Features

Public Support for Environmental Protection: Objective Problems and Subjective Values in 43 Societies
Ronald Inglehart, University of Michigan at Ann Arbor

Policies designed to solve environmental problems are unlikely to succeed unless they have broad public support, but the motives for mass support are poorly understood. The problem is global in scope, but most of the relevant public opinion research done so far has been carried out in advanced industrial societies, usually Western democracies. Moreover, much of this research is limited to the tip of the iceberg, focusing on what people think about environmental problems without probing into why they think it or how deeply they are committed. The analysis of mass attitudes toward environmental problems in this article uses evidence from representative national surveys of countries representing the entire developmental spectrum, from rich to poor nations, including not only Western democracies but authoritarian regimes and recently emerging democracies from the former communist bloc. The data come from the 1990-93 World Values survey, carried out in 43 countries containing 70% of the world's population. Our goal is to determine why given publics areor are not sufficiently concerned about environmental problems that they are willing to make financial sacrifices and undertake other actions in order to help protect the environment. Two key findings emerge: (1) As one would expect, mass support for environmental protection tends to be greatest in countries that have relatively severe objective problems (as indicated by levels of air pollution and water pollution). This finding fits a "challenge-response" model, which is
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the interpretation a naive environmental activist would probably emphasize: people are concerned about the environment because they face serious objective problems. This is, indeed, part of the answerthe publics of countries with relatively severe pollution do tend to be relatively willing to make financial sacrifices in order to protect the environment. But this is only part of the story. (2) Public support for environmental protection is also shaped by subjective cultural factors. The publics of certain cultural regions tend to rank relatively high on support for environmental protection. And, as previous research has found, within given countries, people with "Postmaterialist" values emphasizing self-expression and the quality of lifeare much more apt to give high priority to protecting the environment (and are much more likely to be active members of environmentalist groups), than those with "Materialist" values emphasizing economic and physical security above all(Inglehart 1990; Mueller-Rommel 1990; Betz 1990, Bennulf and Holmberg 1990; Hoffmann-Martinot 1991). As this analysis shows, this also holds true at the national level: countries that have relatively Postmaterialistic publics, rank relatively high in their readiness to make financial sacrifices for the sake of environmental protection. This subjective factor seems to have at least as much influence on relative support levels as does the objective level of pollution. Despite the fact that they have some of the world's lowest levels of air and water pollution, the publics of the

Nordic countries and The Netherlands rank highest of all 43 publics in support for protecting the environment. This can be traced to the fact that .these countries have relatively high proportions of Postmaterialists.in their publics. Objective problems and subjective predispositions are both involved; the available evidence indicates that both of these factors are about equally important.

Environmental Problems in High-Income and Low-Income Countries Pollution has become a global problem. To a greater extent than is generally recognized, countries in the early stages of industrialization now have environmental problems that are as severe as, or even more severe than, those of advanced industrial societies. This has not always been the case. But most industrialized countries have achieved substantial improvements in environmental quality since 1970. Access to clean water, adequate sanitation, and municipal waste disposal is now virtually universal according to a recent OECD report (OECD 1991). Air quality in OECD countries is vastly improved; particulate emissions have declined by 60% and sulfur oxides by 38% since 1970. Lead emissions have fallen by 85% in North America and by 50% in most European cities. Japan has achieved the largest improvement in air quality: emissions of sulfur oxides, particulates, and nitrogen oxides as a share of GDP in Japan arc less than one-quarter of OECD averages. 57

Features But the situation is dramatically different in low-income countries. As a recent World Bank report notes, For the 1 billion people in developing countries who do not have access to clean water and the 1.7 billion who lack access to sanitation, these are the most important environmental problems of all. Their effects on health are shocking: they are major contributors to the 900 million cases of diarrheal diseases every year, which cause the deaths of more than 3 million children; 2 million of these deaths could be prevented if adequate sanitation and clean water were available. At any time 200 million are suffering from schistosomiasis or bilharzia and 900 million from hookworm. Cholera, typhoid, and paratyphoid also continue to wreak havoc with human welfare. Providing access to sanitation and clean water would not eradicate all these diseases, but it would be the single most effective means of alleviating human distress (World Bank 1992, 5). In the developing countries, water quality has continued to deteriorate despite substantial progress in bringing sanitation services to the world's population. Little has been done to expand the treatment of human sewage. In Latin America only about 2% of sewage receives any treatment. Moreover, despite the expansion of sanitation services, the absolute number of people in urban areas without access to these services has probably grown by more than 70 million in the 1980s. The net result is that by the 1990s, water pollution in lowincome and middle-income countries was far worse than in highincome societies, as Figure 1 demonstrates. The situation was similar in regard to air pollution problems. Though air quality has improved substantially in advanced industrial societies, it is deteriorating in lowincome countries. In those developing countries now in the throes of industrialization, city air pollution is far worse than in today's industrial countries. In the early 1980s cities such as Bangkok, Beijing, Calcutta, New Delhi, and Tehran exceeded on more than 200 days a year the SPM [suspended particulate matter] concentrations 58 FIGURE 1 Water Purity in Rivers, late 1980s

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that World Health Organization

guidelines indicate should not be exceeded more than seven days a year. Where adequate data exist, it appears that cities in low-income countries have SPM levels much higher than those in more developed countries. Indeed, pollution levels for even the worst quartile of highincome cities are better than for the best quartile of low-income cities. The gap widened marginally over the past decade; high-income countries took measures to manage emissions, while pollution levels deteriorated in low-income countries (World Bank, 1992, 50-51). As Figure 2 illustrates, urban air pollution has become far worse in low-income countries than in highincome industrial societies.

Findings from the 1990/91 World Values Survey In view of these facts, it is hardly surprising that the publics of most low-income countries show high levels of concern for protecting the environment. When asked if they approved or disapproved of the ecology movement, across the 43 societies included in the 1990-93 World Values survey, practically

everyonea total of 96%was favorable: 62% said that they "strongly a p p r o v e " of the ecology movement, and another 34% said they " a p p r o v e . " As Table 1 indicates, support was particularly strong in Eastern Europe and Latin America; and noticeably less so in the Nordic countries, the United States and Great Britain. Gratifying though it is to find almost universal approval of the ecological cause, these responses do not tell us anything about how deeply this attitude is held. It is easy to agree with this question because it does not ask whether the respondent is willing to make any sacrifice for the sake of environmental purity. The overwhelming approval of the environmental movement that these responses reveal may reflect nothing more than lip service. H o w solid is public support for environmental protection policies that may impose real costs? The World Values survey also included a battery of questions which measured the extent to which those interviewed would be willing to make direct financial sacrifices in order to protect the environment. This proves to be a parPS: Political Science & Politics

Public Support for Environmental Protection

FIGURE 2 Urban Air Pollution in 1980s

350 C O

irrnTl Low-income countries Middle-income countries High-income countries

o
v. G> C D

300 250 200 150 100 50 0

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significant effect on registered levels of support for environmental protection: globally, only 45% of those interviewed express their willingness to make sacrifices for environmental protection by disagreeing with this statement about 20% fewer than supported environmental protection in response to the preceding question. The reader should bear in mind that in Table 3, those countries that rank lowest on the table (Sweden, Denmark, Iceland and The Netherlands), have the publics that are most willing to make financial sacTABLE 1 Approval-'of Ecology Movement (Percentage who "strongly approve" of the Ecology Movement) %
Moscow Poland Brazil East Germany Belarus Argentina Chile Portugal Bulgaria South Korea Austria Russia South Africa West Germany Hungary Mexico Spain Japan Nigeria China Romania Czechoslovakia Canada Netherlands Lithuania Slovenia India Turkey Switzerland Italy France Ireland Belgium Estonia Latvia Norway Britain United States Sweden Northern Ireland Iceland Denmark Finland 83 81 S0 n 11 76 75 74 73 73 71 70 70 70 68 59 59 56 56 54 54 54 54 54 52 52 51 51 50 50 49 49 48 47 47 47 41 38 37 30 28

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C D

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Unacceptable
Marginal Acceptable

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Adapted from World Bank, Development and the Environment, New York: Oxford University Press, 1992, p . 46.

ticularly revealing aspect of mass attitudes on this subject: as this and previous surveys have shown, the vast majority of most publics approve of environmental protection in general; but they are far more reluctant to support it when questions are raised about how much they are willing to pay. Inquiring into where people are willing to draw the line, when it comes to the tradeoff between economic costs and environmental benefits, is realistic. Sometimes it is possible to protect the environment without incurring any economic costsand in such cases, policy choices are easy to make. The crunch comes when a difficult choice is needed between roads or trees, dams or endangered species, to burn fossil fuels that may lead to global warming or to remain nonindustrialized. It is when a society is forced to make difficult choices like these, that environmental protection becomes a political issue. The question reported in Table 2 asks whether the respondent agrees or disagrees with the statement: "I would be willing to pay more taxes if I were certain that the money would be used to prevent environmental pollution."
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Posed in this form, the level of agreement drops substantially, although across the combined global sample, 65% still say they would agree to an increase in taxes for this purpose. The rank ordering of the respective countries changes significantly, too. The East European countries no longer rank at the top, and the publics of the Nordic nations rise from a position near the bottom, in Table I, to rank among those highest in willingness to make financial sacrifices for the sake of environmental protection. Table 3 shows the responses to a question that seems to be a mirror image of the one shown in Table 2. It asks whether the respondent agrees that: "The government has to reduce environmental pollution, but it should not cost me any money." Like the preceding question, this version asks whether the respondent is willing to make financial sacrifices in order to protect the environment, but unlike the preceding question, it does so in a format which makes it easier to say " N o ; " and by changing polarity, it minimizes the impact of response set. This simple change of format has a

Source: 1990/91 World Values Survey. 59

Features

TABLE 2 Willingness to Sacrifice for Environmental Protection (Percentage willing to pay higher taxes to prevent environmental pollution)

%
China Sweden South Korea Chile Norway Turkey Brazil Denmark Britain Bulgaria Lithuania Slovenia Netherlands Moscow Mexico Belarus Czechoslovakia Russia Northern Ireland Portugal United States Canada Latvia 78 77 76 76 73 71 71 70 70 70 70 70 69 69 67 67 67 67 65 65 64 64 64 60 59 57 57 56 56 55 55 54 52 51 51 50 49 41 35

index which reflects responses to four questions concerning environmental protection. What do we find? Table 4 s h o w s the relative willingness of publics throughout the world to pay an economic price in order to protect the environment. These results (like those in the following analyses) sum up these publics' responses to four particularly sensitive indicators, drawn from a series of six questions about environmental problems. The text of these items, and details of index construction, are given at the foot of Table 4. The entries in this table show the percentage of each public that ranks " h i g h " in emphasis on environmental protection: these are the respondents who consistently give priority to environmental pro,.- tection over economic gains, in response to all four questions. There is a wide range of variation across these nations. In S w e den, fully 69% of the public consistently gives priority to environmental protection, even at the cost of less income or higher taxes. In Hungary, only 24% do so. All of these countries show considerable public concern for the environment: even in Nigeria, one of the poorest countries with a 1990 per capita income of $310, we find that a significant minority of the public is willing to give priority to environmental protection in response to all four questions. In Sweden (with an annual per capita income over $25,000), a heavy majority consistently give priority to environmental protection. Some of the highest-ranking countries are among the w o r l d ' s most severely polluted countries. South Korea has been an astounding success story in terms of economic growth: among the 121 countries for which the World Bank publishes statistics; only one (Singapore) showed a higher growth rate from 1965 to 1988 (World Bank 1990). But South Korea is a small, crowded country about the size of Indiana, and its rapid growth has been won at the cost of massive pollution. Czechoslovakia, though industrialized far earlier and lacking rapid growth in recent years, is also one

TABLE 3 Unwillingness to Sacrifice for Environmental Protection (Percentage agreeing that " t h e government has to reduce environmental pollution but it should not cost me any m o n e y " )

%
Portugal Spain Italy Hungary France Bulgaria Argentina Belarus Estonia Moscow Latvia Lithuania Brazil/" Nigeria India Northern Ireland Belgium Austria Iceland Chile Slovenia Japan Britain Turkey West Germany United States Canada Finland South Korea Russia East Germany Czechoslovakia Norway China Mexico Sweden Denmark Iceland Netherlands 92 76 75 75 74 74 72 72 72 71 71 69 65 65 64 63 62 61 60 57 56 56 56 56 56 54 52 51 50 49 48 46 44 44 40 36 29 28 17

S .u^
^eria India East Germany France Austria Ireland Japan Argentina West Germany Belgium Hungary

Source: 1990/91 World Values Survey.

Source: 1990/91 World Values Survey.

rifices for the sake of environmental protection. It would be pointless to argue whether the " r e a l " proportion of the global public who are pro-environmentalist is 96% (as suggested by the results in Table 1), or 65% (as suggested by Table 2) or 45% .as the responses in Table 3 might seem to indicate). Each of these items provides useful information about the extent of environmental support: the diverging results simply reflect the fact that the way a question is formulated helps shape the responses. Rather than rely on any one indicator, subsequent anal yses will be based on a multi-item

of the world's most polluted countries; in Europe, only East Germany has higher levels of air and water pollutants. Environmental pollution is very severe in the urban regions of Russia and China, and the publics of both countries show high levels of support for environmental protection. Mexico is less industrialized than most of the other high-ranking countries, but its industry is largely concentrated in the immensely overpopulated basin around Mexico City. Atmospheric pollution problems in this region are as severe as anywhere on earth; when condiPS: Political Science & Politics

--:

Public Support for Environmental Protection

TABLE 4

Public Support for Environmental Protection (Percentage scoring "high" on Environmental Protection Index)*
Sweden Denmark Netherlands Norway South Korea Iceland Russia Turkey Czechoslovakia China Mexico Finland Brazil Japan East Germany Moscow Chile Slovenia India Bulgaria Latvia Lithuania Britain Canada West Germany United States Belarus Austria Estonia Northern Ireland Portugal Ireland Belgium Italy Spain France Argentina Nigeria Hungary 69 65 64 59 58 54 53 53 52 52 50 48 48 47 47 46 46 46 45 44 44 43 42 42 41 40 40 39 38 36 36 34 33 31 30 30 30 27 24

highly centralized society, public awareness of pollution problems has reached high levels. Finally, Japan is similar to South Korea in having rapidly attained a very high concentration of industry in a very limited area; but environmental concern may be less acute there than in Korea because 15 years ago, the Japanese began taking strong and effective measures against severe pollution problems. The United States and Canada, on the other hand, though highly industrialized, are vast and relatively decentralized societies; they produce a great deal of pollution, but it is relatively dispersed. Nigeria, at the other end of the spectrum, is not only very poor, it remains largely pre-industrial. The results in Table 4 suggest that public support for environmental protection in a given country tends to reflect that country's objective circumstances: the more severely polluted, the greater the public concern. This is scarcely a surprising finding; it is more or less what common sense would lead one to expect. But it is only part of the story. For, as we will demonstrate, quite apart from the relative severity of their objective pollution, a gradual shift toward Postmaterialist values is making the publics of these societies increasingly sensitive to environmental quality as time goes by. Many of these countries had even more severe air and water pollution 10 or 15 years ago than they do todaybut concern for the environment has been rising, not falling. Perhaps the most striking finding here is that the publics of three Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Denmark and Norway), together with The Netherlands, show the greatest willingness to make sacrifices for environmental protection. The point is clear: support for environmental protection is not limited to those countries with the most serious pollution problemsfor these four are prosperous countries with relatively pristine environments. It is also no coincidence, we believe, that these are four of the most advanced welfare states in the world. Table 4 suggests that cultural changes associated with

prosperity and security have an important linkage with support for environmental protection. Though the Nordic countries and The Netherlands do not have relatively high levels of atmospheric and water pollution, their publics are relatively sensitive to these problems, because of a gradual cultural shift that is reshaping the priorities of mass publics around the world. Let us review the reasons for this shift. The Shift Toward Postmaterialist Values A growing body of evidence indicates that what people want out of life is changing. Throughout industrial socjety, people's basic values and goals are gradually shifting from giving top priority to economic growth and consumption, to placing increasing emphasis on the quality of life. The incentives that once motivated the work force are becoming less effective than they were; the policies that once gave rise to broad political support no longer work as readily as they did; even the values that once shaped sexual behavior and child rearing are giving way to new norms. In large part, this reflects a process of intergenerational value change; it is invisible to the naked eye and tends to pass unnoticed unless it is measured by systematic, longitudinal survey research. But its impact is pervasive. It is changing social, political, and economic life. And because it is transforming entire life styles, including consumer patterns, fertility rates, and the priority that people give to environmental protection, it constitutes a major component of global change. Human activities have become a major factor influencing changes in the geophysical environment. And if the motivations underlying human activities are changing, it is essential to understand the direction and rate of these changes in order to assess future global change. A substantial body of evidence indicates that the value shift dealt with here is taking place throughout industrial society, including na61

Respondents are classified as "high" on support for environmental protection if they "agree" or "strongly agree" that: (1) "I would be willing to give part of my income if I were sure that the money would be used to prevent environmental pollution" AND (2) "I would agree to an increase in taxes if the extra money is used to prevent environmental pollution"; AND who "disagree" or "strongly disagree" with these statements: (1) "The government should reduce environmental pollution, but it should not cost me any money"; and (2) "Protecting the environment and fighting pollution is less urgent than often suggested." Source: 1990/91 World Values Survey.

tions are bad, automobiles with even-numbered license plates are only permitted to drive on evennumbered days. And because Mexico City is the political, economic, cultural, and media center of a
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Features tions of both Eastern and Western Europe, as well as North America, East Asia, Australia, and parts of Latin America (Inglehart and Abramson 1994). These changes are most advanced in established industrial societies, but they are beginning to have an impact on industrializing nations such as Mexico and even China. In the long run, they will probably be relevant to any nation that undertakes industrialization. Consequently, this phenomenon needs to be studied in global perspective, to provide a baseline to evaluate the extent to which it has reshaped the outlook of industrial societies, and to gain some insight into the long-term trajectory of those societies that are now beginning to industrialize. One consequence of this change in basic values has been a rise in environmental consciousness and a higher priority for environmental protection among these publics. But, changing environmental attitudes are only one symptom of a much broader process of cultural change that is transforming not only attitudes but much of human behavior. It is reshaping orientations toward work, fertility, and consumption patterns in ways that affect the environment directly and also tend to reshape attitudes toward environmental questions. Evidence of intergenerational value change began to be gathered on a cross-national basis in 1970. It was hypothesized that, as a result of the rapid economic development and the expansion of the welfare state following World War II, the formative experience of the younger birth cohorts differed from that of older cohorts in ways that were leading them to develop fundamentally different value priorities. Throughout most of history, the threat of severe economic deprivation or even starvation had been a crucial concern for most people. But the unprecedented degree of economic security experienced by the postwar generation in most industrial societies was leading to a gradual shift from "Materialist" values toward "Postmaterialist" priorities. In 1970, surveys were carried out in six West European nations to
,1

FIGURE 3 Value Type by Age Group, among the Publics of Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium and The Netherlands in 1970
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50% 45% 40% 35% 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0% Materialist Post-Materi8ltst

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Source: European Community survey of February 1970; based on original 4-item Materialist/ Postmaterialist values battery. Reprinted from Inglehart, 1990: 76.

test this hypothesis. The results (see Figure 3) showed striking differences between the priorities of old and young. Among the oldest group (which had experienced the insecurity and devastation of World War I, the Great Depression and World War II), those with Materialist priorities outnumbered those with Postmaterialist priorities by more than 12 to 1; but as we move from the older to younger cohorts in Figure 3, the proportion of Materialists shrinks, and the proportion of Postmaterialists rises. When we reach the youngest groupthose born after World War IIthere is a shift in the balance between value types, with Postmaterialists becoming more numerous than Materialists.

simply reflect a life cycle effect: when one is young, one tends to emphasize Postmaterialist values, but as one ages one inevitably becomes more Materialist; when the youngest cohort is 65+ years of age, its members will be just as Materialist as the oldest group. Only time series evidence can resolve this questionand fortunately, we now have a 22-year time series, in which exactly the same questions have been administered to representative national samples in each of these six countries, in the Euro-Barometer surveys. These data enable us to follow each birth cohort over a 22-year period, in order to see whether each cohort becomes more Materialist as it ages or whether an intergenerational value shift is occurring. The results Though these results are striking, - are shown in Figure 4. they do not prove that an intergenerational value shift is occurring. Such In this graph, the proportion of proof would require a long series of Postmaterialists increases as we longitudinal surveys. Conceivably, move up on the vertical axis; the the age difference in Figure 3 could proportion of Materialists increases
PS: Political Science & Politics

Public Support for Environmental Protection

FIGURE 4 Value Priorities of Six West European Publics, 1970-1992: Cohort Analysis

1970

1973

1976

1978

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

Year
Source: Pooled representative national surveys from France, West Germany, Britain, Italy, Belgium and The Netherlands, including European Community surveys from 1970, 1973 and Euro-Barometer surveys 6 through 37 (over 220,000 interviews).

as we move down. If the age differences reflected a life cycle effect, then each of the cohort lines should move downward, toward the Materialist pole, as we move from left to right across this 22-year period. We find no such downward movement. Instead, the younger birth cohorts remain more Postmaterialist throughout the period from 1970 to 1990: given cohorts do not become more Materialist as they age by 22 yearsinstead, most of these cohorts are actually a little less Materialist at the end of this period than they were at the start. Some striking period effects are evident: there was a clear tendency for each cohort to dip toward the Materialist pole during the major economic recession of the mid1970s and again during the recession of the early 1980s (these effects are consistent with the theory, which links Postmaterialist values with economic security). But these period effects are relatively transient; they disappear when economic conditions return to normal. In the long run, the values of a given birth cohort seem remarkably stable.
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During the period from 1970 to 1990, the two oldest cohorts largely disappeared from the sample: the group that was aged 65+ in 1970 has become a group aged 85+ by 1990, and very few survivors remain to be interviewed. The two oldest cohorts are replaced by two younger cohorts that enter the sample during this period. Since these two new cohorts are much m o r e Postmaterialist than the cohorts they replace, we would expect to find a net shift from Materialist to Postmaterialist values in the populations of these societies. Do w e ? As Figure 5 demonstrates, the answer is y e s . In each of the six societies first surveyed in 1970 (and also in the United States, first surveyed in 1972, and in Denmark and Ireland, first surveyed in 1973), we find a decline in the proportion of Materialists, and an increase in the proportion of Postmaterialists. The size of this shift varies from country to country, partly as a function of the economic and physical conditions that prevailed in the given country during this period, but all nine countries move in the predicted direction. Similar results

emerge from the much larger number of countries included in both the 1981 and the 1990 World Values surveys: in almost every case, we find evidence of an intergenerational shift from Materialist toward Postmaterialist priorities.

Postmaterialist Values and Environmental Attitudes Does the rise of Postmaterialist values help account for the spectacular rise in the salience of environmental issues which has taken place during the past two decades? It is no coincidence that Postmaterialism has become a significant political force during the past 25 years, as the postwar generation emerged into political relevance, and that shortly afterward environmental concerns took on an unprecedented salience throughout advanced industrial society. Postmaterialist goals are certainly not the only factor motivating concern for the quality of the environment. In a setting in which air and
63

Features FIGURE 5 The Shift toward Postmaterialist Values among the Publics of Nine Western Societies, 1970-1993

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Source: European Community surveys, February 1970 and Spring 1993; and (despite the legend above) U.S. National Election Surveys from 1972 and 1992.

water pollution posed a direct threat to one's health and survival, this concern by itself leads people to take an active interest in the environment. But in advanced industrial societies where the immediate threat to one's survival has been receding rather than advancing, a simple stimulus-response model of this kind is less plausible. Increasingly, environmental concern may be motivated by concern for the quality of life, rather than by survival needs. Accordingly, we would expect the impact of Postmaterialist values to vary in different settings. Figure 6 shows the relationship between Materialist/Postmaterialist values, and support for environmental protection in three types of societies. This figure uses a 12-item battery in which the following five items tap Postmaterialist priorities across all of these societies (see Abramson and Inglehart 1995,
64

forthcoming): protecting freedom of speech; giving people more say in important government decisions; a less impersonal, more humane society; giving people more say on the job and in their communities; a society in which ideas count more than money. A given individual may choose anywhere from zero to all five of these items among his or her high-priority goals. In advanced industrial societies, these values are strongly related to support for environmental protection: as Figure 6a demonstrates, among those w h o give high priority to none of the Postmaterialist goals, only 30% rank high on support for environmental protection; among those who give high priority to all five Postmaterialist goals, fully 65% rank high on support for environmental protection. This relationship has impressive.strength across a variety of advanced indus-

trial societies, in view of the fact that none of the five Postmaterialist items has any direct reference to environmental concerns. But the impact of Postmaterialist values varies a great deal across cultures. In low-income countries, Postmaterialists tend to be more supportive of environmental protection than are Materialists, but the tendency is relatively weak as Figure 6b demonstrates. Postmaterialism is a less important factor for two reasons: (1) Postmaterialists are much less numerous than they are in advanced industrial societies; and (2) Materialist motivations for concern with the quality of the environment are more prominent: in such settings the danger is relatively high that pollution may be immediately life-threatening. Not only India, China, and Nigeria, but also Turkey, Chile, Belarus, Lithuania, Slovenia, Bulgaria, HunPS: Political Science & Politics

Public Support for Environmental Protection

FIGURE 6a Support for Environmental Protection by Materialist/Postmateriaiist Values in 21 Advanced Industrial Societies
70

60 r o 50
.40
03

treme, there is virtually no relationship. The Chernobyl disaster may have left the Russian public with a vivid awareness that environmental problems can have a direct impact on human survival, making Materialists fully as concerned as Postrnaterialists. The Relative Impact of Objective and Subjective Factors The evidence suggests that external conditions and subjective values are both important. What is their relative weight? A related question can be put to rest with relative ease. Postrnaterialists fend to have relatively high levels of education: are these values, and'support for environmental protection, simply joint consequences of education? Multivariate analysis, controlling for the effects of education (as well as age, occupation and sex) indicates that the linkage between Postmaterialist values and environmental attitudes is not spurious; these values are an even stronger predictor of pro-environmentalist attitudes than is education, and their linkage persists

II

30 20 10

0 1 2 3 4 5 Number of Postmaterlallst goals given high priority

Based on 1990-1993 World Values surveys carried out in France, Britain, Portugal, West Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium, Spain, Ireland, Northern Ireland, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Austria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Argentina, United States, and Canada (total N = 29,140), gamma = .26. /

gary, Japan, and South Korea fall into the category of countries in which there is only a moderately strong relationship between values and support for environmental protection. In our samples from Moscow and Russia, there is virtually no relationship between values and support for environmental protection, as Figure 6c illustrates: here, Materialists are practically as likely to be concerned as are Postrnaterialists. This is an extreme case, which may, in part, reflect the Chernobyl disaster. This event, which occurred about a year before the surveys, was a particularly vivid illustration of the fact that environmental problems can be not only damaging to the quality of life, but may pose an immediate threat to life itself. Mexico and Brazil also show weak relationships between values and support for environmental protection, though not as weak as in Russia. The relationship between values and environmental concern varies widely across nations. Nowhere are the Materialists more favorable to environmental protection than the Postrnaterialists, but in advanced
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industrial societies Postrnaterialists are more than twice as likely to rank high on support for environmental protection as Materialists, while in Russia, at the other ex-

FIGURE 6b Support for Environmental Protection by Materialist/Postmateriaiist Values in China, India, and Nigeria
70 60

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30

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*1

0 1 2 3 4 5* Number of Postmaterialist goals given high priority

N = 4,501, gamma = .09 * category 5 omitted because it contains too few respondents (N = 14) 65


Features

FIGURE 6c Support for Environmental Protection by Materiaiist/Postmaterialist Values in Russia

Number of Postmaterialist goals given high priority

N = 2,971, gamma = .03 * category 5 omitted because it contains too few respondents (N = 9) Source: World Values survey. ^ Note: Respondents are classified as "high" on the environmental protection index if they (1) agreed with both of the following (a) "I would give part of my income if I were certain that the money would be used to prevent environmental pollution"; and (b) "I would agree to an increase in taxes if the extra money were used to prevent environmental pollution"; and (2) disagrees with both of the following (a) "The government should reduce environmental pollution but it should not cost me any money"; and (b) "Protecting the environment and fighting pollution is less urgent than often suggested."

cally disentangling their joint effects, that the importance of either factor becomes manifest. Disentangling them is not easy. We have only 18 cases in which data are available for both objective pollution levels and subjective orientations, and the two independent variables have a strong negative correlation. A simple multiple regression analysis encounters the problem that the correction of explained variance, adjusted for the degree of freedom, is too large to estimate. One way around this problem is to handle the two variables separately, first estimating the impact of values with pollution levels controlled. To/^do so, we ran two separate multiple regression analyses, one for the high-pollution cases, and another for the low-pollution cases. As Figure 7 shows, pollution levels are highly skewed, with three cases (China, India, and South Korea) having much higher levels of both air and water pollution than the other 15 countries for which we have data. By isolating the three former cases from the latter 15, we can control for most of the cross-national variation in pollution levels. Table 5 shows the results of a multiple regression analysis of the data from the 15 low-pollution cases. The results are dramatic. Though globally, Materiaiist/Postmaterialist values showed a zeroorder correlation of only .06 with support for environmental protection, when we control for pollution levels, we obtain a partial correlation of .47. Among the 15 relatively low-pollution societies, the linkage between values and support for environmental protection is significant at the .07 level. We ran a similar regression analysis of the data from the three high-pollution societies, obtaining a partial correlation of .76 between values and support for environmental protection. Needless to say, with only three cases this result is not statistically significant, but it is in the expected direction. The analysis is severely limited by a shortage of cases, but the available evidence supports the interpretation that the value priorities prevailing in given societies have an
PS: Political Science & Politics

when these other factors are controlled, in analysis of individuallevel data. Sorting out the relative impact of objective societal-level factors, and individual-level values is a much more difficult task, however. There are two major problems: first, in order to assess the relative importance of external factors, we need comparable measurements of pollution levels across these various societies. Though a great many studies have been made of various kinds of environmental problems in given settings, surprisingly little is available in a form that is directly comparable across national boundaries. We were able to find comparable measures of environmental pollution for only 18 of the 43 societies included in this study (and even these data are limited to conditions in urban settings). The second problem we face is the fact that the two independent
66

variables in this analysis exert powerful suppressor effects on each other. This reflects the fact that severe environmental pollution and high levels of Postmaterialism tend to occur in opposite types of settings: environmental pollution is most severe in rapidly industrializing societies, such as China or South Korea; while Postmaterialist values are most widespread in affluent advanced industrial societies such as Finland or The Netherlands. As Figure 7 illustrates, the two factors do not go together they have a strong negative correlation (r = -.72). Thus, public support for environmental protection policies is stimulated by two completely different types of factors. The result is that, in global perspective, neither high pollution levels nor high levels of Postmaterialism appear to have a significant impact on support for environmental protection. It is only by analyti-

Public Support for Environmental Protection FIGURE 7 Urban Air Pollution Levels and Materialist/Postmaterialist Values in Cross-national Perspective (r = - . 7 2 )

150 140 130 120

China India

x g 100 c
C

110

90 80
70 60 50 40 30

South Korea

o o
Q. "re c

France

Italy Chile West Germany Britain Belgium Finland Netherlands m

20
t

10

0
40

Portugal Poland Japan

Spain

_a

U.S. Ireland Denmark

Canada

-20

+ 20

% Postmaterialists minus % Materialists

Based on mean figure for (1) average number of days during which sulfur dioxide level is over 150 u.g/cubic meter, in capital city or principal communications center; and (2) average number of days during which suspended particulate matter is over 230 /xgjcubic meter in same city. Source of air pollution data: World Resources Institute, World Resources, 1990-91. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 351. These data were obtained from Global Environmental Monitoring System (GEMS). Values data are from 1990/91 World Values Survey.

important impact on their sensitivity to environmental protection. We also carried out a Multiple Classification Analysis of the data from all 18 countries, to estimate the relative weight of the two independent variables. H e r e , again, data limitations imposed constraints on the analysis. In order to reduce
March 1995

the number of categories to a level where the effects could be adjusted, it was necessary to collapse the data on both pollution and values into high, medium, and low categories. Table 6 shows the results of this analysis. The results indicate that both objective conditions and subjective values have a

substantial impact on support for environmental protection, and that their effects are of roughly the same magnitude. Postmaterialist values are not the only factor linked with concern for the environment: it is clear that objective conditions also play an important role. But individuals' val-

67

Features

TABLE 5 The Impact of Materialist/ Postmaterialist Values on Support for Environmental Protection (regression analysis: 15 low pollution countries only)
Partial r B Sigma B Beta T-ratio Probability .47 .235 .125 .47 1.94 .07

tion will tend to increase, as younger cohorts replace older ones within the populations of given societies; and as economic development takes place on a global scale. The shift toward Postmaterialist values is only one of the factors shaping mass support for environmentalist policies, but it has a dynamic component that makes it particularly significant.

ues do seem to be an important part of the story. And they interact in a complex fashion with objective factors such as the severity of environmental pollution, since those societies that have the fewest Postmaterialists tend to have the most severe pollution problems. From the start, the value change theory has postulated that the emergence of Postmaterialist values is linked with economic development, but, until recently, relevant data have been available from only a narrow range of countries, mostly advanced industrial societies. The 1990-91 World Values survey provides data from an unprecedentedly broad array of societies against which to test this proposition, and the results clearly support the hypothesis: Postmaterialist values are far likelier to be found among the publics of highly developed societies than in less developed countries (Abramson and Inglehart 1994). As we have seen, Postmaterialist values became increasingly widespread among the publics of advanced industrial society from 1970 to 1993. This suggests that public support for environmental protecTABLE6 The Impact of Values and Pollution Levels on Support for Environmental Protection (multiple Classification Analysis: all 18 countries)
Eta Pollution levels Mat./Postmat. Values .51 .62 Beta .48 .58

Cultural Change and Environmental Action The Materialist/Postmaterialist dimension has become the basis of a major new axis of political polarization in Western countries, leading to the rise of the Green Party in West Germany, and to a realignment of party systems in a number of other countries (Inglehart 1977; 1990; Dalton, Flanagan and Beck (eds.) 1984). Initially, environmentalist parties were important only in West Germany, but during the 1980s they spread to The Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, and Switzerland. In the 1990s, they made breakthroughs in Sweden and France, and are beginning to show significant levels of support in Great Britain. In every case, support for these parties comes from a disproportionately Postmaterialist constituency. As Figure 8 demonstrates, as we move from the Materialist to the Postmaterialist end of the continuum, the percentage intending to vote for the environmentalist party in their country rises: from 0 to 8% in Britain; from 2% to 17% in France; from 4 to 20% in Sweden; and from 2 to 27% in West Germany. These parties are not yet strong enough to govern independently and may never be so; but they have successfully advocated environmental protection policies in each of these countries; and have forced the established parties to adopt stronger environmental protection policies in order to compete for their voters. Public attitudes toward environmental problems have been studied in a number of Euro-Barometer surveys. The results indicate that public concern over environmental

problems is widespread and has been growing over time. In all 12 European Community countries, strong majorities express general approval of the environmentalist movement. But a more crucial question is whether they are ready to do anything to protect the environment. Postmaterialists are likelier than Materialists to approve of the environmentalist cause and much likelier to act on its behalf. For example, in 1986 across the 12 countries, 37% of the Materialists strongly approved of the environmentalist movement, as compared with 53% of the Postmaterialistsa ratio of 1.4 to 1. When it comes to actual participation, the impact of values is e-Ven stronger: less than one-half,6f 1% of the Materialists said they-were active members of an environmentalist group, as compared with 3.5% of the Postmaterialistsa ratio of 7 to 1. A similar pattern applies to other types of pro-environmental behavior: Postmaterialists are likelier than Materialists to report having actually done something to protect the environment; and they are far more apt to report having done some relatively "difficult" action (such as taking part in demonstrations or contributing money) as compared with " e a s y " actions (such as recycling things or avoiding littering). When we move to the societal level, we find that those nations with relatively large proportions of Postmaterialists, show considerably higher levels of pro-environmental activity than those with lower proportions of Postmaterialists, as Figure 9 illustrates. The process of value change seems to bring changing behavior, not just attitudes. Postmaterialist values also prove to be correlated with a surprisingly wide range of other values, relating to work, leisure, gender roles, and a variety of other social and political orientations. Perhaps the most important of these attitudes, from the standpoint of its long-term impact on the environment, is one's attitude toward fertility. Traditionally, having and rearing children was viewed as a central goal of any woman, one of her most important functions in life,
PS: Political Science & Politics

Mjiuted multiple R2 = .41

Public Support for Environmental Protection

FIGURE 8 Intent to Vote for Environmentalist Political Parties, by Materiaiist/Postmaterialist Values in Four Countries Having Such Parties

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Source: 1990-1993 World Values survey.

and one of her greatest sources of satisfaction. In recent years, this assumption has been increasingly called into question, as growing numbers of women have postponed having children or foregone them completely in order to devote themselves to careers outside the home. This pattern of behavior seems to reflect gradual changes in the outlook of different generations. In each of the countries for which we have data, younger respondents are less likely than older ones to feel that "a woman needs children in order to be fulfilled." As is true of many other attitudes, these age-group differences are linked with value-related differences. Postmaterialists are far likelier than those with other values to reject the idea that a woman needs childrenbut they are also far likelier to accept single parenthood if a woman wishes children. These value differences are not simply a function of the tendency for the
March 1995

young and the educated to be Postmaterialist: multivariate analysis demonstrates that each of these factors exerts an independent effect, though they tend to reinforce each other. Postmaterialists place more emphasis on self-fulfillment through careers, rather than through ensuring the survival of the species; but they are also more permissive toward single parenthood, perhaps because they are likelier to take the economic viability of the single mother for granted. Preliminary evidence suggests that the shift toward Postmaterialist values has an important impact on prevailing behavior in given societies. For example, within given societies, Postmaterialists are far more permissive toward divorce than are Materialists. Interesting and nonobvious though it is, this is only an intra-cranial correlation, reflecting the linkage between one's values and a given attitude. Do these values have societal consequences?

The evidence suggests that they do: for those societies with relatively high proportions of Postmaterialists are characterized by much higher divorce rates than societies in which the public has a more Materialist outlook. This emphasis on self-realization is linked with the fact that Postmaterialists emphasize careers, rather than child rearing, as central to a fulfilling life for women. Though most Materialists believe that a woman needs children in order to be fulfilled, two-thirds of the Postmaterialists in our samples reject this view. This is not just a matter of lip service. Individual-level value change seems to have societal consequences. For, as Figure 10 demonstrates, societies with relatively high proportions of Postmaterialists tend to have much lower birth rates than other societies. The global correlation between values and fertility rates is - . 4 8 (significant at the .01
69

Features

FIGURE 9 Action Taken to Protect the Environment, by Prevailing Values in 12 Nations

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clear power plants; nevertheless, many of these plants have never gone into operation or have been converted to conventional fuels because public opinion, in most Western countries, has not accepted nuclear power. A human component of subjective values and perceptions interacts with the hard science side, sometimes in a decisive way. Thus far, these subjective factors remain poorly understood.

Britain

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Irelond

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-40

-30

-20

-10

10

% Postmaterialists minus % Materialists

Source: Euro-Barometer survey 25 (April 1986).

level). Postmaterialist values are only one component of a broader cultural syndrome involving religious orientations, norms concerning the role of women and attitudes toward child bearing, but they are a good indicator of this syndrome. The data suggest that a broad process of intergenerational change has contributed to declining fertility rates in advanced industrial societies.

The Impact of Changing Human Values on the Physical Environment Human fertility patterns have undergone a major transition during the past two decades, with most Third World countries having falling fertility rates and all advanced industrial societies now having below-replacement fertility rates. This change is not explained by the traditional economic model (which would predict rising fertility rates in times of economic growth); it seems to reflect cultural changes that are linked with economic and technical changes, but exert impor70

tant influences of their own. Changes in the role of women, and in the value placed on family life relative to life outside the home, seem to have contributed to declining fertility rateswith obvious implications for population growth, pollution, and resource consumption. Related cultural changes seem to be reshaping consumer patterns, leading to an outlook that places less emphasis on maximizing economic growth, and more emphasis on the quality of life in general, and of the physical environment in particular. The rise of environmentalist parties in some societies, and the growing salience of environmental issues throughout advanced industrial societies is one consequence of this development. Changing cultural factors such as these interact with technological and environmental factors, and efforts to solve problems in the global environment must take account of both sets of factors. The case of nuclear power provides a dramatic illustration of this point. Billions of dollars were invested in research and development of nuv

The theory that launched the research reported here has been controversial: during the past 20 years, a good deal of the research on value change has been designed to disprove the thesis of a Materialist/ Postmaterialist shift. Even the labels "Materialist" and "Postmaterialist" have led to debate: given widespread popular perceptions that contemporary Western youth are highly materialistic (though not in the sense used here: primarily driven by concern for meeting survival needs), it might be simpler to use other labels such as "scarcity values" and "self-expression"; or "security v a l u e s " and "quality of life values." We continue to use the original terminology here simply because it has become widely known among social scientists. It is unnecessary to resolve these disputes here. We need not assume that the specific theoretical formulation and labels used in the literature on Postmaterialist values are necessarily correct. To some extent, the question is out of date because recent evidence makes it clear that the Materialist/Postmaterialist shift is itself only one aspect of a much broader value shift. Enough evidence has now accumulated to make it clear that pervasive changes are taking place in basic values of the publics of industrialized and industrializing societies throughout the worldand that these changes seem to be linked with intergenerational population replacement processes, which means that they are gradual but
PS: Political Science & Politics

Public Support for Environmental Protection

FIGURE 10 Fertility Rates by Value Priorities in 33 Societies

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30 -20 -10 0 +10 % Postmaterialists minus % Materialists

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have a good deal of inherent longterm momentum. Regardless of whether these changes are due to the causes specified by the Postmaterialist thesis, major changes demonstrably are occurring. They have global implications that are too important to ignore. These processes should be monitored and analyzed, to enable us to achieve a better understanding of social changes that we have only begun to chart and interpret, but which seem to have a direct bearing on public support for policies designed to deal with global change.

References
Abramson, Paul R. and Ronald Inglehart. 1995 (forthcoming). Value Change in Global Perspective. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. March 1995

Abramson, Paul R. and Ronald Inglehart. 1994. " E d u c a t i o n , Security and P o s t m a terialism," American Journal of Political Science 38(3):797-814. Baker, Kendall L., Russell Dalton, and Kai Hildebrandt. 1981. Germany Transformed. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Bennulf, Martin, and Soren Holmberg. 1990. " T h e Green Breakthrough in S w e d e n . " Scandinavian Political Studies 13(2): 1 6 5 84. Betz, Hans-Georg. 1990. " V a l u e Change in Postmaterialist Politics: The Case of West G e r m a n y . " Comparative Political Studies 23:239-56. Block, J. 1981. " S o m e Enduring and C o n s e quential Structures of P e r s o n a l i t y " in Further Explorations in Personality, Albert Rabin et a!., ed. N e w York: Wiley, 368-388. Dalton, Russell J., Scott C. Flanagan, and Paul Allen Beck, e d s . 1984. Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies: Realignment or Dealignmentl Princeton: Princeton University P r e s s . Hinckley, Ronald H. 1991. " E n v i r o n m e n t a l Attitudes and Attitude Change: E v i d e n c e from Eastern Europe and the Soviet U n i o n . " Paper presented at the annual

meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Washington, D.C., February 17-19. Hoffmann-Martinot, Vincent. 1991. " G r u e n e and Verts: T w o Faces of European Ecolo g i s m . " West European Politics 14(4): 70-95. Inglehart, Ronald. 1971. " T h e Silent Revolution in E u r o p e . " American Political Science Review 4:991-1017. Inglehart, Ronald. 1977. The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Inglehart, Ronald. 1990. Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Inglehart, Ronald and Paul R. Abramson. 1994. " E c o n o m i c Security and Value C h a n g e . " American Political Science Review (June) 88(2):336-54. Lubin, N a n c y . "Climate Change: A Soviet P e r s p e c t i v e . " Unpublished manuscript for a forthcoming publication by the Electric Power Institute. Pittsburgh: Carnegie-Mellon University. Forthcoming. Mueller-Rommel, Ferdinand, ed. 1990. New Politics in Western Europe: The Rise and the Success of Green Parties and Alternative Lists. Boulder: Westview P r e s s . 71

Features OECD. 1991. The State of the Environment. Paris: OECD. Topfer, Klaus. 1991. "The Environmental Challenge in Eastern Europe." Occasional paper series number 13-19, Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Washington, D.C. World Bank. 1992. World Development Report, 1992. New York: Oxford University Press. Barometer surveys. Since 1988 he has been global coordinator of the World Values surveys, the 1990 wave of which was carried out in 43 societies containing 70% of the world's population; a third wave of this study will be carried out in 1995.

About the Author

Ronald Inglehart is a professor of political science and program director in the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan and author of more than 100 publications. His book, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society (1990), was published in English, French, German, Spanish, Italian, and Japanese. He was co-founder of the Euro-

Why Americans Hate Politics and Politicians

Michael Nelson, Rhodes College sector. And I know that it is politics that secures the basic freedoms that allow my students to say critical things about politics. The teacher in me also hopes that, as the semester wears on, the more students learn about the American political systemwarts and allthe less cynical and indifferent they will become. A democracy can accommodate many things in its peoplepassion, ambition, selfishness, even corruption. But it cannot long endure on a foundation of public cynicism and indifference, especially among those who are the best educated. That's the teacher in me. The political scientist in me is interested in understanding my students' initial attitudes toward politics and politicians. After all, these are the attitudes that they bring in from the world, having breathed them in at home, at their high schools, at the mall, from the Zeitgeist. Students arrive in my classroom politically cynical and indifferent because the larger society is cynical and indifferent. In 1992, for example, when National Election Studies pollsters asked a random sample of Americans questions like "How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do the right thing?" and "Would you say the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all the people?," the share of respondents that gave cynical answers was anywhere from 15 to 59 percentage points greater than the share that gave trusting answers. Compare these results with those from, say, 1964, when the share of people who gave trusting answers was much larger than the share that gave cynical answers, by a margin of from 37 to 56 percentage points (Stanley and Niemi 1994, 169). The data on voter turnout are ' equally disturbing. As recently as the early 1960s, the turnout rate in a typical presidential election was roughly two-thirds of the voting age populationthis at a time when millions of African Americans were disenfranchised in the South and when registering to vote was inconvenient for everyone. Now, despite full voting rights and registration procedures as easy as a visit to the motor vehicles bureau, voter turnout is around half the voting age population, and commentators actually get excited when 55% vote, as they did in 1992. In midterm congressional and gubernatorial elections, about half the eligible voters used to turn out; now it is closer to one-third.
PS: Political Science & Politics

Do psychiatrists still use wordassociation techniques with their patients? I sometimes do word association with my students, usually on the first day of my introductory American government classes at Rhodes College. The first word I say is "politics," and here is what they come back with: corrupt, dirty, games-playing, ego trip, a waste. (The nicest thing I heard the last time I did this was "boring".) Here is what they say in response to "politician": selfish, ambitious, mediocre, unprincipled.1 The teacher in me wants to despair when students associate words like these with politics. I know, as did Aristotle, that politics is a vital and sometimes noble hu man activity. I know that politics was at the heart of our birth as a nation. (As John Roche [1961] has pointed out, the founding fathers may be described in many ways, but no description is accurate that leaves out the word "politician.") I know that politics was the vehicle that integrated generations of our immigrant ancestors into the mainstream of American societythe job on the city road crew that my German grandfather got from the Frank Hague machine in Jersey City is the reason that my father and then I were later able to build careers of our own in the private
72