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Thanks for the enlightening review. Subject perception of a patrol and actual operation bothers me a long time.

In response to this, held only by the remains of my memory, reading and talking about things I learned early 70s, and as a result of research, I try to show that there is an intolerable gap between concept and theory of operation of the tour, and the actual use made of it . y conclusion is that the period covering the Si!"#ay $ar and %om &ippur, the tour operating theory has collapsed completely. So because of the election of army formation commanders, brigade level and above, run the patrol forces such forces fighting bull " '!cellence, while completely ignoring the classic role of the tour. (mong the grim results of this operation through include blindness of the forces, due to lack of intelligence means close and immediate field, and the erosion of some finely patrol forces, as will be shown below. )eginning of a military patrol, patrol s*uads were operating in small, who knew or learned on the battlefields during the $ar of Independence, and their job was to lead the forces and used them to navigate or routers. (fter the $ar of Independence, the I#+ detachments organi,ation, began the construction of +ls-rim. The high point was during the operation .fls-r 7th )rigade/s fight during the Sinai 0ampaign. +ls-r 7, under the command of %it,hak )en"(ri, sent by the brigade commander to tour the optional traffic routes and to make contact with the enemy positions, producing T,i-h while navigating Show -various water their missions. I think that the brigade commander 1ri )en (ri was the first and last brigade commander in the I#+, who knew to get the best hfls-r intended. 2arallel to the establishment .fls-rim, began to take shape reconnaissance battalions activation theory " tank. To this end, the I#+ purchased t-nim "30 4(chilles5, which are designed to be used as a tank armored battalions are. I can not say what happened to these troops, e!cept that I saw, in 3670, some of them rusting camp near T,rifin. I do not know about running 7ds-rim in si! days. 8n the other hand, this war began to sprout buds rotten fruits of aggressive school, which saw another patrol unit power unit available to the commander, who intended to carry out combat operations, rather than the classical functions of the patrol unit. These roles include reconnaissance, observation " as a means of obtaining intelligence, and information storage space, masking, protecting wing and routing and transport troops. Si! #ay $ar patrol units were used purely for combat, such as +ls-r 7olani in Tel " +ahr. +ls-r #ivision 90 #ivision :: was anne!ed and served as a force fighting in ;erusalem. .oopoe was disguised as a company armored 4very successful5 in ;udea, while his brigade 4division <:5, attached to 7th )rigade 0ommand +ls-r 1ri " light, which served as a force fighting edge. It is understood that these +ls-rim could not e!tend the tour to their name services formed, the remaining organic blind to their units. #uring the interwar period in the organi,ation of the army, even opening theme of the tour. $hile Slhtibot infantry were usually +ls-rim traditional, e!cept that .ih-tim #ivision <37 of its :9= reconnaissance battalion were organi,ed 4-Shonri-5, the armored divisions jeep troops were reservists, while divisions 3>, 7 and >03 4loaded test, may dismantled5 were (20 tour companies. (n e!ception was the tyrant =7>th )rigade, which was an amphibious reconnaissance battalion " the 99th )attalion 4-)ear " $hite-5 " which actual total number of amphibious tanks and booty )i.ti.ar. armored infantry company (rtillery were also clumps jeep companies. .

#ivisions were a major form of additional power armored reconnaissance battalions. Two of the battalions? 97 #ivision 3>< and 3<> division <@, were organi,ed in three companies involved in the tanks and armored personnel carriers " and were in fact included a tank battalion reduced to appro!imately =: tanks " as well as jeep company. 8ther Aeconnaissance )attalion, =99th Aegiment were division 3>@, battalion =79 division 3@= and )attalion 396 #ivision =:=, consisted of a tank company and two companies of (20Bs. also had three battalions of the army commanding tour? walnut, carob and almond, which effectively patrol units were not essentially, but battalions .ir-m intended for routine defense line maintenance tasks. 8stensibly, this was the perfect tour system. In practice, I#+ commanders used these valuable powers " designation was mainly, as, intelligence and security patrol " shamefully, which resulted in the loss of one of the most important means of managing land and making it fight a secondary factor, as another one of the fighting forces. Aesult was a fighter, -the head of the wall -due to their blindness and loss of power factor *ualities of the tour. #are say that almost 300 percent of the entire I#+ patrol was lost.

I will detail?

C )attalion 97 served as divisional reconnaissance battalion just days 9 and 6 8ctober. 9 per month, when the entire division moved south, left the battalion reconnaissance and security positions in .amadia " magic, the ne!t day the battalion was sent to e!plore the boundary between the armies area sweet tooth, and brought great T,i-h " value. That day anne!ed to the battalion, 3>th tank battalion brigade , which fought until the day that "3>D36D7<" completely eroded down from the disposal of the Aoyal. 4 ore about that later5. C )attalion 3<> #ivision 376 was anne!ed and bread which was also a tank battalion. C )attalion =99th fighter regiment was attached to the =0:th battalion. C )attalion =76 #ivision 3@= was dismantled by the parties, which were divided between division units in a tank and armored infantry units. C )attalion 396, -&idnapped- is a wonder too. 2ieces were transferred to various units of divisions 3>< and 3@=.

Thus, none of the Aeconnaissance )attalion served its intended purpose,

The fate of the tour companies not better. Earge units which were e*uipped with jeep detachments were used mostly administrative duty, navigation and transport convoys levels as well as for evacuation of casualties. +ew draw sent for observation and reconnaissance, if that were made including these types of uses. )rigade reconnaissance company of the 3>th #ivision fought at =:= as a force in security, away from

organic brigade .. Aeconnaissance company of the 7th )rigade was used for three days as a force for security, evacuation and transport levels. 8n 30D06D7< she was trying to deal with Syrian commando force on the foot digging in the eastern slopes of ount .ermon, and destroyed down to almost nothing, the light cavalry"style assault. )rigade reconnaissance company of <: was used as a commando " who acted beyond the Syrian lines, not very successfully " away from his brigade. Aeconnaissance :9=, which belonged to such an organic division <37, was, *uite wonderfully, head*uarters 3>< " away from his brigade and served as the infantry, which have eroded to a point. 8nly his anti"tank company " a company of recoilless gun (mir 0ommand +und " used to secure the southern flank of the division 3>< and so successfully. +ls-r 7olani infantry force .ermon bread )attalion 99 was separated from his brigade and was assigned on 37D30 division 3> as a fighting force used.

+or the crossing of the canal on the night of 3:"3@D30D7< re"organi,ed #ivision 3>. '!cept for two who had organic battalions 439> and 765 and tank battalion @00th Infantry )rigade, was attached to an entire 'gged tour forces, which were not understood that designation? )attalion 97, )attalion :9=, Shaked battalion and two infantry forces two company formations? 2ower Shmulik )rigade <: 2ower )ase 3. (ll these forces commanded by 0olonel (mnon Aeshef, great courage, from a tank brigade, which had to also fight for his life in the 'gyptian array. (fter the battle, fell, as the disposal of the Aoyal Aegiment 97th )attalion :9= while suffering heavy losses

The ne!t day, the 99th )attalion was also sent to serve as a force fighting amphibious brigade within 3>. The battalion participated in the con*uest of the 0hinese +arm in the area and -0aravan-, a battle which had suffered heavy losses.

+inally, the %om &ippur $ar the I#+ failed to use his patrol forces in the Torah. Seems that the commanders in this war were prisoners drunk with power " the result of the Si! #ay $ar " and ignored one of the basic rules of combat intelligent, feminine guile. 0ommanders who preferred to act in accordance chaos syndrome, and slammed their heads against the wall, instead of seeking entrance gates to the enemy through the power of arrays tour.
+inally, the %om &ippur $ar the I#+ failed to use his patrol forces in the Torah. Seems that the commanders in this war were prisoners drunk with power " the result of the Si! #ay $ar " and ignored one of the basic rules of combat intelligent, feminine guile. 0ommanders who preferred to act in accordance chaos syndrome, and slammed their heads against the wall, instead of seeking entrance gates to the enemy through the power of arrays tour.