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TnoMrsrrc Stuorss

Mind,
etapnyslcs,
1.

DanielJ. Mclnerny, GeneralEditor

andValue
in theThomistic and

Sponsored by tbe Centerfor TbomisticStwdies Houston, Texas

AnalydcalTraditions
editedby

JOHN HnLDANE

University of Notre DamePress Notre Dame,Indiana

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Introduction vii Jobn Hald.ane

CHAPTER ONE

Manufactured in the United States of America

Aquinas after \flittgenste)n FergasKerr


CHAPTER T T'O

A recordof the Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available upon request from the Librxy of Congress.
rssNo-268-q467-z

The Active and PotentialIntellects:Aquinas as a Philosopherin His Own Right David. Braine
CHAPTER THREE

r8

* Thisboohu)as printed on acid-free paper

Aquinas and the Mind-Body Problem Ricbard Cross


CHAPTER FOUR

36

The Breakdownof ContemporaryPhilosophy of Mind lobn Haldane


CHAPTER FIVE

t4

Voluntary Action and Non-Voluntary Causaliry C.Et. Martin


CHAPTER SIX

76

ThomisticAgent-Causalism Stefun E. Crypers

9o

Vi

CONTENTS

CHAPTER

SEVEN

Habits, Cognition,and Realism JonathanJacobs


CHAPTER EIGHT

ro9

Hylomorphism and Individuation David S. Od,erberg


CHAPTER NINE

r2,

IrNr*oDucrroN
Jobn Haldane
r43

Aquinas on God's Knowledgeof Future Contingents CbristopberHughes


CHAPTER TEN

Ontology and the Art of the Possible GerardJ. Hwghes, S.l.


CHAPTER ELEVEN

16o

vs. AristotelianEssentialism Contemporary"Essentialism" Gyula Klima


CHAPTER T TELVE

17t

PracticalReasonand the Orders of Morals and Nature in Aquinas'sTheory of the Lex Naturae M.W.E Stone

195

Contributors Index 2r7

zr1,

It is alwaysappropriateto begin the work of a singleauthor with an introduction explainingthe motivations,character, and content of the of the book. In the case rcmainder of an editedcollectionof solicited the policy hasdangers, particularlyif the editor takesit upon Gtsays the work of the diversehandshe has commishimself to describe doned. Sucha volume is more like a buffet contributed to by several mealprepared by a singlecook. Readers 3hefs,than an extended are required to begin at one end and proceed to rhe other; rather they lot in a sequence of their own choosbve the option of picking elements and interests, but, one hopes,comfu, accordingto their own tastes plaing the full menuin due course. It may be apt,however,to saysomething aboutthe general aim of my own motivation and hope. thir collection,and in doing so confess by the Jesuits, I left schoolwith a sense Hrving beeneducated of the hrportancewhich the Catholic tradition haslong attached to philosophy and of the contributionsit hasmadeto it. However,my later univcniry educationin the subjectwas entirely secular and conductedin manner. Additionally,it was exclusively I lrrgely ahistorical within 6c rnalytical tradition andat a time when, asis still largely the case, on the philosophies of logic,language, &t cchoollaid greatemphasis I had, mind. and have, no complaint about Indeed,I regard this. |nd lhrt educationas a very good preparationfor philosophicalwork. Llhc any formation, however,it hasits failings in respectof both omiuion andcommission. So far asthe latter is concerned, thereis a tendency of analytical philorophy to proceed asif it, uniquely, werefreeof prejudiccs. Like itself as advancing Mr. Valiantfor Truth it sees heroicellyrtainst
vu

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JONATHAN

JACOBS

consequentialfeature ofthe clouds, not a constitutive one, and it does not have explanatory signifi cance. ry. The issue of underdetermination is a theme throughout much of Quine's work, and it is quite right to recognize its philosophical significance. one merit of the A/T interpretation of cognitionls that it i.rdi""tes a direction for giving an accounr of cognition that is not hobbled by the shackleof underdetermination.The notion of form is not consrrainedby the evidentialist considerationsthat underdetermination emphasizes. r8. J. Kim, "\7hat Is 'Naturalized Epistemology,?,' reprinted in philo_ sophicalPerspecthtes: Epistemology (Atascadero, calif.: Ridg;view publishing Company, 1988), p. 386. 19. SeeagainSf, r.79.6. the passiveintellect is said to be eachthing, inasmuch as ir receives \ow, the intelligible speciesof each thing. To the fact, iherefore, rhat it receives the speciesof intelligible things it owes its being able to operarewhen it wills, but not so that it be always operating: foieven the.it is in porentiality in a certain sense,rhough otherwise than before the act of understanding-.namely, in the sensethat whoever has habitual knowledge is in potentiality to actual understanding. zo' see,for example,the things Hume saysabout habit and custom in 14 Treatiseof Hurnan Natare, Bk. I, Part IV, sec. z, andAn Enquiry concerning Human Und.erstanding,Sec.V, Part I, and Sec.VII, part II. zr- Kripke attributes to \(rittgenstein what (following Hume) he calls a tceptical solution." Seewittgenstein on Rules and priaoti Longroge, ch. 3. papers by John Haldane have been significant h"lpr. I" p"r_ . ?r. .Several ticular his "Mind-\x/orld Identity Theory and the Anti-Realist challenge,', in c. \(right, eds.,Reality, Representation and projecrroz (New J. Haldane "1d York: Oxford University Press,1993),pp. rj-37,helped orient and focus my own thinking.

CHAPTER

EIGHT

Hylomorphismand Individuation
DaztidS. Oderberg

r. Introduction in precision, refinement, and fecunNothing in philosophy approaches, dity, the philosophy of the School.Philosophy would do well to return to it. Apart, however, from some small glimmers of awakened interest in a few quarters, it shows no sign of doing so. In Anglo-American thought the philosophy of the School has suffered a dual fate: on the one hand it has become the ossified material of an essentiallytedious historical analysis;on the other, its substance has been strainedand filtered through centuriesof empiricism, reducdonism, and materialism so that the remains have ended up as the stuff of what is now called analytical philosophy. And while the revivified interest of a small number of able analyticalphilosophers in what the schoolmen have to say is admirable,their output has beenalmost always critical, sccking to exposethe many fallacies and falsehoods of which thc schoolrncn,irr particular St Thomas Aquinas, are supposedlyguilty. lt is rnv r'.rrr (hc St'lr.r'1, viction that philosophers rrr'l would do bettcr to clcfcncl rc rpirr t o b u r y i t ; b u t a l s ot h a t t h c o n l y w a y o f c l o i n gs o i s ,1 , , 1 1 r ' l l r * ' l r rl.r i o n o f s r ) n r c ,trh r r l u g ht h c r n c c l i u no tf irrtitlvtir'. t ll r i l t ' r t ' l ' l r r , P ', is thc Sclrool'o s r r l yl c g i t i r r r . r t hcc i r .l t i s i r r t h i s s l t i r i t t l r . r rI r r ' . r r rtt, '
ttl

126

DAVID S. oDERBERG

HYLOMORPHISM

AND

INDIVIDUATION

127

examinethat most vexed of scholasticquestions,concerning the principle of individuation.

z. \7hat the Principle of Individuation of Material substancesIs Not

The doctrine of the school is that marrer is the principle of individuation. rwemusr note, however:(a) the doctrine appliesonly to complete material substances, or elsecompounds of incomplete iubstan".r of which one is material (in the caseof man); and (b) the precisedoctrine is that designatedmarrer (materia signata)is the principle of individuation (let us call it PDM). I do not propose ro enrerinto exegetical questions concerningwhich schoolsheld which views; it is weillnown that not every schoolmanheld PDM,2 but it is still by far the dominant view, and is the Thomistic one, all schoolmenbeing obliged to hold the Thomistic opinion on all mattersof philosophy as their default position. Let us briefly survey the reasonswhy no other principle of individuation(p/i) will do, sincewe will then havearrived at pDM by a process of elimination, on the assumptionthat there areno other plausiblecandidates.(I will nor rake it as evident that there are no oih"rr; there is no room to canvass all alternatives, only the most likely.) A cavear musr be entered,however: the defenceof PDM to be offered will still be in apparenttension with someof the objectionsto be raisedin the general survey. I will have something ro say about how this rension might be resolvedbut do not pretend ro have disposedof it. To beginwith, prime marteris not thep/ i.(r) It is common, i.e.multiply instantiable (wherever rhere is acruation by a substantialform), and it is a hallmark of individuality, including that of material subsrances, that it is, to use the scholasticterm, incommunicable.3 In analydc terminology we can say (following E. J. Lowe); x is an individual if and only if x is an instanceof somethingy (other than itself) and r itself can have no instances(other than itself).a (z) Prime marter is indivisible, being mere potentiality, so it cannor serveasthe basisof the division of a species or nature into individuals.\7e cannot say,'Here is someprime matte\ and there is some more', but we can say,'Here is Socratei,and there is callias', or in other words 'Here is prime matter informed by Socrateity, and there is prime mamerinformed by Calliacity'.

detersuch-and-such Second, thep/i cannot be matter aspossessing volume,location ('quantity' should be minate quantitS i.e. size,shape, taken broadly to include location, sinceaswe will seeit is really dimensionality which the schoolmenunderstandby quantity in this context). (a contingentproperty in ana(r) Determinatequantity is accidental lytical parlance,though this is not a happy term), and accidentspresuppose the existence (and hence individuadon) of the individual substancein which they inhere, so the individuation of substanceby accidentwould be circular. (I give only qualified endorsementto this later.) (z) A changein standard objection, for reasonsto be suggested determinatequantity would changethe individual, which a substance's is absurd. Third, the p/i cannot be matter as disposed for the possessionof such-and-suchdeterminatequantity. Now such a disposition may not to a thing's nature,but it still will not do. (I) be accidentalbut essential have matter disposedto a determinatequantity Few if any substances (perhapssome micro-physical particlesor micro-organisms do), only to a rangeof quantities.(z) A disposition to quantity follows from the is human form: itis becawse Socrates possession by matter of substantial that he is disposed (speaking now of ranges)to a height greaterthan six inches-socrates would not be so disposedif he were an ant. Hence, as will be explained,even if a disposition to quantity were thep/i, form would have to play arole in individuation by giving otherwise indifferent prime matter whatever it is that enablesmatter to individuate. Fourth, the substantial form, though it is in a sensethe primary factor in individuation, is notthep/i itself. It is the primary f.actorin indiof viduation becauseof what is now called the sortal-dependency identity.s The p/i has to be formulated in terms of substancesof the of the samespeciesare identical6if and samespecies:two substances only if . . . i or, taking -Fto be a substantialkind, we can say that object amounts asb if and only if. . . . \X/hatsortal-dependency a is the same.lq to, speakingin the ontic rather than the linguistic mode, is that information by a specific form is what lays the ground, as it wcrc, lor is numerical identity and diversity. Since the individuirl sttbst,trr.''t' f ,,r rrr, sttl'tst.trtti.tl brought into beingby the union of prime mattcr arrcl form plays,rrolc in irrtlivitltt,rti,'rr, that substantial it is not surprising As l,,r tlrt' tlr.,trglrt. morc onc thirnis ol'tcrr indccd a far cr>mprlicatcc{ and ( l t t ( ) t c s t t p p ort: Arist.,tlt'itt rnrrclc tcrc, wc c:llt l 'tr c i n g birsic 1'roin

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129

\(e assert, then, that substance is one of the categories of being;and that this substance is partly what is called marrer,which by itself is not this individual; and partly form and specific difference, by which a thing is at once denominared individual; and, lastly, the composite of both. And commenting with approval on this passage, St Thomas says:s Form is that by which a 'parricular thing' actually exisrs. Sincethe question'Is a the sameas b?', in order to be answerable, must be expandable in terms of somekind F-'Is the athe same-F[dog, man, lump of wood] asb?'-we know that specificinformation makes individuation possible in the first place, and is in that senseprimar;r, even if not the principle of individuation itself. Two reasonssuffice to show that form cannotbe thep/i itself: (r) form is common) whereas individuality is not (i.e. ir is incommunicable ro many, as was said above);(z) matter is an essentialpart of the material substance, which is a composite of matter and form; but individuality must rake account of the individual's essenrialparts; so form alone cannot confer individuality. Fifth, the existenceof the material substance cannor be thep/i. (r) 'We can conceive of individuals which do not exist, such as fictional objects,the next president of the United States, and so on. One might object to this by saying thar ficdonal objects, for example,have existencewithin their domain of quantificarion (Hamlet existslz the play, but not in real life).The reply is rhar existence is only the presupposition of an object's behaviour or actions, or more broadly of its role within a certain frame of discourse.\7e cannor conceive of Hamlet's being indecisivewithout conceivingof him as existingwithin the play; and we cannot conceive of the next president of the United States making an inarticulate speechwithout conceiving of him as existing. But we can, otherwise, conceiveof a wholly non-existent individual, say a big brown bear,or a man who wins the presidency,withour embedding the conception within any identifiable frame of discourse,and so without presupposingthe rhingt exisrence in any sense. Sucha thing conceivedof is no more or lessthan an individual essence, and it conjust as a species tracts its species contracts its genuswhether or not the species has any actual members.(Think of the genuspolygon; n<>w

cbiliagon;now think of some chiliagon') Similarly, think of the species a sculptor's ideal prototype of a Greek muse already has individuality before he brings it into existence.Hence individuality must be con(z) If exisof a thing, not in its existence. tained in the individual essence it presupposesthe tence is the actualization of an individual essence, an individual poteni.e. it presupposes individuation of that essence, That is, what distinguishesthe tiality. (3) \flhat individuatesexistence? is self-individuating, e of b? If existence of afromthe existenc existence 'in which is prior to existence the then why not saythe sameof essence, order of nature and of perfectiori, asthe Thomist would say?

3. The Principle of Individuation of Material Substances There are three elementsto this, but only one which we should in general speakof astbe principle of individuation. First, it is submitted that we cannot ignore the work of Suarezon this,eand must therefore say: is the principle of its individuation by its own Every materialsubstance is very union of prime matter to substantialform It the proper entity. which constitutes the individual substance,as surely as the coming together of cogs and wheels (or chips and plastic) constitutes an indifrom substantialbeing, vidual watch. Individuality follows necessarily 'no entity withtake the is how we should and if this Quinean slogan an important truth. out identity', that slogan expresses Second,to add to what was said aboveabout the primacy of form, we must say that form holds a higher place than matter in the haecceity Matter assuch is inchoative, and of the complete compositesubstance. whereas of itself no more inchoative of this rather than that substance; form perfects and determines the substance,turning what is wholly indifferent into something determined and singular.l0It is a lack of regard for this point which seemsto be at the root of worries had by 'thick' somephilosophersabout whether the matter that individuatesis or'thin', an issueto which I will return. irt tltis Third, it is matter which is the principle of individuati1ltr, sttbst.trtti.tl thc cntirc principle which by is chief intrinsic it the sense: lot ttl, crtttltllotl It is matterwhich diviclcs is individuated.rr composite rr'lri. lr irr into thc incotttttttttti.'.rlrlt'. i.e.which turns thc communicablc l t t t rrl l i r tt t t rt i r rt h : r tw h i c hi s " i n d i s t i n citn i t s t ' l . u n i o nw i t h f o r r nr c s u l t s ,'.1 r t rt l t t . r r ' . t t : rrc, t l r c r l l,o l r t ' t ' t ' t r r titl r t lc r r c cc l : t i r t tis frrlrl gtftcrs."rr'l'h

T10

DAVID

S. ODERBERG

HYLOMORPHISMANDINDIVIDUATION

IlI

it is the initial or logically prior influence of common form on otherwise indifferent matter which gives to matter the character by which it individuatesthe substance which, asa whole composite,is constituted as an individual entity. So when we say that the substance is the principle of its individuation by its own entity, we pay regard to the fact that every materialsubstance, being a this-such,is ipso facto individual; but we do not excludethe further factthat every material substance has a component, namely its matter,by virtue of which it is a this-such. Individuals can self-individuate without that self-individuation being primitive or incapableof further analysis,just as pianists can by definition play the piano without their pianism being incapableof further analysis. But what kind of matter is it that is the chief intrinsic principle of individuation? The well-known formula (PDM) is that thep/i is 'designated matter' (materia signata),more exacdy matter designatedby quantity, even more precisely matter designated by indeterminate quantity.13 The unpacking of this concept is tricky, and here Thomists of good will differ. The quantity is generally recognized as having to be indeterminatebecause of the simple fact that substances varv in their material quantity over time -ithout losing their individuality. (I say individuality ratherthan identity-although it is alsotrue that they can vary in material quantity without losing their identity-because of a crucial difference between individuality and identity which will be 'designation'supmentioned later.)\7hat, however,is the term-of-art 'possession', posedto mean?The most likely meaningis so by saying that matter designatedby indeterminate quantity is the p/2, Thomists mean that matter in possession of indeterminate quantity is thep/i. But to speakof mafter possessing quantity seemslike just another way of speakingof matter informed by quantity, and the objection goes that matter cannot be informed by (really possess) indeterminatequantity, any more than it can have an indeterminateshape.la The principle of individuation, however, must be real (as opposed to ideal or minddependent)if substances, as is assumed,are really individuated. It is important to be clearabout what this objection is saying.It is not being denied that real information by a specificform ipso facto entailsinformation by every genericor higher-order form which that spccific form restricts. Analytically,this is expressed in termsof thc hicrarchical relarcstrictor.rc tion betweensortalswhich successivcly rrnothcr(whcrc restriction is transitivc).r5 Hcncca circlcrcrrllyis both rrcirclcrrrrd ,rsh,r1'rc,

An indeterminate shapeis but it is not really an indeterminate shape. one. of mind-independent, object,not a real,in the sense a conceptual 'Think (Compare the instructions: of an indeterminateshape',and 'Look in thc forthis book for an indeterminateshape'.PaceBerkeley, mer task is performable in a way the latter is not.) In addition, it is not being denied by the objector that there is at leasta seriousqucstion (clouds? slimemoulds?)haveindcterabout whether somesubstances minate boundaries.I take it that the world containsobjects that are really circular, even if being really circular involves approximation, within arange,to a certain (perhapsideal)limit. Further, many objects' boundaries are in constant flux, eventhose of relatively solid and stable objects such as lumps of inert matter. But this does not mean that we if we choose a suitable non-arbitrary rangeand level of exactness, cannot place every material object within some categoryor other in terms of real shape.However, goesthe objection, the claim that information by indeterminate quantity could be the p/i goesfurther, by of quantity such implying that what individuatesis the real possession with such that it is in principle impossible evento placeany substance quantity, whether precisely,or approximately,or evenplausibly,within one quantitative category rather than another.No material object, let in reality, and so alone substance, could have such inherent vagueness be really individuated by it. It is this sort of objection which led to the modification by John of St Thomas of St Thomas Aquinas'sformula: forJohn of St Thomas, 'matter it is radically designatedby indeterminate quantity' which is thep/a meaningthat it is not actualinformation bylpossessionof indeterminate quantity which individuates,but a dispositionto indetermiFurther, it seems there is a needto speakof disposition nate quantity.16 mentioned of the problem of the individuation of accidents, because by matter of determinate above in connection with the possession e p/i. Of course,we might depart from the Thoquantity as a possibl individuatethcmthat accidents mistic position and hold, with Suarez, thc selves, and we willhavc no obviouscircularityproblem in dccl,rring itsthc irrtlivitltr detcrminate or indetcrminatc, possession of quantity, Ilut lct us sccif wc canholclto thc tr,rtliti.trr.tl ator of substanccs. 1','.i i r rt l r i s, . t . , 't l r . ' cc ci n c l i v i c l u : r t b y lt h c i r s t r b j t ' t ' t(s t i o n t h : r tr r c c i c l c n,tr.rs t,lrrlilt \r, ttrrll w ', tg lrcrrr) , l r i l s ts t i l l . r l l . , u ' i r l(rp s u b s t , r t t cp co ssscssin
t 'i , t t t t r ' , l l t t ' t t , t , , t 1 q l 'l t' , ' vitltt,rtc. , r l l r t ' i tv i , r . t . l i s l t , t s i t i . t tttl t t ' t t ' 1 , t . ' l ' l r p \ r ' \ r ' , 1 ' , . r.ll l r , , . 1 1 1 ' : l . r rrr' r i l i . ' t l r i s .I r r . ' r ' , ' l vt t , t t l . l i r r r r ' l r i , s ( ) t t l ( ' t l r i r rl g

It

r3z

DAVID s. oDERBERG

rrvrouoRPHrsM AND TNDIvIDUATIoN

rJ3

time, its matter hasa certaindefinite quantity atthattime. But sincethat quantity will not be the samein every world, there is something indeterminate about it. But in no world doesS'smatter ltave indeterminate quantity; so we must say that it is rhe dispositionof S'smatter for different quantities in different worlds which givesrise to indeterminacy. In other words, S assuch has,in every world in which it exists,matter disposedto indeterminatequantity even though the matter in each world is quantitatively determinate.Noq what individuates S in each because and world cannot itself be accidental, S can lose its accidents its accidents are themselves indikeep its individuality, and alsobecause viduated by it. So we must say that S's disposition to indeterminate quantity, which is essential to S, is what individuates it in eachworld. of the Perhapsthis just will not do. Perhapswe cannot make sense ideathat a dispositioncan individuate.After all, every substance of kind K will have the samedisposition to indeterminatequantity if, as has 'exigency of been suggested, the disposition is itself a product of the form' (to useJoscphOwens's expression). So we would needsomehow to combine the dispositionof a substance S to indeterminatequantity (via in order to have with the quantity it its matter) actually possesses a genuinep/i, that is, an individuator that is indeed not shareable. But then, it seems, we would needto speakof something hke quantityas-pr od wced- by -th e- disposition- of-matt er, or more precisely, given dispositon-tothe Thomistic formula, matter-insofar-as-throwgh-itsindeterminate- q uantity-it-p oss esses-actwal-quantity, as the p / i. Now, leaving asidethe fact that this is something of a mouthful, the formulation of the principle is beginning to look very complicated,which is, if not a reasonfor abandoningthe task, at leasta reasonfor pause. \7hat I propose, then, is that in our current limited sate of understandingof the questionof individuation, we should step back from the position of John of St Thomas (and Thomas Harper), thus leavingaside at present the role of dispositions in individuation, and return instead to the pure formula of St Thomas himself, namely thatthe p/i is matter ssing-indeterminate quantity. designatedby-which I interpret asposse \flhat this means,unfortunately, is putting on hold the vexed question of whether this inevitably involves a circularity in the individuation of substanceand accident.Naturally one hopes that it does not, but the fact is that no one knows. Still we can, it is submitted, make headway with this formula alone,though we needto do somc work. As a preliminary step, we simply must abarrdonthc idca thrrt rltr:tntity

means,as it seemstraditionally to have done, only spatial quantity. Hence the term dimensions,whichthe schoolmenoften use' is far more suitable, becauseit allows time to play a role in individuation, time being just another dimension.For this I offer the following quotations of St Thomas in support: . . . that which receivesfthe form] is matter, not understood anyhow, or in its genericsignification . . . but as bearing the nature of in its existingunder first subject;*h"."rt hs determination consists to sensein demonstrable it to be cause which fixed dimensions, and time.tT space There is something else,by which rhe narure of the individual is verified according to human cognition, viz. its determination to it is its property to be certain porrions of time and space;because substantiallyexisting here and now. . . . For this reason,determined quantity is said to be the principle of individuation. Not that ir in any way causesits subject, which concomitant of the latter, but it is the inseparable is first substance; and time.tB it in space and determines ofthe epistemoQuite clearly st Thomas is speakingin thesepassages logical q.r.riiorrr concerning individuation, and it is well ro remember that the quesrionunder discussionin this paper is not an epistemoto admit his readiness Nevertheless, logical but an ontological one.1e to the support gives space with along tirie as a dimension oi quantity to be proposal idea that time can play a role in individuation. And the outlined has it as o." of the dimensiYeproperties of matter by which matter individuates.2o

Dcsignrrtctl 4. How to Think of the Principleof Individuation by Problcrns Matter: and the Solution of Several lt.'r, t , f i r r t l i v i t l t t . t t i , ' rtt, r t M y p r o p o s ails t h a tw c a d o p ta st h c p r i n c i p l c i . t t t ' ' lI ' r f t l r r . r t u l r t t i ttlttfr t l r : r tp r i n c i p l ce l r c . l , l r.' ' t t t t t t , as thc pr.r1r". I lr l ' K i r l r i r r ti'r r l t l " r r" t l ' " t t l t t tr c j c c t t ' t S t ' [ ' h t ' n l t r s - '1 r ' r < ' P t ' sr' r tt l ' r t llc n r l r . r,t, \ r , , 1 , ' l,l l,r , l s , I t i s ir rcrlr.t,. ,r l t l i y i t l t r . r t i o r r . r r t . lIl r r o r r A r i s t t l t l t ,l 'ls

rJ4

DAVrD S. ODERBERG

HYLOMORPHISM

AND

INDIVIDUATION

I]'

not go so far as to formulate the idea of designatedmatter,but only of matter as such as individuating substance. This leavesit open whether he meant thin (prime) matter or thick (proximate) matter, and if the latter in whatwa!, or by meansof what cltaracteristlcs, it individuated. And critics (often posing assupporters of Aristotle who sadly find the great man in a spot of bother) have had an enjoyable time poking holes in virtually everything the Philosopher saysabout individuation (and everything else).Fine, in particular, is impressedby the puzzle of Socratesand Callias: "Supposethat Socrates has at one time the same matter asCalliashasat anothertime. Then their matter is the same; their form is the same;and sinceeachof them is a compound of matter and form, they themselves are the same."22 I do not intend to enter into a detailed examination of Fine's ingenious thought about the suppose d puzzle; suffice it to say that he canvasses, perhapsexhaustively, various options and appearsto dispose of them all, making genuinelyinsightful points along the way. But what he has not successfully disposedof, I submit, is the solution he calls RelatizteComposition, whereby the time at which a substanceis enmat'Can', tered can individuate it. because one needn'talways appealtothe temporal dimension: if Socrates and Callias are in different places,then this property of their respectivematters individuates them; if they are different sizes,then that also individuatesthem. But if, as we are encouragedby Fine to suppose,Callias undergoesan imaginary process whereby he slowly shedshis matter while eatingSocrates for breakfast, taking on the matter of Socrates at exaciy the samerate as he loseshis own, and ending up consistingof all of Socrates'matter, as well as being exactly the samesizeasSocrates once was, and placing himself in exactly the sameportion of spaceas Socrates once occupied-if this is all imagined,then what preventsSocrates from ever having been identical to Callias is that they never shared the same matter at the same time.Elsewhere I have argued that two substancesof the samekind cannot be in the sameplace at the sametime;23 and the reason is preciselythat it would be impossiblein principle to say,on such a hypothesis,which matter belongedto which substance, and they would then not be individuated.Form is'parcelledout'by matter in spaceand time, so if matter is shared(and by sharedis of coursemeant zuhollysharedsubstances can overlap) it makes no senseto speakof distinct parcels, i.e. individuals.Socrates and Calliasmight sharetheir mattcr,and thcy might evendo so in the sameplacc; but it will not bc:rt thc srrnrc tirr.rc.

is not a possibility: they cannot sharetheir matter Note that the reverse rather'they simply cannot share at the sametime but in different places; their matter at the same time. This follows from the asymmetry between time and space,but does not in the leastmake a diffcrence to my claim that RelativeComposition solvesFine'sptzzle of Socrates and Callias. Finet objection to Relative Composition is that it makes thc unifying role of form mysterious:"It cannot be that time is one of thc clements that is unified. . . . Nor can it be that unification is relativc to a time; for how can a time, as such, affect the manner whereby the form Fine makes some given matter into one thing rather than another?"2a way the not affect does time In particular, counts. is correct on both chartemporal the form unifies. Rather, the way form unifies affects it is through As has already been suggested, acteristicsof a substance. the disposition to indetermithe exigencyof form that matter receives nate quantity, where it can now be stated that we should understand indeterminate quantity as wbatezterrange of def'nite qwantities,Prebappensto hazte.Form unifies; scribed by the form itself, a substance is a propensity to havethe range part of what it receives matter receives; whether it be the range of form, the by of dimensions prescribed dimensionsappropriateto human beings,or snails,or lumps of marble' Further, contra Fine, there is nothing unduly'selective' about Relative Composition: it is not as though the temPoralindex of a compound givesa certainportion of matter a privilegedposition as' say'the matter madeof this stuff rather than that? Because \(hy is Socrates of Socrates. he is. That his stuff existsat one time rather than anotheris simply a byproduct of the fact that he existsat all, and there is no objection I can i"" to regarding a thing's by-products as the way in which that thing from the is individuated,as long as the by-products flow essentially natureof the thing, asindeterminatetemporal dimensionscertainly do. 'l'here union of matter and form without simply can be no subsranrial nrrtterin dimension. A1 wlrichdivitlcs'" is thatof an amoeba Fineproposes Anothcr case A -,rvitlr t ltt' thcn fuseto form a distinctatrlocb;t whosedcsccndants ,tncl A 1.Now it might bc tcrllttirlI l() s.lvllr.rtt llis frtntrrrs ntattcrancl silntc
il tf l t c r r t t i t t c t t t c x i s t c t t c c , s o t h a t A t = A : l trtv t ltt'rt'tltt"tttt.'t'lt't isrrc:rsc< l i s r i , ' r lp t ' t l t t r l r t l t t ' l r v t t irrwIiclr tlitl rrptcxistrltrrilg tIr'irrtcrvrrl ( r r r r t l .,llr',,1,' i t r r ' , r t t l l, tl , ' , tl , ' t i t , W ..xistctl . l r t . t l r c(r) r ' n ( ) tt l r i si s r ' o r r - r ' c t 'rrl(' l \l ' ( ' i t r ' l r | r l l ( ( l u . t t ( ' l ( ' s l ) ( ) t l s ( l' r l( ) r t 't)l l t ' 1 . t , 'i ts t l l , t tS t ' l ' l r , ) l l l . ( ir

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DAVID S. ODERBERG

HYLOMORPHISM

AND

INDIVIDUATION

T37

countenancethe possibility of intermittent existencein the course of nature.26 So againwe can appealto Relative Composition, and say that what numerically distinguishes A1 from A2 is that they do not havethe samematter at the sametime. Again, Fine suggests the possibility of a Ship of Theseusscenario for amoebae: A1 with matter M splits into a large and a small amoeba, surviving (let us suppose,plausibly) asthe large one. It then fuseswith a small amoeba,surviving as the fusion; and so on until the resulting none of the original matter M, having sheda numamoebaA2 possesses ber of small amoebaewhich then fuse into an amoebaA3 with all and only the matter M. Is A,1= A2 or is A1 = A3? Common matter and form suggests the latter, but a certain continuity of history suggests the former. As with the original Ship of Theseusptzzle, my responseis that the original amoeba(or ship) goesout of existence at sometime (though exactly when is anothcr, and difficult, question) and that the descendants A2 and A3 are both numerically distinct from it. \Whatabout the factthatAl and A3 sharethe samematter and form? Again, they do not do so at the sametime. But now we run up againstan important problem for Relative Composition, which Fine recognizes. For does not Socrates himself have the samematter at different times? So how can the rela:.ivization of matter to time of existencebe the principle of individuation? And again,can he not havedifferent matter at different times (by variation)? (inter alia) by temporal dimension be the So how can matter designated p/i? It is at this point that we must return to the distinction between identity and individualiry which I mentioned earlier.At the end of their discussionof John of St Thomas, Gracia and Kronen consider the objection to the thesisthat matter possessing determinatequantity can be thep/i, an objection raisedby St Thomas, Scotus,Suarez,and John of St Thomas himself, that it would entail the loss of a thing's individuality were it to yary in the determinate dimensions of its matter, as virtually every subshnce does. Gracia and Kronen reply that the objection is ineffectivebecause it'tonfuses individuality with identity, failing to understandthat the principle of one neednot be cheprinciple of the other, and therefore that, even if dimensions change,a different principle could ensure the continuity [i.e. diachronic identity] of the individual."2T This point is, I submit, correct, though it must be qualified by saying that it does not follow that the p/i should indeed be determinately quantifiedmatterafterall; on that St Thornasis right. Iior

the indeterminacy of dimensions,under the exigencyof form, applies both modally, i.e. acrosspossibleworlds, and temporally. The point is for instance,can be six feet tall in the actualworld and that if Socrates, in somepossibleworld, what individuateshim in inches six feet two any arbitrary world, i.e. what individuateshim simpliciter, is whatever dimensionshis matter happensto have in a given world, i.e' his Since,as has been argued,it matter under indeterminaredimensions. matters chiefly in individuation, which is temporal dimensionality given the shareability of spatial dimensions,what individuates Socrates (in any world) is whatevertemporal index his matter happensto have (in that world). The indeterminacy of dimensions also appliestemporally, as was changetheir dimensions,their said. Vithin a given world, substances size,shape,and so on, and also the time at which their matter exists. Further, they can even(at leastconceivably)changetheir entire matter to exist.Vhy should so many schoolmenhave been without ceasing worried by this fact when consideringindividuation? After all, at any has some matter, and that matter is simulgiven time every substance (or so I in its entirety with any other substance taneously unshareable it must variation? Surely about be concerned So why have claimed). individuation of have something to do with the fact that the principle should not just capturewhat obtains at a sliceor slicesof the history of the universe,but also what happensduring an interttal or intervals in the history of the universe.To be sure, a candidatep/l is a non-starter if it cannot, ^t any given moment in the history of the universe'caPture existing every substance which distinguishes what it is, metaphysically, atthatmoment from every other one existing atthatmoment; or what what existsat one moment from what existsat someother distinguishes moment. But one would have thought that another requirement was for it to be ableto capturewhat it rs,dwringa giaen interval, which dispersistingduring that interval from cvcry tinguishesevery substance during that interval;and what distingtrislrcs persisting other substance that which existsduring one interval from that which cxists rtt sotttt' silnplv rll,t\'rr()l other interval.Now, during an interval,a substancc it So if we want t<tlrc l['tlt't()s,tvrr']r.rt climcnsions. bave dctcrminatc r ( ) . 1 ,. ,l1 l t , ' t t t lltrrirrq , h t r r c h i lt l i s t i n g u i s h cs crlt,yC i s t h t t r r u r n c r i c a lc ly l lc rttlr r . . l r li t ll , ' t t tl t , , ( , \ ( \ ( ' l l S t , r l i r r c l t r r i n g r y5 4o T, o r w h : r t d i s t i n g u i s(h "rt tl \t \r '( . r,l r l r.(trp t1 r rl livcs t,vcr'l.t1t1 .' r ,1 i r:rt r lv l r i t ' t ll rt c i r lrt'irrtt'r'v t l t r r i r rtg
l t t t s t s l ) t ' . t I t , l t , t r , . t ' ', " l r l r t t t l l l l t l l l t ttt r',tlltr.t 't , l c t c t ' t t l i t t . t t , ' t I i t t t t ' t t s i . , tl trs

rtl

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DAVID S. ODERBERG

HYLOMORPHTSM AND TNDMDUATION

r39

dimensions;and this, both the modal and temporal variability of dimensions,is what St Thomas and others mean by indeterminare dimensions,which is why they often do so in the context of the phenomenon of variation. Naturally, when the moments or intervalsbeing compared arethe same, we cannot appealto distinct temporal dimensions,but will have to appealto spatialones:Churchill and Roosevelt(rather,their matters) occupied distinct spatial rangesduring the time their lives overlapped.Further, sincea substance can changeits matter over time, we cannot speakof a singleparcel of matter designatedby indeterminate dimensions as thep/i. Fine proposcs the idea of Plural Composition as another possible responseto his puzzles,and I submit that we can adapt this to the question of individuation by saying that individuation is sometimes grounded in the severalmatterswhich a substance possesses over time; but sincedimensionality is crucial, those matters must be indexed just as a single parcel of matter is indexed according to Relative Composition. And what we end up with, as Fine notes,is Plwral Relative Composition, where (to adapt his proposal again),we take individuation throughout an interval asgrounded in the seriesof temporally indexed matterswhich a substance possesses during that interval-its several matters, in order of appearance, during that interval. So, what distinguishedChurchill during r94o-4t from Stalin during r947-rowas their possession of distinct matters during distinct intervals. In fact, the approach in terms of Plural Relative Composition is almost certainly too strict, because it is clearthat, whateverthe changes of non-proximate matter in, say,a living body over time, the body itself remainsnumerically the same,and it is just about as clear that, on the Thomist (and general scholastic) view, what individuates a man is his proximate matter, which is his body; mutatis mutandis for other organisms and possibly even some inanimateobjectsto the extent that they are not merelumps of matter.In which case) we can leavePlural RelativeComp/i, position to one side as a useful adjunct elaboration of our general and speak solely of Relative Composition, where the temporal relativization is either to a moment or an interval, as the casemay be. Despite all that hasjust been said,however,we are still no closerto being ableto employ thep/i to specify what it is that grounds the identity of a given subsance over time.The p/i must, as has been claimed, statein virtue of what a subsunceat a time or over time is distinguished from every other substance at every other time or over every othcr timc.

itself. to be the substance The glaring exceptionto this, however,seems Can we say,in terms of thep/i, what it is that ensuresthat Churchill at a given moment rn 1947,or over a given interval during 1947,lsnot distinguished numerically from Churchill at a given moment, or over a we cannot.All of the dimensionsare It seems given interval,rn l.96o? different. By thep/i, then, they should be two distinct people; but they arenot. So,it is argued,Graciaand Kronen areat leastprima faciccorrect to distinguish the principle of individuation from the principle of diachronic identity, whatever it may be (which we cannot) of course, The p/i only applies on the assumPtion that we have canyasshere).28 principle of diachronic identity one which securesthe pera separate such asChurchill from one moment to the next. of a substance sistence Assuming this, we can say that it is substanceS's matter, under indewhich individuatesit. For any giztenmoments t1 terminatedimensions, and t2, we must appealto the principle of diachronic identity, rather than individuation, in order to statethat whereby S at t1 is the sameas S at t2. In other words, once given our individuals at a time (through actuation by substantialform) and over time (through a principle, no we can statehow the persistence)' doubt form-invoking, which secures and diachronic synchronic for both applies principle of individuation individuation. A certain amount of unpacking, then, is neededin order of whyJohn of St Thomas and to haveat leasta plausibleunderstanding so many other schoolmenspeakof the needfor individuation by indeterminate dimensionsin contextsin which they also speakof variation over time. Variation doesindeedrequirethat the dimensionalityof individuating matter be indeterminate(though of coursedeterminateat any by specificmoment), but this doesnot imply that matter designated just identity substantial secures is what indeterminate dimensions through variation in the first place.

y. Conclusion 'l'lro of intcrprct,r(iorl I do not pretcndto havegivenan incontestablc 'l'hcrt' )t(' rrr( rrr,rrr\' ;lt'(' rnistic thoughton thc principlcof individuation. \\'lr.'n tr r irr1i, to bt's.,lr','.1. slicl,ancl clifficr,rltics trl ['rc thingsthat ncccl ) t( ' l l t ' t t t tt . ' t, ' t , t l t l l { l r c S . . ' l t . tttt ocl 't h c p h i l o s o p h y o rn,rl< , r sw c s h o u l c t l, ' t l rr rt t l r sl t t t r t\,\ ' (,' r l ( ' 1 . t , ,l'',,1 91 l ')i r r t q l l c c t tltrri t 6lr tIc plls(,tt1 r r r r t t c r iIr' r
S t, . , t t t , ' l t t t r , 't tt r \ l l r r ' l ( ' r r t r (l , t r t . l, , 1 . ' r ' , t l t t , t t i t , t pr.r[llcnts.rl t,xt'gcsis

r4o

DAVID S. ODERBERG

HYLOMORPHISM

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INDIVIDUATION

T4I

problem which is greater, a result,among other things, of the somerimes alien vocabulary and thought parrerns of the schoolmen. .With work, however, we can and should try to make senseof them, and to use whatevertools havebeenmadeavailableto us by analyticalphilosophy to accomplishthe task.Sucha task is what hasbeenattemptedhere,and if the theory I have outlined is at leasrarguableit can then serveasrhe basis for further investigation of one of philosophy's most difficult problems. If it is correcr ir can, I believe,solve a number of related problems raised in recent literarure.2e But that is a mamer which will have to be addressed elsewhere.

7. Aristotle, De Anima lI.i, 4rza6-ro. My translation is taken from of the Scbool,vol. r (London: MacmilThomas Harper, 5]., The Metaphysics lan, fi79),from whose important work much of the presentoutline is derived (with modificadons). cited in n' 7), trans.Fostcr and 8. Commentaryon De Anima (passage Humphries (Notre Dame: Dumb Ox Books, ry94; reprint of ry5r Yalc edit i o n ) , s . 2 r 5 ,p . 7 j . in Gracia, pp'475-trc, and refcrcnces 9. SeeGracia,"Francis Suarez," therein; also Harper, vol. r, proposition xlvi ff. the neglectedrole of form in individuro. Owens admirably emphasizes ation: seeesp.sec.II of "Thomas Aquinas" in Gracia. rr. Following Harper, vol.I, prop. xlviii. v. S.Tbeol.I, \.29, a.4:"Individuum autem est quod est in se indistinc'indistinct' does not have its tum, ab aliis vero distinctum." Needlessto say, 'having the character of an undivided unity'. current meaning, but means for St Thomas's 13. SeeOwens in Gracia, esp.pP. I8z-83 and references, espousalof this position. A cursory glanceat the work of Thomists (e.g.John of St Thomas, and latterly Harper) shows that indeterminate quantity is acceptedas the designationof individuating matter. 14. See,e.g.,Harper, echoingJohn of St Thomas. . and Sabstance r5. Seefurther'Wiggins, Sameness 15. Harper, vol. r, prop. xlviii. r7. Opusculum De Natura Materiae et DimensionibusInterminatis, c.3: trans. Harper,p.254; my emphasisin last line. passage trans. Harper; my 18. Opusculum De Principio Indiaidwationis; passage emphasis. r9. There is no question but that, epistemologicallyspeaking,accidents play a crucial role in individuation. zo. Sincethe temporal dimension is rarely mentioned by the schoolmen in connection with individuation, the obiections raisedin my generalsurvey to the idea of thep/i being matter under determinatequantity were implicitly restrictedto spatialquantiry but it canbe readily seenhow they apply to detcrminate temporal quantity: a changein determinatetemporal quantity woulcl temporal quantity is also accidcntal, changethe individual; and determinate which raisesthe circularity problem again. '1" Sc,rlts,rs, zr. Fine, "A Puzzle concerning Matter and Forrn," in itt Arirtrttlt" Identity,and I'.xplanatiott l). Charles, and M. L. Gill, eds.,[Jnity, (Oxford: ClarcndonPrcss,1994), Mctapbysics PP. Il-4o, rrtp. 1:ll. p. r4. zz. Ibicl., ,(]oirrcirlcrtc tc ttttlcr r t S o r t . t l , "I ' l t t l r t v t l , l t t r ' ltil, : t , , , 2 3 . l ) . S .( ) r l c r l r c r g " r, l r l t l l r ' t r ' rlrttt t r r l r ' 'trt l r s ( , ttt' t ( 'lrr t ' t l r rs r o 5( r 9 9 6 )l,) p . r 4 t 7 r . I r l i r ln ( ) tc ( ) r ) s i ( lw
, l, t t . t , 1 , ' t . t l t , , t.tt:, l r . t t trr r l l t r ' t r st1 1 , 1 1 1 . r 1 t i.r1 r r c ,I r t r t t l r . ' g c r r t ' r ' ., r ,.,ttt r. , , i r r c i t l t . i r rrrr"trr I t ' t t t l t ' l ' v i t ' t t s s t l l ) l ) ( ) l lr , t l r t ' i t l t " t t l r ' t t t l t t ' t ( ' t t l t l r r l \ \ ' l r r ' l ' ' 1 " " t " ' l

Notes r. See,for instance,the suggestiveremarks by Joseph Owens in his "Thomas Aquinas," in JorgeJ. E. Gracia, ed.,Individ.uation in Scholasticism, the Later Middle Ages and tbe Cownter-Reformation, rtso-165o (Albany: SUNY Press,1994;hereafterGracia), pp.r73-g4, at p. r88.The School'sother fate, on the Continent, was to be filtered through the Rationalists,Kant, the Idealists, and finally Brentano, Husserl, et al. to becomewhat are now the various branchesof Continental philosophy. while there is important material in the early phenomenologists,I do not believethat the School can or should be revived by doing philosophy the Continentalway. z. For the variety of views, seeGracia, a uniquely important collection for obtaining an overview of the question. e.g.,St Albert the Great (asexpoundedbyJ. M.G. Hackett, in Gra3. See, cia,pp. 97-99, and references therein); St Thomas,S.Theol.q.n, a3, responsio. Seealso Gracia, "Individuals as Instances,"Reztiero of MetaphVsics 37 Q9$), PP'39-t9. 4. E.J. Lowe, Kinds of Being (Oxford: Blackwell, ry89),p.38. The left conjunct is included sinceour examinationis confined to material individuals. It doesnot apply to immaterial substances such as God and the angels,which are identical with their own species. Note also thar Lowe's formulation is nonmodal-rc has no instancesother than itself-but I have changed this to a modal claim-x can have no instancesother than itself-so asto capture better the essence of individuality and to forestall possible Platonist ripostes concerning uninstantiateduniversals. y. D. Viggins, Sameness and Sabstance(Oxford: Blackwell, r98o),passim, esp.ch. r. 6. More precisely,synchronicallyidentical:for reasons to be given, thep/i is not a principlc of identity oaer tirnc (diachronicidcntity).

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DAVID S. ODERBERG

distinct materi.al objeas cannot coincide; only that if they did, at least one of them would not be a substance. 24, Fine, "APuzzler' p. 34, z;. \7e should say that itfi.ses,by analogywithfusion/to fuse. pbi26. SeeC. Hughes, "Aquinas on Continuity andldentity', Med.ieztal losopbyandTbeology 6 (tgg),pp.93-ro1,atpp.98-9. Of coursea miraculous intervention could reinstate a corrupted substance,but even then its essential principles (matter and form) would have to have survived the period of nonexistence,which they do in the caseof man. 27. Gracia and Kronen, "John of St Thomas," in Gracia, pp. ,rr-33, at p't26' 28. In The Metapbysics of Identity Ooer Time (New york: St Marrin,s Press,1993), I at leastsay what the principle of diachronic identiry coul dnotbe. 29. Ihave in mind the interestingwork of Christopher Hughes on identity and individuation in St Thomas: see his "Matter and Individuation in Aquinas," History of Philosophy Quarterly ry $996):pp. r-r5; and ..Aquinas on Continuity and Identity," cited above.

CHAPTER

NINE

Aquinason God'sKnowledge of Future Contingents


Hwgbes Christopber

I Thomas Aquinas held that there are future contingent events and states of affairs. If there were not future contingents, he believed, none of our future acts would be free, or deserving of punishment or reward, and Aquinas alsobelievedthat God knows deliberationwould be needless.l future contingents.By his lights, to recognize the existenceof future contingents, but to deny that God knows them, would be to deny limitations on his proviGod's omniscienceand to placeunacceptable dential government of human afifairs.z Although Aquinas thought that God's knowledge of future contingents was compatible with their contingency,he did not think that this compatibility was immediately obvious. He was familiar with, and took very seriously, a varrety of arguments purporting to show the incompatibility of God's knowledgewith the contingency of its objcct. togetherwith In what follows, I shall considertwo sucharguments, to them. Aquinas's responseto the 6rst argumcnt Aquinas's responses is straightforward,and I shall accordinglydiscussit only bricfly. Hir response to the secondargumentis much morc dctailcd,but rlro much more obscure.I shall attempt to determinehow thrt rerponrc rhould about iu rdequrcy. be understood,and raisesomequestions

r{l

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