Caldebate.com Pre-emption Good/Bad Index

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Pre-emption Good/Bad
Index (1 of 2)
Index (1 of 2)...........................................................................................................................................................................................1 Yes Pre-Emption (1 of 2)........................................................................................................................................................................3 Yes Pre-Emption (2 of 2)........................................................................................................................................................................4 No Pre-emption....................................................................................................................................................................................... Pre-emption not ne!- "odelin#$ Perception % E$&...............................................................................................................................' () Ira* dispro+es$non-,ni*,es modelin#.................................................................................................................................................. Pre-emption /ood ........................................................................................................................................................................0 1,n2er 1,sters- )3e45re /ood...............................................................................................................................................................6 Iran- 1,s3 7on5t 8tri2e........................................................................................................................................................................19 Iran- 8tri2e /ood (1 of 2).....................................................................................................................................................................11 Iran- 8tri2e /ood (2 of 2)....................................................................................................................................................................12 N: - 1,s3 7on5t 8tri2e........................................................................................................................................................................13 N: - Pre-emption /ood (1 of 2)...........................................................................................................................................................14 N:- Pre-emption /ood (2 of 2)............................................................................................................................................................1 Prolif 8cenario (1 of 2)..........................................................................................................................................................................1' Prolif 8cenario (2 of 2)..........................................................................................................................................................................1Prolif - () Con+entional &eterrence 7or2s (1 of 2)...........................................................................................................................10 Prolif 8cenario- () Con+entional &eterrence 7or2s (2 of 2).............................................................................................................16 8tate disinte#ration 8cenario.................................................................................................................................................................29 )errorism 8cenario (1 of 2)...................................................................................................................................................................21 )errorism 8cenario (2 of 2)...................................................................................................................................................................22 )errorism- Pre-emption 8ol+es (1 of )................................................................................................................................................23 )errorism- Pre-emption 8ol+es (2 of )................................................................................................................................................24 )errorism- Pre-emption 8ol+es (3 of )................................................................................................................................................2 )errorism- Pre-emption 8ol+es (4 of )................................................................................................................................................2' )errorism- Pre-emption 8ol+es ( of )................................................................................................................................................2)errorism- () )errorists can5t be deterred...........................................................................................................................................20 () Nations !ill ,se 1,s3 doctrine ;,stifies !ars <= (1 of 2)..............................................................................................................26 () Nations !ill ,se 1,s3 doctrine ;,stifies !ars <= (2 of 2)..............................................................................................................39 () Nations !ill ,se 1,s3 doctrine ;,stifies !ars- >tn 1(...................................................................................................................31 () Nations !ill ,se 1,s3 doctrine ;,stifies !ars- >tn 2.....................................................................................................................32 () Pre-emption 2ills NP)....................................................................................................................................................................33 () Pre-emption 2ills alliances..............................................................................................................................................................3 () ?iolates I =a!.................................................................................................................................................................................3' () Pre-emption 2ills I 8,pport for t3e 7@).......................................................................................................................................3... Pre-emption 1ad ........................................................................................................................................................................30 /eneric A Card......................................................................................................................................................................................36 (,stralia-B.8. Cels 8cenario (1 of 3)...................................................................................................................................................49 (,stralia-B.8. Cels 8cenario (2 of 3)...................................................................................................................................................41 (,stralia-B.8. Cels 8cenario (3 of 3)...................................................................................................................................................42 1,n2er 1,sters 8cenario.......................................................................................................................................................................43 1,n2er 1,sters- Pre-emption 1,n2er 1,sters (1 of 2)....................................................................................................................44 1,n2er 1,sters- Pre-emption 1,n2er 1,sters (2 of 2)....................................................................................................................4 1,n2er 1,sters- NP) D (1 of 2).............................................................................................................................................................4' 1,n2er 1,sters- NP) D (2 of 2).............................................................................................................................................................41,n2er 1,sters- Prolif D (1 of 4)...........................................................................................................................................................40 1,n2er 1,sters- Prolif D (2 of 4)...........................................................................................................................................................46 1,n2er 1,sters- Prolif D (3 of 4)........................................................................................................................................................... 9 1,n2er 1,sters- Prolif D (4 of 4)........................................................................................................................................................... 1 1,n2er 1,sters- )3e4 &on5t 7or2 (1 of 2).......................................................................................................................................... 2 1,n2er 1,sters- )3e4 &on5t 7or2 (2 of 2).......................................................................................................................................... 3 1,n2er 1,sters- )3e45re Pointless- Con+entional 7eapons 8ol+e...................................................................................................... 4 1,n2er 1,sters- )estin# Prolif........................................................................................................................................................ C3ec3n4a 8cenario................................................................................................................................................................................ ' C3ec3n4a - B.8. Pre-emption C,ssian Pre-emption........................................................................................................................ C3ec3n4a - C,ssian Pre-emption N,clear 8tri2e............................................................................................................................. 0 1
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C3inese Nationalism 8cenario (1 of 2)................................................................................................................................................. 6 C3inese Nationalism 8cenario (2 of 2).................................................................................................................................................'9 C$b 8cenario..........................................................................................................................................................................................'1 C$b- Pre-emption C$b (1 of 2)..........................................................................................................................................................'2 C$b- Pre-emption C$b (2 of 2)..........................................................................................................................................................'3 C$b-Ee#e I=..........................................................................................................................................................................................'4 C$b- N7 D..............................................................................................................................................................................................' C$b- International b$l Pre-emption failin#........................................................................................................................................'' Int. Co-op 8cenario (1 of 3)..................................................................................................................................................................'Int. Co-op 8cenario (2 of 3)..................................................................................................................................................................'0 Int. Co-op 8cenario (3 of 3)..................................................................................................................................................................'6 Int. Co-op- Pre-emption 2ills co op on 7@).......................................................................................................................................-9 Int. Co-op- 2e4 to 7@)........................................................................................................................................................................-1 Int. =a! 8cenario..................................................................................................................................................................................-2 Iran (ttac2 8cenario..............................................................................................................................................................................-3 Iran (ttac2- Prolif F N7................................................................................................................................................................-4 Iran (ttac2- tan2s Econ.........................................................................................................................................................................Iran (ttac2- 2ills "E 8tabilit4 (1 of 2).................................................................................................................................................-' Iran (ttac2- 2ills "E 8tabilit4 (2 of 2).................................................................................................................................................-Iran (ttac2- destabiliGes Ira*................................................................................................................................................................-0 Iran (ttac2- 8tri2e Israel attac2 F b,n2er b,sters...........................................................................................................................-6 Iran (ttac2- Yes !e !ill be n,2in# t3em (1 of 2)................................................................................................................................09 Iran (ttac2- Yes !e !ill be n,2in# t3em (2 of 2)................................................................................................................................01 Iran (ttac2- () No 8tri2e....................................................................................................................................................................02 Iran (ttac2- () 8tri2e Ce+ol,tion...................................................................................................................................................03 Iran (ttac2- () Israel !ill first stri2e..................................................................................................................................................04 Iran Prolif 8cenario (1 of 2)..................................................................................................................................................................0 Iran Prolif 8cenario (1 of 2)..................................................................................................................................................................0' :as3mir 8cenario..................................................................................................................................................................................0:as3mir- Pre-emption 7ar (1 of 2).................................................................................................................................................00 :as3mir- Pre-emption 7ar (2 of 2).................................................................................................................................................06 :as3mir- () Neit3er side !ants to pre-empt.......................................................................................................................................69 Nort3-8o,t3 &isparit4 8cenario (1 of 2)...............................................................................................................................................61 Nort3-8o,t3 &isparit4 8cenario (2 of 2)...............................................................................................................................................62 Nort3-8o,t3 &isparit4- Prolif F )errorism D (1 of 2)...........................................................................................................................63 Nort3-8o,t3 &isparit4- Prolif F )errorism D (2 of 2)...........................................................................................................................64 N: 8cenario (1 of 2).............................................................................................................................................................................6 N: 8cenario (2 of 2).............................................................................................................................................................................6' N:- Pre-emption N7 (1 of 3).........................................................................................................................................................6N:- Pre-emption N7 (2 of 3).........................................................................................................................................................60 N:- Pre-emption N7 (3 of 3).........................................................................................................................................................66 N:- D Calc Probabilit4........................................................................................................................................................................199 N:- () N: first stri2e.......................................................................................................................................................................191 N:- Pre-emption fails.........................................................................................................................................................................192 NP) 8cenario (1 of 2).........................................................................................................................................................................193 NP) 8cenario (2 of 2).........................................................................................................................................................................194 @+erstretc3 8cenario...........................................................................................................................................................................19 @+erstretc3- Pre-emption Ca,ses it (1 of 3).......................................................................................................................................19' @+erstretc3- Pre-emption Ca,ses it (2 of 3).......................................................................................................................................19@+erstretc3- Pre-emption Ca,ses it (3 of 3).......................................................................................................................................190 @+erstretc3- It :ills Ee#e...................................................................................................................................................................196 Prolif 8cenario.....................................................................................................................................................................................119 Prolif- Pre-emption ca,ses it...............................................................................................................................................................111 Prolif- () Pre-emption 2 deter Co#,e 8tates.....................................................................................................................................112 Ce#ional Conflicts 8cenario (1 of 2) ..................................................................................................................................................113 Ce#ional Conflicts 8cenario (2 of 2)...................................................................................................................................................114 Ce#ional Conflicts- Pre-emption ca,ses t3em....................................................................................................................................11 2
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)rade 8cenario (1 of 3).......................................................................................................................................................................11' )rade 8cenario (2 of 3).......................................................................................................................................................................11)rade 8cenario (3 of 3).......................................................................................................................................................................110 )errorism 8cenario..............................................................................................................................................................................116 ),r2is3-B.8. Cels 8cenario (1 of 2)...................................................................................................................................................129 ),r2is3-B.8. Cels 8cenario (2 of 2)...................................................................................................................................................121 B.N. 8cenario (1 of 3).........................................................................................................................................................................122 B.N. 8cenario (2 of 3).........................................................................................................................................................................123 B.N. 8cenario (3 of 3).........................................................................................................................................................................124 B.N.- 7@) D.......................................................................................................................................................................................12 Pre-emption % Bns,stainable..............................................................................................................................................................12' Pre-emption % "odeled......................................................................................................................................................................12() Pre-Emption +s. C3ina..................................................................................................................................................................120 () No modelin#- 1,s3 pre-emption is distinct..................................................................................................................................126 () Pre-emption 1and!a##onin#..................................................................................................................................................139 () Pre-emption doesn5t +iolate I =a!...............................................................................................................................................131 () Co#,e 8tate !ill #i+e !eapons to terrorists.................................................................................................................................132 () B.8. 3as to loo2 stron#..................................................................................................................................................................133
Yes Pre-Emption (1 of 2)
The pre-emption doctrine is still alive and kicking- hes considering a first strike Iran
Rubin 06
()r,d4-H Col,mnist for t3e P3iladelp3ia In*,irerH "arc3 2-H )3e (nniston 8tarH I1,s3 #i+es ne! life to failed pre-emption doctrineJH 3ttpK$$!!!.annistonstar.com$opinion$299'$as-insi#3t-932--9-'c24s39 .3tmL Macob)
If 4o, !ere !onderin# !3at t3e 73ite Eo,se 3as learned from t3ree 4ears of Ira* errorsH last !ee2 !on5t offer m,c3 comfort. President 1,s3 3as been #i+in# speec3es ass,rin# (mericans t3at t3in#s are #oin# !ellH !it3 a fe! speed b,mps. 8ecretar4 of &efense &onald C,msfeld sa4s t3at It3e terrorists ... are losin#.J 1,t t3e most ,nsettlin# e+ent !as t3e ,n+eilin# of a ne! national sec,rit4 strate#4 t3at reaffirms t3e 2992 1,s3 doctrine of pre-empti+e !ar. Pre-empti+e !arH 4o, ma4 recallH is t3e concept t3at (merica !ill attac2 its enemies N !3et3er state or terrorist #ro,p N before t3e4 attac2 ,sH especiall4 if !e t3in2 t3e4 ma4 ,se !eapons of mass destr,ction.
@n t3e s,rfaceH t3ere is not3in# exceptional abo,t t3e doctrine. <or exampleH in 16'-H Israel pre-empti+el4 attac2ed E#4pt and 84ria after E#4pt 3ad bloc2ed one of Israel5s main !ater!a4s and 2ic2ed o,t B.N. obser+ers. @ne co,ld ima#ine B.8. forces attac2in# terrorists !3o !ere s3eltered b4 a !ea2 state and !ere plottin# to bomb an (merican cit4. 1,t t3e 1,s3 doctrine is a m,c3 more explosi+e strate#4 t3at 3as alread4 #otten ,s into bi# tro,ble in Ira*L it #oes !a4 be4ond t3e concept of #ettin# t3em before t3e4 #et 4o,.
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In Ira*H t3e pre-emption doctrine !as ,sed to o+ert3ro! a r,ler based on spec,lation abo,t !3at 3e mi#3t do in t3e f,t,re. )3e ass,mption !as t3at 8addam !o,ld #et n,clear !eapons and 3and t3em off to terrorists !3o !o,ld ,se t3em a#ainst ,s. )3is !as pre+enti+e !ar a#ainst a 3i#3l4 ,nli2el4 t3reat for !3ic3 #ood intelli#ence !as lac2in#. If ot3er co,ntries tried pre+enti+e !arH ima#ine o,r reaction. E+er4one 2no!s no! t3at most 73ite Eo,se premises for t3e !ar !ere specio,s. E+en in 2992H t3e administration 2ne! t3at intelli#ence abo,t 8addam5s n,clear !eapons pro#ram !as t3in. It !as l,dicro,s to t3in2 3e !o,ld #i+e a bomb to radical Islamists !3o !anted to destro4 3imH and !3ose bomb co,ld be traced bac2 to 3im. )3e 73ite Eo,se co,ld 3a+e made a different case a#ainst 8addamK t3at 3e !as an international paria3H in fla#rant +iolation of B.N. resol,tionsH !3o !o,ld re+i+e 3is n,clear pro#ram once sanctions !ere lifted and t3reaten t3e entire "ideast.
1,t t3e president c3ose to in+o2e a broad ne! doctrine t3at #a+e (merica carte blanc3e to o+ert3ro! an4 re#ime on t3e basis of e+idence !e c3ose. )3is doctrine ,nner+ed e+en close allies. 73en !e failed to find 7"& in Ira*H it s3redded 1,s35s credibilit4 abroad. Yet t3e doctrine of pre-emption s,r+i+es
as t3e #,ts of 1,s35s sec,rit4 strate#4. "ore to t3e pointH in a 46pa#e doc,mentH t3e doctrine is spelled o,t ;,st t!o pa#es before t3e B.8. case a#ainst Iran. )3e strate#4 paper states t3at (merica faces Ino #reater c3allen#e from a sin#le co,ntr4 t3an IranJL spec,lation is rife as to !3et3er Iran is t3e next candidate for pre-emption. )3e paper sa4s (merica5s concerns !it3 )e3ran5s n,clear pro#ram can be sol+ed onl4 if Iran opens ,p its political s4stem. )3is feeds t3e #lobal b,GG o+er !3et3er (merica intends to bomb Iran5s n,clear sites and topple t3e re#ime.
1,s35s national sec,rit4 ad+iserH 8tep3en Eadle4H insisted last !ee2 t3at t3e doctrine !as not aimed specificall4 at Iran. )3e pre-emption doctrine is associated !it3 Ira*i re#ime c3an#e at !3ic3 !e 3a+e pro+ed 3apless. (mericans are not c,t o,t to pla4 a 1ritis3-st4le imperial role. Yet 1,s35s lan#,a#e on Iran so,nds as if !e !ant to tr4 it a#ain in )e3ran.
E+en if Ira* 3as d,lled t3e president5s ent3,siasm for re#ime c3an#eH ma2in# pre-empti+e !ar t3e centerpiece of sec,rit4 doctrine is still a +er4 bad idea N especiall4 !it3 Iran.
8,c3 a doctrine no do,bt 3as increased )e3ran5s appetite to b,ild a n,clear !eapons pro#ram s!iftl4. Pres,mabl4H Iran noticed t3at t3e doctrine doesn5t t3reaten Nort3 :orea as 3ars3l4 N per3aps beca,se Nort3 :orea alread4 3as se+eral bombs. )3e doctrine 3as certainl4 increased Iran5s incenti+e to ma2e tro,ble for (mericans inside Ira*. "oreo+erH as <rancis <,2,4ama points o,t in 3is ne! boo2H I(merica at t3e CrossroadsHJ pre+enti+e stri2es aren5t li2el4 to destro4 b,ddin# n,clear pro#rams. Iran learned a lesson from Israel5s destr,ction of Ira*5s @sira2 reactor and 3as dispersed its pro#ram ,nder#ro,nd. <,2,4amaH a leadin# neocon t,rned critic of administration polic4H adds anot3er ca,tion. (lt3o,#3 an attac2 mi#3t slo! Iran5s n,clear pro#ramH t3e political dama#e !o,ld be immense. Nationalistic Iranians !o,ld rall4 ro,nd t3eir re#ime. In ot3er !ordsH a broad pre-emption doctrine !ill ma2e more problems for national sec,rit4 t3an it sol+es. Ira* !o,ld seem a #larin# case st,d4 of its fail,re.
Eo!e+erH t3ere
it standsH t3e centerpiece of o,r national sec,rit4 doctrine. =essons not learned.
Yes Pre-Emption (2 of 2)
More evidence- Bush hasnt learned from his mistakes in Iraq
Dale 06
(Eelle-H &irector of t3e &o,#las F 8ara3 (llison Center for <o. Po. 8t,dies O t3e Eerita#e <o,ndationH "arc3 22H Eerita#e <o,ndation Press CoomH I<reedom doctrineJH 3ttpK$$!!!.3erita#e.or#$Press$Commentar4$ed93229'a.cfmL Macob)
In a predictable repla4 of t3e reaction t3at #reeted President 1,s3Ps 2992 National 8ec,rit4 8trate#4
(N88)H t3e reaction to t3e 299' ,pdate of t3e doc,ment 3as foc,sed almost entirel4 on t3e doctrine of preemption. (fter all t3e noise made fo,r 4ears a#o and after t3e diffic,lties enco,ntered b4 Bnited 8tates in
Ira*H per3aps critics 3ad 3oped t3at pre-emption !o,ld *,ietl4 #o a!a4. Yet 3ere it is a#ainH pointin# at t3e next potential tar#etH Iran. P,re exasperation !it3 t3e National 8ec,rit4 Co,ncilPs b,ll3eadedness is in t3e air.
(nd not onl4 t3atH b,t t3e doctrine of democrac4-b,ildin# 3as not #one o,t t3e !indo! d,e to diffic,lt da4s and sometimes disappointin# res,lts. In factH in t3e 299' +ersion of t3e N88H it 3as become t3e mainsta4 of t3e entire doc,mentH rat3er t3an a s,bsection of t3e #lobal !ar on terrorism. "ean!3ileH t,rnin# t3in#s on t3eir 3eadH t3e !ar on terrorism 3as no! become one s,bsection of t3e o+erall doc,mentH t3o,#3 admittedl4 an important one. )3ose !3o donPt li2e eit3er pre-emption or democrac4 promotion are findin# in t3e doc,ment an inabilit4 in t3e 73ite Eo,se to learn from past mista2esH and a dist,rbin# lac2 of to,c3 !it3 realit4. )3e c3ar#e of Qneo4
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7ilsonianismQ is le+eled an#ril4 b4 critics bot3 on t3e ri#3t and t3e leftH t3ese da4s 3a+in# become practicall4
s4non4mo,s !it3 t3at dreaded !ord Qneoconser+atism.Q (s is so often t3e caseH 3o!e+erH labels are not a partic,larl4 ,sef,l !a4 of cond,ctin# a disc,ssion of forei#n polic4. (s important as t3is doc,ment is as a bl,eprint for (merican international
action ,ntil t3e end of t3e 1,s3 presidenc4H it deser+es serio,s attention. ( readin# of t3e N88 of 299' and a comparison !it3 t3e N88 2992 s,##est an e+ol+in# +ision for t3e f,t,re.
o Pre-emption
Bush has shifted away from pre-emption
Daalder 06
(I+o E.-H 8r. <ello! O t3e 1roo2in#s Instit,tionH "arc3 1'H )3e 1roo2in#s Instit,tionH I8tatement on t3e 299' National 8ec,rit4 8trate#4JH 3ttpK$$!!!.broo2in#s.ed,$+ie!s$op-ed$daalder$299'931'nss.3tmL Macob) 7it3 t3e p,blication of its ne! National 8ec,rit4 8trate#4H t3e 1,s3 Ce+ol,tion is officiall4 o+er. 7ePre seein# a ret,rn to a forei#n polic4 t3at is m,c3 more a2in to t3e forei#n policies p,rs,ed b4 t3e administrationPs predecessors t3an b4 t3is administration in its first term. )3e ne! strate#4Ps t!in pillarsNof promotin# 3,man ri#3tsH freedom and democrac4 and of !or2in# to#et3er !it3 o,r friends and alliesN3a+e been central pillars of (merican forei#n polic4 for decades. )3e re+ersal is clear in t3e !a4 t3e strate#4 s3ifts t3e balance from emp3asiGin# force to emp3asiGin# diplomac4H from rel4in# on (mericaPs ,nilateral po!er to rel4in# on m,ltilateral alliances and instit,tionsH from stressin# t3e need to ens,re (mericaPs militar4 preeminence to stressin# t3e importance of en3ancin# o,r po!er b4 !or2in# !it3 ot3ers. In some notable !a4sH t3e ne! strate#4 doc,ment represents a ret,rn to t3e forei#n polic4 of 1ill Clinton. Yo, can see it in t3e ne! emp3asis on democratiGation (no different from ClintonPs enlar#ement strate#4)H t3e ne! reco#nition t3at #lobaliGation creates f,ndamentall4 different c3allen#es and opport,nities (!3ic3 !as central to ClintonPs forei#n polic4H b,t entirel4 missin# from t3e 2992 8trate#4 doc,ment)H and in t3e centralit4 of !or2in# !it3 allies and friends and t3e
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decided preference for diplomac4 o+er t3e ,se of militar4 force (!3ic3 !as at t3e core of ClintonPs strate#4). (nd !3ile t3e ne! doc,ment reiterates t3at preemption remains a 2e4 part of t3e strate#4H it does so in a !a4 t3at is little different from 3o! t3e Clinton administration addressed t3e iss,e in its disc,ssions on t3e ,se of force. )3e interestin# *,estion is !34 t3e 1,s3 administration 3as decided to re+erse co,rse. Part of t3e ans!erH s,rel4H lies in t3e fact t3at realit4 demonstrated t3e limits of its re+ol,tionar4 forei#n polic4. @ne 2e4 realit4 is t3at most of t3e t3reats !e face toda4 cannot be effecti+el4 defeated b4 (merican (militar4) po!er aloneL it re*,ires a m,ltifaceted ,se of po!er and t3e acti+e cooperation of !illin# and able allies. (not3er is t3at (mericaPs actions m,st en;o4 international le#itimac4 if t3e4 are to be effecti+e in sol+in# #lobal problems. YetH it is clear t3at t3e administration 3as accepted t3ese ne! realities onl4 rel,ctantl4. It 3as been forced to c3an#e co,rse b4 necessit4 rat3er t3an o,t of con+iction.
Pre-emption not ne!- "odelin#$ Per%eption & E$D

America has been engaging in pre-emptive wars all along
Die'l 02
(Mac2son-H @ct. 1H 7as3in#ton PostH ICice prod,ces a brilliant s4nt3esisJH 3ttpK$$!!!.,ni-m,enster.de$PeaCon$#lobal-texte$#!$n$die3l-ricebrilliance.3tmL Macob) )3e first proof t3at Cice and 3er team are on to somet3in# is t3e alarmist reactions t3at 3a+e #reeted 3er paper. 8candaliGed members of t3e forei#n polic4 establis3ment are callin# its treatment of preempti+e action an ,nprecedented polic4 depart,re t3at endorses blitG2rie# as t3e remed4 for anti-(mericanism. Polic4 perestroi2a ,s,all4 pro+o2es s,c3 first responses. 1,t (merican presidents 3a+e been en#a#in# in ,nilateral and preempti+e militar4 actions all alon#H most recentl4 in PanamaH /renada and EaitiH and in Ira* after t3e 1660 exp,lsion of t3e inspectors.
Iraq was the test case for pre-emption

(runnee ) Di *io+anni 0,
(M,tta-H (drian-H (pril 1H Canadian 1,siness and C,rrent (ffairsH IIra*K ( for2 in t3e road for a special relations3ipRJH =exisL Macob)
'
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"an4 commentators 3a+e cast t3e Ira* in+asion as a test case for t3e ne!l4 minted B8 doctrine of preemption. IndeedH t3e B8 president and ot3er #o+ernment officials ,sed t3e r3etoric of self-defence and t3reat
pre+ention in statements to t3e (merican p,blicH alon# !it3 references to 8addamPs ties to al Saeda and to 3is re#imePs br,tal oppression of t3e Ira*i people.4 Eo!e+erH it is important to note t3at self-defence !as mentioned onl4 in
passin# in t3e official le#al ;,stification of t3e inter+ention. Bnder article 1 of t3e BN c3arterH states m,st notif4 t3e sec,rit4 co,ncil t3at t3e4 are actin# in self-defence. 73ile t3e B8 did so in t3e case of t3e militar4 action in (f#3anistan in @ctober 2991H its "arc3 2993 letter to t3e sec,rit4 co,ncil asserted primaril4 t3at t3e in+asion of Ira* !as ;,stified as enforcement of co,ncil resol,tions. (s did t3e B: and (,stralia in similar lettersH t3e B8 ar#,ed t3at t3e ceasefire t3at 3ad ended t3e first /,lf 7ar !as contin#ent ,pon Ira*i compliance !it3 +ario,s resol,tions. /i+en Ira*Ps contin,ed breac3es of t3ese resol,tions and t3eir disarmament pro+isionsH t3e co,ncilPs ori#inal a,t3oriGation to enforce peace and sec,rit4 in t3e /,lf re#ion !as said to be re+i+ed. )3,sH t3e B8 le#al ;,stification claimed t3at t3e Ira* inter+ention !as cond,cted not ,nilaterall4 b,t !it3in t3e BNPs m,ltilateral frame!or2.
!"! has always maintained the right to pre-emptive nuclear strikes

-prin# 0,
(1a2er-H <. ". :irb4 Cesearc3 <ello! in National 8ec,rit4 Polic4 O t3e :at3r4n and 83elb4 C,llom &a+is Instit,te for International 8t,dies O )3e Eerita#e <o,ndationH @ct. 20H Eerita#e <o,ndation 1ac2#ro,nderH ICon#ress 83o,ld 1ac2 1,s3 (dministration Plans to Bpdate N,clear 7eapons Polic4 and <orcesJH T1069H 3ttpK$$!!!.3erita#e.or#$Cesearc3$ National8ec,rit4$b#1069.cfmL Macob) Neit3er t3e implied nor t3e explicit concl,sion is tr,e. B.8. n,clear !eapons polic4H e+en prior to t3e 1,s3 (dministrationH 3as maintained t3e option to ,se n,clear !eapons to preempt an attac2 ,nder extraordinar4 circ,mstances. )3e B.8. 3as ne+er la,nc3ed an ,npro+o2ed n,clear attac2 in its 3istor4.
./ Ira0 dispro+es$non-uni0ues modelin#

The Iraq situation was too unique- it didnt set a precedent for anything
1aniffa 02
((GiG-H @ct. 2 H India (broad HIMosep3 C. 1iden Mr.JH =exisL Macob)
in perspecti+e. 8addam E,ssein la,nc3ed an a##ressi+e attac2 on a so+erei#n nationH !as repelledH lost a !arH s,ed for peace and a condition of 3im sta4in# in po!er !as to abide b4 a set of resol,tions 3e si#ned on to. 8o t3is is not a !ar of preemptionH if it5s a !ar. It5s a !ar of enforcin# t3e terms of a peace a#reementH and no s,c3 circ,mstance exists !it3 re#ard to India and Pa2istanH C3ina and )ai!anH or an4 n,mber of examples 4o, can #i+e.
7e s3o,ld p,t t3is
Another pre-emptive war could still set a precedent

Ross 02
(@a2land-H No+. 1H )oronto 8tarH IP&octrine of pre-emptionP a step bac2JH =exisL Macob)
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It is not ,nt3in2ableH 3e sa4sH t3at a re-elected and apparentl4 +indicated Cep,blican 73ite Eo,se mi#3t la,nc3 ,nilateral militar4 action a#ainst Iran or Nort3 :oreaH bot3 of !3ic3 3a+e n,clear !eapons pro#rams t3at pose a sec,rit4
t3reat to t3e Bnited 8tates. No ot3er #o+ernment co,ld expect to 3a+e m,c3 sa4 in t3ose decisions.
QPre-emption abro#ates to one #o+ernment t3e po!er to c3oose !3en and !3ere to proceedHQ sa4s (x!ort34. Q)3atPs an a!f,l precedent for ot3er co,ntries to follo!.Q
The Iraq war wasnt pre-emption a! #ontinuation of the gulf war

P'illips 02
(Mames-H Cesearc3 <ello! in t3e :at3r4n F 83elb4 C,llom &a+is Instit,te for International 8t,dies O )3e Eerita#e <o,ndationH "arc3 24H Eerita#e =ect,reH IIra*K @ne Year =aterJH T02 H 3ttpK$$!!!.3erita#e.or#$Cesearc3$"iddleEast$3l02 .cfmL Macob) )3e Ira* !ar also 3as some notable dra!bac2sH aside from t3e contin,ed losses of (merican troops. )3e fail,re to find !eapons of mass destr,ction admittedl4 3as 3,rt B.8. credibilit4 and t3e 1,s3 (dministrationPs preempti+e doctrineH b,t t3is problem is fre*,entl4 o+erstated since t3e B.8. 3as al!a4s retained t3e ri#3t of self-defense ,nder international la!. I !o,ld ar#,e t3at t3e Ira* !ar !as not a preempti+e !arH b,t a contin,ation of t3e 1661 /,lf 7ar--an ,nfinis3ed !ar t3at failed to defan# 8addam.
b!
!$! authori%ation
1erita#e 3oundation 02
((pril 13H 7eb"emoH I)3e ?iabilit4 of International Ce#imes and Instit,tionsJH T4- H 3ttpK$$!!!.3erita#e.or#$Cesearc3$ International@r#aniGations$!m4- .cfmL Macob) )3e Eonorable Mo3n &. Eol,m of t3e Center for Non-Proliferation 8t,dies con#rat,lated &r. Eolmes Ut3e Eonorable :im C. EolmesH P3.&.H (ssistant 8ecretar4 of 8tate for International @r#aniGationsV on 3is speec3 b,t said t3at it left open t3e *,estion of rationaliGin# preemption in ot3er co,ntries in t3e !ar on terrorism. &r. Eolmes said t3at 3e co,ld not #et into 34pot3etical examplesH b,t reiterated t3at t3e !ar in Ira* !as a follo!-,p to BN resol,tions and not a case of preemption.
444 Pre-emption *ood 444
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(un5er (usters- /'e67re *ood

Bunker busters k deterrence
Pe8a 09
(C3arles ?.-H director of defense polic4 st,dies at t3e Cato Instit,teH No+. 16H Cato Polic4 (nal4sisH I"ini-N,2es and Preempti+e Polic4K ( &an#ero,s CombinationJH T466H !!!.cato.or#$p,bs$pas$pa466.pdfL Macob) ( second rationale for mini-n,2es is deterrence. (d+ocates belie+e t3at beca,se mini-n,2es !o,ld be more ,seable t3e4 !o,ld be more credible !eapons andH t3ereforeH a more effecti+e deterrent. :eit3 Pa4neH a former dep,t4 assistant secretar4 of defense in t3e c,rrent 1,s3 administrationH ar#,esK 7e need researc3 on ne!H lo!-4ield n,clear !eapons beca,se t3at researc3 ma4 contrib,te to a deterrent t3at is belie+ableH i.e.H a deterrent t3at !or2s. @,r existin# arsenal5s #enerall4 3i#3 4ields and limited precision co,ld inflict so man4 innocent cas,alties t3at enemies ma4 belie+e t3e B.8. president !o,ld be paral4Ged b4 self-deterrence. (merica5s pop,lar a+ersion to ca,sin# collateral dama#e is !ell 2no!n. PrecisionH lo!-4ield !eapons t3at !o,ld inflict a m,c3 lo!er le+el of ci+ilian cas,alties !ill appear m,c3 more credible to some opponentsH and t3,s constit,te a better deterrent to !ar.
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Bunker busters " prolif

Pe8a 09
(C3arles ?.-H director of defense polic4 st,dies at t3e Cato Instit,teH No+. 16H Cato Polic4 (nal4sisH I"ini-N,2es and Preempti+e Polic4K ( &an#ero,s CombinationJH T466H !!!.cato.or#$p,bs$pas$pa466.pdfL Macob) )3e final ar#,ment for mini-n,2es is t3at t3e abilit4 to destro4 deepl4 b,ried facilities ,sed in t3e prod,ction of c3emicalH biolo#icalH or n,clear !eapons !o,ld diss,ade ro#,e states from de+elopin# s,c3 !eapons in t3e first place. Pa4ne ar#,es t3at mini-n,2es !o,ld ca,se ro#,e states to 3a+e less incenti+e to ac*,ire !eapons of mass destr,ction beca,se Ia !or2in# B.8. n,clear deterrent . . . can 3elp to de+al,e ro#,e 7"&H b4 credibl4 t3reatenin# a costl4 repl4 if t3ose 7"& !ere e+er ,sed.J24 )3e lo#ic is t3at if ro#,e states belie+e t3at t3e Bnited 8tates co,ld credibl4 destro4 t3eir 7"& (or 7"& pro#rams)H t3e4 !o,ld 3a+e less or no incenti+e to p,rs,e 7"&. 1a2er 8prin#H a researc3 fello! at t3e Eerita#e <o,ndationH is reported to 3a+e saidK I)3ere also appears to be #ro!in# acceptance t3at a 2e4 role for n,clear !eapons toda4 is to ma2e enemies *,estion t3e !isdom of stoc2pilin# c3emical and biolo#ical !eapons. . . . If t3e Bnited 8tates can destro4 s,c3 stoc2piles !it3 n,clear stri2esH 3ostile co,ntries !ill be less inclined to b,ild t3em.J2 In ot3er !ordsH t3e t3reat of ,sable mini-n,2es in a limited stri2e a#ainst selected tar#ets !o,ld 3a+e t3e same effect as Israel5s M,ne 1601 airstri2e to pre+ent Ira* from de+elopin# a n,clear capabilit4 b4 destro4in# t3e @siri2 n,clear reactor before it became operational.
Iran- (us' :on7t -tri5e

Bush wont attack Iran- & reasons
-anta 3e e! "exi%an 06
((pril 13H I@,r ?ie!K Iran a C3allen#e --- (nd @pport,nit4JH =exisL Macob) 1,t !it3 an4 l,c2H t3is latest episode co,ld amo,nt to a bl,ff -- b4 bot3 sides. (nd 1,s3H to 3is creditH is so,ndin# somet3in# li2e a diplomat in t3e face of Iranian irrationalit4. Ee 2no!s 3e canPt spare a sin#le soldier a#ainst IranH e+en if 3ePs able to close do!n o,r operation in -- rememberR -- (f#3anistan late t3is s,mmer. )3e president also seems +a#,el4 a!are of t3e diplomatic dama#e 3e did b4 cobblin# to#et3er a Qcoalition of t3e !illin#Q instead of enlistin# N()@ or t3e Bnited Nations a#ainst 8addam. 8oH 3a+in# raised a more-t3an-faint possibilit4 of attac2in# IranH 3e !as *,ic2 to dismiss s,c3 notions as !ild spec,lation. &iplomac4H 3e sa4sH !ill pla4 at least as bi# a role as t3reats of pre-emption in t,rnin# do!n t3e 3eat on Iran.
19
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1,s3H and !3oe+er s,cceeds 3imH probabl4 3a+e time on t3eir sideK 7eapons experts sa4 it co,ld ta2e Iran fi+e to 19 4ears to be able to !a#e n,clear !arL b4 t3enH per3apsH t3at co,ntr4 !ill see a second !a+e of moderation. If t3at 3appensH IranPs ne! leaders co,ld ma2e a case before t3e Bnited Nations for n,clear de+elopment -- t3e ci+ilian 2indL !orrisomeH b,t s,b;ect to monitorin# B.8. forces o+erstretc3ed Not eno,#3 international s,pport- 1,s3 doesn5t !ant to alienate e+er4one li2e 3e did !it3 Ira* 1,s3 is la,#3in# off t3e notion t3at it5s a possibilit4
Iran- -tri5e *ood (1 of 2)

#onfrontation with Iran is inevitable' if the !"! doesnt take an aggressive stance soon it will lose the ()T! *iplomacy is useless' its a form of appeasement that only invites an Iranian attack!
;edeen 0,
("ic3ael-H Cesident 8c3olar in t3e <reedom C3air O t3e (merican Enterprise Instit,teH 8ept. 23H National Ce+ie!H IIran 1,bbles @+erJH =exisL Macob) "anic "oments F Exod,s )3e m,lla3s are alto#et3er capable of decidin# t3at e+ents are no! r,nnin# stron#l4 in t3eir fa+orH and t3at t3e4 s3o,ld stri2e directl4 at t3e Bnited 8tates. )3e4 loo2 at ,sH and t3e4 see a deepl4 di+ided nationH a
president !3o tal2ed a lot abo,t brin#in# democratic re+ol,tion to Iran and t3en did not3in# to s,pport itH a militar4 t3at is clearl4 fi#3tin# in Ira* aloneH and co,ntin# t3e da4s ,ntil !e can sa4 QitPs ,p to t3e Ira*is no!HQ and--a#ain based on !3at t3e4 see in o,r pop,lar press--a co,ntr4 t3at 3as no stomac3 for a prolon#ed campai#n a#ainst t3e remainin# terror masters in IranH 84riaH and 8a,di (rabia.
11
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@sama bin =aden came to similar concl,sionsH and ordered t3e e+ents of 6$11. 734 s3o,ld t3e Iranians--!3o 3a+e been ma;or s,pporters of t3e terror net!or2 e+er since t3e 16-6 re+ol,tion--not do t3e sameR
"an4 Iranians 3a+e come to t3e concl,sion t3at t3eir co,ntr4 is a dan#ero,s placeH and t3e4 are r,nnin#. ( si#nificant n,mber of former officials 3a+e left Iran for infidel co,ntries in t3e past fe! !ee2s and mont3s. )3e former minister of c,lt,reH (4atolla3 "o3a;eraniH 3as #one to =ondonH alon# !it3 t3e former ma4or of )e3ranH "o3ammed Eassan "ale2madani. "o3sen 8aGe#araH a fo,nder of t3e Ce+ol,tionar4 /,ardsH is no! in 7as3in#ton. "o3ammed )a#3i 1an2i and C4r,s NasseriH ,ntil recentl4 3i#3-ran2in# officialsH 3a+e #one to (,stria. (nd t3ese are t3e l,c24 onesH beca,se t3e4 3a+e mana#ed to escape t3e Islamic rep,blic. 7it3in t3e ca,ldronH t3e p,r#e contin,esH as I 3a+e s,##ested it !o,ld. )en members of t3e :3orassan ;,diciar4 3a+e been forced to resi#n. )3e commander in c3ief of t3e arm4 is #one. Pa4man <oro,Ges3 and /olmo3ammad 1a*eriH bot3 members of t3e last parliamentH 3a+e resi#nedH as 3as "o3ammed "irlo3iH t3e dep,t4 minister of le#al and parliamentar4 affairs. @t3er resi#nations and depart,res are li2el4 to follo! in s3ort orderL a friend of mine !3o 2no!s a #reat deal abo,t t3e affairs of ban2s in t3e Persian /,lf tells me t3ere is an ,nprecedented flo! of pri+ate mone4 o,t of Iran to places li2e &,baiH (b, &ab3iH and Satar.
)3is exod,s does not bespea2 eit3er a tran*,il co,ntr4 or a re#ime confident of its internal po!erH especiall4 a#ainst t3e bac2#ro,nd of t3e massi+e repression no! ,nder !a4. It rat3er s,##ests a re#ime t3at 2no!s it is 3atedH and intends to sta4 in po!er b4 cr,s3in# an4one in its !a4H bot3 at 3ome and abroad. It is reminiscent of t3e final
da4s of t3e NaGi re#imeH !3en t3e <,3rer in 3is b,n2er s!,n# !ildl4 bet!een me#alomaniacal dreams of mirac,lo,s !orld con*,estH and deep depressionH alternatel4 p,r#in# 3is old #,ard and promotin# incompetent ,nderlin#s to positions of #reat po!er. It ma4 !ell be t3at t3e m,lla3s are torn bet!een !ild fear of (mericaH and a fanatical con+iction t3at t3e4 can finall4 destro4 t3e #reat 8atan. IfH as I fearH t3e4 are eit3er +er4 close toH or act,all4 possess atomic bombsH it mi#3t 3elp explain t3eir manic momentsH and enable t3em to tell t3emsel+es t3at (merica !o,ld not dare attac2 a n,clear po!er.
@,r polic4ma2ers 3a+e t3,s far ,tterl4 failed to desi#n an4t3in# !ort34 of t3e name of an Iran polic4H e+en t3o,#3 it is ar#,abl4 t3e sin#le most important c3allen#e !e face. National 8ec,rit4 (d+iser 8tep3en Eadle4 recentl4 ans!ered a *,estion abo,t Iran polic4 b4 sa4in# t3at !e did indeed 3a+e a polic4H b,t !e 3adnPt 4et !ritten it do!n. )3is is reminiscent of t3e old riddle of !3et3er a fallin# tree ma2es a so,nd if no one is t3ere to 3ear itK can t3ere be a polic4 if nobod4 can define itR
=ac2in# an4 defined polic4H !e can onl4 ;,d#e t3e president and 3is aides b4 t3eir actionsH and t3ere arenPt an4H aside from t3e occasional speec3 or off3and remar2 at a press conference. )3e m,lla3s see t3atH and treat it !it3 t3e contempt it deser+es. 7e are c,rrentl4 indistin#,is3able from t3e E,ropeansH !3o r,n !3ene+er t3e Iranians snarl at t3em. )3is is not a !ar on terrorH it is paral4sis at bestH and appeasement at !orst. )3e 3ell of it is t3at it is costin# t3o,sands of li+esH and !ill cost man4 more ,ntil t3e terror masters are destro4edH or !e s,rrender. )3ose
!ords !ere inconcei+able for man4 4earsH b,t it is a si#n of o,r present fec2lessness t3at t3e4 are no! entirel4 appropriate.
7e can still lose t3is !ar. (nd !e cannot !in it so lon# as !e are blinded b4 o,r potentiall4 fatal fail,re of strate#ic +isionK !e are in a re#ional !arH b,t !e 3a+e limited o,r actions to a sin#le t3eater. @,r
most potent !eapons are political and ideolo#icalH b,t o,r actions 3a+e been almost excl,si+el4 militar4. @,r main enem4H t3e sin#le #reatest en#ine in s,pport of t3e terror !ar a#ainst ,sH !3et3er 8,nni or 83iiteH ;i3adiH or sec,larH (rab or 1ritis3 or Italian or 8paniardH is Iran. )3ere is no escape from t3is fact. )3e onl4 *,estions are
Iran- -tri5e *ood (2 of 2)

3o! lon# it !ill ta2e ,s to face itH 3o! effecti+e !e !ill be !3en !e finall4 decide to actH and 3o! terrible t3e price !ill be for o,r lon# dela4.
12
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< - (us' :on7t -tri5e

Bush wont engage in a pre-emptive war against $orth +orea- hes ,ust posturing-- reasons!
Eberstadt and 3er#uson 02
(Nic3olas- and Mosep3 P.-H (,#,st 39H )3e 7ee2l4 8tandardH I)3e Nort3 :orean Ni#3tmareL ItPs later t3an 4o, t3in2.JH ?ol. 6 No. 4-H =exisL Macob) )3e t3ird possible o,tcome !o,ld be for t3e international comm,nit4 (or t3e Bnited 8tates) to aim forH and to ac3ie+eH re#ime c3an#e in t3e Nort3. It is more diffic,lt to #eneraliGe abo,t t3is o,tcome. @ne can be ass,red t3at t3e pat3 to re#ime c3an#e !o,ld be fra,#3t !it3 dan#erH and t3at t3e res,ltH ,nder e+en t3e most optimistic +ariantsH !o,ld in+ol+e tremendo,s disr,ption and ,ncertaint4. It does not re*,ire m,c3 ima#inationH for exampleH to see 3o! a s,ccessf,l p,s3 for re#ime c3an#e co,ld precipitate a mass exod,s of star+in# Nort3 :oreansH !3et3er o+erland into C3ina and C,ssiaH or b4 boat to Mapan and 8o,t3 :orea. )3ere is also a real possibilit4 t3at t3e p,s3 for re#ime c3an#e in Nort3 :orea co,ld res,lt in !arH in !3ic3 case t3e li2eli3ood of 8eo,lPs escapin# ,nscat3ed !o,ld seem *,ite small. In an4 e+entH 3o!e+erH a p,s3 for re#ime c3an#e in P4on#4an# does not loo2 to be in 13
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t3e cards. 73ate+er t3eir ot3er differencesH t3e #o+ernments of C3inaH C,ssiaH 8o,t3 :oreaH and Mapan are toda4 ,nited in t3eir a+ersion to a polic4 of promotin# re#ime c3an#e in P4on#4an#. 7it3in t3e senior reac3es of t3e 1,s3 administrationH t3e notion of re#ime c3an#e in Nort3 :orea 3as been disc,ssed--b,t apparentl4H onl4 to4ed !it3. @ccasional flirtations not!it3standin#H (merican polic4 3as ne+er act,all4 embraced t3e ar#,ment t3at re#ime c3an#e is eit3er desirable or necessar4 in Nort3 :orea .
< - Pre-emption *ood (1 of 2)

A! .ven the threat of pre-emption would diffuse the risk of a crisis on the +orean /eninsula!
3rum ) Perle 09
(&a+id- <ello! O t3e (merican Enterprise Instit,teH Cic3ard-H fmr assist sec. of defenseH An End to Evil: How to Win the War on Terror, P. 193-194) NextH !e m,st accelerate t3e redeplo4ment of o,r #ro,nd troops on t3e :orean penins,la so t3e4 are be4ond t3e ran#e of Nort3 :orean artiller4 and s3ort-ran#e roc2ets. President 1,s3 and 8ecretar4 C,msfeld 3a+e alread4 be#,n to do t3is. B.8.
troops ori#inall4 ser+ed to deter t3e Nort3 from in+adin# a second timeL toda4 t3e4 3a+e become 3osta#esH !3ose +,lnerabilit4 t3e Nort3 exploits to deter ,s-and !3ose presence disco,ra#es t3e 8o,t3 from impro+in# its o!n defenses. )3irdH as !e reposition troopsH !e s3o,ld de+elop detailed plans for a preempti+e stri2e a#ainst Nort3 :orea5s n,clear facilities. @f co,rseH it is tr,e t3at !e do not 2no! !3ere all t3ese facilities are. 1,t !e 2no! !3ere t3e most important one isL and ;,st as a s,r#eon !ill !is3 to remo+e a mali#nant t,mor e+en if 3e
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s,spects t3at t3ere ma4 be ot3ers t3at cannot be locatedH so !e s3o,ld not 3esitate to 3it t3e bomb factor4 !e can findH e+en if ot3er facilities ma4 be 3idden ,nder#ro,nd. 1,t !e 3opeNand t3is 3ope isH !e t3in2H !ell fo,nded t3at a credible b,ild,p to an (merican stri2e !ill pers,ade t3e C3inese finall4 to do !3at t3e4 3a+e so often promised to doK brin# t3e Nort3 :oreans to 3eel. In ret,rnH t3e C3inese #et peace on t3eir frontiers and a Nort3 :orean #o+ernment friendl4 to t3em. It ma4 be t3at t3e onl4 !a4 o,t of t3e decade-lon# crisis on t3e :orean penins,la is t3e topplin# of :im Mon# Il and 3is replacement b4 a Nort3 :orean comm,nist !3o is more s,bser+ient to C3ina. If soH !e s3o,ld accept t3at o,tcome. Eo!e+er menacin# C3ina ma4 become o+er t3e lon# termH it is m,c3 more sane and predictable t3an comm,nist Nort3 :orea 3as been. (nd a more pro-C3inese Nort3 :orea !o,ld also probabl4 instit,te more rational
economic policiesH t3ereb4 sa+in# millions of Nort3 :orean people from famine and miser4. In timeH all of :orea !ill be ,nited in libert4. E+ent,al :orean ,nification !ill reinforce t3e po!er of t3e !orldPs democracies a#ainst an a##ressi+e and ,ndemocratic C3inaH s3o,ld C3ina so e+ol+e. 1,t t3at is tomorro!Ps c3allen#e. <or toda4H it
!ill be more t3an eno,#3 to force Nort3 :orea to esc3e! n,clear blac2mail.
<- Pre-emption *ood (2 of 2)

B! The impact is nuclear apocalypse!
3un#am!an#o ==
(Pat-H @ct. 2 H (frica Ne!sH I(frica-at-=ar#eL )3ird !orld !arK 7atc3 t3e :oreasJH =exisL Macob)
If t3ere is one place toda4 !3ere t3e m,c3-dreaded )3ird 7orld 7ar co,ld easil4 er,pt and probabl4 redu%e eart' to a 'u#e smoulderin# %inder it is t3e :orean Penins,la in <ar East (sia. E+er since t3e end of t3e sa+a#e t3ree-4ear :orean !ar in t3e earl4 16 9sH militar4 tension bet!een t3e 3ardline comm,nist nort3 and t3e (merican bac2ed 8o,t3 :orea 3as remained dan#ero,sl4 3i#3. In fact t3e :oreas are tec3nicall4 still at !ar.
( forei#n +isitor to eit3er P4on#4on# in t3e Nort3 or 8eo,l in 8o,t3 :orea !ill *,ic2l4 notice t3at t3e di+ided co,ntr4 is al!a4s on maxim,m alert for an4 e+ent,alit4. Nort3 :orea or t3e &emocratic PeoplePs Cep,blic of :orea (&PC:) 3as ne+er for#i+en t3e B8 for comin# to t3e aid of 8o,t3 :orea d,rin# t3e :orean !ar. 83e still re#ards t3e B8 as an occ,pation force in 8o,t3 :orea and !3oll4 to blame for t3e non-re,nification of t3e co,ntr4. Nort3 :orean media constantl4 c3,rns o,t a tirade of attac2s on QimperialistQ (merica and its Qr,nnin# do#Q 8o,t3 :orea. 1
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)3e &PC: is one of t3e most secreti+e co,ntries in t3e !orld !3ere a +isitor is #i+en t3e impression t3at t3e peoplePs 3atred for t3e B8 is absol,te !3ile t3e lo+e for t3eir #o+ernment is total. 73et3er t3is is reall4 soH it is extremel4 diffic,lt to concl,de. In t3e &PC:H a +isitor is ne+er #i+en a c3ance to spea2 to ordinar4 :oreans abo,t t3e politics of t3eir co,ntr4. No +isitor mo+es aro,nd alone !it3o,t #o+ernment escort. )3e (merican #o+ernment ar#,es t3at its presence in 8o,t3 :orea !as beca,se of t3e constant dan#er of an in+asion from t3e nort3. (merica 3as +ast economic interests in 8o,t3 :orea. 83e points o,t t3at t3e nort3 3as d,# n,mero,s t,nnels alon# t3e demilitarised Gone as part of t3e in+asion plans. 83e also acc,ses t3e nort3 of +iolatin# 8o,t3 :orean territorial !aters. Earl4 t3is 4earH a small Nort3 :orean s,bmarine !as ca,#3t in 8o,t3 :orean !aters after #ettin# entan#led in fis3in# nets. 1ot3 t3e (mericans and 8o,t3 :oreans claim t3e s,bmarine !as on a militar4 sp4in# mission. Eo!e+erH t3e intension of t3e alle#ed intr,sion !ill probabl4 ne+er be 2no!n beca,se t3e craftPs cre! !ere all fo,nd !it3 fatal #,ns3ot !o,nds to t3eir 3eads in !3at 3as been described as s,icide pact to 3ide t3e tr,t3 of t3e mission. )3e B8
mistr,st of t3e nort3Ps intentions is so deep t3at it is no secret t3at toda4 7as3in#ton 3as t3e lar#est concentration of soldiers and !eaponr4 of all descriptions in so,t3 :orea t3an an4!3ere else in t3e 7orldH
apart from (merica itself. 8ome of t3e armada t3at !as deplo4ed in t3e recent bombin# of Ira* and in @peration &esert 8torm a#ainst t3e same co,ntr4 follo!in# its in+asion of :,!ait !as from t3e fleet permanentl4 stationed on t3e :orean Penins,la. It is tr,e too t3at at
t3e moment t3e Nort3$8o,t3 :orean border is t3e most fortified in t3e !orld. )3e border line is littered !it3 anti-tan2 and anti-personnel landminesH s,rface-to-s,rface and s,rfaceto-air missiles and is constantl4 patrolled b4 !arplanes from bot3 sides. It is common 2no!led#e t3at (merica also 2eeps an e4e on an4 militar4 mo+ement or b,ild-,p in t3e nort3 t3ro,#3 sp4 satellites. )3e &PC: is said to 3a+e an estimated one million soldiers and a 3,#e arsenal of +ario,s !eapons. (lt3o,#3 t3e &PC: re#ards 3erself as a de+elopin# co,ntr4H s3e can 3o!e+er be classified as a s,per-po!er in terms of militar4 mi#3t. )3e &PC: is capable of prod,cin# medi,m and lon#-ran#e missiles. =ast 4earH for exampleH s3e testfired a medi,m ran#e missile o+er MapanH an action t3at #reatl4 s3oo2 and alarmed t3e B8H Mapan and 8o,t3 :orea.
)3e &PC: sa4s t3e pro;ectile !as a satellite. )3ere 3a+e also been fears t3at s3e !as plannin# to test anot3er ballistic missile capable of reac3in# Nort3 (merica. Nat,rall4H t3e !orld is anxio,s t3at militar4 tension on t3e :orean Penins,la m,st be def,sed to a+oid an apo%al6pse on eart'. It is t3erefore si#nificant t3at t3e (merican #o+ernment anno,nced a fe! da4s a#o t3at it !as mo+in# to!ards normalisin# relations !it3 Nort3 :orea.
Prolif -%enario (1 of 2)
A! #onventional deterrence is obsolete- pre-emption is the only way to stabili%e the international order by scaring our enemies out of acquiring weapons in the first place!
<raut'ammer 02
(C3arles-H 7inner of t3e W0- P,litGer PriGeH Common!ealt3 8c3olar in Politics O @xfordH &ec. 6H )3e 7ee2l4 8tandardH I)3e @bsolescence of &eterrenceJH ?ol. 0 T13H 3ttpK$$!!!.!ee2l4standard.com$Btilities$printerXpre+ie!.aspRid(rticle%16'4FC% C0110 EL Macob) )3e c,rrent deterrence sc3ool starts !it3 t3e ass,mption t3at t3ere is no stoppin# t3e proliferation of !eapons of mass destr,ctionH b,t t3ere is no #reat need to !orr4 beca,se deterrence can deal !it3 t3e problem. It ta2es t3e model of t3e bipolar late 29t3 cent,r4--t!o s,perpo!ers deterrin# eac3 ot3er and 2eepin# t3e peace--and applies it to t3e 21st cent,r4. 1,t t3e 21st cent,r4 is not bipolar. 7"& tec3nolo#4 is spreadin# and comin# !it3in t3e reac3 of doGens of co,ntries. Bnder s,c3 circ,mstancesH t3e lo#ic of deterrence ar#,es per+ersel4 for increased proliferation--if e+er4one 3as n,2esH e+er4one is deterredH and no one !ill ,se t3em. 8afet4 t3ro,#3 deterrenceL ,ni+ersal safet4 t3ro,#3 ,ni+ersal deterrence. 1'
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3,man !ill certainl4 incl,de increasin#l4 ,nstable and ,nbalanced c3aracters. It !ill mean t3at e+en s,c3 in3erentl4 ,ndeterrable s,bstate #ro,ps as al Saeda !ill in time #et t3ese !eapons. )3e res,lt !ill ine+itabl4 be a deepl4 ,nstable international str,ct,re t3at promises to brea2 do!n at m4riad points in t3e f,t,reH e+en t3e near f,t,re. )3e case for deterrenceH dra!in# on t3e bipolar Cold 7arH leads inexorabl4 to a !orld of 34perproliferation. )3is is madness. (s t3e era of !eapons of mass destr,ction da!nsH t3e better approac3 is to den4 t3em--forcibl4 if necessar4--to +er4 bad actors. 8tartin# !it3 8addam. IndeedH ma2in# an example of 8addam. Ironicall4H t3e preemption optionH if adoptedH !ill ser+e as a 3i#3er form of deterrence. )3e idea of preemption is to deter states not from ,sin# !eapons of mass destr,ction b,t from ac*,irin# t3em in t3e first place. If 4o, are merel4 deterrin# 7"& ,se in !arH it is alread4 too late. Yo, become open to precisel4 t3e 2ind of n,clear blac2mail to !3ic3 Nort3 :orea is toda4 s,b;ectin# t3e Bnited 8tates (and Mapan and 8o,t3 :orea). Preemption is a 2ind of pre-deterrence t3at stops t3e t3reat at an earlierH safer sta#e. @+ert3ro!in# 8addam beca,se of 3is ref,sal to relin*,is3 t3ese !eapons !o,ld be a clear demonstration to ot3er t4rants t3at attemptin# to ac*,ire 7"& is a losin# propositionK Not onl4 do t3e4 not p,rc3ase 4o, imm,nit4 (as in classical deterrence)H t3e4 p,rc3ase 4o, extinction. Yo, !ill be not onl4 disarmed b,t det3roned. ( deat3 penalt4 (political or literal) for t3e attempted ac*,isition of t3ese !eapons s3o,ld concentrate t3e mind of t3ose contemplatin# ac*,irin# t3em. )a2en to#et3er !it3 ot3er nonproliferation meas,resH s,c3 as export controlsH preemption can be t3e most potent deterrent to proliferation.
)3ere are #ood reasons to oppose !ar on Ira*. Nostal#ia for deterrence is not one of t3em. 7ar !it3 Ira* mi#3t indeed be costl4L t3e ris2s need to be caref,ll4 !ei#3ed. 1,t t3e case for preempti+e !ar cannot be dismissed !it3 t3e eas4 and ,nexamined in+ocation of deterrence. YesH deterrence !or2ed in t3e past. 1,t in t3e past it !as a pla4 !it3 +er4 fe! actors. (nd e+en ,nder t3ose circ,mstancesH t3e best of circ,mstancesH deterrence !as ps4c3olo#icall4 debilitatin#H in3erentl4 ,nstableH and 3i#3l4 dan#ero,s. )o +ol,ntaril4 c3oose it as t3e principle on !3ic3 to rest o,r safet4 in t3is a#e of !eapons of mass destr,ction is s3eer foll4.
)3erePs no escapin# t3is lo#ic. Yet it is plainl4 a 3,#e bet a#ainst e+er4t3in# !e 2no! abo,t nat,re. It is also a terrible temptin# of statistics. )3e proliferation of !eapons of mass destr,ction
Prolif -%enario (2 of 2)
B! /rolif $(
>t#off 02
(?ictor-H &ep,t4 &irector for t3e 8trate#4H <orcesH F Ceso,rces &i+ision of t3e Instit,te for &efense (nal4sisH 8,mmerH 8,r+i+alH ?ol. 44 T2H P. 0--69) In s,mH !idespread proliferation is li2el4 to lead to an occasional s3oot-o,t !it3 n,clear !eaponsH and t3at s,c3 s3ooto,ts !ill 3a+e a s,bstantial probabilit4 of escalatin# to t3e maxim,m destr,ction possible !it3 t3e !eapons at 3and. Bnless n,clear proliferation is stoppedH !e are 3eaded to!ard a !orld t3at !ill mirror t3e (merican 7ild 7est of t3e late 1099s. 7it3 mostH if not allH nations !earin# n,clear Psix-s3ootersP on t3eir 3ipsH t3e !orld ma4 e+en be a more polite place t3an it is toda4H b,t e+er4 once in a !3ile !e !ill all #at3er on a 3ill to b,r4 t3e bodies of dead cities or e+en !3ole nations.
1-
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Prolif - ./ ?on+entional Deterren%e :or5s (1 of 2)

*eterrence wont continue to stabili%e the world- all their e0amples of deterrence 1working2 are suspect
<raut'ammer 02
(C3arles-H &ec. 6H )3e 7ee2l4 8tandardH I)3e @bsolescence of &eterrenceJH ?ol. 0 T13H 3ttpK$$!!!.!ee2l4standard.com$ Btilities$printerXpre+ie!.aspRid(rticle%16'4FC%C0110 EL Macob) )3ereforeH !3en t3is 3iat,s of coG4 consens,s ends--as it ine+itabl4 !ill eit3er !3en 8addam +iolates 8ec,rit4 Co,ncil Cesol,tion 1441 to t3e satisfaction of <ranceH or !3en t3e Bnited 8tates loses patience !it3 bot3 8addamPs c3eatin# and t3e 8ec,rit4 Co,ncilPs e*,i+ocation--t3e *,estion of a !ar o+er t3ese !eapons of mass destr,ction !ill ret,rn. It cannot be ot3er!ise. )3is is t3e central *,estion of o,r timeH extendin# far be4ond Ira*. Eo! to deal !it3 t3e ine+itable proliferation of
!eapons of mass destr,ction to ro#,e statesK preempt or deterR

)3e case for deterrence rests on t3e follo!in# s4llo#ismK 7eapons of mass destr,ction !ere not in+ented 4esterda4. 7e 3a+e 3alf a cent,r4 of experience on 3o! to 2eep t3em from bein# ,sed. 73at 2ept t3e peace !it3 a 3ostile n,clear s,perpo!er !as deterrenceK )3e 8o+iet Bnion 3ad n,2esL !e 3ad n,2esL bot3 sides 2ne! t3at if t3e4 dared ,se t3eir n,2es firstH t3e4 !o,ld be obliterated. 8addam E,ssein is infinitel4 !ea2er t3an s,c3 +ast continental s,perpo!ers. Ee !ill certainl4 be as deterrable as t3e 8o+iets !ere. (s 1rent 8co!croft p,t itK Q)3reatenin# to ,se t3ese !eapons for blac2mail--m,c3 less t3eir act,al ,se--!o,ld open 3im and 3is entire re#ime to a de+astatin# response b4 t3e B.8. 73ile 8addam is t3oro,#3l4 e+ilH 3e is abo+e all a po!er-3,n#r4 s,r+i+or.Q 734 does t3e president feelH as2s Ybi#nie! 1rGeGins2iH t3at Qdeterrence doesnPt !or2H !3en it !or2ed !it3 s,c3 m,rdero,sH dan#ero,s t4rants as 8talinH as "ao Yedon#. It !or2ed d,rin# t3e C,ban missile crisisQR 10
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)3e first problem !it3 t3is ar#,ment is its nostal#ia for containment and n,clear deterrence. =i2e all nostal#iaH especiall4 Cold 7ar nostal#iaH it depends on a memor4 t3at is 3i#3l4 selecti+e. (nd f,GG4. It presents
t3e international relations of t3e second 3alf of t3e 29t3 cent,r4 as simple and stable. )3e4 !ere not. 7e came more t3an once to t3e brin2 of (rma#eddon. In @ctober 16'2H !e came to !it3in a sin#le mis;,d#mentH a sin#le miscomm,nicationH per3aps e+en a sin#le o+erea#er fi#3ter pilot. Ead one t3in# #one !ron#--for exampleH 3ad :enned4 not i#nored a partic,larl4 belli#erent messa#e from :3r,s3c3e+ !3ile ac2no!led#in# a more conciliator4 s,bse*,ent messa#e--t3e Bnited 8tates and t3e 8o+iet Bnion mi#3t !ell 3a+e red,ced eac3 ot3er to a smo2in# r,in. )3e fact t3at !e escaped is not an ar#,ment for t3e stabilit4 of deterrence. It is an ar#,ment for l,c2. IndeedH it is an ar#,ment for tr4in# to escape deterrence and find st,rdier #ro,nd for 3,man s,r+i+al. If t3e C,ban missile crisis is e+idence of t3e +irt,es of deterrenceH /od 3elp ,s. It bro,#3t ,s closer to t3e ab4ss t3an an4 e+ent in 3,man 3istor4H and co,ld +er4 !ell 3a+e ta2en ,s o+er 3ad t3e Bnited 8tates and t3e 8o+iet Bnion 3ad different leaders at t3e time. )3e !orld !ill not s,r+i+e more t3an a +er4 fe! missile-crisis e*,i+alents before someone ma2es a bl,nder t3at precipitates catastrop3ic n,clear !ar. &E)ECCENCE N@8)(=/IC8 also con+enientl4 for#et its debilitatin# ps4c3olo#ical effects. <or fift4 4earsH t3e peace of t3e !orld 3in#ed on a balance of terror. (s C3,rc3ill memorabl4 c3aracteriGed t3e central paradoxH Q8afet4 !ill be t3e st,rd4 c3ild of terrorH and s,r+i+al t3e t!in brot3er of anni3ilation.Q )error and paradox are not eas4 to li+e !it3. )o rest strate#ic stabilit4 on terror and paradox is to as2 a lot of a democratic societ4.
Prolif -%enario- ./ ?on+entional Deterren%e :or5s (2 of 2)

Assured destruction doesnt scare rogue states and terrorists!
/anter 02
(Ca4mond-H (,#,st 10H )3e &etroit Ne!sH IYesK Co#,e re#imes canPt be containedL precedents exist for 3ittin# E,sseinL 83o,ld B.8. la,nc3 a pre-empti+e !ar on Ira*RJH =exisL Macob)
(merica needs to la,nc3 a pre-empti+e attac2 beca,se t3e old Cold 7ar polic4 of containment and deterrence doesnPt !or2 !it3 ro#,e re#imes. 73ile deterrence seems applicable a#ainst /reat Po!ersH it is less applicable a#ainst ro#,e states and e+en less rele+ant a#ainst terrorist net!or2s. In M,neH President 1,s3
!isel4 mo+ed a!a4 from t3at doctrine in a 7est Point address to!ard a ne! pre+enti+e !ar doctrine. E+en d,rin# t3e Cold 7arH it !as ,nreasonable for (merica to ride o,t a first stri2eL smaller
ro#,e re#imes and terrorists are more li2el4 to stri2e first !it3 n,clear !eapons since t3e4 3a+e less to lose andH in t3e case of terroristsH less to fear from a retaliator4 stri2e.
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-tate disinte#ration -%enario

The Bush doctrine is the best way to minimi%e the risks of proliferation and (M* warfare during inevitable state disintegration!
@o!itt 09
(:en-H PreG F "a,rine Eotc32is 8r. <ello! O t3e Eoo+er Instit,tionH 8prin#H Eoo+er &i#estH I734 t3e 1,s3 &octrine "a2es 8enseJH T2H 3ttpK$$!!!.3oo+erdi#est.or#$932$;o!itt.3tmlL Macob) 1,s35s statements and 3is cabinet5s strate#4 3erald a radical re+ision of (merican forei#n polic4 and conse*,entl4 a radical re+ision in (merica5s #lobal role. )3e strate#4 appears to be based on t3ree pillarsK identification of t3e enem4H intimidation of t3e enem4 !it3 lan#,a#e and deplo4mentH andH !3en necessar4H t3e ,se of +iolence to eliminate t3e enem4. )3e &efense &epartment5s identification of possible 3ostile tar#ets and preempti+e-stri2e doctrine amo,nt to an operational strate#4 desi#ned to map and militaril4 respond to t3e +er4 different t4pes of +iolent t3reat emer#in# in t3e aftermat3 of t3e Cold 7ar. Z e+idence contin,es Z I belie+e t3e #ro!in# interest in empire 3as t!o so,rces. <irstH t3e ma;or p3enomenon in t3e post[Cold 7ar period 3as not been democratic transition b,t rat3er t3e realit4 of and potential for state disinte#ration. )3e 8o+iet BnionH
Y,#osla+iaH (f#3anistanH 8omaliaH 8ri =an2aH EaitiH and CGec3oslo+a2ia spea2 to t3e realit4. IndonesiaH Pa2istanH IndiaH C3inaH and se+eral ot3er nations spea2 to t3e potential. 8econdH and most importantH state disinte#ration is precededH accompaniedH and follo!ed b4 I!ildcat +iolenceJK +iolence !it3 m,ltipleH o+erlappin#H b,t !ea2l4 connected points of ori#in and or#aniGationL +iolent Imo+ements of ra#eJ t3at i#nore and el,de state bo,ndaries b,t t3at dra! on t3e reso,rces of and possibl4
29
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collaborate !it3 +ir,lentl4 anti-7estern statesL +iolent mo+ements t3at lac2 #lobal po!er b,t en;o4 #lobal reac3. 73at ma2es state disinte#ration partic,larl4 omino,s toda4 is t3e #en,ine possibilit4 t3at mo+ements of ra#e !ill combine t3e el,si+eness of !ildcat or#aniGation and +iolentl4 dispersed actions !it3 t3e compactness and destr,cti+eness of modern c3emicalH biolo#icalH and n,clear !eapons. )3e 1,s3 administration5s doctrineNimperial or notNis a positi+e response to t3e li2el4 proliferation of !ildcat +iolence in a context of state disinte#ration and dan#ero,sl4 ,npredictable states (s,c3 as Nort3 :orea and Ira*) t3at ma4 offer mo+ements of ra#e access to insidio,s !eapons. If t3e 1,s3 administration5s polic4 is one of identif4in#H intimidatin#H and possibl4 eliminatin# !ildcat +iolence !it3 #lobal reac3 and 3orrendo,s
conse*,encesH t3en I fa+or itNe+en if t3at effort incl,des ne! imperial notions of extraterritorialit4 and sp3eres of infl,ence (b,t notH except in t3e most exceptional of circ,mstancesH prolon#ed occ,pation of entire co,ntries).
/errorism -%enario (1 of 2)
A! /re-emption stops (M* terrorism by scaring states out of working with terrorists!
*addis 02
(Mo3n =e!is-H <eb. 'H Co,ncil on <orei#n CelationsH Inter+ie!H I1,s3 Pre-emption &octrine )3e "ost &ramatic Polic4 83ift 8ince Cold 7arJH Inter+ie!erK 1ernard /!ertGmanH Cons,ltin# EditorH 3ttpK$$!!!.cfr.or#$p,blication$'- $#addis.3tmlL Macob) (nd if 4o, as2 abo,t t3e o+erall ob;ecti+es of t3e strate#4H it seems to me t3at t3e pict,re is better and a #ood deal more s,ccessf,l. )3e lo#ic of t3e administration5s strate#4 3as been to sa4 t3at pre-emption is necessar4 to deal !it3 ad+ersaries li2e t3e 6$11 terrorists beca,se 4o, not onl4 3a+e to find t3ese people t3emsel+esH b,t 4o, also 3a+e to eit3er intimidate orH if necessar4H ta2e o,t t3ose states !3ic3 mi#3t 3a+e been s,pportin# s,c3 terrorists in t3e pastH t3e ass,mption bein# t3at terrorism can5t s,cceed !it3o,t some 2ind of state s,pport. Z e+idence contin,es Z )3is #ets bac2 to m4 point t3atH !3ile t3e exec,tion 3as been fla!edH in man4 !a4sH in partic,lar sit,ationsH one can ma2e t3e case t3at t3e o+erall UadministrationV strate#4 3as #one reasonabl4 !ell. <irst of allH !e 3a+e #one no!H t3an2 /od and cross fin#ersH for !ell o+er t!o 4ears !it3o,t an4 rec,rrences of !3at 3appened on 8eptember 11. (nd it is eas4 to lose si#3t of 3o! fearf,l all of ,s !ere t3at Ut3e e+ents ofV 8eptember 11 !ere simpl4 a prec,rsor for somet3in# m,c3 !orse t3at co,ld 3appen at an4 moment. 8o t3e +er4 fact t3at somet3in# m,c3 !orse 3as not 3appened so far is in some !a4 an indication t3at t3e lar#er strate#4 3as !or2ed. 8econdl4H it seems to me t3at t3e real #oal of t3e strate#4 3as been one t3at t3e administration cannot p,blicl4 ac2no!led#eK simpl4 to fri#3ten badl4 an4 state t3at mi#3t be t3in2in# abo,t s,pportin# terrorists in t3e f,t,re. I 21
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li2e to ,se t3e analo#4 t3at Ut3e strate#4V is a little bit li2e t3e par2in# si#ns t3at "a4or Ed :oc3 ,sed to 3a+e p,t ,p aro,nd Ne! Yor2 Cit4 Ut3at readVH I&on5t e+en t3in2 abo,t par2in# 3ere.J )3is is t3e administration5s ob;ecti+e !it3 t3e strate#4N I &on5t e+en t3in2 abo,t doin# !3at t3e )aliban did in 3arborin# al Saeda.J In t3at senseH t3e administration 3as been *,ite s,ccessf,l. It 3as forced Uc3an#es inV problematic states
!3ose intentions !e 3ad reason to do,btH li2e =ib4a and IranH and in Pa2istanH !3ic3 3ad a record of s,pportin# terrorism or s,ppl4in# !eapons of mass destr,ction to ot3ers. It is *,ite ob+io,s t3at ret3in2in# 3as 3appened in t3ese states. )3ere is e+en some ambi#,it4 abo,t t3e direction t3at 84ria !ill be ta2in#. 1,t clearl4H t3ere 3as been sober ret3in2in# in t3ese states abo,t t3e pl,ses and min,ses of #i+in# s,pport to terrorists. )3e !3ole contextH t3e !3ole center of #ra+it4 in t3e "iddle EastH in t3at senseH 3as s3ifted as a res,lt of t3e administration5s strate#4.
/errorism -%enario (2 of 2)
B! The impact is e0tinction!
.lexander 09
(Yona3-H Prof. F &irector O Inter-Bni+ersit4 for )errorism 8t,diesH (,#,st 20H 7as3in#ton )imesH I)errorism "4t3s and CealitiesJH =exisL Macob) =ast !ee2Ps br,tal s,icide bombin#s in 1a#3dad and Mer,salem 3a+e once a#ain ill,strated dramaticall4 t3at t3e international comm,nit4 failedH t3,s far at leastH to ,nderstand t3e ma#nit,de and implications of t3e terrorist t3reats to t3e +er4 s,r+i+al of ci+iliGation itself. E+en t3e Bnited 8tates and Israel 3a+e for decades tended to re#ard terrorism as a mere tactical n,isance or irritant rat3er t3an a critical strate#ic c3allen#e to t3eir national sec,rit4 concerns. It is not s,rprisin#H t3ereforeH t3at on 8eptember 11H 2991H (mericans !ere st,nned b4 t3e ,nprecedented tra#ed4 of 16 al Saeda terrorists stri2in# a de+astatin# blo! at t3e center of t3e nationPs commercial and militar4 po!ers. =i2e!iseH Israel and its citiGensH despite t3e collapse of t3e @slo (#reements of 1663 and n,mero,s acts of terrorism tri##ered b4 t3e second intifada t3at be#an almost t3ree 4ears a#oH are still Qs3oc2edQ b4 eac3 s,icide attac2 at a time of intensi+e diplomatic efforts to re+i+e t3e morib,nd peace process t3ro,#3 t3e no! re+o2ed cease-fire arran#ements U3,dnaV. 734 are t3e Bnited 8tates and IsraelH as !ell as scores of ot3er co,ntries affected b4 t3e ,ni+ersal ni#3tmare of modern terrorism s,rprised b4 ne! terrorist Qs,rprisesQR
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)3ere are man4 reasonsH incl,din# mis,nderstandin# of t3e manifold specific factors t3at contrib,te to terrorismPs expansionH s,c3 as lac2 of a ,ni+ersal definition of terrorismH t3e reli#ioniGation of politicsH do,ble standards of moralit4H !ea2 p,nis3ment of terroristsH and t3e exploitation of t3e media b4 terrorist propa#anda and ps4c3olo#ical !arfare. Bnli2e t3eir 3istorical co,nterpartsH contemporar4 terrorists 3a+e introd,ced a ne! scale of +iolence in terms of con+entional and ,ncon+entional t3reats and impact.
)3e internationaliGation and br,taliGation of c,rrent and f,t,re terrorism ma2e it clear !e 3a+e entered an (#e of 8,per )errorism Ue.#. biolo#icalH c3emical, radiolo#icalH n,clear and c4ber] !it3 its serio,s implications concernin# nationalH re#ional and #lobal sec,rit4 concerns.
/errorism- Pre-emption -ol+es (1 of ,)

The Bush doctrine is the only way to win the ()T!
:einber#er ) -%'!eiAer 01
(Caspar-H fmr. &efense 8ecretar4 (d,rin# t3e Cea#an administration)H Peter-H Cesearc3 fello! O t3e Eoo+er Instit,tionH 8ept. 24H B.8.(. )oda4H I...b,t !eP+e defeated terrorists beforeJH =exisL Macob)
can be deterred. In (pril 160'H t3e B8( str,c2 tar#ets in =ib4a and named East /erman4 as a terrorist base in li#3t of attac2s on (merican ser+icemen in E,rope. (ccordin# to secret East /erman intelli#ence files a mont3 after t3e first attac2H t3e 8tasi became a!are t3at (b, Nidal !as plannin# anot3er attac2. 1efore t3e4 mi#3t 3a+e t,rned a blind e4eH b,t t3is time 8tasi officials !rote t3is memoK Q7e s3o,ld point o,t t3at an4 ne! terrorist actsH no matter !3at t3eir moti+ationH !o,ld onl4 pla4 into t3e 3ands of t3e Cea#an administration and !o,ld allo! 7as3in#ton to p,rs,e more acti+el4 its polic4 of ,sin# force a#ainst so+erei#n states and national-liberation mo+ements ,nder t3e slo#an of its battle a#ainst terrorism.Q
(ccordin# to Mo3n :oe3ler in 3is boo2 8tasiK )3e Bntold 8tor4 of t3e East /erman 8ecret PoliceH
1,t terrorists
8tasi operati+es t3is time 3alted t3e attac2 o,t of fear of (merican reprisals.
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)3e reason deterrence failed in 8ept. 11Ps attac2s is bot3 complex and tro,blin#. 1in =aden and 3is sponsors seem to 3a+e concl,ded t3at t3e Bnited 8tates !as incapable of effecti+el4 and forcef,ll4 respondin# to a terror attac2. It !as based in part on t3eir experience. (fter t3e 1660 bombin# of B.8. embassies in (fricaH bin =aden and 3is sponsors s,ffered onl4 mild retaliation from t3e Clinton administrationK a fe! cr,ise-missile stri2es and bl,nt lan#,a#e. )3e4 also no do,bt loo2ed at t3e sit,ation in Ira*H !3ere 8addam E,ssein is almost dail4 +iolatin# promises 3e made after t3e Persian /,lf 7ar. Eere t3e Bnited 8tates 3as responded b4 la,nc3in# a fe! ineffecti+e airstri2es. 1ased on t3ese !ea2 responsesH t3e c,lprits seem to 3a+e concl,ded t3at (merica is a paper ti#erH decadent and lac2in# in moral co,ra#e. )3is !as t3e same sort of del,sion t3at Mapanese leaders operated ,nder !3en t3e4 attac2ed Pearl Earbor in 1641. (nd as e+idenced t3is time b4 t3e steel4 response of t3e 1,s3 administrationH Con#ress
and t3e (merican peopleH t3is !as clearl4 a miscalc,lation. 1,t t3erein lies t3e tro,ble !it3 deterrenceK It depends on 3o! 4o,r enemies c3oose to see 4o,H not 3o! 4o, see 4o,rself. If t3ese 3orrific attac2s teac3 ,s an4t3in#H it is t3at !e need to respond to acts of terror and
a##ression -- 3o!e+er minor -- !it3 o+er!3elmin# force.

In 160'H t3e B.8. not onl4 !ent after t3e terroristsH it also directl4 str,c2 t3eir sponsorH "oammar /ad3afi. M,st to #et t3e point acrossH !e made it personal. )3e 1,s3 administration seems to 3a+e m,c3 t3e same in mind t3is timeH
stri2in# not onl4 at bin =adenH b,t also at 3is sponsors. If it doesH !e !ill 3a+e t3e first critical polic4 in place to !in t3e !ar on terrorism. M,st as t3e )r,man &octrine and t3e Cea#an &octrine !on t3e Cold 7arH t3is ne! Q1,s3 &octrineQ co,ld 3elp !in t3e !ar on terrorism.

There is no viable alternative to pre-emption- the nature of status quo threats demands it
:ortAel 02
(=arr4 ".-H ?.P. F &irector of t3e :at3r4n F 83elb4 C,llom &a+is Instit,te for International 8t,dies O )3e Eerita#e <o,ndationH "arc3 1-H )estimon4 to t3e (rmed 8er+ices Committee of t3e B.8. Eo,se of Cepresentati+esH ICombatin# 7eapons of "ass &estr,ctionJH 3ttpK$$!!!.3erita#e.or#$Cesearc3$National8ec,rit4$tst931-94a.cfmL Macob) )3e dan#ers posed to t3e (merican people and o,r allies b4 s,c3 !eapons 3a+e m,ltiplied si#nificantl4 in t3e past fe! 4ears. "ilitar4 meas,res s,c3 as deterrence and political means li2e arms controlH !3ic3 pro+ed reasonabl4 effecti+e d,rin# t3e Cold 7arH are more diffic,lt in a !orld !it3 m,ltiple actors t3at 3a+eH see2H and ma4 ,se s,c3 !eapons. )3e existence of non-state actors t3at f,nction on a #lobal scaleH s,c3 as al-SaedaH t3at ma4 #ain
access to !eapons of mass destr,ction si#nificantl4 c3an#es t3e 3abit,al calc,l,s of deterrence and arms controlH partic,larl4 beca,se for t3e terrorists neit3er re#ime s,r+i+al nor t3e s,r+i+al of a state is in+ol+ed in t3eir decision calc,l,s. IndeedH e+en personal s,r+i+al is often not a consideration.
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In toda45s t3reat en+ironment a
s,ccessf,l polic4 for combatin# !eapons of mass destr,ction addresses t3e most serio,s dan#er to t3e peace of t3e !orld and t3e sec,rit4 of t3e Bnited 8tates. (s President 1,s3 pointed o,t
in a 73ite Eo,se fact s3eet on <ebr,ar4 11H 2994H c3emicalH biolo#icalH or n,clear !eapons in t3e 3ands of terrorists or ro#,e re#imes co,ld brin# catastrop3ic 3arm to (merica and to t3e international comm,nit4. &iplomatic meas,res and nonproliferation re#imes alone !ill ne+er be s,fficient to c,rb t3ese dan#ero,s t3reatsL t3e4 lac2 t3e t3reat of force. Z e+idence contin,es Z Preemption 3as al!a4s been an option for addressin# a circ,mstance !3ere t3e ris2 of attac2 is #ro!in#. (s earl4 as (pril 2992H )3e Eerita#e <o,ndation s,##ested in its p,blication Iss,es 2992 t3at t3e 1,s3 (dministration adopt a polic4 of
preemptin# imminent attac2s b4 terrorists or states !3en t3ere is certain 2no!led#e t3at !eapons of mass destr,ction ma4 be ,sed or t3at an attac2 is imminent. )3e ri#3t to do so is not a ne! principle in international la!. It 3as been an
in3erent ri#3t for cent,ries t3at nations need not s,ffer an attac2 before t3e4 can la!f,ll4 defend t3emsel+es a#ainst imminent dan#er of attac2. "a2in# t3is an explicit strate#4 and polic4 3i#3li#3ts t3is option beca,se of t3e ,ni*,e t3reats posed b4 ro#,e states or terrorists !3o ma4 be armed !it3 !eapons of mass destr,ction. ( polic4 of preemption re*,ires Icertain 2no!led#e.J Ima#ine if 4o, !ill t3at it is &ecember 'H 1641H and Bnited 8tates s3ips and aircraft obser+e t3e assembled Mapanese fleet la,nc3in# armed aircraft off t3e s3ores of Ea!aii. No rational person !o,ld ar#,e t3at attac2in# t3ose Mapanese aircraft and s3ips before t3e4 reac3ed (merican s3ores !o,ld 3a+e +iolated international la!. )3e fail,re of t3e (merican intelli#ence comm,nit4 to acc,ratel4 portra4 t3e scopeH nat,re and location of Ira*5s !eapons of mass destr,ction pro#ram is a serio,s matter t3at Con#ress is in+esti#atin#. 1eca,se a polic4 of preemption is so dependent on acc,rate intelli#enceH t3e international comm,nit4 !ill *,estion
b,t t3e explicit statement of s,c3 a polic4 ser+es as a notice to terrorists and ro#,e states t3at t3e4 cannot prepare an attac2 a#ainst (merica !it3 imp,nit4. /i+en t3e potential scope of s,c3 an attac2H preemption becomes a more important tool. )3e President is ;,stified in appl4in# preempti+e militar4 force to fi#3t t3e !ar on terrorism. <ail,re to do so in spite of a t3reat of imminent attac2 !o,ld be to i#nore t3e lessons learned from 8eptember 11 re#ardin# t3e nat,re of t3e t3reats a#ainst (merica in t3e 21st cent,r4. . &eterrence alone is not s,fficient to s,ppress a##ression. 1ot3 @sama bin =aden and t3e )aliban co,ld 3a+e predicted t3at t3e Bnited 8tates !o,ld respond to t3eir attac2sL 4etH t3e4 acted an4!a4. . (ttac2s can occ,r !it3 little or no !arnin#. )3e emer#ence of #lobal comm,nicationsH ad+ances in tec3nolo#4H and t3e #lobaliGation of terrorism 3a+e si#nificantl4 decreased t3e time it ta2es not onl4 for a potential t3reat to be identifiedH b,t also for t3at t3reat to emer#e as an act of a##ression. . )3e ,se of a !eapon of mass destr,ction is reasonabl4 li2el4. @n 8eptember 11H (mericans !ere 2illed on a massi+e scale. Eostile entities increasin#l4 +ie! !eapons of mass destr,ction (7"&) as political assets.
t3e le#itimac4 of an4 f,t,re preempti+e action b4 t3e Bnited 8tates (or an4 ot3er nation)H
. ( deadl4 s4ner#4 is created !3en 3ostile state and non-state a#ents conspire. 73ile 3ostile states contin,e to t3reaten (merica and its interestsH t3e t3reat of non-state actorsH s,c3 as al-SaedaH is #ro!in#. )3e dan#er increases !3en states and non-state actors !or2 to#et3er. 8tates 3a+e reso,rcesNincl,din# territor4H financesH an international diplomatic presenceH and tradeNt3at non-state actors do not 3a+e. @n t3e ot3er 3andH non-state actors are able to operate #loball4 and can act lar#el4 ,ndetected.

3orcibly disarming states of nuclear weapons is the only way to prevent a terrorist attack that will destroy global stability and collapse American primacy!
<raut'ammer 02
(C3arles-H 7inner of t3e W0- P,litGer PriGeH Common!ealt3 8c3olar in Politics O @xfordH 7interH )3e National InterestH I)3e Bnipolar "oment Ce+isitedJH =exisL Macob)
)3e (merican 3e#emon 3as no #reat po!er enemiesH an 3istorical oddit4 of t3e first order. Yet it does face a serio,s t3reat to its dominanceH indeed to its essential sec,rit4. It comes from a so,rce e+en more 3istoricall4 oddK an arc3ipela#o of ro#,e states (some connected !it3 transnational terrorists) !ieldin# !eapons of mass destr,ction. )3e t3reat is not tri+ial. It is t3e sin#le #reatest dan#er to t3e Bnited 8tates beca,seH for all of (mericaPs dominanceH and for all of its recentl4 demonstrated resilienceH t3ere is one t3in# it mi#3t not s,r+i+eK decapitation. )3e detonation of a doGen n,clear !eapons in ma;or (merican citiesH or t3e spreadin# of
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smallpox or ant3rax t3ro,#3o,t t3e #eneral pop,lationH is an existential t3reat. It is per3aps t3e onl4 realistic t3reat to (merica as a f,nctionin# 3e#emonH per3aps e+en to (merica as a f,nctionin# modern societ4. QIt is of co,rse banal to sa4 t3at modern tec3nolo#4 3as s3r,n2 t3e !orld. 1,t t3e ob+io,s corollar4H t3at in a s3r,n2en !orld t3e di+ide bet!een re#ional s,perpo!ers and #reat po!ers is radicall4 narro!edH is rarel4 dra!n. "issiles s3rin2 distance. N,clear (or c3emical or biolo#ical) de+ices m,ltipl4 po!er. 1ot3 can be bo,#3t at mar2et.
Conse*,entl4 t3e #eopolitical map is irre+ocabl4 altered. <ift4 4ears a#oH /erman4-centrall4 locatedH 3i#3l4 ind,strial and 3ea+il4 pop,lated-co,ld pose a t3reat to !orld sec,rit4 and to t3e ot3er #reat po!ers. It !as inconcei+able t3at a relati+el4 small "iddle Eastern state !it3 an almost entirel4 imported ind,strial base co,ld do an4t3in# more t3an t3reaten its nei#3bors. )3e central tr,t3 of t3e comin# era is t3at t3is is no lon#er t3e caseK relati+el4 smallH perip3eral and bac2!ard states !ill be able to emer#e rapidl4 as t3reats not onl4 to re#ionalH b,t to !orldH sec,rit4.Q-)3e Bnipolar "oment =i2e ,nipolarit4H t3is is 3istoricall4 ,ni*,e. !md are not ne!H nor are ro#,e states. )3eir con;,nction is. 7e 3a+e 3ad
fift4 4ears of experience !it3 n,clear !eapons-b,t in t3e context of bipolarit4H !3ic3 #a+e t3e s4stem a predictableH if perilo,sH stabilit4. 7e 3a+e ;,st no! entered an era in !3ic3 t3e capacit4 for inflictin# mass deat3H and t3,s posin# a t3reat bot3 to !orld peace and to t3e dominant po!erH resides in smallH perip3eral states. 73at does t3is con;,nction of ,ni*,e circ,mstances-,nipolarit4 and t3e proliferation of terrible !eapons-mean for (merican forei#n polic4R )3at t3e first and most ,r#ent tas2 is protection from t3ese !eapons. )3e catal4st for
t3is realiGation !as a#ain 8eptember 11. )3ro,#3o,t t3e 1669sH it 3ad been ass,med t3at !md posed no emer#enc4 beca,se traditional concepts of deterrence !o,ld 3old. 8eptember 11 re+ealed t3e possibilit4 of f,t,re !md-armed enemies bot3 ,ndeterrable and potentiall4 ,ndetectable. )3e 6$11 s,icide bombers !ere ,ndeterrableL t3e a,t3or of t3e s,bse*,ent ant3rax attac2s 3as pro+en ,ndetectable. )3e possible alliance of ro#,e states !it3 s,c3 ,ndeterrables and
,ndetectables-and t3e possible transfer to t3em of !eapons of mass destr,ction-presents a ne! strate#ic sit,ation t3at demands a ne! strate#ic doctrine. Q(n4 sol,tion !ill 3a+e to incl,de t3ree elementsK den4in#H disarmin#H and defendin#. <irstH !e !ill 3a+e to
de+elop a ne! re#imeH similar to cocom (Coordinatin# Committee on Export Controls) to den4 4et more 3i#3 tec3nolo#4 to s,c3 states. 8econdH t3ose states t3at ac*,ire s,c3 !eapons an4!a4 !ill 3a+e to s,bmit to strict o,tside control or ris2 bein# p34sicall4 disarmed. ( final element m,st be t3e de+elopment of antiballistic missile and air defense s4stems to defend a#ainst t3ose !eapons t3at do escape 7estern control or preemption. . . . )3ere is no alternati+e to confrontin#H deterrin# andH if necessar4H disarmin# states t3at brandis3 and ,se !eapons of mass destr,ction. (nd t3ere is no one to do t3at b,t t3e Bnited 8tatesH bac2ed b4 as man4 allies as !ill ;oin t3e endea+or.Q-t3e Bnipolar "oment

The pre-emption doctrine deters terrorism- abandoning it will only embolden them!
(roo5es 02
(Peter-H 8r. <ello! National 8ec,rit4 (ffairs F C3,n# M,-Y,n# <ello! for Polic4 8t,dies O t3e Eerita#e <o,ndationH (,#,st 2H )3e Eerita#e <o,ndation PressK Commentar4H I83o! of <orceJH 3ttpK$$!!!.3erita#e.or#$Press$Commentar4$ed909294a.cfmL Macob) Ce+i+in# PreemptionK 8ome 3a+e s,##ested t3at t3e idea of preemption died !it3 t3e re+elation of t3e intelli#ence fail,res o+er 6$11 and Ira*i 7"&. 1,t !ord t3at t3e arro! of preemption 3as +anis3ed from o,r *,i+er is ;,st t3e t3in# o,r enemiesH especiall4 t3e terroristsH !ant to 3ear. (merica m,st be able to stri2e first.
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@f co,rseH acc,rate intelli#ence is a m,stH b,t it ma2es no sense for t3is nation to ta2e t3e first p,nc3 li2e !e did on 6$11. 1ein# able to m,ster t3e po!er of se+eral aircraft carrier tas2 forces at almost a momentPs notice is a tremendo,s complication and deterrence to t3ose !3o t3reaten ,s. )3e aircraft carrier pro+ides (mericaPs polic4ma2ers !it3 69H999 tons of cold-steel B.8. diplomac4. 7it3o,t firin# a
sin#le s3otH t3e presence of 4. acres of floatin#H so+erei#n (merican territor4 off t3e coast 3as made more t3an one forei#n leader t3in2 t!ice abo,t actin# foolis3l4. (t t3e onset of international crisesH (merican presidents
often ,tter t3e !orried !ordsH Q73ere are t3e carriersRQ )3e Na+4Ps for!ard-leanin# <CP #i+es t3e commander-in-c3ief t3e opport,nit4 to 3a+e na+al forces a+ailable more rapidl4 t3an e+er before. (nd t3o,#3 t3is #reat nation s3o,ld al!a4s be slo! to !arH !3en t3e president needs a bi# stic2H itPs #ood to 2no! t3e carriers !ill be t3ere.
/re-emption k prevent (M* terrorist attacks

-pen%er 09
(Mac2-H 8r. Polic4 (nal4st O :at3r4n and 83elb4 C,llom &a+is Instit,te for International 8t,dies O t3e Eerita#e <o,ndationH "arc3 16H 7eb"emoH I734 Preemption is Necessar4JH T22'H 3ttpK$$!!!.3erita#e.or#$Cesearc3$"iddleEast$!m22'.cfmL Macob) )3e realit4 of international life in t3e 21st cent,r4 is t3at nations or or#aniGations t3at !is3 to c3allen#e (merica or 7estern po!ers increasin#l4 are see2in# !eapons of mass destr,ction to ac3ie+e t3eir political ob;ecti+es. )3e onl4 effecti+e response ma4 be to destro4 t3ose capabilities before t3e4 are ,sed. )3e tenet of traditionalH c,stomar4 international la! t3at allo!s for t3is pre+enti+e or preempti+e action is Qanticipator4 self-defense.Q Eistoricall4H t3e Bnited 8tates 3as asserted its ri#3t to anticipator4 self-defenseK . In 16'2H President Mo3n :enned4 ordered a bloc2ade of C,ba d,rin# t3e C,ban missile crisis. . &,rin# t3e 1609sH President Conald Cea#an in+o2ed t3is ri#3t at least t!iceK firstH in 1603H orderin# an in+asion of /renadaH and a#ain in 160'H orderin# t3e bombin# of terrorist sites in =ib4a. =earnin# <rom t3e 8eptember 11 (ttac2s Complacenc4 is not acceptable. B.8. a,t3orities 2ne! of t3e t3reat posed b4 @sama bin =adenH 4et did not3in#. 1. &eterrence alone is not s,fficient to s,ppress a##ression. 2. (ttac2s can occ,r !it3 little or no !arnin#. In t3is !orld of drasticall4 s3ortened time linesH it is essential
t3at t3e President 3a+e t3e a,t3orit4 to act decisi+el4H in s3ort orderH to defeat a##ressors !3en a preponderance of information points to a t3reat of imminent attac2. 73ile t3e President did not 2no! t3e 8eptember
11 attac2s !o,ld 3appenH t3ere !as ample e+idence t3at t3reats to t3e Bnited 8tates !o,ld li2el4 emer#e from (f#3anistan. 3. )3e ,se of a !eapon of mass destr,ction is reasonabl4 li2el4. Eostile entities increasin#l4 +ie! !eapons of mass destr,ction as political assets. 4. ( deadl4 s4ner#4 is created !3en 3ostile state and non-state a#ents conspire. )3e realit4 of t3e 21st cent,r4 is t3at a state li2e Ira* can 3arness its reso,rces to de+elop a !eapon of mass destr,ction and coll,de !it3 non-state actors to deli+er t3at !eapon. . )3e f,t,re en+isioned b4 (mericaPs enemies is incompatible !it3 B.8. sec,rit4. @n 8eptember 11H t3e idea t3at 3ostile re#imes and t3e Bnited 8tates co,ld sim,ltaneo,sl4 p,rs,e t3eir respecti+e interests lost all credibilit4. It !as clear t3at (mericaPs enemies !ere !illin# to ,se ,npro+o2ed +iolence to ac3ie+e t3eir ob;ecti+es. )3e Bnited 8tates co,ld no lon#er postpone actin# a#ainst terrorists and nations t3at s,pport t3em.
/errorism- Pre-emption -ol+es (, of ,)

(s t3e nat,re of t3e t3reats to t3e Bnited 8tates c3an#esH so m,st t3e nationPs approac3 to its defense.
)o f,lfill 3is constit,tional responsibilit4H t3e President m,st 3a+e t3e flexibilit4 to address t3ese t3reats as t3e4 emer#eL andH #i+en t3e proliferation of !eapons of mass destr,ction b4 nations 3ostile to (mericaH in an increasin# n,mber of casesH t3is ma4 re*,ire appl4in# militar4 po!er before t3e Bnited 8tates or its interests are str,c2. In sit,ations !3ere t3e e+idence demonstrates o+er!3elmin#l4 t3at be3a+ioral trendsH capabilit4H and moti+es all point to imminent t3reatH it ma4 be necessar4 for t3e President to attac2 preempti+el4.
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/errorism- ./ /errorists %an7t be deterred

.ven if some terrorists are irrational and suicidal their leaders are not- proves there is still hope for deterence
:einber#er ) -%'!eiAer 01
(Caspar-H fmr. &efense 8ecretar4 (d,rin# t3e Cea#an administration)H Peter-H Cesearc3 fello! O t3e Eoo+er Instit,tionH 8ept. 24H B.8.(. )oda4H I...b,t !eP+e defeated terrorists beforeJH =exisL Macob)
)3e con+enient ans!er is t3at deterrence failed beca,se t3ese are s,icidal madmen !3o fail to t3in2 rationall4. 1,t t3e4 3a+e s3o!n #reat c,nnin# and lon#-ran#e plannin# -- and bin =aden 3as no deat3 !is3. Ee 3as ne+er c3osen to carr4 o,t one of 3is s,icide missionsL insteadH 3e orc3estrates and exec,tes complex and !ell-t3o,#3t-o,t strate#4.
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./ ations !ill use (us' do%trine Bustifies !ars 3; (1 of 2)

4- *ouble bind- either A! $ations go to war irrespective of international legitimacy so precedents set by the !"! dont matter!
;ieber ) ;iber 09
(:eir (.-H (ssist. Prof. of Poli 8ci O B. of Notre &ameH Cebert M.-H Prof. of /o+. F <orei#n 8er+ice O /eor#eto!n B.H (pril 1H &ail4 Ne!sH I)3e 1,s3 national sec,rit4 strate#4JH 3ttpK$$!!!.dail4ne!s.l2$2993$94$91$fea91.3tmlL Macob)
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@t3er critics 3a+e ar#,ed t3at t3e 1,s3 N88 #oes !ell be4ond e+en t3e ri#3t to anticipator4 self-defense t3at 3as been commonl4 interpreted to flo! from (rticle 1 of t3e BN C3arterH and t3,s t3e 1,s3 strate#4 !ill ,ndermine international la! and lead ot3er states to ,se B.8. polic4 as a pretext for a##ression. )3e most common examples are t3at t3e broad interpretation of le#itimate pre-emption co,ld lead C3ina to attac2 )ai!anH or India to attac2 Pa2istan. )3is lo#ic is not compellin#H 3o!e+erH as t3ese states are not c,rrentl4 constrained from ta2in# action b4 an4 norm a#ainst pre-emptionH and t3,s !ill not be emboldened b4 r3etorical s3ifts in B.8. polic4.
)5 B! International legitimacy is key and the nations in question wont get it! All their evidence that indicates the world hates the Bush doctrine supercharges this argument!
Efron ) :illiams 02
(8onni-H 8taff 7riter for =.(. )imesH Carol M.-H 8taff 7riter for =.(. )imesH 8ept. 26H )3e CecordH I8tri2e firstH tal2 laterL 7ill preempti+e attac2 polic4 3elp or 3,rt B.8. interestsRJH =exisL Macob) ( senior administration official dismissed t3e idea t3at C,ssia or India co,ld credibl4 in+o2e t3e 1,s3 doctrine to la,nc3 preempti+e stri2es on C3ec3n4a or :as3mir. QIt isnPt #oin# to be considered a le#itimate ar#,ment if it is clearl4 a co+er for na2ed a##ressionHQ t3e official said. Q(nd t3at is a ;,d#ment t3at ... t3e !orld comm,nit4 !ill easil4 ma2e in a case !3ere t3erePs eit3er an
,nderl4in# political disp,te t3at co,ld be resol+ed ... or !3ere t3ere are ot3er means b4 !3ic3 to resol+e t3e conflict.Q
6- And if nations were ever held back from initiating a pre-emptive war by international norms thats only because the !"! was there to enforce those norms- no reason it wouldnt continue to do so!
"ura+%'i5 02
(Mos3,a-H Cesident 8c3olar O t3e (merican Enterprise Instit,te for P,blic Polic4 Cesearc3H &ec.) @ne mi#3t c3allen#e aspects of t3e en,merated criteriaH b,t t3e claim t3at 1,s3 3as so,#3t an ,nlimited !rit for preempti+e action is nonsense. "ore reasonable is t3e fear t3at ot3ers mi#3t borro! t3e doctrine of preemption for t3eir o!nH less sa+or4 p,rposes. 8ome statesH no do,btH !ill tr4 to do precisel4 t3at. 1,t (to anticipate some!3at t3e t3ird ob;ection) t3ere is less ca,se for alarm 3ere t3an meets t3e e4eH for t3e fear rests on t3e ass,mption t3at
international la! acts as a s,bstantial barrier to misbe3a+ior b4 states. In tr,t3H international la! is not selfenforcin#H and ser+es as a barrier onl4 insofar as statesH meanin# ,s,all4 t3e Bnited 8tatesH are !illin# to enforce it. In practiceH miscreant nations ro,tinel4 cloa2 t3eir actions in sp,rio,s claims of self-defense or of ot3er ri#3ts ens3rined in la!. It is not t3e cle+erness of t3eir ar#,ments b,t rat3er t3e !illin#ness of ot3ers to bear t3e b,rdens of co,nteractin# t3em t3at determines !3at t3e4 !ill #et a!a4 !it3.
./ ations !ill use (us' do%trine Bustifies !ars 3; (2 of 2)

&- Their misinterpret the Bush *octrine- there are strict criteria and no one besides Iraq meets them!
Yor5 02
((nt3on4-H 8alon.comH 8ept. 24H I1,s3 doctrine ma2es !a+es o+erseasJH 3ttpK$$arc3i+e.salon.com$ne!s$feat,re$2992$96$24$ o+erseasXreaction$print.3tmlL Macob) 39
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Q(fter allH t3ere are doGens of ,npleasant re#imesH and some of t3em 3a+e !eapons of mass destr,ction. Is t3e Bnited 8tates ... #oin# to o+ert3ro! e+er4 one of t3emR (nd !3at is to pre+ent ot3er co,ntries from claimin# t3e ri#3t to preempti+e attac2R If 7as3in#ton can o+ert3ro! "r. E,ssein beca,se 3e mi#3t attac2 t3e Bnited 8tates one da4H !3at is to stopH sa4H India from attac2in# Pa2istanH or C3ina from attac2in# )ai!anR (s former Canadian ambassador :imon ?alas2a2is p,t it on t3ese pa#es t3e ot3er da4H P,nilateral pre-empti+e !ar in t3e name of national interest opens ,p a PandoraPs box m,c3 more dan#ero,s t3an t3e problem it addresses.P Q)3at !o,ld certainl4 be tr,e if 7as3in#tonPs ne! doctrine !ere as s!eepin# as t3e !orriers sa4. )3an2f,ll4H it is not. No B.8. leader is claimin# t3e ri#3t to o+ert3ro! e+er4 re#ime t3at 7as3in#ton 3appens to disli2e or t3at 3appens to disli2e t3e Bnited 8tates. No matter 3o! nast4 t3e4 ma4 be to t3eir o!n peopleH no one is tal2in# abo,t ,nseatin# Cobert ",#abe of Yimbab!e or e+en <idel Castro of C,ba. 734R 1eca,se t3e4 pose no t3reat to international peace. E*,all4H no one in 7as3in#ton is tal2in# abo,t ta2in# on C3ina or India ;,st beca,se t3e4 possess n,clear !eapons. Q73at t3e (mericans are tal2in# abo,t is somet3in# far more limited. Bnder t3e emer#in# 1,s3
doctrineH t3e Bnited 8tates !o,ld reser+e t3e ri#3t to ta2e pre-empti+e action a#ainst a 3ostile re#ime if it (a) bac2edH 3arbored or conspired !it3 terroristsL (b) 3ad s3o!n clear a##ressi+e intentL and (c) 3ad ac*,ired or !as consistentl4 tr4in# to ac*,ire !eapons of mass m,rder. Q?er4 fe! re#imes are #,ilt4 on all t3ree co,nts. In factH onl4 one c,rrentl4 is. Ira* 3as (a) bac2edH 3arbored
and conspired !it3 terrorists for more t3an 29 4ears ((b, NidalH one of t3e !orldPs leadin# terroristsH recentl4 met 3is end in 1a#3dad after li+in# t3ere for man4 4ears)L (b) made !ar a#ainst t!o nei#3bors -- Iran in t3e 1609s and :,!ait in 1669L and (c) spent billions of dollars tr4in# to ac*,ire !eapons of mass m,rderH s,cceedin# in t3e case of c3emical and biolo#ical !eapons and comin# close in t3e case of n,clear !eapons.
./ ations !ill use (us' do%trine Bustifies !ars- Ctn 1.

More ev1anson 02
(?ictor &a+is-H NC@ Contrib,torH 8ept. 29H IIra*i Interro#atoriesJH 3ttpK$$nationalre+ie!.com$3anson$3anson962992.aspL Macob)
1,t !onPt !e set a bad precedentR "a4be India or C,ssia !ill do t3e sameR
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)3is is t3e c,rrent con+entional !isdom repeated ad na,seam. 1,t
C,ssia !ent into C3ec3n4a re#ardless of o,r !is3es or example. (nd India !ill ma2e a decision to act on t3e basis of its o!n self-interestH not !3et3er t3e4 can cite QprecedentQ on t3e part of t3e Bnited 8tates. 8tron# nations e+al,ate t3eir options from calc,lations of self-preser+ation and moralit4 N c3oices not necessaril4 predicated on !3at t3e Bnited 8tates m,st do to ens,re its o!n sec,rit4.
./ ations !ill use (us' do%trine Bustifies !ars- Ctn 2

More ev<6l 02
(Mon-H /.@.P. 8enator from (riGonaH (,#,st 'H Eerita#e =ect,reH I)3e <,t,re of )ransatlantic CelationsJH T- 'H 3ttpK$$!!!.3erita#e.or#$Cesearc3$E,rope$3l- '.cfmL Macob)
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Nor s3o,ld !e allo! o,rsel+es to be paral4Ged b4 t3e ar#,ment t3at preempti+e mo+es b4 democracies !ill enco,ra#e similar mo+es b4 t3e li2es of C3ina a#ainstH sa4H )ai!an. In addition to t3e fact t3at )ai!an poses no t3reat to an4oneH !e 2no! t3at t4rants in t3e !orld are not #,ided b4 t3e examples t3at democracies setL rat3erH t3e4 calc,late !3et3er t3e democracies !ill let t3em #et a!a4 !it3 a##ression. 8tron# 7estern action infl,ences t3ese calc,lations.
./ Pre-emption 5ills P/
$/T is unraveling in the squo
-lateD%om 0,
(M,l4 22)
It is clear to e+en t3e most dedicated arms controllers t3at t3e NP) is fra4in# ,nder t3e press,re of modern tec3nolo#4 and an increasin#l4 anarc3ic international s4stem. )3e !orldPs most ro#,e re#imeH
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Nort3 :oreaH simpl4 abro#ated t3e treat4. Iran seems on its !a4 to ac*,irin# t3e bomb b4 exploitin# t3e treat4Ps loop3oles. )3e NP) isnPt *,ite obsoleteH b,t ma4be one !a4 to 2eep t3e n,clear #enie ,nder some control is occasionall4H
,na+oidabl4H to #o o,tside t3e treat4H to c,t separate deals !it3 +ario,s co,ntries t3at 3a+e #oneH or are abo,t to #oH n,clearN ne#otiations !it3 IranH sec,rit4 #,arantees for Nort3 :oreaH a #lobal partners3ip !it3 India.
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./ Pre-emption 5ills allian%es

$o 7- in the post cold war world we dont need lots of traditional military alliances' instead we ,ust need a few bilateral agreements centered around fighting terrorism
?arafano 09
(Mames Ma4-H 8r. Cesearc3 <ello! for National F Eomeland 8ec,rit4 O t3e :at3r4n and 83elb4 C,llom &a+is Instit,te for International 8t,dies O t3e Eerita#e <o,ndationH Eerita#e <o,ndation 1ac2#ro,nderH I(fter Ira*K =earnin# t3e 7arPs =essonsJH T1''4H 3ttpK$$!!!.3erita#e.or#$Cesearc3$"iddleEast$b#1''4.cfmL Macob) Cet3in2in# (mericaPs (lliances &,rin# @peration Ira*i <reedomH alliances and international or#aniGations t3at ser+ed !ell eno,#3 d,rin# t3e Cold 7ar !ere lar#el4 irrele+ant to t3e s,ccess in Ira*. )3e Bnited 8tates needed allies to !in t3e !arH b,t t3e4 !ere different in 2ind and c3aracter from t3ose relied on in t3e past. :e4 allies (in partic,larH Satar and :,!ait) offered sta#in# #ro,nds for B.8. forces. "ean!3ileH E,ropean nationsH o,tside t3e frame!or2 of N()@H pro+ided facilities t3at made possible t3e transit of most of t3e material and troops t3at fo,#3t in t3e !ar. )oda4H B.8. strate#ic needsH as operations in Ira* clearl4 reflectH are far more di+erse. (merica re*,ires partners t3at can 3elp ,s diss,adeH preemptH and defeat as !ell as deter t3reats--and it ma4 not al!a4s be clear lon# before3and !3ic3 co,ntries !ill be needed and !3en t3e4 !ill be needed. In additionH as diplomatic !ran#lin# before t3e !ar demonstratedH t3e Bnited 8tates appears increasin#l4 at odds !it3 man4 of its traditional allies re#ardin# t3e serio,sness of emer#in# sec,rit4 t3reats. Bnli2e t3e Cold 7arH t3ere is no ,ni+ersal consens,s on t3e nat,re of #lobal dan#ersH partic,larl4 !it3 respect to international terrorism and t3e spread of !eapons of mass destr,ction. E+er4one a#rees t3ese are bad t3in#sH b,t t3e a#reement ends on 3o! to 3andle t3ese problemsH as ill,strated b4 B.N. 8ec,rit4 Co,ncil debates o+er inspections in Ira*. &isa#reements bet!een strate#ic partners are not3in# ne!. "an4 for#etH for exampleH t3e intense strains t3at t3e decision to deplo4 B.8. #ro,nd-la,nc3ed cr,ise missiles and Pers3in# II missiles placed on t3e N()@ alliance in t3e late 16-9s.0 &ifferences bet!een allies are a fact of life. IndeedH absent a clear common t3reat li2e t3e 8o+iet BnionH and #i+en t3e diminis3in# defense contrib,tion of man4 t3e Bnited 8tatesP traditional E,ropean alliesH6 it is li2el4 t3at t3ere !ill be e+en less collecti+e decision-ma2in# and more fre*,ent disa#reements in t3e f,t,re. 73at is more important to note is t3at t3e basic p,rpose of (mericaPs militar4 alliances 3as c3an#ed. &,rin# t3e Cold 7arH for!ard-deplo4ed militar4 forces and m,ltinational coalitions !ere a trip!ire a#ainst 8o+iet expansionism. No! t3e4 ser+e a different role. In factH in t3e f,t,reH t3e best militar4 alliances ma4 primaril4 be a !ide ran#e of bilateral arran#ements t3at ens,re options for B.8. access to different parts of t3e !orld. ",ltinational and international or#aniGations mi#3t best ser+e primaril4 for diplomatic f,nctions foc,sed more on ens,rin# t3e appropriate be3a+ior of allies (s,c3 as s,pportin# nonproliferation re#imesH anti-terrorism meas,resH and 3,manitarian assistance) t3an on pro+idin# militar4 forces for #oin# after enemies.
Caldebate.com
./ Eiolates I ;a!
#ustomary international law' including the
Dale 02
(Eelle-H &irector of t3e &o,#las F 8ara3 (llison Center for <o. Po. 8t,dies O t3e Eerita#e <o,ndationH <eb. 2'H Eerita#e <o,ndation Press CoomH I73at5s !ron# !it3 self-defenseRJH 3ttpK$$!!!.3erita#e.or#$Press$Commentar4$ed93229'a.cfmL Macob) 1,t international la! permits nations to act in self-defenseH and t3is is !3at t3e Bnited 8tates did in Ira* (after tr4in# a decade of B.N. sanctions and containment). (ccordin# to (rticle 1 of t3e B.N. C3arterH INot3in# in t3e
!$! charter' allow for pre-emption
present c3arter s3all impair t3e in3erent ri#3t of indi+id,al or collecti+e self-defense in an armed attac2 a#ainst a "ember of t3e Bnited NationsH ,ntil t3e 8ec,rit4 Co,ncil 3as ta2en meas,res to maintain international peace and stabilit4.J
)3e realit4 is t3at in t3e 21st cent,r4 terrorists or states t3at !is3 to c3allen#e (merican po!er increasin#l4 see2 !eapons of mass destr,ction to ac3ie+e t3eir political ob;ecti+es. C,stomar4 international la! allo!s for t3is pre+enti+e or
preempti+e action as Qanticipator4 self-defense.Q
The pre-emption doctrine is neither wholly new nor inconsistent with international law!
1erita#e 3oundation 02
((pril 13H 7eb"emoH I)3e ?iabilit4 of International Ce#imes and Instit,tionsJH T4- H 3ttpK$$!!!.3erita#e.or#$Cesearc3$ International@r#aniGations$!m4- .cfmL Macob) Ce#ardin# t3e iss,e of preemptionH &r. Eolmes recalled t3e disc,ssion in t3e National 8ec,rit4 strate#4H !3ic3 reflects t3e B.8. 3as lon# maintained t3e option of preempti+e action to co,nter a s,fficient t3reat to national sec,rit4. Ee also noted t3at international la! 3as lon# reco#niGed nations need not s,ffer an attac2 before t3e4 ta2e action to defend a#ainst forces t3at present an imminent dan#er of attac2. 73at5s ne! is t3e realiGation follo!in# 6$11 abo,t t3e nex,s of 7eapons of "ass &estr,ction (I7"&J) and terrorists !3o !o,ld ,se t3em a#ainst ,sL and #o+ernments cannot simpl4 !ait ,ntil somet3in# 3orrendo,s 3appens to act. Ee obser+ed t3at t3e coalition response to 8addam E,ssein5s defiance of 3is international obli#ations !as pre+io,sl4 a,t3oriGed ,nder a series of 8ec,rit4 Co,ncil resol,tions and !as not in an4 sense a t3reat to t3e international s4stem.
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./ Pre-emption 5ills I -upport for t'e :F/

I support for ()T is irrelevent
(oot 02
("ax-H 8ept. 'H 7ee2l4 8tandard I=ess CespectH "ore 8,ccessJ) @NE @< M@EN <. :ECCYP8 most damnin# acc,sations a#ainst President 1,s3 is t3at 3e 3as made (merica a #lobal paria3H t3ereb4 ,nderc,ttin# t3e international cooperation !e need to !in t3e !ar on terrorism. :err4 pled#es to restore Q(mericaPs respect and leaders3ip so !e donPt 3a+e to #o it alone in t3e !orldQ and to Qreb,ild o,r alliances so !e can #et t3e terrorists before t3e4 #et ,s.Q@pinion polls s3o! t3at a lar#e n,mber of (mericans 3a+e bo,#3t t3is ar#,ment. )3e Pe! Cesearc3 Center recentl4 fo,nd t3at '- percent t3in2 t3e Bnited 8tates is less respected in t3e !orld t3an it ,sed to beH and 43 percent t3in2 t3is is a ma;or problem. ItPs eas4 to see !34 so man4 people !o,ld come to t3is concl,sionH since s,r+e4s do s3o! t3at B.8. pop,larit4 3as declined in man4 co,ntries d,rin# t3e past fo,r 4ears. @b+io,sl4 itPs betterH all t3in#s bein# e*,alH to be li2ed t3an disli2ed. :err4 3as a point !3en 3e acc,ses t3e 1,s3 administration of s*,anderin# some opport,nities to #arner s,pport abroad. )3e mis3andlin# of ),r2e4 before t3e Ira* !ar is a case in point. 73ere :err4 is dead !ron#H demonstrabl4 !ron#H is in s,##estin# t3at t3is ,npop,larit4 is ta2in# a 3ea+4 toll on (mericaPs efforts to !in t3e !ar on terrorism. (ct,all4H b4 all indicationsH t3e Bnited 8tates is no! #ettin# si#nificantl4 more cooperation in fi#3tin# terrorists t3an it e+er did in t3e balm4 da4s of 1ill ClintonH !3o did all t3e s!eet m,ltilateral t3in#s t3at :err4 endorsesN tr4in# to bro2er an Israeli-Palestinian accordH si#nin# t3e :4oto #lobal !armin# treat4H not offendin# Q@ld E,ropeQ or t3reatenin# t3e po!er of "iddle Eastern a,tocrats. Earl4 last !ee2H Pa2istan anno,nced t3e arrest of a doGen Islamist radicals !3o 3ad been plottin# attac2s on t3e B.8. embass4 and ot3er tar#ets. )3is comes s3ortl4 after t3e capt,re of some 2 ot3er ;i3adistsH incl,din# a comp,ter expertH ",3ammad Naeem Noor :3anH !3ose arrest led to t3e expos,re of an al Saeda cell in 1ritain t3at !as said to be plottin# attac2s on Ne! Yor2H Ne!ar2H and 7as3in#ton. Cecall t3at ,ntil 6$11 Pa2istan !as a leadin# s,pporter of Islamist militants. Portions of its intelli#ence ser+ice and militar4 maintain t3eir lin2s !it3 t3ese fanaticsH b,t Islamabad 3as become m,c3 more responsi+e to B.8. concerns.
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444 Pre-emption (ad 444
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*eneri% G ?ard
The pre-emption wont work and risks destroying the world- & scenarios!
1irs' 0,
(Mor#e-H Prof. of P34sics O B.C.8.&.H No+. 1HJ )3e Ceal Ceason for N,2in# IranK 734 a n,clear attac2 is on t3e neocon a#endaJH 3ttpK$$!!!.anti!ar.com$ori#$ 3irsc3.p3pRarticleid%-0'1L Macob) YesH 4o, read it ri#3tK )3e B.8. is prepared to brea2 a '9-4ear-old taboo on t3e ,se of n,clear !eapons a#ainst non-n,clear co,ntries [ not beca,se t3e s,r+i+al of t3e co,ntr4 is at sta2eH not beca,se t3e li+es of man4 (mericans or allies are at sta2e [ ;,st to demonstrate t3at it can do it. )3e B.8. 3as maintained for some time no! t3at it reser+es t3e ri#3t to respond !it3 n,clear !eapons to
attac2s or intended attac2s !it3 7"&H and t3at it intends to ,se n,clear !eapons to destro4 ,nder#ro,nd enem4 facilities. It is ar#,ed t3at s,c3 statements 3a+e deterrent +al,eH and t3at maintainin# ambi#,it4 as to !3at mi#3t tri##er a B.8. n,clear attac2 deters co,ntries from p,rs,in# militar4 initiati+es t3at are contrar4 to B.8. interests. Nonsense. )3ose statements 3a+e no deterrent +al,e beca,se no one in 3is or 3er ri#3t mind !o,ld belie+e t3at t3e #reatest democrac4 in t3e !orld !o,ld do s,c3 a t3in#.
Bnless t3e B.8. demonstratesH b4 act,all4 doin# it onceH t3at it is indeed prepared to do so. Eo! do 4o, create t3e conditions to perform s,c3 a demonstration and a+oid immediate ,ni+ersal condemnationR Z a,t3or contin,es Z Eo!e+erH t3e real !orld does not al!a4s follo! t3e script en+isioned b4 B.8. plannersH as t3e Ira* experience ill,strates. 8o 3ere is a more li2el4 Qpost-demoQ scenarioK . "an4 non-n,clear co,ntriesH incl,din# t3ose c,rrentl4 friendl4 to t3e B.8.H !ill r,s3 to de+elop a n,clear deterrentH and man4 !ill s,cceed. . )errorist #ro,ps s4mpat3etic to Iran !ill do t3eir ,tmost to retaliate in-2ind a#ainst t3e B.8.H and e+ent,all4 !ill s,cceed. . 7it3 t3e taboo a#ainst t3e ,se of n,clear !eapons bro2enH ,se of t3em b4 ot3er co,ntries !ill follo! in +ario,s re#ional conflictsH and s,bse*,ent escalation !ill lead to #lobal n,clear !ar. 14e-b4e !orldH incl,din# t3e Bnited 8tates of (merica. Preemption doesn5t deter conflict beca,se t3e t3reat isn5t credible- no one t3in2s t3e B.8. !ill follo! t3ro,#3 It scares bot3 allied and enem4 po!ers into proliferatin# for fear of t3eir o!n sec,rit4. It pro+o2es n,clear terrorism. It brea2s t3e taboo on n,clear ,se- ot3er co,nties !ill follo! t3is model and ,se n,clear !eapons in re#ional !ars escalatin# t3em to #lobal n,clear !ar and in t3e end extinction.
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.ustralia->D-D Rels -%enario (1 of 9)

A! /re-emption destroys the Australian public support necessary to sustain its alliance with the !"!
<ell6 09
(Pa,l-H 8prin#H )3e National InterestH I(,stralian for (llianceJH =exisL Macob) 73at does it mean for a middle-siGed re#ional po!er to be a friend and all4 of t3e Bnited 8tates in t3e 21st cent,r4R )3is *,estion is bein# debated toda4 amon# B.8. allies !it3 an intensit4 not seen since t3e ?ietnam 7ar. )3e !o,nded 3e#emon ro,sed to action after 8eptember 11 3as pro+o2ed s4mpat34H alarm and astonis3mentH b,t abo+e all a desire to 2no! !3et3er (mericaPs pled#e to defeat its ne! enemies once a#ain represents t3e last best 3ope for man2indH or !3et3er it !ill instead ,nleas3 a selfdefeatin# c4cle of +iolence and ripplin# c3aos. (mon# (mericaPs E,ropean and (sian allies a #ood deal of an#st 3as been comm,nicated to 7as3in#ton in recent mont3sH m,c3 of it or#aniGed aro,nd B.8. policies to!ard 1aPat3i Ira* and comm,nist Nort3 :orea. (cc,sations of arro#ance and ,nilateralism 3a+e been tossed at t3e 1,s3 (dministrationL intimations of fec2lessness 3a+e been tossed bac2. (mid all t3is noise it 3as been eas4 for (mericans to o+erloo2 !3at 3as been 3appenin# in (,stralia. 73en t3e4 t3in2 abo,t (,stralia at allH (mericans see it as t3e least of t3eir problems. )3e t!o co,ntries 3a+e co,nted t3eir dead in t3e !ar on terrorismH first in Ne! Yor2H 7as3in#ton and Penns4l+aniaH and t3en in 1ali. (,stralia 3as +ol,nteered to fi#3t alon#side t3e Bnited 8tates in Ira* !it3o,t conditions or complaints in contrast to certain ot3er old (merican friends. 1,t diffic,lties are no! arisin# !it3in t3is fift4 4ear-old allianceH and it is best t3at t3e4 be ac2no!led#ed and addressed. <riends Indeed (merica 3as 3ad fe! closer allies t3an (,stralia. @+er t3e past cent,r4 t3e t!o co,ntries fo,#3t to#et3er in fi+e !ars and be#an t3e ne! cent,r4 as allies in t3e !ar on terrorismH !it3 (,stralian special forces fi#3tin# in (f#3anistan. In M,ne 2992 (,stralian Prime "inister Mo3n Eo!ard told t3e B.8. Con#ress t3at Q(merica 3as no better friend an4!3ere in t3e !orld t3an (,stralia.Q @n t3e fiftiet3 anni+ersar4 of t3e sec,rit4 alliance ((NYB8) bet!een t3e nationsH 8ecretar4 of 8tate Colin Po!ell described (,stralia as Qo,r oldest and closest all4 in t3e Pacific re#ion.Q )3e relations3ip is en;o4in# one of its periodic 3i#3 tides !it3 a Cep,blican president in t3e 73ite Eo,se and a conser+ati+e prime minister in Canberra. )3e ne! National 8ec,rit4 8trate#4 pa4s positi+e attention to (,stralia as a model all4H and t3e t!o nations are no! ne#otiatin# a free-trade a#reement-a diffic,lt b,t potentiall4 far-reac3in# expansion of t3eir ties. (ll t3is not!it3standin#H (,stralians 3a+e #otten a mixed messa#e from 7as3in#ton o+er t3e past 4ear. <rom Qdo!n ,nderQH it loo2s as if Colin Po!ellPs effort to constr,ct a broad militar4 coalition to deal !it3 Ira* !as contradicted b4 &efense 8ecretar4 &onald C,msfeldPs depiction of a ,nilateralist (merica t3at !o,ld not allo! an4 coalition to define or ,ndermine its mission. @f co,rseH t3e Bnited 8tates 3as not discarded deterrence for pre-emption in all casesH b,t t3e intense p,blic debate in (,stralia and man4 ot3er co,ntries foc,sed on pre-emption. (s a res,ltH (,straliaPs perception is t3at ,nder t3e 1,s3 (dministration t3e Bnited 8tates is a more demandin# alliance partner. <or t3e first time in man4 4earsH tooH t3e alliance !it3 (merica 3as ac*,ired a s3arp domestic foc,sH lar#el4 o!in# to t3e Eo!ard /o+ernmentPs earl4 declaration of intention to participate in Ira*. @pinion is no! polariGin# aro,nd competin# +ie!s of t3e Bnited 8tates. @ne +ie!H s3aped b4 traditionH is for expressions of alliance ,nit4 and resol,tion to meet common t3reatsH alon# !it3 a con+iction t3at (,stralian infl,ence on t3e Bnited 8tates is maximiGed b4 close partners3ip. )3e alternati+e is for 2eepin# some distance bet!een t3e allies in t3is instanceH for fear t3at mis;,d#ments in 7as3in#ton !ill 3arm (,stralia. )3is sentiment do,bts !3et3er (merica remains a reliable all4 and pr,dent 3e#emon. In an4 s,c3 debateH of co,rseH !3at (mericaPs friends are sa4in# co,nts mostH b,t e+en man4 s,c3 friends are more !orried t3an ,s,al. In late 2992H t3ree former (,stralian prime ministers-/o,#3 73itlamH "alcomb <raser and 1ob Ea!2e-as !ell as se+eral former militar4 c3iefs ;oined to si#n a letter opposin# t3eir co,ntr4Ps participation in an4 Ira* campai#n t3at is not +alidated b4 a specific BN 8ec,rit4 Co,ncil resol,tion. )3is effort !as orc3estrated b4 former =abo,r Prime "inister Ea!2eH notable for 3is pro-B.8. +ie!s and close relations in office !it3 President /eor#e E.7. 1,s3H and s,c3 sentiments are s3ared !idel4 in (,straliaPs forei#n polic4 comm,nit4 o,tside of t3e Eo!ard /o+ernment. E+en inside t3is pro-B.8. #o+ernmentH pri+ate concerns 3a+e been +ented abo,t President 1,s3Ps inabilit4 d,rin# 2992 to pers,ade t3e (,stralian p,blic to 3is ca,se. (mon# (mericaPs best (,stralian friendsH tooH t3ere is a da!nin# reco#nition t3at a more demandin# (merica poses a c3allen#e. @+er t3e past 4ear t3e !ord Q,nilateralQ 3as meant to discernin# obser+ers not t3at t3e Bnited 8tates !o,ld prefer to act aloneH b,t t3at it expected its closest friends to embrace its o!n t3reat perceptions. =i2e most ot3er nationsH (,stralia !as ps4c3olo#icall4 ,nprepared for t3e 6$11 calamit4. Its empat34 for (merica o+er t3e attac2s on Ne! Yor2 and 7as3in#ton !as real eno,#3H b,t !3en President 1,s3 said t3at (merica !as Qat !arPPH t3ere !as little real sense t3at (,stralia !as also at !ar. 73en t3e President declared t3at Ira* !as a t3reat to t3e Bnited 8tatesH t3ere !as no real sense t3at Ira* !as also a t3reat to (,stralia. (n omen of t3is disorientation in (,stralia !as t3e fact t3at t3e (NYB8 )reat4 !as in+o2ed for t3e first time b4 an attac2 on (mericaH not on (,stralia. (,stralian arc3itects of t3e allianceH and most of t3eir (,stralian s,ccessorsH ass,med t3at (NYB8 49
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3ad mainl4 to do !it3 (merican 3elp for (,straliaPs national sec,rit4H not t3e ot3er !a4 aro,nd. Nat,rall4 eno,#3H !3en t3e e*,ation !as re+ersedH ne! *,estions arose. 73at dan#ers and costs mi#3t (,stralia create for itself b4 ;oinin# B.8.-led militar4 coalitionsR 7ill (merica pla4 t3e constr,cti+e leaders3ip role in t3e international s4stem t3at its ;,nior allies need and expect of s,c3 a 3e#emonR @r !ill alliance actions ,ndermine (,stralian sec,rit4 in its partic,lar re#ional frame!or2R )3ese *,estions are +ital for (,stralia. 73ile Mo3n Eo!ard !as correct to stress s3ared +al,es bet!een (merica and (,straliaH s3ared +al,es are ,ltimatel4 not as important in an alliance as s3ared interests and strate#ic p,rpose. (n4 disc,ssion of t3e B.8.-(,stralian alliance m,st penetrate t3e 3aGe of m,t,al con#rat,lations t3at s,rro,nds it and address t3is *,estion of s3ared strate#ic p,rpose. 73en !e assess t3e alliance in t3at !a4H t3e first t3in# !e see is t3at t3in#s 3a+e c3an#ed from Cold 7ar da4sand rat3er too fe! obser+ers 3a+e mar2ed t3e !a4s. Z e+idence contin,es Z It is far from ob+io,s t3at t3e !ar a#ainst terrorism ,nites (merican and (,stralian interests to t3e same extent as 3a+e pre+io,s !ars. )3e fear amon# (mericaPs alliesH t3at t3e Bnited 8tates !ill deliberatel4 pri+ile#e pre-empti+e militar4 and ,nilateral meansH +aries from all4 to all4 and is often exa##erated. Nonet3elessH it is tr,e t3at (merican perceptions of t3e t3reat it faces are different from t3ose of its allies. )o t3e extent t3at (merica tends to!ard militar4 pre-emption and ,nilateralism o+er m,ltilateralismH it creates ne! problems for old allies. )3ese differences bet!een ,nilateral and m,ltilateral approac3esH !3ile not3in# li2e t3e caricat,res created in some *,arters (and stim,lated b4 some o+er-dramatic r3etoric b4 t3e B.8. 8ecretar4 of &efense)H do matter. 73ile not dispara#in# m,ltilateral ,nderta2in#s in all b,t t3e most +ital of B.8. interestsH C3arles :ra,t3ammer fa+orsH as 3e p,t it in t3e 7inter 2992$93 iss,e of )3e National InterestH Qt3e a##ressi+e and confident application of ,nipolar po!er rat3er t3an fallin# bac2H as !e did in t3e 1669sH on paral4Gin# m,ltilateralism.PP <areed Ya2aria ,nderstands as !ell as an4one t3e fra#ilit4 of t3e Bnited Nations and t3e need for B.8. sec,rit4 polic4 leaders3ipH b,t 3e !arned in t3e @ctober 21 iss,e of )3e Ne! Yor2er t3at B.8. 3e#emon4 needs t3e le#itimac4 deri+ed from operatin# !it3in an international consens,s. Q7it3o,t t3is cloa2 of respectabilit4 (merica !ill face a #ro!in# 3ostilit4 aro,nd t3e !orldPPH 3e !roteH addin# t3at !it3o,t s,c3 respectabilit4 anti-(mericanism !ill become Qt3e #lobal lan#,a#e of political protest-t3e defa,lt ideolo#4 of all opposition-,nif4in# t3e !orldPs discontents and malcontents.PP @n balanceH most (,stralians incline to Ya2ariaPs sensibilities rat3er t3an to :ra,t3ammerPs. (,straliaPs s,pport for t3e 1,s3 (dministrationPs militar4 actions s3o,ld not be misread to ,nderestimate (,straliaPs serio,s interest in t3e le#itimiGation of s,c3 actions. )3ere 3as been a stron# bipartisan +ie! in (,stralia t3at an4 Ira* campai#n s3o,ld be sanctioned b4 t3e BN 8ec,rit4 Co,ncil. (,straliaPs preference in t3e post-8eptember 11 climate for militar4 action sanctioned b4 a broad coalition of nations mirrors its concern t3at t3e ne! B.8. emp3asis on pre-emption co,ld ris2 #reater #lobal disorderH and t3at deterrence s3o,ld not be li#3tl4 abandoned. (,stralia 3as stron# national interest reasons for s,c3 concerns. (s a middle po!erH (,stralia is interested in seein# t3at B.8. 3e#emon4 is deplo4ed not ;,st on be3alf of (merica itself b,t for a better #lobal order. )3is is 3o! an4 sensible middle po!er t3in2s. (,stralia !ants t3e Bnited 8tates to operate as a constr,cti+e #lobal leader t3at s,pports (,straliaPs post-7orld 7ar II diplomatic s4nt3esis bet!een realism and m,ltilateralism. In its realist p3aseH (,stralia 3as priGed t3e B.8. alliance !it3 its militar4 and sec,rit4 dimensions to bolster its o!n sec,rit4 and political le+era#e. In its m,ltilateral commitment (,straliaPs interests 3a+e consisted in t3e de+elopment of la!H treatiesH economic a#reements and peace2eepin# to ad+ance t3e de+elopment of a r,les-based international s4stem. )3is lo#ic deri+es from (,straliaPs sit,ation as a stable co,ntr4 in an ,nstable re#ion. (,stralia t3erefore does not !ant an (merica so imprisoned b4 t3e searc3 for consens,s t3at it is paral4Ged from ta2in# militar4 action. 1,t neit3er does it !ant an (merica t3at is !al2in# a!a4 from #lobal instit,tions rat3er t3an laborin# to !or2 !it3in t3em. IndeedH not3in# !o,ld ca,se more disma4 in (,stralia t3an seein# t3e E,ropean Bnion pre+ail !it3in s,c3 instit,tions at t3e cost of t3ose instit,tionsP ,ltimate +iabilit4. If (merica s3o,ld e+er decide t3at t3e #lobal instit,tions and r,les of t3e post-7orld 7ar II period 3a+e little +al,e for its needs as a 3e#emonH it !o,ld be disastro,s for middle po!ers s,c3 as (,stralia. In s3ortH (,stralia prefers an (merica t3at +al,es partners3ips and coalitionsH t3at ,tiliGes soft as !ell as 3ard po!erH t3at emp3asiGes political met3ods as !ell as militar4 ones. 8,c3 an approac3 is critical to maintainin# a sense of common p,rpose in relation to endsH means and lan#,a#e. @ne reason for t3is is t3at a certain rise in anti-(mericanism is ine+itableL #reat po!ersH no matter 3o! beni#nH in+ariabl4 #enerate resentment. 1,t 7as3in#ton m,st ,nderstand t3at s,c3 a de+elopment affects not ;,st (merica b,t increases t3e potential price paid b4 (mericaPs allies in sidin# !it3 t3e 3e#emon. )3is is not an ar#,ment a#ainst all militar4 action. It is an ar#,ment for more attention to t3e tone of B.8. polic4H and for le#itimiGin# militar4 action b4 la! and t3ro,#3 coalitions !3ene+er possible. 8,c3 care is partic,larl4 important beca,se t3e (merican alliance s4stem is o+er!3elmin#l4 composed of democratic co,ntries !it3 real p,blics. (,straliaPs pro-B.8. political leaders spent m,c3 of 2992 tr4in# to ,p3old t3e (merican positionH onl4 to be en#,lfed b4 a tide of ,nilateral and pro+ocati+e r3etoric from t3e B.8. administration t3at 3ad t3e re+erse impact. )3e B.8. alliance is not imm,table in (,stralia. It needs democratic no,ris3ment and it can be s,stained in t3e lon# r,n onl4 b4 p,blic s,pport t3at sees militar4 commitments ,nder its banner as bein# in t3e national interest and possessin# international le#itimac4. It is idle to belie+e t3at an4 l,rc3 to an (merican ,nilateralism !o,ld not erode t3e domestic political s,pport !it3in (,stralia for t3e alliance. 41
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B! Thats key to asian stability
Do!ner 01
((lexander-H (,stralian "inister for <orei#n (ffairsH M,ne 26H )3e (,stralia-Bnited 8tates (lliance and East (sian 8ec,rit4H I(,straliaPs (lliance !it3 t3e Bnited 8tatesK "aintainin# t3e W<abric of Peace5JH 3ttpK$$!!!.dfat.#o+.a,$media$speec3es$forei#n$ 2991$919'26XfaX,sXalliance.3tmlL Macob) In factH (NYB8 !as seen from t3e o,tset as a means of en3ancin# o,r ties !it3 t3e re#ionK Perc4 8penderH !3o p,s3ed so stron#l4 to concl,de t3e (NYB8 )reat4H did so !it3 a clear and expressed con+iction t3at (,stralia5s destin4 !as bo,nd ,p !it3 (sia. Ee sa! t3e (,stralia [ B8 alliance as a linc3pin for stabilit4 in t3e re#ion. @n t3e e+e of 3is depart,re for t3e Colombo Conference in Man,ar4 16 9H 8pender said t3at I(,stralia and t3e Bnited 8tates of (merica are t3e t!o co,ntries !3ic3 canH in co-operation one !it3 t3e ot3erH ma2e t3e #reatest contrib,tion to stabilit4 and to democratic de+elopment of t3e co,ntries of 8o,t3-East (sia.J )3is !as 13 mont3s before t3e cr,cial Canberra ne#otiations at !3ic3 t3e f,ndamentals of (NYB8 !ere 3ammered o,t. (nd t3e preamble to t3e treat4 itself noted t3e desire of t3e parties Ito stren#t3en t3e fabric of peace in t3e Pacific (reaJ. )3e contemporar4 ar#,ment in fa+o,r of (NYB8 and t3e (,stralia-B8 alliance doesnPt rest f,ndamentall4 on t3e #en,inel4 close emotional and c,lt,ral lin2s bet!een t3e t!o co,ntries - as important and lon#-standin# as t3e4 are - b,t on t3e contin,in# con#r,ence of (,stralian and B8 national interests and +al,es in so man4 areas. In s3ortH it is m,t,all4 beneficial. =et me ma2e fo,r 2e4 points in s,pport of m4 ar#,ment. <irstH from t3e o,tsetH (NYB8 !as concei+ed as a sec,rit4 pact flexible eno,#3 to be rele+ant to a ran#e of c3allen#es. Initiall4H t3is !as (,stralia5s concern to be protected a#ainst t3e t3reat of a militaril4 res,r#ent Mapan. )3enH in t3e Cold 7arH it !as protection a#ainst t3e t3reat of Comm,nist expansionism. No!H in !3at President 1,s3 3as recentl4 described as an era in !3ic3 t3e t3reats come from ,ncertaint4H it pro+ides a bedroc2 of certaint4 and sec,rit4 on !3ic3 bot3 (,stralia and t3e Bnited 8tates 2no! t3e4 can al!a4s rel4. 8econdH t3e alliance 3elps cement t3e B8 into t3e sec,rit4 arc3itect,re of t3e re#ion. )3e Bnited 8tatesH t3ro,#3 its en#a#ement in t3e 7estern PacificH pla4s a partic,larl4 important role in balancin# and containin# potential ri+alries in t3e re#ion. <or all t3e crises of t3e past t3ree 4earsH t3e po!er balance in t3e re#ion 3as remained stableH essentiall4 beca,se t3e B8 3as maintained and stren#t3ened its alliances !it3 (sia-Pacific co,ntries.
#! Asian instability $(
<enned6 ) Irie 00
(Prof. Pa,l-H Prof. (2ira-H &ail4 Yomi,riH Man. 19H I21st Cent,r4--&ialo#,es on t3e <,t,re$ /lobaliGationPs s!a4 in e+ol,tion of states p,t in foc,sJH =exisL Macob) :enned4K @+er t3e past t!o or t3ree decadesH man4 (sian nations 3a+e increased t3eir defense b,d#etsH !3ile E,ropean co,ntries 3a+e done ot3er!ise. &,rin# t3is timeH t3ere 3a+e been man4 flas3 points in (siaH s,c3 Nort3 :oreaH )ai!an and :as3mir. 8ome (sian co,ntries 3a+e de+eloped n,clear !eaponsH as contrasted !it3 fe! E,ropeans !3o e+en !ant n,clear po!er stations toda4. 7e 3a+e #ood reason to feel !orried t3at (sia co,ld become a tinderbox s3o,ld t3ere be an4 conflict in disp,ted territories li2e t3e 8pratl4 Islands and an a,tistic Nort3 :orean re#ime t3at does not bot3er to ,nderstand t3e o,tside !orld. )ai!an is often ras3 to pro+o2e 1ei;in#H !3ile t3e :as3mir conflict co,ld #ro! into an India-Pa2istan !ar. )3ere is #reat concern abo,t 3o! !e s3o,ld ens,re t3at bitter ri+alries in t3e (sian part of t3e #lobe !ill not brin# do!n a s4stem t3at is emer#in# in t3e !orld no!. 7e do not !ant a repeat of 1614. I am concerned t3at an armed conflict mi#3t arise in 8o,t3 or East (sia in 2990H for exampleH and brin# do!n t3e creditH financial flo! and capital in t3e re#ion. IrieK I s3are Prof. :enned4Ps sense of pessimism abo,t some serio,s problems facin# t3e !orld toda4. )3ere are man4 more so+erei#n nations toda4H and t3e ma;orit4 of t3em are ne!l4 independent states. )3ereforeH t3e4 are e+en more nationalistic. Nationalism 3as often ser+ed as t3e onl4 s4mbol of national ,nit4 for some (fricanH (sian and "iddle Eastern co,ntries t3at 3a+e been #rated in t3eir re#ions !it3o,t national traditions comparable to t3ose of E,ropean co,ntries. )3is 3as made matters e+en !orse. Nationalism is all t3at can 2eep a co,ntr4 to#et3er. It is essential to ens,re t3at local conflicts !ill be 2ept from blo!in# ,p t3e entire !orld.
42
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(un5er (usters -%enario

The !"! will deploy bunker busters as part of pre-emption- other nations will retaliate resulting in nuclear war
?lar5 02
("oll4-H 8co+ille <ello! O P34sicians for 8ocial Cesponsibilit4H @ct. 22H P.8.C. 8ec,rit4 Pro#ramH I)3e National 8ec,rit4 8trate#4 of t3e Bnited 8tates of (mericaK &octrine of /lobal Ee#emon4 and PreemptionJH 3ttpK$$!!!.psr.or#$ 3ome.cfmR id%NssXiss,eXbriefL Macob) (n En3anced Possibilit4 of t3e Bse of )actical N,clear 7eapons 8econdl4H 1,s35s preempti+e strate#4 is in3erentl4 dan#ero,s in terms of its implications for tactical n,clear ,se. (lt3o,#3 not explicitl4 stated in t3e National 8ec,rit4 8trate#4 of t3e Bnited 8tates of (mericaH t3e 1,s3
administration 3as indicated else!3ere its plans for t3e de+elopment of a Ib,n2er-b,sterHJ a tactical n,clear !eapon !it3 a lo! eno,#3 explosi+e 4ield to be deemed ,sable for preempti+e missions aimed at destro4in# ,nder#ro,nd stores of 7"&H and e+en re*,ested A1 . million for t3e de+elopment of s,c3 a !eapon in t3e <Y2993 &efense (,t3oriGation 1ill.14 )3e all,sions to n,clear ,se in3erent in t3is preempti+e strate#4 spea2 to t3e #ra+e dan#er of n,clear !ar made increasin#l4 possible b4 t3e 1,s3 administration5s plans. IndeedH an4 n,clear ,se b4 t3e Bnited 8tates in a preempti+e stri2e carries !it3 it t3e t3reat of n,clearH biolo#icalH or c3emical retaliation at t3e Bnited 8tates b4 eit3er t3e tar#eted state or its allies.
43
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(un5er (usters- Pre-emption (un5er (usters (1 of 2)

/re-emption doctrine necessitates testing and deployment of bunker busters
Po!as5i 02
(Conald E.-H Prof. of Eistor4 O Cle+eland 8t. B.H Man. 1H 1,lletin of t3e (tomic 8cientistsH I1,s3Ps n,clear 34pocris4K if t3e next administration !ants to be seen as serio,s abo,t nonproliferationH itPll 3a+e to ,ndo a lot of 1,s3 administration practicesJH =exisL Macob) 1,t t3e 1,s3 administration 3as been no friend of t3e NP) eit3er. It 3as appro+ed a strate#ic doctrine t3at calls for t3e possible ,se of n,clear !eapons a#ainst so-called ro#,e states li2e Nort3 :orea and Iran. )3e ne! doctrine t3reatens to o+ert,rn a B.8. pled#e not to ,se n,clear !eapons a#ainst non-n,clear states t3at are still a part4 to t3e NP)H s,c3 as Iran. ( partic,larl4 bitin# editorial in t3e Parisian ne!spaper =e "onde pointed o,t t3e ironic position in !3ic3 t3e administrationPs n,clear strate#4 places t3e non-n,clear states. Q734HQ t3e paper as2edH Qsi#nH or remain si#nator4 toH a treat4 Ut3e NP)V !3ic3H in exc3an#e for 4o,r absol,te ren,nciation of n,clear armsH does not #,arantee t3at t3e4 !ill not be ,sed a#ainst 4o,RQ Ne+ert3elessH t3e 1,s3 administrationPs 2992 N,clear Post,re Ce+ie! calls for reb,ildin# 2e4 parts of t3e B.8. n,clear !eapons prod,ction complex to permit t3e modificationH ,p#radin#H or replacement of portions of t3e existin# n,clear force. It f,rt3er proposes t3e de+elopment of ne!H lo!-4ieldH and pres,mabl4 more ,sable n,clear !eaponsH s,c3 as a ne! n,clear eart3penetratin# !eapon. )3e alle#ed p,rpose of t3is !eapon is to #i+e t3e Bnited 8tates t3e capabilit4 to destro4 3ardened and$or deepl4 b,ried tar#etsH s,c3 as t3e ca+e complex ,sed b4 (l Saeda in (f#3anistan. (lt3o,#3 t3e 1,s3 administration 3as stated t3at it 3as no intention of testin# n,clear !eaponsH it is 3ard to belie+e t3at t3e militar4 !o,ld deplo4 an4 ne! n,clear !eapons !it3o,t tr4in# t3em o,t first--and a res,mption of n,clear !eapon tests b4 t3e Bnited 8tates !o,ld f,rt3er ,ndermine t3e NP). In 166 H man4 nations appro+ed t3e indefinite extension of t3e NP) on t3e explicit condition t3at t3e n,clear po!ers !o,ld cease all n,clear-4ield testin# and ratif4 t3e Compre3ensi+e )est 1an )reat4 (C)1)). "an4 re#ard t3e C)1) as one of t3e most effecti+e !a4s of endin# t3e n,clear arms race. It is based on t3e ass,mption t3at if nations are pro3ibited from testin# n,clear !eaponsH t3e4 are less li2el4 to de+elop t3em. (s of M,ne 2993H 1'- nations 3ad si#ned t3e C)1) and 191 3ad ratified itH incl,din# 31 of t3e 44 n,clear-capable states t3at m,st ratif4 t3e treat4 for it to enter into force. (lt3o,#3 t3e Bnited 8tates 3as ad3ered to a self-imposed testin# moratori,m for more t3an a decadeH t3e 8enate re;ected t3e C)1) in 1666H and t3e 1,s3 administration 3as ref,sed to res,bmit it. (s a clear indication of !34 t3e administration opposes ratification of t3e C)1)H t3e N,clear Post,re Ce+ie! calls for s3ortenin# t3e preparation time re*,ired to res,me B.8. n,clear testin# from t!o to t3ree 4ears to as little as t3ree mont3sH ma2in# possible a m,c3 more rapid res,mption of tests. )3e administrationPs intent is ob+io,sK to test a ne! #eneration of tactical n,clear !eapons for possible ,se a#ainst terrorists 3oled ,p deep in mo,ntain ca+es or a#ainst so-called ro#,e states li2e Iran and Nort3 :orea. In 8eptemberH t3e 8enate appro+ed an administration re*,est for f,nds for contin,ed researc3 on t3e contro+ersial n,clear eart3 penetratorH accelerated n,clear testin# readinessH exploration of ne! !eapons tec3nolo#iesH and preliminar4 st,dies on b,ildin# a plant to prod,ce pl,toni,m cores for n,clear !eapons. Eo!e+erH t3e 8enatePs action 3ad to be reconciled !it3 a meas,re passed b4 t3e Eo,se in "a4 t3at eliminated all mone4 for s,c3 p,rposes. &emocratsH most of !3om oppose t3e administrationPs Qrec2lessQ p,rs,it of ne! n,clear !eaponsH 3oped to o+ert,rn t3e 8enatePs action in a conference committee in t3e fall. 1,t t3e &emocrats !ere onl4 partiall4 s,ccessf,l. In earl4 No+emberH con#ressional appropriators c,t 3alf of t3e administrationPs A 1 million 2994 f,ndin# re*,est for st,d4in# b,n2er b,sters and barred t3e Ener#4 &epartment from spendin# A 4 million of an appro+ed A ' million for ne! !eapons concepts ,ntil it s,bmits a report on B.8. n,clear stoc2pile re*,irements. In so doin#H 3o!e+erH t3e Eo,se and 8enate complied !it3 a 73ite Eo,se re*,est to repeal a 19-4ear-old ban on researc3 leadin# to t3e de+elopment of ne! n,clear !eapons !it3 4ields of less t3an fi+e 2ilotons and t3e proposed n,clear b,n2er b,sters. )3e4 also a#reed to s3orten t3e time re*,ired to prepare for a f,ll-scale n,clear test from 24 to 10 mont3s.
44
Caldebate.com
(un5er (usters- Pre-emption (un5er (usters (2 of 2)

/re-emption necessitates bunker busters
Pe8a 09
(C3arles ?.-H director of defense polic4 st,dies at t3e Cato Instit,teH No+. 16H Cato Polic4 (nal4sisH I"ini-N,2es and Preempti+e Polic4K ( &an#ero,s CombinationJH T466H !!!.cato.or#$p,bs$pas$pa466.pdfL Macob) Preemption is also explicit in t3e administration5s strate#4 to combat !eapons of mass destr,ctionK IB.8. militar4 forces and appropriate ci+ilian a#encies m,st 3a+e t3e capabilit4 to defend a#ainst 7"&-armed ad+ersariesH incl,din# in appropriate cases t3ro,#3 preempti+e meas,res.J41 (lt3o,#3 &aniel /o,r\ of t3e =exin#ton Instit,te does not specificall4 mention minin,2esH 3e ar#,es t3at In,clear !eapons are li2el4 to be re*,ired as a means of #,aranteein# t3e abilit4 to s,ccessf,ll4 preempt ro#,e states5 efforts to ac*,ire or emplo4 7"&. )3e tendenc4 of t3ese states to 3arden and b,r4 critical militar4 facilities and assets means t3at t3ere are tar#ets t3at no nonn,clear con+entional stri2e capabilit4 can 3old at ris2.J42
Caldebate.com
(un5er (usters- P/ H (1 of 2)
Bunker busters kill $/T' testing
Pe8a 09
(C3arles ?.-H director of defense polic4 st,dies at t3e Cato Instit,teH No+. 16H Cato Polic4 (nal4sisH I"ini-N,2es and Preempti+e Polic4K ( &an#ero,s CombinationJH T466H !!!.cato.or#$p,bs$pas$pa466.pdfL Macob) (rms control ad+ocates contend t3at minin,2es !o,ld t3reaten international arms control and nonproliferation efforts. C3arles &. <er#,son and Peter &. Yimmerman at t3e "ontere4 Instit,te of International 8t,dies s,ccinctl4 s,mmariGe t3e arms control ar#,ment a#ainst mini-n,2esK E+en if a stron# case can be made for ne! B.8. n,clear !eaponsH de+elopment and prod,ction of t3ese !eapons !o,ld ,ndermine B.8. commitments ,nder t3e n,clear Non-Proliferation )reat4. (lon# !it3 t3e ot3er fo,r de ;,re n,clear !eapons statesH t3e Bnited 8tates pled#ed ,nder (rticle ?I of t3e NP) Ito p,rs,e ne#otiations in #ood fait3 on effecti+e meas,res relatin# to t3e cessation of t3e n,clear arms race at an earl4 date and to n,clear disarmamentH and on a )reat4 on #eneral and complete disarmament ,nder strict and effecti+e international control.J (lt3o,#3 t3is article does not specif4 a time-bo,nd commitmentH prod,ction of ne! n,clear !eapons !o,ld ta2e steps bac2!ards from t3e treat45s obli#ations Ito p,rs,e . . . n,clear disarmament.J In additionH t3e Bnited 8tates !o,ld p,t itself in a 34pocritical position if it proceeded !it3 n,clear !eapons de+elopment. In essenceH t3e Bnited 8tates !o,ld be sa4in# to aspirin# n,clear !eapons statesH I&o as I sa4H not as I do.J2' 7ritin# for (rms Control )oda4H 8idne4 &rell (professor emerit,s of p34sics at 8tanford Bni+ersit4 and a senior fello! at t3e Eoo+er Instit,te)H Mames /oodb4 (former ad+iser to President Clinton on t3e Compre3ensi+e )est 1an )reat4)H Ca4mond MeanioG (professor of eart3 and planetar4 science at t3e Bni+ersit4 of California at 1er2ele4)H and Cobert Pe,rifo4 (+ice president of 8andia National =aboratories) stateK I)3e !orld5s onl4 s,perpo!er !o,ld send a ne#ati+e si#nal to t3e non-n,clear states if it felt t3e need to de+elop ne! t4pes of n,clear !eapons.J2- )3e ot3er related arms control ob;ection is t3at de+elopment of minin,2es mi#3t res,lt in n,clear testin#K 8,c3 an initiati+e !o,ld f,rt3er ,ndermine t3e NP) if it led to a res,mption of n,clear explosi+e testin# in order to deplo4 ne! !eapons desi#ns. In 166 H man4 of t3e !orld5s non-n,clear nations made it clear t3at t3eir contin,ed ad3erence to t3e NP) !as contin#ent on t3e cessation of all n,clear-4ield testin#. (lt3o,#3 it 3as ad3ered to a self-imposed moratori,m on s,c3 tests for more t3an a decadeH t3e Bnited 8tates 3as ref,sed to ratif4 t3e Compre3ensi+e )est 1an )reat4H t3ereb4 for#oin# t3e opport,nit4 to stren#t3en t3e NP) re#ime. ( decision to res,me testin# to b,ild lo!-4ield n,clear !eapons co,ld deal t3e re#ime a fatal blo! !3ile pro+idin# t3e Bnited 8tates !it3 a capabilit4 of *,estionable militar4 +al,e.20
4'
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(un5er (usters- P/ H (2 of 2)
B! #ollapse of the $/T prolif
(romle6 02
("ar2H 1ritis3 (merican 8ec,rit4 Informational Co,ncil (nal4stH M,l4H I1,n2er 1,stersK 7as3in#ton5s &ri+e for Ne! N,clear 7eaponsJH 3ttpK$$!!!.basicint.or#$p,bs$Cesearc3$299211.pdf) @f all t3e international re#imes to be affected b4 t3e NPCH t3e NP) ma4 s,ffer t3e #reatest blo!. (lread4 an ,nstable international re#imeH t3e NP) !as implicitl4 or o+ertl4 dama#ed b4 se+eral of t3e NPC5s recommendations 73ile t3e 1,s3 administration 3as +oiced do,bts abo,t se+eral m,ltilateral arms control a#reements since its first da4s in 7as3in#tonH it 3as reiterated its stron# s,pport for t3e NP)H a treat4 !it3 t3e p,rpose of c,rtailin# t3e spread of n,clear 2no!-3o! and c,ttin# existin# arsenals. <or exampleH t3e Bnited 8tates bac2ed t3e final comm,ni*,\ from t3e N()@ <orei#n "inisters meetin# in "a4 2991 !3ic3 statedH I7e reaffirm o,r determination to contrib,te to t3e implementation of t3e concl,sions of t3e 2999 NP) Ce+ie! ConferenceJ.120 In additionH a ;oint comm,ni*,\ iss,ed b4 1,s3 and P,tin on No+ember 13H 2991 committed t3e Bnited 8tates to ,nderta2e Iefforts to stren#t3en t3e n,clear Non-Proliferation )reat4J.126 (mbassador Norm 7,lf restated 7as3in#ton5s s,pport for t3e NP) d,rin# t3e (pril 2992 Preparator4 Committee meetin# for t3e NP)5s 299 Ce+ie! Conference !3en 3e saidH I)3e
Bnited 8tates contin,es to +ie! t3e NP) as t3e bedroc2 of t3e #lobal efforts to pre+ent t3e spread of n,clear !eapons.J139 (mon# 7as3in#ton5s reasons for s,pportin# t3e NP) is t3e treat45s +al,able role in pre+entin# proliferation. 8ince t3e NP)5s entr4 into force in 16-9H a n,mber of states 3a+e abandoned t3eir n,clear !eapons pro#rammes and ;oined t3e NP) as non-n,clear statesH incl,din# (r#entinaH 1elar,sH 1raGilH :aGa23stanH 8o,t3 (fricaH and B2raine. 73ile Nort3 :orea and Ira* ma4 be seen as fail,res of t3e NP)H it !as onl4 t3ro,#3 t3e mec3anisms establis3ed b4 t3e treat4 t3at t3eir n,clear pro#rammes !ere first disco+ered and t3en 3alted. ( report from t3e B8 &efence )3reat Ced,ction (#enc4 (&)C() s,pports t3is assessment. It concl,des t3at t3e collapse of t3e NP) !o,ld enco,ra#e Istates to re+ie! t3eir n,clear policies and to adopt more a##ressi+e policies. In t3e lon# r,nH t3is strate#ic en+ironment !o,ld li2el4 foster +ertical and 3oriGontal proliferation of n,clear !eapons.J131 )3e dan#ers posed b4 a !ea2ened NP) are real and ,ni+ersall4 reco#nised.
#! /rolif $(
>t#off 02
(?ictor-H &ep,t4 &irector for t3e 8trate#4H <orcesH F Ceso,rces &i+ision of t3e Instit,te for &efense (nal4sisH 8,mmerH 8,r+i+alH ?ol. 44 T2H P. 0--69) In s,mH !idespread proliferation is li2el4 to lead to an occasional s3oot-o,t !it3 n,clear !eaponsH and t3at s,c3 s3oot-o,ts !ill 3a+e a s,bstantial probabilit4 of escalatin# to t3e maxim,m destr,ction possible !it3 t3e !eapons at 3and. Bnless n,clear proliferation is stoppedH !e are 3eaded to!ard a !orld t3at !ill mirror t3e (merican 7ild 7est of t3e late 1099s. 7it3 mostH if not allH nations !earin# n,clear Psix-s3ootersP on t3eir 3ipsH t3e !orld ma4 e+en be a more polite place t3an it is toda4H b,t e+er4 once in a !3ile !e !ill all #at3er on a 3ill to b,r4 t3e bodies of dead cities or e+en !3ole nations.
4-
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(un5er (usters- Prolif H (1 of 2)

Bunker busters will cause global proliferation and full scale nuclear war within the decade
"illar 01
((listair-H <o,rt3 <reedom <or,mH (,#,st 1H )3e Pro#ressi+e) )3e c,rrent 1,s3 (dministration is st,d4in# options for t3e de+elopment and prod,ction of a smallH lo!-4ield n,clear !eapon called an eart3-penetrator or b,n2er-b,sterH !3ic3 !o,ld b,rro! into t3e #ro,nd and destro4 a deepl4 b,ried 3idea!a4 of a Iro#,eJ leader li2e 8addam E,ssein. 1,t s,c3 a bomb !o,ld ta2e man4 more people !it3 it. I)3e ,se of an4 n,clear !eapon capable of destro4in# a b,ried tar#et t3at is ot3er!ise imm,ne to con+entional attac2 !ill necessaril4 prod,ce enormo,s n,mbers of ci+ilian cas,altiesHJ !rites &r. Cobert NelsonH a professor of t3eoretical science at Princeton Bni+ersit4H in a recent st,d4 for t3e <ederation of (merican 8cientists. INo eart3-b,rro!in# missile can penetrate deep eno,#3 into t3e eart3 to contain an explosion !it3 a n,clear 4ield e+en as small as 1 percent of t3e 1 -2iloton Eiros3ima !eapon. )3e explosion simpl4 blo!s o,t a crater of radioacti+e dirtH !3ic3 rains do!n on t3e local re#ion !it3 an especiall4 intense and deadl4 fallo,t.J )3e blast from one of t3ese !eapons !o,ld I2noc2 do!n nearl4 all 3omes and apartmentsNand 2ill nearl4 all t3e people in t3emN o,t to distances of #reater t3an 3alf a mile from t3e blastHJ sa4s /re# "elloH !3o directs t3e =os (lamos 8t,d4 /ro,pH a n,clear !eapons polic4 researc3 and ed,cation #ro,p based in 8anta <e. )3ose !3o s,r+i+ed t3e blast !o,ld s,ffer a let3al dose of radiationH 3e predicts. I)o ta2e a specific exampleHJ sa4s "elloH Iif t3e tar#et in *,estion !ere t3e Ira*i presidential b,n2er located in so,t3-central 1a#3dadH t3ere !o,ld be +er4 ro,#3l4 29H999 people located !it3in one-3alf mile of t3is tar#et.J If t3e 1,s3 (dministration proceeds !it3 t3e b,n2er-b,ster n,2eH it !o,ld si#nal a fri#3tenin# depart,re for B.8 n,clear polic4. )3e Bnited 8tates !o,ld be rene#in# on its pled#e not to de+elop ne! n,clear !eaponsH and t3is !o,ld +iolate t3e spirit if not t3e letter of t3e N,clear Non- Proliferation )reat4 and t3e Compre3ensi+e )est 1an )reat4H !3ic3 are #eared to t3e elimination of n,clear !eaponsH not t3e ma2in# of ne! ones. 73at5s moreH it !o,ldH for t3e first time in almost fifteen 4earsH confer le#itimac4 on t3e idea t3at n,clear !eapons 3a+e a s,itable role to pla4 e+en in con+entional !arfare. )3is leapin# of t3e fire!all !o,ld increase t3e li2eli3ood of n,clear !eapons bein# ,sed in t3e next decade or so. (nd it co,ld t,rn a con+entional !ar into a f,ll-blo!n n,clear catastrop3e.
Bunker-busters will create a new arms race and destroy the $/T
-an *abriel Ealle6 /ribune 0,
(<eb. 1 ) 8ome n,clear planners ar#,e t3e need for a more flexible arsenal to meet t3e ne! t3reats from t3e proliferation of n,clear and ot3er !eapons of mass destr,ction to co,ntries s,c3 as Iran and Nort3 :orea. 1,t t3e B.8. militar4 3as ne+er itself artic,lated t3e need for s,c3 a !eapon. Ne! !eapon desi#ns ine+itabl4 lead to!ard t3e need to res,me testin#H !3ic3 !as s,spended in 1662 b4 President 1,s35s fat3er. E+en more dan#ero,sH it ,ndermines t3e abilit4 to 3alt n,clear proliferation. It is prett4 3ard to ar#,e a#ainst ot3er co,ntries de+elopin# n,clear !eapons m,c3 less t3e efforts of establis3ed n,clear po!ers s,c3 as C3ina and C,ssia to de+elop t3eir o!n ne! !eapons !3en !e are doin# t3e same t3in#. In "a4H an international conference !ill re+ie! t3e stat,s of t3e N,clear Non-Proliferation )reat4H an e+ent t3at occ,rs e+er4 fi+e 4ears. 1,t t3e treat4 re+ie! is 3eadin# for a train !rec2H in part beca,se of t3e #larin# contradictions of t3e administration5s persistent attempt to de+elop ne! n,clear !eapons.
40
Caldebate.com

*eterring rogue states is impossible theres only a risk deployment of bunker busters as part of a pre-emptive strategy will motivate prolif 8 terrorism
Pe8a 09
(C3arles ?.-H director of defense polic4 st,dies at t3e Cato Instit,teH No+. 16H Cato Polic4 (nal4sisH I"ini-N,2es and Preempti+e Polic4K ( &an#ero,s CombinationJH T466H !!!.cato.or#$p,bs$pas$pa466.pdfL Macob) Critics of mini-n,2es belie+e t3at a nonproliferation re#ime !ill contain t3e spread of n,clear !eapons. (d+ocates ar#,e t3at mini-n,2es !ill deter co,ntries from ac*,irin# n,clear !eapons. )3e4 are bot3 !ron#. Bltimatel4H co,ntries !ill act in !3at t3e4 percei+e to be t3eir strate#ic self-interest. )3e actions of Nort3 :orea and Iran s,##est t3at co,ntries t3at feel t3reatened b4 t3e Bnited 8tates (bot3 Nort3 :orea and Iran !ere named part of t3e axis of e+il in President 1,s35s 2992 8tate of t3e Bnion address) 3a+e tremendo,s incenti+es to ac*,ire n,clear !eapons as per3aps t3e onl4 !a4 to deter t3e Bnited 8tates from en#a#in# in preempti+e re#ime c3an#e. )3at t3e Bnited 8tates !as s,ccessf,l in cond,ctin# re#ime c3an#e a#ainst a non-n,clear Ira* (t3e ot3er co,ntr4 named in t3e axis of e+il) onl4 reinforces t3is incenti+e. "ini-n,2es are not t3e ans!er to tr4in# to deter t3e ,ndeterrableNt3at isH co,ntries actin# in t3eir o!n self-interestH partic,larl4 !3en t3e s,r+i+al of t3e re#ime is at sta2e. Nor are mini-n,2esH or n,clear !eapons in #eneralH li2el4 to deter con+entional conflict. )3e problem is t3at too man4 people expect too m,c3 of deterrence. It is often pointed o,t
t3at t3e B.8. n,clear arsenal did not deter 8addam E,ssein from in+adin# :,!ait in 1661. 1,t deterrence isn5t intended to pre+ent an4 and all possible actions co,nter to B.8. interests or desires. Cat3erH deterrence is abo,t pre+entin# anot3er co,ntr4 from en#a#in# in actions t3at !o,ld be catastrop3ic to t3e Bnited 8tates. (nd t3e B.8. strate#ic n,clear arsenal ser+es as a credible deterrent a#ainst direct n,clear attac2 or ot3er catastrop3ic action b4 anot3er nation-state. Bltimatel4H mini-n,2es co,ld ,ndermine deterrence and ma2e t3e Bnited 8tates less sec,reH especiall4 !3en combined !it3 a polic4 of preempti+e re#ime c3an#e. If ro#,e states belie+e t3at t3e Bnited 8tates 3as a n,clear capabilit4 t3at it is !illin# to ,se preempti+el4H leaders of t3ose co,ntries ma4 feel t3e4 3a+e not3in# to lose b4 stri2in# first at t3e Bnited 8tates (2no!in# t3at !aitin# means certain defeat). If t3e4 possess 7"& and are !illin# to #i+e t3ose !eapons to terroristsNbeca,se bein# dead men !al2in# red,ces or remo+es all pre+io,s restraints to !or2 !it3 terroristsNt3en t3e Bnited 8tates !ill be +,lnerable to potentiall4 catastrop3ic attac2s t3at can neit3er be deterred nor ade*,atel4 defended a#ainst.
/re-emption prolif' kills deterrence' causes terror

Pe8a 09
(C3arles ?.-H director of defense polic4 st,dies at t3e Cato Instit,teH No+. 16H Cato Polic4 (nal4sisH I"ini-N,2es and Preempti+e Polic4K ( &an#ero,s CombinationJH T466H !!!.cato.or#$p,bs$pas$pa466.pdfL Macob) )3e realit4 is t3at mini-n,2es !on5t deter co,ntries from ta2in# actions t3at t3e4 percei+e to be in t3eir self-interestH s,c3 as t3e ac*,isition of n,clear !eapons t3o,#3t to be t3e onl4 !a4 to deter t3e Bnited 8tates from en#a#in# in preempti+e re#ime c3an#e. (nd neit3er !ill arms control a#reements and a nonproliferation re#ime. In t3e final anal4sisH mini-n,2es and preemption are a dan#ero,s combination t3at co,ld ,ndermine deterrence and ma2e t3e Bnited 8tates less sec,re. If ro#,e state leaders belie+e t3at t3e Bnited 8tates 3as tar#eted t3em for re#ime c3an#eNre#ardless of an4 actions t3e4 mi#3t ta2e s3ort of abdicatin# po!er to a ne! leader deemed acceptable b4 t3e Bnited 8tatesNand is !illin# to ,se n,clear !eapons preempti+el4H t3e4 ma4 feel t3e4 3a+e not3in# to lose b4 ,sin# !3at t3e4 canNincl,din# 7"&Nto stri2e at t3e Bnited 8tates first. 46
Caldebate.com

<,rt3ermoreH if ro#,e state leaders do not possess t3e lon#-ran#e militar4 capabilit4 to directl4 attac2 t3e Bnited 8tatesH and if preempti+e re#ime c3an#e is t3o,#3t to be ine+itableH t3e nat,ral barriers for t3ose leaders to form alliances !it3 terrorist or#aniGations !ill be eroded and t3e incenti+e for t3em to see terrorismNand possibl4 s,ppl4in# terrorists !it3 7"&Nas t3e onl4 !a4 to retaliate a#ainst t3e Bnited 8tates !ill increase.
/re-emption 9 bunker busters : prolif

Pe8a 09
(C3arles ?.-H director of defense polic4 st,dies at t3e Cato Instit,teH No+. 16H Cato Polic4 (nal4sisH I"ini-N,2es and Preempti+e Polic4K ( &an#ero,s CombinationJH T466H !!!.cato.or#$p,bs$pas$pa466.pdfL Macob) (not3er ar#,ment made b4 critics of minin,2es is t3at t3e4 !o,ld pro+ide an incenti+e for co,ntries to ac*,ire n,clear !eapons. ( #ro,p of prominent n,clear !eapons scientistsH incl,din# Eans 1et3eH 8idne4 &rellH and Cic3ard /ar!inH !rote a letter to B.8. senators in "a4 2993H statin#K I)3e perception t3at t3e Bnited 8tates is p,rs,in# t3ese !eapons and considerin# t3eir ,se !o,ld #i+e le#itimac4 to t3e de+elopment of similar !eapons b4 ot3er co,ntriesH and !o,ld be an incenti+e to co,ntries . . . to de+elop t3eir o!n n,clear !eapons as a deterrent.J ' "ini-n,2e ad+ocatesH s,c3 as Pa4neH co,nterK IPotential enemies !ant 7"& for t3eir +er4 o!n reasonsNnot ;,st beca,se !e 3a+e a n,clear arsenal. )3e4 3a+e calc,lated t3at 7"& can ser+e t3eir political and militar4 p,rposes a#ainst re#ional foes or tr,mp B.8. con+entional militar4 ad+anta#es. If !e #a+e ,p n,clear researc3H or e+en o,r entire n,clear arsenalH ro#,es !o,ld still 3a+e t3e same incenti+es to ac*,ire 7"&.J - 1ot3 sides are partiall4 ri#3t. B.8. minin,2es !o,ld pro+ide increased impet,s for t3ose co,ntries to accelerate t3eir pro#rams to obtain n,clear !eapons. 1,t mini-n,2es per se !o,ld not be t3e dri+in# force. Cat3erH t3e 1,s3 administration5s polic4 of preempti+e re#ime c3an#e is !3at is creatin# stron# incenti+es for ro#,e states to ac*,ire n,clear !eapons in an effort to 3a+e some 3ope of bein# able to deter B.8. militar4 action. (s )ed /alen CarpenterH +ice president of defense and forei#n polic4 st,dies at t3e Cato Instit,teH obser+esK In 3is 2992 8tate of t3e Bnion addressH President 1,s3 explicitl4 lin2ed bot3 Nort3 :orea and Iran to Ira* in an Iaxis of e+il.J It !o,ld 3ardl4 be s,rprisin# if P4on#4an# and )e3ran concl,ded t3e4 !o,ld be next on 7as3in#ton5s 3it list ,nless t3e4 co,ld effecti+el4 deter an attac2. Yet neit3er co,ntr4 co,ld 3ope to matc3 t3e con+entional militar4 capabilities of a s,perpo!er. )3e most reliable deterrentNma4be t3e onl4 reliable deterrentNis to 3a+e n,clear !eapons. In ot3er !ordsH B.8. be3a+ior ma4 3a+e inad+ertentl4 created a po!erf,l incenti+e for n,clear !eapons proliferationN t3e last t3in# 7as3in#ton !anted to occ,r. 0 Nort3 :orea5s n,clear !eapons pro#ram 6 and alle#ations t3at Iran 3as !eapons #rade ,rani,m'9 s,pports t3is t3esis. IndeedH citin# a I3ostile polic4J a#ainst t3e Nort3 b4 t3e Bnited 8tatesH Nort3 :orea claimed it 3ad Imade a s!itc3o+er in t3e ,se of pl,toni,m c3,rned o,t b4 reprocessin# spent f,el rods in t3e direction UofV increasin# its n,clear deterrent force.J'1 In effectH Nort3 :orea is claimin# to be b,ildin# n,clear !eapons as a deterrent a#ainst t3e Bnited 8tates in direct response to a 3ostile B.8. polic4. Yet t3e mini-n,2e ad+ocates fail to #rasp t3e lo#ical implications of t3eir o!nNcorrectNconcl,sion. IndeedH ro#,e states 3a+e t3eir reasons for !antin# n,clear !eapons apart from B.8. de+elopment of mini-n,2es. @ne of t3e primar4 reasons is to deter B.8. militar4 actionH incl,din# preempti+e re#ime c3an#e. In ot3er !ordsH ro#,e states are actin# in t3eir percei+ed self-interest for p,rposes of s,r+i+al. If ac*,irin# n,clear !eapons is seen b4 leaders of ro#,e states as t3e onl4 possible !a4 to deter t3e Bnited 8tates and ens,re t3e re#ime5s contin,ed s,r+i+alH t3en B.8. mini-n,2es !ill 3a+e little effect in deterrin# ro#,e states from see2in# to ac*,ire s,c3 !eapons. )3ereforeH as lon# as preempti+e re#ime c3an#e is a core component of B.8. polic4H ro#,e states !ill li2el4 contin,e to p,rs,e n,clear !eapons de+elopment e+en if t3e Bnited 8tates de+elops and deplo4s minin,2es.
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Bunker busters wont decrease the rate of prolif
Pe8a 09
(C3arles ?.-H director of defense polic4 st,dies at t3e Cato Instit,teH No+. 16H Cato Polic4 (nal4sisH I"ini-N,2es and Preempti+e Polic4K ( &an#ero,s CombinationJH T466H !!!.cato.or#$p,bs$pas$pa466.pdfL Macob)
Nort3 :orea seems intent on becomin# a n,clear po!er e+en in t3e face of o+er!3elmin# B.8. con+entional militar4 and strate#ic n,clear s,periorit4. )3e Bnited 8tates alread4 3as t3e n,clear capabilit4 to destro4 t3e Nort35s n,clear and ot3er 7"& pro#ramsH albeit !it3 tremendo,s destr,ction and collateral dama#e. It is
not ob+io,s t3at a less destr,cti+e n,clear capabilit4 (b,t one t3at !o,ld still ca,se si#nificant dama#e) !o,ld 3a+e a #reater deterrent effect.
(nd despite B.8. con+entional b,n2erb,stin# capabilitiesH co,ntries s,c3 as Nort3 :orea contin,e to b,ild ,nder#ro,nd facilities. ( mini-n,2e capabilit4 to destro4 3ardened and deepl4-b,ried tar#ets !ill li2el4 res,lt in co,ntries simpl4 b,r4in# complexes deeper ,nder#ro,ndH ma2in# t3em more diffic,lt (if not impossible) to destro4. )3e res,lt is t3at a lar#er 4ield or deeper penetratin# !eapon !o,ld be needed in response. In t,rnH t3is !o,ld probabl4 #enerate a co,nterresponseNfor exampleH !idel4 dispersin# facilities or placin# t3em near ci+ilian facilities. 73ile not an arms raceH t3e Bnited 8tates co,ld find itself in a contin,o,s and potentiall4 expensi+e'2 action-reaction c4cle !it3 no real militar4 or deterrent benefit. )3e ans!erH 3o!e+erH is not a more rob,st arms control strate#4 or nonproliferation re#ime. Cat3erH t3e Bnited 8tates m,st come to #rips !it3 t3e fact t3at it ma4 not be possible to pre+ent co,ntries s,c3 as Nort3 :orea and Iran from e+ent,all4 ac*,irin# n,clear !eapons. (nd it is important to ,nderstand t3ese co,ntries5 moti+ations for
!antin# s,c3 !eapons. It is not necessaril4 t3e case t3at socalled ro#,e states see2 n,clear !eapons beca,se t3e4 !ant to attac2H t3reatenH or blac2mail t3e Bnited 8tates. Ce#ional po!er is often t3e most po!erf,l moti+ation for an4 co,ntr45s *,est for n,clear !eaponsNt3is is clearl4 t3e case !it3 bot3 India5s and Pa2istan5s n,clear capabilitiesH as !ell as Israel5s. (nd it is certainl4 eas4 to ,nderstand !34 co,ntries !o,ld !ant n,clear !eapons to deter t3e Bnited 8tates from preempti+e re#ime c3an#e.
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(un5er (usters- /'e6 Don7t :or5 (1 of 2)

Bunker busters : useless
Pe8a 09
(C3arles ?.-H director of defense polic4 st,dies at t3e Cato Instit,teH No+. 16H Cato Polic4 (nal4sisH I"ini-N,2es and Preempti+e Polic4K ( &an#ero,s CombinationJH T466H !!!.cato.or#$p,bs$pas$pa466.pdfL Macob) )3e stron#est ar#,ment a#ainst minin,2es is tec3nical. Critics c3allen#e t3e notion of I,sabilit4HJ t3at isH t3at t3e dama#e Npartic,larl4 collateral dama#eNca,sed b4 s,c3 !eapons !o,ld be relati+el4 minimal. (n extensi+e st,d4 b4 Cobert 7. NelsonH a p34sicist at Princeton Bni+ersit4 and senior fello! at t3e Co,ncil on <orei#n CelationsH concl,dedK ( lo!-4ield n,clear EP7 Ueart3-penetratin# !eaponV !o,ld still onl4 be able to destro4 facilities relati+el4 close to t3e s,rface. &espite t3e increased co,plin# of a b,ried explosionH e+en a 1-2iloton n,clear !eapon cannot destro4 a str,ct,re protected b4 more t3an abo,t 39 mUetersV of concrete from t3e point of detonation. ?er4 lar#e 4ield Uat least 199-2tV !eapons are still re*,ired to destro4 facilities b,ried ,nder t3e e*,i+alent of 199 m of concrete. )3e penetration capabilit4 of 2inetic ener#4 !eapons is limited b4 t3e stren#t3 of t3e missile casin#H and t3e abilit4 of t3e !eapon components to !it3stand t3e s3oc2 associated !it3 #ro,nd impact. 7e 3a+e s3o!n t3at 3-meter lon# missilesH constr,cted from t3e 3ardest steelsH cannot penetrate deeper t3an abo,t 12 m of reinforced concrete. ( n,clear explosion at t3is dept3 !ill simpl4 blo! o,t a lar#e crater and #enerate radioacti+e material !3ic3 rains do!n on t3e local pop,lation as fallo,t. Nelson also ,sed act,al data from s3allo!b,ried n,clear tests (named IPlo!s3areJ) cond,cted in t3e earl4 16'9s to ill,strate t3e effects of ,sin# a lo!-4ield !eapon a#ainst an ,nder#ro,nd tar#etK I( one 2iloton !eapon detonated at a dept3 of 39 meters in dr4 soil or soft roc2 !ill prod,ce a crater !it3 an apparent radi,s . . . more t3an a football field in diameter . . . and !it3 an extended lip of e;ecta t!o to t3ree times t3is radi,s. 1et!een 19 to 9] of t3e total mass e;ected from t3e crater settles as local radioacti+e fallo,t.J33 I)3e 2.3 2iloton Cabriolet Plo!s3are test !as b,ried at a dept3 of 2 meters. It prod,ced a crater 3' m deep and 119 m in diameter. )3e 3i#3l4 radioacti+e base s,r#e reac3ed a diameter of approximatel4 2. U2ilometersV.J34
Nelson also calc,lates t3at a Ione 2iloton eart3-penetratin# Wminin,2e5 ,sed in a t4pical t3ird-!orld ,rban en+ironment !o,ld spread a let3al dose of radioacti+e fallo,t o+er se+eral s*,are 2ilometersH res,ltin# in tens of t3o,sands ci+ilian cas,alties.J3 In anot3er report for t3e <ederation of (merican 8cientistsH Nelson statesK IIn order to be f,ll4 containedH n,clear explosions at t3e Ne+ada )est 8ite m,st be b,ried at a dept3 of ' 9 feet for a 2iloton explosi+eN1399 feet for a 199-2iloton explosi+e. E+en t3enH t3ere are man4 doc,mented cases !3ere caref,ll4 sealed s3afts r,pt,red and released radioacti+it4 to t3e local en+ironment.J3'
)3,sH t3e empirical data s,##ests t3at e+en relati+el4 lo!-4ield !eapons detonated at a dept3 #reater t3an !3at 1=B-113 eart3-penetratin# !ar3ead can ac3ie+e !ill prod,ce si#nificant blast dama#e t3at is not contained belo! t3e s,rfaceH as !ell as fairl4 !idespread radioacti+e fallo,t. In ot3er !ordsH it is not li2el4 to be a IcleanH +er4 precise stri2eHJ !3ic3 is 3o! retired (ir <orce /en. =arr4 7elc3 (and a former (ir <orce c3ief of staff) defended t3e ,sabilit4 of mini-n,2es.3Interestin#l4 eno,#3H alt3o,#3 =os (lamos5 8tep3en Yo,n#er ar#,ed t3at more precise smaller 4ield n,clear !eapons mi#3t be able to destro4 certain tar#ets t3at c,rrentl4 re*,ire a lar#e 4ieldH 3e did not ori#inall4 ar#,e t3at mini-n,2es co,ld be ,sed a#ainst 3ardened and deepl4 b,ried str,ct,resK I8ome +er4 3ard tar#ets re*,ire 3i#3 4ield to destro4 t3em. No application of con+entional explosi+es or e+en lo!er4ield n,clear explosi+es !ill destro4 s,c3 tar#etsH !3ic3 mi#3t incl,de 3ardened str,ct,res b,ried beneat3 3,ndreds of feet of eart3 or roc2 Ue.#.H ca+esV.J I8,per3ard tar#etsH s,c3 as t3ose fo,nd ,nder certain C,ssian mo,ntainsH ma4 not be able to be defeated reliabl4 b4 e+en 3i#3-4ield n,clear !eapons.J30 8oH e+en a s,pporter of t3e mini-n,2e concept ac2no!led#es its potentiall4 limited ,tilit4 and effecti+eness a#ainst t3e +er4 tar#ets t3at mini-n,2e ad+ocates claim s,c3 !eapons !o,ld be ,sed to destro4.
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(un5er (usters- /'e6 Don7t :or5 (2 of 2)

Bunker buster nuclear weapons fail because of impact velocity
:einber# 02
(8te+en-H Prof. of P34sics O B) (,stinH "a4 1'H 8enate <orei#n Celations Committee) <or instanceH t3e N,clear Post,re Ce+ie! calls for t3e de+elopment of lo! 4ield eart3 penetratin# n,clear !eapons for attac2s on ,nder#ro,nd facilities. )3ere are #reat tec3nical diffic,lties 3ereH !3ic3 mi#3t pre+ent o,r ,sin# s,c3 a !eapon e+en if !e 3ad it. Calc,lations b4 Cobert 7. Nelson of Princeton Bni+ersit4 s3o! t3at an eart3-penetratin# !eapon cannot be dri+en do!n to a dept3 #reater t3an abo,t fo,r times its len#t3 in concrete. Increasin# t3e +elocit4 of impact be4ond a certain point ;,st ca,ses t3e !eapon to cr,mpleH so t3at t3e dept3 of penetration decreases rat3er t3an increasin#. )3is sets an ,pper limit on t3e dept3 of penetration of abo,t 09 feet for a !eapon t3at is t!ice t3e len#t3 of o,r present 1'1-11 eart3-penetratin# n,clear !eapon. )3e act,al dept3 t3at ma4 be reac3ed in practice ma4 be considerabl4 lessH beca,se t3e +elocit4 of penetration m,st be 2ept lo! eno,#3 to preser+e t3e !eapon5s electronics. No!H an 09 foot dept3 is s,fficient to p,t most of t3e ener#4 of t3e explosion into a destr,cti+e ,nder#ro,nd blast !a+eH b,t e+en so a 1 2iloton explosion !o,ld onl4 destro4 t,nnels t3at are at dept3s considerabl4 less t3an 399 feetH !it3 t3e precise ran#e sensiti+e to #eolo#ical details t3at !e are not li2el4 to 2no!. )o 3a+e confidence t3at t3e ,nder#ro,nd tar#et 3ad been destro4ed !e !o,ld 3a+e to 3a+e troops on t3e #ro,nd an4!a4H so t3at a missile attac2 mi#3t not e+en be necessar4.
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(un5er (usters- /'e67re Pointless- ?on+entional :eapons -ol+e

#onventional weapons work better than bunker-busters
:is%onsin >ni+ersit6 :ire 0,
(<eb. 11) )3e fact t3at an effecti+e alternati+e to CNEP !eapons exists ma2es it clear t3at f,ndin# for t3ese missiles is ,nnecessar4. Mames @. Ellis Mr.H former 3ead of B.8. 8trate#ic CommandH said in 2993 t3at smartH precision-#,ided con+entional m,nitions co,ld seal off deepl4 b,ried tar#ets. No reason can ;,stif4 spendin# taxpa4er mone4 on CNEPs !3en t3ere is a safeH effecti+e and less costl4 alternati+e alread4 a+ailable.
#onventional weapons are effective at penetrating bunkers

elson 01
(<ederation of (merican 8cientistsH ?ol. 4 No. 1H 3ttpK$$!!!.fas.or#$faspir$2991$+ 4n1$!eapons.3tm) )3e Penta#on alread4 3as a n,mber of con+entional !eapons capable of destro4in# 3ardened tar#ets b,ried !it3in approximatel4 9 feet of t3e s,rface. )3e most !ell-2no!n of t3ese is t3e /1B-20 de+eloped and deplo4ed in t3e final !ee2s of t3e air campai#n in t3e /,lf 7ar. )3e (ir <orce !as initiall4 ,nable to destro4 a !ell-protected b,n2er nort3 of 1a#3dad after repeated direct 3its. )3e 4999 lb /1B-20 !as created from a +er4 3ea+4 s,rpl,s (rm4 ei#3t-inc3 #,n t,be filled !it3 con+entional explosi+e and a modified laser #,idance 2it. It destro4ed t3e b,n2erH !3ic3 !as protected b4 more t3an 39 feet of eart3H concrete and 3ardened steel. )3e precisionH penetratin# capabilit4H and explosi+e po!er of t3ese con+entional !eapons 3as impro+ed dramaticall4 o+er t3e last decadeH and t3ese trends !ill certainl4 contin,e. IndeedH t3e /1B-3- #,ided bombH a s,ccessor to t3e /1B-20H is alread4 t3o,#3t to be capable of disablin# a silo based IC1" N a tar#et formerl4 t3o,#3t +,lnerable onl4 to n,clear attac2. In t3e near f,t,reH t3e Bnited 8tates !ill deplo4 ne! classes of 3ard tar#et penetrators !3ic3 can land !it3in one to t!o meters of t3eir tar#ets.
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(un5er (usters- /estin# Prolif

Testing causes a wave of proliferation across the globe
Paine ==
(8r. Cesearc3er NC&CH 3ttpK$$!!!.cl!.or#$p,b$cl!$coalition$nrdctalltales1966.3tm) )3e most #larin# !ea2ness of t3e test ban opponents5 letter is its fail,re to examine caref,ll4 [ or e+en consider [ t3e !ider reperc,ssions of t3e action it espo,ses. )3is is a c3aracteristic failin# of ideolo#,es do!n t3ro,#3 t3e cent,riesH and it ,s,all4 c,lminates in disaster. Ce;ection of t3e test ban treat4 b4 t3e 8enateNco,pled !it3 impendin# or act,al res,mption of B.8. test explosionsN!o,ld tri##er rene!ed n,clear explosi+e testin# b4 C,ssiaH C3inaH IndiaH and Pa2istan. <rom t3ereH it is impossible to predict !3ere t3e action-reaction c4cle of proliferation mi#3t t,rn next. ( f,ll blo!n n,clear arms race bet!een India and Pa2istan !o,ld f,rt3er impo+eris3 and destabiliGe bot3 co,ntriesH !it3 an increasin# li2eli3ood of a reactionar4 Islamic #o+ernment comin# to po!er in Pa2istanH and t3e possibilit4 t3at s,c3 an isolatedH extremistH and impo+eris3ed re#ime !o,ld 3a+e stron# economic and political incenti+es to s3are its n,clear tec3nolo#4 !it3 a !ealt3ier Islamic f,ndamentalist state. If s,c3 a n,clear t3reat appeared alon# t3e so,t3ern littoral of E,ropeH res,mption of testin# b4 <rance and t3e Bnited :in#dom !o,ld seem ine+itable. <aced !it3 s,c3 a t3reatH Israel !o,ld eit3er test openl4 to demonstrate its deterrent capabilit4H orH as it 3as in t3e pastH la,nc3 a preempti+e attac2 to depri+e an4 3ostile po!er in its re#ion of a n,clear option. 8,c3 a catastrop3ic re+ersal for t3e #lobal nonproliferation re#ime !o,ld e+iscerate B.8. and allied moral and political standin# to mobiliGe opposition to dan#ero,s f,t,re n,clear de+elopmentsH and t3,s pro+ide tacit license for f,t,re Nort3 :oreanH IranianH and Ira*i n,clear testsH and t3en b4 potentiall4 at least a 3alf doGen ot3er c,rrent non!eapon states 3a+in# n,clear capabilities and a record of mot3balled or abandoned clandestine n,clear !eapon pro#rams. )3is list incl,des (r#entinaH 1raGilH 8o,t3 (fricaH )ai!anH 8o,t3 :oreaH and e+enH at one timeH 8!eden. (nd lest !e for#etH ad+anced n,clear non-!eapon statesNs,c3 as /erman4 and Mapan [ are f,ll4 capable of desi#nin# and prod,cin# n,clear !eapons in t3e e+ent t3at t3e 8enate commits t3e colossal bl,nder of +otin# do!n t3e treat4 and spar2in# t3e disastro,s c3ain reaction o,tlined abo+e.
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?'e%'n6a -%enario
A! The pre-emption doctrine will give 5ussia carte-blanche to launch pre-emptive strikes against #hechen rebels!
Efron ) :illiams 02
(8onni-H 8taff 7riter for =.(. )imesH Carol M.-H 8taff 7riter for =.(. )imesH 8ept. 26H )3e CecordH I8tri2e firstH tal2 laterL 7ill preempti+e attac2 polic4 3elp or 3,rt B.8. interestsRJH =exisL Macob)
1,s3 doctrine co,ld enco,ra#e C,ssia to claim a similar ri#3t to preempti+e militar4 action to defeat t3e C3ec3en separatists it calls terroristsH and to defend so,t3ern C,ssian re#ions from crossborder inc,rsions bein# sta#ed from !it3in /eor#ia.
( senior administration official dismissed t3e idea t3at C,ssia or India co,ld credibl4 in+o2e t3e 1,s3 doctrine to la,nc3 preempti+e stri2es on C3ec3n4a or :as3mir. QIt isnPt #oin# to be considered a le#itimate ar#,ment if it is clearl4 a co+er for na2ed a##ressionHQ t3e official said. Q(nd t3at is a ;,d#ment t3at ... t3e !orld comm,nit4 !ill easil4 ma2e in a case !3ere t3erePs eit3er an ,nderl4in# political disp,te t3at co,ld be resol+ed ... or !3ere t3ere are ot3er means b4 !3ic3 to resol+e t3e conflict.Q
"an4 E,ropeans fear t3e
B.N. /eneral (ssembl4 on notice t3at 3is sec,rit4 forces !ere preparin# to expand t3e !ar a#ainst international terrorism b4 la,nc3in# preempti+e stri2es a#ainst C3ec3en militants and t3eir alle#ed forei#n bac2ers ta2in# ref,#e in /eor#iaPs remote Pan2isi /or#e. B.8. officials *,ic2l4 s3ot do!n "osco!Ps plan !it3 !arnin#s t3at /eor#ian independence and territorial inte#rit4 m,st be respected. 1,t t3e 1,s3 administration !ill 3a+e mo,ntin# diffic,lties !it3 t3e :remlin if it attempts to in+o2e its o!n ri#3t to pre+enti+e action !3ile den4in# "osco!Ps Qme tooQ reaction.
C,ssian President ?ladimir ?. P,tin last !ee2 p,t t3e
B! $uclear war
?o'en =6
((riel-H P3.&.H 8enior Polic4 (nal4st O t3e Eerita#e <o,ndationH Man. 2 H Eerita#e <o,ndation CeportsH I)3e Ne! W/reat /ame5K @il Politics in t3e Ca,cas,s and Central (siaH T19' H 3ttpK$$!!!.3erita#e.or#$Cesearc3$C,ssiaandE,rasia$1/19' .cfmL Macob) ",c3 is at sta2e in E,rasia for t3e B.8. and its allies. (ttempts to restore its empire !ill doom C,ssiaPs transition to a democrac4 and free-mar2et econom4. )3e on#oin# !ar in C3ec3n4a alone 3as cost C,ssia A' billion to date (e*,al to C,ssiaPs I"< and 7orld 1an2 loans for 166 ). "oreo+erH it 3as extracted a tremendo,s price from C,ssian societ4. )3e !ars !3ic3 !o,ld be re*,ired to restore t3e C,ssian empire !o,ld pro+e m,c3 more costl4 not ;,st for C,ssia and t3e re#ionH b,t for peaceH !orld stabilit4H and sec,rit4. (s t3e former 8o+iet arsenals are spread t3ro,#3o,t t3e NI8H t3ese conflicts ma4 escalate to incl,de t3e ,se of !eapons of mass destr,ction. 8cenarios incl,din# ,na,t3oriGed missile la,nc3es are especiall4 t3reatenin#. "oreo+erH if s,ccessf,lH a reconstit,ted C,ssian empire !o,ld become a ma;or destabiliGin# infl,ence bot3 in E,rasia and t3ro,#3o,t t3e !orld. It !o,ld endan#er not onl4 C,ssiaPs nei#3borsH b,t also t3e B.8. and its allies in E,rope and t3e "iddle East. (ndH of co,rseH a neoimperialist C,ssia co,ld imperil t3e oil reser+es of t3e Persian /,lf.1
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?'e%'n6a - >D-D Pre-emption Russian Pre-emption

/re-emption war in #hechnya
Roberts 02
(Pa,l Crai#-H @lin <ello! O t3e Instit,te for Political Econom4H <mr. (ssist. 8ecretar4 of t3e B.8. )reas,r4H &ec. 'H IPreemption for (llDJH 3ttpK$$!!!.anti!ar.com$roberts$Rarticleid%411'L Macob) @n &ec. 3H C,ssian President ?ladimir =. P,tin replied to 1,s3Ps Ealifax speec3 b4 declarin# 1,s3Ps polic4 Qdictatorial and 34pocritical.Q C,ssiaPs leader !arned t3at policies Qbased on t3e barrac2-room principles of a ,nipolar !orld appear to be extremel4 dan#ero,s.Q C,ssian (ir <orce commander /eneral ?ladimir "i23ailo+ anno,nced t3at C,ssiaH tooH can en#a#e in preempti+e attac2s. C,ssia 3as informed nei#3borin# /eor#ia t3at C,ssia mi#3t ,se cr,ise missiles and strate#ic bombers in pre+enti+e stri2es a#ainst C3ec3en terrorists s3elterin# on /eor#ian territor4. 1,s3Ps insane doctrine of preempti+e !ar promises a 21st cent,r4 more blood4 t3an t3e 29t3.
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?'e%'n6a - Russian Pre-emption

Piont5o!s56 ==
u%lear -tri5e
5ussian pre-emption in #hechnya will entail a nuclear strike

((ndrei-H &irector of Center for 8trate#ic 8t,diesH 8ept. 20H Pacific Ne!s 8er+icesH IC,ssia /oes N,clear @+er C3ec3n4aJH 3ttpK$$!!!.pacificne!s.or#$;inn$stories$ .16$669620-c3ec3n4a.3tml)
toda4 C,ssian strate#ists and ;o,rnalists are serio,sl4 disc,ssin# ,sin# t3ermon,clear !eapons a#ainst C3ec3n4a.
PN8 commentator (ndrei Piont2o!s24H !3o 3olds a doctorate in applied mat3H 3eads t3e Center for 8trate#ic 8t,diesH a "osco!based t3in2-tan2H and 3as !ritten !idel4 on n,clear sec,rit4 iss,es. (t a seminar I attended recentl4 in t3e 8tate &,ma of t3e C,ssian <ederationH se+eral participants disc,ssedH in all serio,snessH t3e possibilit4 of ,sin# t3ermon,clear !eapons in C3ec3n4a. I spo2e a#ainst t3isH ar#,in# s,c3 an act !o,ld be abs,rd and s,icidalH b,t I co,ld not s3a2e off a feelin# of ,nrealit4. "4 o!n ar#,ments seemed craG4 and ,n!ort34H beca,se it !as dis3onorable ;,st to be ta2in# part in s,c3 a disc,ssion. @n t3e front pa#e of C,ssiaPs most pop,lar ne!spaper I readH QC3ec3n4a s3o,ld be presented !it3 an
( decade a#oH no one in C,ssia !o,ld 3a+e dared spea2 of t3e p34sical extermination of a !3ole race. 1,t
,ltimat,mK Eit3er t3e4 cease all militar4 action on C,ssian territor4H or t3e4 face t3e p34sical extermination of t3e !3ole rep,blic ,sin# strate#ic air stri2esH biolo#ical !eaponsH ps4c3otropic #asesH napalm and e+er4t3in# at t3e disposal of o,r once po!erf,l arm4.
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?'inese ationalism -%enario (1 of 2)

A! The pre-emption doctrine emboldens #hinese hard-liners!
Efron ) :illiams 02
(8onni-H 8taff 7riter for =.(. )imesH Carol M.-H 8taff 7riter for =.(. )imesH 8ept. 26H )3e CecordH I8tri2e firstH tal2 laterL 7ill preempti+e attac2 polic4 3elp or 3,rt B.8. interestsRJH =exisL Macob) Critics sa4 t3e doctrinePs assertion of a ri#3t to sta#e preempti+e attac2s on terrorists and ro#,e nations co,ld be ,sed b4 C,ssiaH IndiaH Pa2istanH and ot3er nations to claim a similar ri#3t to self-defense in tinderboxes across t3eir borders. @t3ers !orr4 t3e doctrine mi#3t stren#t3en t3e 3and of C3inese 3ard-liners !3o alread4 belie+e t3at t3e Bnited 8tates is ,sin# its Q!ar on terrorismQ as an opport,nit4 to expand its militar4 presence on C3inaPs perip3er4.
B! They will block ;u and (ens reforms!

-tratfor 0,
(No+. 19H 3ttpK$$!!!.stratfor.com$prod,cts$premi,m$readXarticle.p3pRid%2 023 )
(s 1ei;in# no! prepares to tac2le t3e +er4 real problem of internal ine*,it4H it a#ain see2s a respite from B.8. press,re. C3inaPs leaders3ip 3as s,##ested it can onl4 proceed !it3 economicH social and e+en political reforms if t3e Bnited 8tates 2eeps press,re on C3ina to a minim,m. )3e idea is t3at Qconser+ati+eQ or Q3ard-lineQ forces are !aitin# in t3e !in#sH see2in# an opport,nit4 to ,ndermine 1ei;in#Ps ne! Qpro#ressi+eQ policies. )3,sH if B.8. t3reats and press,res -- be t3e4 economicH political or militar4 in nat,re -- #i+e t3ese reactionar4 forces t3e opport,nit4H t3ese forces !ill c,rtail t3e ne! economic and strate#ic policies of C3inaPs c,rrent leaders3ipH and per3aps e+en restore a polic4 of confrontation instead of cooperation.
#! 5eforms solve the urban-rural divide

(a5er 06
(8r. (nal4st O 8tratforH "arc3 0H IC3inaK Cidin# t3e C,ral )i#erJH 3ttpK$$!!!.stratfor.com$prod,cts$premi,m$ readXarticle.p3pR id%2'3149) )3e coastal pro+inces and cities became t3e focal points for international in+estments in man,fact,rin#H as in+estors exploited preferential #o+ernment policies and c3eap labor. )3e r,ral areas -- traditionall4 t3e bac2bone of C3inaPs econom4 -- and t3e petrole,m and 3ea+4 ind,str4 of t3e nort3east (!3ic3 3ad been core to earl4 Comm,nist C3inese economics) faded in rele+ance. )3o,#3 1ei;in# occasionall4 promoted more inland de+elopment and in+estment opport,nitiesH #eo#rap34 and a lac2 of infrastr,ct,re made t3ese ,nappealin# to in+estors. )3e concentration of !ealt3 in t3e coastal re#ions !as a so,rce of minor social tensionsH b,t restrictions on internal mi#ration 2ept a b,ffer bet!een r,ral and ,rban pop,lationsH and social frictions remained comparati+el4 lo!. )3ese restrictionsH 3o!e+erH 3a+e been onl4 selecti+el4 enforced as of lateH and man4 are bein# lifted. )3e boomin# coastal economies created clear opport,nities for corr,ption. (s pro+incial and local Part4 cadre and political leaders became t3e #ate2eepers for forei#n in+estmentsH t3e4 also became mini-emperors of t3eir o!n economic fiefdoms. Coll,sion and nepotism -- al!a4s a part of C3inese political societ4 -- became e+en more entrenc3ed as t3e mone4 flo!ed in. 7it3 t3e central #o+ernment fixated on #ro!t3H t3e best-performin# local leaders !ere re!arded. )3e more forei#n capital t3e4 !ere able to attractH t3e #reater t3eir personal infl,ence and ta2in#s. )3ese officials !ere not meas,red on efficienc4 or profitabilit4H b,t on total flo!-t3ro,#3 of capitalH rates of #ro!t3H emplo4ment and social stabilit4. 6
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)3is partl4 explains !34 attempts b4 t3e pre+io,s #o+ernment to address t3e ,ne*,al de+elopment in C3ina failed. Eac3 time former President Mian# Yemin or former Premier Y3, Con#;i tried to ad;,st policies and financial flo!s to t3e interiorH t3ere !ere stron# ob;ections from t3e !ealt3ier coastal pro+inces. 73en t3e4 la,nc3ed anti-corr,ption campai#nsH t3e #raft t3eir in+esti#ators ,nco+ered !as deep and !ideH and in some cases e+en t3reatened to reac3 ,p to t3e top ec3elons of po!er -- at times implicatin# Mian# 3imself. )3is onl4 f,rt3er entrenc3ed t3e problem and remo+ed incenti+es for Mian# and Y3, to actL after allH bot3 !ere part of t3e so-called 83an#3ai cli*,e and deri+ed t3eir political s,pport from t3e coastal re#ions.
?'inese ationalism -%enario (2 of 2)

Bnder t3ese t!o leadersH t3e #o+ernment !as m,c3 more s,ccessf,l in red,cin# t3e independence of t3e militar4H as neit3er Mian# nor Y3, 3ad si#nificant ties into t3e instit,tion. 1,t beca,se t3e economic and political elite in t3e coastal re#ions !ere t3e so,rce of t3e central leaders3ipPs po!erH t3e4 !ere able to repel reforms so,#3t b4 t3e central #o+ernment. )3is all c3an#ed !it3 t3e comin# of E, and 7enH bot3 of !3om are from r,ral areas. 7enH a perennial political s,r+i+or 2no!n for 3is abilit4 to connect !it3 t3e Qcommon manHQ 3as been practicall4 deified amon# r,ral-d!ellers on acco,nt of 3is 194ear-old coat. )3at t3e premier still !ears t3e same coat after 19 4ears is a clear si#n (accordin# to ample co+era#e b4 t3e ne!s media and blo# sites) of 3is care for t3e peopleH rat3er t3an for 3imself. Eerein lies t3e secret of E, and 7enPs strate#4 to re#ain control o+er t3e local and re#ional #o+ernments and Part4 officials. 73ereas Mian# and Y3, tried ,sin# anti-corr,ption campai#ns -- onl4 to end ,p implicatin# t3emsel+es and t3eir core s,pporters -- E, and 7en are mo+in# to 3arness t3e po!er of C3inaPs r,ral masses. &ependin# on !3ic3 C3inese official 4o, belie+eH t3is is a mass of 3,manit4 n,mberin# from -99 million to 6 9 million people. E+en at t3e lo! end of t3e estimatesH 3o!e+erH r,ral-d!ellers ma2e ,p more t3an 3alf of C3inaPs pop,lation -- and #reatl4 o,tn,mber t3e 399 million middle- and ,pperclass C3inese li+in# mainl4 in 1ei;in# and t3e coastal cities.
*! Thats key to prevent a collapse of the ##/

(i 09
(P3&. in Poli 8ci O Cant,rb,r4H "arc3 1H Ne! Yealand International =a! Ce+ie!H I)3e C3inese =eaders3ip 8,ccessionJ) If t3e C3inese leaders do not adopt appropriate and effecti+e meas,res to deal !it3 t3e potentiall4 exacerbated social and economic problems and a deepenin# crisis of #o+ernanceH t3e comm,nists !ill lose t3eir po!er and t3e co,ntr4 co,ld e+en collapse) It appears t3at some sc3olars 3a+e made s,c3 sensational predictions ;,st to raise alarm. Eo!e+erH t3eir predictions co,ld come tr,e if t3e ne! C3inese leaders dra# t3eir feet on instit,tin# necessar4 reformsH mainl4 in t3e political arena.
.! The imact is war and Asian prolif

Yee ) -tore6 02
(Prof. of I.C. O Eon# :on# B.H Prof. of I.C. O &ea2in B.H )3e C3ina )3reatK PerceptionsH "4t3sH and Cealit4H P. ) )3e fo,rt3 factor contrib,tin# to t3e perception of a C3ina t3reat is t3e fear of political and economic collapse in t3e PCC res,ltin# in territorial fra#mentationH ci+il !ar and !a+es of ref,#ees po,rin# into nei#3bo,rin# co,ntries. Nat,rall4H an4 or all of t3ese scenarios !o,ld 3a+e a profo,ndl4 ne#ati+e impact on re#ional stabilit4. )oda4 t3e C3inese leaders3ip faces a raft of internal problemsH incl,din# t3e increasin# political demands of its citiGensH a #ro!in# pop,lationH a s3orta#e of nat,ral reso,rces and a deterioration in t3e nat,ral en+ironment ca,sed b4 rapid ind,strialisation and poll,tion. )3ese problems are p,ttin# a strain on t3e central #o+ernmentPs abilit4 to #o+ern effecti+el4. Political disinte#ration or a C3inese ci+il !ar mi#3t res,lt in millions of C3inese ref,#ees fleein# to nei#3borin# co,ntries. 8,c3 an ,nprecedented re#ime collapse !o,ld no do,bt p,t a se+ere strain on t3e reso,rces of C3inaPs nei#3bo,rs. ( fra#mented C3ina co,ld also res,lt in anot3er ni#3tmare scenario - n,clear !eapons fallin# into t3e 3ands of irresponsible local pro+incial leaders or !arlords. 2 <rom t3is perspecti+eH a disinte#ratin# C3ina !o,ld also pose a t3reat to its nei#3bo,rs and t3e !orld.
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?$b -%enario
/re-emption counterbalancing collapsing American primacy
@udis 09
(Mo3n 1.-H M,ne 6H )3e Ne! Cep,blicH IEistor4 =essonJH =exisL Macob)
administrationPs re;ection of international instit,tionsH its readiness to !a#e a##ressi+eH pre+enti+e !ars to dominate a +ital re#ionH and its protectionist trade strate#4 3a+e alread4 aro,sed considerable pop,lar opposition--not ;,st in s,rro,ndin# (rab nationsH b,t in E,rope and (sia as !ell. In recent elections in co,ntries as di+erse as 1el#i,mH /erman4H 8painH 8o,t3 :oreaH and Pa2istanH t3e parties most identified !it3 opposition to B.8. forei#n polic4 emer#ed +ictorio,s. )3is pop,lar opposition is alread4 spar2in# a c3allen#e to B.8. 3e#emon4. Initiall4H s,c3 a c3allen#e is ta2in# t3e form of terrorism b4 Islamic radicals--as4mmetric militar4 c3allen#esH in t3e c,rrent ;ar#on--and of !3at political scientists call Qsoft balancin#.Q )3ese latter tactics foc,s on economic polic4 and on diplomac4 in t3e Bnited NationsH natoH and ot3er international or#aniGations. In
response to B.8. steel tariffsH t3e E,ropean Bnion 3as con+inced t3e 7orld )rade @r#aniGation to r,le a#ainst t3eir le#alit4 and 3as ref,sed to remo+e its ban on #eneticall4 modified food imports. EB 3ostilit4 to t3e Bnited 8tates also contrib,ted to t3e fail,re of last <ebr,ar4Ps 7orld )rade @r#aniGation ne#otiations in )o24o. (lsoH accordin# to Cox Ne!sH Q"an4 ",slim clerics (3a+e be#,n) demandin#
t3at (rab co,ntries sell oil for e,rosH not dollarsQ--and t3e C,ssian and Iranian parliaments are considerin# doin# exactl4 t3at. If a si#nificant percenta#e of oil sales !ere in e,ros rat3er t3an dollarsH t3e price of oil imports !o,ld rise in t3e Bnited 8tates. "ore importantH t3e Bnited 8tates !o,ld lose t3e freedom it no! 3as to r,n lar#e b,d#et deficits financed b4 oil exporters ,sin# t3eir s,rpl,s dollars to b,4 )reas,r4 notes.
)3e 1,s3
)3ere is also #ro!in# disc,ssion in E,rope of expandin# t3e E,ropean Bnion to meet t3e c3allen#e of B.8. 3e#emon4. In a recent report on E,ropePs economic f,t,reH <rancePs leadin# t3in2 tan2H t3e Instit,t <rancais des Celations InternationalesH !arned t3atH
if E,rope doesnPt !ant to be dominated b4 t3e Bnited 8tatesH it m,st create an economic bloc t3at !o,ld stretc3 to C,ssia in t3e east and to (rab Nort3 (frica in t3e so,t3. 8,c3 a bloc !o,ld en;o4 nat,ral reso,rces and a pool of !ell-ed,cated professionals and lo!-!a#e ser+ice !or2ers.
E+ent,all4H attempts to balance (mericaPs imperial efforts ma4 e+en ta2e Q3ardHQ militar4 forms. )3e B.8. !ar in Ira* p,s3ed t3e EB co,ntries closer to de+elopin# an independent militar4H !it3 /erman4H <ranceH 1el#i,mH and =,xembo,r# meetin# in (pril to plan a ne!H m,ltinational force. )3e !ar also bro,#3t <ranceH /erman4H and C,ssia closer to#et3er. ( militar4H as !ell as economicH alliance bet!een 7estern E,rope and n,clear-armed C,ssia co,ld one da4 pose a real t3reat to B.8. dominance. )o#et3er !it3 t3e ine+itable #ro!t3 of C3ina as an economic and militar4 po!erH it co,ld lead to a !orld di+ided into 3ostile B.8.H E,ro-C,ssianH and C3inese po!er blocs. )3atPs 3i#3l4 spec,lati+eH of co,rseH b,t t3is disa##re#ation of a Q,nipolarQ !orld dominated b4 a sin#le imperial po!er into 3ostile alliances 3as 3appened once before-d,rin# t3e last era of 1ritis3-dominated #reat-po!er imperialism.
#ontinued
<'alilAad =,
!"! hegemony is key to preventing global nuclear war!
(Yalma4-H 1adassH 8prin#H 7as3in#ton S,arterl4H I=osin# t3e "omentR )3e Bnited 8tates and t3e 7orld (fter t3e Cold 7arJH ?ol. 10 T2H P. 04H =exisL Macob) Bnder t3e t3ird optionH t3e Bnited 8tates !o,ld see2 to retain #lobal leaders3ip and to precl,de t3e rise of a #lobal ri+al or a ret,rn to m,ltipolarit4 for t3e indefinite f,t,re. @n balanceH t3is is t3e best lon#-term #,idin# principle and +ision. 8,c3 a +ision is desirable not as an end in itselfH b,t beca,se a !orld in !3ic3 t3e Bnited 8tates exercises leaders3ip !o,ld 3a+e tremendo,s ad+anta#es. <irstH t3e #lobal en+ironment !o,ld be more open and more recepti+e to (merican +al,es -democrac4H free mar2etsH and t3e r,le of la!. 8econdH s,c3 a !orld !o,ld 3a+e a better c3ance of dealin# '1
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cooperati+el4 !it3 t3e !orldPs ma;or problemsH s,c3 as n,clear proliferationH t3reats of re#ional 3e#emon4 b4 rene#ade statesH and lo!-le+el conflicts. <inall4H B.8. leaders3ip !o,ld 3elp precl,de t3e rise of anot3er 3ostile #lobal ri+alH enablin# t3e Bnited 8tates and t3e !orld to a+oid anot3er #lobal cold or 3ot !ar and all t3e attendant dan#ersH incl,din# a #lobal n,clear exc3an#e. B.8. leaders3ip !o,ld t3erefore be more cond,ci+e to #lobal stabilit4 t3an a bipolar or a m,ltipolar balance of po!er s4stem.5
?$b- Pre-emption ?$b (1 of 2)

/re-emption counterbalancing- makes the
/raaset' 09
(Nate-H 8taff 7riterH M,ne 6H &ail4 )exanH IB.8. forei#n polic4 needs ret3in2in#JH =exisL Macob) /i+en (merican economicH political and militar4 po!er aro,nd t3e !orldH t3e Bnited 8tates 3as an empire t3at is ,nri+aled on t3e planet. In ,sin# t3is empire in a post-8ept. 11 !orldH President 1,s3 3as tar#eted t3e Qaxis of e+ilHQ establis3in# a forei#n polic4 based on t3ree distinct principlesK "oralit4H preemption and ,nilateralism. )3is trend 3as to be stopped. Bnilateral po!er can be necessar4 b,t s3o,ld onl4 be ,sed ca,tio,sl4 and !3en all diplomatic and m,ltilateral options are no lon#er a+ailable. )3e Bnited 8tates needs to embrace m,ltilateral relations to maintain its po!er for as lon# as possible. 8ince (merican +al,es are #enerall4 accepted b4 ot3er 7estern democraciesH t3e Bnited 8tates does !ell at promotin# 3,man ri#3ts and ot3er +al,es amon# most ci+iliGed c,lt,res. <or t3is reasonH t3e (merican empire is beneficial. 1,tH as t3e 3e#emon4H t3e Bnited 8tates cannot be arro#ant t3ro,#3 consistent ,nilateral actions. It needs to en#a#e t3e rest of t3e !orld and act more li2e a team pla4er and less li2e a lone ran#er. E+en if ,nilateral action is ;,stified in its endsH co,ntries !ill not necessaril4 s,pport t3e end res,ltL t3e4 ma4 in fact f,rt3er balance a#ainst t3e Bnited 8tates. )3is 3as been e+ident in t3e post-Ira* !ar !it3 <rance and C,ssia.
!"! seem arrogant
8ince states respond primaril4 to percei+ed t3reatsH t3e Bnited 8tates needs to ma2e its po!er loo2 as beni#n as possible. It needs to con+ince t3e !orld t3at (merican ,nipolar militar4 po!er is best for t3e interests of all states desirin# peace and prosperit4. Bnilateral action !ill se+erel4 compromise t3is b4 alienatin# states t3at s3are a common interest.
In order to ma2e (merican po!er percei+ed as less imperialH m,ltilateral instit,tions are t3e onl4 pla,sible strate#4. )3e ,se of (merican militar4 and economic mi#3t !ill not fa+orabl4 infl,ence states to respond to its re*,ests or to +ie! (merican po!er beni#nl4.
Neo-conser+ati+e 3a!2s in t3e administration claim self-defense is t3e self-e+ident ;,stification for ,nilateralism. )3ere is no *,estion t3e Bnited 8tates 3as an obli#ation to protect its citiGens from !eapons of mass destr,ction.
1,t at !3at costsK "inimal cooperation from t3e international comm,nit4 and t3e res,ltant instabilit4 of balance-of-po!er politics as present t3ro,#3o,t t3e 29t3 Cent,r4R
/re-emption cb collapsing hege

<issin#er 02
(Eenr4-H No+. -H 8,nda4 )imesH I1,s3 and a scared ne! !orldJH =exisL Macob) Ine+itabl4H t3e concept of pre-emption leads to a clas3 bet!een ne! realities and traditional notions of order. Co,ntries ,sed to establis3ed patterns find it diffic,lt to accept t3e ne! necessitiesH and all nations !ill see2 some r,les of cond,ct t3at do not lea+e decisions on pre-emption to t3e ,nilateralH ,nconstrained determination of a sin#le state. 73en
implemented b4 a po!er !it3 t3e o+er!3elmin# militar4 preponderance of t3e B8H t3e doctrine prompts claims of 3e#emon4 b4 some on t3e B8 sideH and increasin# resistance b4 ot3ers. 1,s3 !ill !ant to ma2e a distinction bet!een po!er and t3e claims made on its be3alf. No nationH no matter 3o! po!erf,lH can or#anise t3e international s4stem b4 itselfL o+er a 3istorical periodH it is be4ond t3e ps4c3olo#ical and political capacit4 of e+en t3e most dominant state. )3e #oal of B8 forei#n polic4 m,st be to t,rn dominant po!er into s3ared responsibilit4 - to cond,ct polic4H as t3e (,stralian sc3olar Coral 1ell 3as !rittenH as if
'2
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t3e international order !ere composed of man4 centres of po!erH e+en !3ile !e are a!are of o,r strate#ic pre-eminence. It implies t3e need for a st4le of cons,ltation less foc,sed on imposin# immediate polic4 prescriptions t3an
ac3ie+in# a common definition of lon#-ran#e p,rposes.
?$b- Pre-emption ?$b (2 of 2)

/re-emption c<b
3u5u6ama 02
(<rancis-H 8,mmerH )3e National InterestH I)3e Neoconser+ati+e "omentJH =exisL Macob) Israel5s polic4 of constantl4 bein# on t3e offensi+eH pre-emptin# and ta2in# t3e initiati+e (as in its polic4 of tar#eted assassinations) is also somet3in# t3at does not scale !ell. Bnli2e IsraelH t3e Bnited 8tates 3as a s,bstantial mar#in of strate#ic dept3 and does not constantl4 3a+e to r,n ris2s in order to sta4 on top. ( sole s,perpo!er t3at is seen bein# as inclined to inter+ene pre-empti+el4 and often !ill fri#3ten not ;,st its enemies b,t its friends as !ell. )3e Bnited 8tates m,st ne+er ab;,re its ri#3t to pre-emptH b,t it is a ri#3t t3at needs to be exercised ca,tio,sl4. E+en tal2in# abo,t s,c3 a strate#4H as !e did in t3e National 8ec,rit4 8trate#4 doc,mentH !ill tend to promote opposin# coalitions and resistance to B.8. policies. Israel can afford to anta#oniGe potential allies and disre#ard international p,blic opinion as lon# as it can co,nt on s,pport from t3e Bnited 8tates. )3e Bnited 8tates co,ldH I s,pposeH s,r+i+e if it !ere similarl4 isolatedH b,t it is 3ard to see !34 !e !o,ld !ant to p,t o,rsel+es in t3is position. It is 3ardl4 an ad+anta#eo,s position
from !3ic3 to la,nc3 an idealistic 7ilsonian cr,sade to res3ape t3e "iddle East in o,r ima#e.
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?$b-1e#e I;
=arge-scale opposition to !"! leadership risks isolationism!
/u%5er 09
(Cobert-H Prof. of (merican &iplomac4 O Mo3ns Eop2ins B.H 8,mmerH National InterestH IE,rope C3allen#edJH =exis)
)oo #reat a s!in# in terms of an o+er-commitment t3at #oes badl4 co,ld prompt an exa##erated s!in# in t3e opposite direction. )3enH tooH isolationism co,ld be t3e res,lt of an (merica t3at is increasin#l4 disli2ed b4 t3e !orldH !it3 all t3at t3is implies in terms of political oppositionH criticismH obstr,ctionism and #eneral disaffection. <or a nation as desiro,s as e+er to be li2edH 3o! lon# !o,ld t3e Bnited 8tates be !illin# to #o on pla4in# an ,npop,lar roleH one t3at !o,ld per3aps 3a+e to depend more and more on na2ed po!erR Prospects not to be dismissedH t3e4 s3o,ld #i+e pa,se to an administration 3ell-bent on 3a+in# its !a4.
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?$b- : H
#<b $( 8 e0tinction
6e =1
(Mosep3-H &ean of :enned4 8c3ool of /o+. O Ear+ardH Bound to LeadH P. 1-)
Perceptions of c3an#e in t3e relati+e po!er of nations are of critical importance to ,nderstandin# t3e relations3ip bet!een decline and !ar. @ne of t3e oldest #eneraliGations abo,t international politics attrib,tes t3e onset of ma;or !ars to s3ifts in po!er amon# t3e leadin# nations. )3,s )3,c4dides acco,nted for t3e onset of t3e
Peloponnesian 7ar !3ic3 destro4ed t3e po!er of ancient (t3ens. )3e 3istor4 of t3e interstate s4stem since 1 99 is p,nct,ated b4 se+ere !ars in !3ic3 one co,ntr4 str,##led to s,rpass anot3er as t3e leadin# state. IfH as Cobert /ilpin ar#,esH Q international politics 3as not c3an#ed f,ndamentall4 o+er t3e millenniaHQ t3e implications for t3e f,t,re are blea2 .4 (nd if
fears abo,t s3iftin# po!er precipitate a ma;or !ar in a !orld !it3 9H999 n,clear !eaponsH 3istor4 as !e 2no! it ma4 end.
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?$b- International b$l Pre-emption failin#

)ur impact short circuits all their offense- .ven Bush admits successful pre-emption hinges upon the support of Americas allies
*addis 02
(Mo3n =e!is-H Cobert (. =o+ett Prof. of "ilitar4 F Na+al Eistor4 O YaleH No+. 1H <orei#n Polic4H I( #rand strate#4 of transformationJH =exisL Macob) President /eor#e 7. 1,s3Ps national sec,rit4 strate#4 co,ld represent t3e most s!eepin# s3ift in B. 8. #rand strate#4 since t3e be#innin# of t3e Cold 7ar. 1,t its s,ccess depends on t3e !illin#ness of t3e rest of t3e !orld to !elcome B.8. po!er !it3 open arms. Z e+idence contin,es Z
)3ereP+e al!a4s been anarc3istsH assassinsH and sabote,rs operatin# !it3o,t ob+io,s sponsorsH and man4 of t3em 3a+e ris2ed t3eir li+es in doin# so. )3eir actions 3a+e rarel4 s3a2en t3e stabilit4 of states or societiesH 3o!e+erH beca,se t3e n,mber of +ictims t3e4P+e tar#eted and t3e amo,nt of p34sical dama#e t3e4P+e ca,sed 3a+e been relati+el4 small. 8eptember 11 s3o!ed t3at terrorists can no! inflict le+els of destr,ction t3at onl4 states !ieldin# militar4 po!er ,sed to be able to accomplis3. 7eapons of mass destr,ction !ere t3e last resort for t3ose possessin# t3em d,rin# t3e Cold 7arH t3e N88 points o,t. Q)oda4H o,r enemies see !eapons of mass destr,ction as !eapons of c3oice.Q )3at ele+ates terrorists to t3e le+el of t4rants in 1,s3Ps t3in2in#H and t3atPs !34 3e insists t3at preemption m,st be added to--t3o,#3 not necesaril4 in all sit,ations replace--t3e tas2s of containment and deterrenceK Q7e cannot let o,r enemies stri2e first.
)3e N88 is caref,l to specif4 a le#al basis for preemptionK international la! reco#niGes Qt3at nations need not s,ffer an attac2 before t3e4 can la!f,ll4 ta2e action to defend t3emsel+es a#ainst forces t3at present an imminent dan#er of attac2.Q )3erePs also a preference for preemptin# m,ltilaterall4K Q)3e Bnited 8tates !ill constantl4 stri+e to enlist t3e s,pport of t3e international comm,nit4.Q 1,t Q!e !ill not 3esitate to act aloneH if necessar4H to exercise o,r ri#3t of selfdefense b4 actin# preempti+el4 a#ainst s,c3 terroristsH to pre+ent t3em from doin# 3arm a#ainst o,r people and o,r co,ntr4.Q Preemption in t,rn re*,ires 3e#emon4. (lt3o,#3 1,s3 spea2sH in 3is letter of transmittalH of creatin# Qa balance of po!er t3at fa+ors
3,man freedomQ !3ile forsa2in# Q,nilateral ad+anta#eHQ t3e bod4 of t3e N88 ma2es it clear t3at Qo,r forces !ill be stron# eno,#3 to diss,ade potential ad+ersaries from p,rs,in# a militar4 b,ild-,p in 3opes of s,rpassin#H or e*,alin#H t3e po!er of t3e Bnited 8tates.Q )3e 7est Point speec3 p,t it more bl,ntl4K Q(merica 3asH and intends to 2eepH militar4 stren#t3s be4ond c3allen#e.Q )3e president 3as at last appro+edH t3ereforeH Pa,l 7olfo!itGPs contro+ersial recommendation to t3is effectH made in a 1662 Q&efense Plannin# /,idanceQ draft s,bse*,entl4 lea2ed to t3e press and t3en disa+o!ed b4 t3e first 1,s3 administration. ItPs no accident t3at 7olfo!itGH as dep,t4 secretar4 of defenseH 3as been at t3e center of t3e ne! 1,s3 administrationPs strate#ic plannin#.
in t3e 1,s3
Eo!H t3o,#3H !ill t3e rest of t3e !orld respond to (merican 3e#emon4R )3at #ets ,s to anot3er inno+ation strate#4H !3ic3 is its emp3asis on cooperation amon# t3e #reat po!ers. )3erePs a stri2in# contrast 3ere !it3
ClintonPs foc,s on ;,stice for small po!ers. )3e ar#,ment also seems at oddsH at first #lanceH !it3 maintainin# militar4 stren#t3 be4ond c3allen#eH for donPt t3e !ea2 al!a4s ,nite to oppose t3e stron#R In t3eor4H 4esH b,t in practice and in 3istor4H not necessaril4. Eere t3e 1,s3 team seems to 3a+e absorbed some prett4 sop3isticated political scienceH for one of t3e iss,es t3at discipline 3as been !restlin# !it3 recentl4 is !34 t3erePs still no anti-(merican coalition despite t3e o+er!3elmin# dominance of t3e Bnited 8tates since t3e end of t3e Cold 7ar. Z e+idence contin,es Z :enned4 re;ected a s,rprise attac2 a#ainst 8o+iet missiles in C,ba beca,se 3e feared losin# t3e moral ad+anta#eK Pearl Earbor analo#ies !ere eno,#3 to
N88 ac2no!led#es t3e m,ltiplier effects of m,ltilateralismK Qno nation can b,ild a saferH better !orld alone.Q )3ese can 3ardl4 be #ained t3o,#3 ,nilateral action ,nless t3at action itself commands m,ltilateral s,pport.
sin2 plans for preemption in a m,c3 more dan#ero,s crisis t3an (mericans face no!. )3e 1,s3 team ass,mes !ePll 3a+e t3e moral 3i#3 #ro,ndH and 3ence m,ltilateral s,pportH if !ePre c3eered and not s3ot at !3en !e #o into 1a#3dad and ot3er similar places. No do,bt t3e4Pre ri#3t abo,t t3at. )3e4Pre see2in# B.N. a,t3oriGation for s,c3 a mo+e and ma4 !ell #et it. Certainl4H t3e4Pll 3a+e t3e consent of t3e B.8. Con#ress. <or t3ere lies be3ind t3eir strate#4 an incontestable moral claimK t3at in some sit,ations preemption is preferable to doin# not3in#. 73o !o,ld not 3a+e preempted Eitler or "ilose+ic or "o3ammed (ttaH if #i+en t3e c3anceR
)3e 1,s3
7ill Ira* seem s,c3 a sit,ationH t3o,#3H if !ePre not c3eered in 1a#3dadR Can !e co,nt on m,ltilateral s,pport if t3in#s #o badl4R Eere t3e 1,s3 administration 3as not been t3in2in# a3ead. ItPs been di+idin# its o!n moral m,ltipliers t3o,#3 its tendenc4 to be3a+eH on an arra4 of m,ltilateral iss,es ran#in# from t3e :4oto Protocol to t3e Compre3ensi+e )est 1an )reat4 to t3e International Criminal Co,rtH li2e a s,llenH po,tin#H obli+io,sH and o+erm,scled teena#er. (s a res,ltH itPs depleted t3e reser+oir of s,pport from allies it o,#3t to 3a+e in place before embar2in# on s,c3 a 3i#3-ris2 strate#4.
)3ere areH to be s,reH +alid ob;ections to t3ese and ot3er initiati+es t3e administration doesnPt li2e. 1,t itPs made too fe! efforts to ,se diplomac4--b4 !3ic3 I mean tact--to express t3ese complaints. Nor 3as it tried to c3an#e a domestic political c,lt,re t3at too often relis3es 3a+in# t3e Bnited 8tates stand defiantl4
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alone. )3e )r,man administration ,nderstood t3at t3e s,ccess of containment abroad re*,ired co,nterin# isolationism at 3ome. )3e 1,s3 administration 3asnPt 4et made t3at connection bet!een domestic politics and #rand strate#4. )3atPs its bi##est fail,re of leaders3ip so far.
)3e 1,s3 strate#4 depends ,ltimatel4 on not standin# defiantl4 alone--;,st t3e oppositeH indeedH for it claims to be p,rs,in# +al,es t3atH as t3e N88 p,ts itH are Qtr,e for e+er4 personH in e+er4 societ4.Q 8o t3is crac2 especiall4 needs fixin# before t3is +e3icle departs for its intended destination. ( nation t3at sets itself ,p as an example to t3e !orld in most t3in#s !ill not ac3ie+e t3at p,rpose b4 tellin# t3e rest of t3e !orldH in some t3in#sH to s3o+e it.
IntD ?o-op -%enario (1 of 9)

/re-emption risks a global backlash against the !"! destroying the international cooperation necessary to keep the world economy afloat and win the ()T!
ussbaum 02
(1r,ce-H Editorial Pa#e Editor for 1,isness 7ee2H @ct. -H 1,isness 7ee2H I<orei#n Polic4K 1,s3 is Ealf Ci#3tJH =exis)
&espite loose tal2 toda4 abo,t a beni#n ne! Pax (mericanaH man4 (mericans and man4 more people o+erseas are ,ncomfortable !it3 t3e ima#e of an (merica actin# ,nilaterall4 aro,nd t3e !orldH brea2in# treaties at !illH #i+in# lip ser+ice to allies and international instit,tions !3ile claimin# for itself t3e sole le#itimate ,se of force an4!3ereH an4time it feels t3reatened. )3at is t3e text and s,btext of m,c3 of t3e National 8ec,rit4 8trate#4 report.
)3ere certainl4 3a+e been moments in B.8. 3istor4 !3en imperialism 3as been in +o#,e. Nineteent3 cent,r4 "anifest &estin4 is t3e most stri2in# example. 1,t t3e o+erall arc of B.8. 3istor4H from t3e birt3 of t3e nation in re+ol,tion a#ainst t3e 1ritis3 to battles a#ainst 8panis3H /ermanH and 8o+iet empiresH 3as been to oppose t3e concept. ImperialismH e+en compassionate imperialismH ;,st isnPt part of t3is co,ntr4Ps &N(.
)3e 1,s3 &octrine laid o,t in t3e National 8ec,rit4 paper t3reatens to ,nra+el t3e fabric of international comm,nit4 at a time !3en t3at comm,nit4 is needed to combat terrorism and restore 3ealt3 to a deterioratin# !orld econom4. Ironicall4H t3is international comm,nit4 is t3e +er4 one t3e B.8. 3as spent decades b,ildin# to spread (merican +al,es of r,le-of-la!H democrac4H and free mar2ets all o+er t3e #lobe. It is t3e comm,nit4 B.8. corporations and cons,mers rel4 on as t3e4 t,rn increasin#l4 to C3ina for 3i#3-tec3 and cons,mer #oods. 14 !or2in# t3ro,#3 instit,tions ran#in# from N()@ to N(<)(H from t3e International "onetar4 <,nd to t3e 7orld )rade @r#aniGationH t3e B.8. 3as been able to expand its po!er and infl,ence +ia #lobal consens,sH not intimidation. Yet t3is s4stem is t3reatened b4 a #lobal bac2las3 a#ainst percei+ed (merican ,nilateralism and arro#ance.
=osing the ()T means e0tinction!

.lexander 09
(Yona3-H Prof. F &irector O Inter-Bni+ersit4 for )errorism 8t,diesH (,#,st 20H 7as3in#ton )imesH I)errorism "4t3s and CealitiesJH =exisL Macob) =ast !ee2Ps br,tal s,icide bombin#s in 1a#3dad and Mer,salem 3a+e once a#ain ill,strated dramaticall4 t3at t3e international comm,nit4 failedH t3,s far at leastH to ,nderstand t3e ma#nit,de and implications of t3e terrorist t3reats to t3e +er4 s,r+i+al of ci+iliGation itself. E+en t3e Bnited 8tates and Israel 3a+e for decades tended to re#ard terrorism as a mere tactical n,isance or irritant rat3er t3an a critical strate#ic c3allen#e to t3eir national sec,rit4 concerns. It is not s,rprisin#H t3ereforeH t3at on 8eptember 11H 2991H (mericans !ere st,nned b4 t3e ,nprecedented tra#ed4 of 16 al Saeda terrorists stri2in# a de+astatin# blo! at t3e center of t3e nationPs commercial and militar4 po!ers. =i2e!iseH Israel and its citiGensH despite t3e collapse of t3e @slo (#reements of 1663 and n,mero,s acts of terrorism tri##ered b4 t3e second intifada t3at be#an almost t3ree 4ears a#oH are still Qs3oc2edQ b4 eac3 s,icide attac2 at a time of intensi+e diplomatic efforts to re+i+e t3e morib,nd peace process t3ro,#3 t3e no! re+o2ed cease-fire arran#ements U3,dnaV. 734 are t3e Bnited 8tates and IsraelH as !ell as scores of ot3er co,ntries affected b4 t3e ,ni+ersal ni#3tmare of modern terrorism s,rprised b4 ne! terrorist Qs,rprisesQR )3ere are man4 reasonsH incl,din# mis,nderstandin# of t3e manifold specific factors t3at contrib,te to terrorismPs expansionH s,c3 as lac2 of a ,ni+ersal definition of terrorismH t3e reli#ioniGation of politicsH do,ble standards of moralit4H !ea2 p,nis3ment of terroristsH and t3e exploitation of t3e media b4 terrorist propa#anda and ps4c3olo#ical !arfare. '-
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Bnli2e t3eir 3istorical co,nterpartsH
contemporar4 terrorists 3a+e introd,ced a ne! scale of +iolence in terms of con+entional and ,ncon+entional t3reats and impact. )3e internationaliGation and br,taliGation of c,rrent and f,t,re terrorism ma2e it clear !e 3a+e entered an (#e of 8,per )errorism Ue.#. biolo#icalH c3emical, radiolo#icalH n,clear and c4ber] !it3 its serio,s implications concernin# nationalH re#ional and #lobal sec,rit4 concerns.

.conomic collapse causes e0tinction!
(eardon 00
()om-H Cetired =ie,tenant-ColonelH I)3e Bnnecessar4 Ener#4 CrisisK Eo! to 8ol+e it S,ic2l4HJ 3ttpK$$!!!.freerep,blic.com$for,m$a3aaf6-f22e23.3tm)
Eistor4 bears o,t t3at desperate nations ta2e desperate actions. Prior to t3e final economic collapseH t3e stress on nations !ill 3a+e increased t3e intensit4 and n,mber of t3eir conflictsH to t3e point !3ere t3e arsenals of !eapons of mass destr,ction (7"&) no! possessed b4 some 2 nationsH are almost certain to be released. (s an exampleH s,ppose a star+in# Nort3 :orea la,nc3es n,clear !eapons ,pon Mapan and 8o,t3 :oreaH incl,din# B.8. forces t3ereH in a spasmodic s,icidal response. @r s,ppose a desperate C3ina-!3ose lon#-ran#e n,clear missiles (some) can reac3 t3e Bnited 8tates-attac2s )ai!an. In addition to immediate responsesH t3e m,t,al treaties in+ol+ed in s,c3 scenarios !ill *,ic2l4 dra! ot3er nations into t3e conflictH escalatin# it si#nificantl4. 8trate#ic n,clear st,dies 3a+e s3o!n for decades t3atH ,nder s,c3 extreme stress conditionsH once a fe! n,2es are la,nc3edH ad+ersaries and potential ad+ersaries are t3en compelled to la,nc3 on perception of preparations b4 onePs ad+ersar4. )3e real le#ac4 of t3e "(& concept is t3is side of t3e "(& coin t3at is almost ne+er disc,ssed. 7it3o,t effecti+e defenseH t3e onl4 c3ance a nation 3as to s,r+i+e at all is to la,nc3 immediate f,llbore pre-empti+e stri2es and tr4 to ta2e o,t its percei+ed foes as rapidl4 and massi+el4 as possible. (s t3e st,dies s3o!edH rapid escalation to f,ll 7"& exc3an#e occ,rs. )oda4H a #reat percent of t3e 7"& arsenals t3at !ill be ,nleas3edH are alread4 on site !it3in t3e Bnited 8tates itself. )3e res,ltin# #reat (rma#eddon !ill destro4 ci+iliGation as !e 2no! itH and per3aps most of t3e biosp3ereH at least for man4 decades.
International legitimacy in the use of force is the cornerstone of !"! leadership

*riffit's 09
(&r. "artin-H Prof. of Political F International 8t,dies O <linders B.H @ct. 1H (,stralasian Political 8t,dies (ssociation ConferenceH I8elf-Inflicted 7o,ndsK Bnited 8tates /rand 8trate#4 and t3e 7ar on )errorJH 3ttpK$$!!!.,tas.ed,.a,$#o+ernment$ (P8($"/riffit3sfinal.pdfL Macob) )3,s 3e#emon4 !it3o,t le#itimac4 is ins,fficient to deter +iolent c3allen#es to t3e international orderH and ma4 pro+o2e attempts to b,ild co,nter-alliances a#ainst t3e 3e#emon. Ee#emonic a,t3orit4 !3ic3 accepts t3e principle of t3e independence of states and treats states !it3 a relati+e de#ree of bene+olence is more easil4 accepted. )3e le#itimac4 of B.8. 3e#emon4 d,rin# t3e cold !ar !as facilitated b4 t!o important c3aracteristics of t3e cold !ar era. <irstH t3e comm,nist t3reat (!3et3er real or ima#inar4) dis#,ised t3e tension bet!een t3e B.8. promotion of its o!n interests and its claim to ma2e t3e !orld safe for capitalism ((nderson 2992). 8econdH B.8. 3e#emon4 mana#ed to combine economic liberalism bet!een ind,strialised states !it3 an instit,tional arc3itect,re (t3e 1retton 7oods s4stem) t3at moderated t3e +olatilit4 of transaction flo!s across borders. It enabled #o+ernments to pro+ide social in+estmentsH safet4 nets and ad;,stment assistance at t3e domestic le+el (C,##ie 1602H 166-). In t3e ind,strialised !orldH t3is #rand bar#ain formed t3e basis of t3e lon#est and most e*,itable economic expansion in 3,man 3istor4H from t3e 16 9s to t3e 1609s. (nd it pro+ided t3e instit,tional fo,ndation for t3e ne!est !a+e of #lobalisationH '0
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!3ic3 be#an not lon# t3ereafter and is far broader in scope and deeper in reac3 t3an its 16t3 cent,r4 antecedent. )3e s4stem
t3at t3e B8 led t3e !a4 in creatin# after 77 II 3as fared !ell beca,se t3e connectin# and restrainin# aspects of democrac4 and instit,tions red,ce t3e incenti+es for 7estern nations to en#a#e in strate#ic ri+alr4 or balance a#ainst B8 3e#emon4. )3e stren#t3 of t3is order is attested to b4 t3e lon#e+it4 of its instit,tionsH alliances and arran#ementsH based on t3eir le#itimac4 in t3e e4es of t3e participants. Ceactin# a#ainst t3e closed a,tarc3ic
re#ions t3at 3ad contrib,ted to t3e !orld depression and split t3e #lobe into competin# blocs before t3e !arH t3e B8 led t3e !a4 in constr,ctin# a post!ar order t3at !as based on economic opennessH ;oint mana#ement of t3e 7estern political-economic orderH and r,les and instit,tions t3at !ere or#anised to s,pport domestic economic stabilit4 and social sec,rit4 (I2enberr4 2999).

)3is order in t,rn !as b,ilt aro,nd a basic bar#ainK t3e 3e#emonic state obtains commitments from secondar4 states to participate in t3e international orderH and t3e 3e#emon in ret,rn places limits on t3e exercise of its po!er. )3e ad+anta#e for t3e !ea2 state is t3at it does not fear domination or abandonmentH red,cin# t3e incenti+e to balance a#ainst t3e 3e#emonH and t3e leadin# state does not need to ,se its po!er to acti+el4 enforce order and compliance. It is t3ese restraints on bot3 sides and t3e !illin#ness to participate in t3is m,t,al accord t3at explains t3e lon#e+it4 of t3e s4stemH e+en after t3e end of t3e cold !ar.
#ontinued
<'alilAad =,
!"! hegemony is key to preventing global nuclear war!
(Yalma4-H 1adassH 8prin#H 7as3in#ton S,arterl4H I=osin# t3e "omentR )3e Bnited 8tates and t3e 7orld (fter t3e Cold 7arJH ?ol. 10 T2H P. 04H =exisL Macob) Bnder t3e t3ird optionH t3e Bnited 8tates !o,ld see2 to retain #lobal leaders3ip and to precl,de t3e rise of a #lobal ri+al or a ret,rn to m,ltipolarit4 for t3e indefinite f,t,re. @n balanceH t3is is t3e best lon#-term #,idin# principle and +ision. 8,c3 a +ision is desirable not as an end in itselfH b,t beca,se a !orld in !3ic3 t3e Bnited 8tates exercises leaders3ip !o,ld 3a+e tremendo,s ad+anta#es. <irstH t3e #lobal en+ironment !o,ld be more open and more recepti+e to (merican +al,es -democrac4H free mar2etsH and t3e r,le of la!. 8econdH s,c3 a !orld !o,ld 3a+e a better c3ance of dealin# cooperati+el4 !it3 t3e !orldPs ma;or problemsH s,c3 as n,clear proliferationH t3reats of re#ional 3e#emon4 b4 rene#ade statesH and lo!-le+el conflicts. <inall4H B.8. leaders3ip !o,ld 3elp precl,de t3e rise of anot3er 3ostile #lobal ri+alH enablin# t3e Bnited 8tates and t3e !orld to a+oid anot3er #lobal cold or 3ot !ar and all t3e attendant dan#ersH incl,din# a #lobal n,clear exc3an#e. B.8. leaders3ip !o,ld t3erefore be more cond,ci+e to #lobal stabilit4
t3an a bipolar or a m,ltipolar balance of po!er s4stem.5
'6
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IntD ?o-op- Pre-emption 5ills %o op on :F/

/re-emption b<l vs!
*riffit's 09
(&r. "artin-H Prof. of Political F International 8t,dies O <linders B.H @ct. 1H (,stralasian Political 8t,dies (ssociation ConferenceH I8elf-Inflicted 7o,ndsK Bnited 8tates /rand 8trate#4 and t3e 7ar on )errorJH 3ttpK$$!!!.,tas.ed,.a,$#o+ernment$ (P8($"/riffit3sfinal.pdfL Macob) <irstH B8
!"! esp on terrorism
#rand strate#4 reinforces t3e ima#e of t3e Bnited 8tates as too *,ic2 to ,se militar4 force and to do so o,tside t3e bo,nds of international la! and le#itimac4. )3is can ma2e it more diffic,lt for t3e Bnited 8tates to #ain international s,pport for its ,se of forceH and o+er t3e lon# termH ma4 lead ot3ers to resist B.8. forei#n polic4 #oals more broadl4H incl,din# its efforts to fi#3t terrorism. Ele+atin# pre-emption to t3e le+el of a formal doctrine ma4 also increase t3e (dministration5s inclination to reac3 for t3e militar4 le+er *,ic2l4H !3en ot3er tools
still 3a+e a #ood c3ance of !or2in#. @t3er states ma4 !is3 to em,late t3e precedent set b4 t3e Bnited 8tates in (f#3anistan and Ira*H at t3e same time red,cin# its le+era#e to con+ince s,c3 co,ntries not to ,se force. )3is concern is t3eoretical at one le+elH since it relates to stated doctrine as opposed to act,al B.8. actions. 1,t it is +er4 real at anot3er le+el. )oda45s international s4stem is c3aracterised b4 a relati+e infre*,enc4 of interstate !ar. &e+elopin# doctrines t3at lo!er t3e t3res3old for pre-empti+e action co,ld p,t t3at accomplis3ment at ris2H and exacerbate re#ional crises alread4 on t3e brin2 of open conflict.
/re-emption destroy I support esp on the ()T

FI1anlonJ Ri%eJ ) -teinber# 02
("ic3ael E.-H8r. <ello! in <orei#n Polic4 8t,dies O t3e 1roo2in#s Instit,tionH 8,san E.-H 8r. <ello! in <orei#n Polic4 8t,dies O t3e 1roo2in#s Instit,tionH Mames 1.-H &ean of t3e =1M 8c3ool of P,blic (ffairs O B.).H Polic4 1riefH I)3e Ne! National 8ec,rit4 8trate#4 and PreemptionJH T 113H 3ttpK$$!!!.broo2in#s.ed,$printme.!bsRpa#e%$comm$polic4briefs$pb113.3tmL Macob) Ele+atin# t3e preempti+e option to a polic4 doctrine can 3a+e serio,s ne#ati+e conse*,ences. <or oneH it reinforces t3e ima#e of t3e Bnited 8tates as too *,ic2 to ,se militar4 force and to do so o,tside t3e bo,nds of international la! and le#itimac4. )3is can ma2e it more diffic,lt for t3e Bnited 8tates to #ain international s,pport for its ,se of forceH and o+er t3e lon# termH ma4 lead ot3ers to resist B.8. forei#n polic4 #oals more broadl4H incl,din# efforts to fi#3t terrorism. Ele+atin# preemption to t3e le+el of a formal doctrine ma4 also increase t3e administrationPs inclination to reac3 for t3e militar4 le+er *,ic2l4H !3en ot3er tools still 3a+e a #ood c3ance of !or2in#.
(d+ocatin# preemption !arns potential enemies to 3ide t3e +er4 assets !e mi#3t !is3 to ta2e preempti+e action a#ainstH or to ot3er!ise prepare responses and defenses. In t3is tactical senseH tal2in# too openl4 abo,t preemption red,ces its li2el4 ,tilit4H if and !3en it is emplo4ed. <inall4H ad+ocatin# preemption ma4 !ell embolden ot3er co,ntries t3at !o,ld li2e to ;,stif4 attac2s on t3eir enemies as preempti+e in nat,re.
@ne can ar#,e t3at a more explicit polic4 of preemption act,all4 reinforces deterrence b4 p,ttin# ot3er co,ntries on notice abo,t (mericaPs serio,sness of p,rpose in addressin# t3reats s,c3 as t3e possession of !eapons of mass destr,ction b4 ro#,e re#imes. It also allo!s t3e administration to ar#,e t3at its foc,s on Ira* is part of a broader sec,rit4 concept and does not represent preocc,pation !it3 a specific re#ime. Eo!e+erH lin2in# t3e real problem of Ira*Ps !eapons of mass destr,ction (7"&) to a broader doctrine of preemption (defined to incl,de pre+enti+e !ar) complicated t3e administrationPs tas2 in #ainin# international s,pport for its preferred polic4H and ma4 do so a#ain if t3e administration c3ooses to ,se force a#ainst Ira*. "an4 co,ntries !orr4 t3at t3e 1,s3 administration !ill ta2e a similar approac3 in dealin# !it3 ot3er cases s,c3 as Nort3 :orea or -9
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Iran or 84ria. <,rt3erH ot3er co,ntriesP fr,stration !it3 t3e Bnited 8tatesP decision to #rant to itselfH (t3o,#3 not to ot3ers)H a ri#3t of preemption ma4 c3ill t3eir !illin#ness to cooperate f,ll4 !it3 t3e Bnited 8tates in t3e !ar on terrorism.
IntD ?o-op- 5e6 to :F/

I co op k ()T
I5enberr6 01
(Mo3n-H Prof. of /eopolitics and /lobal M,stice O 7als3 8c3ool of <orei#n 8er+ice O /eor#eto!nH @ct. 22-23H I(fter 8eptember 11K (merican /rand 8trate#4 and International @rder in t3e (#e of )errorJH'ttpK$$!!!Dbroo5Dedu$d6bdo%root$fp$proBe%ts$ europe$forumpapers$i5enberr6DpdfL Macob)
)o fi#3t terrorism on a #lobal scale t3e 1,s3 administration !ill need to redisco+er t3e t!o bar#ains t3at t3e Bnited 8tates 3as made !it3 t3e !orld. )3e realist bar#ain exc3an#es (merica5s sec,rit4 s,pport and access to mar2ets and tec3nolo#4 for t3e diplomatic and lo#istical s,pport needed b4 t3e Bnited 8tates to p,rs,e its #eopolitical ob;ecti+es. )o fi#3t terrorism effecti+el4H t3e Bnited 8tates needs partners . militar4 and lo#istical s,pport of alliesH intelli#ence s3arin#H and t3e practical cooperation of front-line states. )3e transnational c3aracter of modern terrorism ma2es a national strate#4 impotent. )3e 3ard !or2 of fi#3tin# terrorism entails tracin# ban2 acco,ntsH s3arin# criminal informationH and ot3er basic tas2s of transnational la! enforcement. )3e simple lo#ic of problem sol+in# mo+es t3e Bnited 8tates into t3e realm of m,ltilateralH r,lebased forei#n polic4. (erial bombin# ma4 root o,t terrorists and destro4 t3eir camps b,t t3e lon#-term demands of a campai#n a#ainst terrorism is to !or2 !it3in and stren#t3en r,lesH la!sH and instit,tions -- !it3in and bet!een co,ntries aro,nd t3e !orld.
)3e liberal bar#ain t3at t3e Bnited 8tates 3as !it3 t3e !orld !ill also need to be redisco+ered. )3is is t3e bar#ain !3ere t3e Bnited 8tates #ains t3e cooperation of ot3er states b4 openin# ,p and bindin# itself to its democratic partners. )3e Bnited 8tates #ets ot3er states to cooperate !it3 it b4 offerin# to restrain and commitment itself in ret,rn. )o t3e s,rprise of man4 obser+ersH t3e 1,s3 administration did not r,s3 t3e ,se of force after 8eptember 11. It !aited !3ile 8ecretar4 of 8tate Po!ell b,ilt an informal coalition of s,pport and it defined t3e !ar aims in s,fficientl4 precise and limited terms to 2eep ot3er states on board. 73ile reser+in# t3e ri#3t to act ,nilaterall4H t3e Bnited 8tates si#naled patience and restraint. )3ere are practical incenti+es for t3e Bnited 8tates to do so. If t3e !orld comes to see t3e !ar on terrorism to be bet!een an arro#ant and narro!l4 self-interested (merica and an a##rie+ed Islamic peopleH t3e !ar is lost. 1,t !3en it is
seen as a !ar bet!een t3e ci+iliGedH democratic !orld and m,rdero,s o,tla!sH t3e !ar is one t3at can be !on. Coalitions do not ;,st a##re#ate po!er t3e4 also le#itimate po!erH partic,larl4 !3en t3e4 are or#aniGed aro,nd s3ared principles and +al,es.
-1
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IntD ;a! -%enario

A! /re-emption would destroy I law
-immons 02
((dele-H 8r. (ssoc. O t3e Center for International 8t,dies O B. of C3ica#oH@ct. 13H C3ica#o 8,n-)imesH I@pposition to Ira* !ar spa!nin# *,ic2l4JH =exisL Macob) International la!4ers point o,t t3at t3ere are no international le#al precedents for t3is sort of a##ressi+e defense. &o,#lass CasselH of t3e Nort3!estern Bni+ersit4 =a! 8c3oolH ar#,es t3at Qa preempti+e stri2e in t3ese
circ,mstances !o,ld r,pt,re t3e frame!or2 for international la! b,ilt since 7orld 7ar II and pro+ide a precedent for f,t,re a##ression b4 po!erf,l states !3ose a#endas mi#3t be *,ite different from t3at of t3e Bnited 8tates.Q @nce t3ese r,les of international en#a#ement are bro2enH t3ere is no t,rnin# bac2. 8,ppose t3e C3inese decide t3e4 are t3reatened b4 )ai!anR 7o,ld India or Pa2istanH eac3 of !3ic3 3as n,clear !eapons and eac3 of !3ic3 fears t3e ot3erH follo! o,r leadR C,ssiaH !3ic3 alread4 is ,sin# t3e !a4 in !3ic3 t3e Bnited 8tates is exec,tin# t3e !ar on terrorism in t3eir mana#ement of C3ec3n4aH mi#3t !is3 to ta2e ,nilateral action in /eor#ia. )3e collapse of international la! leads to c3aos.
>Insert *amrosch 8 Mullerson ?@AB
-2
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Iran .tta%5 -%enario

The pre-emption doctrine is being e0panded and will soon be used to ,ustify an attack on Iran- the result will be nuclear war and e0tinction!
.n%'ora#e Dail6 e!s 06
(Man. 12H INe! n,clear doctrine !o,ld 3asten t3e end of t3e !orld as !e 2no! itJH =exisL Macob)
of militar4 pre-emptionH !3ic3 #ot ,s into Ira* !it3o,t B.N. appro+al or an imminent t3reat to t3e B.8.H is bein# *,ietl4 expanded !it3 scant p,blic debate to incl,de pre-empti+e n,clear stri2esH accordin# to t3e latest draft of &octrine for Moint N,clear @perations. )3is ne! doctrine calls for t3e Qinte#rationQ of n,clear and con+entional arsenals to pro+ide Qa broader ran#e of stri2e options.Q It also appro+es t3e ,se of n,clear !eapons a#ainst all forms of !eapons of mass destr,ction and a#ainst Qterrorists.Q If t3e B.8. is plannin# a n,clear assa,lt on IranH as former CI( intelli#ence officer P3ilip /iraldi assertsH t3e li2el4 conse*,ences incl,deK a lar#e cas,alt4 co,ntH (merica re#arded as a paria3 stateH !orld!ide anti-8emitismH n,clear proliferation and #lobal n,clear !arH accordin# to Bni+ersit4 of CaliforniaH 8an &ie#o p34sics professor Mor#e Eirsc3. Per3aps 1,s3 is tr4in# to accelerate t3e end times.
)3e 1,s3 doctrine
-3
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Iran .tta%5- Prolif ) :

Iran strike prolif and global nuclear war
1irs%' 06
(Mor#e-H Prof. of P34sics O B.C.8.&.H <eb. 29H (nti!ar.comH I(merica and IranK (t t3e 1rin2 of t3e (b4ssH 7e can stop a Qpreempti+eQ n,clear stri2eJ 3ttpK$$!!!.anti!ar.com$ori#$3irsc3.p3pRarticleid%0 --L Macob) )3e Bnited 8tates is preparin# to enter a ne! eraK an era in !3ic3 it !ill enforce n,clear nonproliferation b4 t3e t3reat and ,se of n,clear !eapons. )3e ,se of tactical n,clear !eapons a#ainst Iran !ill ,s3er in a ne! !orld order. )3e ,ltimate #oal is t3at no nation ot3er t3an t3e B.8. s3o,ld 3a+e a n,clear !eapons arsenal. ( telltale si#n t3at t3is is t3e plan is t3e recent c3an#e in t3e stated mission of =os (lamos National =aborator4H !3ere n,clear !eapons are de+eloped. )3e mission of =(N= ,sed to be described officiall4 as Q=os (lamos National =aborator4Ps central mission is to red,ce t3e #lobal n,clear dan#erQ U1V U.pdfVH U2V U.pdfVH U3V U.pdfV. )3at !ill so,nd ridic,lo,s once t3e B.8. starts t3ro!in# mini-n,2es aro,nd. In anticipation of itH t3e =os (lamos mission statement 3as been recentl4 c3an#ed to Qpre+ent t3e spread of !eapons of mass destr,ction and to protect o,r 3omeland from terrorist attac2.Q )3at is t3e present and f,t,re role of t3e B.8. n,clear arsenalH to be ac3ie+ed t3ro,#3 t3reat (deterrence) and ,se of n,clear !eapons. Ceferences to t3e old mission are no!3ere to be fo,nd in t3e c,rrent =os (lamos doc,mentsH indicatin# t3at t3e c3an#e !as deliberate and t3oro,#3. It is not impossible t3at t3e B.8. !ill s,cceed in its #oal. 1,t it is ,tterl4 improbable. )3is is a bi# !orld. @nce t3e B.8. crosses t3e n,clear t3res3old a#ainst a non-n,clear co,ntr4H man4 more co,ntries !ill stri+e to ac*,ire n,clear !eaponsH and man4 !ill s,cceed. )3e n,clear ab4ss ma4 t,rn o,t to be a steep precipice or a #entle slope. Eit3er !a4H it !ill be a one-!a4 do!n3ill slide to!ard a bottomless pit. 7e !ill 3a+e entered a pat3 of no ret,rnH leadin# in a fe! mont3s or a fe! decades to #lobal n,clear !ar and ,nima#inable destr,ction.
-4
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Iran .tta%5- tan5s E%on

A! Iran "trike would collapse the global economy!
(ar5le6 0,
(&aniel ).-H Prof. of "icroeconomics O Nort3ern :ent,c24 B.H (,#,st 1-H ICaid !on5t diarm IranJH 3ttpK$$ne!s.24post.com$apps$ bcs.dll$articleR(I&%$299 901'$NE7892$ 901'93-3$1914L Macob) (ttac2in# Iran doesnPt ma2e #ood economic sense eit3er. Iran is @PECPs second-lar#est oil prod,cer and 3olds 19 percent of t3e !orldPs pro+en oil reser+es. It also 3as t3e !orldPs second-lar#est nat,ral #as reser+es (after C,ssia). @il and #as prices 3a+e recentl4 soared in response to risin# #lobal demand and 3ei#3tened sec,rit4 concerns in t3e "iddle East. Iran is ,nli2el4 to maintain its c,rrent le+el of oil prod,ction in t3e face of a massi+e militar4 assa,lt. )3e loss of ;,st a fraction of Iranian oil prod,ction eit3er t3o,#3 collateral dama#eH sabota#e or economic embar#o co,ld tri##er a se+ere economic #lobal recession.
B! The 7 is e0tinction
(eardon 00
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Iran .tta%5- 5ills "E -tabilit6 (1 of 2)

A! "triking Iran wont disarm them- it will ,ust accelerate regional arms races destabli%ing the region
(ar5le6 0,
(&aniel ).-H Prof. of "icroeconomics O Nort3ern :ent,c24 B.H (,#,st 1-H ICaid !on5t diarm IranJH 3ttpK$$ne!s.24post.com$apps$ bcs.dll$articleR(I&%$299 901'$NE7892$ 901'93-3$1914L Macob) Bnilateralists 3a+e pointed to t3e Israeli stri2e as an example of s,ccessf,l pre-empti+e disarmament. 73ile t3e destr,ction of @sira* ma4 3a+e slo!ed 8addam E,sseinPs n,clear pro#ram it b4 no means stopped it. In factH in destro4in# @sira* Israel accelerated !eapons proliferation and 3elped destabiliGe t3e "iddle East. )3e destr,ction of @sira* enco,ra#ed Ira* and ot3er "iddle Eastern co,ntries to accelerate t3e de+elopment of less conspic,o,s !eapons of mass destr,ction (7"&) s,c3 as c3emical !eapons and to de+elop lon#-ran#e ballistic missiles. )3e @sira* experience also appears to 3a+e ta,#3t Iran t3at sec,rit4 is abo,t spreadin# ris2s. Bnli2e Ira*H IranPs n,clear facilities are not concentrated in one place. (ccordin# to /lobal 8ec,rit4.@r#K QIn allH t3ere are per3aps t!o doGen s,spected n,clear facilities in Iran ... air stri2es on Iran !o,ld +astl4 exceed t3e scope of t3e 1601 Israeli attac2 on t3e @sira* n,clear center in Ira*H and !o,ld more resemble t3e openin# da4s of t3e 2993 air campai#n a#ainst Ira*.Q )3e destr,ction of IranPs n,clear facilities !ill not end or e+en c,rtail its *,est for n,clear !eapons. 8,c3 an assa,lt co,ld ;,stifiabl4 lead to )e3ran !it3dra!in# from t3e Non-Proliferation )reat4 and !or2in# !it3 Nort3 :orea on b,ildin# a bomb. )3is !o,ld not be t3e first time Iran 3as t,rned to Nort3 :orea for 3elpK d,rin# t3e Ira*-Iran !ar P4on#4an# !as IranPs principal s,pplier of missile tec3nolo#4 and anal4sts belie+e IranPs 699-mile 83a3ab-3 missile is based on Nort3 :oreaPs No &on# missile. Ze+idence contin,es Z If Iran is indeed de+elopin# n,clear !eaponsH !e can t3an2 o,r disarmament polic4 in Ira*K Qopen 4o,r co,ntr4 to !eapon inspectors and #et in+aded.Q )3e in+asion of Ira* serio,sl4 ,ndermined t3e credibilit4 of disarmament. )3e messa#e from Ira* and Nort3 :orea to Iran and ot3er co,ntries is t3e !a4 to escape Ira*Ps fate is to Q#et a n,clear bomb *,ic2l4H before t3e Bnited 8tates finds o,t abo,t it.Q @ne of t3e main problems !it3 preempti+e disarmament is t3at it is not carried o,t b4 experts b,t b4 #o+ernments !it3 political a#endas be4ond simple arms control. (nd t3e 1,s3 (dministration cannot be tr,stedK )3e Q&o!nin# 8treet memosQ dispro+e "r. 1,s3Ps often-made claim t3at t3e ,se of force !as Qlast option for an4 president.Q Not onl4 did t3e 73ite Eo,se see2 to discredit Moe 7ilsonPs findin# t3at Ira* 3ad not so,#3t ,rani,m from Ni#er b,t 1,s3 (dministration officials exposed t3e identit4 of "r. 7ilsonPs !ifeH ?alerie PlameH as a co+ert CI( a#ent in retaliation. 7it3o,t ne,tral and compre3ensi+e !eapons inspectionsH #o+ernments are left to Qsex-,pQ t3eir o!n dossiersH and rel4 on for#ed doc,ments to ;,stif4 a##ression. /i+en Ira*Ps le+el of tec3nolo#4 in 1601H it co,ld not 3a+e b,ilt a n,clear !eapon !it3o,t considerable tec3nical assistance from abroad. E+en IsraelH a co,ntr4 2no!n for its tec3nical pro!essH did not de+elop its n,clear capabilit4 in isolationK t3e @sira* plant !as constr,cted b4 t3e <renc3H !3o 3ad b,ilt an identical plant for Israel. )3e dependenc4 on forei#n tec3nolo#4 means t3at disarmament t3at tar#ets critical e*,ipment and components can be s,ccessf,l. IndeedH t3e B.N. !eapons inspections re#imes of t3e 1669sH not Q@peration Ira*i <reedomHQ are responsible for disarmin# Ira*. Caidin# IranPs n,clear facilities !ill 3a+e t3e ,nintended conse*,ence of acceleratin# proliferation and f,rt3er destabiliGin# t3e "iddle East. (nd it loo2s as if t3e Bnited 8tates ma4 #o it aloneH a#ainK @nl4 3o,rs after President 1,s3 ref,sed to r,le o,t t3e ,se of force a#ainst IranH /erman C3ancellor /er3ard 8c3roeder promptl4 re;ected s,c3 a t3reat of militar4 force. (n attac2 on Iran !o,ld ,ndermine diplomatic disarmament efforts and represent a contin,ation of t3e failed polic4 of ,nilateralism. -'
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Iran .tta%5- 5ills "E -tabilit6 (2 of 2)

B! Mid .ast proliferation spirals to nuclear conflict
@os'i 00
(83arad-H 8t,dentH International CelationsH "arc3H 8trate#ic (nal4sisH 3ttpK$$!!!.ciaonet.or#$ol;$sa$saX99;os91.3tml)
)3e introd,ction of n,clear !eapons in an alread4 3ostile re#ion co,ld increase t3e possibilit4 of act,al ,se of n,clear !eapons in a tense sit,ation. )3e contin,o,s 3ostilit4 of +ar4in# le+els o+er t3e past fi+e decadesH mi#3t lead to t3e incl,sion of n,clear and ot3er 7"& in existin# I!ar-fi#3tin#J doctrines. 10 If t3e states in t3e re#ion see 7"& simpl4 as !eapons to be ,sed in a conflictH t3e probabilit4 of t3ese !eapons bein# ,sed increases drasticall4. )3e (rabs 3a+e tried to co,nter Israel5s n,clear s,periorit4H b4 de+elopin# a siGeable c3emical and biolo#ical !eapons arsenal. )3e #reater t3e n,mber of po!ers in a re#ion possessin# 7"&H t3e #reater t3e ris2 of escalation. 7ars in 3istor4 3a+e more often t3an not been limitedL b,t t3e main reason for t3is 3as been constraints d,e to reso,rces and tec3nolo#ical 2no!-3o!. Instances are +er4 rare of a !ar bein# limited d,e to considerations of t3e conse*,ences of existin# capabilities. 16 )3e indiscriminate effect of 7eapons of "ass &estr,ction ma2es it +er4 diffic,lt to 2eep a !ar in+ol+in# s,c3 !eaponsH limited.
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Iran .tta%5- destabiliAes Ira0

A! "triking Iran would destabili%e Iraq
(ar5le6 0,
(&aniel ).-H Prof. of "icroeconomics O Nort3ern :ent,c24 B.H (,#,st 1-H ICaid !on5t diarm IranJH 3ttpK$$ne!s.24post.com$apps$ bcs.dll$articleR(I&%$299 901'$NE7892$ 901'93-3$1914L Macob) (ttac2in# Iran !o,ld 3,rt o,r Qreb,ildin#Q efforts in Ira* and f,rt3er strain B.8. relations !it3 2e4 allies. (nd t3e Bnited 8tates !ill not be able to deco,ple itself from an Israeli air raid. &estro4in# IranPs n,clear facilities re*,ires Israel 3a+e access to B.8.-controlled Ira*i air space. (llo!in# Israeli planes to fl4 o+er Ira* in order to attac2 Iran !o,ld tri##er o,tra#e in t3e Islamic 7orld.
B! (ar in the middle east

-ulli+an 02
((nton4 ).-H (ssoc. O Center for "iddle Eastern and Nort3 (frican 8t,dies O B. "ic3H 8ept. 22H &etroiot Ne!s H I7o,ld o,stin# Ira*Ps E,ssein destabiliGe "ideastR YesK Possible ,p3ea+als mi#3t create problems 3,rtin# B.8. interestsJ )3e possible splinterin# of Ira* as a res,lt of B.8. militar4 action mi#3t radicall4 destabiliGe t3e "iddle East. 8,c3 an o,tcome !o,ld do not3in# to promote (merican national interests. Ira* is di+ided into t3ree partsK t3e 83iite so,t3H t3e 8,nni center and t3e :,rdis3 nort3. )3ese t3ree constit,ent parts !ere soldered to#et3er after 7orld 7ar I. Eistoricall4H t3e4 possessed little in common. &,rin# most of t3e last - 4earsH t3e4 3a+e been 3eld to#et3er onl4 t3ro,#3 t3e 3ea+4 3and of t3e 8,nni center. E,ssein is +er4 m,c3 in t3at 8,nni dictatorial tradition. @f co,rseH !3at 3e 3as done to :,!aitH and to 3is o!n peopleH is abominable. Ne+ert3elessH one ma4 ar#,e t3at !it3o,t t3e Qri#orQ imposed from 1a#3dadH Ira* mi#3t dissol+eH briefl4H into t3ree independent statelets. 1,t s,c3 statelets !o,ld probabl4 not be independent for lon#. ",c3 lar#er and more po!erf,l nei#3bors !o,ld li2el4 #obble eac3 of t3em ,p soon eno,#3. ( fra#mented Ira* !o,ld introd,ce radical instabilit4 into t3e "iddle East political s4stem. Bp3ea+als !o,ld probabl4 metastasiGeH !it3 ,npredictable res,lts. None !o,ld foster (merican national interests. 73at 3appens if t3e Bnited 8tates mana#es to sa+e Ira*H b,t in t3e process loses 8a,di (rabia and MordanR @sama bin =adenH if ali+eH ma4 !ell be ecstatic o+er t3e m4riad possibilities t3at a B.8. !ar !it3 1a#3dad mi#3t offer al-Saida. 73at President /eor#e 7. 1,s3 proposesH if implementedH ma4 !ell pro+ide terrorists !it3 le#ions of recr,its. IndeedH terrorist t3reats to t3e Bnited 8tates mi#3t become e+en #reater d,rin# and after a !ar t3an t3e4 are no!. Ima#ine a !ar !it3 Ira* t3at initiall4 Qs,cceedsQ in topplin# E,ssein and 3is loat3some 1aPat3ist re#imeH b,t res,lts in Ira* dissol+in# into its t3ree parts. Ima#ine t3at in t3e post!ar conf,sionH so,t3ern 83iite Ira* (constit,tin# '9 percent of t3e pop,lation) detac3es itself from 1a#3dad. 8oon eno,#3H 83iite Iran mi#3t step into t3e breac3 and occ,p4 or effecti+el4 control t3e 83iite re#ion. 14 doin# soH Iran !o,ld place itself on t3e nort3ern frontier of 8a,di (rabia. 8eein# t3isH t3e 83iites in 8a,di (rabiaH located o+er!3elmin#l4 in t3e eastern part of t3e co,ntr4 and sittin# atop ma;or oil fieldsH mi#3t re+olt. )3e 8a,dis mi#3t !ell be ,nable to repress t3e rebellionH and t3e (mericans mi#3t be too o+erstretc3ed militaril4 to pro+ide timel4 assistance. Iranian infl,ence t3en mi#3t pl,n#e so,t3!ard into t3e !orldPs most important oil fields. 7o,ld t3is be in t3e B.8. national interestR )3en t3ere is t3e 8,nni center of Ira*. (ss,me t3e 8,nnisH !3o comprise onl4 abo,t 29 percent of t3e Ira*i pop,lationH are left bereft in a disinte#rated co,ntr4. 1,t ima#ine t3at t3e 8,nni pl,ralit4 in 84riaH despite its (la!ite re#imeH co,ldnPt resist t3e -0
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opport,nit4 to ta2e control of formerl4 8,nni Ira*. (ss,me f,rt3er t3at t3e res,lt is t3e creation of a #reater 84ria !it3 po!er pro;ected east into 1a#3dad and !est into 1eir,t. 7o,ld t3is also be in t3e (merican national interestR <inall4H ass,me t3at in a post!ar Ira* t3e mainl4 8,nni :,rds in formerl4 Ira*i :,rdistanH !3o sit atop a lar#e amo,nt of oilH decide to realiGe t3eir millennial dream of an independent state. )3is mi#3t !ell lead t3e :,rds in bot3 ),r2e4 and Iran to re+olt or secedeH and to attempt to ,nite !it3 t3eir 2insmen to t3e so,t3 and !est. ),r2e4 and Iran t3en mi#3t send armies into :,rdistan to repress internal secessions and sec,re control of at least some :,rdis3 oil. )3en ima#ine t3at !ar brea2s o,t bet!een N()@ member ),r2e4 and IranH !3ose relations 3a+e lon# been poisono,s.
Iran .tta%5- -tri5e Israel atta%5 ) bun5er busters

#urrent plans for Iran attack include the use of bunker busters and Israeli involvement
"adsen 02
(7a4ne-H fmr. "ember of t3e National 8ec,rit4 Co,ncil (d,rin# t3e Cea#an (dministration) @ct. 24H I( 1,s3 pre-election stri2e on IranRJH 3ttpK$$!!!.#lobalresearc3.ca$articles$"(&419(.3tmlL Macob) )3e Iran attac2 plan !as reportedl4 dra!n ,p after internal pollin# indicated t3at if t3e 1,s3 administration la,nc3ed a socalled anti-terrorist attac2 on Iran some t!o !ee2s before t3e electionH 1,s3 !o,ld be ass,red of a landslide !in a#ainst :err4. Ceports of a pre-empti+e stri2e on Iran come amid concerns b4 a n,mber of political obser+ers t3at t3e 1,s3 administration !o,ld concoct an Q@ctober 8,rpriseQ to infl,ence t3e o,tcome of t3e presidential election. (ccordin# to 73ite Eo,se so,rcesH t3e B88 Mo3n <. :enned4 !as deplo4ed to t3e (rabian 8ea to coordinate t3e attac2 on Iran. &efense 8ecretar4 &onald C,msfeld disc,ssed t3e :enned4Ps role in t3e planned attac2 on Iran !3en 3e +isited t3e s3ip in t3e (rabian 8ea on @ctober 6. C,msfeld and defense ministers of B.8. coalition partnersH incl,din# t3ose of (lbaniaH (Gerbai;anH 1a3rainH 1,l#ariaH CGec3 Cep,blicH &enmar2H EstoniaH /eor#iaH E,n#ar4H Ira*H =at+iaH =it3,aniaH "acedoniaH "on#oliaH PolandH SatarH ComaniaH and B2raine briefl4 disc,ssed a +er4 Qtop le+elQ +ie! of potential d,al-trac2 militar4 operations in Iran and Ira* in a special Q!ar roomQ set ,p on board t3e aircraft carrier. (mericaPs primar4 all4 in Ira*H t3e Bnited :in#domH did not attend t3e plannin# session beca,se it reportedl4 disa#rees !it3 a militar4 stri2e on Iran. =ondon also s,spects t3e B.8. !ants to mo+e 1ritis3 troops from 1asra in so,t3ern Ira* to t3e 1a#3dad area to 3elp p,t do!n an expected s,r#e in 83Pia +iolence in 8adr Cit4 and ot3er 83Pia areas in central Ira* !3en t3e B.8. attac2s Iran as !ell as clear t3e !a4 for a B.8. militar4 stri2e across t3e Ira*i-Iranian border aimed at sec,rin# t3e 3,#e Iranian oil installations in (badan. B.8. allies 8o,t3 :oreaH (,straliaH :,!aitH MordanH Ital4H Net3erlandsH and Mapan !ere also left o,t of t3e B88 Mo3n <. :enned4 plannin# disc,ssions beca,se of t3eir reported opposition to an4 stri2e on Iran. In additionH Israel 3as been s,pplied b4 t3e Bnited 8tates !it3 99 Qb,n2er b,sterQ bombs. (ccordin# to 73ite Eo,se so,rcesH t3e Israeli (ir <orce !ill attac2 IranPs n,clear facilit4 at 1,s3e3r !it3 t3e B.8. b,n2er b,sters in t3ree !a+es !it3 t3e radar and comm,nications ;ammin# protection bein# pro+ided b4 B.8. (ir <orce (7(C8 and ot3er B.8. aircraft in t3e area.)3e ;oint B.8.-Israeli pre-empti+e militar4 mo+e a#ainst Iran reportedl4 !as crafted b4 t3e same neo-conser+ati+e #ro,pin# in t3e Penta#on and ?ice President &ic2 C3ene4Ps office t3at en#ineered t3e in+asion of Ira*.
-6
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Iran .tta%5- Yes !e !ill be nu5in# t'em (1 of 2)

!"! pre-emptive strike will be nuclear
1irs%' 06
(Mor#e-H Prof. of P34sics O B.C.8.&.H <eb. 29H (nti!ar.comH I(merica and IranK (t t3e 1rin2 of t3e (b4ssH 7e can stop a Qpreempti+eQ n,clear stri2eJ 3ttpK$$!!!.anti!ar.com$ori#$3irsc3.p3pRarticleid%0 --L Macob) )3e Impendin# N,clear (ttac2 (ll t3e elements 3a+e been p,t in place caref,ll4 and met3odicall4 for t3e B.8. to ,se tactical n,clear !eapons a#ainst Iran in a !a4 t3at !ill seem QacceptableQ at first si#3tH as disc,ssed in pre+io,s col,mnsK t3e ne! n,clear doctrineH t3e n,clear 3itmenH t3e !eaponsH t3e ;,stificationH t3e le#al frame!or2H and t3e p,blic mindset. )3e I(E( resol,tion of <eb. 4 U.pdfV 3as pa+ed a smoot3 road to confrontationH parallelin# t3e e+ents after t3e passa#e of BN 8ec,rit4 Co,ncil Cesol,tion 1441 of No+ember 2992. )3e ,se of lo!-4ield eart3-penetratin# n,clear !eapons !ill appear to be a militar4 necessit4H one t3at !ill sa+e t3o,sands of (merican and Israeli li+esH deter an Iranian responseH and ac3ie+e Qrapid and fa+orable !ar termination on B.8. terms.Q )3e p,blic mindset 3as been t3oro,#3l4 prepared for !ar b4 a barra#e of ,ntr,e propa#anda a#ainst IranH extendin# o+er man4 4ears and #rad,all4 escalatin# in +ol,me and tone. Iran 3as been demoniGed as t3e p,re incarnation of e+ilK t3e foremost sponsor of terrorismH p,rs,in# n,clear !eaponsH intent on 3armin# (mericaH 3arborin# al-SaedaH 3idin# arsenals of c3emical and biolo#ical !eapons and t3eir means of deli+er4H oppressin# its o!n peopleH intent on destro4in# Israel and t3e 7est. "ax 1oot ;,st !rote in t3e =os (n#eles )imesH QIn s,mH a terrorist-sponsorin# state led b4 an apocal4ptic l,natic !ill soon 3a+e t3e abilit4 to incinerate )el (+i+ or Ne! Yor2HQ !3ic3 Qlea+es onl4 one serio,s option [ air stri2es b4 Israel or t3e B.8.Q Niall <er#,son !rote a fe! da4s earlier in t3e same ne!spaper t3at a B.8. preempti+e stri2e a#ainst Iran toda4 !o,ld pre+ent an Iranian n,clear stri2e on Israel in 299-H i#norin# amon# ot3er t3in#s t3e realit4 t3at it is p34sicall4 impossible for Iran to prod,ce a n,clear !eapon in a 4ear. Nic3olas /oldber#H !3o edits t3e )imesP opinion pa#eH st,dio,sl4 a+oids p,blis3in# an4 alternati+e +ie!points. ( similar approac3 is ta2en b4 t3e rest of t3e mainstream media in t3e B.8. and 7estern E,rope. Is it s,rprisin# t3at a fe! da4s after t3ese t!o opinion pieces !ere p,blis3ed t3e =os (n#eles )imes fo,nd t3at - percent of t3e B.8. p,blic bac2s a militar4 stri2e on IranR 73et3er Iran 3as n,clear !eapons toda4H 19 4ears from toda4H or ne+er is not t3e iss,e an4more. )3e B.8. 3as declared t3at Iran !ill not be allo!ed to 3a+e a Qn,clear !eapons capabilit4.Q Eo!R Per3aps t3e CI( !ill s,ppl4 Iran !it3 misleadin# doc,ments indicatin# t3at E%m2c rat3er t3an E%mc2R Bnli2el4. )3e n,clear !eapons Qcapabilit4Q !ill be defined as broadl4 as neededH no matter !3at Iran a#rees toH to ;,stif4 t3e militar4 optionH !3ic3 3as alread4 been endorsed b4 senators on bot3 sides of t3e aisle. Eo!e+erH neit3er t3e media nor Con#ress are brin#in# ,p t3e incon+enient little fact t3at t3e militar4 option !ill necessaril4 lead to t3e ,se of n,clear !eapons a#ainst Iran. (nd t3e4 are ,n!illin# to !ei#3 t3e fact t3at ,sin# n,clear !eapons a#ainst a non-n,clear co,ntr4 li2e Iran !ill li2el4 3a+e disastro,s conse*,ences for t3e B.8. and t3e rest of t3e !orld. )3e <allac4 of N,clear Q&eterrenceQ 7e are told o+er and o+er t3at t3e sole p,rpose of B.8. n,clear !eapons is to QdeterQ ad+ersariesH !3ic3 s,rel4 pro+ides some comfort to ot3er!ise moral people !3o de+ote t3eir efforts to b,ildin# ,p t3e B.8. n,clear !eapons arsenal. )3e ar#,ment made some sense beforeK an ad+ersar4 li2e t3e 8o+iet Bnion co,ld ar#,abl4 be deterred b4 t3e B.8. n,clear arsenal from la,nc3in# a n,clear attac2 a#ainst t3e B.8. or its alliesH or e+en a massi+e con+entional attac2 a#ainst 7estern E,rope. Eo!e+erH t3e QdeterrentQ role of B.8. n,clear !eapons 3as recentl4 been extended to deter 7"& (e.#.H c3emical !eapons) attac2sH and t3e administration ar#,es t3at Qlo!-4ieldQ n,clear !eapons ma2e deterrence more QcredibleQ U.pdfVH and lo!4ield eart3 penetratin# !eapons (1'1-11) are alread4 in t3e B.8. n,clear stoc2pile U.pdfV. 73ere does t3is leadR 09
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(s :eit3 Pa4neH a proponent of t3e c,rrent B.8. N,clear Post,re !ell p,ts itH Qdeterrence is in3erentl4 ,nreliableK prepare for its fail,re.Q )3is means t3at if an ad+ersar4 ,nderta2es an action t3at t3e B.8. n,clear t3reat !as meant to deterH t3e B.8. !ill respond b4 ma2in# #ood on its t3reat and ,se its n,clear !eapons. Co,ple t3is !it3 t3e recentl4 adopted preempti+e National 8ec,rit4 8trate#4H and t3e fact t3at t3e B.8. acc,ses Iran of 3a+in# c3emical !eapons and t3at it can Qdeplo4 c3emical !ar3eads on its lon#-ran#e missilesHQ and 4o, are led to t3e follo!in# scenarioK If in response to an aerial attac2 on IranPs facilitiesH Iran fires or t3reatens to fire a sin#le missile a#ainst Israel or a#ainst B.8. forces in Ira*H t3e B.8. !ill attac2 Iran !it3 tactical n,clear !eapons. 734 is t3is a realistic expectationR 1eca,se no matter !3at t3e political costH it !o,ld s,pport t3e m,c3 broader role desired for t3e B.8. n,clear arsenal in t3e Qsecond n,clear a#eHQ !3ic3 c,rrentl4 3as no credibilit4. (ccordin# to t3e 2991 N,clear Post,re Ce+ie!H t3e B.8. n,clear arsenal is no! also s,pposed to Qdiss,ade ad+ersaries from ,nderta2in# militar4 pro#rams or operations t3at co,ld t3reaten B.8. interests or t3ose of allies and friends.Q 7ellH it 3as alread4 failed in t3is re#ard. Iran is p,rs,in# its n,clear pro#ramH ,ndeterred b4 all o+ert and less o+ert B.8. t3reats. @nce t3e B.8. ma2es #ood on its n,clear deterrence t3reat once and ,ses its n,clear !eaponsH t3e +alidit4 of t3e n,clear deterrence polic4 a#ainst an4 action opposed b4 t3e B.8. !ill be
Iran .tta%5- Yes !e !ill be nu5in# t'em (2 of 2)

establis3ed for f,t,re contin#encies. )3ere is a #ood reason !34 B.8. doc,ments emp3asiGe t3at Qt3ere is no c,stomar4 or con+entional international la! to pro3ibit nations from emplo4in# n,clear !eapons in armed conflict.Q
01
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Iran .tta%5- ./ o -tri5e

Bush will attack Iran despite being bogged down in Iraq
Rea#an 0,
()om-H (,#,st 1-H C8"H I)3e "ilitar4 8tri2e @ption (#ainst IranJH 3ttpK$$csmonitor.com$299 $901-$dail4Bpdate.3tml) /lobal iss,es expert &an Plesc3 points o,t in t3e /,ardian t3at 1,s3 3as Qt3e capabilit4 and t3e reasonsQ for an assa,lt on Iranian n,clear facilities. Ee notes t3at an4one !3o t3in2s t3at t3e B8 is Qo+erextendedQ militaril4 in Ira* Qmis,nderstandsQ t3e #oals of t3e 1,s3 administration. I(mericaPs de+astatin# air po!er is not committed in Ira*. M,st 129 1 2H 11 and 12 bombers co,ld 3it H999 tar#ets in a sin#le mission. )3o,sands of ot3er !arplanes and missiles are a+ailable. )3e arm4 and marines are 3ea+il4 committed in Ira*H b,t eno,#3 forces co,ld be fo,nd to sec,re coastal oilfields and to cond,ct raids into Iran.J
Bush wont negotiate

La5aria 0,
(<areed-H (,#,st 1'H 7as3in#ton PostH I)al2 to )e3ranJH 3ttpK$$!!!.!as3in#tonpost.com$!p-d4n$content$article$299 $90$1 $ (C299 901 911 9.3tmlL Macob) 8tic2s are not #oin# to !or2H 3o!e+er. In its second termH t3e 1,s3 administration 3as softened its Iran polic4H and 4et it remains ,n!illin# to tal2H let alone ne#otiateH on an4t3in# s,bstanti+e. (s !it3 Nort3 :oreaH t3e s3ift to!ard a less 3ostile polic4 is so sli#3t t3at it canPt possibl4 s,cceed. In factH I sometimes !onder !3et3er t3is ne! QsoftQ polic4 3as been desi#ned b4 ?ice President C3ene4Ps officeH so t3at it failsH discredits an4 prospect of ne#otiatin# and t3,s ret,rns ,s to t3e old polic4H !3ic3 is to do not3in# and 3ope t3e re#ime falls (a prediction t3at 3as been made b4 neoconser+ati+es for 1 4ears no!).
02
Caldebate.com
Iran .tta%5- ./ -tri5e Re+olution

$o way it would fail' and even if it worked would actually strengthen public support for the regime- o yea and it wouldnt work
La5aria 0,
(<areed-H (,#,st 1'H 7as3in#ton PostH I)al2 to )e3ranJH 3ttpK$$!!!.!as3in#tonpost.com$!p-d4n$content$article$299 $90$1 $ (C299 901 911 9.3tmlL Macob) (ir stri2es a#ainst Iran !o,ld be extremel4 ,n!ise. )3e4 !o,ld 3a+e minimal militar4 effectK )3e facilities are scatteredH reasonabl4 !ell 3idden and co,ld be repaired !it3in mont3s. 7it3 oil at A'' a barrelH t3e m,lla3s are s!immin# in mone4. ()3e 3i#3 price of oil and IranPs boldness are directl4 related.) "ore importantH a forei#n militar4 attac2 !o,ld stren#t3en local s,pport for t3e n,clear pro#ram and bolster an ,npop,lar re#ime. Iran is a co,ntr4 !it3 a stron# tradition of nationalism -- it is one of t3e oldest nations in t3e !orld.
More ev- it would strength public support for the regime

Rubin 06
()r,d4-H Col,mnist for t3e P3iladelp3ia In*,irerH "arc3 2-H )3e (nniston 8tarH I1,s3 #i+es ne! life to failed pre-emption doctrineJH 3ttpK$$!!!.annistonstar.com$opinion$299'$as-insi#3t-932--9-'c24s39 .3tmL Macob)
<,2,4amaH a leadin# neocon t,rned critic of administration polic4H adds anot3er ca,tion. (lt3o,#3 an attac2 mi#3t slo! Iran5s n,clear pro#ramH t3e political dama#e !o,ld be immense. Nationalistic Iranians !o,ld rall4 ro,nd t3eir re#ime.
03
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Iran .tta%5- ./ Israel !ill first stri5e

Israel wont and cant first strike Iran
"itni%5 02
(Mos3,a-H Contrib,tor to t3e C8"H (,#,st 10H )3e C3ristian 8cience "onitorH I7o,ld Israel stri2e first at IranRJH 3ttpK$$!!!.csmonitor.com$2994$9010$p9's91-!ome.3tmlL Macob) In orderin# t3e li#3tnin# 2noc2o,tH Israel ser+ed notice to its "iddle Eastern foes t3at t3e Me!is3 state !o,ld act - e+en preempti+el4 - to depri+e t3em of a n,clear option. )!o decades laterH t3e @sira2 precedent end,res. (s t3e 1,s3 administration steps ,p its r3etoric a#ainst IranPs n,clear pro#ramH t3e possibilit4 of Israel follo!in# t3ro,#3 on +eiled t3reats to 3it Iranian sites remains a !ildcard. 1,t se+eral Israeli experts sa4 t3at t3e @sira2 experience bears little rele+ance in t3e case of Iran and t3at t3e c3ances of a repeat stri2e are +er4 lo!. Bnli2e in t3e earl4 1609s !3en Israel fo,nd itself isolated in percei+in# a t3reat from Ira*Ps n,clear pro#ramH t3e prospect of B8-led m,ltilateral press,re a#ainst Iran casts a ,nilateral stri2e in a more-problematic li#3t. 7it3 National 8ec,rit4 (d+iser CondoleeGGa Cice !arnin# last !ee2 t3at t3e B8 !onPt tolerate a n,clear IranH Israel is m,c3 more li2el4 to act in tandem !it3 its most po!erf,l all4 rat3er t3an electin# to #o it aloneH obser+ers sa4. Q)3e circ,mstances are *,ite differentHPP sa4s Ep3raim :amH 3ead of t3e 1e#in 8adat Center for 8trate#ic 8t,dies at 1ar Ilan Bni+ersit4 in Camat /anH Israel. QIf Israel is #oin# to ta2e an4 mo+e be4ond t3e diplomatic mo+eH t3ere s3o,ld be better ,nderstandin# in t3e international arena t3at t3ere is no !a4 to stop t3e Iranians.PP )e3ran admits it 3as so,#3t so-called d,al-,se n,clear tec3nolo#4 in order to #enerate electricit4H b,t denies it aims to b,ild n,clear !eapons. Cepeat performanceR E+en t3e +er4 abilit4 of IsraelPs militar4 to repeat t3e decisi+e stri2e ac3ie+ed at @sira2 appears do,btf,l. 73ile t3e Ira*i n,clear effort !as concentrated at t3e @sira2 plantH n,clear experts sa4 t3e Iranians 3a+e dispersed t3eir pro#ram at m,ltiple sitesH some of !3ic3 are 3idden ,nder#ro,nd. )3at ma2es a repeat performance of t3e clean and decisi+e blo! a#ainst Ira* almost impossibleH anal4sts sa4. Not onl4 is it ,nclear 3o! Israeli forces !o,ld eliminate ,nder#ro,nd centrif,#e installationsH b,t t3e tas2 of locatin# all of IranPs n,clear tar#ets re*,ires a 3i#3 de#ree of intelli#ence and ris2. QI donPt t3in2 t3erePs an option for a preempti+e act beca,se !ePre tal2in# abo,t a different sort of a n,clear pro#ramHPP sa4s 83m,el 1arH a fello! at t3e Instit,te for Polic4 and 8trate#4 at t3e Interdisciplinar4 Center in EerGli4aH Israel. Q( 3it-and-r,n preempti+e attac2 canPt #,arantee m,c3 s,ccess.PP Z e+idence contin,es Z <or t3eir partH Israeli officials ar#,e t3at IranPs ambition is to ,se n,clear prominence to t3reaten 8a,di (rabiaH E,ropeH and B8 infl,ence in t3e /,lf. )3at position ma2es it 3arder to ;,stif4 anot3er @sira2H beca,se s,c3 an action !o,ld contradict Israeli claims t3at IranPs n,clear pro#ram is a #lobal t3reat rat3er t3an a re#ional one. Q7e donPt !ant to create t3e impression t3at itPs on o,r s3o,ldersHPP sa4s Israeli le#islator Y,+al 8teinmetGH c3air of t3e parliamentPs forei#n affairs and defense committee. Q)3is time itPs not ,p to Israel to sa+e t3e !orld.PP
04
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Iran Prolif -%enario (1 of 2)

A! /re-emption doctrine scares Iran into proliferating
Rubin 06
()r,d4-H Col,mnist for t3e P3iladelp3ia In*,irerH "arc3 2-H )3e (nniston 8tarH I1,s3 #i+es ne! life to failed pre-emption doctrineJH 3ttpK$$!!!.annistonstar.com$opinion$299'$as-insi#3t-932--9-'c24s39 .3tmL Macob) 8,c3 a doctrine no do,bt 3as increased )e3ran5s appetite to b,ild a n,clear !eapons pro#ram s!iftl4. Pres,mabl4H Iran noticed t3at t3e doctrine doesn5t t3reaten Nort3 :orea as 3ars3l4 N per3aps beca,se Nort3 :orea alread4 3as se+eral bombs. )3e doctrine 3as certainl4 increased Iran5s incenti+e to ma2e tro,ble for (mericans inside Ira*.
B! Iranian nucleari%ation regional prolif

"il'ollin 09
(/ar4-H &irector of t3e 7isconsin Pro;ect on N,clear (rms ControlH &ec. 11H bitterlemons-international.or#H IN,clear brea2o,t in t3e "iddle EastRJH !!!.!isconsinpro;ect.or#$p,bs$ articles$2993$bitterlemons.3tmL Macob) )3ere is e+er4 reason to t3in2 t3at Iran !ill ac3ie+e n,clear !eapons stat,s if it sta4s its present co,rse. )3e centrif,#es appear to be f,nctionalH and Iran 3as mana#ed to b,4 e*,ipment needed to assemble or ma2e centrif,#es on its o!n. 83o,ld Iran enter t3e n,clear cl,bH t3e "iddle East !ill face a n,clear-armed state !it3 lon#standin# ties to terrorism and a #ro!in# missile fleet. IranPs missiles are capable of carr4in# a n,clear-siGed pa4load not onl4 to IsraelH b,t to MordanH Ira*H 84riaH 8a,di (rabia and possibl4 E#4pt. It is nai+e to t3in2 t3at none of t3ese states !ill react. BGi C,binH former director of defense polic4 at IsraelPs National 8ec,rit4 Co,ncilH predicted in an @ctober 2993 speec3 to an international conference on missile defense t3at an Iranian bomb !o,ld sp,r n,clear !eapon mo+es b4 bot3 E#4pt and 8a,di (rabia. E#4pt does not possess s,c3 !eapons no!H b,t in t3e past 3as considered b,ildin# t3em. It 3as alread4 be#,n to prod,ce 8c,d-t4pe missiles capable of carr4in# a n,clear !ar3ead to Israel. 8a,di (rabia does not possess t3e bomb eit3erH b,t it bo,#3t a fleet of C3inese missiles in t3e 1609s t3at co,ld deli+er n,clear !ar3eads to man4 points in t3e "iddle EastH and it is r,mored to 3a+e disc,ssed n,clear cooperation recentl4 !it3 Pa2istan. /i+en t3e fact t3at Pa2istan 3as sold ,rani,m centrif,#e tec3nolo#4 to Nort3 :oreaH and is r,mored to 3a+e s,pplied t3e same to IranH an4 n,clear tal2s bet!een it and t3e 8a,dis s3o,ld ca,se real alarm. Neit3er 8a,di (rabia nor E#4pt !o,ld li2e to see Iran dominate t3e re#ion. In addition to all t3isH =ib4a 3as s3o!n si#ns of rene!ed n,clear acti+it4. Colonel Saddafi 3as been tal2in# to t3e C,ssians abo,t ref,rbis3in# 3is )a;,ra n,clear siteH and abo,t b,ildin# a po!er reactor. =ib4a 3as for 4ears imported 8c,d-t4pe missiles from Nort3 :orea. )3,s t3e n,clear *,estion in t3e "iddle East is not ;,st bet!een Israelis and ",slims. ( n,clear brea2o,t b4 Iran !o,ld affect inter-Islamic ri+alries as !ell. )3at is !34 t3e n,clear f,t,re in Iran is so important. Iran5s pro#ress is not li2el4 to be stopped b4 its pled#es ,nder t3e N,clear Non-Proliferation )reat4. Bnfort,natel4H a co,ntr4 is perfectl4 free to ,se its ad3erence to t3e treat4 as a reason !34 ot3er co,ntries s3o,ld pro+ide it !it3 n,clear tec3nolo#4. )3enH after importin# !3at it needsH it can drop o,t of t3e treat4 on t3ree mont35s notice and t,rn its n,clear !3ere!it3al to bombma2in#. Nor do t3e inspections carried o,t b4 t3e International (tomic Ener#4 (#enc4 pro+ide m,c3 comfort. (s lon# as t3e inspectors are allo!ed to obser+e !3at Iran is doin#H Iran can come ri#3t ,p to t3e ed#e of n,clear !eapon capabilit4 !it3o,t brea2in# t3e r,les. 0
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It is time for t3e !3ole !orld--not ;,st t3e Bnited 8tates--to start ima#inin# !3at a n,cleariGed "iddle East !ill loo2 li2e. Co,ld !estern diplomac4 2eep s,c3 a re#ion from #oin# o+er t3e ed#eR 7o,ld some species of local deterrence !or2R (nd !3at abo,t B8 President /eor#e 7. 1,s3Ps plan to extend democrac4 in t3e re#ionR Bnless t3e !orld is read4 to ans!er s,c3 *,estionsH it 3ad better c,rb Iran5s n,clear pro#ram before it is too late.
Iran Prolif -%enario (1 of 2)

#! Mid .ast proliferation spirals to nuclear conflict
@os'i 00
(83arad-H 8t,dentH International CelationsH "arc3H 8trate#ic (nal4sisH 3ttpK$$!!!.ciaonet.or#$ol;$sa$saX99;os91.3tml)
)3e introd,ction of n,clear !eapons in an alread4 3ostile re#ion co,ld increase t3e possibilit4 of act,al ,se of n,clear !eapons in a tense sit,ation. )3e contin,o,s 3ostilit4 of +ar4in# le+els o+er t3e past fi+e decadesH mi#3t lead to t3e incl,sion of n,clear and ot3er 7"& in existin# I!ar-fi#3tin#J doctrines. 10 If t3e states in t3e re#ion see 7"& simpl4 as !eapons to be ,sed in a conflictH t3e probabilit4 of t3ese !eapons bein# ,sed increases drasticall4. )3e (rabs 3a+e tried to co,nter Israel5s n,clear s,periorit4H b4 de+elopin# a siGeable c3emical and biolo#ical !eapons arsenal. )3e #reater t3e n,mber of po!ers in a re#ion possessin# 7"&H t3e #reater t3e ris2 of escalation. 7ars in 3istor4 3a+e more often t3an not been limitedL b,t t3e main reason for t3is 3as been constraints d,e to reso,rces and tec3nolo#ical 2no!-3o!. Instances are +er4 rare of a !ar bein# limited d,e to considerations of t3e conse*,ences of existin# capabilities. 16 )3e indiscriminate effect of 7eapons of "ass &estr,ction ma2es it +er4 diffic,lt to 2eep a !ar in+ol+in# s,c3 !eaponsH limited.
0'
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<as'mir -%enario
A! !" policy of pre-emption war in the +ashmir- makes Indias pre-emptive option seem legitimate and destroys international efforts at conflict prevention!
("ic3ael E.-H8r. <ello! in <orei#n Polic4 8t,dies O t3e 1roo2in#s Instit,tionH 8,san E.-H 8r. <ello! in <orei#n Polic4 8t,dies O t3e 1roo2in#s Instit,tionH Mames 1.-H &ean of t3e =1M 8c3ool of P,blic (ffairs O B.).H Polic4 1riefH I)3e Ne! National 8ec,rit4 8trate#4 and PreemptionJH T 113H 3ttpK$$!!!.broo2in#s.ed,$printme.!bsRpa#e%$comm$polic4briefs$pb113.3tmL Macob) ( final concern relates to t3e impact of t3e precedent set b4 t3e Bnited 8tates le#itimatin# action t3at ot3ers mi#3t em,lateH at t3e same time red,cin# its le+era#e to con+ince s,c3 co,ntries not to ,se force. )3is
concern is t3eoretical at one le+elH since it relates to stated doctrine as opposed to act,al B.8. actions. 1,t it is +er4 real at anot3er le+el. )oda4Ps international s4stem is c3aracteriGed b4 a relati+e infre*,enc4 of interstate !ar. &e+elopin# doctrines t3at lo!er t3e t3res3old for preempti+e action co,ld p,t t3at accomplis3ment at ris2H and exacerbate re#ional crises alread4 on t3e brin2 of open conflict.
@f co,rseH no co,ntr4 !ill embar2 s,ddenl4 on a !ar of a##ression simpl4 beca,se t3e Bnited 8tates pro+ides it !it3 a *,asi-le#al ;,stification to do so. 1,t co,ntries alread4 on t3e brin2 of !arH and leanin# stron#l4 to!ards !arH mi#3t ,se t3e doctrine to ;,stif4 an action t3e4 alread4 !is3ed to ta2eH and t3e effect of t3e B.8. post,re ma4 ma2e it 3arder for t3e international comm,nit4 in #eneralH and t3e B.8. in partic,larH to co,nsel dela4 and diplomac4. Potential examples abo,ndH ran#in# from Et3iopia and EritreaH to C3ina and )ai!anH to t3e "iddle East. 1,t per3aps t3e clearest case is t3e India-Pa2istan crisis. =ast sprin#H India !as poised to attac2 Pa2istanH #i+en Pa2istanPs s,spected complicit4 in assistin# Islamic extremist terrorists !3o !ent from Pa2istan into t3e disp,ted territor4 of :as3mir. ( combination of B.8. press,re on bot3 co,ntriesH !it3 some last-min,te ca,tion b4 t3e leaders of Pa2istan and IndiaH narro!l4 a+erted a !ar t3at 3ad t3e potential to escalate to t3e n,clear le+el once it be#an. (lt3o,#3 India mi#3t 3a+e intended to limit its action to eliminatin# terrorist bases in Pa2istan-3eld :as3mir and per3aps some bases inside Pa2istanH n,clear-armed Pa2istan mi#3t !ell 3a+e belie+ed t3at IndiaPs intentions !ere to o+ert3ro! t3e re#ime in Islamabad or to eliminate its n,clear !eapons capabilit4. )3at sit,ation !o,ld 3a+e f,rt3er exacerbated t3e ris2s of escalation. Bnfort,natel4H t3e terrorist infiltrations from Pa2istan to :as3mir t3at did m,c3 to spar2 t3e earlier crisis appear to be res,min#. :as3mirPs stat,s remains contentio,sH meanin# t3at t3e ris2 of conflict remains.
83o,ld t3e crisis res,meH a B.8. polic4 of preemption ma4 pro+ide 3a!2s in India t3e added amm,nition t3e4 need to ;,stif4 a stri2e a#ainst Pa2istan in t3e e4es of t3eir fello! Indian decision-ma2ers.
Cecentl4H India <inance "inister (and former <orei#n "inister) Mas!ant 8in#3 !elcomed t3e administrationPs ne! emp3asis on t3e le#itimac4 of preemption.
B! The 7 is .0tinction
:as'in#ton Times 01
(July 8, I)3e most dan#ero,s placeJH =exisL Macob) 0-
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)3e forei#n polic4 of t3e Bnited 8tates in 8o,t3 (sia s3o,ld mo+e from t3e lac2adaisical and distant (!it3 India cro!ned !it3 a ,nilateral +eto po!er) to a##ressi+e in+ol+ement at t3e +ortex. )3e most dan#ero,s place on t3e planet is :as3mirH a disp,ted territor4 con+,lsed and ille#all4 occ,pied for more t3an 3 4ears and sand!ic3ed bet!een n,clear-capable India and Pa2istan. It 3as i#nited t!o !ars bet!een t3e estran#ed 8o,t3 (sian ri+als in 1640 and 16' H and a t3ird co,ld tri##er n,clear +olle4s and a nu%lear !inter t3reatenin# t3e entire #lobe. )3e Bnited 8tates !o,ld en;o4 no sanct,ar4. )3is apocal4ptic +ision is no idios4ncratic +ie!. )3e director of central intelli#enceH t3e &efense &epartmentH and !orld experts #enerall4 place :as3mir at t3e pea2 of t3eir n,clear !orries. 1ot3 India and Pa2istan are racin# li2e t3oro,#3breds to bolster t3eir n,clear arsenals and ad+anced deli+er4 +e3icles. )3eir defense b,d#ets are climbin# despite !idespread miser4 amon#st t3eir pop,lations. Neit3er co,ntr4 3as initialed t3e N,clear Non-Proliferation )reat4H t3e Compre3ensi+e )est 1an )reat4H or indicated an inclination to ratif4 an impendin# <issile "aterial$C,t-off Con+ention.
<as'mir- Pre-emption :ar (1 of 2)

/re-emption India first striking /akistan
*riffit's 09
(&r. "artin-H Prof. of Political F International 8t,dies O <linders B.H @ct. 1H (,stralasian Political 8t,dies (ssociation ConferenceH I8elf-Inflicted 7o,ndsK Bnited 8tates /rand 8trate#4 and t3e 7ar on )errorJH 3ttpK$$!!!.,tas.ed,.a,$#o+ernment$ (P8($"/riffit3sfinal.pdfL Macob) <irstH B8 #rand strate#4 reinforces t3e ima#e of t3e Bnited 8tates as too *,ic2 to ,se militar4 force and to do so o,tside t3e bo,nds of international la! and le#itimac4. )3is can ma2e it more diffic,lt for t3e Bnited 8tates to #ain international s,pport for its ,se of forceH and o+er t3e lon# termH ma4 lead ot3ers to resist B.8. forei#n polic4 #oals more broadl4H incl,din# its efforts to fi#3t terrorism. Ele+atin# pre-emption to t3e le+el of a formal doctrine ma4 also increase t3e (dministration5s inclination to reac3 for t3e militar4 le+er *,ic2l4H !3en ot3er tools still 3a+e a #ood c3ance of !or2in#. @t3er states ma4 !is3
to em,late t3e precedent set b4 t3e Bnited 8tates in (f#3anistan and Ira*H at t3e same time red,cin# its le+era#e to con+ince s,c3 co,ntries not to ,se force. )3is concern is t3eoretical at one le+elH since it relates to stated doctrine as opposed to act,al B.8. actions. 1,t it is +er4 real at anot3er le+el. )oda45s international s4stem is c3aracterised b4 a relati+e infre*,enc4 of interstate !ar. &e+elopin# doctrines t3at lo!er t3e t3res3old for pre-empti+e action co,ld p,t t3at accomplis3ment at ris2H and exacerbate re#ional crises alread4 on t3e brin2 of open conflict. @f co,rseH no co,ntr4 !ill embar2 s,ddenl4 on a !ar of a##ression simpl4 beca,se t3e Bnited 8tates pro+ides it !it3 a *,asi-le#al ;,stification to do so. 1,t co,ntries alread4 on t3e brin2 of !arH or leanin# stron#l4 to!ards !arH mi#3t ,se t3e doctrine to ;,stif4 an action t3e4 alread4 !is3ed to ta2eH and t3e effect of t3e B.8. post,re ma4 ma2e it 3arder for t3e international comm,nit4 in #eneralH and t3e B.8. in partic,larH to co,nsel dela4 and diplomac4. Potential examples abo,ndH ran#in# from Et3iopia and EritreaH to C3ina and )ai!anH to t3e "iddle East. 1,t per3aps t3e clearest case is t3e India-Pa2istan crisis. In 2992H India !as poised to attac2 Pa2istanH #i+en Pa2istan5s s,spected complicit4 in assistin# Islamic extremist terrorists !3o !ent from Pa2istan into t3e disp,ted territor4 of :as3mir. ( combination of B.8. press,re on bot3 co,ntriesH !it3 some last-min,te ca,tion b4 t3e leaders of Pa2istan and IndiaH narro!l4 a+erted a !ar t3at 3ad t3e potential to escalate to t3e n,clear le+el once it be#an. (lt3o,#3 India mi#3t 3a+e intended to limit its action to eliminatin# terrorist bases in Pa2istan-3eld :as3mir and per3aps
some bases inside Pa2istanH n,clear-armed Pa2istan mi#3t !ell 3a+e belie+ed t3at India5s intentions !ere to o+ert3ro! t3e re#ime in Islamabad or to eliminate its n,clear !eapons capabilit4. )3at sit,ation !o,ld 3a+e f,rt3er ris2 of conflict remains. 83o,ld t3e
crisis res,meH a B.8. polic4 of pre-emption ma4 pro+ide 3a!2s in India t3e added amm,nition t3e4 need to ;,stif4 a stri2e a#ainst Pa2istan in t3e e4es of t3eir fello! Indian decision-ma2ers. C,ssia5s t3reats a#ainst t3e so+erei#n state of /eor#iaH !3ic3 it acc,ses of protectin# or at least failin# to p,rs,e Islamic extremists tied to t3e C3ec3en !arH also ill,strate t3e dan#ers of le#itimatin# an eas4 and earl4 reco,rse to pre-emption.
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!"! pre-emption India first striking /akistan

<upperman 02
((lan :.-H No+. 12H B.8.(. )oda4 IPre-EmptionK 83o,ld B.8.(. P,nc3 <irstR NoJH =exis)
@t3er states also mi#3t cop4 t3e dan#ero,s (merican example. )3e Indian #o+ernment lon# 3as considered attac2in# Pa2istanPs small n,clear force pre-empti+el4H b,t 3as been diss,aded at least in part b4 B.8. ex3ortations and fear of international condemnation. 1,s3Ps ne! polic4 !o,ld ,nderc,t bot3 of t3ese incenti+es.
<as'mir- Pre-emption :ar (2 of 2)

(idespread use of the pre-emption doctrine increases the risk of war over +ashmir!
Daalder 02
(I+o E.-H 8r. <ello! O t3e 1roo2in#s Instit,tionH No+. 1'H Co,ncil on <orei#n Celations PressH IPolic4 Implications of t3e 1,s3 &octrine on PreemptionJH 3ttpK$$!!!.cfr.or#$p,blication.3tmlRid% 2 1L Macob)
of preemption is also strate#icall4 impr,dent. If ta2en serio,sl4 b4 ot3ersH it !ill exacerbate t3e sec,rit4 dilemma amon# 3ostile statesH b4 raisin# t3e incenti+e of all states to initiate militar4 action before ot3ers do. )3e res,lt is to ,ndermine !3ate+er stabilit4 mi#3t exist in a militar4 standoff. )a2e t3e +er4 real case of India and Pa2istanH bot3 n,clear po!ers !it3 lon#-standin# territorial and ot3er #rie+ances. 8,ppose tensions riseH as t3e4 did last s,mmerH !3en a million Indian and Pa2istani troops massed on t3e border. IslamabadH fearin# t3at &el3i mi#3t tr4 to preempt its *,ite +,lnerable n,clear stri2e capabilit4H !ill 3a+e a po!erf,l incenti+e to #o first. IndiaH 2no!in# t3is to be t3e caseH !ill 3a+e an e*,all4 po!erf,l incenti+e to #et its !eapons off before Pa2istan does. /i+en t3is d4namicH t3e ,se of force in tense sit,ations li2e t3ese !ill increasin#l4 be +ie!ed as a first resortH t3,s ,nderminin# !3ate+er moderatin# infl,ence diplomatic inter+ention mi#3t ot3er!ise 3a+e 3ad.
)3e doctrine
/re-emption nuclear e0change between India and /akistan

?ase6 02
(83a,n-H Prof. of C3ristian et3ics O 7esle4 )3eolo#ical 8eminar4H @ct. 26H IC3ristian Et3ics (#ainst Pre-empti+e 7arJH =exisL Macob) E+en more fri#3tenin#K If t3e Bnited 8tates can pre-empti+el4 stri2e enemies !3o possess !eapons of mass destr,ction and mi#3t 3arbor terroristsH t3e same lo#ic !3en #ranted to India and Pa2istan co,ld lead to a n,clear exc3an#e !it3 millions of deat3s.
@,r #lobe !ill be a far bloodier one if t3is 1,s3 doctrine of pre-emption is accepted as a norm b4 ot3er states. It is 3ard to see 3o! t3e #ood of remo+in# E,ssein o,t!ei#3s t3ese potential 3arms. @,r p,rpose as et3icists is not
to pres,me t3at b4 3a+in# o,r sa4 t3e moral con+ersation is o+er. <ar from itH !e 3ope t3at !e can be part of la,nc3in# a tr,l4 p,blic moral deliberation. Bnfort,natel4H t3e administration is ,ne*,ipped for and ,ninterested in s,c3 a moral debate.
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<as'mir- ./ eit'er side !ants to pre-empt

Indias military leaders are cra%y- they are considering a pre-emptive strike
;od'i 02
("alee3a-H Pa2istani (mbassador to t3e B.8.H M,ne 2H <ox Ne!s Net!or2H <ox Ne!s 8,nda4 !it3 1rit E,me F <red 1arnesH IInter+ie! !it3 "alee3a =od3i Pa2istani (mbassadorJH =exisL Macob) I t3in2 to tal2 abo,t n,clear !eapons in s,c3 a ca+alier !a4 !o,ld be 3,#el4 irresponsible. "4 president 3as alread4 said t3at e+en contemplatin# a n,clear conflict is irresponsible and !o,ld be insane. Eo!e+erH let t3ere be no mista2e t3at t3ese fanc4 notions of limited !arH 3ot pre-emption are dan#ero,s ill,sions in t3e minds of Indian strate#ic and militar4 planners. If t3ere is an4 a##ression t3at is committed a#ainst m4 co,ntr4H m4 co,ntr4 !ill respond appropriatel4 in self-defense.
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ort'--out' Disparit6 -%enario (1 of 2)

A! !"! pre-emption is perceived by the developing world as a new form of imperialism- the result is the widening of the $orth-"outh gap' and lack of consensus that undermines international efforts to curb proliferation!
"uller ) Reiss =,
(Earald-H "itc3ell-H 8prin#H 7as3in#ton S,arterl4H ICo,nterproliferationK P,ttin# Ne! 7ine in @ld 1ottlesJH =exisL Macob) (s ambi#,o,s si#nals abo,t co,nterproliferation started to emer#e from 7as3in#ton in late 1663H t3ose abroad tr4in# to read t3ese si#nals seiGed on t3eir most a,dible and spectac,lar aspectsK t3e apparent readiness of t3e Bnited 8tates to prepare for preempti+e attac2s on 7"& facilities in 3ostile co,ntries. )3is aro,sed m,c3 anxiet4H m,c3 of !3ic3 3as not 4et been f,ll4 dispelled.
<irstH forei#ners !orried abo,t t3e catal4tic conse*,ences s,c3 an action mi#3t en#ender. Pre+entin# anot3er co,ntr4 from ac*,irin# 7"& before its efforts bore fr,itH or preemptin# t3e ,se of s,c3 !eapons in a crisisH b,t before a conflict started -- t3at isH militar4 action d,rin# !3at !o,ld strictl4 be peacetime -co,ld !ell pro+o2e a !ar !it3 de+astatin# conse*,ences. )3e :orean penins,la is a case in pointH and t3e plea of Nort3 :oreaPs nei#3bors to t3e Bnited 8tates t3at it s3o,ld refrain from actions t3at co,ld precipitate armed conflict s,##ests t3e probable reactions of man4 co,ntries s3o,ld t3e4 find t3emsel+es in similar circ,mstances. )3e onl4 exception to t3is mi#3t be IsraelH !3ic3 itself cond,cted a s,ccessf,l Qco,nterproliferationQ operation and feels more ac,tel4 t3an an4 ot3er state t3e t3reats t3at mi#3t emanate from a 7"&-armedH a##ressi+e re#ional po!er. (lt3o,#3 t3e Israelis are toda4 far less confident t3at t3e t4pe of operation performed in t3eir M,ne 1601 raid a#ainst Ira*Ps )amm,G reactor co,ld be s,ccessf,ll4 repeatedH n3 t3e4 ma4 belie+e t3at t3e alternati+e -- to do not3in# -- !o,ldH ,nder extreme circ,mstancesH be !orse t3an t3e attempt. 8econdH and closel4 connected to t3e first pointH forei#ners experienced serio,s concern o+er t3e collateral conse*,ences of a militar4 attac2 on Nort3 :oreaPs Yon#b4on n,clear complex. )3is reser+ationH in factH fo,nd expression in man4 sober anal4ses b4 t3e B.8. militar4 and intelli#ence comm,nit4 itself. If 7"& or t3eir prod,ction facilities can be fo,nd in Nort3 :orea and t3oro,#3l4 destro4ed (not al!a4s an eas4 tas2)H t3e in+entor4 ma4 lea2 o,tH exposin# +ast n,mbers of people -- bot3 on t3e :orean penins,la and in t3e re#ion -- to let3al doses of radioacti+it4. ( stri2e a#ainst an operatin# reactor or reprocessin# plant co,ld release radioacti+it4 of an order of ma#nit,de lar#er t3an t3e C3ernob4l disaster. )3e political le#itimac4 and international la!f,lness of s,c3 an action co,ld be serio,sl4 in do,btH t3e distinction bet!een militar4 tar#ets and innocent noncombatants co,ld be bl,rredH and t3e proportionalit4 of t3e response to t3e t3reat co,ld be *,estioned.
le#itimac4 of B.8. actions !as itself an iss,e. Co,nterproliferation made it appear t3at t3e B.8. #o+ernment alone !o,ld determine if a percei+ed sec,rit4 t3reat ;,stified an offensi+e militar4 operation. (ttac2in# first in peacetime or d,rin# a crisis is a matter of #ra+est conse*,enceH not onl4 for t3e states in+ol+edH b,t
for t3e !orld comm,nit4. It is no!3ere apparent in t3e Clinton administrationPs conception of co,nterproliferation t3at t3e BN 8ec,rit4 Co,ncil mi#3t 3a+e a role to pla4 in an4 decision to attac2 7"&. )3is o+ersi#3t !as all t3e more ,n!elcome beca,se t3e 8ec,rit4 Co,ncil declaration of Man,ar4 31H 1662H !it3 t3e s,pport of t3e Bnited 8tatesH 3ad declared t3at t3e proliferation of 7"& constit,ted a t3reat to international peace and sec,rit4. )3is opened t3e possibilit4 of ,tiliGin# all t3e sanctions a+ailable ,nder c3apter ?II of t3e BN C3arterH incl,din# militar4 meas,resH in response to s,c3 proliferation t3reats. )3at t3e Bnited 8tates !o,ld ass,me t3e role of nonproliferation policeman
)3irdH t3e international
at t3e +er4 moment !3en t3e 8ec,rit4 Co,ncil 3ad at lon# last reco#niGed t3e role assi#ned to it ,nder all t3ree 7"& nonproliferation instr,ments (t3e NP)H t3e 1iolo#ical and )oxin 7eapons Con+entionH and t3e C3emical 7eapons Con+ention)H in t3e e4es of man4 t3reatened to ,ndermine t3e promisin# en3ancement of t3e Co,ncilPs roleH and to replace t3e prospect of m,ltilateral enforcement !it3 B.8. ,nilateralism. )3at t3e
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Bnited 8tates co,ld create a co,nterproliferation doctrine !it3o,t reference to international proced,res -- for exampleH to t3e findin#s of t3e +ario,s a#encies entr,sted !it3 +erif4in# nonproliferation treatiesH and to existin# enforcement mec3anismsH namel4H t3e BN 8ec,rit4 Co,ncil -- !as an alarmin# prospect for someH amo,ntin# to a sort of Qnonproliferation imperialism.Q <or #o+ernments in t3e de+elopin# !orldH t3is perception immediatel4 prompted anot3er concernK t3at of B.8. selecti+it4 in distin#,is3in# bet!een Qfriendl4Q and Q,nfriendl4Q proliferators. )3at B.8. nonproliferation polic4 3ad some selecti+it4 to it 3as not been lost on de+elopin# co,ntriesH least of all t3ose in t3e (rab and !ider Islamic !orld. )3at s,c3 selecti+it4 co,ld extend into offensi+e militar4 operations !as seen as 3i#3l4 ob;ectionable and t3reatenin#.
<o,rt3H a#ain from t3e perspecti+e of non-n,clear !eapon states in t3e de+elopin# !orldH co,nterproliferation !as a blo! to en3anced efforts to obtain better and more credible ne#ati+e sec,rit4 ass,rances from n,clear !eapon states in t3e r,n-,p to t3e 166 NP) re+ie! conference. Ne#ati+e sec,rit4 ass,rances are solemn declarations b4 n,clear !eapon states not to t3reaten or attac2 non-n,clear !eapon states !it3 n,clear arms. 8o farH onl4 C3ina 3as #i+en s,c3 an ,nconditional ass,rance. )3e Bnited 8tatesH for exampleH 3as reser+ed t3e ri#3t to ,se n,clear !eapons in defense a#ainst an attac2 b4 a non-n,clear !eapon state allied to or associated !it3 a n,clear !eapon state. )3is is seen toda4 b4 man4H especiall4 o,tside t3e Bnited 8tatesH as a remnant of t3e Cold 7ar t3at 3as little
ort'--out' Disparit6 -%enario (2 of 2)

rele+ance to t3e c,rrent international sec,rit4 en+ironment. It 3asH 3o!e+erH so far pro+ed impossible to obtain ,niform and le#all4 bindin# sec,rit4 ass,rances b4 t3e fi+e declared n,clear !eapon states. Co,nterproliferationH as it !as percei+ed abroadH affected t3is disco,rse amon# and !it3in t3e Bnited 8tatesH <ranceH and 1ritain in t!o !a4s. <irstH t3ere !as initiall4 a lot of loose tal2 abo,t de+elopin# ne!H smallH 3i#3l4 acc,rate deep-penetratin# n,clear !eapons for co,nterproliferation operations. 8econdH t3ere !as a p,blic debate -- still not finaliGed -- in t3e Bnited 8tates abo,t t3e need to reser+e t3e ri#3t of n,clear retaliation a#ainst t3e ,se of c3emical and biolo#ical !eapons. )o#et3er t3ese possibilities !o,ld lar#el4 in+alidate ne#ati+e sec,rit4 ass,rances e+en in t3eir present formH not to mention t3e c3ances of reac3in# consens,s on more compre3ensi+e ass,rances and #,arantees.
abo,t ille#itimac4H ,nilateralismH selecti+it4H and t3reat assessment c,m,lati+el4 tend to !iden t3e Nort3-8o,t3 #apH !3ic3 contin,es to ;eopardiGe t3e badl4 needed consens,s in t3e #lobal nonproliferation re#imes. M,stified or notH t3e nonali#ned co,ntries complain abo,t ine*,alit4H discriminationH and QNort3ernQ be3a+ior t3at ne#lects t3eir interestsH +ie!sH and sensiti+ities. )3e Bnited 8tatesH as leader of t3e ind,strialiGed !orld and t3e most po!erf,l #lobal actorH is t3e main tar#et of s,c3 criticism. <rom t3e +anta#e point of t3e nonali#nedH co,nterproliferation is seen as a lo#ical corollar4 to t3e stren#t3enin# of international safe#,ards and t3e ti#3tenin# of export controlsH all directed a#ainst t3e de+elopin# !orld. Impro+ements in +erification are
seen as en3ancin# t3e abilit4 of o,tsiders to collect intelli#ence in de+elopin# co,ntriesL t3at international +erification a#encies s,c3 as t3e International (tomic Ener#4 (#enc4 (I(E() m,st rel4 on information from intelli#ence a#encies of t3e QNort3HQ partic,larl4 t3e Bnited 8tatesH onl4 reinforces t3is perception. Export controls -- indispensable as t3e4 are for an4 nonproliferation re#ime -- are seen as proxies for controllin# t3e speed and scope of economic de+elopmentH and as a means to maintain and perpet,ate t3e tec3nolo#ical dominance of t3e ind,strialiGed 7est. Co,nterproliferationH t3enH completes t3e pict,re b4 addin# a militar4 dimension aimed at p,nis3in# t3ose states t3at 3a+e s,ccessf,ll4 defied t3e spiderPs !eb of controls imposed b4 t3e ind,strialiGed !orld ,nder B.8. leaders3ip. )o be s,reH m,c3 of t3is amo,nts to a paranoid interpretation of !orld politicsH based on misinformation and mis perception. Pre+entin# t3e spread of 7"& remains an ob;ecti+e t3at is s3ared b4 t3e o+er!3elmin# ma;orit4 of states in t3e !orldH a #oal t3at ,nites Nort3 and 8o,t3. 1,t it is ne+ert3eless a !orld+ie! t3at m,st be ta2en serio,sl4H
<ift3H mis#i+in#s
precisel4 beca,se it co,ld impede t3e badl4 needed international consens,s on !3ic3 all s,ccessf,l nonproliferation re#imes m,st rel4.
B! /rolif $(
>t#off 02
(?ictor-H &ep,t4 &irector for t3e 8trate#4H <orcesH F Ceso,rces &i+ision of t3e Instit,te for &efense (nal4sisH 8,mmerH 8,r+i+alH ?ol. 44 T2H P. 0--69) In s,mH !idespread proliferation is li2el4 to lead to an occasional s3oot-o,t !it3 n,clear !eaponsH and t3at s,c3 s3oot-o,ts !ill 3a+e a s,bstantial probabilit4 of escalatin# to t3e maxim,m destr,ction possible !it3 t3e !eapons at 3and. Bnless n,clear proliferation is stoppedH !e are 3eaded to!ard a !orld t3at !ill mirror t3e (merican 7ild 7est of t3e late 1099s. 7it3 mostH if not allH nations !earin# n,clear Psix-s3ootersP on t3eir 3ipsH t3e !orld ma4 e+en be a more polite place t3an it is toda4H b,t e+er4 once in a !3ile !e !ill all #at3er on a 3ill to b,r4 t3e bodies of dead cities or e+en !3ole nations. 62
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ort'--out' Disparit6- Prolif ) /errorism H (1 of 2)

A! This $orth-"outh disparity is the primary impetus for nuclear proliferation and terrorism
;o!n =6
(1ernard-H "& Co-<o,nderH IPPN7H ICr,de N,clear 7eapons Proliferation and t3e )errorist )3reatJH T16H 3ttpK$$!!!.ippn!.or#)
N,clear apart3eid cannot end,re. )3e stim,l,s to proliferation deri+es lar#el4 from an ine*,itable !orld order and t3e #ro!in# economic di+ide bet!een ric3 and poor co,ntries. @ne fift3 of t3e !orld li+es on t3e ed#e of
s,bsistence. (t a time of potential ab,ndanceH more people are 3,n#r4 t3an e+er before. 7e end t3e cent,r4 !it3 far more desperatel4 poorH illiterateH 3omelessH star+in#H and sic2 t3an !e be#an. No!3ere are t3e ine*,ities more in e+idence t3an in t3e 3ealt3 sector. Ei#3t 3,ndred million people are !it3o,t an4 3ealt3 care at all. @ne-t3ird of t3e !orld5s pop,lation li+es in co,ntries !3ose 3ealt3 care expendit,res are far less t3an A12 per person per 4ear (t3e bare minim,m recommended b4 t3e 7orld 1an2) !3ile t3e ind,strialiGed Nort3 spends more t3an A1H999 for 3ealt3 per person ann,all4. Cecent BN fi#,res indicate t3at from 16'9 to 1669H per capita income rose ei#3t-fold in t3e Nort3 !3ile increasin# onl4 3alf as m,c3 in t3e depri+ed lands of t3e 8o,t3. )3is di+ide is li2el4 to !iden f,rt3er !3ile acceleratin# o+er-cons,mption in t3e Nort3 and b,r#eonin# pop,lation press,res in t3e de+elopin# co,ntries. (s +ital ra! materialsH scarce mineralsH fossil f,elsH and especiall4 !ater become depletedH Nort3ern affl,ence !ill be s,stained b4 imposed belt ti#3tenin# of impo+eris3ed m,ltit,des str,##lin# for mere s,bsistence. )3is is an
a#enda for endless conflict and colossal +iolence. )3e #lobal press,re coo2er !ill f,rt3er s,per3eat b4 t3e on#oin# !orld!ide information re+ol,tion t3at exposes e+er4one to t3e promissor4 note of ,nlimited cons,mptionH t3ere b4 instillin# impatience and i#nitin# more embers of social ,p3ea+al. If desperation #ro!sH t3e depri+ed !ill be tempted to c3allen#e t3e affl,ent in t3e onl4 concei+able !a4 t3at can ma2e an impactH namel4 b4 #oin# n,clear. )3eir possession enables t3e !ea2 to inflict ,nacceptable dama#e on t3e stron#. &esperation and 3opelessness breed reli#io,s f,ndamentalism and pro+ide endless recr,its read4 to !rea2 +en#eanceH if necessar4 b4 self immolation in t3e process of inflictin# ,nspea2able +iolence on ot3ers. ( n,clear bomb affords It3e c3eapest and bi##est ban# for t3e b,c2.J No blac2mail is as compellin# as 3oldin# an entire cit4 3osta#e. No ot3er destr,cti+e de+ice can ca,se #reater societal disr,ption or exact a lar#er 3,man toll. )errorists !ill soon raise t3eir si#3ts to +aporiGin# a metropolitan area rat3er t3an merel4 p,l+eriGin# a b,ildin#.
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ort'--out' Disparit6- Prolif ) /errorism H (2 of 2)

.lexander 09
(Yona3-H Prof. F &irector O Inter-Bni+ersit4 for )errorism 8t,diesH (,#,st 20H 7as3in#ton )imesH I)errorism "4t3s and CealitiesJH =exisL Macob) =ast !ee2Ps br,tal s,icide bombin#s in 1a#3dad and Mer,salem 3a+e once a#ain ill,strated dramaticall4 t3at t3e international comm,nit4 failedH t3,s far at leastH to ,nderstand t3e ma#nit,de and implications of t3e terrorist t3reats to t3e +er4 s,r+i+al of ci+iliGation itself. E+en t3e Bnited 8tates and Israel 3a+e for decades tended to re#ard terrorism as a mere tactical n,isance or irritant rat3er t3an a critical strate#ic c3allen#e to t3eir national sec,rit4 concerns. It is not s,rprisin#H t3ereforeH t3at on 8eptember 11H 2991H (mericans !ere st,nned b4 t3e ,nprecedented tra#ed4 of 16 al Saeda terrorists stri2in# a de+astatin# blo! at t3e center of t3e nationPs commercial and militar4 po!ers. =i2e!iseH Israel and its citiGensH despite t3e collapse of t3e @slo (#reements of 1663 and n,mero,s acts of terrorism tri##ered b4 t3e second intifada t3at be#an almost t3ree 4ears a#oH are still Qs3oc2edQ b4 eac3 s,icide attac2 at a time of intensi+e diplomatic efforts to re+i+e t3e morib,nd peace process t3ro,#3 t3e no! re+o2ed cease-fire arran#ements U3,dnaV. 734 are t3e Bnited 8tates and IsraelH as !ell as scores of ot3er co,ntries affected b4 t3e ,ni+ersal ni#3tmare of modern terrorism s,rprised b4 ne! terrorist Qs,rprisesQR )3ere are man4 reasonsH incl,din# mis,nderstandin# of t3e manifold specific factors t3at contrib,te to terrorismPs expansionH s,c3 as lac2 of a ,ni+ersal definition of terrorismH t3e reli#ioniGation of politicsH do,ble standards of moralit4H !ea2 p,nis3ment of terroristsH and t3e exploitation of t3e media b4 terrorist propa#anda and ps4c3olo#ical !arfare. Bnli2e t3eir 3istorical co,nterpartsH contemporar4 terrorists 3a+e introd,ced a ne! scale of +iolence in terms of con+entional and ,ncon+entional t3reats and impact.
)3e internationaliGation and br,taliGation of c,rrent and f,t,re terrorism ma2e it clear !e 3a+e entered an (#e of 8,per )errorism Ue.#. biolo#icalH c3emical, radiolo#icalH n,clear and c4ber] !it3 its serio,s implications concernin# nationalH re#ional and #lobal sec,rit4 concerns.
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< -%enario (1 of 2)
A! /re-emption
?lar5 02
("oll4-H 8co+ille <ello! O P34sicians for 8ocial Cesponsibilit4H @ct. 22H P.8.C. 8ec,rit4 Pro#ramH I)3e National 8ec,rit4 8trate#4 of t3e Bnited 8tates of (mericaK &octrine of /lobal Ee#emon4 and PreemptionJH 3ttpK$$!!!.psr.or#$ 3ome.cfmR id%NssXiss,eXbriefL Macob) C3ina similarl4 reco#niGes in3erent dan#ers in 1,s35s national sec,rit4 strate#4H b,t its concerns foc,s more on t3e possible ramifications of t3e polic4 in specified areasH namel4 Nort3 :orea and )ai!an. 1eca,se Nort3 :orea is mentioned in )3e National 8ec,rit4 8trate#4 as a ma;or 7"& prod,cerH t3e C3inese belie+e t3at t3e Bnited 8tates ma4 preempti+el4 tar#et Nort3 :orea sometime in t3e relati+el4 near f,t,re. &,e to its #eo#rap3ic proximit4 to Nort3 :oreaH C3ina !is3es to contin,e s,pportin# cooperati+e and diplomatic approac3es to dealin# !it3 Nort3 :oreaH and t3e possibilit4 of B.8. militar4 action in t3at re#ion !orries t3e C3inese. )3e e+er-present possibilit4 of a B.8.-C3inese conflict o+er )ai!an f,rt3er exacerbates C3ina5s anxiet4 abo,t t3is ne! national sec,rit4 strate#4H specificall4 in terms of its restatement of IB.8. commitments to t3e self-defense of )ai!an.J1-
!"! attacking $+
B! The 7 is a thermonuclear e0change

?'ol 02
(:im "4on#-H Exec,ti+e &irector of t3e Center of :orean-(merican peaceH @ct. 24H Polic4 <or,m @nlineH I(#reed <rame!or2 Is 1rain &eadL 83ot#,n 7eddin# Is t3e @nl4 @ption to &ef,se CrisisJH 3ttpK$$!!!.na,til,s.or#$fora$sec,rit4$9212(XC3ol.3tmlL Macob)
(n4 militar4 stri2e initiated a#ainst Nort3 :orea !ill promptl4 explode into a t3ermon,clear exc3an#e bet!een a tin4 n,clear-armed Nort3 :orea and t3e !orldPs s,perpo!erH (merica. )3e most densel4
pop,lated "etropolitan B.8.(.H Mapan and 8o,t3 :orea !ill certainl4 e+aporate in )3e &a4 (fter scenario-t4pe ni#3tmare. )3e Ne! Yor2 )imes !arned in its (,#,st 2-H 2992 commentK QNort3 :orea r,ns a more ad+anced biolo#icalH c3emical
and n,clear !eapons pro#ramH tar#ets (merican militar4 bases and is de+elopin# missiles t3at co,ld reac3 t3e lo!er 40 states. Yet t3erePs #ood reason President 1,s3 is not tal2in# abo,t ta2in# o,t &ear =eader :im Mon# Il. If !e triedH t3e &ear =eader !o,ld bombard 8o,t3 :orea and Mapan !it3 ne+er #as or e+en n,clear !ar3eadsH and
(accordin# to one Penta#on st,d4) 2ill ,p to a million people.Q
B.8. Perception Co,nts "ost 73at co,nts most is not so m,c3 Nort3 n,clear and missile capabilit4 as t3e (merican perception t3at Nort3 :orea ma4 3a+e s,c3 capabilit4. No matter 3o! tr,e Nort3 :orean n,clear capabilit4 ma4H s,c3 capabilit4 does not ser+e t3e political p,rposes of :im Mon# Il and 3is polic4 planners in dealin# !it3 t3e B.8.H ,nless 7as3in#ton polic4 planners percei+e Nort3 :orean n,clear t3reat as real. )3eir +ie! is of t3e (mericans bein# 3oaxed into s,spectin# t3at t3e Nort3 :oreans 3a+e alread4 n,clear capabilit4. )3e (mericans are t3e most s2eptical people in t3e !orld. &,e to t3e 3istoric al bac2#ro,nd of t3eir nation b,ildin#H t3e4 are least read4 to tr,st !3at ot3ers sa4. 73at t3e4 tr,st most is #,ns and mone4. )3is is t3e reason !34 t3e (mericans s3o! a stron# preference for lie detectorsH !3ic3 are ,bi*,ito,s in t3e
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B.8. If t3e Nort3 :oreans sa4 t3at t3e4 3a+e n,clear capabilit4H t3e immediate (merican response is to do,bt t3e statement. If t3e Nort3 :oreans den4H t3e (mericans 3a+e a t4pical propensit4 to s,spect t3at t3e4 3a+e. "ost interestin#l4H (mericans readil4 accept as tr,e ac2no!led#ement after repeated denial. It is eas4 to ima#ine 3o! st,nned Mames :ell4 and (merican officials !ere at t3e reported post-denial ac2no!led#ement b4 <irst &ep,t4 <orei#n "inister :an# 8o2 M, t3at t3e Nort3 :oreans 3a+e a ,rani,m enric3ment centrif,#e. (s expectedH (merican officials 3a+e been ordered into #lobe-3oppin# to,rsH rall4in# international s,pport for t3eir campai#n to appl4 press,re to bear ,pon t3e Nort3 :oreans to diss,ade t3em from t3eir alle#ed n,clear !eapons pro#ram. 1,s3H CiceH C,msfeld and ot3er to,#3 #,4s too2 special care to paint Nort3 :orea as different from Ira*H offerin# t3e Nort3 :oreans t3e striped-pants treatment. It is too ob+io,s t3at indirect diplomac4 is not effecti+e no! matter 3o! 3ard t3e (mericans ma4 cons,lt t3eir allies and t3e allies of Nort3 :orea. )3e past cons,ltation !it3 C,ssia and C3ina failed to prod,ce an4 positi+e res,ltsH beca,se t3e4 3a+e little le+era#e !it3 Nort3 :orea. )3e fo,r-!a4 tal2s are a case in pointH !3ere t3e (mericans ended ,p tal2in# !it3 t3e Nort3 :oreans. )3ree @ptions (+ailable )3en t3e *,estion arises of 3o! to interpret t3e reported Nort3 :orean admission of t3e possession of a ,rani,m enric3ment de+ice. @ne most li2el4 explanation is t3at it is more of an in+itation to diplomatic ne#otiations t3an ref,sal to tal2. )3ere are a fe! mont3s to #o before t3e tar#et 4ear of 2993 stri2es. In ot3er !ordsH t3e :an# 8o2 M, statement means t3at t3e Nort3 :oreans still 2eep t3e n,clear tr,mp cardH namel4H t3at t3e 1,s3 (dministration 3as no c3oice b,t to pic2 ,p !3ere t3e Clinton (dministration left off. )3e 1,s3 (dministration is left !it3 t3ree c3oicesK )3e first is ;,st to i#nore Nort3 :orea and let t3e re#ime of :im Mon# Il emer#e a n,clear po!er !it3 atomic and t3ermon,clear !eapons in t3eir arsenal !it3 a fleet of IC1"s loc2ed on to (merican tar#ets. )3is option is most li2el4 to set into motion t3e domino p3enomenonH ind,cin# Mapan and 8o,t3 :orea to ac*,ire n,clear armsH ma2in# ,nnecessar4 t3e (merican militar4 presence on t3eir soil !it3 anti-(mericanism risin# to ne! 3ei#3ts.
< -%enario (2 of 2)
)3e second c3oice is for t3e (mericans to initiate militar4 action to 2noc2 o,t t3e n,clear facilities in Nort3 :orea. 7it3o,t precise 2no!led#e of t3e location of t3ose tar#et facilitiesH t3e (merican polic4 planners face t3e real ris2 of Nort3 :orea la,nc3in# a f,ll-scale !ar a#ainst 8o,t3 :oreaH Mapan and t3e B.8. )3e Nort3 :orean retaliation !ill most li2el4 lea+e 8o,t3 :orea and Mapan totall4 de+astated !it3 t3e "etropolitan B.8. bein# cons,med in n,clear confla#ration. =oo2in# do!n on t3e demolis3ed (merican 3omelandH (merican polic4 planners aboard a special 1oein# ;ets !ill 3a+e #ood ca,se to claimH Q7e are !innersH alt3o,#3 o,r 3omeland is in as3es. 7e are safel4 ali+e on t3is ;et.Q
6'
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<- Pre-emption
"trike on $+ suicidal retaliation causing war
Daalder 02
: (1 of 9)
(I+o E.-H 8r. <ello! O t3e 1roo2in#s Instit,tionH No+. 1'H Co,ncil on <orei#n Celations PressH IPolic4 Implications of t3e 1,s3 &octrine on PreemptionJH 3ttpK$$!!!.cfr.or#$p,blication.3tmlRid% 2 1L Macob) (not3er practical diffic,lt4 is t3at t3e tar#et state can respond in !a4s t3at ma2e preemption +er4 costl4 N and per3aps e+en co,nterprod,cti+e N in !a4s t3at ad+ocates of t3e strate#4 3a+e lar#el4 i#nored. )a2eH for exampleH a pre+enti+e !ar a#ainst Ira*. )3is co,ld +er4 !ell precipitate t3e +er4 ,se of !eapons of mass destr,ction b4 1a#3dad t3at t3e militar4 action is desi#ned to forestall. 8addam !o,ld 3a+e e+er4 incenti+e to ,se !3at 3e 3as before B.8. forces can find and destro4 t3e !eapons. "oreo+erH as t3e CI( 3as reco#niGedH once 8addam deems !ar ine+itable an4 constraints on 3im transferrin# !eapons to terrorist #ro,ps ea#er to stri2e t3e Bnited 8tates and its interests !ill be lifted. (nd in t3e c3aos t3at attends an4 !ar control o+er !eapons and materials is bo,nd to brea2 do!nH ma2in# it t3at m,c3 more li2el4 t3at t3ese fall into t3e !ron# 3ands. @r ta2e t3e case of Nort3 :oreaH !3ere it mi#3t be possible to la,nc3 a precision stri2e a#ainst P4on#4an#5s
critical n,clear facilities. 1,t e+en if s,ccessf,lH t3e conse*,ences co,ld be se+ere N incl,din# t3e not ,nli2el4 decision b4 Nort3 :orea5s leaders to la,nc3 a s,icidal !ar t3at !o,ld 2ill millions of :oreans in t3e process.
The impact is nuclear apocalypse!

3un#am!an#o ==
(Pat-H @ct. 2 H (frica Ne!sH I(frica-at-=ar#eL )3ird !orld !arK 7atc3 t3e :oreasJH =exisL Macob)
If t3ere is one place toda4 !3ere t3e m,c3-dreaded )3ird 7orld 7ar co,ld easil4 er,pt and probabl4 redu%e eart' to a 'u#e smoulderin# %inder it is t3e :orean Penins,la in <ar East (sia. E+er since t3e end of t3e sa+a#e t3ree-4ear :orean !ar in t3e earl4 16 9sH militar4 tension bet!een t3e 3ardline comm,nist nort3 and t3e (merican bac2ed 8o,t3 :orea 3as remained dan#ero,sl4 3i#3. In fact t3e :oreas are tec3nicall4 still at !ar.
( forei#n +isitor to eit3er P4on#4on# in t3e Nort3 or 8eo,l in 8o,t3 :orea !ill *,ic2l4 notice t3at t3e di+ided co,ntr4 is al!a4s on maxim,m alert for an4 e+ent,alit4. Nort3 :orea or t3e &emocratic PeoplePs Cep,blic of :orea (&PC:) 3as ne+er for#i+en t3e B8 for comin# to t3e aid of 8o,t3 :orea d,rin# t3e :orean !ar. 83e still re#ards t3e B8 as an occ,pation force in 8o,t3 :orea and !3oll4 to blame for t3e non-re,nification of t3e co,ntr4. Nort3 :orean media constantl4 c3,rns o,t a tirade of attac2s on QimperialistQ (merica and its Qr,nnin# do#Q 8o,t3 :orea. )3e &PC: is one of t3e most secreti+e co,ntries in t3e !orld !3ere a +isitor is #i+en t3e impression t3at t3e peoplePs 3atred for t3e B8 is absol,te !3ile t3e lo+e for t3eir #o+ernment is total. 73et3er t3is is reall4 soH it is extremel4 diffic,lt to concl,de. 6-
Caldebate.com
In t3e &PC:H a +isitor is ne+er #i+en a c3ance to spea2 to ordinar4 :oreans abo,t t3e politics of t3eir co,ntr4. No +isitor mo+es aro,nd alone !it3o,t #o+ernment escort. )3e (merican #o+ernment ar#,es t3at its presence in 8o,t3 :orea !as beca,se of t3e constant dan#er of an in+asion from t3e nort3. (merica 3as +ast economic interests in 8o,t3 :orea. 83e points o,t t3at t3e nort3 3as d,# n,mero,s t,nnels alon# t3e demilitarised Gone as part of t3e in+asion plans. 83e also acc,ses t3e nort3 of +iolatin# 8o,t3 :orean territorial !aters. Earl4 t3is 4earH a small Nort3 :orean s,bmarine !as ca,#3t in 8o,t3 :orean !aters after #ettin# entan#led in fis3in# nets. 1ot3 t3e (mericans and 8o,t3 :oreans claim t3e s,bmarine !as on a militar4 sp4in# mission. Eo!e+erH t3e intension of t3e alle#ed intr,sion !ill probabl4 ne+er be 2no!n beca,se t3e craftPs cre! !ere all fo,nd !it3 fatal #,ns3ot !o,nds to t3eir 3eads in !3at 3as been described as s,icide pact to 3ide t3e tr,t3 of t3e mission. )3e B8
mistr,st of t3e nort3Ps intentions is so deep t3at it is no secret t3at toda4 7as3in#ton 3as t3e lar#est concentration of soldiers and !eaponr4 of all descriptions in so,t3 :orea t3an an4!3ere else in t3e 7orldH
apart from (merica itself.
<- Pre-emption
: (2 of 9)
8ome of t3e armada t3at !as deplo4ed in t3e recent bombin# of Ira* and in @peration &esert 8torm a#ainst t3e same co,ntr4 follo!in# its in+asion of :,!ait !as from t3e fleet permanentl4 stationed on t3e :orean Penins,la. It is tr,e too t3at at
t3e moment t3e Nort3$8o,t3 :orean border is t3e most fortified in t3e !orld. )3e border line is littered !it3 anti-tan2 and anti-personnel landminesH s,rface-to-s,rface and s,rfaceto-air missiles and is constantl4 patrolled b4 !arplanes from bot3 sides. It is common 2no!led#e t3at (merica also 2eeps an e4e on an4 militar4 mo+ement or b,ild-,p in t3e nort3 t3ro,#3 sp4 satellites. )3e &PC: is said to 3a+e an estimated one million soldiers and a 3,#e arsenal of +ario,s !eapons. (lt3o,#3 t3e &PC: re#ards 3erself as a de+elopin# co,ntr4H s3e can 3o!e+er be classified as a s,per-po!er in terms of militar4 mi#3t. )3e &PC: is capable of prod,cin# medi,m and lon#-ran#e missiles. =ast 4earH for exampleH s3e testfired a medi,m ran#e missile o+er MapanH an action t3at #reatl4 s3oo2 and alarmed t3e B8H Mapan and 8o,t3 :orea.
)3e &PC: sa4s t3e pro;ectile !as a satellite. )3ere 3a+e also been fears t3at s3e !as plannin# to test anot3er ballistic missile capable of reac3in# Nort3 (merica. Nat,rall4H t3e !orld is anxio,s t3at militar4 tension on t3e :orean Penins,la m,st be def,sed to a+oid an apo%al6pse on eart'. It is t3erefore si#nificant t3at t3e (merican #o+ernment anno,nced a fe! da4s a#o t3at it !as mo+in# to!ards normalisin# relations !it3 Nort3 :orea.
/re-emption nuclear meltdowns 8 war with $+

"uller ) Reiss =,
(Earald-H "itc3ell-H 8prin#H 7as3in#ton S,arterl4H ICo,nterproliferationK P,ttin# Ne! 7ine in @ld 1ottlesJH =exisL Macob) (s ambi#,o,s si#nals abo,t co,nterproliferation started to emer#e from 7as3in#ton in late 1663H t3ose abroad tr4in# to read t3ese si#nals seiGed on t3eir most a,dible and spectac,lar aspectsK t3e apparent readiness of t3e Bnited 8tates to prepare for preempti+e attac2s on 7"& facilities in 3ostile co,ntries. )3is aro,sed m,c3 anxiet4H m,c3 of !3ic3 3as not 4et been f,ll4 dispelled. <irstH forei#ners !orried abo,t t3e catal4tic conse*,ences s,c3 an action mi#3t en#ender. Pre+entin# anot3er co,ntr4 from ac*,irin# 7"& before its efforts bore fr,itH or preemptin# t3e ,se of s,c3 !eapons in a crisisH b,t before a conflict started -- t3at isH militar4 action d,rin# !3at !o,ld strictl4 be peacetime -- co,ld !ell pro+o2e a !ar !it3 de+astatin# conse*,ences. )3e :orean penins,la is a case in pointH and t3e plea of Nort3 :oreaPs nei#3bors to t3e Bnited 8tates t3at it
s3o,ld refrain from actions t3at co,ld precipitate armed conflict s,##ests t3e probable reactions of man4 co,ntries s3o,ld t3e4 find t3emsel+es in similar circ,mstances.
)3e onl4 exception to t3is mi#3t be IsraelH !3ic3 itself cond,cted a s,ccessf,l Qco,nterproliferationQ operation and feels more ac,tel4 t3an an4 ot3er state t3e t3reats t3at mi#3t emanate from a 7"&-armedH a##ressi+e re#ional po!er. (lt3o,#3 t3e Israelis are toda4 far less confident t3at t3e t4pe of operation performed in t3eir M,ne 1601 raid a#ainst Ira*Ps )amm,G reactor co,ld 60
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be s,ccessf,ll4 repeatedH n3 t3e4 ma4 belie+e t3at t3e alternati+e -- to do not3in# -- !o,ldH ,nder extreme circ,mstancesH be !orse t3an t3e attempt. 8econdH and closel4 connected to t3e first pointH forei#ners experienced serio,s concern o+er t3e collateral conse*,ences of a militar4 attac2 on Nort3 :oreaPs Yon#b4on n,clear complex. )3is reser+ationH in factH fo,nd expression in man4 sober anal4ses b4 t3e B.8. militar4 and intelli#ence comm,nit4 itself. If 7"& or t3eir prod,ction facilities can be fo,nd in Nort3 :orea
and t3oro,#3l4 destro4ed (not al!a4s an eas4 tas2)H t3e in+entor4 ma4 lea2 o,tH exposin# +ast n,mbers of people -- bot3 on t3e :orean penins,la and in t3e re#ion -- to let3al doses of radioacti+it4. ( stri2e a#ainst an operatin# reactor or reprocessin# plant co,ld release radioacti+it4 of an order of ma#nit,de lar#er t3an t3e C3ernob4l disaster. )3e political le#itimac4 and international la!f,lness of s,c3 an action co,ld be serio,sl4 in do,btH t3e
distinction bet!een militar4 tar#ets and innocent noncombatants co,ld be bl,rredH and t3e proportionalit4 of t3e response to t3e t3reat co,ld be *,estioned.
<- Pre-emption
/re-emptive attack on $+ $(
?oore6 09
(P3illip-H M,l4 16H Eerald 8,nH INort3ern Expos,reJH =exisL Macob)
: (9 of 9)
)ensions !it3 Nort3 :orea are a#ain dan#ero,sl4 3i#3. )3ere !as e+en an exc3an#e of #,nfire across t3e demilitarised Gone t3is !ee2 bet!een soldiers from t3e Nort3 and 8o,t3H t3e first s,c3 incident in 29 mont3s. B8 experts fear a pre-empti+e militar4 stri2e to combat t3e #ro!in# n,clear t3reat b4 P4on#4an# !o,ld set off a 3oloca,st.
Threat of pre-emption : root cause of $+ nucleari%ation

-n6der 09
(Mac2-H 8prin#H National InterestH IImperial )emptationJH =exisL Macob)
of an (merican attac2 is all too credible. )3e main moti+ation for Nort3 :orea to brea2 o,t of t3e 1664 a#reement constrainin# its n,clear pro#ram !as apparentl4 its percei+ed needH in li#3t of t3e 1,s3 (dministrationPs pre+enti+e !ar doctrine and rel,ctance to ne#otiateH for more po!erf,l !eapons to deter t3e Bnited 8tates.
(nd 4et it ma4 be t3at t3e t3reat
66
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<- H ?al% Probabilit6

;eres comparative evidence- $+ is far more likely attack out of perceived self defense than to initiate any sort of war!
-n6der 09
)3e idea of offensi+e ad+anta#e also r,ns co,nter to t3e most t4pical patterns of deterrence and coercion. 8ometimes t3e p,rpose of a militar4 operation is not to ta2e or 3old territor4 b,t to infl,ence an ad+ersar4 b4 inflictin#
pain. )3is is especiall4 tr,e !3en !eapons of mass destr,ction are in+ol+ed. In t3at caseH !ar ma4 resemble a competition in t3e !illin#ness to end,re pain. Eere tooH 3o!e+erH t3e defender normall4 3as t3e ad+anta#eH beca,se t3e side defendin#
its o!n 3omeland and t3e s,r+i+al of its re#ime t4picall4 cares more abo,t t3e sta2es of t3e conflict t3an does a !o,ld-be attac2er. It is diffic,lt to ima#ine Nort3 :orea ,sin# n,clear !eapons or mo,ntin# a con+entional artiller4 barra#e on t3e 8o,t3 :orean capital of 8eo,l for p,rposes of con*,estH b,t it is m,c3 easier to en+ision s,c3 desperate meas,res in response to Qpre+enti+eQ B.8. attac2s on t3e core po!er reso,rces of t3e re#ime. 1eca,se t3e 1,s3 (dministration sa! s,c3 retaliation as feasible and credibleH it !as deterred from ,nderta2in# pre+enti+e stri2es !3en t3e Nort3 :oreans ,nsealed a n,clear reactor in &ecember. IndeedH
deterrin# an4 co,ntr4 from attac2in# is almost al!a4s easier t3an compellin# it to disarmH s,rrender territor4 or c3an#e its re#ime. @nce statedH t3is point seems ob+io,sH b,t t3e lo#ic of t3e 1,s3 strate#4 doc,ment implies t3e opposite.
199
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<- ./ < first stri5e

$orth +orea will never first strike
((? 0,
(8ept. 6H ICold 7ar &ipolmac4 1est 8trate#4 (#ainst Nort3 :oreaJH =exisL Macob) )3e !orld can t3,s ass,me t3at t3e Nort3 :orean #o+ernment 3as been !ea2ened. It is ,nnecessar4 for 8o,t3 :oreans to respond to or be t3reatened b4 t3e fact t3at :im Mon#-il 3as n,clear !eapons. :im Mon#-il !ill ne+er
,se t3e !eapons beca,se t3ere is simpl4 no reason for 3im to #i+e ,p 3is first-class position as t3e r,ler of Nort3 :orea b4 ,sin# t3e n,clear !eaponsH committin# s,icide.
191
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<- Pre-emption fails

!"! surgical strike would fail
<an# 0,
(&a+id C.-H (ssoc. Prof. in t3e /o+. &ept. O &artmo,t3H (,t,mnH )3e 7as3in#ton S,arterl4H IMapanK B.8. Partner or <oc,sed on (bd,cteesRJH =exisL Macob) E+en if Mapan ,ltimatel4 c3ooses to ;oin t3e Bnited 8tates in p,rs,in# more coerci+e meas,resH fe! realistic polic4 options are a+ailable. 7arH e+en a s,r#ical stri2eH !o,ld be extremel4 ris24 and !o,ld be ,nli2el4 to destro4 all of t3e Nort3Ps n,clear facilitiesH !3ic3 are pres,med to be scattered abo,t t3e co,ntr4 in b,n2ers and ca+es. n39 <,rt3ermoreH alt3o,#3 a solid B.8.-8o,t3 :orean deterrent 3as restrained Nort3 :orea for more t3an 9 4earsHn31 deterrence on t3e penins,la !or2s bot3 !a4s. 7it3 its No-don# missilesH Nort3 :orea co,ld potentiall4 de+astate )o24oH some 1H299 2ilometers from s,spected sites. n32 (s c,rrent National 8ec,rit4 Co,ncil director for East (sia ?ictor C3a notesH QNo-don# ballistic missile deplo4ments effecti+el4 3old Mapan 3osta#e. )3e !arnin# time for a Nort3 :orean artiller4 s3ell landin# in 8eo,l is meas,red in seconds ( -)H and for a ballistic missile fired on t3e Mapanese arc3ipela#oH meas,red in min,tes (19). )3ere is no concei+able defense a#ainst t3ese t3reats t3at does not res,lt in 3,ndreds of t3o,sands of cas,alties.Qn33
192
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P/ -%enario (1 of 2)
A! /re-emtion testing which kills the $/T
Po!as5i 02
(Conald E.-H Prof. of Eistor4 O Cle+eland 8t. B.H Man. 1H 1,lletin of t3e (tomic 8cientistsH I1,s3Ps n,clear 34pocris4K if t3e next administration !ants to be seen as serio,s abo,t nonproliferationH itPll 3a+e to ,ndo a lot of 1,s3 administration practicesJH =exisL Macob) I) I8 IC@NIC (N& EYP@CCI)IC(=. )E() )EE 1B8E (&"INI8)C()I@N 3as condemned bot3 Nort3 :orea and Iran for t3eir apparent efforts to de+elop n,clear !eapons. )3e 1,s3 administration itself is ,nderminin# t3e international n,clear nonproliferation re#ime.
)3e 3eart of t3e re#ime is t3e N,clear Non-Proliferation )reat4 (NP)). @ne of its main pro+isions is t3e promise b4 t3e n,clear !eapon statesH incl,din# t3e Bnited 8tatesH to mo+e to!ard n,clear disarmament. In ret,rn for t3at promiseH t3e non-n,clear !eapon states 3a+e pled#ed not to ac*,ire n,clear !eapons. =ast 4earH 3o!e+erH t3e 1,s3 administration scrapped t3e (nti-1allistic "issile ((1") )reat4H one of t3e pillars of t3e international nonproliferation re#imeH in order to free t3e Bnited 8tates from t3e treat4Ps restraints on t3e constr,ction of a national missile defense s4stem. In doin# soH t3e administration ar#,ed t3at t3e (1" )reat4 no lon#er ser+ed (mericaPs national interest--t3e same Qnational interestQ lan#,a#e Nort3 :orea ,sed to ;,stif4 its !it3dra!al from t3e NP) last Man,ar4.
1,t t3e 1,s3 administration 3as been no friend of t3e NP) eit3er. It 3as appro+ed a strate#ic doctrine t3at calls for t3e possible ,se of n,clear !eapons a#ainst so-called ro#,e states li2e Nort3 :orea and Iran. )3e ne! doctrine t3reatens to o+ert,rn a B.8. pled#e not to ,se n,clear !eapons a#ainst non-n,clear states t3at are still a part4 to t3e NP)H s,c3 as Iran. ( partic,larl4 bitin# editorial in t3e Parisian ne!spaper =e "onde pointed o,t t3e ironic position in !3ic3 t3e administrationPs n,clear strate#4 places t3e non-n,clear states. Q734HQ t3e paper as2edH Qsi#nH or remain si#nator4 toH a treat4 Ut3e NP)V !3ic3H in exc3an#e for 4o,r absol,te ren,nciation of n,clear armsH does not #,arantee t3at t3e4 !ill not be ,sed a#ainst 4o,RQ Ne+ert3elessH t3e 1,s3 administrationPs 2992 N,clear Post,re Ce+ie! calls for reb,ildin# 2e4 parts of t3e B.8. n,clear !eapons prod,ction complex to permit t3e modificationH ,p#radin#H or replacement of portions of t3e existin# n,clear force. It f,rt3er proposes t3e de+elopment of ne!H lo!-4ieldH and pres,mabl4 more ,sable n,clear !eaponsH s,c3 as a ne! n,clear eart3penetratin# !eapon. )3e alle#ed p,rpose of t3is !eapon is to #i+e t3e Bnited 8tates t3e capabilit4 to destro4 3ardened and$or deepl4 b,ried tar#etsH s,c3 as t3e ca+e complex ,sed b4 (l Saeda in (f#3anistan. (lt3o,#3 t3e 1,s3 administration 3as stated t3at it 3as no intention of testin# n,clear !eaponsH it is 3ard to belie+e t3at t3e militar4 !o,ld deplo4 an4 ne! n,clear !eapons !it3o,t tr4in# t3em o,t first--and a res,mption of n,clear !eapon tests b4 t3e Bnited 8tates !o,ld f,rt3er ,ndermine t3e NP). In 166 H man4 nations appro+ed t3e indefinite extension of t3e NP) on t3e explicit condition t3at t3e n,clear po!ers !o,ld cease all n,clear-4ield testin# and ratif4 t3e Compre3ensi+e )est 1an )reat4 (C)1)). "an4 re#ard t3e C)1) as one of t3e most effecti+e !a4s of endin# t3e n,clear arms race. It is based on t3e ass,mption t3at if nations are pro3ibited from testin# n,clear !eaponsH t3e4 are less li2el4 to de+elop t3em. (s of M,ne 2993H 1'- nations 3ad si#ned t3e C)1) and 191 3ad ratified itH incl,din# 31 of t3e 44 n,clear-capable states t3at m,st ratif4 t3e treat4 for it to enter into force. (lt3o,#3 t3e Bnited 8tates 3as ad3ered to a self-imposed testin# moratori,m for more t3an a decadeH t3e 8enate re;ected t3e C)1) in 1666H and t3e 1,s3 administration 3as ref,sed to res,bmit it. (s a clear indication of !34 t3e administration opposes ratification of t3e C)1)H t3e N,clear Post,re Ce+ie! calls for s3ortenin# t3e preparation time re*,ired to res,me B.8. n,clear testin# from t!o to t3ree 4ears to as little as t3ree mont3sH ma2in# possible a m,c3 more rapid res,mption of tests. )3e administrationPs intent is ob+io,sK to test a ne! #eneration of tactical n,clear 193
Caldebate.com
!eapons for possible ,se a#ainst terrorists 3oled ,p deep in mo,ntain ca+es or a#ainst so-called ro#,e states li2e Iran and Nort3 :orea. In 8eptemberH t3e 8enate appro+ed an administration re*,est for f,nds for contin,ed researc3 on t3e contro+ersial n,clear eart3 penetratorH accelerated n,clear testin# readinessH exploration of ne! !eapons tec3nolo#iesH and preliminar4 st,dies on b,ildin# a plant to prod,ce pl,toni,m cores for n,clear !eapons. Eo!e+erH t3e 8enatePs action 3ad to be reconciled !it3 a meas,re passed b4 t3e Eo,se in "a4 t3at eliminated all mone4 for s,c3 p,rposes. &emocratsH most of !3om oppose t3e administrationPs Qrec2lessQ p,rs,it of ne! n,clear !eaponsH 3oped to o+ert,rn t3e 8enatePs action in a conference committee in t3e fall. 1,t t3e &emocrats !ere onl4 partiall4 s,ccessf,l. In earl4 No+emberH con#ressional appropriators c,t 3alf of t3e administrationPs A 1 million 2994 f,ndin# re*,est for st,d4in# b,n2er b,sters and barred t3e Ener#4 &epartment from spendin# A 4 million of an appro+ed A ' million for ne! !eapons concepts ,ntil it s,bmits a report on B.8. n,clear stoc2pile re*,irements. In so doin#H 3o!e+erH t3e Eo,se and 8enate complied !it3 a 73ite Eo,se re*,est to repeal a 19-4ear-old ban on researc3 leadin# to t3e de+elopment of ne! n,clear !eapons !it3 4ields of less t3an fi+e 2ilotons and t3e proposed n,clear b,n2er b,sters. )3e4 also a#reed to s3orten t3e time re*,ired to prepare for a f,ll-scale n,clear test from 24 to 10 mont3s.
P/ -%enario (2 of 2)
Ne+ert3elessH la!ma2ers also demonstrated t3eir ,nease o+er t3e administrationPs plans to rein+i#orate B.8. n,clear !eapons researc3 and test preparations. 73ile t3e4 appro+ed researc3 into ne! lo!-4ield !eaponsH t3e4 ref,sed to a,t3oriGe t3e de+elopment and testin# of ne! or modified desi#ns. C=E(C=YH I< )EE 1B8E (&"INI8)C()I@N !ere serio,s abo,t 3altin# t3e proliferation of n,clear !eaponsH it !o,ld accept t3e same standards of be3a+ior t3at it is attemptin# to impose on non-n,clear !eapon states. Needless to sa4H t3is administration is ,nli2el4 to re+erse its decision mandatin# contin,ed B.8. reliance on n,clear !eapons or to abandon its pro#ram to de+elop ne! n,clear !eapons. Yet it still is not too late to re+erse t3e dama#e to t3e international nonproliferation re#ime prod,ced b4 t3e 1,s3 administrationPs rec2less n,clear policies. In all li2eli3oodH t3o,#3H it !ill re*,ire t3e election of a ne! president before t3ere can be a ret,rn to a sane B.8. n,clear !eapon polic4. ( ne! president !ill 3a+e to lead t3e international comm,nit4 b4 settin# a #ood example--t3at isH b4 actin# to preser+e and stren#t3enH rat3er t3an ,ndermineH t3e nonproliferation re#ime. )o disco,ra#e c,rrent non-n,clear !eapon states from ac*,irin# n,clear !eaponsH t3e next administration !ill 3a+e to pled#e t3at t3e Bnited 8tates itself !ill refrain from ,sin# or t3reatenin# to ,se n,clear !eapons first.
B! #ollapse of the $/T prolif

(romle6 02
("ar2H 1ritis3 (merican 8ec,rit4 Informational Co,ncil (nal4stH M,l4H I1,n2er 1,stersK 7as3in#ton5s &ri+e for Ne! N,clear 7eaponsJH 3ttpK$$!!!.basicint.or#$p,bs$Cesearc3$299211.pdf) @f all t3e international re#imes to be affected b4 t3e NPCH t3e NP) ma4 s,ffer t3e #reatest blo!. (lread4 an ,nstable international re#imeH t3e NP) !as implicitl4 or o+ertl4 dama#ed b4 se+eral of t3e NPC5s recommendations 73ile t3e 1,s3 administration 3as +oiced do,bts abo,t se+eral m,ltilateral arms control a#reements since its first da4s in 7as3in#tonH it 3as reiterated its stron# s,pport for t3e NP)H a treat4 !it3 t3e p,rpose of c,rtailin# t3e spread of n,clear 2no!-3o! and c,ttin# existin# arsenals. <or exampleH t3e Bnited 8tates bac2ed t3e final comm,ni*,\ from t3e N()@ <orei#n "inisters meetin# in "a4 2991 !3ic3 statedH I7e reaffirm o,r determination to contrib,te to t3e implementation of t3e concl,sions of t3e 2999 NP) Ce+ie! ConferenceJ.120 In additionH a ;oint comm,ni*,\ iss,ed b4 1,s3 and P,tin on No+ember 13H 2991 committed t3e Bnited 8tates to ,nderta2e Iefforts to stren#t3en t3e n,clear Non-Proliferation )reat4J.126 (mbassador Norm 7,lf restated 7as3in#ton5s s,pport for t3e NP) d,rin# t3e (pril 2992 Preparator4 Committee meetin# for t3e NP)5s 299 Ce+ie! Conference !3en 3e saidH I)3e
Bnited 8tates contin,es to +ie! t3e NP) as t3e bedroc2 of t3e #lobal efforts to pre+ent t3e spread of n,clear !eapons.J139 (mon# 7as3in#ton5s reasons for s,pportin# t3e NP) is t3e treat45s +al,able role in pre+entin# proliferation. 8ince t3e NP)5s entr4 into force in 16-9H a n,mber of states 3a+e abandoned t3eir n,clear !eapons pro#rammes and ;oined t3e NP) as non-n,clear statesH incl,din# (r#entinaH 1elar,sH 1raGilH :aGa23stanH 8o,t3 (fricaH and B2raine. 73ile Nort3 :orea and Ira* ma4 be seen as fail,res of t3e NP)H it !as onl4 t3ro,#3 t3e mec3anisms establis3ed b4 t3e treat4 t3at t3eir n,clear pro#rammes !ere first disco+ered and t3en 3alted. ( report from t3e B8 &efence )3reat Ced,ction (#enc4 (&)C() s,pports t3is assessment. It concl,des t3at t3e collapse of t3e NP) !o,ld enco,ra#e Istates to re+ie! t3eir n,clear policies and to adopt more a##ressi+e
194
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policies. In t3e lon# r,nH t3is strate#ic en+ironment !o,ld li2el4 foster +ertical and 3oriGontal proliferation of n,clear !eapons.J131 )3e dan#ers posed b4 a !ea2ened NP) are real and ,ni+ersall4 reco#nised.
#! /rolif $(
>t#off 02
(?ictor-H &ep,t4 &irector for t3e 8trate#4H <orcesH F Ceso,rces &i+ision of t3e Instit,te for &efense (nal4sisH 8,mmerH 8,r+i+alH ?ol. 44 T2H P. 0--69) In s,mH !idespread proliferation is li2el4 to lead to an occasional s3oot-o,t !it3 n,clear !eaponsH and t3at s,c3 s3oot-o,ts !ill 3a+e a s,bstantial probabilit4 of escalatin# to t3e maxim,m destr,ction possible !it3 t3e !eapons at 3and. Bnless n,clear proliferation is stoppedH !e are 3eaded to!ard a !orld t3at !ill mirror t3e (merican 7ild 7est of t3e late 1099s. 7it3 mostH if not allH nations !earin# n,clear Psix-s3ootersP on t3eir 3ipsH t3e !orld ma4 e+en be a more polite place t3an it is toda4H b,t e+er4 once in a !3ile !e !ill all #at3er on a 3ill to b,r4 t3e bodies of dead cities or e+en !3ole nations.
F+erstret%' -%enario
A! #ontinued use of the pre-emption doctrine will overstretch the collapsing hegemony!
(u%'anan 06
(Patric2 M.-H Common 4o, 2no! t3is d,deL 3e ran for President in 2999H c,rrentl4 a political anal4st for "8N1CH "a4 6H 7orld Net &ail4 Commentar4H I(pproac3in# imperial o+erstretc3JH 3ttpK$$!!!.!orldnetdail4.com$ne!s$ article.aspR(C)IC=EXI&%33'-4L Macob) (merica is no! approac3in# t3e imperial o+erstretc3 to!ard !3ic3 !e 3a+e been l,n#in# and st,mblin# since t3e Cold 7ar. <or 19 4earsH t3e Q;odp,rs-and-pit3-3elmetsQ ;in#o cro!d at t3e little ma#aGines 3as been beatin# t3e dr,m to dri+e ,s to!ard t3is cataract. No!H !e are t3ereH t3e Bnited 8tates is facin# !3at 7alter =ippmann called Qforei#n-polic4 ban2r,ptc4.Q ( forei#n polic4 is ban2r,pt !3en a nationPs strate#ic assets [ its forces and alliances [ are ins,fficient to co+er its liabilitiesH !3at it 3as committed to defend. B.8. forei#n-polic4 ban2r,ptc4 !as reac3ed before Pearl EarborH !3en <ran2lin Coose+elt !as iss,in# ,ltimata to Mapan !it3o,t t3e na+al po!er to defend t3e P3ilippines and an4 ot3er island possessions in t3e far Pacific. 8oH o,r notes !ere calledH !e 3ad ins,fficient f,nds to co+er t3emH and t3e !ar came. <orei#n polic4 ban2r,ptc4 is a condition t3at in+ites a r,n on t3e ban2 b4 a nationPs enemies and ad+ersaries. 8o toda4H !e see axis-of-e+il nations def4in# t3e 1,s3 &octrine and dri+in# to!ard n,clear !eaponsH Ira*is risin# ,p to expel ,sH ",slim fanatics slippin# into Ira* to attac2 o,r soldiersH and alienated allies sittin# bac2 and relis3in# !atc3in# t3e Q(merican 34perpo!erQ t3ras3 abo,t. (s o,r reser+es are bein# called ,pH not onl4 is o,r acti+e d,t4 B.8. militar4 stretc3ed t3in. @,r b,d#et deficit is A4 billion and risin#H o,r trade deficit is A 99 billion and risin#H o,r dollar 3as fallen 2 percent a#ainst t3e e,ro. In r,t3less candorH President 1,s3 does not 3a+e t3e s,rpl,s of reso,rces [ militar4H strate#icH financialH political [ to 3old t3e empire. (s some of ,s predicted a decade a#oH t3e comp,lsi+e inter+entionism of t3e 1,s3ites m,st lead to imperial o+erstretc3. 8omet3in# 3as to #i+e. It is #oin# to be t3e empire. 7e are at or close to 3i#3 tide no!. <rom 3ere onH it be#ins to recede. Eit3er President 1,s3 starts discardin# imperial responsibilities !e cannot carr4H and brin#in# t3e troops 3omeH or 3is s,ccessor !ill.
!"! military
B! The 7 is a global nuclear e0change!

<'alilAad =,
(Yalma4-H 1adassH 8prin#H 7as3in#ton S,arterl4H I=osin# t3e "omentR )3e Bnited 8tates and t3e 7orld (fter t3e Cold 7arJH ?ol. 10 T2H P. 04H =exisL Macob) Bnder t3e t3ird optionH t3e Bnited 8tates !o,ld see2 to retain #lobal leaders3ip and to precl,de t3e rise of a #lobal ri+al or a ret,rn to m,ltipolarit4 for t3e indefinite f,t,re. @n balanceH t3is is t3e best lon#-term #,idin# principle and +ision. 8,c3 a +ision is desirable not as an end in itselfH b,t beca,se a !orld in !3ic3 t3e Bnited 8tates exercises leaders3ip !o,ld 3a+e 19
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tremendo,s ad+anta#es. <irstH t3e #lobal en+ironment !o,ld be more open and more recepti+e to (merican +al,es -democrac4H free mar2etsH and t3e r,le of la!. 8econdH s,c3 a !orld !o,ld 3a+e a better c3ance of dealin# cooperati+el4 !it3 t3e !orldPs ma;or problemsH s,c3 as n,clear proliferationH t3reats of re#ional 3e#emon4 b4 rene#ade statesH and lo!-le+el conflicts. <inall4H B.8. leaders3ip !o,ld 3elp precl,de t3e rise of anot3er 3ostile #lobal ri+alH enablin# t3e Bnited 8tates and t3e !orld to a+oid anot3er #lobal cold or 3ot !ar and all t3e attendant dan#ersH incl,din# a #lobal n,clear exc3an#e. B.8. leaders3ip !o,ld t3erefore be more cond,ci+e to #lobal stabilit4
t3an a bipolar or a m,ltipolar balance of po!er s4stem.5
F+erstret%'- Pre-emption ?auses it (1 of 9)

/re-emption o<s
Roberts 02
(Pa,l Crai#-H @lin <ello! O t3e Instit,te for Political Econom4H <mr. (ssist. 8ecretar4 of t3e B.8. )reas,r4H &ec. 'H IPreemption for (llDJH 3ttpK$$!!!.anti!ar.com$roberts$Rarticleid%411'L Macob) Eas President 1,s3 lost 3is #rip on realit4R In 3is &ec. 1 speec3 in EalifaxH No+a 8cotiaH President 1,s3 a#ain declared 3is intention to preempti+el4 attac2 Qenemies !3o plot in secret and set o,t to m,rder t3e innocent and t3e ,ns,spectin#.Q <reedom from terrorismH 1,s3 declaredH !ill come onl4 t3ro,#3 preempti+e !ar a#ainst enemies of democrac4. Eo! does 1,s3 2no! !3o and !3ere t3ese secret enemies areR Eo! man4 more times !ill 3is #,esses be !ron# li2e 3e !as abo,t Ira*R 73at !orld does 1,s3 li+e inR )3e B.8. cannot control Ira*H m,c3 less battle t3e rest of t3e ",slim !orld and be4ond. 73ile 1,s3 t3reatened t3e !orld !it3 B.8. a##ressionH 3eadlines re+ealed t3e f,tilit4 of preempti+el4 in+adin# co,ntriesK QPenta#on to 1oost Ira* <orce b4 12H999HQ QB.8. &eat3 )oll in Ira* at Ei#3est "ont3l4 =e+elHQ Q7o,ndedH &isabled 8oldiers :ept on (cti+e &,t4.Q 7e are #ettin# o,r b,tts 2ic2ed in Ira*H and 1,s3 !ants to in+ade more co,ntriesR It is clear as da4 t3at !e do not 3a+e eno,#3 troops to deal !it3 Ira*. )3e 12H999 additional troops Qto impro+e sec,rit4Q are bein# ac*,ired b4 extendin# t3e combat to,rs of troops alread4 on d,t4 in Ira*. "ore B.8. soldiers !ere 2illed in Ira* in No+ember t3an in an4 pre+io,s mont3. )3e B.8. is so 3ard-,p for troops t3at t3e Penta#on is deplo4in# soldiers !3o 3a+e lost arms and le#s in combat. @n &ec. 1H t3e 7as3in#ton Post reportedK QB.8. armed forces 3a+e recentl4 anno,nced ne! efforts to 2eep serio,sl4 !o,nded or disabled soldiers on acti+e d,t4.Q Cedeplo4in# t3e disabled is presented as a 3eroic demonstration of o,r #,n#-3o !arriorsP fi#3tin# spirit. 1,t !3at it reall4 means is !e 3a+e no more troops to t3ro! at t3e fe! t3o,sand li#3tl4 armed Ira*i ins,r#ents !3o 3a+e tied do!n ei#3t B.8. di+isions. (ccordin# to t3e B.8. militar4 3ospital in =andst,3lH /erman4H t3e 3ospital 3as treated 29H092 B.8. troops for in;,ries recei+ed in Ira*. (ccordin# to t3e Penta#onPs fi#,resH 4 percent of t3e !o,nded are too serio,sl4 in;,red to ret,rn to t3eir ,nits. If t3at fi#,re is correctH it !o,ld mean t3at t3e ins,r#ents 3a+e p,t 11H233 B.8. troops o,t of action. (dd in t3e 1H2 4 B.8. troops !3o 3a+e been 2illed for a total of 12H40-. )3atPs 6 percent of o,r total force in Ira* and a m,c3 3i#3er percenta#e of o,r combat force. )3ere is no indication t3at !e 3a+e p,t 12H40- Ira*i ins,r#ents o,t of action. IndeedH ,ntil +er4 recentl4H t3e B.8. militar4 estimated t3at t3ere !ere onl4 se+eral t3o,sand acti+e ins,r#ents in all of Ira*. 8omeone needs to tell 1,s3 t3at terrorists are stateless and t3at in+adin# states creates ins,r#encies. In Ira*H o,r soldiers are not fi#3tin# terrorists. )3e4 are fi#3tin# an ins,r#enc4 t3at 1,s3 created b4 in+adin# Ira*. 1,s3Ps preempti+e !ars are a #ood !a4 to depop,late t3e B.8. and ban2r,pt o,r co,ntr4. <or all o,r firepo!erH !e are not !innin# t3e !ar. <all,;a3 3as been destro4edH b,t t3e B.8. militar4 can claim onl4 1H2991H'99 ins,r#ents !ere 2illed. "an4 of t3e dead co,nted as ins,r#ents are probabl4 ci+ilians 2illed b4 t3e B.8. militar4Ps indiscriminate ,se of 3i#3 explosi+es. 1,t e+en if !e ass,me t3e militar4Ps estimate of enem4 dead is acc,rateH it is an ,nimpressi+e fi#,re in +ie! of t3e 0 9 !o,nded and -1 dead (mericans. B.8. <all,;a3 cas,alties of 621 is a stri2in#l4 3i#3 fi#,re considerin# t3e 3ea+4 armorH artiller4H 3elicopter #,ns3ipsH ;et fi#3tersH and sop3isticated comm,nications t3at bac2 ,p B.8. troops. 19'
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734 !as 1,s3 in No+a 8cotia ad+ocatin# preempti+e in+asion ,nless 1,s3 3as ot3er "iddle Eastern co,ntries tar#etedR Iran and 84ria are t3e onl4 t!o remainin# "iddle Eastern co,ntries t3at are not r,led b4 B.8. p,ppets. =ac2in# s,fficient militar4 forces to s,ccessf,ll4 occ,p4 Ira*H 3o! is 1,s3 #oin# to en#a#e in preempti+e !ars a#ainst Iran and 84ria !it3o,t brin#in# bac2 t3e draftR If ei#3t B.8. di+isions canPt do t3e ;ob in Ira*H 1' B.8. di+isions !onPt be eno,#3 for Iran. &efeatin# standin# armies is a different #ame from occ,p4in# a 3ostile co,ntr4. )3e B.8. militar4 is #ood at t3e formerH not at t3e latter.

/re-emption leads to overstretch
-n6der 09
(Mac2-H 8prin#H National InterestH IImperial )emptationJH =exisL Macob) Proponents of t3e ne! pre+enti+e strate#4 c3ar#e t3at s,c3 realists are o,t of to,c3 !it3 a !orld in !3ic3 formin# alliances to balance a#ainst o+er!3elmin# B.8. po!er 3as simpl4 become impossible. It is tr,e t3at small ro#,e states and t3eir il2 cannot on t3eir o!n offset (merican po!er in t3e traditional sense. It is also tr,e t3at t3eir potential #reat-po!er bac2ersH C,ssia and C3inaH 3a+e so far been !ar4 of o+ertl4 opposin# B.8. militar4 inter+entions. 1,t e+en if (mericaPs ,nprecedented
po!er red,ces t3e li2eli3ood of traditional balancin# alliances arisin# a#ainst itH t3e Bnited 8tates co,ld find t3at its o!n offensi+e actions create t3eir f,nctional e*,i+alents. 8ome earlier expansionist empires fo,nd t3emsel+es o+erstretc3ed and s,rro,nded b4 enemies e+en t3o,#3 balancin# alliances !ere slo! to oppose t3em. <or exampleH alt3o,#3 t3e prospecti+e +ictims of Napoleon and Eitler fo,nd it diffic,lt to form effecti+e balancin# coalitionsH t3ese empires attac2ed so man4 opponents sim,ltaneo,sl4 t3at s,bstantial de facto alliances e+ent,all4 did form a#ainst t3em. )oda4H an analo#o,s form of self-imposed o+erstretc3political as !ell as militar4-co,ld occ,r if t3e need for militar4 operations to pre+ent n,clear proliferation ris2s !ere deemed ,r#ent on se+eral fronts at t3e same timeH or if an attempt to impose democrac4 b4 force of arms on
a score or more of ",slim co,ntries !ere serio,sl4 ,nderta2en.
E+en in t3e absence of 3i#3l4 coordinated balancin# alliancesH sim,ltaneo,s resistance b4 se+eral tro,blema2in# states and terrorist #ro,ps !o,ld be a da,ntin# c3allen#e for a strate#4 of ,ni+ersal pre+enti+e action. Ei#3l4 moti+ated small po!ers or rebel mo+ements defendin# t3eir 3ome #ro,nd 3a+e often pre+ailed a#ainst +astl4 s,perior states t3at lac2ed t3e s,stained moti+ation to dominate t3em at extremel4 3i#3 costH as in ?ietnam and (l#eria. E+en !3en t3e4 do not pre+ailH as on t3e 7est 1an2H t3e4 ma4 fi#3t onH imposin# 3i#3 costs o+er lon# periods. Precisel4 beca,se (merica is so stron#H !ea2 states on (mericaPs 3it list ma4 increasin#l4 concl,de t3at !eapons of mass destr,ction ;oined to terror tactics are t3e onl4 feasible e*,aliGer to its po!er. &espite (mericaPs a##re#ate po!er ad+anta#esH !ea2er opponents can #et access to o,tside reso,rces to s,stain t3is 2ind of cost-imposin# resistance. E+en a state as !ea2 and isolated as Nort3 :orea 3as been able to mo,nt a credible deterrentH in part b4 en#a#in# in m,t,all4 +al,able strate#ic trade !it3 Pa2istan and ot3er "iddle Eastern states. )3e 1,s3 (dministration itself stresses t3at Ira* bo,#3t components for t3e prod,ction of !eapons of mass
destr,ction on t3e commercial mar2et and fears t3at no embar#o can stop t3is. Iran is b,4in# a n,clear reactor from C,ssia t3at t3e Bnited 8tates +ie!s as posin# ris2s of n,clear proliferation. Palestinian s,icide bombers s,ccessf,ll4 impose se+ere costs !it3 minimal reso,rces. In t3e 8eptember 11 attac2H (l-Saeda famo,sl4 ,sed its enem4Ps o!n reso,rces. Z e+idence contin,es .. President 1,s3Ps National 8ec,rit4 (d+isorH former 8tanford political science professor and pro+ost CondoleeGGa CiceH 3as recentl4 ad+anced a m,c3 different +ie! of t3e interpla4 of po!er-political realism and democratic idealism. (@nce 4o, 3a+e been a 19-
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professor of international relationsH it is e+identl4 3ard to #et t3ese debates o,t of 4o,r blood.) 83e ar#,es t3at realism and idealism s3o,ld not be seen as alternati+esK a realistic sense of po!er politics s3o,ld be ,sed in t3e ser+ice of ideals. 73o co,ld possibl4 disa#reeR 1,t contrar4 to !3at s3e and 1,s3 once ar#,ed on t3e campai#n trail abo,t 3,milit4 and a ;,dicio,s sense of limitsH Cice no! belie+es t3at (mericaPs +ast militar4 po!er s3o,ld be ,sed pre+enti+el4 to spread democratic ideals. 83e 3as also saidH spea2in# in Ne! Yor2 t3is past @ctoberH t3at t3e aim of t3e 1,s3 strate#4 is Qto diss,ade an4 potential ad+ersar4 from p,rs,in# a militar4 b,ild-,p in t3e 3ope of s,rpassin#H or e*,alin#H t3e po!er of t3e Bnited 8tates and o,r allies.Q )oda4H no combination of ad+ersaries can 3ope to e*,al (mericaPs po!er ,nder an4 circ,mstances.
Eo!e+erH if t3e4 fear t3e ,nbridled ,se of (mericaPs po!erH t3e4 ma4 percei+e o+er!3elmin# incenti+es to !ield !eapons of terror and mass destr,ction to deter (mericaPs offensi+e tactics of self-defense. IndeedH t3e 3istor4 of t3e m4t3s of empire s,##ests t3at a #eneral strate#4 of pre+enti+e !ar is li2el4 to brin# abo,t precisel4 t3e o,tcome t3at 1,s3 and Cice !is3 to a+ert.

Bush doctrine fiscal overstretch collapsing hege
?alleo 09
(&a+id P.-H 8,mmerH )3e National InterestH IPo!erH 7ealt3 and 7isdomJH =exisL Macob) 14 t3e end of t3e decadeH 3o!e+erH t3e boom !as a b,bble. Clinton5s ,nipolar +ision carried its o!n form of o+erstretc3. (lt3o,#3 3is administration did c,re t3e radical fiscal deficit in3erited from Cea#anH it failed to deal !it3 Cea#an5s ot3er poisoned le#ac4K t3e econom45s 3,#e external imbalanceH an old (merican problem t3at Cea#anomics #reatl4 exacerbated. )3e external deficit !orsened t3ro,#3o,t t3e Clinton boom and no! is !orse t3an e+er. 73at does t3is deficit meanH and 3o! is it related to (merican militar4 po!erR ( 3,#e and contin,in# external deficit means simpl4 t3at t3e Bnited 8tates re#,larl4 cons,mes and in+ests more t3an it prod,ces. )3e difference 3as to be importedL it 3as to be financed b4 forei#ners. <inancin# from abroad !as no problem in t3e Clinton era as E,ropeans floc2ed to in+est in t3e boomin# (merican econom4. (nd despite t3e massi+e inflo! of forei#n capitalH price and !a#e inflation !ere 2ept at ba4 b4 t3e stron# dollar and c3eap imports from (sia. In t3e endH 3o!e+erH inflation did re+eal itself as Iasset inflationJ-o+er-in+estment in t3e classic manner-!3ic3 led t3e !a4 from boom to cras3. Needless to sa4H as t3e b,bble b,rstH E,ropean in+estors lost t3eir ardor for po,rin# capital into t3e Bnited 8tates. 8lac2enin# forei#n in+estment 3as exacerbated t3e cras3 and contin,es to !ea2en t3e dollar. 73at are t3e implications for (merican po!erR )3e Bnited 8tates 3asH of co,rseH r,n lar#e external deficits !it3 t3e !orld econom4 t3ro,#3 m,c3 of t3e post!ar era. 73en one form,la for financin# t3e deficit 3as failedH !e 3a+e al!a4s been able to find anot3er. )3e B.8. #o+ernment al!a4s 3ad t!o ma;or ad+anta#es in t3isK t3e Cold 7ar and t3e dollar. )3e 8o+iet t3reat #a+e t3e Bnited 8tates #reat bar#ainin# le+era#e o+er its ric3 protectoratesH E,rope and MapanH !3ile t3e dollar5s international role #a+e s,ccessi+e administrations !ide abilit4 to create ne! mone4 to spend in t3e !orld. 1ot3 ad+anta#es are no! eroded. )3e end of t3e Cold 7ar 3as depri+ed t3e Bnited 8tates of its former #eopolitical le+era#eL t3e ad+ent of t3e e,ro t3reatens (merica5s monopol4 po!er o+er t3e !orld5s mone4. No! t3at Clinton5s in+estment boom is o+erH financin# (merica5s f,t,re deficits is li2el4 to #ro! more expensi+e. It !ill ta2e 3i#3er interest rates to l,re forei#n sa+in#s. Ei#3er rates seem li2el4 to force (merican politics into 3ars3er c3oices-bet!een #,ns and b,tterH or #ro!t3 and cons,mption. (r#,abl4H t3is !o,ld be tr,e e+en if t3e Clinton policies !ere still in effect. 1,t President 1,s35s #eopolitical and fiscal policies promise to ma2e a diffic,lt sit,ation !orse. 73ile Clinton5s policies did not diminis3 (merica5s o+er-absorption and conse*,ent external deficitH t3e4 did at least eliminate t3e fiscal deficit. )3e present 1,s3 (dministration came into office scornf,l of Clinton5s fiscal priorities. (s in t3e Cea#an eraH t3e desire to increase militar4 po!er 3as ta2en precedence o+er b,d#et balancin#. 1,s3 !as able to ,se 6$11 to carr4 a #iant increase in militar4 spendin#. "ean!3ileH 3is administration proposed t3e familiar neoconser+ati+e fiscal model of t3e Cold 7ar-tax c,ts to #o !it3 3ea+4 increases in militar4 spendin#. =i2e t3e Cea#an experimentH t3e 1,s3 model implies lar#e <ederal deficits. )3e b,d#et s,rpl,s in3erited from Clinton !as an earl4 cas,alt4.' "ean!3ileH t3e 3,#e external deficits #ro! !orse. In effectH t3e Bnited 8tates 3as ret,rned to t3e It!in deficitsJ of t3e pre-Clinton era. C,rrent pro;ections foresee a B.8. c,rrent acco,nt deficit of A 99 billion for 2993H- and a b,d#et deficit of A24' billion for t3e comin# fiscal 4ear-not co,ntin# t3e extra militar4 costs of t3e !arH for !3ic3 t3e administration 3as as2ed a f,rt3er A-4.- billion.0 Estimates for occ,pation and reconstr,ction costs in Ira* +ar4 !idel4H b,t t3e amo,nts !ill certainl4 be si#nificant.6 1,d#etar4 expectations 3a+e to be !ei#3ed in t3e li#3t of t3e administration5s ne! strate#ic doctrine. )3at doctrineH formall4 proclaimed in 8eptember 2992H !arns t3atH #i+en toda45s !eapons of mass destr,ctionH to#et3er !it3 t3e l,natic procli+ities of ro#,e states and terrorist or#aniGationsH t3e Bnited 8tates Icannot remain idle !3ile dan#ers #at3er.J (merica5s !ars in (f#3anistan and Ira* 190
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s,##est t3at t3e doctrine is meant to be ta2en serio,sl4. 1,t t3e doctrine5s lo#ic and lan#,a#e impl4 a still !ider application-not merel4 preempti+e stri2es at ro#,e statesH b,t pre+enti+e !ar !3ene+er a 3ostile po!er or coalition t3reatens (merican militar4 primac4 in an4 of t3e !orld5s ma;or re#ions. 8,c3 a doctrine s,##ests a formidable circle of potential enemiesH man4 !it3 lar#e armies. IndeedH if t3e doctrine5s lo#ic is ta2en serio,sl4H t3e Bnited 8tates co,ld e+ent,all4 loo2 for!ard to !ar !it3 C3inaH C,ssiaH per3aps e+en E,rope. "ean!3ileH t3ere are lesser b,t more ,r#ent c3allen#es-Nort3 :orea and IranH for example. E+en t3e lesser c3allen#es point to a contin,in# lar#e in+estment in militar4 po!erH !it3 3ea+4 fiscal conse*,ences. )3ese #eopoliticall4dri+en fiscal prospects raise t3e all-important *,estion of !3et3er t3e neo-conser+ati+e #lobal a#enda is economicall4 s,stainable. M,st as t3ere 3as been a re+i+al of ICea#anomicsJ in (mericaH so it seems li2el4 t3ere !ill soon be a re+i+al of IdeclinismJH !it3 its !arnin# of 3e#emonic Io+erstretc3.J ( feeble econom4 seems a li2el4 and reinforcin# complement to s,c3 a re+i+al. )o sa4 t3at a polic4 is economicall4 r,ino,s is not to sa4 t3at it is impossible. 1,t s,stainin# t3e financial b,rdens of t3e 1,s3 #eopolitical a#enda implies a radical c3an#e in t3e co,ntr45s political c,lt,reH to#et3er !it3 a more a,t3oritarian state t3an (mericans are ,sed to. )3e p,blic ma4 re;ect t3e 1,s3 a#enda and ret,rn t3e co,ntr4 to a different administration !it3 a different #eopolitical !orld+ie!. @r t3e 1,s3 (dministra-tion can c3an#e itself. 1,t t3e lon#er t3e c,rrent #eopolitical a#enda 3olds s!a4H t3e more its expectations of t3e rest of t3e !orld5s 3ostilit4 !ill become a self-f,lfillin# prop3ec4H and t3e 3arder it !ill be for (merica to t,rn bac2. (nd t3e more t3e (merican and #lobal economies are ab,sed b4 3,#e deficits and ,nstable mone4H t3e #reater !ill be t3e dama#e and t3e lon#er t3e time needed to reco+er. (s in t3e 1639sH t3e collateral social and political conse*,ences ma4 be se+ere.
F+erstret%'- It <ills 1e#e

)verstretch kills hege
Rosen 09
(8tep3en Peter-H 8prin#H )3e National InterestH I(n EmpireH If 4o, Can :eep ItJH <indarticles.comL Macob) In con+entional interstate relations t3e presence of ri+al po!ers of near-e*,al stren#t3 creates t3e possibilit4 t3at initial conflicts !ill escalateH and escalation ma4 or ma4 not fa+or t3e state t3at starts t3e !ar. Pr,dence t3erefore leads to at least t3e consideration of limits on militar4 operations. Empires do not face t3e problem of escalation mo,nted b4 peers. )3e4 do face t3e problem of lon#H dra!n o,tH small b,t m,ltiple !ars a#ainst peoples !3o 3a+e not 4et #otten t3e messa#e t3at resistance to t3e empire is f,tile. )3is is t3e so,rce of t3e lo#ic of o+er!3elmin# force--of !3ic3 3istor4 pro+ides man4 s,ccessf,l examples aside from t3at of Come. )3e (t3enians co,ld not afford to !a#e !ar a#ainst e+er4 island state t3at mi#3t def4 t3em. )3e "elians 3ad to be cr,s3edH t3ereforeH so t3at no ot3er island state !o,ld e+en t3in2 abo,t rebellin# a#ainst (t3ens. 8oH tooH !it3 C3ina. )3e /reat 7all !as meant not onl4 to 3andle 3ostile local peoplesH b,t to pro+ide t3e base for massi+e p,niti+e raids. 1ot3 its barriers and its p,niti+e raids !ere responses to c3ronic t3reats t3at co,ld not be met at acceptable cost b4 t3e permanent presence of re#,lar militar4 forces. (11) In 2993H t3e Bnited 8tates is tr4in# to cope !it3 essentiall4 t3e same problems and !it3 essentiall4 t3e same concept,al ran#e of responses. )3e militar4 position of t3e Bnited 8tatesH 3o!e+er stron#H can still be stretc3ed to t3e brea2in# point b4 m,ltiple 3ostile peoples !3o cannot mo,nt direct militar4 c3allen#es to t3e Bnited 8tatesH b,t !3o can create disorder b4 ,ncon+entional means. E+en before t3e attac2s la,nc3ed b4 (l-SaedaH t3e B.8. militar4 !as bein# !orn o,t b4 t3e extensi+e operations needed to maintain an acceptable international order in s,c3 places as Eaiti and 1osnia. )3e increase in international terrorism reflects t3e abilit4 of t3e enemies of t3e (merican empire to ta2e ad+anta#e of t3e porosit4 of its frontiers. )3e (merican response to date 3as in+ol+ed t3e application of force follo!ed b4 !it3dra!al and indirect r,le. =ess attention 3as been paid to t3e de+elopment of barriers or defensi+e Gones.
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Prolif -%enario
A! /re-emption prolif by weakening the taboo against nuclear weapons and scaring nations into nucleari%ing to stop a pre-emptive attack
/'a5ur 02
(Cames3-H ?ice. &irector of t3e B.N. B. in )o24oH @ct. 29H )3e Mapan )imesH IPeril of pre-empti+e t3in2in#JH =exisL Macob) )3e dismissi+e attit,de to!ard #lobal re#imes 3as fo,nd expression in ,nilateral c3an#es in B.8. doctrines !it3 respect to t3e ,tilit4 and ,sabilit4 of n,clear !eapons. ",t,al and extended deterrence (for allies s3eltered ,nder t3e n,clear ,mbrella) 3as #i+en !a4 to offensi+e deterrence and ,nilateral pre-emption !it3 special-p,rpose n,clear !eapons t3at 3a+e been transformed from !eapons of last resort to !eapons of c3oice. )3ere is f,rt3er mission creep. 73ere pre+io,sl4 t3eir ,se !as ,nima#inable except a#ainst n,clear enemiesH toda4 t3e4 are ;,stified as co,nters to Q!eapons of mass destr,ctionHQ incl,din# biolo#ical and c3emical !eapons. 1,t s,c3 doctrinal spread ma4 3a+e ,n3app4 conse*,ences for !eapons proliferation. <or t3e calc,l,s of
potential proliferators is bo,nd to be c3an#ed in response to t3e c3an#in# B.8. doctrine. It is not possible to con+ince ot3ers of t3e f,tilit4 of n,clear !eapons !3en t3e facts of possession and doctrines of ,se pro+e t3eir ,tilit4 for a self-selected fe!. =o!erin# t3e t3res3old of t3eir ,se !ea2ens t3e taboo a#ainst t3emH t3,s ine+itabl4 lo!erin# t3e normati+e barriers to n,clear proliferation.
)3e proclamation of an essentiall4 imperial doctrine of ,nc3allen#ed militar4 s,premac4 and f,ll-spectr,m dominance !ill #reatl4 ma#nif4 t3e all,re of n,clear !eapons as !eapons of defense and deterrence for poor$!ea2
co,ntries. "oreo+erH t3e combination of B.8. 3i#3-tec3 s,periorit4H reliance on lon# distance o+er-t3e3oriGon !arfare and cas,alt4 a+ersion adds +al,e to n,clear !eapons as le+era#in# tools t3at can affect t3e calc,l,s of B.8. militar4 decisions.
B! /rolif $(
>t#off 02
(?ictor-H &ep,t4 &irector for t3e 8trate#4H <orcesH F Ceso,rces &i+ision of t3e Instit,te for &efense (nal4sisH 8,mmerH 8,r+i+alH ?ol. 44 T2H P. 0--69) In s,mH !idespread proliferation is li2el4 to lead to an occasional s3oot-o,t !it3 n,clear !eaponsH and t3at s,c3 s3oot-o,ts !ill 3a+e a s,bstantial probabilit4 of escalatin# to t3e maxim,m destr,ction possible !it3 t3e !eapons at 3and. Bnless n,clear proliferation is stoppedH !e are 3eaded to!ard a !orld t3at !ill mirror t3e (merican 7ild 7est of t3e late 1099s. 7it3 mostH if not allH nations !earin# n,clear Psix-s3ootersP on t3eir 3ipsH t3e !orld ma4 e+en be a more polite place t3an it is toda4H b,t e+er4 once in a !3ile !e !ill all #at3er on a 3ill to b,r4 t3e bodies of dead cities or e+en !3ole nations. 119
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Prolif- Pre-emption %auses it

/re-emption prolif
-n6der 09
Precisel4 beca,se (merica is so stron#H !ea2 states on (mericaPs 3it list ma4 increasin#l4 concl,de t3at !eapons of mass destr,ction ;oined to terror tactics are t3e onl4 feasible e*,aliGer to its po!er. &espite (mericaPs a##re#ate po!er ad+anta#esH !ea2er opponents can #et access to o,tside reso,rces to s,stain t3is 2ind of cost-imposin# resistance. E+en a state as !ea2 and isolated as Nort3 :orea 3as been able to mo,nt a credible deterrentH in part b4 en#a#in# in m,t,all4 +al,able strate#ic trade !it3 Pa2istan and ot3er "iddle Eastern states. )3e 1,s3 (dministration itself stresses t3at Ira* bo,#3t components for t3e prod,ction of !eapons of mass
destr,ction on t3e commercial mar2et and fears t3at no embar#o can stop t3is. Iran is b,4in# a n,clear reactor from C,ssia t3at t3e Bnited 8tates +ie!s as posin# ris2s of n,clear proliferation. Palestinian s,icide bombers s,ccessf,ll4 impose se+ere costs !it3 minimal reso,rces. In t3e 8eptember 11 attac2H (l-Saeda famo,sl4 ,sed its enem4Ps o!n reso,rces. Z e+idence contin,es .. President 1,s3Ps National 8ec,rit4 (d+isorH former 8tanford political science professor and pro+ost CondoleeGGa CiceH 3as recentl4 ad+anced a m,c3 different +ie! of t3e interpla4 of po!er-political realism and democratic idealism. (@nce 4o, 3a+e been a professor of international relationsH it is e+identl4 3ard to #et t3ese debates o,t of 4o,r blood.) 83e ar#,es t3at realism and idealism s3o,ld not be seen as alternati+esK a realistic sense of po!er politics s3o,ld be ,sed in t3e ser+ice of ideals. 73o co,ld possibl4 disa#reeR 1,t contrar4 to !3at s3e and 1,s3 once ar#,ed on t3e campai#n trail abo,t 3,milit4 and a ;,dicio,s sense of limitsH Cice no! belie+es t3at (mericaPs +ast militar4 po!er s3o,ld be ,sed pre+enti+el4 to spread democratic ideals. 83e 3as also saidH spea2in# in Ne! Yor2 t3is past @ctoberH t3at t3e aim of t3e 1,s3 strate#4 is Qto diss,ade an4 potential ad+ersar4 from p,rs,in# a militar4 b,ild-,p in t3e 3ope of s,rpassin#H or e*,alin#H t3e po!er of t3e Bnited 8tates and o,r allies.Q )oda4H no combination of ad+ersaries can 3ope to e*,al (mericaPs po!er ,nder an4 circ,mstances.
Eo!e+erH if t3e4 fear t3e ,nbridled ,se of (mericaPs po!erH t3e4 ma4 percei+e o+er!3elmin# incenti+es to !ield !eapons of terror and mass destr,ction to deter (mericaPs offensi+e tactics of self-defense. IndeedH t3e 3istor4 of t3e m4t3s of empire s,##ests t3at a #eneral strate#4 of pre+enti+e !ar is li2el4 to brin# abo,t precisel4 t3e o,tcome t3at 1,s3 and Cice !is3 to a+ert.
/re-emption prolif
/el'ami 09
(83ible4-H (n!ar 8adat C3air for Peace and &e+elopment O B. of "ar4landH <eb. 2 H Inter+ie!K Con+ersations !it3 Eistor4L Instit,te of International 8t,diesH BC 1er2ele4H I)3e 1,s3 &octrineJH 3ttpK$$#lobetrotter.ber2ele4.ed,$people$)el3ami$ tel3ami93-con .3tmlL Macob) 111
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)oda4H t3at same lo#ic is propellin#
people a#ainst band!a#onin# !it3 (merica. 1eca,se !3at t3e4 see toda4H !3at t3e4 fearH is t3at Ira* is t3e first case of a preemption strate#4 t3at is to be follo!ed b4 ot3er cases. )3e4 donPt !ant to le#itimiGe it b4 acceptin# t3e notionH so t3e4Pre appl4in# t3e bra2eH so as not to #i+e it t3e le#itimac4H beca,se e+er4bod4 feels fri#3tened b4 it. If I !ere an aspirin# and fri#3tened t3ird !orld co,ntr4H if I t3o,#3t I mi#3t be nextH I !o,ld accelerate m4 !eapons of mass destr,ction pro#ramH so as to deter t3e possibilit4 of preemption. If 4o, loo2 at Nort3 :oreaH t3e4 did precisel4 t3at. )3e4 3ad e+er4 reason to t3in2 t3at t3e4 ma4 be next after Ira*H #i+en t3e r3etoric in 7as3in#tonH and #i+en t3e doctrine of preemption. (nd t3e4 3a+e exploited t3e sit,ation -- t3e B.8. is en#a#ed in t3e Ira* iss,e -- to ma2e clear t3at t3e4Pre #oin# to prod,ce eno,#3 !eapons to be able to deter an attac2. IPd expect Iran to do t3e same t3in#. (nd IPd expect t3e tendenc4 across t3e international comm,nit4 to be similar. 8o t3e +er4 strate#4 to pre+ent somet3in# is creatin# incenti+es for it to 3appenH at least to ac*,ire n,clear !eapons.
Prolif- ./ Pre-emption 5 deter Ro#ue -tates

Traditional deterrence works against rogue states- even #ondolee%%a 5ice agrees!
("ic3ael E.-H8r. <ello! in <orei#n Polic4 8t,dies O t3e 1roo2in#s Instit,tionH 8,san E.-H 8r. <ello! in <orei#n Polic4 8t,dies O t3e 1roo2in#s Instit,tionH Mames 1.-H &ean of t3e =1M 8c3ool of P,blic (ffairs O B.).H Polic4 1riefH I)3e Ne! National 8ec,rit4 8trate#4 and PreemptionJH T 113H 3ttpK$$!!!.broo2in#s.ed,$printme.!bsRpa#e%$comm$polic4briefs$pb113.3tmL Macob) &eterrence appears to 3a+e a considerable effect e+en a#ainst ro#,e states. (s t3e 8tate &epartmentPs ann,al report on terrorism ma2es clearH for exampleH most ro#,e states are act,all4 diminis3in# t3eir acti+e s,pport for terrorismH per3aps partl4 in response to President 1,s3Ps recent t3reats. )3at is not beca,se t3e4 3a+e all reformed t3eir !a4sH b,t beca,se deterrence tends to !or2 a#ainst e+en br,tal a,tocratsH !3o tend to +al,e 3i#3l4 t3eir 3old on po!er and t3eir li+esNas National 8ec,rit4 (d+isor CondoleeGGa Cice 3erself !rote in t3e Man,ar4$<ebr,ar4 2999 iss,e of <orei#n (ffairsK Q)3ese Uro#,eV re#imes are li+in# on borro!ed timeH so t3ere need be no sense of panic abo,t t3em. Cat3erH t3e first line of defense s3o,ld be a clear and classical statement of deterrenceNif t3e4 do ac*,ire 7"&H t3eir !eapons !ill be ,n,sable beca,se an4 attempt to ,se t3em !ill brin# national obliteration.Q
AT #ant deter rogue states with conventional deterence

(ar5le6 0,
(&aniel ).-H Prof. of "icroeconomics O Nort3ern :ent,c24 B.H (,#,st 1-H ICaid !on5t diarm IranJH 3ttpK$$ne!s.24post.com$apps$ bcs.dll$articleR(I&%$299 901'$NE7892$ 901'93-3$1914L Macob) Bnilateral a##ression a#ainst Iran !o,ld expose an e#re#io,s do,ble standard t3atPs been confo,ndin# disarmament in t3e "iddle East for more t3an t!o decades. &isarmin# Iran b4 force sa4s in effectH t3at Iran (and all ot3er "iddle Eastern states) m,st not be allo!ed a n,clear capabilit4 b,t IsraelPs ,ndeclared and internationall4 ,ninspected arsenal is permissible. (nd declarin# Iranian leaders to be irrational and incapable of ,nderstandin# a n,clear t3reat doesnPt ;,stif4 t3e do,ble standardK It !as 8addam E,sseinPs t3reat to ,se c3emical !eapons a#ainst Iranian cities in 1600 t3at #ot Iranian leaders to ne#otiate endin# of t3e !ar. 8addam made similar t3reats a#ainst Israel d,rin# t3e 1661 Persian /,lf 7ar b,t did not send c3emicall4 loaded missiles to )el (+i+ for fear of n,clear retaliation. &eterrence does !or2 a#ainst Qro#,e states.Q
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Re#ional ?onfli%ts -%enario (1 of 2)

A! /re-emption lowers the global threshold for warfare e0acerbating regional conflicts currently on the brink of war!
*riffit's 09
(&r. "artin-H Prof. of Political F International 8t,dies O <linders B.H @ct. 1H (,stralasian Political 8t,dies (ssociation ConferenceH I8elf-Inflicted 7o,ndsK Bnited 8tates /rand 8trate#4 and t3e 7ar on )errorJH 3ttpK$$!!!.,tas.ed,.a,$#o+ernment$ (P8($"/riffit3sfinal.pdfL Macob) <irstH B8 #rand strate#4 reinforces t3e ima#e of t3e Bnited 8tates as too *,ic2 to ,se militar4 force and to do so o,tside t3e bo,nds of international la! and le#itimac4. )3is can ma2e it more diffic,lt for t3e Bnited 8tates to #ain international s,pport for its ,se of forceH and o+er t3e lon# termH ma4 lead ot3ers to resist B.8. forei#n polic4 #oals more broadl4H incl,din# its efforts to fi#3t terrorism. Ele+atin# pre-emption to t3e le+el of a formal doctrine ma4 also increase t3e (dministration5s inclination to reac3 for t3e militar4 le+er *,ic2l4H !3en ot3er tools still 3a+e a #ood c3ance of !or2in#. @t3er states ma4 !is3
to em,late t3e precedent set b4 t3e Bnited 8tates in (f#3anistan and Ira*H at t3e same time red,cin# its le+era#e to con+ince s,c3 co,ntries not to ,se force. )3is concern is t3eoretical at one le+elH since it relates to stated doctrine as opposed to act,al B.8. actions. 1,t it is +er4 real at anot3er le+el. )oda45s international s4stem is c3aracterised b4 a relati+e infre*,enc4 of interstate !ar. &e+elopin# doctrines t3at lo!er t3e t3res3old for pre-empti+e action co,ld p,t t3at accomplis3ment at ris2H and exacerbate re#ional crises alread4 on t3e brin2 of open conflict. @f co,rseH no co,ntr4 !ill embar2 s,ddenl4 on a !ar of a##ression simpl4 beca,se t3e Bnited 8tates pro+ides it !it3 a *,asi-le#al ;,stification to do so. 1,t co,ntries alread4 on t3e brin2 of !arH or leanin# stron#l4 to!ards !arH mi#3t ,se t3e doctrine to ;,stif4 an action t3e4 alread4 !is3ed to ta2eH and t3e effect of t3e B.8. post,re ma4 ma2e it 3arder for t3e international comm,nit4 in #eneralH and t3e B.8. in partic,larH to co,nsel dela4 and diplomac4. Potential examples abo,ndH ran#in# from Et3iopia and EritreaH to C3ina and )ai!anH to t3e "iddle East. 1,t per3aps t3e clearest case is t3e India-Pa2istan crisis. In 2992H India !as poised to attac2 Pa2istanH #i+en Pa2istan5s s,spected complicit4 in assistin# Islamic extremist terrorists !3o !ent from Pa2istan into t3e disp,ted territor4 of :as3mir. ( combination of B.8. press,re on bot3 co,ntriesH !it3 some last-min,te ca,tion b4 t3e leaders of Pa2istan and IndiaH narro!l4 a+erted a !ar t3at 3ad t3e potential to escalate to t3e n,clear le+el once it be#an. (lt3o,#3 India mi#3t 3a+e intended to limit its action to eliminatin# terrorist bases in Pa2istan-3eld :as3mir and per3aps
some bases inside Pa2istanH n,clear-armed Pa2istan mi#3t !ell 3a+e belie+ed t3at India5s intentions !ere to o+ert3ro! t3e re#ime in Islamabad or to eliminate its n,clear !eapons capabilit4. )3at sit,ation !o,ld 3a+e f,rt3er ris2 of conflict remains. 83o,ld t3e
crisis res,meH a B.8. polic4 of pre-emption ma4 pro+ide 3a!2s in India t3e added amm,nition t3e4 need to ;,stif4 a stri2e a#ainst Pa2istan in t3e e4es of t3eir fello! Indian decision-ma2ers. C,ssia5s t3reats a#ainst t3e
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so+erei#n state of /eor#iaH !3ic3 it acc,ses of protectin# or at least failin# to p,rs,e Islamic extremists tied to t3e C3ec3en !arH also ill,strate t3e dan#ers of le#itimatin# an eas4 and earl4 reco,rse to pre-emption.
Re#ional ?onfli%ts -%enario (2 of 2)

B! $uclear war
Dean =,
(Monat3an- (d+isor on I 8ec,rit4 to Bnion of Concerned 8cientistsH !or2ed !it3 B.N. P:ers in t3e field and in & of 8tateH "arc3H 1,lletin of t3e (tomic 8cientistsH I( stron#er B.N. stren#t3ens (mericaJH No. 2H ?ol. 1H =exisL Macob)
Experts t3ro,#3o,t t3e !orld expect #ro!in# pop,lation press,res and increasin# en+ironmental stress to de+elop o+er t3e comin# decades into intenseH far-reac3in# social ,nrest and re#ional conflict. Economic de+elopment is t3e sol,tionH 3o!e+er slo! and ,ncertain it ma4 be in comin#. 1,t t3e !orld also needs effecti+e re#ional conflict-pre+ention proced,res. =eft on its o!nH re#ional +iolence can lead to confrontation and e+en !ar bet!een t3e #reat po!ersH incl,din# t3e Bnited 8tatesH as mi#3t occ,rH for exampleH in t3e e+ent of conflict bet!een B2raine and C,ssia or bet!een C3ina and its nei#3bors. In t3e final anal4sisH ,nc3ec2ed re#ional +iolence and t3e fear of f,rt3er +iolence !ill lead more states to de+elop n,clear !eapons. In past decadesH t3is process occ,rred in IsraelH 8o,t3 (fricaH IndiaH Pa2istanH Ira*H and pres,mabl4H in Nort3 :orea. ( !orld !it3 29 or 39 n,clear !eapon states !o,ld not onl4 ma2e a more effecti+e #lobal sec,rit4 s4stem impossibleH it !o,ld lead t3e present n,clear !eapon states to moderniGe and increase t3eir !eapons - and it !o,ld mar2edl4 increase t3e +,lnerabilit4 of t3e Bnited 8tates to direct attac2. Instead of s3r,##in# at 3,man fallibilit4H acceptin# !ar as ine+itableH andH reactin# after it 3appensH B.8. polic4 s3o,ld aim at establis3in# an international peace2eepin# s4stem t3at can 3ead off an increasin# n,mber of conflicts.
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Re#ional ?onfli%ts- Pre-emption %auses t'em

/re-emption gets modeled global regional conflicts
ussbaum 02
(1r,ce-H Editorial Pa#e Editor for 1,isness 7ee2H @ct. -H 1,isness 7ee2H I<orei#n Polic4K 1,s3 is Ealf Ci#3tJH =exis) )3e 1,s3 &octrineH as expressed in t3e reportH 3as t3ree basic tenets. <irstH t3e B.8. is free to ta2e preempti+e action a#ainst terrorists and states t3at 3a+e !eapons of mass destr,ction. 8econdH no co,ntr4 or combination of co,ntries !ill e+er be allo!ed to c3allen#e B.8. militar4 s,periorit4. )3irdH ,nilateral meas,res are better t3an international treaties and or#aniGations in pre+entin# t3e spread of n,clear !eapons. In s3ortH t3e 1,s3 &octrine declares t3at (merica !ill no lon#er be constrained b4 t3e traditional norms and r,les of t3e international comm,nit4. 1,t preemption as a core sec,rit4 doctrine !rea2s 3a+oc !it3 traditional norms of self-defense. E+en IsraelPs destr,ction of t3e <renc3-b,ilt Ira*i n,clear reactor in 1601H probabl4 pre+entin# Ira* from 3a+in# n,clear !eapons d,rin# t3e Persian /,lf 7arH bro,#3t 3o!ls of condemnation from B.8. (mbassador to t3e B.N. Meane M. :ir2patric2 and 1ritis3 Prime "inister "ar#aret )3atc3er. Placin# preemption at t3e center of sec,rit4 polic4 lea+es t3e !orld !onderin# !3at t3e clear-c,t r,les for !ar are. )3e 1,s3 &octrine doesnPt detail an4 ne! r,les of en#a#ement. Nations are alread4 r,s3in# to create t3eir o!n. C,ssia is reform,latin# its !ar rationale a#ainst C3ec3n4a in terms of preemptin# terrorists. C3ina is adoptin# t3e lan#,a#e of preemption in battlin# ",slim separatists. 7ill India follo! in :as3mir or a#ainst Pa2istanR (nd !3at of IsraelR (n (merican strate#ic polic4 of preemption !it3o,t internationall4 a#reed-,pon r,les co,ld increase #lobal +iolence and instabilit4.
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/rade -%enario (1 of 9)
A! /re-emption kills global trade collapsing the global economy
Fli+e 09
(&a+id-H Editor-in-C3ief of Ceport on 1,siness "a#aGineH (pril 'H )oronto 8tarH I/lobal coolin#JH =exisL Macob) )3e crisis in diplomac4 o+er t3e Ira* !ar 3as alread4 t3ro!n #lobaliGation into re+erse #ear. (nd t3e ,ltimate disinte#ration of t3e #lobal econom4H if it s3o,ld come to t3atH !ill be traced to an ,nli2el4 all4 of t3e anti-#lobaliGation mo+ement. /eor#e 7. 1,s3Ps doctrine of pre-empti+e stri2es at Qro#,e nationsQ s,spected of de+elopin# !eapons of mass destr,ction and 3arbo,rin# terrorists is more far-reac3in# in its conse*,ences t3an e+en its detractors 4et realiGe. =o#icall4H t3e pro;ection of ,nfettered B.8. po!er aro,nd t3e #lobe in p,rs,it of t3e (merican presidentPs nationalsec,rit4 ob;ecti+es !ill re*,ire t3at t3e !orldPs lone s,perpo!er ass,me man4 roles in #lobal #o+ernance no! filled b4 post-7orld 7ar II international bodies t3at t3e Bnited 8tates no lon#er tr,sts. It !ill force (merica to micro-mana#e t3e !orld econom4 and t3e acti+ities of m,ltinational corporations lest t3e4 abet real or percei+ed B.8. enemies. Q1oosters of corporate-led #lobaliGation s3o,ld ,nderstand t3at t3eir +ision of a ne! !orld order is f,ndamentall4 incompatible !it3 /eor#e 7. 1,s3PsHQ !rites 7illiam /reider in t3e c,rrent iss,e of )3e NationH a left-leanin# B.8. ;o,rnal not #enerall4 re#arded as a 3and-3older of capitalists. /reiderPs reasonin# is t3at if t3e Bnited 8tates no! proposes to stri2e preempti+el4 at nationsH it !ill s3o! little 3esitation in stri2in# at companies or !3ole ind,stries t3at donPt readil4 fall in line !it3 1,s3Ps more rob,st definition of Pax (mericana. )3e 1,s3 &octrine of ,npro+o2ed inter+ention and crassH ,nilateral p,rs,it of national self-interest rep,diates 3alf a cent,r4 of (merican-led #lobal #ro!t3 in free tradeH free mo+ement of labo,rH more rapid exc3an#e of intellect,al propert4 and promotion of QtransnationalQ corporations.
In its first 4ear aloneH t3e 1,s3 administration !it3dre! from fi+e international treatiesH and rep,diated Clinton-era diplomatic initiati+es spannin# t3e #lobe from Nort3 :orea to t3e "iddle East. (nd t3at !as before t3e recent s3o!do!n at t3e Bnited Nations o+er Ira*H in !3ic3 t3e Bnited 8tates ,ndermined t3e a,t3orit4 of an or#aniGation t3at co-ordinates e+er4t3in# from #lobal 3,manitarian aid and tec3nical standards for ind,str4 to a#ric,lt,ral mana#ement and postal con+entions. Bntil no!H t3e ,#l4 face of #lobaliGation 3as been s!eats3ops in t3e de+elopin# !orldH capricio,s 7estern ban2ers dictatin# 3ars3 economic policies to disad+anta#ed nationsH and t3e d,mpin# of ,nder-priced 7estern a#ric,lt,ral #oods in )3ird 7orld mar2ets !3ere local prod,cers are forced off t3eir land. No! add to t3at a spectre t3at t3reatens #lobal b,siness exec,ti+es.
In its campai#n to ne,traliGe real and percei+ed t3reats to its sec,rit4H t3e Bnited 8tates !ill at least to some de#ree 3a+e to abandon its free-mar2et instincts. (t a minim,mH 1,s3 !ill li2el4 see t3e need to more strictl4 police t3e international trade in Qdefence-sensiti+eQ materialsH appl4in# ne! re#,lator4 controls on t3e m,ltinational corporations from !3ic3 Ira*H Nort3 :oreaH Pa2istan and India b,4 t3eir !eapons and t3e seemin#l4 innocent Qd,al-,seQ materials t3at can be con+erted into !eapons. )3e definition of Qdefence-sensiti+eQ is open-ended. )3e notorio,s al,min,m t,bes p,rc3ased b4 8addam E,ssein !ere ,sef,l bot3 for irri#ation pro;ects and as s3eat3es for n,clear-!eapon pro;ectiles. &efence-sensiti+e co,ld no! embrace e+er4t3in# from crop d,sters to fertiliGer for ma2in# )imot34 "c?ei#3-t4pe tr,c2 bombs to sop3isticated +ideo-#ame components t3at co,ld be Q!eaponiGedQ as a tri##erin# de+ice for explosi+es. )o !3om !ill /eneral "otors Corp. no! be permitted to sell E,m+eesH and !it3 !3at restrictions on t3eir ,seR /i+en t3e resilience ,nder B.8. bombin# of Ira*Ps fibre-optics comm,nications net!or2H essential to 8addamPs command-and-control s4stem 11'
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and s,pplied in part b4 t3e li2es of Nortel Net!or2s Corp.H 3o! soon before m,ltinationals s,c3 as NortelH M&8 Bnip3ase Corp.H Cornin# Inc. and 8!edenPs =.". Ericsson Co. are made to present t3eir order boo2s to 7as3in#ton for appro+alR M,st as t3e international traffic in tec3nolo#4 !ill need to be re#,lated b4 t3e Bnited 8tatesH so too !ill t3e #lobal flo! of mone4. Ea+in# alread4 tried to freeGe Ira*i financial assets !orld!ideH t3e 1,s3 administration !ill be tempted to b,s4 itself !it3 strate#ic inter+entions in #lobal mone4 mar2ets in efforts to star+e ot3er o,tla! nations of financin#. ?ictims of t3e collateral dama#e from implementation of t3e 1,s3 &octrine !ill incl,de m,ltinational corporations lon# acc,stomed to sellin# !3at t3e4 !ant to !3ome+er t3e4 !antH !it3 minimal or no s,per+ision from t3e Bnited 8tates or an4 ot3er #o+ernment. <renc3 oil #iant )otal 8( !ill no! 2no! t3at doin# b,siness in =ib4a ris2s <renc3 telecom #iant (lcatel 8( losin# contracts !it3 B.8. p3one companies. (nd ban2sH bro2era#esH pension f,nds and ot3er financial intermediaries aro,nd t3e !orld !ill be loo2in# o+er t3eir s3o,lders as Bncle 8am +ets e+er4 transaction. (n alarmist scenarioR Per3aps. 1,t t3e 1,s3 &octrine 3as plent4 of capitalists !orried abo,t t3e #lobal desi#ns of t3e s,pposed free-enterpriser in t3e 73ite Eo,se. Q(merican imperialism isH b4 definitionH a retreat a!a4 from #lobal capitalismHQ sa4s Pa,l "cCalle4H a mana#in# director at California-based PI"C@H t3e !orldPs bi##est bond in+estor. QItPs a retreat from t3e in+isible 3and of mar2ets in fa+o,r of a more dominant role for t3e +isible fist of #o+ernments.Q
(s in post!ar Ira*H t3e reb,ildin# of f,t,re tar#ets of Qre#ime c3an#eQ mi#3t also be ,nderta2en excl,si+el4 or mostl4 b4 B.8. firms in pro;ects for !3ic3 t3e B.8. taxpa4er alone pic2s ,p t3e tab. It co,ld scarcel4 be ot3er!ise if m,c3 of t3e !orld bal2sH as it did in t3e Ira* conflictH at 3o! t3e Bnited 8tates no! defines bot3 its national sec,rit4 interests and 3o! to mana#e t3emH !it3o,t reco,rse to !orld opinion.
C,rrentl4H t3e E,ropean Bnion and Mapan co+er most of t3e cost for t3eir o!n and BN-administered 3,manitarian efforts to stabiliGe tro,ble spots li2e (f#3anistanH CambodiaH "oGambi*,e and :oso+o. 7it3 t3e precedent it 3as set !it3 Ira*H t3e Bnited 8tates ris2s s3o,lderin# most of t3e b,rden of nationreb,ildin#. Q7ere 7as3in#ton to mo+e to an entirel4 ad 3oc approac3HQ forsa2in# traditional international bodies in dealin# !it3 failed re#imesH Q!34 !o,ld t3e rest of t3e !orld a#ree to clean ,p its messesRQ as2s Ne!s!ee2 in a recent co+er stor4 on Q(mericaK )3e (rro#ant Empire.Q 8ixteen 4ears a#oH 7illiam E4landH a national sec,rit4 official in t3e Nixon and <ord administrations and editor of <orei#n (ffairsH !arned t3at Qisolationism is t3e &rac,la of (merican forei#n polic4.Q Bnder 1,s3H t3e B.8. appears to be re+ertin# to a less beni#n +ersion of t3e isolationism t3at 3elped cripple t3e !orld econom4 in t3e 1639s.
)3e 7all 8treet Mo,rnalH c3ampion bot3 of 1,s3Ps Ira*i ad+ent,re and ,nfettered capitalismH recentl4 ac2no!led#ed t3e constraints on capitalism in3erent to t3e #o-it-alone 1,s3 &octrineK Q)3ere is a ris2 t3at t3e bitterness so apparent toda4 !ill lin#erL t3at it !ill be 3arder to p,rs,e trans-(tlantic b,siness dealsL t3at alread4 tense tal2s to!ard freer trade in a#ric,lt,re and ser+ices !ill be prolon#ed for 4ears ... and t3at t3e foc,s on stren#t3enin# and moderniGin# post-7orld 7ar II instit,tions - t3e International "onetar4 <,nd and all t3e rest - !ill be dissipated.Q
B! #ollapse of global trade $(

-pi%er =6
()3e C3allen#e from t3e East and t3e Cebirt3 of t3e 7estH P. 121)
)3e c3oice facin# t3e 7est toda4 is m,c3 t3e same as t3at !3ic3 faced t3e 8o+iet bloc after 7orld 7ar 11K bet!een meetin# 3ead-on t3e c3allen#e of !orld trade !it3 t3e ad;,stments and t3e benefits t3at it !ill brin#H or of attemptin# to s3,t o,t mar2ets t3at are #ro!in# and !3ere a d4namic ne! pace is bein# set for inno+ati+e prod,ction. )3e problem abo,t t3e second approac3 is not simpl4 t3at it !onPt 3oldK satellite tec3nolo#4 alone !ill ens,re t3at t3e cons,mers !ill be#in to demand t3ose #oods t3at t3e East is able to pro+ide most c3eapl4. "ore f,ndamentall4H it !ill #,arantee t3e emer#ence of a fra#mented !orld in !3ic3 nat,ral fears !ill be fanned and inflamed. ( !orld di+ided into ri#id trade blocs !ill be a deepl4 tro,bled and ,nstable place in !3ic3 s,spicion and ,ltimatel4 en+4 !ill possibl4 er,pt into a ma;or !ar. I do not sa4 t3at t3e con+erse !ill necessaril4 be tr,eH t3at in a free tradin# !orld t3ere !ill be an absence of all strife. 8,c3 a proposition !o,ld manifestl4 be abs,rd. 1,t to trade is to become interdependentH and t3at is a #ood step in t3e direction of !orld stabilit4. 7it3 n,clear !eapons at t!o a penn4H stabilit4 !ill be at a premi,m in t3e 4ears a3ead.
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#! Clobal economic collapse e0tinction!
(eardon 00
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/errorism -%enario
A! /re-emption scares states into giving (M*s to terrorists
Pe8a 09
(C3arles ?.-H director of defense polic4 st,dies at t3e Cato Instit,teH No+. 16H Cato Polic4 (nal4sisH I"ini-N,2es and Preempti+e Polic4K ( &an#ero,s CombinationJH T466H !!!.cato.or#$p,bs$pas$pa466.pdfL Macob) Preempti+e re#ime c3an#eNpartic,larl4 !it3 n,clear !eaponsNco,ld also erode t3e nat,ral barriers for ro#,e state leaders to form alliances !it3 terrorist or#aniGations. If t3ose leaders belie+e re#ime c3an#e is a fore#one concl,sionH t3e incenti+e for t3em to see terrorism as per3aps t3e onl4 !a4 to retaliate a#ainst t3e Bnited 8tates increasesH incl,din# t3e possibilit4 of pro+idin# 7"& to terrorists. )3is !as exactl4 t3e point t3at CI( director /eor#e )enet made to t3e Con#ress in @ctober 2992 as it debated !3et3er to #rant President 1,s3 a,t3orit4 to ,se militar4 force a#ainst Ira*. (ccordin# to )enetH 8addam E,ssein !as Idra!in# a line s3ort of cond,ctin# terrorist attac2s !it3 con+entional or c3emical or biolo#ical !eaponsHJ b,t if 8addam concl,ded t3at a B.8.-led attac2 a#ainst Ira* co,ld not be deterred I3e probabl4 !o,ld become m,c3 less constrained in adoptin# terrorist action.J46
.lexander 09
(Yona3-H Prof. F &irector O Inter-Bni+ersit4 for )errorism 8t,diesH (,#,st 20H 7as3in#ton )imesH I)errorism "4t3s and CealitiesJH =exisL Macob) =ast !ee2Ps br,tal s,icide bombin#s in 1a#3dad and Mer,salem 3a+e once a#ain ill,strated dramaticall4 t3at t3e international comm,nit4 failedH t3,s far at leastH to ,nderstand t3e ma#nit,de and implications of t3e terrorist t3reats to t3e +er4 s,r+i+al of ci+iliGation itself. E+en t3e Bnited 8tates and Israel 3a+e for decades tended to re#ard terrorism as a mere tactical n,isance or irritant rat3er t3an a critical strate#ic c3allen#e to t3eir national sec,rit4 concerns. It is not s,rprisin#H t3ereforeH t3at on 8eptember 11H 2991H (mericans !ere st,nned b4 t3e ,nprecedented tra#ed4 of 16 al Saeda terrorists stri2in# a de+astatin# blo! at t3e center of t3e nationPs commercial and militar4 po!ers. =i2e!iseH Israel and its citiGensH despite t3e collapse of t3e @slo (#reements of 1663 and n,mero,s acts of terrorism tri##ered b4 t3e second intifada t3at be#an almost t3ree 4ears a#oH are still Qs3oc2edQ b4 eac3 s,icide attac2 at a time of intensi+e diplomatic efforts to re+i+e t3e morib,nd peace process t3ro,#3 t3e no! re+o2ed cease-fire arran#ements U3,dnaV. 734 are t3e Bnited 8tates and IsraelH as !ell as scores of ot3er co,ntries affected b4 t3e ,ni+ersal ni#3tmare of modern terrorism s,rprised b4 ne! terrorist Qs,rprisesQR )3ere are man4 reasonsH incl,din# mis,nderstandin# of t3e manifold specific factors t3at contrib,te to terrorismPs expansionH s,c3 as lac2 of a ,ni+ersal definition of terrorismH t3e reli#ioniGation of politicsH do,ble standards of moralit4H !ea2 p,nis3ment of terroristsH and t3e exploitation of t3e media b4 terrorist propa#anda and ps4c3olo#ical !arfare. 116
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Bnli2e t3eir 3istorical co,nterpartsH
contemporar4 terrorists 3a+e introd,ced a ne! scale of +iolence in terms of con+entional and ,ncon+entional t3reats and impact. )3e internationaliGation and br,taliGation of c,rrent and f,t,re terrorism ma2e it clear !e 3a+e entered an (#e of 8,per )errorism Ue.#. biolo#icalH c3emical, radiolo#icalH n,clear and c4ber] !it3 its serio,s implications concernin# nationalH re#ional and #lobal sec,rit4 concerns.
/ur5is'->D-D Rels -%enario (1 of 2)

A! /re-emption destroys
-afa5 0,
(Yeni-H M,ne 11H 11C "onitorin# E,ropeH ICe+ie! of t3e ),r2is3 Islamist press for 11 M,n 9 JH =exisL Macob)
!"!-Turkish relations
8afa2 col,mnist <e3mi :or, ar#,es t3at t3ere co,ld be neit3er Qstrate#ic partners3ipQ nor Qstrate#ic cooperationQ bet!een ),r2e4 and t3e Bnited 8tates beca,se of t3e Qf,ndamental realit4 of international relationsQ (!3ic3 is t3at e+er4 co,ntr4 is #,ided b4 its o!n interests) as !ell as beca,se of t3e !a4 in !3ic3 t3e B8 forei#n polic4 since 11 8eptember 3as pre+ented t3e Bnited 8tates from ser+in# as a model for de+elopin# democracies li2e ),r2e4 and t3e doctrine of pre-emption espo,sed b4 t3e 1,s3 administration precl,des a +ol,ntar4 partners3ip model !it3 7as3in#ton. Ee #oes on to claim t3at ),r2e4 is a #eo#rap3icall4 cr,cial co,ntr4 t3at t3e Bnited 8tates cannot afford to i#nore in assessin# t3e 1al2ansH t3e "iddle EastH Central (sia and t3e Ca,cas,s in t3e same !a4 as t3e Bnited 8tates is a co,ntr4 ),r2e4 !o,ld li2e to see on its side o!in# to its militar4 pro!ess and domination of financial mar2etsH addin# t3at an4 possibilit4 of cooperation or strate#ic relations3ip bet!een ),r2e4 and t3e Bnited 8tates is to be loo2ed for in t3is conc,rrence of interests.
In a -99-!ord article entitled Q8trate#4K In plain ),r2is3Q on pa#e 12H Yeni
B! "trong
!"!-Turkish relations k #entral Asian "tability
/ur5is' Dail6 e!s 09

(@ct. -H I),r2is3-B.8. CelationsH t3e "iddle East and t3e Ne! Political =andscape after t3e Collapse of t3e 8o+iet BnionJH =exisL Macob) (not3er corner of t3e !orldH !3ic3 is also an important area of cooperation bet!een ),r2e4 and t3e B8H is t3e post-8o+iet Bnion landscapeH stretc3in# from t3e Ca,cas,s to Central (sia. )3e 8eptember 11 terrorist attac2sH (f#3anistanH and finall4 t3e Ira* !ar dramaticall4 increased t3e strate#ic si#nificance of t3e re#ion. It 3as become all t3e more e+ident to ,s t3at pro#ress in E,rasia is essential for #lobal sec,rit4. Z contin,es Z I belie+e t3at ),r2e4 and B8 3a+e to act to#et3er in t3is #eo#rap34 in order to stren#t3en positi+e trends and to address t3e c,rrent and potential ris2s in t3e re#ion. )3e potential of o,r strate#ic partners3ip is ,ne*,alled and 3as m,c3 to offer to t3e co,ntries of t3e re#ion. 7e are read4 to s3are t3e experience !e 3a+e acc,m,lated in E,rasia !it3 t3e B8. )3e follo!in# is a priorit4 list t3at !eH ),r2e4 and t3e B8H s3o,ld foc,s in t3e re#ionK . )o consolidate t3ese co,ntriesP access to t3e E,ro-(tlantic sec,rit4 cooperation sc3emesL mainl4 t3ro,#3 partners3ip for peace pro#rams of N()@ and @8CE. . )o extend more +i#oro,s assistance in t3eir economic and political transformation. 129
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. )o ass,re t3eir so+erei#nt4 and independenceH !3ile enco,ra#in# re#ional cooperation. 7eH ),r2sH are 2een to bolster t3e spirit of partners3ip !it3 t3e Bnited 8tates. (s in :oreaH t3e Cold 7arH t3e 1al2ans and 8omaliaH t3is partners3ip 3as t3e potential to 4ield fr,its in t3e Ca,cas,sH Central (sia and (f#3anistanL in fi#3tin# a#ainst terrorismL in stoppin# proliferation of !eapons of mass destr,ctionL and indeed in t3e "iddle East.
/ur5is'->D-D Rels -%enario (2 of 2)

#! The 7 is $(
-'orr 01
(Ira-H anal4st !it3 t3e Instit,te for Polic4 8t,diesH @ct. 14H )3e CecordH I/reatest Peril is 8till N,clearJH =exisL Macob) )3is process of 2eepin# n,clear !eapons on a 3air-tri##er means t3at leaders on bot3 sides 3a+e ;,st min,tes to assess !3et3er a !arnin# of an attac2 is real or false. (nd !3ile t3e t3reats !e faced d,rin# t3e Cold 7ar came from 8o+iet stren#t3 -t3e dan#er toda4 comes more from C,ssiaPs !ea2ness. <or exampleH C,ssiaPs tro,bled econom4 3as led to t3e profo,nd deca4 of its earl4 !arnin# satellite s4stem. ( fire last "a4 t3at destro4ed a critical facilit4 ,sed to control C,ssian !arnin# satellites 3as made t3in#s e+en !orse. C,ssia 3as completel4 lost its space-based earl4 !arnin# capabilitiesHQ sa4s 1r,ce 1lair of t3e Center for &efense Information. QIn essenceH t3e co,ntr4Ps abilit4 to tell a false alarm from a real !arnin# 3as been nearl4 crippled. Q <alse alarms on bot3 sides 3a+e alread4 bro,#3t ,s to t3e brin2 of n,clear !ar. 73at !ill 3appen no! if t3ere is a !ar in t3e +olatile nei#3bor3ood of Central (sia -- a re#ion t3at incl,des n,clear po!ers IndiaH Pa2istanH and C,ssiaR <ormer 8en. 8am N,nn bro,#3t t3e point 3ome in a recent speec3K Q)3e e+ents of 8ept. 11 #a+e President 1,s3 +er4 little time to ma2e a +er4 diffic,lt decision -- !3et3er to #i+e orders to s3oot do!n a commercial ;etliner filled !it3 passen#ers. @,r c,rrent n,clear post,re in t3e Bnited 8tates and C,ssia co,ld pro+ide e+en less time for eac3 president to decide on a n,clear la,nc3 t3at co,ld destro4 o,r nations. Q N,nn called on Presidents 1,s3 and P,tin to Qstand-do!nQ t3eir n,clear forces to Qred,ce to!ard Gero t3e ris2 of accidental la,nc3 or miscalc,lation and pro+ide increased la,nc3 decision time for eac3 president. Q In t3e spirit of t3e co,ra#eo,s steps 3is fat3er too2 to decrease t3e n,clear t3reat 19 4ears a#oH President 1,s3 s3o,ld ta2e action no! to remo+e n,clear !eapons from 3air-tri##er alert. )3is !o,ld send a si#nal to t3e !orld t3at in t3is +olatile timeH t3e B.8. is serio,s abo,t pre+entin# t3e ,se of n,clear !eapons.
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>D D -%enario (1 of 9)
A! /re-emption will destroy the
/'a5ur 02
(Cames3-H ?ice. &irector of t3e B.N. B. in )o24oH @ct. 29H )3e Mapan )imesH IPeril of pre-empti+e t3in2in#JH =exisL Macob) )3erein lies t3e lo#ic of pre-emptionH if necessar4H !ell before t3e t3reat act,all4 materialiGes (as !it3 E,sseinH !3ose ac*,isition of n,clear !eapons does not seem imminentH all bl,ster to t3e contrar4 not!it3standin#). )3ere is also an ,nderl4in# belief t3at c,rrent criticism of an4 B.8.-led !ar to ta2e o,t E,sseinPs !eapons of mass destr,ction !ill be *,ic2l4 m,ted !it3 t3e s,ccess of t3e operation and e+ent,all4 t,rn into #ratit,de for someonePs 3a+in# 3ad t3e necessar4 foresi#3tH fortit,de and resol,tion. 1,t in t,rn t3is c3an#es t3e basis of !orld order as !e 2no! it. (nd t3at mi#3t be t3e most profo,nd and lon#-lastin# si#nificance of 6$11. It ma4 indeed 3a+e c3an#ed t3e !orld and tipped ,s into a post-7estp3alian !orld. B.8. polic4 is f,ll of contradictions !it3in t3e paradi#m of !orld order since t3e )reat4 of 7estp3alia (1'40) !3erein all states are of e*,al stat,s and le#itimac4. Eo! can t3e most prominent dissident a#ainst man4 #lobal norms and re#imes - from arms control to climate c3an#e and international criminal ;,stice - claim to be t3e !orldPs most po!erf,l enforcer of #lobal norms and re#imesH incl,din# nonproliferationR Eo! can t3e most +ocal critic of t3e +er4 notion of an international comm,nit4 anoint itself as t3e international comm,nit4Ps s3eriffR <or t3at matterH b4 !3at ri#3t do t3e fi+e ,nelected members of t3e 8ec,rit4 Co,ncil claim a permanent monopol4 on n,clear !eaponsR )3e ans!er lies in a conception of !orld order rooted o,tside t3e frame!or2 of 7estp3alian so+erei#nt4. )3is also explains !34 some of toda4Ps most potent t3reats come not from t3e con*,erin# states !it3in t3e 7estp3alian paradi#mH b,t from failin# states o,tside it. In effectH 1,s3 is sa4in# t3at t3e #ap bet!een t3e fiction of le#al e*,alit4 and t3e realit4 of po!er preponderanceH bet!een e*,all4 le#itimate and democraticall4 le#itimate statesH 3as stretc3ed be4ond t3e brea2in# point. 7as3in#ton is no lon#er bo,nd b4 s,c3 fiction. )3e 1,s3 administration insists t3at t3e B.8. !ill remain as f,ndamentall4 tr,st!ort34H balanced and responsible a c,stodian of !orld order as before - b,t of a post-7estp3alian order centered on t3e Bnited 8tates s,rro,nded b4 a !asteland of +assal states. )3e B.N. is an or#aniGation of member states. &,rin# t3e minicrisis in t3e 8ec,rit4 Co,ncil in M,l4 o+er t3e International Criminal Co,rtH 7as3in#ton 3ad alread4 demonstrated t3at it +ie!s t3e B.N. as a for,m for a,#mentin# polic4 options - not limitin# t3em. In 3is address to t3e /eneral (ssembl4 last mont3H 1,s3 modified t3e Qif 4o, are not !it3 ,sH 4o, are a#ainst ,sQ slo#an from t3e !ar on terror to Qif 4o, are not !it3 ,sH 4o, are irrele+antQ for t3e comin# !ar a#ainst Ira*. )3is !as not an (merican concession to B.N. m,ltilateralismH b,t a demand for international capit,lation to t3e B.8. t3reat to #o to !ar. 1,t in doin# soH 1,s3 presented t3e B.N. !it3 an impossible c3oice bet!een credibilit4 and effecti+enessH on t3e one 3andH and inte#rit4 and principleH on t3e ot3er. )3e B.N. is bot3 t3e s4mbol and t3e ma;or instr,ment for moderatin# t3e ,se of force in international affairsH not sanctif4in# it and blessin# a ma;or expansion in its permissi+e scope t3ro,#3 s,c3 s,b;ecti+e s,bterf,#es as pre-emption. (nd it is 122
!$!
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t3e collecti+e bod4 for protectin# t3e territorial inte#rit4 of member states !it3in t3e 7estp3alian paradi#m of national so+erei#nt4. )3e c3oice bet!een irrele+ance (for not 3a+in# t3e co,ra#e to enforce its decisions) and complicit4 (in endorsin# an armed attac2 on t3e territorial inte#rit4 of t3e !ea2 b4 t3e po!erf,l) !o,ld be a fatal one for t3e or#aniGation.
#ontinued e0istence of an effective
-%ott =M
(Commander-H (ssistant =e#al (d+iser O t3e M,d#e (d+ocate /eneral5s Corps of t3e B8 Na+4H @ct.H "ilitar4 =a! Ce+ie!H =exis) )3e traditional practice of rel4in# on canonical strate#ies from t3e last !ar 3as repeatedl4 led to strate#ic s,rprise and defeat. (rmed !it3 t3e lessons of 3istor4H militar4 commanders labor to 2eep pace !it3 c3an#eH to 2no! potential enemiesH and to o,tmatc3 t3em !it3 inno+ations of strate#4H tec3nolo#4 and st4le. )3e decades-lon# arms race of t3e recent Cold 7ar etc3ed in t3e minds of man4 a pattern of one-,pmans3ipH raised to t3e 3ea+ens !it3 t3e s3oc2 of t3e 8o+iet ina,#,ration of t3e 8pace (#e. n1 (s in all t3in#sH t3e militar4 str,##les to remain at least one step a3eadH to de+elop co,ntermeas,res for t3e latest t3reatH to control t3e battlespace and dominate an4 ad+ersar4H to end-r,n enem4 s4stemsH to deli+er a 2noc2-o,t p,nc3 in t3e first ro,nd. ?al,e is placed on ne! ideasH not old idioms. )3e c3ief en#ine of national prosperit4 is inno+ation. C3an#e is o,r creed. @ld strate#ies for peace can fail ;,st as s,rel4 as old strate#ies for !arL t3e record bears t3is o,t. )3e )reat4 of ?ersaillesH t3e =ea#,e of NationsH t3e 7as3in#ton and =ondon Na+al ConferencesH n2 t3e :ello##-1riand Pact n3 --t3e instr,ments of order concei+ed after 7orld 7ar I failed to co,nter t3e res,r#ence of /erman militarism and t3e a##ressi+e expression of Mapanese imperialism t3at led to a second 7orld 7ar. (#ainst t3is bac2drop of fail,reH t3e 1669Ps are #o+erned b4 a re#ime of peace approximatel4 fift4 4ears oldH consistin# of t3e Bnited NationsH n4 toot3less 3,man ri#3ts declarations and a#reementsH n and t3e instit,tions t3at e+ol+ed from 1retton 7oods (e.#.H t3e 7orld 1an2 and t3e International "onetar4 <,nd). n' )3e U.26V Cold 7ar st4mied t3e post-7orld 7ar II re#ime of peace. n- No! t3e Q#ood #,4sQ are d,stin# off t3at re#ime and rel4in# on old r,lesH !3ile ne! t3reats seem increasin#l4 not amenable to establis3ed sol,tions. )3e 3abit of inno+ation so permeates modern t3in2in# t3at people !3o fanc4 t3emsel+es mo+ers and s3a2ers in t3e defense b,siness are impatient !it3 an4 old order t3at seems to in3ibit immediate res,lts--old !arH old peaceH ne! !orld. Ea+e !e come to a streetfi#3t !it3 t3e "ar*,is of S,eensb,r4Ps r,lesR Proponents of ne!-a#e sol,tions blame t3e nation-state s4stem ensconced in t3e BN C3arter for t3e seemin# intractabilit4 of modern t3reats. n0 8o+erei#nt4 3as become t3e s3ield of t3e enem4. )3e Islamic 7orld is breedin# and exportin# terrorists to m,rder b,sloads of Israelis n6 and barrac2s f,ll of B.8. ser+icemenH n19 attac2in# e+en t3e fo,ndations of t3e 7orld )rade Center in Ne! Yor2. n11 Narcotics prod,ced in t3e (ndean Cid#e are poisonin# o,r c3ildren. In a period of increasin#l4 ner+o,s #raceH !e !ait for n,clear !eapons to explode in t3e tr,n2s of cars or in small s,icide airplanes. n12 7e !ait for IranH Pa2istanH Nort3 :oreaH =ib4aH or some ot3er fr,strated state to pla4 t3e openin# 3and in a ne! t3ermon,clear a#e. )3e borders of states aro,nd t3e !orld are permeated b4 tides of indi#entH ,ntalented mi#rants !3o sap local economies and c3allen#e c,lt,ral order establis3ed amon# assimilated pop,lations. International crime proliferates from bases safel4 !it3in t3e borders U.39V of ro#,e states. n13 )3e !orld !aits ner+o,sl4 for t3e next C3ernob4lH ,nable to enforce en+ironmental standards inside national bo,ndaries. n14 @,r c,rrenc4 is co,nterfeitedH n1 and o,r intellect,al propert4 is stolen. n1' 7e attempt to deli+er 3,manitarian relief in en+ironments of +iolence and to c3ampion 3,man ri#3ts a#ainst a,t3oritarian re#imes t3at act ,nder t3e ae#is of so+erei#nt4. In t3e processH t3e Bnited 8tates s,ffers cas,alties and is acc,sed of ta2in# sides in t3e conflict. 8tates ne#otiate !3ile e+il proliferatesL and t3e ne! acti+ists are callin# for forcef,l transbo,ndar4 sol,tions. n1(s t3e sole s,perpo!erH t3e Bnited 8tates co,ld mars3all irresistible forces of ,nmatc3able mass and tec3nolo#ical sop3istication to extin#,is3 t3e embers of re#ional instabilit4H to !in decisi+el4 t3e !ar on dr,#sH or erase proliferation of !eapons of mass destr,ction !3ere+er fo,nd. (##ressi+el4 expandin# militar4 roles and missions to co,nter ne! t3reats co,ld ac3ie+e 123
!$! is key to solve multiple scenarios for $(
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immediateH demonstrable res,lts--and 3appil4 pro+ide a ne! raison dPetre for a militar4 b,rea,crac4 no! scannin# for t3reats to offset irrele+ance. If !e lac2 s,fficient con+entional enemies to s,stain o,r forceH !34 not t,rn to noncon+entional enemiesH li2e narcotraffic2ersH mi#rant sm,##lersH and r3inoceros poac3ersH !3ile !e attempt to inspire con+entional fears of a tradin# partner li2e C3inaR 8oldiers of fort,neH earnest problem-sol+ersH or b,d#et-preser+ersH !3ate+er t3eir moti+ationH t3ere is no s3orta#e of ne! p,#ilists !3o !o,ld stri2e off t3e s3ac2les of la! and !3ip a tr,mpetin# elep3ant a#ainst an U.31V arm4 of poisono,s ants. Q)3e #oalHQ t3e4 t4picall4 claimH is not to tr4 t3e ne! criminals in a co,rt of la!H Qb,t to 2ill t3em ,ntil t3e s,r+i+ors *,it.Q n10 8,c3 pr,rient !arrior-+a,nt mi#3t titillate fr,strated tri##er-p,llersH b,t it is ;,st so m,c3 !asted in2 in a #ro!in# corp,s of exasperated 3a!2is3 porno#rap34. )3e ne! era ,nfoldin# mi#3t call for militar4 strate#ists to Qt3in2 o,tside t3e boxHQ b,t no one s3o,ld 3old 3is breat3 for napalm stri2es in t3e ,pper E,alla#a ?alle4H or a #lobal campai#n b4 M)< (Moint )as2 <orce) "BC&EC to root o,t comp,ter 3ac2ers and expatriate 8o+iet scientists. )3e problem some ne! strate#ists face is t3e desire to appl4 t3e tools of militar4 force to t3reats apparentl4 not amenable to resol,tion b4 traditional non-forcef,l means. )3e BN C3arter is t3e c3ief obstacle to s,c3 inno+ations. (ppreciation of t3e conto,rs of t3e BN C3arter s4stemH of its ori#ins and importanceH and o,r national commitment to its o+erarc3in# principlesH is not an inte#ral element of B.8. militar4 c,lt,re. n16 )3e re#ime of peace embodied in t3e C3arterH 3o!e+erH #o+erns t3e ,se of force--t3e c3ief b,siness of B.8. armed forces. )3e C3arter is not t3e ar#ot of la!4ersH a mere factor for planners to considerH an inp,t to be balancedH or an infl,ence to be anal4Ged--it is t3e fo,ndation of c,rrent !orld orderH !3ate+er its imperfections. )3e C3arter re#ime exists on a 3i#3er plane of #lobal politicsH of past and f,t,reH t3an t3e familiar field of tar#ets and tra;ectories. =est !e
merel4 add more paper to a #ro!in# 3eap of 3apless +anit4 literat,reH t3e re#ime of t3e C3arter m,st be considered in an4 ne! strate#4 t3at incl,des international ,se of force. )3e C3arter s4stem defines for t3e present t3e difference bet!een pipedreams and polic4. In recent national sec,rit4 debatesH disc,ssion 3as foc,sed on t3e BN onl4 as an instit,tionH recallin# its missteps in 8omalia and U.32V 1osniaH n29 its mismana#ement of mone4H n21 its bloated staffH n22 and !3et3er B.8. troops s3o,ld be placed ,nder BN command. n23 )3is narro! foc,s on t3e BN o+erloo2s t3e fact t3at t3e BN C3arterH t3e doc,ment itselfH !3oll4 apart from t3e instit,tion of t3e BNH is a treat4 t3at contains !ell-settled norms for t3e ,se of force !3ic3 e+ol+ed before t3e C3arter !as ratified. n24 C3arter norms 3a+e b4 no! attained t3e po!er of ;,s co#ens n2 --,ni+ersal principlesH li2e t3e pro3ibition of tort,reH t3at do not depend on specific expressions of la!. )3e ,nderl4in# principle of t3e C3arter s4stem is t3at states s3o,ld resol+e disp,tes b4 peacef,l meansH n2' reser+in# t3e ,se of militar4 force for indi+id,al or collecti+e self-defense a#ainst an armed attac2. n2- <or t3reats to international peace belo! t3e U.33V t3res3old norm for national self-defenseH t3e C3arter a,t3oriGes t3e 8ec,rit4 Co,ncil to call for t3e ,se of force proacti+el4H to redress incipient t3reats. )3e problem man4 t3eorists face is t3e desire to inter+ene forcef,ll4 in t3e affairs of ot3er nations belo! t3e ;,ridical t3res3old of national selfdefenseH !it3o,t resort to t3e 8ec,rit4 Co,ncil--a desire to ,se force prop34lacticall4H to nip problems in t3e b,dH to s3ape forcef,ll4 t3e be3a+ior of t3e rest of t3e !orld to (merican +al,es. )3e C3arter s4stemH 3o!e+erH does not pro+ide s,c3 a s,per+isor4 role for t3e Bnited 8tates.
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>D D- :F/ H
(ithout the !$! the !"! cant hope to win the ()T
:il5ieJ De*rasseJ ) Roan 02
(Edit3 1.-H PreG Peace )3ro,#3 =a! Ed,cation <,ndH 1et3 C.-H Exec. &irector O P.).=.E.<.H Colonel Cic3ard 7.-H 8r. <ello! P.).=.E.<.H "arc3 14H I( <orce for Peace and 8ec,rit4K B.8. and (llied Commanders5 ?ie!s of t3e "ilitar45s Cole in Peace @perations and t3e Impact on )errorism of 8tates in ConflictJ) 8eptember 11 bro,#3t t3e B.8. and ot3er nations a ne! appreciation for t3e critical importance of t3e Bnited Nations as a partner in t3e !ar on terrorism. )3ro,#3 tra#ed4H !e no! ,nderstand t3at social and political ,p3ea+al in fara!a4 places can be a dan#ero,s t3reat to o,r sec,rit4 at 3ome. )3e +oices of militar4 commanders are ,nited in prescribin# en#a#ement and earl4 inter+ention as prime tools in dealin# !it3 t3ese ,p3ea+alsH !it3 t3e places t3at (dmiral 1lair refers to as t3e Iseams of la!lessness.J )3e4 are e*,all4 ,nited in reco#niGin# t3at t3e B.8. can not and s3o,ld not s3o,lder t3e b,rden of dealin# !it3 t3is ne! realit4 alone. In appropriate sit,ationsH t3e B.N. can be an effecti+e instr,ment of en#a#ement. E+en more importantH t3e B.N. m,st remain an effecti+e partner in t3ose crises !3ere t3e B.8. and its allies c3oose to inter+ene. "ilitar4 commanders !3o 2no! t3e4 !ill 3a+e to depend on t3e B.N. in t3e f,t,re stress t3at t3e sta2es are too 3i#3 eit3er to i#nore t3e B.N. or to allo! t3e B.N. to maintain its stat,s *,o [ and t3at insteadH t3e B.8. s3o,ld demand effecti+eness and acco,ntabilit4 from t3e B.N.H and p,rs,e reform of B.N. operations.
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Pre-emption & >nsustainable

Bushs pre-emption strategy is unsustainable
<ell6 09
(Pa,l-H Editor-at-=ar#eH "arc3 2'H )3e (,stralianH IPre-emption tenet battles for s,r+i+alJH =exisL Macob) )3e tr,e cost of Ira*H 3o!e+erH !ill def4 arit3metic. )3e B8 !ill disco+er after 8addam E,ssein is #one t3at t3e !orld remains a dan#ero,sl4 ,nsafe place !it3 ne! ris2s replacin# t3e old ris2s t3at it paid so m,c3 to sol+e. It !ill also pro+e a tr,t3 -- a tr,t3 doc,mented in t3e latest iss,e of )3e National Interest b4 Col,mbia Bni+ersit4Ps Mac2 8n4derH !3o s,r+e4s imperial temptations and concl,des t3at Qa #eneral strate#4 of pre+entati+e !ar is li2el4 to brin# abo,t precisel4 t3e o,tcome t3at 1,s3 and CondoleeGGa Cice !is3 to a+ertQ. )3e reason is beca,se !ea2 states on t3e 3it list !ill de+elop ne! let3al capacities to sa+e t3emsel+es. 73at else !o,ld t3e4 doR In s,mmar4H a t3eor4 of pre-emption at state-to-state le+el !ill not end,re beca,se its political #ains cannot o,t!ei#3 its costs and a democratic societ4 s,c3 as t3e B8 !ill ad;,st accordin#l4.
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Caldebate.com
Pre-emption & "odeled

/re-emption creates a precedent for future aggression that will be modeled globally
-immons 02
((dele-H 8r. (ssoc. O t3e Center for International 8t,dies O B. of C3ica#oH@ct. 13H C3ica#o 8,n-)imesH I@pposition to Ira* !ar spa!nin# *,ic2l4JH =exisL Macob) International la!4ers point o,t t3at t3ere are no international le#al precedents for t3is sort of a##ressi+e defense. &o,#lass CasselH of t3e Nort3!estern Bni+ersit4 =a! 8c3oolH ar#,es t3at Qa preempti+e stri2e in t3ese
circ,mstances !o,ld r,pt,re t3e frame!or2 for international la! b,ilt since 7orld 7ar II and pro+ide a precedent for f,t,re a##ression b4 po!erf,l states !3ose a#endas mi#3t be *,ite different from t3at of t3e Bnited 8tates.Q @nce t3ese r,les of international en#a#ement are bro2enH t3ere is no t,rnin# bac2. 8,ppose t3e C3inese decide t3e4 are t3reatened b4 )ai!anR 7o,ld India or Pa2istanH eac3 of !3ic3 3as n,clear !eapons and eac3 of !3ic3 fears t3e ot3erH follo! o,r leadR C,ssiaH !3ic3 alread4 is ,sin# t3e !a4 in !3ic3 t3e Bnited 8tates is exec,tin# t3e !ar on terrorism in t3eir mana#ement of C3ec3n4aH mi#3t !is3 to ta2e ,nilateral action in /eor#ia. )3e collapse of international la! leads to c3aos.
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Caldebate.com
./ Pre-Emption +sD ?'ina

/re-emption vs! #hina fails and undermines status quo cooperation that key to global stability!
/oronto -tar 0,
(M,ne 1'H IIsolatin# C3ina !onPt !or2JH =exisL Macob)
C3inaH in its o!n interestH is see2in# co-operation !it3 t3e B.8. for man4 reasonsH incl,din# t3e need to close t3e #ap bet!een its o!n de+eloped and de+elopin# re#ionsL t3e imperati+e of ad;,stin# its political instit,tions to t3e acceleratin# economic and tec3nolo#ical re+ol,tionsL and t3e potentiall4 catastrop3ic impact of a Cold 7ar !it3 t3e Bnited 8tates on t3e contin,ed raisin# of t3e standard of li+in#H on !3ic3 t3e le#itimac4 of t3e #o+ernment depends.
1,t it does not follo! from t3is t3at an4 dama#e to C3ina ca,sed b4 a Cold 7ar !o,ld benefit (merica.
7e !o,ld 3a+e fe! follo!ers an4!3ere in (sia. (sian co,ntries !o,ld contin,e tradin# !it3 C3ina. 73ate+er 3appensH C3ina !ill not disappear. )3e (merican interest in co-operati+e relations !it3 C3ina is for t3e p,rs,it of a stable international s4stem. Pre-emption is not a feasible polic4 to!ard a co,ntr4 of C3inaPs ma#nit,de. It cannot be in o,r interest to 3a+e ne! #enerations in C3ina #ro! ,p !it3 a perception of a permanentl4 and in3erentl4 3ostile Bnited 8tates.
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./ o modelin#- (us' pre-emption is distin%t

That distinction is too fu%%y
Daalder 02
(I+o E.-H 8r. <ello! O t3e 1roo2in#s Instit,tionH No+. 1'H Co,ncil on <orei#n Celations PressH IPolic4 Implications of t3e 1,s3 &octrine on PreemptionJH 3ttpK$$!!!.cfr.or#$p,blication.3tmlRid% 2 1L Macob) )3e case of India and Pa2istan points to anot3er #ra+e dan#er of p,blicl4 prom,l#atin# a doctrine of preemptionH !3ic3 is t3at ot3er states !ill in+ariabl4 embrace ar#,ments in its fa+or as a co+er for settlin# t3eir o!n national sec,rit4 scores N as C,ssia 3as alread4 done !it3 respect to /eor#ia. (s Eenr4 :issin#er 3as ar#,edH IIt cannot be eit3er in t3e (merican national interest or t3e !orld5s interest to de+elop principles t3at #rant e+er4 nation an ,nfettered ri#3t of preemption a#ainst its o!n definition of t3reats to its sec,rit4.J )3e 1,s3 administration reco#niGes t3is problemH and !arns ot3er co,ntries not to I,se preemption as a pretext for a##ression.J 1,t t3at is easier said t3an done. )3e administrationH !3ile arro#atin# to itself t3e ri#3t to ,se force !3ene+er and !3ere+er it belie+es t3e preemption of potential f,t,re t3reats !arrants itH 3as made no effort to define t3e line separatin# ;,stifiable preemption from ,nla!f,l a##ression. (nd t3at ma4 !ell be t3e #ra+est fla! of t3e ne! doctrine. <or b4 pres,min# t3at t3e concept of self-defense no! incl,des preemption (as broadl4 defined)H t3e administration 3as erased an4 +iable distinction bet!een t3e offensi+e and defensi+e p,rposes of militar4 action. YetH t3e le#itimac4 of ,sin# force depends cr,ciall4 on a clear and a#reed ,nderstandin# of precisel4 t3is distinction.
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./ Pre-emption (and!a##onin#
AT pre-emption bandwaggoning
-n6der 09
(Mac2-H 8prin#H National InterestH IImperial )emptationJH =exisL Macob) (not3er m4t3 of empire is t3at states tend to ;,mp on t3e band!a#on !it3 t3reatenin# or forcef,l po!ers. &,rin# t3e Cold 7arH for exampleH t3e 8o+iet Bnion t3o,#3t t3at forcef,l action in 1erlinH C,ba and t3e de+elopin# !orld !o,ld demonstrate its political and militar4 stren#t3H enco,ra#e so-called pro#ressi+e forces to all4 acti+el4 !it3 "osco!H and t3ereb4 s3ift t3e balance of forces still f,rt3er in t3e fa+or of t3e comm,nist bloc. )3e 8o+iets called t3is t3e Qcorrelation of forcesQ t3eor4. In factH t3e balance of po!er effect far o,t!ei#3ed and erased t3e band!a#on effect. )3e 8o+iet Bnion !as left far !ea2er in relati+e terms as a res,lt of its pressin# for ,nilateral ad+anta#e. (s C3,rc3ill said of t3e 8o+iets in t3e !a2e of t3e first 1erlin CrisisH Q734 3a+e t3e4 deliberatel4 acted for t3ree lon# 4ears so as to ,nite t3e free !orld a#ainst t3emRQ6 &,rin# t3e 1661 /,lf 7arH t3e earlier 1,s3 (dministration ar#,ed t3at rollin# bac2 8addam E,sseinPs con*,est of :,!ait !as essential to disco,ra#e (rabs t3ro,#3o,t t3e "iddle East from ;,mpin# on t3e Ira*i band!a#on. No! t3e c,rrent 1,s3 (dministration 3opes t3at band!a#on d4namics can be made to !or2 in its o!n fa+or. &espite t3e diffic,lties t3at t3e Bnited 8tates 3as 3ad in linin# ,p s,pport for an in+asion of Ira*H t3e administration nonet3eless asserts t3at its strate#4 of pre+enti+e !ar !ill lead ot3ers to ;,mp on t3e B.8. band!a#on. 8ecretar4 C,msfeld 3as said t3at Qif o,r leaders do t3e ri#3t t3in#H ot3ers !ill follo! and s,pport o,r ;,st ca,se-;,st as t3e4 3a+e in t3e #lobal !ar a#ainst terror.Q19 (t t3e same timeH some self-st4led realists in t3e administration also ar#,e t3at t3eir polic4 is consistent !it3 t3e concept of t3e balance of po!erH b,t t3e r3etoric of t3e N88 p,lls t3is concept inside o,tK Q)3ro,#3 o,r !illin#ness to ,se force in o,r o!n defense and in t3e defense of ot3ersH t3e Bnited 8tates demonstrates its resol+e to maintain a balance of po!er t3at fa+ors freedom.Q 73at t3is @r!ellian statement reall4 seems to mean is t3at pre+enti+e !ar !ill attract a band!a#on of s,pport t3at creates an imbalance of po!er in (mericaPs fa+orH a conception t3at is lo#icall4 t3e same as t3e !ron#3eaded 8o+iet t3eor4 of t3e Qcorrelation of forces.Q (dministration strate#ists li2e to ,se t3e terminolo#4 of t3e balance of po!erH b,t t3e4 ,nderstand t3at concept exactl4 bac2!ards.
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./ Pre-emption doesn7t +iolate I ;a!

$o way- Bushs pre-emption doctine goes beyond what it ,ustified in I law- it allows for preventative attacks even without an immediate threat!
("ic3ael E.-H8r. <ello! in <orei#n Polic4 8t,dies O t3e 1roo2in#s Instit,tionH 8,san E.-H 8r. <ello! in <orei#n Polic4 8t,dies O t3e 1roo2in#s Instit,tionH Mames 1.-H &ean of t3e =1M 8c3ool of P,blic (ffairs O B.).H Polic4 1riefH I)3e Ne! National 8ec,rit4 8trate#4 and PreemptionJH T 113H 3ttpK$$!!!.broo2in#s.ed,$printme.!bsRpa#e%$comm$polic4briefs$pb113.3tmL Macob) PreemptionH narro!l4 definedH 3as lon# been an important and !idel4 accepted polic4 option for t3e Bnited 8tates. 1,t t3e 1,s3 administration ar#,es t3at preemption m,st be extended to incl,de Qpre+enti+eQ attac2s e+en in t3e absence of an imminent t3reat. Pre+ention is a far less accepted concept in international la!H e+en t3o,#3 t3e Bnited 8tates 3as t3reatened or ,tiliGed it in pre+io,s eras as !ellH and e+en t3o,#3 it ma4 be a necessar4 tool at times. <or exampleH in 1664H t3enN8ecretar4 of &efense 7illiam Perr4 stated p,blicl4 t3at t3e Bnited 8tates !o,ld not allo! Nort3 :orea to de+elop a n,clear arsenal (alt3o,#3 t3e administration iss,ed no explicit t3reat to ,se force). P4on#4an#Ps a!areness t3at t3e Bnited 8tates mi#3t destro4 Nort3 :oreaPs capacit4 to prod,ce fissile materials ma4 3a+e contrib,ted to t3e s,bse*,ent (#reed <rame!or2 b4 !3ic3 Nort3 :orea capped its lar#e-scale n,clear pro#ram. 1,t s,c3 t3reats are more problematic in t3e case of a concealed Qbasement bombQ pro#ram t3at B.8. intelli#ence co,ld not easil4 locateNand in factH it is precisel4 s,c3 a smallerH 4et still dan#ero,sH t4pe of n,clear pro#ram t3at Nort3 :orea later initiated.
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./ Ro#ue -tate !ill #i+e !eapons to terrorists

5ogue states handing weapons to terrorists : unlikely
/el'ami 09
(83ible4-H (n!ar 8adat C3air for Peace and &e+elopment O B. of "ar4landH <eb. 2 H Inter+ie!K Con+ersations !it3 Eistor4L Instit,te of International 8t,diesH BC 1er2ele4H I)3e 1,s3 &octrineJH 3ttpK$$#lobetrotter.ber2ele4.ed,$people$)el3ami$ tel3ami93-con .3tmlL Macob) =etPs separate t3e t!o ideas t3at 4o, 3a+e 3ereH beca,se t3e4 reall4 are t!o. @ne is t3e doctrine of preemptionH and t3e ot3er is t3e s,##estion t3at statesH menacin# states or dan#ero,s statesH or !3ate+er 4o, !ant to call t3emH are li2el4 to pass on !eapons of mass destr,ction to militant #ro,ps t3at ma4 t3en carr4 o,t attac2s a#ainst (merica. If 4o, as2 an4 proliferation expertH incl,din# !it3in t3e administrationH Q73at is t3e bi##est fear of !eapons of mass destr,ction #ettin# into t3e 3ands of a #ro,p li2e al Saeda toda4R 73ere are t3e li2el4 so,rcesRQ t3e ans!er !o,ld beH firstH t3e former 8o+iet BnionL secondH t3e former 8o+iet BnionL t3irdH t3e former 8o+iet Bnion. (nd t3en 4o,Pll probabl4 #o do!n to Pa2istanH if its #o+ernment collapsesH if 4o, 3a+e anarc34H beca,se instabilit4 is t3e most li2el4 so,rce of t3ese !eaponsH not a state 3andin# t3em o+er. In factH if 4o, loo2 at t3e instances of !3ere t3is 3as 3appenedH 4o, probabl4 3ad cases of ro#,e scientistsH not ro#,e states. )3in2 abo,t t3e ant3rax attac2 3ere in (merica -- !e donPt 2no! !3oPs be3ind itH b,t t3atPs t3e most li2el4 t3eor4. 8oH firstH I donPt t3in2 t3at Uro#,e statesP !eapons 3ando+erV is li2el4. 8econdH in t3e case of statesH 4o, 2no! !3om to p,nis3. 8,reH it mi#3t be 3arder to traceH b,t do t3e4 !ant to ta2e t3e ris2 of bein# fo,nd o,tH !3enH in factH t3ere is a co,ntr4 t3at can p,nis3 t3em ten times o+erR 73en 4o, loo2 at t3e 3istor4 of states ,sin# non-state militant #ro,ps as instr,ments of polic4H s,reH if 4o, loo2 at a militant #ro,p li2e EeGbolla3 in =ebanonH certainl4 itPs bein# s,pported b4 states li2e 84ria and Iran. 1,t t3e fact t3at it 3as t3at relations3ip !it3 a stateH in factH 3as been a restrainin# factor. EeGbolla3H 4esH 3as attac2ed tar#etsH lar#el4 on or near its borders and lar#el4 a#ainst Israeli soldiers. )3e4 3a+e not dispatc3ed s,icide bombers into )el (+i+ to 2ill ci+ilians. Ead t3e4 done soH Israel !o,ld 3a+e retaliated a#ainst 84riaH no do,bt. )3ere are red lines t3at are not crossed. 8oH act,all4H states are restrainin# factors in t3e case of t3ese #ro,ps. In t3e case of Ira*H t3e onl4 reason !e !orr4 abo,t t3is 2ind of contin#enc4 is t3at Ira* remains ,nder +er4 fe! incenti+es to mo+e for!ard beca,se of t3e sanctions re#ime and no 3opeH seemin#l4H of #ettin# o,t of t3at. It co,ld become effecti+eH b,t itPs not t3e same as !orr4in# abo,t t3e instabilit4.
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Caldebate.com
./ >D-D 'as to loo5 stron#

/re-emption isnt key to overcoming perceptions of
("ic3ael E.-H8r. <ello! in <orei#n Polic4 8t,dies O t3e 1roo2in#s Instit,tionH 8,san E.-H 8r. <ello! in <orei#n Polic4 8t,dies O t3e 1roo2in#s Instit,tionH Mames 1.-H &ean of t3e =1M 8c3ool of P,blic (ffairs O B.).H Polic4 1riefH I)3e Ne! National 8ec,rit4 8trate#4 and PreemptionJH T 113H 3ttpK$$!!!.broo2in#s.ed,$printme.!bsRpa#e%$comm$polic4briefs$pb113.3tmL Macob) Eo!e+erH a broad-based doctrine of preemption carries serio,s ris2s. )3e 1,s3 administration !as ri#3t to ta2e a stron# stand a#ainst terrorists and extremist statesH b,t it 3ad alread4 accomplis3ed t3is #oal !it3 its earl4 !ords in t3e period after t3e 8eptember 11 attac2s and its actions in (f#3anistan. It did not need a formal doctrine of preemption to dri+e t3e point 3ome. Cat3er t3an en,nciate a formal ne! doctrineH it !o,ld 3a+e been better to contin,e to reser+e t3e preempti+e militar4 tool for a narro!H rare class of sit,ations !3ere inaction poses a credible ris2 of lar#e scaleH irre+ersible 3arm and !3ere ot3er polic4 tools offer a poor prospect of s,ccess. /i+en t3at t3e doctrine 3as no! been prom,l#atedH t3e 1,s3 administration s3o,ld clarif4 and limit t3e conditions ,nder !3ic3 it mi#3t be applied.
!"! weakness
133

Caldebate.com Pre-emption Good/Bad Index

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Caldebate.

Pre-emption not ne!- "odelin#$ Per%eption & E$D

Iraq was the test case for pre-emption

!"! has always maintained the right to pre-emptive nuclear strikes

./ Ira0 dispro+es$non-uni0ues modelin#

7e s3o,ld p,t t3is

Another pre-emptive war could still set a precedent

The Iraq war wasnt pre-emption a! #ontinuation of the gulf war

444 Pre-emption *ood 444

(un5er (usters- /'e67re *ood

Bunker busters " prolif

Iran- (us' :on7t -tri5e

Iran- -tri5e *ood (1 of 2)

Iran- -tri5e *ood (2 of 2)

< - (us' :on7t -tri5e

< - Pre-emption *ood (1 of 2)

<- Pre-emption *ood (2 of 2)

Prolif - ./ ?on+entional Deterren%e :or5s (1 of 2)

!eapons of mass destr,ction to ro#,e statesK preempt or deterR

Prolif -%enario- ./ ?on+entional Deterren%e :or5s (2 of 2)

-tate disinte#ration -%enario

/errorism- Pre-emption -ol+es (1 of ,)

a##ression -- 3o!e+er minor -- !it3 o+er!3elmin# force.

/errorism- Pre-emption -ol+es (2 of ,)

/errorism- Pre-emption -ol+es (9 of ,)

/errorism- Pre-emption -ol+es (2 of ,)

/re-emption k prevent (M* terrorist attacks

/errorism- Pre-emption -ol+es (, of ,)

/errorism- ./ /errorists %an7t be deterred

./ ations !ill use (us' do%trine Bustifies !ars 3; (1 of 2)

./ ations !ill use (us' do%trine Bustifies !ars 3; (2 of 2)

./ ations !ill use (us' do%trine Bustifies !ars- Ctn 1.

./ ations !ill use (us' do%trine Bustifies !ars- Ctn 2

./ Pre-emption 5ills allian%es

!$! charter' allow for pre-emption

preempti+e action as Qanticipator4 self-defense.Q

./ Pre-emption 5ills I -upport for t'e :F/

444 Pre-emption (ad 444

.ustralia->D-D Rels -%enario (1 of 9)

.ustralia->D-D Rels -%enario (2 of 9)

.ustralia->D-D Rels -%enario (9 of 9)

(un5er (usters -%enario

(un5er (usters- Pre-emption (un5er (usters (1 of 2)

(un5er (usters- Pre-emption (un5er (usters (2 of 2)

(un5er (usters- Prolif H (1 of 2)

(un5er (usters- Prolif H (2 of 2)

/re-emption prolif' kills deterrence' causes terror

(un5er (usters- Prolif H (9 of 2)

/re-emption 9 bunker busters : prolif

(un5er (usters- Prolif H (2 of 2)

(un5er (usters- /'e6 Don7t :or5 (1 of 2)

(un5er (usters- /'e6 Don7t :or5 (2 of 2)

(un5er (usters- /'e67re Pointless- ?on+entional :eapons -ol+e

#onventional weapons are effective at penetrating bunkers

(un5er (usters- /estin# Prolif

"an4 E,ropeans fear t3e

C,ssian President ?ladimir ?. P,tin last !ee2 p,t t3e

?'e%'n6a - >D-D Pre-emption Russian Pre-emption

?'e%'n6a - Russian Pre-emption

5ussian pre-emption in #hechnya will entail a nuclear strike

?'inese ationalism -%enario (1 of 2)

B! They will block ;u and (ens reforms!

#! 5eforms solve the urban-rural divide