated communities:
1. Diasporas as typological tool: in this concept is the same explanation as Safran
said about classical diaspora paradigm which means the people who forced to
leave from the center in their settled territory or homeland to hostlands, retain a
 9

collective memory, and continue their relationship to that homeland and Suzuki
(2005) defined diaspora as people of the “sameness-in-dispersal”
2. Diasporas as social conditions: in this sense, diaspora was consequent with the
social, economic and culture conditions of transnational societies. Diasporas
identity was constructed under social conditions among globalization

Brubaker (2005) discussed about ‘diaspora’ meaning has been stretched in various directions
made diaspora as a dispersion of the meanings of the term in semantic, conceptual and
disciplinary space. The dispersion in semantic and conceptual space can identify three core
elements; firstly is dispersion in space, secondly is orientation to ‘homeland’, and thirdly is
boundary-maintenance.
- Dispersion. This is today the most widely accepted criterion. It can be interpreted
strictly as forced or otherwise traumatic dispersion; more broadly as any kind of
dispersion in space, provided that the dispersion crosses state borders; or more
broadly still, so that dispersion within state borders may suffice. Some substitute
division for dispersion, defining diasporas as ‘ethnic communities divided by state
frontiers’ or as ‘that segment of a people living outside the homeland’. This
allows even compactly settled populations to count as diasporas when part of the
population lives as a minority outside its ethnonational ‘homeland’.
- Homeland Orientation. This criterion is the orientation to a real or imagined
‘homeland’ as an authoritative source of value, identity and loyalty. These
include: maintaining a collective memory or myth about the homeland; regarding
the ancestral homeland as the true, ideal home and as the place to which one
would eventually return; committed to the maintenance or restoration of the
homeland and to its safety and prosperity; continue to relate, personally or
vicariously, to the homeland, in a way the significantly shapes one’s identity and
solidarity.
- Boundary-Maintenance. The preserveation of a distinctive identity VS host
society. Emphasize the importance of boundaries for collectivities that do not
have ‘their own’ territorial polity. Boundaries can be maintained by deliberate
resistance to assimilation through self-enforced endogamy or other forms of self-
segregation or as an unintended consequence of social exclusion. A diaspora as a
distinctive ‘community’, held together by a distinctive, active solidarity, as well
 10

as by relatively dense social relationship, that cut across state boundaries and link
members of the diaspora in different states into a single ‘transnational
community’

Voutira (2006) explained diaspora aspects in academic fields such as: Historically
exemplified by the exodus of the Jews from Babylon, the concept of a ‘diaspora’ has
witnessed an unprecedented popularity among social scientists over the last twenty years. As
used in social science research, the concept has typically referred to ethnic minority groups
who live outside the territory of their ‘historical homelands’. During the 1990s, the term
attracted the attention of anthropologists, sociologists, geographers, political scientists, and
cultural critics searching for more comprehensive analytical terms to accommodate the
admittedly complex transnational and global linkages among economies, cultures, and
peoples. At the core of this concern is a critique of the underlying assumptions about the
‘natural’ bonds that connect traditional anthropological concepts such as kinship and
membership with a territory or place. Under the influence of post-modernism, scholars have
often employed the term to express notions of ‘hybrid’ identities and loyalties.

Voutira discussed to rethink some basic assumptions of diaspora about displacement, while
acknowledging the need to rethink basic concepts and categories used in migration and
refugee research and to capture the changing patterns of social relations on a global level,
such developments tend to undermine the important and urgent need to study and understand
the formative processes of new diasporas and the redefinition of old ones at the end of the
Cold War. The creation of a massive post-Soviet Russian diaspora of approximately 25
million Russians outside Russia’s borders is one dramatic case of an ‘unintended’ diaspora
creation occurring practically overnight. Both within and outside former Soviet space there is
now more than ever an urgent need to rethink some basic assumptions about displacement per
se. Specifically, in discussing displacement, we are not merely referring to people moving
across borders (which is presupposed by the conventional view of ‘diaspora’), but also to
borders moving across people. One major consequence of this type of ‘border displacement’
is the radical dispossession of those who are found not to ‘belong’ within the new territorial
boundaries. This involves the divorcing of populations from their ostensible homelands and
the creation of another crisis of identity and responsibility that also includes the impact of
reshuffling populations along ‘ethnic’ lines. At the core of the very concept of ‘displacement’
are implicit assumptions about the natural correspondence between a people and a territory,
 11

or the proper place for a people and, by implication, an assumption about every people
having its own place.

In conclusion, Diaspora refers to the historical exile of the Jews from Palestine and their
being dispersed dramatically throughout the world. It also refers to their permanent state of
dispersion, fragmentation and exile. The use of ‘diaspora’ as a way to explain some modern
experiences of migration or mobility in a wider sense, especially the social mobility created
by some wars and other massive migrations in the modern world. The meaning and concepts
has proliferated, this enlargement may have gone too far and become problematic and made
modernity can be understood as an existential moment through which everybody feels
himself exiled from his homeland. The term ‘diaspora’ may have overlapped to the others
such as immigrant, refugee, expatriate, guest worker, ethnic minority, exile community,
oversea community and transnational community. Its explosion is not confined to academic
writing, yields a million Google hits that large majority are not academic. Most early
discussions of diaspora were firmly rooted in a conceptual ‘homeland’. As discussions of
diasporas began to branch out to include other cases. From the point of view of the homeland,
emigrant groups have been conceptualized as diasporas, even when they have been largely
assimilated (Brubaker, 2005). The problem of diaspora category becomes stretched to the
point of uselessness; if everyone is diasporic then no one is distinctively, so the term loses its
discriminating power. Therefore, many scholars try to set criteria for ‘stringency of
definition’ (i.e. Safran, Cohen, Brubaker, Vertovec, etc.). However, to apply concepts and
theories about diaspora to phenomena need to step down from abstract ideas to concrete
phenomena and clear understanding the term ‘diaspora’ for example Thai Diasporas too.

Thai Diasporas in Thai Society

The problems of Thai Diasporas may be started with creation of geo-body and geo-soul of
Thailand formerly, Siam. By 1932, monarchic rule and colonial powers had demarcated the
‘geo-body’ of Siam, the national soul was not yet fully cultivated. Until, Prime Minister
Phibunsongkhram sought to mould the religio-national identity of Thailand until the religious
community’s borders coincided with those of the nation-state. Infusion the geographic body
with a religio-national soul, so the nationalism that developed embraced the fusion of the
religious identity with the national identity (Thongchai Winichakul, 1994 and Ricks, 2008).
Mapmaking has been a tool for recording and controlling space and mapping also destroys
 12

the open and dynamic character of local resource tenure practices, freezing these practices
into maps that cannot easily be changed, in other words, mapping destroys indigenous
conceptions of space and replaces them with imagined lines on the ground (Fox, 2002). Thai
Diasporas were consequence outcomes of boundary demarcation and made them lived in the
territories which belong to Burma nation-state boundaries as assigned in the map of the
‘modern’ world, they held on to the belief that they lived in the ‘original’ Thailand’s
boundaries and believed that they were Thai citizens. After the militarily government of
Burma moved forward to control Thai communities, Thai Diasporas moved back to Thailand
by have not been granted the Thai citizenship and therefore have not obtained any citizen’s
rights.

Thai Diasporas (in Burma) may categorize as ‘victim diaspora’ based on explanation of
Brubaker (2005) that some substitute division for dispersion, defining diasporas as ‘ethnic
communities divided by state frontiers’ or as ‘that segment of a people living outside the
homeland’. This allows even compactly settled populations to count as diasporas when part
of the population lives as a minority outside its ethnonational ‘homeland’. And Voutira
(2006) discussed to rethink some basic assumptions of diaspora about displacement. For post-
Soviet Russia case that created massive of diasporas outside Russia’s borders is one dramatic
case of an ‘unintended’ diaspora creation occurring practically overnight. Specifically, in
discussing displacement, we are not merely referring to people moving across borders, but
also to borders moving across people. This type of ‘border displacement’ is the radical
dispossession of those who are found not to ‘belong’ within the new territorial boundaries.

After serial migrations of Thai Diasporas moved back from Burma to Thailand in 1980s, they
may categorize as ‘victim diaspora’ again based on Safran’s and Cohen’s criteria. This
diasporic cause was the same circumstance as a prototype or classical diaspora paradigm,
which refers to the movement of any population sharing common ethnic identity that were
forced to leave their settled territory or homeland. But Thai Diasporas (in Thailand), they are
‘diasporas in homeland’ not in the ‘hostland’. Majority of Thai Diasporas who moved into
Thailand have not been granted the Thai citizenship and therefore have not obtained any
citizen’s rights. Their status has turned out to be Thai Diasporas and ‘stateless Thais’ in Thai
Society.
 13

Thai Diasporas are not well-known while the use of ‘diaspora’ has proliferated in the last
decade. Safram (1991) observed that most scholarly discussions of ethnicity and immigration
paid little if any attention to diasporas. ‘Diaspora’ and its cognates appear as keywords only
once or twice a year in dissertations from the 1970s, about thirteen times a year in the late
1980s, and nearly 130 times in 2001 (Brubaker, 2005). But only one dissertation which
related to Thai Diasporas was published in 2007 which studied about Thai Diasporas
phenomena with political sciences concepts i.e. nation-state, nation and citizenship, diasporic
public sphere and sovereignty (see detail in Thirawuth Senakham, 2007). Consequently of
research and information on Thai Diasporas is relatively limited therefore, majority of Thai
people do not know who are Thai Diasporas.

Thai Diaspora issues have been recognized since Thai government supported Social
Investment Fund (SIF) to poor people in 2002. Some NGOs worked closely with poor people
in Ranong Province promoted Saving Scheme and open for membership application with ID
card. But many poor people had no ID card or any identified documents. After interviewing
for more information, they were known as Thai Diasporas or stateless people who live in
Thai society for a long time. And after Tsunami struck to southern part of Thailand in 2004,
Thai Diasporas have been more recognized with the same circumstance. Many affected
people included Thai Diasporas could not receive any help from social welfare agencies and
NGOs because they had no ID card or any identified documents. After that, Thai Diasporas’
matter has been widespread to Thai society.

‘Thai Diasporas’ or in Thai official documents called ‘Burmese nationality with Thai race
Diaspora person’ categorized in two groups as reported in memorandum of Secretariat of the
National Security Council (SNSC) on 7 January 1997 which is the official document
presented to ministry on 27 May 1997:
1. Thai people who migrated to work in Burma and be backed after minority groups
repression
2. Thai people who attached with the losing land after the boundary demarcation
between Britain and Siam i.e. Thaway, Marid and Tanaosri District

In some documents (B. Thammabut, 2003; Thirawuth Senakham, 2005, 2007 and Wikipedia,
2009) categorized Thai Diasporas in 3 groups which may not different from SNSC:
1. Buddhist Thai Southerners
 14

2. Muslim Thais (the first two groups are Thai people who attached with the losing
land after the boundary demarcation but categorized in more detail to religious
groups)
3. Thai Esan or Northeasterners who migrated to work and settle in Burma

These categories may be different from Thai Diasporas’ view as the telling stories of a Thai
Diaspora who live in Prachuap Khiri Khan Province longer than 3 decades and made
argument to the ‘Thai Diaspora’ definition of SNSC:

“…There were two groups of originally Thai people who live in Taninthayi
Division (in Burma), from Dawei (or Thaway) to Tenasserim (or Tanaosri).
Firstly, Thai people who attached with the land after the boundary
demarcation between Britain and Siam in 1868. But Thai people there did not
know about this matter, so they hold on believing that they lived in the
‘original’ Thailand’s boundaries and believed that they were Thai citizens,
because there is a city pillar with Thai letters at Tanaosri district. This city
pillar is hallowed cannot pull up, so now the Thai letters here was cemented.
Secondly, Thai people who lived there before World War II (in Asia during
1937-1945) because, they afraid of Japanese military when occupied to
Thailand, so they escaped to the territory that ever belong to Thailand (in
Burma) where Britain occupied. They thought that after World War ended,
Britain may hand over this land to Thailand. We are Thai not Burmese; we
lose territory but not lose nationality…”

Thai Diasporas in Prachuap Khiri Khan Province retain their collective memory about
peaceful, happiness and resourceful life in their original homeland (in the land where was
former Thailand’s boundaries) and sufferings from force to move:

“…I moved to Thailand in 1973. Before backed here, at Ban (village)

Singkhon in Burma, we were happy. Because, we had everything, i.e.
hundreds flock of cows and buffaloes with 200-300 cows/buffaloes in each
flock, hundreds of elephants, farmlands, huge of wild animals that we can
hunt, etc. It was resourceful life here and we had so many properties which
derived from selling domestic and wild animals to Thailand. In the past,
 15

Burmese military did not meddle in Thai communities. After war with
independent minority groups, Burmese military moved forward to control
Thai communities and forced Thai villagers (diasporas) carrying weapons and
victual. Many Thai people died when Burmese military and dependent
minority groups clashing around our communities. Therefore, we made
decision to escape to Thailand…”

Thai Diasporas’ Livelihoods

Majority of Thai Diasporas who backed to Thailand have not been granted the Thai
citizenship and therefore have not obtained any citizen’s rights for access to legal rights to all
types of assets and basic livelihoods means. So, their livelihoods have been totally changed
compare when living in their homeland (in Burma) from resourceful life to have nothing in
living:

“…Thai Diasporas who live there (in Thailand) have no rights as Thai
citizenship. We have no legal rights for being assets owner such as land,
housing, vehicle, etc; cannot receive health service from government health
facilities; not allowed travelling beyond provincial boundaries neither for
working nor studying. So, most of us work as local labourer in construction or
fishing sectors, some of us work as labourer in industrial factory or
agricultural sector, but cannot grow rice or do agriculture by ourselves
because no lands for growing therefore we must buy all for consumption. In
the past when we lived there (at Ban Singkhon in Burma), we bought nothing
for eating we can produce food by ourselves in our community…”

For analyzing Thai Diasporas ‘Livelihoods’ with academic field, ‘Livelihood’ perspective
has proved to be interesting for scholars from different disciplines and background, and has,
to date, produced studies dealing with a diversity of themes and focusing on diverse
categories of people all over the globe, but always from perspective of people’s day-to-day
struggles in making a living. Thus, livelihood studies may focus on the way people cope with
ecological disaster and economic and political adversity, on the effects of resettlement and
processes of deagrarianisation, on social-security mechanisms, diversification, and problems
of sustainable livelihoods. The livelihood approach is indeed useful for studying poverty
 16

issues and there are still ways forward to be explored i.e. actor’s perceptions of the
environment, of themselves, and of the dynamics and processes they are involved in. The
term ‘livelihood’ is to help us understand the complexity of current problems of poverty and
development (Kaag and others, 2004).

The definition of ‘livelihood’ has been extensively discussed among academics and
development practitioners (see for instance Ellis, 1998, Batterbury, 2001; Chambers and
Conway, 1992; Carney, 1998; Bernstein, 1992; Francis, 2000, 2002; Radoki, 2002). There is
a consensus that livelihood is about the ways and means of ‘making a living’ (website
Livelihood, 2006: http://www.livelihood.wur.nl/index.php?id=24). Furthermore, there are
some scholars who focused on livelihood studies provided the definitions such as:
- livelihood is never just a matter of finding or making shelter, transacting money,
getting food to put on the family table or to exchange on the market place. It is
equally a matter of ownership and circulation of information, the management of
skills and relationships and the affirmation of personal significance... and group
identity (Wallman, 1984)
- best express the idea of individuals and groups striving to make a living,
attempting to meet their various consumption and economic necessities, coping
with uncertainties, responding to new opportunities, and choosing between
different value positions (Long, 1997)
- a person's assets, such as land, are not merely means with which he or she makes
a living: they also give meaning to that person's world. Assets are not simply
resources that people use in building livelihoods: they are assets that give them
the capability to be and to act. Assets should not be understood only as things that
allow survival, adaptation and poverty eradication: they are also the basis of
agents' power to act and to reproduce, challenge or change the rules that govern
the control, use and transformation of resource (Bebbington, 1999)
- the activities, the assets, and the access that jointly determine the living gained by
an individual or household (Ellis, 2000)

However, the word ‘livelihood’ can be used in many different ways. deHaan and Zoomers
(2003) summarized that, the most widely accepted and quoted definition of livelihood is that
 17

given by Carney (1998, based on Chambers and Conway 1992), the following definition
captures the broad notion of livelihoods understood here:

‘A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (including both material and

social resources) and activities required for a means of living. A livelihood is
sustainable when it can cope with a recover from stress and shocks and
maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets both now and in the future,
while not undermining the natural recourse base’

Livelihood concept was developed through contributions made by scholars from different
disciplines. One type of these contributions has been made with policy circles to develop
analytical frameworks that allow the livelihood situation of a target group to be captured and
the subsequent formulation of adequate policy interventions. DFID is the main representative
of such an approach.

Figure 1: Sustainable Livelihoods Framework: SLF (DFID, 1999)

Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (SLF) is a tool to improve our understanding of

livelihoods. The framework is centred on people. It does not work in a linear manner and
does not try to present a model of reality. Its aim is to help stakeholders with different
 18

perspectives to engage in structured and coherent debate about the many factors that affect
livelihoods, their relative importance and the way in which they interact. This, in turn, should
help in the identification of appropriate entry points for support of livelihoods. SLF presents
the main factors that affect people’s livelihoods, and typical relationships between these. It
can be used in both planning new development activities and assessing the contribution to
livelihood sustainability made by existing activities. The main factors that affect people’s
livelihoods as listed below (DFID, 1999):
- Vulnerability Context frames the external environment in which people exist.
People’s livelihood and the wider availability of assets are fundamentally affected
by critical trends as well as by shock and seasonality – over which they have
limited or no control. The factors that make up the Vulnerability Context are
important because they have a direct impact upon people’s asset status and the
options that are open to them in pursuit of beneficial livelihood outcomes
- Livelihood Assets, the livelihoods approach is concerned first and foremost with
people. It seeks to gain an accurate and realistic understanding of people’s
strengths (assets or capital endowments) and how they try to convert these into
positive livelihood outcomes. The livelihood framework identifies five core asset
categories or types of capital upon which livelihoods are built include human
capital, social capital, natural capital, physical capital and financial capital
- Transforming Structures and Processes within the livelihoods framework are
the institutions, organizations, policies and legislation that shape livelihoods. The
various types and levels of structure and process: Structures are focused on public
sector, private sector and civil society and Processes are focused on policy,
legislation, institutions, culture and power relations
- Livelihood Strategies, the livelihoods approach seeks to promote choice,
opportunity and diversity. This is nowhere more apparent than in its treatment of
livelihood strategies – the overarching term used to denote the range and
combination of activities and choices that people make/undertake in order to
achieve their livelihood goals (including productive activities, investment
strategies, reproductive choices, etc.)
- Livelihood Outcomes are the achievements or outputs of Livelihood Strategies.
Livelihood outcomes help to understand; the ‘output’ of the current configuration
of factors within the livelihoods framework, what motivates people to behave as
 19

they do, what their priorities are, how they are likely to respond to new
opportunities and which performance indicators should be used to assess support
activity

In this context, ‘Livelihoods Strategies’ will be a special attention and issues that will
generate clearer understanding on the livelihoods strategies of these Thai Diasporas; for
example how they cope and survive, with limited access to livelihoods assets and citizenship
rights, rehabilitate, negotiate, and formulate livelihoods strategies, and to assess the impact of
these strategies on their lives and communities.

Rakodi (1999) summarized ‘Livelihoods Strategies’ that households cope with

impoverishment by:
- diversification of economic activities (including migration)
- utilizing social networks based on reciprocity
- borrowing
- seeking charity/begging
- selling assets e.g. livestock, jewelry, land
- saving expenditure by postponing or not seeking medical treatment (or choosing
cheaper providers), withdrawing children from school, postponing consumption
or investment, purchasing poorer quality or less food, increasing own production
(especially of food), and embarking on or increasing foraging (for wild foods or
fuel, scavenging waste)
- changing household composition (either increasing its size to increase labour
power or reducing it e.g. by sending children to live elsewhere)

Mulugeta (2008) studied on survival strategies of poor women in Addis Ababa. The findings
were type of coping strategy mostly used by the women included:
- eating less and utilizing savings, especially cutting down on meals, reducing the
quality, quantity, and frequency of meals
- changing expenditure patterns
- increasing indebtedness, etc
 20

These types of coping strategies do not usually help women to cope and go beyond survival
to empowerment, and will eventually lead to chronic poverty. However, the feeling of
optimism would diminish when problems are persistent, and situations become
uncontrollable and unpredictable, resulting in, what psychologists call ‘learned helplessness’.
This might be one of the reasons why a significant number of women adopt the passive type
of strategies by do not take any action to mitigate their situation.

SLF identifies five capital assets which people can build up and draw upon: human, natural,
financial, social and physical. ‘Sets of activities’ and ‘diverse options or choices’ that Thai
Diasporas have chosen as their coping and survival strategies based on their limited access to
capitals assets and citizenship rights are:
- Human Capitals: ‘Household members’ of Thai Diaspora in the old generation
may not be different from other households. But the young Diasporas are guided
to get intermarriage with Thai citizens for citizenship granting to their child and
seeking who can be livelihood assets owner, etc. ‘Occupations’ of Thai Diasporas
are the same pattern. They do not allow travelling beyond provincial boundaries
neither for working nor studying. So, most of them work as local labourer in
construction, fishing sectors or in industrial factories, and some of them are the
merchants at local market. In this sense ‘Labour’ is their key human capital.
‘Health’, they cannot receive health service from government health facilities and
must fully pay for healing their illness.
- Natural Capitals: ‘Access to land’ where production takes place, Thai Diasporas
cannot be the legal land owner. So, they can produce some agricultural products
in small plots where rented from landlords. ‘Natural resources’ which Thai
Diasporas can take from nature, they indicated the fishery resources from canal
and sea are main natural capital.
- Social Capitals: Social capital is considered to be the key factor upon which Thai
Diasporas draw in pursuit of their livelihood objectives. These include networks
and relations of connectedness, that increase people’s trust and ability to work
together and linkage to other capitals assets which can assist in increasing well-
being. These included membership in local associations and networks such as
saving groups and Thai Nationality Getting back Problems Solving Network, etc.
 21

- Financial Capitals: For sources of finance and credit, Thai Diasporas indicated
the vital role played by social capital in accessing financial capital. They
organized credit and saving scheme by themselves, because they cannot take
advantage from bank service without ID card. Therefore, ‘Saving Group’ is the
core activity that encourages participation, collaboration and connection of Thai
Diaspora communities.
- Physical Capital: Thai Diasporas cannot own their livelihood assets which need
certificate such as house, car, motorbike, etc. Again, ‘social capital’ is the key
factor for solving their limitation. They entrust and let their kin, relative, or
son/daughter-in-law even neighbor who be granted citizenship to be the owner of
these assets. So, they can draw upon these ‘physical capital’ for make a living.

In conclusion, multiple motives prompt people to diversify their assets, incomes and
activities. Multi-tasking is mentioned as a way to compensate for insufficient income or
temporary crisis situations. It is a strategy to escape poverty, to cope with insecurity or to
reduce risk and might relate to a sense of well-being. Considering on SLF, ‘Livelihood
Strategies’ were defined as ‘sets of activities’ and ‘diverse options or choices’ which be
mixed for using to achieve their livelihoods goal. These strategies are constructed from
processes that included multi-approaches to response the contrasted ‘needs’ based on the
contexts of times, geographies and economic levels. SLF may not be included ‘power and
rights’ as capital asset of people on ‘making a living’.

Critical Problems of Thai Diasporas in Thai Society

For some time there has been debate over whether to include ‘political capital’ in SLF. The
distinction between social and political capital is often based, at least in part, on the nature of
the claims that they serve. Social capital relates to horizontal claims on kin, associations, and
social networks of different kinds, while political capital is much more concerned with
power, differentiation and vertical claims that households can make on the state or those
more powerful than they.

SLF identifies five capital assets which people can build up and/or draw upon: human,
natural, financial, social and physical. It does not include ‘political capital’ as an endogenous
asset. SLF provides an understanding of the operational, technical and legislative factors that
 22

influence sustainable livelihoods at the local level. These are incomplete without an analysis
of politics and power relations – which cannot be captured through ‘structures and processes’.
Political capital is one of the key capital assets on which ‘people draw to build their
livelihoods’ and also one of the key constraining factors on sustainable livelihoods. Political
capital is critical because ‘rights’ are claims and assets which ‘people draw on and reinvest in
to pursue livelihood options’. Because these rights are politically defended, how people
access these assets depends on their political capital. It is therefore critical to understand how
these are constituted at the local level and the dynamic interrelation between political capital
and the other assets identified in SLF. Political capital is important because policies,
institutions and processes that aim to change the structure of rights are likely to meet
resistance to change. Not to include political capital also weakens the SL framework as an
approach to development and therefore the likely effectiveness of interventions to meet SL
objectives. It is best considered as a sixth capital asset – ‘political capital’ in SLF (Baumann,
2000 and Baumann and Sinha, 2001).

Figure 2: An adapted Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (Baumann and Sinha, 2001)

Some NGO adapted SLF with ‘political capital’ to fit with their work context such as
Concern. This is a voluntary non-governmental organization devoted to the relief, assistance
and advancement of peoples in need in less developed areas of the world. Concern’s work is
 23

guided by a series of policy documents which are translated into practice. Concern will
contribute to the improvement of poor people’s long-term, sustainable access to food and
income. Concern defines livelihood security as the adequate and sustainable access to and
control over resources, both material and social, to enable households to achieve their rights
without undermining the natural resource base. Available Resources in Concern’s
Livelihoods Framework can be considered under the following categories:
- Human capital (health, education, knowledge and skills)
- Social capital (community relationships)
- Natural capital (such as land, forests, rivers, air, wildlife)
- Physical capital (basic infrastructure and producer goods – tools, other productive
assets such as appropriate technology and livestock)
- Financial capital (such as income, savings, remittances, access to financial
services)
- Political capital (the ability to use power to further political or economic
positions) (Concern, 2003)

Figure 3: Livelihoods Framework (Concern, 2003)

The arguments which Thai Diasporas made to the government are related to their nationality
and citizenship rights. These arguments might relate to capitals assets identified in SLF too.
 24

In case of Thai Diasporas, ‘power and rights’ are critical problems for their livelihoods in
Thai society.

“…Our main problem of Thai Diasporas is no citizenship rights. Without

Thai identity cards, it’s very hard to deal with government officers,
everything is difficulty. Now, most of us are registered as the persons who
have not any documents to identify their nationality and received a thirteen
digits ID card which start with zero digit (0-xxxx-xxxxx-xx-x), so we called
this card is ‘zero digit card’. Some Thai Diasporas accepted to be transformed
nationality from Burmese to Thai. These people will be Thai citizens by
naturalized and received a thirteen digits ID card which start with eight digit
(8-xxxx-xxxxx-xx-x), so we called this card is ‘eight digit card’. Normal Thai
citizens have a thirteen digits ID card which start with a digit of one to five [1
(or 2-5)-xxxx-xxxxx-xx-x]. With ‘zero digit card’ we still can do nothing,
only travelling in provincial boundaries. With ‘eight digit card’ may be
better, they can be owner of the assets which need certificate such as land,
house, car or motorbike, but they still lose ‘political rights’ at all level. They
cannot go to vote or be a candidate for election at all level or cannot work in
the jobs which relate to national security such as soldier, police, lawyer, etc.
The critical point is we are Thai not Burmese, why the government force us to
transform nationality…”

After discussion, why are ‘political rights’ considered as an endogenous asset for their
livelihoods? These Thai Diasporas said about the sufferings from this matter:

“…If Thai Diasporas can vote in headman election, the current village
headman (Phu-yai Ban) will not be elected. Because, all matters related to
Thai Diasporas must work through clearing with him. All agencies that came
to our communities must go through him first. So, everything related to Thai
Diasporas is blocked at this stage cannot pass to the positions above for
making decision…”

In this sense, power and right which claim as ‘political capital’ may consider as an
endogenous asset for ‘making a living’ which Thai Diasporas can convert into positive
 25

livelihood outcomes. This related to ‘capabilities approach’ which developed by Amartya

Sen, this idea has been influenced to ‘livelihood’ conceptualization too. We should look at
people’s ability to do and be what they have reason to value the ‘capabilities’ of each person
(Sen, 2005). ‘Sustainable Livelihoods’ that was explained as, the ability to make a living is
dependent on what one has (livelihood assets or resources), can build upon (capacity), have
access to (equity) and is able to make use of (capability). Sustainability is dependent on how
resilient a livelihood is to vulnerability dynamics by assessing the coping mechanisms
available in the short term and the ability to adapt and recover in the long term (capacity)
without damaging current livelihood assets (McHugh, 2008). This explanation will be
matched with Thai Diasporas and their livelihood strategies in Thai Society too.

Conclusion
Status of Thai Diaspora is not different from stateless people. They make a living in lacking
‘power and rights’ circumstance. They can be granted Thai citizenship by naturalize or
accept to transform their nationality from Burmese to Thai, but in consciousness they are
‘Thai not Burmese’. Even by this way, they still lose political rights at all level and still are
incompletely Thai citizens. In this sense, ‘political capital’ which contained power and rights
is critical in their livelihoods. Sustainable Livelihoods Approach may also gain through
building on rights and power issues. It looks at access to assets and how these relate to
people’s ability to demand their rights as well as how governance and institutional factors
affect the ‘supply’ of rights. This thinking should help us understand ways in which existing
power structures affect the livelihoods of different groups as well as how we can best assist
people in vulnerability context to claim their rights and begin to play a more active role as
citizens and decision-makers. To consider ‘political capital’ as a sixth capital asset in SLF
may encourage policy makers aware on ‘power and rights’ as a critical issue of people in
vulnerability context such as Thai Diasporas.
 26

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