Facts: Isabelita Reodica was allegedly recklessly driving a van and hit Bonsol causing him physical injuries

and damage to property amounting to P 8,542.00. Three days after the accident a complaint was filed before the fiscals office against the petitioner. She was charged of "Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Slight Physical Injury." After pleading not guilty trial ensued. RTC of Makati rendered the decision convicting petitioner of "quasi offense of reckless imprudence, resulting in damage to property with slight physical injuries" witharresto mayor of 6 months imprisonment and a fine of P 13,542.00. Petitioner made an appeal before the CA which re-affirmed the lower courts decision. In its motion for reconsideration, petitioner now assails that 1. the court erred in giving its penalty on complex damage to property and slight physical injuries both being light offenses over which the RTC has no jurisdiction and it cant impose penalty in excess to what the law authorizes. 2. reversal of decision is still possible on ground of prescription or lack of jurisdiction. Issues: 1. Whether or not the penalty imposed is correct. 2. Whether or not reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property and reckless imprudence resultingto slight physical injuries are light felonies. 3. Whether or not there is a complex crime applying Article 48 of the RPC. 4. Whether or not the duplicity of the information may be questioned for the first time on appeal. 5. Whether or not the RTC of Makati has jurisdiction over the case. 6. Whether the quasi offenses already prescribed. Held: 1. On penalty imposed The proper penalty for reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical injury is public censure (being the penalty next lower in degree to arresto menor see the exception in the sixth paragraph of Article 365 applies). The proper penalty for reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property amounting to 8,542.00 would be arresto mayor in minimum and medium periods. 2. Classification of each felony involved Reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical injuries is a light felony. Public censure is classified under article 25 of RPC as a light penalty and it belongs on the graduated scale in Article 71 of the RPC as a penalty next lower to arresto menor.

Reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property is punishable by a correctional penalty of arresto mayor and thus belongs to less grave felony and not as a light felony as claimed by petitioner. 3. Rule on complex crime Art. 48 on penalty for complex crime provides that when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is necessary a means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. Both offenses cannot constitute a complex crime because reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical injuries is not either a grave or less grave felony. Therefore each felony should be filed as a separate complaint subject to distinct penalties. 4. Right to assail duplicity of information Rule 120, section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that when two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint and the accused fails to object against it before the trial, the court may convict the accuse to as many offenses as charged and impose a penalty for each of them. Complainant failed to make the objection before the trial therefore the right to object has been waived. 5. Jurisdiction Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the duration of the penalty and the fine imposed as prescribed by law to the offense charged. Reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical injuries and reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property is within the jurisdiction of the MTC. The case was dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction of the RTC of Makati and the decision of the CA was set aside. Court Ruling on Zaldivia v Reyes and Reodica v CA on Prescription: 1. Zaldivia v Reyes involves a violation of an ordinance while in Reodica v CA the violation was against the RPC. 2. Filing of a complaint in the fiscals office involving a felony under the RP C is sufficient to interrupt the running of prescription. But filing a complaint under the fiscals office involving offenses punished by a special law (i.e. ordinance) does not interrupt the running of prescription. Act 3326 is the governing law on prescriptions of crimes punishable by a special law which states that prescription is only interrupted upon judicial proceeding.

In Jayson Ivler Y Aguilar vs. Hon. Maria Rowena Modesto-San Pedro, the Supreme Court sufficiently explained that the doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded this Courts unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article 365 starting with People v. Diaz, [94 Phil. 715 (1954)] decided in 1954. There, a full Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Montemayor, ordered the dismissal of a case for "damage to property thru reckless imprudence" because a prior case against the same accused for "reckless driving," arising from the same act upon which the first prosecution was based, had been dismissed earlier. Since then, whenever the same legal question was brought before the Court, that is, whether prior conviction or acquittal of reckless imprudence bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of the consequences alleged for both charges, the Court unfailingly and consistently answered in the affirmative in People v. Belga[100 Phil. 996 (1957) (barring subsequent prosecutions for physical injuries thru reckless imprudence and damage to property thru reckless imprudence following an acquittal for "reckless imprudence with physical injury")] (promulgated in 1957 by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.), Yap v. Lutero[105 Phil. 1307 (1959) (Unrep.) (barring subsequent prosecution for "serious physical injuries" following an acquittal for "reckless driving")] (promulgated in 1959, unreported, per Concepcion, J.), People v. Narvas [107 Phil. 737 (1960) (barring subsequent prosecution for "damage to property thru reckless imprudence" following a conviction for "multiple slight and serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence.")] (promulgated in 1960 by the Court en banc, per

Bengzon J.), People v. Silva [No. L-15974, 30 January 1962, 4 SCRA 95 (barring subsequent prosecution for "homicide thru reckless imprudence" following an acquittal for "slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence").] (promulgated in 1962 by the Court en banc, per Paredes, J.), People v. Macabuhay [123 Phil. 48 (1966) (barring subsequent prosecution for "damage to property thru reckless imprudence" following an acquittal for two counts of "slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence.")] (promulgated in 1966 by the Court en banc, per Makalintal, J.), People v. Buan [131 Phil. 498 (1968) (barring subsequent prosecution for "serious physical injuries and damage to property thru reckless imprudence" following an acquittal for "slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence").] (promulgated in 1968 by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.B.L., acting C. J.), Buerano v. Court of Appeals [200 Phil. 486 (1982) (reversing a subsequent conviction for "damage to property thru reckless imprudence" following a conviction for "slight and serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence").] (promulgated in 1982 by the Court en banc, per Relova, J.), and People v. City Court of Manila [206 Phil. 555 (1983) (barring subsequent prosecution for "homicide thru reckless imprudence" following a conviction for "serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence").] (promulgated in 1983 by the First Division, per Relova, J.). These cases uniformly barred the second prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause.

The reason for this consistent stance of extending the constitutional protection under the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses was best articulated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Buan, where, in barring a subsequent prosecution for "serious physical injuries and damage to property thru reckless imprudence" because of the accuseds prior acquittal of "slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence," with both

charges grounded on the same act, the Court explained: [131 Phil. 498, 500 (1968).]

Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act.For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions. x x x (Emphasis supplied) x x x x x

Evidently, the Diaz line of jurisprudence on double jeopardy merely extended to its logical conclusion the reasoning of Quizon. x x x x Hence, the Supreme Court found merit in petitioners submission that the lower courts erred in refusing to extend in his favor the mantle of protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause. A more fitting jurisprudence could not be tailored to petitioners case than People v. Silva, No. L-15974, 30 January 1962, 4 SCRA 95, a Diaz progeny. There, the accused, who was also involved in a vehicular collision, was charged in two separate Informations with "Slight Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence" and "Homicide with Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence." Following his acquittal of the former, the accused sought the quashal of the latter, invoking the Double

Jeopardy Clause. The trial court initially denied relief, but, on reconsideration, found merit in the accuseds claim and dismissed the second case. x x x x Ergo, the Supreme Court granted the petition and DISMISSED the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 against petitioner Jason Ivler y Aguilar pending with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 on the ground of double jeopardy (JASON IVLER Y AGUILAR VS. HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, G.R. NO. 172716, NOVEMBER 17, 2010, CARPIO, J.).